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New perspectives on language,cognition, and valuesThomas Wiben Jensena

a Department of Language and Communication, University ofSouthern DenmarkPublished online: 12 Dec 2013.

To cite this article: Thomas Wiben Jensen (2014) New perspectives on language, cognition, andvalues, Journal of Multicultural Discourses, 9:1, 71-78, DOI: 10.1080/17447143.2013.861841

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17447143.2013.861841

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REVIEW ARTICLE

New perspectives on language, cognition, and values

Thomas Wiben Jensen*

Department of Language and Communication, University of Southern Denmark

(Received 10 September 2013; accepted 30 October 2013)

Distributed language, edited by Stephen J. Cowley, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, John Benjamins Publish-

ing, 2011, ix + 220 pp., US$ 128.00 (hardback), ISBN 978-90-272-0253-6

The morality of knowledge in conversation, edited by Tanya Stivers, Lorenza Mondada and Jakob

Steensig, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, ix + 335 pp., US$ 119.00 (hardback), ISBN

978-0-521-19454-9

Being innovative is the imperative of our time. It is virtually impossible not to encounterthe word innovation several times a day if you follow the media and public debate or, forthat matter, go through the official descriptions of the aims of present-day universities.This all-pervading use of ‘innovation’ reflects at the same time the decline of theindustrial powers, the disasters created by the international financial market, not tomention the pervading threat of global climate crisis, all crying out for a completely newway of thinking and producing. We are in desperate need of new ideas, new ways ofdoing things, and a re-thinking of our whole way of organizing and structuring oureconomy, society, science, as well as our personal lives. This fundamental shift in focusaway from old, conventional and worn-out ideas can, on the one hand, be seen as a muchwelcomed and positive side effect of the severe environmental and financial situation. Asthe idiom says, necessity is the mother of invention. And this is indeed a time ofnecessity.

On the other hand however, this new, insistent and much talked-about focus on ourso-called innovative potential can also be seen as a further sign of a deep intellectualcrisis: a crisis of new ideas. Sometimes one wonders whether this overwhelming need totalk and elaborate on terms like innovation and creativity in reality points to a profoundlack of inventive ideas. Because what is actually meant by innovation and are we capableof grasping a truly profound innovation? In fact innovation is rare and troublesome. Itdoes not just concern the development of new products or even new ways of producing ororganizing our consumption of products. Real – or deep – innovation is about re-defining,re-thinking, and re-developing ways of looking at ourselves, our environment andsurroundings, and the interactions constituting their fundamental relations. In otherwords, innovation is about transforming the core concepts that we are accustomed to

*Email: twj@sdu.dk

Journal of Multicultural Discourses, 2014Vol. 9, No. 1, 71–78, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17447143.2013.861841

© 2013 Taylor & Francis

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employing in our usual investigation of the world. Deep innovation is conceptualinnovation.

Out of the box cognition

The outset for the anthology, Distributed Language edited by Stephen J. Cowley, isexactly such a revitalization of one of the most influential scientific concepts of the last50 years – the concept of cognition – within cognitive science. The diverse field ofcognitive science, with its multitude of theoretical assumptions, seems to exist in a stateof constant change. It has developed and renewed itself numerous times through ongoingstruggles between different generations and opposing approaches to mind, body, culture,and thinking. The outcome has been a steadfast conceptual innovation closely intertwinedwith technical and societal change. First-generation cognitive science developed the ideaof thinking as primarily a question of processing information that allowed us to see themind as computational and hence machines as a sort of thinking devices carving the wayfor the modern computer. The second generation advanced the idea of thinking asfundamentally embodied. This perspective allowed a re-framing of the relationshipbetween cognition, body, and feeling as closely intertwined – a mindset that has nowbecome mainstream in most of modern society. And now – as the latest innovative move– a third generation is appearing viewing cognition as not just embodied but distributed,embedded, extended, enacted, and situated as well. Cognition is no longer reserved to theindividual mind – as has been the tradition in Western thinking for Millennia – but is nowtranscending the boundaries of the skull. Thus, cognition is seen as fundamentallydistributed between minds, bodies, objects, technical systems, artifacts, and socialdynamics that together constitute a complex network – a network that in itself can beseen as possessing emergent cognitive features. Interestingly, the distributed view oncognition and language seems very analogous to the way IT-driven social networks, as wespeak, are changing our basic ways of thinking and interacting with each other. Theaffordances of the rapidly evolving new social technology not only highlight but alsoexploit and encourage perceiving, acting, thinking, and communicating as fundamentallyshared activities. And this is a development that challenges the traditional divisionbetween the individual and the collective. Cognition and thinking have now moved ‘outof the box’ literally as well as figuratively speaking.

Language in a distributed perspective

In investigating and relating these latest tendencies in cognitive science to the study oflanguage Distributed Language offers a stimulating and thought-provoking example ofthe ability of cognitive science to renew itself. This is a book filled with challenging newideas on the relationship between language, mind, environment, and human actionpointing to new undertakings for cognitive language studies. It contains contributions onmany different subjects ranging from studies in reading and writing, experiments on howwe perceive everyday objects in unfamiliar circumstances, and studies on the historicalperformances of Shakespeare’s plays viewed as distributed activity. The prevailing focus,however, is on a radically new perspective for explaining verbal language and bodilyaction. Whereas first-generation cognitive science studied language as a code drivensystem, and the second generation pursued the idea that the primary object of study ishow linguistic patterns work as embodied representations inside individual minds, the

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distributed approach sees language as embodied activity arising in socially and culturallydefined situations. As Cowley states in the opening chapter:

Whereas disembodied views place language in either the mind or in society, the distributedperspective treats language as part of the ecology. It arises as social events link bodies withthe physical environment and cultural traditions. Language is therefore neither localizedwithin a person (or a body) nor a property of the environment. (…) As we engage withlanguage, we dream, think, talk and use texts, telephones, computers and so on. Inrecognizing this diversity, the study of language becomes ecological. (Cowley: 4)

First of all, this distributed view on language is opposed to the cognitive tradition oftreating language as a property of the individual human mind grounded in embodiedconceptual structures (as in Cognitive Linguistics), and communicated by a sender(speaker) to a receiver (listener) via linguistic encodings in an oral or textual ‘channel’(as in Communication Studies). Second, the distributed view also rejects the idea oflanguage as solely a social phenomenon rooted in either societal formations (as inSociolinguistics) or in the sequentially organized microstructures of social interaction (asin Conversation Analysis). Instead, the distinction or dualism between the biological andsocial sphere is challenged by a new take on the nature of language.

The term languaging (borrowed from the early work of Humberto Maturana) ispromoted as an attempt to capture the activity bound character of language as its primordialfeature. In this sense language, or languaging, is first and foremost viewed as a whole-bodysense making involving a complex coordination of multiple activities. The notion oflanguaging emphasizes the dynamics of real-time behavioral events that are co-constructedby co-acting agents as the primary feature of language. That is, the languaging dynamicsprecede – or rather are the precondition of – any instantiation of a language system, like agrammar. In that sense, the common assumption that a person uses a language – as isinherent in the notion of ‘language use’ in most linguistic theories – is rejected or ratherreversed. It is dynamics first and symbols afterwards (p. 11) – as one new sloganformulates. Languaging is seen as a way of aligning behavior through bodily coordinationin which we deploy our senses and sense-making skills in performing a variety of actions.On a theoretical level, the notion represents a stride toward coming to grips with the deeplyintertwined material, embodied, affect-based as well as dialogically coordinated andsocially enacted aspects of language in a naturalistic framework. Or put in another way,language is now conceptualized as an instance of culturally distributed, socially embeddedand embodied cognition, and in that sense language, action, and perception are seen asinseparable. For that reason languaging – language as an activity – is promoted as first-order language, whereas what is usually referred to as language within linguistics –language as a symbolic and rule-governed system – is termed as second-order language.This has important theoretical and methodological implications, as stated by JoannaRaczaszek-Leonardi:

It is thus mistaken to focus exclusively on either individual or collective processes. Indeed,the theoretical challenge lies in showing how these can be connected. By recognizing thatsymbols function to constrain dynamics, we can begin to ask how it is that individualdynamics gains from being embedded in (shaping and being shaped by) the dynamics thattake place in higher level interpersonal scales. (Raczaszek-Leonardi: 178–179)

Distributed language (DL) thus appears as a highly promising approach which, ifsupported by further empirical investigations, has the potential of offering a much-needed

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advance in the study of language by grounding it in bodily coexperience while at thesame time being sensitive to overreaching cultural and social constraints on language.

Language and values

The idea of languaging as fundamentally situated characterizes the distributed view onlanguage as ecological. It is ecological in the sense that this new take on language, action,and cognition entails a focus on the dialogical relations between living biologicalorganisms and their physical and social surroundings including objects, technicalequipment, cultural artifacts, environmental structures – and above all other people andthe dynamics of social relations. An interesting example of the potentials of an ecologicaltake on language and human action is to be found in Bert Hodges’ chapter ‘Ecologicalpragmatics’ in which human dialog is interpreted in terms of value realization. Inspiredby James Gibson’s (1904–1979) work on affordances within his theory of directperception, the notion of values gains a whole new meaning in Hodges’ treatment. Thestandard view (at least within continental philosophy since Nietzsche) apprehends valuesas properties that are reached over time in and through social processes and culturaltraditions. On this view there is nothing intrinsic about values, which are essentially amatter of social consensus, what a given community decides to treat as valuable or notvaluable. In contrast to this (somewhat relativistic) view, Hodges claims that:

…all actions, whether driving or conversing with a colleague, are constrained andlegitimated by multiple values. Values are the real goods that actions must realize sufficientlyfor an ecosystem to exist; thus values are obligatory demands that define what constitutesgood driving or a good conversation. (Hodges: 138)

Within this ecological framework, values are conceived as the fundamental conditionsthat allow, enable, and restrain the directedness of actions within our physical as well associal environment. This places values in a heterarchy rather than a hierarchy that ‘initself’ determines right and wrong. Like the notion of languaging, this highlyunconventional, while also truly original, approach that attempts to tie together themotivation for simple mundane actions, like reaching out for another cup of coffee, tomore large-scale value judgments of making the right decision when being placed in amoral dilemma. The basic claim is that the act of defining and recognizing actions,cognitions, and emotions is to make a value judgment in itself. For instance, when wecarry something – a sleeping child from the couch to its bed, a dirty plate to the kitchen,or the garbage can onto the sidewalk – we perceive what and where something is, pick itup, hold it, and move it to where we think it ought to be (example taken from workshopslides with Hodges). In other words, acting in our environment is a matter of perceivingthe surrounding affordances in order to realize values. Another example is the humanactivity of driving that can be captured as an ecosystem defined by a reciprocity of valuessuch as safety, accuracy (e.g. direction), and efficiency (e.g. speed). Following from this,Hodges introduces a perspective on conversing as a perceptual and caring system inwhich we constantly orient, integrate, and try to find our way in order to inviteresponsible action:

Conversing, like driving, is an ecosystem defined by values. Among the values that define itare clarity, coherence, comprehensiveness, and complexity. Both in our speaking and ourhearing we work to make utterances differentiated, integrated, flexible, and rich enough(first-order language) to be labeled as articulate, grammatical, meaningful, and useful(second-order language). (Hodges: 140)

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These value function as boundary constraints on our languaging behavior each time weengage in dialog with others. In this way, this approach combines a pragmatic perspectivewith a more ecological-systemic perspective in which language is conceived as anongoing agency that activates environmental potentials in realizing affordances.

Conversations and morality of knowledge

Such an attempt to relate questions of values and morality to social interaction is far fromcommon in mainstream research. However, it is worth noticing that a somewhat similarundertaking is present within a recent volume, The Morality of Knowledge inConversation, edited by Tanya Stivers, Lorenza Mondada, and Jakob Steensig, in whichthe field of Conversation Analysis (CA) is applied to epistemic moral dimensions ofhuman dialog. The basic claim of this book is that each time we say something in aconversation we also indicate what we know and what we think the other participantsknow or do not know. In that sense we treat knowledge, or rather who has the right todisplay possession of knowledge at what point in a conversation, as moral:

In social interaction conversationalists attend not only to who knows what, but also to whohas a right to know what, who knows more about what, and who is responsible for knowingwhat. We have observed that speakers monitor themselves as well as others with respect tothese issues. (…) Insofar as interactants hold each other accountable for the rights andresponsibilities associated with epistemic access, primacy and responsibility, knowledge is amoral domain with important implications for managing social relationships. (Stivers,Mondada, and Steensig: 18–19)

The different ways in which we display cooperation in conversations by, for instance,aligning or by affiliating are here related to a new moral dimension in the conversationalanalytic analysis of talk-in-interaction. It is a morality of knowledge in conversation inthe sense that how we display knowledge and epistemic access to certain bits ofknowledge is a way of monitoring the moral order on a micro-level, as are the variousways in which we position ourselves by indicating different levels of, for instance,agreement, cooperation, perspective sharing, willingness to give or receive help, etc.

An ontology of dialog vs. membership concerns

At a first glance, there seems to be a similar intention of relating questions of morality tothe micro-level of human action inherent in both volumes. This undertaking is central toHodges and in a similar vein, on the opening pages of The Morality of Knowledge theeditors argue that micro-level moral calibrations ‘can be understood as cut from the samecloth as other forms of moral reasoning’ (Stivers, Mondada, and Steensig: 3).

However, at closer scrutiny the two approaches are in fact highly different. As it isoften the case, the devil lies in the details: CA (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974;Hutchby and Wooffit 2008) is a micro-sociological method and highly empirical practice(they are reluctant to call their work a theory). Thus, conversation analysts are interestedin the ways in which people accomplish various social activities, goals, and tasks on aturn-by-turn basis in the ongoing interaction. The basic assumption is that each new turnbuilds on aspects of prior talk, and through the production of a new turn, speakers exhibittheir understanding of the state of talk. This means that the analytical method is limited tomicro-sociological descriptions of how people act and how they orient to otherparticipants in the social interaction. In other words, the conversation analytic interestin questions of morality is based on a membership perspective on a purely descriptive and

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local level. Morality is treated as local, situational and not as situation transcendent,distributed, and thus ecological. It is an interest in the social machinery that is displayedin talk-in-interaction, i.e. it never transgresses the face-to-face domain of social actorstreating knowledge as a morally accountable matter. Thus the interest is not to set up anormative account on conversations as such, or for that matter to define conversations interms of values, which has the consequence that morality in a CA framework is in factonly a matter of social consensus (morality is what we choose to treat as moral) as in theNietzschian tradition.

Contrary to this, Hodges’ values-realizing theory seeks to outline a general ontologyof human dialog as ongoing values-realizing activity. His interest is in coming to gripswith the global constraints on human dialog, viewed as an ecosystem. The assumption isthat such constraints provide not only the initial conditions for the system, but alsounderwrite the system dynamics. And here it is important to bear in mind that the notionof ‘constraints’ entails both the conditions that enable as well as restrain, that encourageas well as discourage. In that sense values are seen as the precondition for the activity ofdialog. The ambition is to carve out the fundamental conditions that any humaninteraction must meet in order to be defined as a dialogical activity. This framework thusadds a new ecological ontology based on the axiomatic view that interaction is basically avalues-realizing activity. Hence values are not like normative rules, neither like law-basedconditions but relational dynamics between humans and their habitats.

The question of data

It is in many ways interesting, but perhaps also a bit unfair, to compare CA with theapproach in DL. CA is by now a well-established discipline with a coherent, thoroughand explicit methodology, whereas DL is in many ways still in its making. Therefore, itought to come as no surprise that DL is currently a very heterogeneous endeavor withoutany clear methodology or general consensus on the object of study.

However, such a new orientation toward dialog, behavior, and interactivity ought toembrace a more social and empirical grounding in real-life data, as can be found in TheMorality of Knowledge. The empirical commitment is clearly stated in the openingchapter: ‘The chapters rely entirely on video and audio tapes of spontaneous naturallyoccurring conversation from a variety of settings and languages’ (Stivers, Mondada, andSteensig: 23). On this point DL leaves a lot to be desired. Granted, the volume containsvarious empirical chapters with different experimental data on, for instance, the dynamicsof reading (Järvilehto, Nurkkala, and Koskela), the depiction of everyday static objects(Tylén, Bjørnedahl, and Weed), or a new take on ‘the cheap necklace problem’(Fioratouand Cowley). Still, all of the empirical data are solely of an experimental nature comingfrom linguistic or behavioral tests; not one single example of real life or ethnographicdata, away from the experimental setting, is presented. Now, one can of course argue thatexperimental data are part of an empirical basis too. But the problem is that thedistributed view on language makes a profound social claim about language as rooted ‘inneither bodies nor society but the play of dialogue’ (Cowley: 5). By dialog, one expectsnaturally occurring dialog or social interaction taking place in a real-life situation; notbehavioral tests or some sort of staged dialog in an experimental setting.

Recalling the tradition of ethnographic observations and analyses in, for instance,Edwin Hutchins’s (1995) seminal work, Cognition in the Wild, seems very odd indeedthat none of the chapters are based on more ethnographic type of data. Furthermore, for abook promoting language as perceptual behavior and dialogical in nature, it is deeply

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problematic and unsatisfactory that no analyses of actual dialog or behavior in anaturalistic setting are to be found anywhere in the volume. Reading through the bookone wonders whether this latest move in cognitive language studies is actually ready totake the empirical consequences of their new social orientation and ‘dig into’ thecomplexities of real life; or whether they will, after all, rather ‘stay in the lab.’ Still, in allfairness it must be mentioned that recently a number of empirical-based analyses haveappeared (Steffensen, Thibault, and Cowley 2010; Pedersen 2010, 2012; Thibault 2011,Steffensen 2012, 2013; Jensen and Cuffari forthcoming). And of course, it must be takeninto consideration that this is still a brand new and quite heterogeneous endeavor that hasyet to manifest itself as an established field of study with a coherent methodology and acomprehensive empirical basis. Nevertheless, the distributed view entails a ‘socialpromise’ that is yet to be fulfilled.

The end of the cognitive isolation

The German sociologist Werner Vogd (2010) has recently remarked that the presentacademic landscape is changing due to a naturalization of the humanities and the socialsciences combined with a corresponding sociologization of the natural sciences. Judgingfrom Distributed Language, Vogd has spotted a clear tendency of projects innaturalization and sociologization to thrive alongside each other. This double movementseems to encompass obvious advantages. First of all, it seems advantageous andbeneficial to finally take the consequences of the new views on cognition present inthe upcoming third generation and integrate them with the study of language. This moveallows a replacement of the dominating view in Cognitive Linguistics that the essence oflanguage can be captured by studying ‘conceptual structures and cognitive processesgoverning linguistic representation and behavior’ (Croft and Cruse 2004). Even thoughCognitive Linguistics often proclaimed the importance of language use and a concern forcontextual factors, these facets of language remained to a large extent empiricallyunexplored and methodologically disintegrated within the larger cognitive framework.

The perspective of Distributed Language potentially marks an end to this ‘cognitiveisolation’ of language and points to new ways of investigating language as culturally andsocially embedded in the environment, while developing and fine tuning the attachmentto cognition and ecology. But even more so, as a consequence of this relational move, theontology of language is re-thought in interesting ways. In insisting that one should notseparate language either from its immediate physical environment or its extendedenvironment of social and historical anchoring, a new ontology of nonlocality isadvanced (see Steffensen’s chapter ‘Beyond mind’). Instead of investigating languageon the basis of some inner nature or cognitive essence, the distributed view investigateslanguage as embedded in social reality and as a multi-centric activity constituted byinterrelatedness, interdependence, and interactivity. This seems like a vital and potentiallyproductive sociologization of a cognitive view on language within an ecological anddialogical framework.

Indeed, what Distributed Language offers is a fundamental re-thinking of these age-old concepts; a re-framing and conceptual innovation that at times can be hard to graspsince it involves re-thinking and re-phrasing well-known phenomena in order for them tobe examined in a new light. It can be seen as the first step of a challenging but inventiveattempt to re-invent our understanding of language, cognition, and human action thatholds many promises for the future of cognitive language studies. In that sense, thisvolume is an example of real innovation.

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AcknowledgmentI would like to thank Elena Clare Cuffari and Sarah Bro Petersen for many helpful comments on anearlier version of the essay.

ReferencesCroft, W., and D.A. Cruse. 2004. Cognitive linguistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Hutchby, I., and R. Wooffit. 2008. Conversation analysis. Second edition. Cambridge: Polity Press.Hutchins, E. 1995. Cognition in the wild. Boston, MA: MIT Press.Jensen, T.W., and E.C. Cuffari. Forthcoming. Doubleness in experience: A distributed enactiveapproach to metaphor in real life data. Metaphor & Symbol.

Pedersen, S.B. 2010. Towards a dialogical health care practices: Human errors as a result of culturalaffordances. In Signifying bodies. Biosemiosis, interaction and health, ed. S.J. Cowley, C. Major,S.V. Steffensen, and A. Dinis, 245–276. Braga: Catholic University of Portugal.

Pedersen, S.B. 2012. Interactivity in health care. Bodies, values and dynamics. Language Sciences34, no.5: 532–542.

Sacks, H., E.A. Schegloff, and G. Jefferson. 1974. A simplest systematics for the organization ofturn-taking for conversation. Language 50, no.4: 696–735. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/412243

Steffensen, S.V. 2012. Care and conversing in dialogical systems. Language Sciences 34, no.5:513–531.

Steffensen, S.V. 2013. Human interactivity: Problem-solving, solution-probing, and verbal patternsin the wild. In Cognition beyond the brain: Computation, interactivity and human artifice, ed.S. Cowley and F. Vallée-Tourangeau, 195–222. Dordrecht: Springer.

Steffensen, S.V., P.J. Thibault, and S.J. Cowley. 2010. Living in the social meshwork: The case ofhealth interaction. In Signifying bodies. Biosemiosis, interaction and health, ed. S.J. Cowley,C. Major, S.V. Steffensen, and A. Dinis, 207–244. Braga: Catholic University of Portugal.

Thibault, P.J. 2011. First-order languaging dynamics and second-order language: The distributedlanguage view. Ecological Psychology 23, no.3: 210–245.

Vogd, W. 2010. Gehirn und Gesellschaft [The Brain and Society]. Weilerswist: VelbrückWissenschaft.

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