‘Naturalism’ and ‘Skepticism’ in Hume's Treatise of Human Nature

© 2008 The AuthorJournal Compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Philosophy Compass 3/4 (2008): 721–733, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00143.x

‘Naturalism’ and ‘Skepticism’ in Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature

Sean Greenberg*University of California, Irvine

AbstractHume begins the Treatise of Human Nature by announcing the goal of developinga science of man; by the end of Book 1 of the Treatise, the science of man seemsto founder in doubt. Underlying the tension between Hume’s constructive ambition– his ‘naturalism’ – and his doubts about that ambition – his ‘skepticism’ – is thequestion of whether Hume is justified in continuing his philosophical project.In this paper, I explain how this question emerges in the final section of Book 1of the Treatise, the ‘Conclusion of this Book’, then examine Janet Broughton’sand Don Garrett’s answers to it, and conclude by sketching a different approachto this question.

There seems to be a tension in David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature.In the Introduction, Hume proposes to develop a ‘science of man’ (TIntro.4; SBN xv), that will illuminate ‘the extent and force of theunderstanding . . . the nature of the ideas we employ . . . and . . . theoperations we perform in our reasonings’ (T Intro.4; SBN xv), and serveas the ‘solid foundation for the other sciences’ (T Intro.7; SBN xvi).1

Hume seems to prosecute the science of man successfully in parts 1 to 3of Book 1 of the Treatise, but each successive section of part 4 seemsfurther to narrow the extent of the understanding, thereby threatening tosap the very foundations of the science of man itself, as Hume seems torecognize in the ‘Conclusion of this Book’.

Methinks I am like a man, who, having struck on many shoals, and havingnarrowly escap’d ship-wreck in passing a small frith, has yet the temerity to putout to sea in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel, and even carries his ambitionso far as to think of compassing the globe under these disadvantageous circum-stances. My memory of past errors and perplexities, makes me diffident for thefuture. The wretched condition, weakness, and disorder of the faculties, I mustemploy in my enquiries, encrease my apprehensions. And the impossibility ofamending or correcting these faculties, reduces me almost to despair, and makesme resolve to perish on the barren rock, on which I am at present, rather thanventure myself upon that boundless ocean, which runs out into immensity. Thissudden view of my danger strikes me with melancholy. (T 1.4.7.1; SBN 264)

722 ‘Naturalism’ and ‘Skepticism’ in Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature

© 2008 The Author Philosophy Compass 3/4 (2008): 721–733, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00143.xJournal Compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

A deep and thorough-going ‘skepticism’ – Hume even calls it ‘total skepticism’(T 1.4.7.7; SBN 268) – seems to emerge in the course of the ‘Conclusionof this Book’. This ‘skepticism’ seems to call into question the results ofthe preceding sections of the Treatise and thus to threaten the ambitiousproject of the Treatise, since Book 1 is meant to set the foundation of thatproject.

The question naturally arises whether Hume is justified in continuinghis philosophical project – as he of course does in the remainder of theTreatise – and if so, on what grounds. The deep philosophical issue hereis whether Hume has any philosophical justification for his continuedreliance on the understanding. This issue, which I, following DavidOwen, will henceforth refer to as the ‘question of warrant’ (211), underliesdiscussions of Hume’s ‘naturalism’ and his ‘skepticism’.2

In what follows, I first explain how the question of warrant arises inthe final section of Book 1 of the Treatise, the ‘Conclusion of this Book’,then I examine Janet Broughton’s and Don Garrett’s approaches to thisquestion, and I conclude by sketching an alternative answer to it.

1. The Question of Warrant in the ‘Conclusion of this Book’

There is widespread agreement among commentators that the questionof warrant emerges explicitly only in the final section of Book 1 of theTreatise, the ‘Conclusion of this Book’.3,4 The question of warrant actuallyemerges in the course of Hume’s review of (certain of ) the results of thepreceding parts of Book 1, which lies at the heart of the ‘Conclusion ofthis Book’ (T 1.4.1.3–7; SBN 265–8). I focus here only on the first andlast sections of this review, which bring the question of warrant mostsharply into focus.5

Hume commences the review by considering his account of causalreasoning, according to which causal inferences are determined, not byreason, but rather by custom or habit. According to this account, of whichHume was quite proud – he remarks that ‘this act of the mind has neveryet been explain’d by any philosopher’ (T 1.3.7 fn.20; SBN 97) – thebeliefs arrived at through causal reasoning depend on vivacity, the ‘quality,by which the mind enlivens ideas beyond others’ (T 1.4.7.3; SBN 265).

Since vivacity is essential to the human capacity to form beliefs aboutobjects not present to the senses, it is supposed to account both for causalreasoning and the belief in the continued existence of external objects.Yet in ‘Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses’ (T 1.4.2; SBN 187–217),it was shown that causal reasoning seems to undermine the belief in thecontinued existence of external objects.

But tho’ these two operations be equally natural and necessary to the humanmind, yet in some circumstances they are directly contrary. . . . How thenshall we adjust those principles together? Which of them shall we prefer? (T1.4.7.4; SBN 266)


‘Naturalism’ and ‘Skepticism’ in Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature 723

In this passage, Hume explicitly raises the question of warrant for the firsttime in the Treatise. Although both causal reasoning and the belief in thecontinued existence of external objects are ‘natural and necessary’, yet ‘insome circumstances’ they lead to contradiction. But in what circumstances?Is there any way to avoid the contradiction? What basis is there forpreferring one principle to the other?

Hume returns to the question of the basis for preferring one cognitiveprinciple to another when he reviews his account of causation, or necessaryconnection. He begins by admitting that the nature of necessary connection– namely, as a quality of the mind, not of objects – ‘is not, indeed,perceiv’d in common life’ (T 1.4.7.6; SBN 267). The reason that this isnot ‘perceiv’d’, according to Hume, ‘proceeds merely from an illusion ofthe imagination, and the question is, how far we ought to yield to theseillusions’ (T 1.4.7.5; SBN 267). After raising this question, another versionof the question of warrant, Hume generalizes the question of warrant inthe form of ‘a dangerous dilemma’ (T 1.4.7.6; SBN 267).

For if we assent to every trivial suggestion of the fancy; beside that thesesuggestions are often contrary to each other; they lead us into such errors,absurdities, and obscurities, that we must at last become asham’d of our credulity.Nothing is more dangerous than flights of the imagination. . . . But on theother hand, if the consideration of these instances makes us take a resolutionto reject all the trivial suggestions of the fancy, and adhere to the understanding,that is, to the general and more establish’d properties of the imagination; eventhis resolution, if steadily executed, wou’d be dangerous, and attended with themost fatal consequences. For I have already shown that the understanding,when it acts alone, and according to its most general principles, entirely subvertsitself. . . . We save ourselves from this total skepticism only by means of thatsingular and seemingly trivial property of the fancy, by which we enter withdifficulty into remote views of things. . . . Shall we, then, establish it for a generalmaxim, that no refin’d or elaborate reasoning is every to be receiv’d? . . . By thismeans, you cut off entirely all science and philosophy . . . And you expresslycontradict yourself; since this maxim must be built on the preceding reasoning.(T 1.4.7.6–7; SBN 267–8)

On the one hand, if one assents to ‘every trivial suggestion of the fancy’,one is led ‘into . . . errors, absurdities, and obscurities’; on the other hand,if one accepts no ‘suggestion of the fancy’, that is, if one adheres to the‘understanding alone’, the understanding subverts itself. One mightrespond to the fact that the understanding, when operating alone, subvertsitself, by rejecting all ‘refin’d or elaborate reasoning’. But, as David Owennotes, this leads to ‘another dilemma, closely related to that with whichwe started’ (202). If all reasoning is rejected, then one falls into absurdity;if one follows only the understanding, one falls into contradiction.

‘What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties?’ Hume asks.

If we embrace this principle, and condemn all refin’d reasoning, we run intothe most manifest absurdities. If we reject it in favour of these reasonings, we



subvert entirely the human understanding. We have, therefore, no choice leftbut betwixt a false reason and none at all. (T 1.4.7.7; SBN 268)

Annette Baier gives a nice gloss of the preceding passage: ‘If we fall intoincoherence when we use the imagination’s usual products in an unre-strained way, perhaps the proper policy is to . . . try to separate the reliableworkings of the imagination from its troublesome workings. But how arewe to draw the line? Which workings are productive of illusion andcontradiction, and which are free of those defects?’ (8). Although Humeseems to imply that no line can be drawn – ‘we have . . . no choice leftbut betwixt a false reason and none at all’ – the question remains whetherthis is correct, or whether some line can be drawn, on the basis of theresources of the Treatise. (This is, of course, another way of posing thequestion of warrant.)

2. The Question of Warrant: Two Interpretations

Commentators who disagree about how to understand Hume’s answer tothe question of warrant nevertheless agree that getting clear about hisanswer to that question is one of the most important problems in Humescholarship.6

Work on this topic continues to reflect the influence of Norman KempSmith’s seminal book, The Philosophy of David Hume, originally publishedin 1941. In that book, Kemp Smith challenged the interpretation ofHume as a ‘skeptic’, which had remained entrenched since it was advocatedby readers such as Thomas Reid (Reid 21). Kemp Smith attended toHume’s ‘naturalism’ far more carefully than previous readers and soughtto reopen the question of the relation between Hume’s ‘naturalism’and his ‘skepticism’. ‘How’, Kemp Smith asked, ‘does this naturalisticteaching . . . stand related to the more skeptical attitude which Humedefines and eulogizes in the closing sections of Book I of the Treatise?’(129). This question, Don Garrett remarks in the Introduction to therecent reprinting of Kemp Smith’s book,

has led to proposed answers of every possible kind: that [Hume’s] skepticismdefeats his naturalism; that his naturalism defeats his skepticism; that Humesimply accepts both despite their incompatibility; and that they are compatibleor even mutually supporting. (xxxiv)

In this section, I present and assess two approaches to the question of warrantthat seek to do justice both to Hume’s ‘naturalism’ and to his ‘skepticism’:Janet Broughton thinks that Hume’s ‘skepticism’ undermines his ‘naturalism’;Don Garrett thinks that Hume’s ‘naturalism’ defeats his ‘skepticism’. Ifocus on these interpretations because they are well worked out, widelyaccessible, and represent the two current dominant interpretive paradigms.7,8,9

Janet Broughton’s interpretative starting point is the idea that Hume’s‘naturalistic’ investigation into the human mind presupposes ‘cognitive



norms’: ‘norms of consistency for sets of our beliefs, of clarity for ourideas, and of evidence, or empirical justification, for our inferences aboutcauses and effects’ (Broughton, ‘Inquiry’ 542; cf. Broughton, ‘Hume’sNaturalism’ 7).10 The norm of clarity is manifest in the ‘copy principle’,according to which every idea must derive from an impression (T 1.1.1;SBN 1–8); the norm of evidence is manifest in the rules by which tojudge of causes and effects (T 1.3.15; SBN 173–5). Hume ‘finds in Part4 that these . . . cognitive norms dictate a surprising verdict on theproducts of the understanding. That verdict is that the commonsenseassumption with which he begins – the assumption that we have a largebody of justified beliefs about the world around us – is not itself coherent,clear, and justified’ (Broughton, ‘Inquiry’ 543).

This ‘surprising verdict’ emerges most clearly in Hume’s treatment ofthe belief in the continued existence of external objects or body, whichreveals that Hume’s conception of causal inference is opposed to the beliefthat bodies exist independently of being perceived. Broughton thinks thatthis opposition reflects a tension between Hume’s cognitive norms andthe investigation into the human mind conducted on the basis of thosenorms. According to Broughton, Hume’s questions, ‘How then shall weadjust those principles together? Which of them shall we prefer?’ (T1.4.7.4; SBN 266), do not, therefore, admit of a stable answer. If one wereto ‘prefer’ causal reasoning to a belief in an external world, then ‘wewould be jettisoning our basic, commonsense assumption that in everydaylife we are equipped with a large body of justified beliefs about the worldaround us’ (Broughton, ‘Inquiry’ 546). Although this causal reasoningmight itself meet our cognitive norms,

the ‘opposition’ Hume is reflecting on [between the belief in the continueddistinct existence of bodies and causal reasoning] would show that we cannotmake any use of these norms to achieve the good we aim at. (Broughton,‘Inquiry’ 546)

The good, that is, of ‘forming sense-based beliefs about an objective,physical world’ (546). Because Hume’s science of man depends on certaincognitive norms, which he discovers cannot be satisfied, Hume comes tohis ‘skeptical’ conclusions, recognizing that the conclusions of the scienceof man do not admit of justification (547):

for Hume, the outcome of naturalistic inquiry into the human understanding isthat the human understanding operates according to principles . . . that makereasonable belief in almost anything impossible. (Broughton, ‘Hume’s Voyage’ 188)

Broughton recognizes that there is a tension between this interpretationand the fact that Hume continues his philosophical project in the Treatise,but she claims that

Hume certainly depicts the inquirer as someone who regards himself as havinggiven fuller and stronger reasons for his skeptical conclusion than for his



resumption of scientific inquiry. That is because he gives no reason at all forhis resumption of scientific inquiry . . . he describes himself simply as shiftingoutlooks under pressure from the course of nature . . . And I think that hetreats his resumption of scientific activity in a detached way. (‘Inquiry’ 550)

This ‘detachment’ is manifest, according to Broughton, in Hume’s use ofirony, which she takes to be the dominant tone in the sections of Book1, part 4 that follow the review of the results of the investigations of thepreceding chapters, and which she even reads back into the introductionof the Treatise itself (‘Inquiry’ 552–3). After the ‘Conclusion of this Book’,according to Broughton,

once again [Hume] takes it that through experience, reflection, and reasoning,we acquire many justified and true beliefs about the people and things aroundus, for example, about human passions and morals. But he does all this with adifference. (551)

The ‘difference’ is that Hume no longer wholeheartedly endorses thescience of man, in light of the recognition that its results do not admit ofjustification, and although he continues to pursue it, he does so with ‘ironicdetachment’ (553).

Irony is, of course, a rhetorical trope of which Hume is fond. YetBroughton’s appeal to irony in order to reconcile the ‘skepticism’ that shesees in the ‘Conclusion of this Book’ with Hume’s apparent ‘naturalistic’progress in the remainder of the Treatise seems to be a somewhat ad hocmaneuver, designed to preserve her interpretation. The fact that Broughtonis driven to appeal to irony in this way in order to make her interpretationfit the text may reflect a strain in her interpretive approach.

This strain may be due to Broughton’s conception of Hume’s ‘naturalism’.Broughton believes that Hume’s inability to justify the belief in bodiesreflects a tension between the results of the science of man and theepistemic norms according to which that investigation is conducted. Yetit’s not clear that she accurately conceives of the science of man. First,I’m unconvinced that she has indeed identified epistemic norms thatstructure Hume’s project. The copy principle, for example, seems to menot to be a norm that governs Hume’s ‘naturalistic’ investigation intothe mind, but rather one of the results of that investigation (Garrett,Cognition and Commitment 43–50). Second, and more importantly,Broughton’s characterization of the science of man as resting on epis-temic norms seems to imply that it is an epistemic investigation, but thisis somewhat anachronistically to overlook the fact that the science ofman is an investigation into the cognitive faculties.11 It is becauseBroughton believes that the science of man is underwritten by epistemicnorms that she concludes that the conclusion of ‘Of skepticism withrespect to the Senses’ reflects a tension between those norms and thescience of man that has been conducted in accordance with thosenorms. But if she isn’t right that the investigation is conducted in



accordance with such norms, then her diagnosis of the genesis of Hume’s‘skepticism’ can’t be right, either.

Since the chief problem with Broughton’s interpretation, from my per-spective, is that she assumes that Hume’s investigation must presupposecertain epistemic constraints, perhaps an interpretation that does not makethis assumption will be able to resolve the tension between his ‘skepticism’and his ‘naturalism’. I’ll now consider the best worked-out version of suchan interpretation, that developed by Don Garrett.12

Garrett believes that it is only in the ‘Conclusion of this Book’ thatepistemic or normative considerations even arise.

In Treatise I.iii, Hume reaches at least two conclusions with potentially skepticalapplications: his conclusion about the basis of inductive inference in customand his conclusion about the imaginative illusion of real necessary connections.Prior to Treatise I.iv, however, he discusses primarily the implications forcognitive psychology of these conclusions, resolutely avoiding any discussionof their skeptical applications. Only in Treatise I.iv does he begin to allowhimself to consider the potentially skeptical implications of any of his discoveries;only in the first half of Treatise I.iv.7 does he survey these implications system-atically; and only in the latter half of Treatise I.iv.7 does he explore the questionof what cognitive attitude should be taken toward those implications. (Cognitionand Commitment 232)

According to Garrett, this exploration begins with careful psychologicalobservation of the succession of states of mind that follow upon recognitionof the ‘dangerous dilemma’. The progression of states of mind that Humecharts – from ‘melancholy and delirium’ (T 1.4.7.9; SBN 269) arisingfrom consideration of philosophical questions, to ‘spleen and indolence’(T 1.4.7.10; SBN 270), in which it is resolved to abandon philosophyaltogether, to a renewed inclination to philosophize (T 1.4.7.11; SBN270) – reveals that ‘the natural course of our thoughts and sentiments leadsto a return to reasoning and philosophy’ (Garrett, Cognition and Commitment234). This return to philosophy is carried out under the aegis of an epistemicnorm that Garrett calls the ‘Title Principle’ (234), which emerges in thefollowing passage: ‘Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with somepropensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it never can haveany title to operate upon us’ (T 1.4.7.11; SBN 270).

The Title Principle certainly seems to answer the question of warrant.It accounts for Hume’s preference for natural beliefs, that involve some‘peculiar manner of conception, or the addition of a force or vivacity’ (T1.4.1.8; SBN 184), over those that require some special ‘effort of thought’(T 1.4.1.11; SBN 185), or ‘reflection’ (T 1.4.2.57; SBN 218) and thus hispreference for ‘philosophy in this careless manner’ (T 1.4.7.14; SBN 273),to the ‘abstruse thought’ (T 1.4.1.11; SBN 185) demanded by ‘foundersof systems’ (T 1.4.7.14; SBN 272).13,14 Insofar as the Title Principlejustifies Hume’s commitment to natural beliefs, it also provides somejustification of the fact that Hume continues his philosophical project



despite the seemingly debilitating doubts that arose in the course of Book1, part 4 of the Treatise.

Although the appeal to the Title Principle thus seems neatly to resolvethe question of warrant, one might wonder whether there is any justificationfor relying on it. Garrett admits that

reason cannot initially establish the reliability of the Title Principle, but humannature leads us to reason and believe in accordance with it anyway. Oncewe do so, the Title Principle can be made to speak in its own favor, forreasoning that is in accordance with the principle leads naturallyto . . . continued reasoning in accordance with the principle. (Cognition andCommitment 235)

The suggestion seems to be that continued reasoning in accordance withthe Title Principle constitutes an endorsement of it: Garrett thus seemsto be proposing a reflective endorsement account of the justification ofthe Title Principle.15

It’s somewhat worrisome that the text doesn’t seem to support theattribution to Hume of a reflective endorsement account of justification.More problematic, however, is the fact that Garrett cites the fact thatnatural propensities lead to the Title Principle as a point in its favor.Although the Title Principle was supposed to answer the question ofwarrant, a question that arose because the natural operation of the mindseemed to lead to ‘skepticism’, in order to justify the Title Principle,Garrett appeals to the very natural operations of the mind that the TitlePrinciple was invoked to justify in the first place. The Title Principle thusseems not actually to answer the question of warrant after all.

3. The Norm of Nature

I conclude by sketching an alternative approach to the question of warrant.The proposal is based on an under-appreciated strand of the Treatise thatseems to me to license the ascription to Hume of a conception of naturalnormativity.16

The textual point of origin for this proposal is a passage at the beginningof ‘Of the Modern Philosophy’.

One who concludes somebody to be near him, when he hears an articulatevoice in the dark, reasons justly and naturally; tho’ that conclusion be deriv’dfrom nothing but custom, which infixes and enlivens the idea of a humancreature, on account of his usual conjunction with the present impression. Butone, who is tormented he knows not why, with the apprehension of spectresin the dark, may, perhaps, be said to reason, and to reason naturally, too: Butthen it must be in the same sense, that a malady is said to be natural; as arisingfrom natural causes, tho’ it be contrary to health, the most agreeable and mostnatural situation of man. (T 1.4.4.1; SBN 225)

Frederick Schmitt gives a nice gloss of this passage.



Here Hume distinguishes two senses of ‘natural’. . . . One characterizes thepsychologically proper functioning of the mind. The other admits both properand improper functioning. . . . The improper operation which yields belief inspecters in the dark is not justifying. . . . This brings us to a . . . naturalisticinterpretation of his account of justified belief: a belief is justified just in caseit results from a natural (i.e. proper) operation. (Knowledge and Belief 69)

On Schmitt’s interpretation, in this passage, Hume introduces a normativesense of ‘natural’, which ‘admits both proper and improper functioning’.It might be objected, however, that this is not a distinctively normativesense of ‘natural’, for all the uses of ‘natural’ in this passage may beunderstood in terms of two senses of ‘natural’, namely, ‘not miraculous’and ‘usual’, included in Hume’s oft-cited discussion of different senses of‘natural’ in Book 3 of the Treatise (T 3.1.2.7–10; SBN 473–5).17

This objection is misplaced. The passage seems to suggest that althoughall reasoning in accordance with custom or habit is natural, insofar as it isdetermined by natural causes – and hence not supernatural, or artificial –a distinction may be drawn between reasoning that promotes health andthat which does not, which further suggests that health itself may be anorm of nature. But if this distinction is to have any normative significance,then a merely statistical sense of ‘natural’ – ‘usual’ – won’t do; moreover,it just doesn’t seem to me to be the case that health is ‘usual’. Hence I’minclined to take this passage to introduce a sense of ‘natural’ that Humedoesn’t elsewhere explicitly note. (Although a question of course remainsas to why Hume doesn’t note it.)

If one replaces the appeal to the Title Principle as Hume’s answer tothe question of warrant with natural normativity, the question of warrantcannot re-emerge. On this account, natural beliefs are warranted, becausethey promote health: to this end, there is an easy transition of animalspirits from impression to idea that ensures the enlivening of ideas thatconstitutes beliefs. It even seems to me that the Title Principle issomewhat akin to the ‘rules by which to judge of causes and effects’ thatHume develops in Book 1, part 3 (T 1.3.15; SBN 173–6): those rulesmay be plausibly seen as an inductive generalizations made on the basis ofHume’s investigation into causal reasoning that do not themselves justifycausal reasoning; the Title Principle itself, similarly, may be seen as ageneralization that reflects, although it does not constitute, Hume’s answerto the question of warrant, natural normativity.

Admittedly, the appeal to natural normativity sketched here needsconsiderable further development and defense.18 But development of thisaccount is a task for another occasion.19

Acknowledgment

Earlier versions of some of the ideas in this paper were presented at the2007 Southern California Conference in Philosophy and at a meeting of



the NY/NJ Research Group in Early Modern Philosophy: thanks to thosepresent on those occasions for very helpful discussion of the issues. Thanksto Tim Black, Tom Donahue, Matthew Holtzman, Matt McAdam, EricSchliesser, and an anonymous referee for Philosophy Compass, for helpfulwritten comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Short Biography

Sean Greenberg’s chief research interest is in early modern philosophy: inparticular, in early modern conceptions of the passions and of the will.He has published papers on Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz, and Kant.He is currently working on a long-term project on early modern accountsof human freedom, and two shorter-term projects: a systematic interpre-tation of the philosophy of Malebranche, and, in conjunction with R. C.Sleigh, Jr., a new translation and edition, with a commentary, of Leibniz’sTheodicy. Before coming to the University of California, Irvine, in July2007, Greenberg taught for seven years at the Johns Hopkins University.He holds an A.B. in philosophy and French from Amherst College, anda Ph.D. from Harvard University.

Notes

* Correspondence address: Sean Greenberg, Department of Philosophy, University of California,Irvine, CA 92697, USA. Email: [email protected].

1 All quotations are drawn from the Clarendon edition of The Treatise of Human Nature. I citeboth widely available editions of the text, the Norton and Norton edition and the editionprepared by Selby-Bigge and revised by Nidditch: I refer to the Norton and Norton edition as‘T’ and cite it by book, part, section, and paragraph number; I refer to the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch edition as ‘SBN’ and cite it by page number.2 I frame the problem in this way because the terms ‘naturalism’ and ‘skepticism’ are extraordi-narily philosophically slippery, and are taken in very different senses by contemporary philosophers.In order to avoid these ambiguities, I merely mention, rather than use, the terms ‘naturalism’and ‘skepticism’. 3 Baier, Garrett (Cognition and Commitment), Owen, Morris, and Broughton (‘Hume’s Naturalism’)all agree that the question of warrant emerges explicitly in the ‘Conclusion of this Book’.Despite the fact that there is widespread agreement on this point, consensus, unsurprisingly, hasnot been achieved. David Owen, for example, claims that the question of warrant is ‘not reallycentral until the first Enquiry’ (206), and hence he thinks that in order to answer it one needsto supplement the discussion of this issue in the Treatise with a consideration of the first Enquiry(11, 218; cf. Winkler 197). This claim is related to the deep and disputed question aboutwhether Hume has a uniform conception of the relation between ‘naturalism’ and ‘skepticismin the Treatise and the first Enquiry (not to mention Hume’s other works). Garrett (‘SmallTincture’) argues that the similar approaches to this issue are taken in the Treatise and the firstEnquiry; Broughton suspects that Hume ‘suggested different answers to this question in differentworks’ (‘Hume’s Voyage’ 537; ‘Hume’s Naturalism’).4 There is some disagreement about whether the question of warrant only emerges in the‘Conclusion of this Book’. This disagreement centers on the question of whether Hume’streatment of causal reasoning in Book 1, part 3 of the Treatise describes or explains how causalreasoning takes place or if it is meant to be normative. If the treatment of causal inference ismerely explanatory, then the question of warrant would not seem to arise before Book 1, part



4; if it is not merely explanatory, then the question of warrant would arise before Book 1, part4. Garrett (Cognition and Commitment) and Owen argue that Hume’s treatment of causal inferencein the Treatise is explanatory or descriptive, while Loeb (‘Psychology’) responds to them andargues that it is normative. Further discussion of this debate lies outside the scope of this paper,although it is surely relevant to the topic: if Hume’s treatment of causal reasoning is normative,then a satisfactory answer to the question of warrant would also have to be able to account forthe normativity of causal reasoning.5 See Garrett, Cognition and Commitment 208–32 for a much more detailed treatment of thereview.6 See, inter alia, Fogelin 2; Garrett, Cognition and Commitment 206; Winkler 211 fn. 25;Broughton, ‘Hume’s Naturalism’.7 Loeb (Stability and Justification), Singer, and Thielke develop interpretations that are structurallysimilar to that of Broughton. Loeb’s extraordinarily interesting and fine-grained interpretationwarrants close attention: considerations of space prevent me from taking it up here. Readersinterested in Loeb’s interpretation should consider the extended discussions of that interpretationin Schmitt (‘Loeb on Stability and Justification’) and Williams, as well as Loeb (‘Stability andJustification’), which responds to those discussions. 8 Allison endorses and extends Garrett’s interpretation; Morris explicitly aligns his interpretationwith that of Garrett.9 Paul Russell rejects the dominant interpretive approaches, claiming that ‘recent work on thissubject . . . has not . . . succeeded in providing a satisfactory solution’ (8) to the question of therelation between ‘naturalism’ and ‘skepticism’ in Hume’s Treatise, because ‘the alternative inter-pretations on offer fail to identify both the core motivation and the underlying structure ofHume’s skeptical and naturalistic commitments’ (8). According to Russell, the question of therelation between ‘naturalism’ and ‘skepticism’, which he calls the ‘riddle of the Treatise’ (2), canonly be answered by attending, as he does, to Hume’s irreligious aims in the Treatise (11; 222).While Russell’s important study undeniably illuminates Hume’s overarching philosophicalproject in the Treatise, it is not, however, altogether clear to me that consideration of theirreligious aims of the Treatise does or even could resolve the ‘riddle of Hume’s Treatise’. Indeed,Russell himself only briefly addresses the question of warrant, the challenge that ‘Hume’sproject of a science of man rests on foundations that he ‘subverts entirely’ by his own (extreme)skeptical principles’ (221). Russell’s first response to this challenge is the admission that ‘if weare looking for secure philosophical foundations for the project of the ‘science of man’ . . . thenHume must agree with his critic that this cannot be done’ (221). Russell admits that thisresponse is unsatisfying, and he says that ‘Hume has . . . another line of reply that does moreto meet the critic’s objections on his own terms’ (221).

Although philosophical reflection may momentarily ‘disturb’ our willingness to reason andbelieve, further reflection will bring us to doubt our own doubts – thereby returning us toa more moderate, academic skepticism. What pulls us back from the abyss of ‘philosophicalmelancholy and delirium’, therefore, is not only ‘the current of nature’, but also the forceof skeptical reflection itself. It is within this philosophical dynamic that Hume undertakes topursue his . . . project of a ‘science of man’. From this perspective, there is no conflictbetween the principles of a ‘true skeptic’ and the aims of a ‘science of man’. (Russell 221–2)

This response seems to me to restate, rather than to answer, the question of warrant. Thequestion remains what basis there is to assert that ‘there is no conflict between the principlesof a “true skeptic” and the aims of a “science of man” ’. Perhaps attention to the relationbetween ‘the current of nature’ and skeptical reflection can provide the basis for an answer tothe question of warrant: even if this proves to be the case, it would seem that Russell has onlyprovided a hypothesis about how to resolve ‘the riddle of Hume’s Treatise’ rather than thepromised resolution of that riddle.10 Various aspects of this interpretation are elaborated in Broughton, ‘Hume’s Naturalism’;‘Inquiry’; ‘Hume’s Voyage’: I concentrate on ‘Inquiry’.11 On the relation between early modern faculty psychology and epistemology, see Hatfield,Natural 21–60; ‘Workings of the Intellect’.12 Garrett, Cognition and Commitment introduces the position, which is further elaborated in‘Small Tincture’; ‘Hume’s Conclusions’.



13 Garrett, Cognition and Commitment 234 adduces further recommendations for the Title Principle.14 Kenneth Winkler objects that the Title Principle does not rule out superstition (Winkler 211fn. 22). Garrett seems to imply that the preference for philosophy over superstition does notrest on the Title Principle, but rather on practical grounds, on the fact that philosophy is amore agreeable and safer guide than religion (Cognition and Commitment 234). Yet it’s not clearthat this is a satisfactory answer, for one might still wonder why philosophy is a more agreeable andsafer guide than religion, and even suspect that the question of warrant might arise again here.15 The idea that Garrett is proposing a reflective endorsement account of the justification of theTitle Principle derives from Allison. Allison helpfully distinguishes various reflective endorse-ment interpretations of Hume. He takes his own account of the justification of the TitlePrinciple to differ from Garrett’s (Allison 455 fn. 39).16 Versions of such an interpretation have been endorsed, albeit without much argument andon relatively slight textual grounds, by Monteiro, Craig, Wright, and Wolterstorff.17 Thanks to Don Garrett and an anonymous referee for Philosophy Compass for pressing thisobjection.18 Singer and Meeker argue, on very different grounds, against the attribution to Hume of anaccount of natural normativity.19 I hope to develop and defend this interpretation in future work.

Works Cited

Allison, Henry. ‘Hume’s Philosophical Insouciance: A Reading of Treatise 1.4.7’. Hume Studies31.2 (November 2005): 427–56.

Baier, Annette. A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume’s Treatise. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUP, 1991.

Craig, Edward. The Mind of God and the Works of Man. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.Broughton, Janet. ‘Hume’s Naturalism about Cognitive Norms’. Philosophical Topics 31.1–2

(Spring and Fall 2003): 1–19.——. ‘Hume’s Naturalism and his Skepticism’. A Companion to Hume. Ed. Elizabeth Radcliffe.

Oxford: Blackwell, 2008. 425–40.——. ‘Hume’s Voyage’. Persons and Passions: Essays in Honor of Annette Baier. Eds. Joyce Jenkins,

Jennifer Whiting, and Christopher Williams. South Bend, IN: U of Notre Dame P, 2005.174–91.

——. ‘The Inquiry in Hume’s Treatise’. The Philosophical Review 113.4 (October 2004): 537–56.Fogelin, Robert J. Hume’s Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature. London: Routledge, 1985.Garrett, Don. Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy. New York, NY: Oxford UP,

1997.——. ‘Hume’s Conclusions in ‘Conclusion of this Book’. Blackwell Guide to Hume’s Treatise. Ed.

Saul Traiger. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006. 151–75.——. ‘ “A Small Tincture of Pyrronism”: Skepticism and Naturalism in Hume’s Science of

Man’. Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. New York, NY: Oxford UP,2004. 68–98.

Hatfield, Gary. The Natural and the Normative: Theories of Visual Perception from Kant to Helmholtz.Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990.

——. ‘The Workings of the Intellect: Mind and Psychology’. Logic and the Workings of the Mind:The Logic of Ideas and Faculty Psychology in Early Modern Philosophy. Ed. Patricia Easton.Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing, 1997. 21–45.

Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Eds. David Fate Norton and Mary Norton. Oxford:Clarendon Press, 2007.

——. A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge. Rev. P. H. Nidditch. Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1978.

Kemp Smith, Norman. The Philosophy of David Hume. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan,2005.

Loeb, Louis. ‘Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume’s Argument about Induction’.Synthese 152 (2006): 321–38.

——. Stability and Justification in Hume’s Treatise. New York, NY: Oxford UP, 2002.



——. ‘Stability and Justification in Hume’s Treatise, Another Look – A Response to Erin Kelly,Frederick Schmitt, and Michael Williams’. Hume Studies 30.2 (November 2004): 339–404.

Meeker, Kevin. ‘Was Hume a Proper Functionalist?’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research72.1 ( January 2006): 120–36.

Monteiro, J. P. ‘Hume, Induction, and Natural Selection’. McGill Hume Studies 1: Studies inHume and Scottish Philosophy. San Diego, CA: Austin Hill Press, 1979. 291–308.

Morris, William Edward. ‘Hume’s Conclusion’. Philosophical Studies 99.1 (2000): 89–100.Owen, David. Hume’s Reason. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999.Reid, Thomas. An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. Ed. Derek

R. Brookes. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State UP, 1997.Russell, Paul. The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion. New York, NY:

Oxford UP, 2008.Schmitt, Frederick F. Knowledge and Belief. London: Routledge, 1992.——. ‘Loeb on Stability and Justification in Hume’s Treatise’. Hume Studies 30.2 (November

2004): 297–327.Singer, Ira. ‘Nature Breaks Down: Hume’s Problematic Naturalism in Treatise I iv’. Hume Studies

26.2 (November 2000): 225–43.Thielke, Peter. ‘Hume, Kant, and the Sea of Illusion’. Hume Studies 29.1 (April 2003): 63–88.Williams, Michael. ‘The Unity of Hume’s Philosophical Project’. Hume Studies 30.2 (November

2004): 265–96.Winkler, Kenneth P. ‘Hume’s Inductive Skepticism’. The Empiricists: Critical Essays on Locke,

Berkeley, and Hume. Ed. Margaret Atherton. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.Wolterstorff, Nicholas. John Locke and the Ethics of Belief. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.Wright, John P. The Skeptical Realism of David Hume. Minneapolis, MN: The U of Minnesota

P, 1983.

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‘Naturalism’ and ‘Skepticism’ in Hume's Treatise of Human Nature