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IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
Non- Proliferation and Safeguards
Safeguards Implementation
Concepts and Practices
Malik Derrough
Senior Inspector, Division of Operations B
World Nuclear University - Summer Institute 2012
Oxford, United Kingdom
30 July 2012
IAEA
Outline
1. A few basic principles
2. State reporting obligations
3. Agency in-field verification activities
4. Other sources of information
5. Evaluation of information and safeguards
conclusions
6. Key points
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1. A few basic principles
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Safeguards Agreements
• Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) (INFCIRC/153 (Corr.)) Concluded by NNWS in connection with the NPT and NWFZ
Treaties
• Item Specific (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2)
Concluded prior to the NPT or by non-NPT States
• Voluntary Offer Agreements (VOAs) Concluded by NPT NWS i.e. China, France, Russia, UK, US
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The Model Additional Protocol
• New legal instrument approved by Board of Governors in May 1997 (INFCIRC/540)
• Concluded by States on a voluntary basis; becomes part of a State’s safeguards agreement
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Nuclear Material
Nuclear material is anything that contains
in any physical or chemical form and in any quantities
(except ore)
Uranium (U) Plutonium (Pu) Thorium (Th)
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Nuclear Material
Radioactive sources are not nuclear material
(e.g. cobalt, cesium, polonium)
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Basic Concept
Plan safeguards activities
Conduct safeguards activities
Analyse all information
Other information
State declarations
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2. State Reporting Obligations
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Three Types of Information Supplied
Nuclear material
accountancy; facility
design information
Voluntary
reporting
Additional protocol
declarations
State-supplied
information
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States’ Obligations under a CSA
• Establish a State system of accounting for and
control of nuclear material (SSAC)
• Provide required reports and declarations to the
IAEA that are timely, accurate and complete
• Facilitate inspector access during in-field
activities
• Respond to questions in a timely manner
• Cooperate with the IAEA in the implementation
of safeguards
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Coverage under a CSA
Waste Storage
Waste Storage
CSA
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Provision of information under CSA
• Nuclear material accounting reports detailing
quantities, types and location of nuclear material
inventories
• Inventory changes
• Advance notifications of transfers of nuclear
material
• Facility design information
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Expanded coverage with an AP
CSA AP
Waste Storage
Waste Storage
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3. Agency In-Field Verification Activities
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Three Types of Verification Activities
Nuclear material
accountancy; facility
design information
Voluntary
reporting
Additional protocol
declarations
State-supplied
information
Inspection
Design information
verification (DIV)
Complementary
access
Verification
Activities
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Basic Concept
Trust but verify!
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Agency Inspectors
• Appointed by Director General
• Approved by Board of Governors
• Designated for the country
• Granted privileges and immunities
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Verification Type - Inspections
• To verify that the nuclear material declared and
placed under safeguards remains in peaceful
nuclear activities or is otherwise adequately
accounted for
• Frequency and intensity varies depending on type
of facility, type of nuclear material and other State
factors
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Inspection: example of activities
Records Examination
Identification
Measurements
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Inspection: Non-Destructive Assay
Inspectors counting and identifying
fresh fuel at a power reactor
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Inspection: NDA & DA Verification
Non-destructive assay measurements
Nuclear material samples
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Seals
Cameras/Video
Inspection: Containment & Surveillance
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Inspection: Containment & Surveillance
Surveillance cameras
being serviced Sealing of a transport cask
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Computerfor local
Data Acquisition
Camera(s)
Seal(s)
Sensor(s)
Ala
rm T
rigg
er
Site
Telephone
Satellite dish
Telephone
Satellite
or
ADSL
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Headquarters
or Field Office
Review Station
Sta
tus
& S
tate
-of-
Hea
lth
Inspection: Remote Monitoring Systems
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Remote Monitoring – Current Status
• Total 271 systems with remote
monitoring capabilities in 22
countries
• 156 surveillance systems (590
cameras)
• 115 radiation detection systems
• Approximately 3.5 GB/day.
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Environmental Sampling
Based on the premise that every nuclear process, no matter how leak tight, emits small amounts of process material to the environment
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10 m
1 m
Environmental Sampling
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Network of Analytical Laboratories
QinetiQ UK
ORNL USA
PNNL USA
LANL USA
LLNL USA
AFTAC USA
ANSTO Australia
LMA Russia
ITU EC
SAL IAEA
KRI Russia
CEA France
JAEA Japan
CNEN Brazil
NRI Řež Czech Rep.
STUK Finland
KAERI South Korea
AWE UK
• Implemented as a
safeguards
verification method
17 years ago
• Swipe sample
collections in more
than 75 countries
• Network of Analytical
Laboratories
(NWAL): 19
laboratories in 8
Member States, the
European
Commission and the
IAEA
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Verification Type: Design Information
Verification (DIV)
To ensure that appropriate safeguards
measures are applied
and
to detect potential misuse of a facility
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DIV During Construction
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DIV During Operation
Verification of piping
and cascade layout
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Complementary Access / Objectives
• To assure the absence of undeclared nuclear
material or activities
• To resolve questions or inconsistencies with
respect to States’ declarations
• To confirm the decommissioned status of
facilities and locations outside facilities
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Verification Type: Complementary
Access
Additional Protocol provides broader access to:
• All places in nuclear installations or on sites
• All other places where nuclear material is located
• Decommissioned facilities
• Certain locations where nuclear-related activities are
conducted
• Other locations, under certain circumstances
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4. Other Sources of Information
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Nuclear material
accountancy; facility
design information
Voluntary
reporting
Additional protocol
declarations
State-supplied
information
Inspection
Design information
verification (DIV)
Complementary
access
Verification
activities
Other Information
Open and
other sources
Other
information
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Open and Other Sources of Information
• IAEA information
• Satellite imagery
• Scientific and technical literature
• Academic and research institutions
• Trade publications
• Newspapers/radio/television/magazine reports
• Third-party information
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Commercial Satellite Imagery
• In-house satellite imagery
laboratory established
• High-resolution
commercial imagery
acquired from over 15
imagery providers in
11 States
• In past year over 700
images purchased and
analysed
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Trade Information
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5. Evaluation of Information
and Safeguards Conclusions
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Evaluation of Information for each
“State as a whole”
Nuclear material
accountancy; facility
design information
Voluntary
reporting
Additional protocol
declarations
State-supplied
information
Inspection
Design information
verification (DIV)
Complementary
access
Results
of verification
activities
Open and
other sources
Other
information
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State Evaluation
• Provides picture of a State’s
nuclear and nuclear-related
activities
• Involves comparison and
assessment of all
information available
• Identifies issues requiring
follow up
• Information continuously
evaluated
• Forms basis for SG
conclusions
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Consistency Analysis
• Internal consistency of the information provided by a State
• e.g. bidding procedure vs future plans
• Consistency of the information provided by a State with information resulting from Agency verification activities
• e.g. declared enrichment level vs ES results
• Consistency of the information provided by a State with other information
• e.g. declared activities vs published report
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Consistency Analysis – Scientific Literature
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The Analytical Process
1. DEFINE BORDERS/BOUNDARIES/PERIMETERS (SEPARATES WHEAT FROM CHAFF – KNOWN FROM UNKNOWN)
BASIC METHODOLOGY
2. SELECT OR CLASSIFY FUNCTIONAL AREAS (CHARACTERISTICS OF LAYOUT OR FEATURES OR GENERAL FUNCTION)
3. IDENTIFY RECOGNISED FACILITIES (SHAPE - SIZE - SHADOW - TONE - ASSOCIATED FEATURES)
(DATE OF INFORMATION MAY BE CRITICAL RELATIVE TO IMAGERY ACQUISITION DATE)
4. USE COLLATERAL TO CONFIRM OR REFUTE ANALYSIS
AREA 1
STEAM CONDUIT
UNL STOCK TANKS OFF-GAS SCRUBBING
FOUNDRY
DISSOLUTION
FILTRATION
SOLVENT EXTRACTION
CONCENTRATION
DENITRATION UO3
HYDRATION UO3
REDUCTION UO2
U-MET PRODUCTION
FLUORINE PRODUCTION
UF6 PRODUCTION
HYDROFLUORINATION UF4
FORCED-DRAFT COOLING
EVAPORATION BASIN
FUEL FAB
HYDROGEN STORAGE
NITRIC ACID STORAGE
HEAT/STEAM PLANT
Consistency Analysis – Satellite Imagery
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Consistency Analysis – Thermal Imagery
Landsat Thermal Imagery
Light tone = warmer temp
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Consistency Analysis - Network Link
• Trading company in State
1 seeking specific
nuclear-related
technology outside its
main business area
• Suspected end-user
entity in State 2
• Links to watch-listed
entity in State 2
Any additional data could
reveal bigger picture
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Acquisition Path Analysis
Operational Possible R&D
Under Safeguards
Not confirmed
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Safeguards Conclusions
• Annual statement made by the Agency for every State with a safeguards agreement regarding the State’s compliance with its safeguards obligations
• Based on evaluation of all information available to the Agency on States’ nuclear activities
• Reported annually in the Agency’s Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR)
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Safeguards Conclusions
• … the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful activities …
For States with comprehensive safeguards
agreements and additional protocols:
• … all nuclear material remained
in peaceful activities …
For States with safeguards agreements:
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6. Key Points
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• Agreements: three types of safeguards agreements
(CSA, INFCIRC/66, VOA) with or without an additional protocol
• Reporting and verification activities: depend on
the agreement and if AP in force. Activities include
inspections, DIV, CA (if AP in force) with tools such as
NDA, DA, ES taking, containment and surveillance
measures, remote monitoring
• SSAC: Cooperation from States is important to ensure
effective and efficient implementation
Key Points – Agreements and Activities
IAEA
• Multiple sources of information: State declared,
from Agency verification activities, open and other sources
• Evaluation: comparison & assessment of all information,
consistency analysis. Regularly reported and form basis for
conclusions.
• Tools for evaluation: include satellite imagery analysis,
acquisition pathway analysis, trade analysis and others.
• Conclusions: nuclear material and items placed under
safeguards / all nuclear material remain in peaceful activities
Key Points – Evaluation of information
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The way we implement the safeguards system
continues to evolve to anticipate and respond
to new challenges
Concluding Remark