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CONSTruCTIVIST FOuNdATIONs vol. 8, N°1

What Exists between Realism and Constructivism?Armin Nassehi Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich, Germany armin/at/nassehi.de

> upshot • I argue that the distinction between realism and constructivism is incompatible with Luhmann’s systems theory. An operative theory of (social and psychic) systems has certain ontological implications that cannot be seen from a radical constructivist perspective.

« 1 » Is the distinction between real-ism and constructivism a practical one? Scholl’s argumentation affirms this distinc-tion when he confronts Luhmann’s theory with radical constructivism. I do not wish to discuss the philosophical background of radical constructivism here. What I wish to emphasize is that what is called “radical con-structivism” can only be so radical because it is a theory of subjectivism in terms of a theory of cognition in a rather traditional form. Ernst von Glasersfeld’s accomplish-ment lies in his radicalization of the Kantian idea of epistemological agnosticism. Strictly speaking, he offers an empirical version of Immanuel Kant’s transcendental philoso-phy, which at first sight seems to be a con-tradiction. Kant did not have any empirical perspectives. He was interested in the ques-tion about the conditions for the possibility of cognition. One of these conditions was, for Kant, the impossibility of direct contact between consciousness and the object of cognition. So Kant created the modern phil-osophical figure of a distinction between the world and its awareness. From a sociological point of view, this can be read as a reaction to the social experience of different perspec-tives on the world.

« 2 » radical constructivism has radi-calized this theory by giving the distinction between cognition and the world an empiri-cal form. (radical) constructivism theorizes a radical perspective. In that sense, it can be interpreted as an heir to subject philosophy. reality is then only a cognitive construction. And this implies that all realistic perspec-

tives fall behind the achievements of a post-ontological theory.

« 3 » As Armin Scholl aptly puts it (§2), Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems begins with such a relapse when Luhmann asserts that “there are systems.” However, Luhmann does not begin with an ontologi-cal definition but with a hypothesis; that is with a construction, a theoretical first sen-tence, with an asymmetric idea of ontology. Not to begin with an epistemological doubt is far from the naive realism that Scholl as-serts (§9). In my reading, this refusal of a radical epistemological doubt indeed has ontological implications. But these impli-cations are located on another level than Scholl supposes.

« 4 » Scholl concedes that Luhmann’s alleged realism is due to his sociological perspective (§25). As a sociologist, he has to avoid any solipsistic or subjectivist per-spective. So a little realism can be admitted. While this is a rather abbreviated recon-struction of Scholl’s argumentation, I think that this figure can lead us to the crucial point. The radicalism of radical constructiv-ism stems from its delimitation of the cogni-tive operations of entities with a central ner-vous system to avoid speaking of subjects or agents. Such entities can be theorized as radically constructing entities because the world in which entities such as these occur cannot even be doubted. This outer world is no problem for the heirs of Kantian theory.

« 5 » So radical constructivism can re-construct individual constructions and ego-logical forms of awareness. But it is not able to theorize the communication between ego and alter ego. In my reading, the most radical radical constructivism is Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy. Husserl has shown how the world can only become reconstructed as a result of a cog-nitive system that only can operate with its own capacities. His Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewussteins shows that the suc-cession of cognitive events in unobservable presents (“Urimpressionen”) emerges in an operatively closed unit. The only contact of this unit with an outer world is self-aware-ness. By reconstructing Husserl this way, we can see that Husserl antedated theoretical figures of cybernetics, constructivism, and systems theory in the language of traditional philosophy (cf. Nassehi 2012).

« 6 » radical constructivism, then, reconstructed in the language of Husserl, repeats Husserl’s grand collapse with the problem of intersubjectivity. The radical-ism of radical constructivism is based on this grand collapse. When Scholl argues that Luhmann’s alleged realism stems from his sociological orientation (§25), he is right – but in another way than he sug-gests. Luhmann has overcome the problem of intersubjectivity by theorizing social systems as operating systems consisting of communications as basic elements. The radicalism of Luhmann is that he theorizes social systems in a similar way to that in which Husserl describes the operations of consciousness. Consciousness emerges by successive occurrences of conscious ele-ments, operatively closed in and on its own operative basis. Psychic elements can only become connected by and with other psy-chic elements.

« 7 » And the same is true for com-munication: social systems consist of com-munication, emerging by the occurrence of communicative elements, operatively closed by their own operative basis. Communica-tive elements can only become connected by and with other communications from the same system (cf. Luhmann 1995: 137–176).

« 8 » Constructivism now means that the only reality in which different systems, both psychic and social, can operate is the reality that stems from their own operations. This sentence has two implications.

« 9 » The first implication is compat-ible with what is called “radical construc-tivism” – with the difference that there now exists a theoretical possibility for solving the problem of intersubjectivity: by avoid-ing it. Psychic systems become structurally coupled to social systems. And the co-evo-lution of this special kind of system-envi-ronment-relations is the basis of the emer-gence of a constructed reality in time. These construction processes happen on different levels and with different operational condi-tions – but they are radically bound to their own respective operative basis. This is more radical than radical constructivism because it replaces the distinction of construction and reality with the distinction of different system-environment relations. The Kantian heritage of the world outside is then no lon-ger a radical problem.

15

open Peer Commentaries Armin Scholl

radical Constructivism

http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/8/1/005.scholl

« 10 » The second implication is an ontological implication. I think that the radical refusal of ontological questions is somewhat naive. Scholl seems to have an-ticipated this point when he writes about minimal ontology (§42). Traditional on-tological distinctions use the difference of being/not-being. Scholl (§20) refers on my 1992 paper. In a comment on this pa-per, Luhmann argues that my criticism of the ontological implications of his theory might be based on terminological differ-ences because systems theory is not based on this distinction of being/not-being (Luhmann 1992b: 381) – given that, Luh-mann is right. But there is another ontolog-ical implication. Systems theory, especially Luhmann’s theory of temporalized social systems, is based upon the idea that systems consist of subsequent temporal elements. In a traditional Cartesian way I think we can-not doubt that systems operate when they do what they do. They operate in unob-servable presences, which can only become observed afterwards. So the beginning of a

system has always begun. This paradoxical figure can be unfolded in terms of time. We can then see that everything a system does is the result of its own operations, which occur somehow invisibly. So the system it-self is both constructing and constructed, based on the operations of the system itself. It unfolds its basic paradox in time and by time (cf. Nassehi 2008: 210–231).

« 11 » This is reminiscent of Jacques derrida’s criticism of Husserl’s theory of time. derrida argued that Husserl’s theory has metaphysical elements because the pres-ence of operations cannot become theorized when consciousness is based on occurring presences (cf. derrida 2010). But what we can learn from derrida is not how to avoid metaphysical or ontological implications but how to come to terms with this problem. I think that Luhmann’s operative systems the-ory is able to solve this ontological problem. There are social systems: that means there is something operating. This has nothing to do with being or not being. This is not a metaphysical assumption. It is only an

empirical observation, which presupposes observations. So the idea that there is some-thing that operates is the proof of itself – it is important to be aware of this Cartesian meditation.

« 12 » If we do not accept this para-doxical figure, we have to remain radical constructivists and to theorize about the distinction between constructivism and re-alism. My question is: What exists between realism and constructivism? My answer: operations. do they exist? Not really (sic!). They operate.

Armin Nassehi has been Professor of sociology at the Ludwig Maximilians-Universität in Munich

since 1998. The main fields of work are sociological theory, systems theory, political sociology, and

sociology of culture. He has written numerous books and articles and is co-editor of the sociological

journal Soziale Welt and editor of the “Kursbuch.”

received: 19 October 2012 Accepted: 22 October 2012

Author’s Response: What Constructivism does not Say

Armin Scholl

> upshot • Egner’s suggestion that a the-ory of observation should be developed towards a more abstract concept in or-der to apply it to any autopoietic system is plausible from the point of a general systems theory. However, this strategy of theorizing is not suited to solving episte-mological problems in particular because such a broad concept fails to specify con-structivism as a strictly observer-related philosophy. Nassehi’s search for a third way between constructivism and real-ism, in turn, presumes a too narrow and biased concept of constructivism and is therefore not suited to solving the epis-temological problem for which construc-tivism has been developed.

Can constructivism do without the observer?« 1 » In her comment, Heike Egner

touches a sore spot in Luhmann’s kind of theory building. Indeed, the abstract con-cept of observation provided by Luhmann’s theory of social systems seems to conflict with the claim to identify his or any con-structivist foundation using a strict observer relation. If we conceive of observation in such an abstract sense that even a stomach can observe its environment, the process of observing and the relationship between an “observer” and an “observed” phenomenon or environment does not say much about epistemological questions that are left to human thinking and communicating (Eg-ner §2). What would be the consequences? Either we would need to drop the strict re-lationship between the observer and the ob-served as a necessary and sufficient criterion for defining and characterizing radical con-structivism, or we would need to confine the

concept of observation to psychic and social systems. The first route might be problem-atic because the main difference between constructivism and realism is their concep-tion of the observer’s role in gaining (scien-tific) knowledge. The second route seems to be problematic, too, because epistemology is typical for human beings only; but many animals have a mind and social relation-ships, too. From a consistent constructivist perspective, we cannot even know whether (some) animals address epistemological questions or not. When Egner refers to pet owners (§3), this is not intended to be an ar-gument for fun! As human beings, we have the experience of inter-species communica-tion. Obviously, any kind of limiting of the concept of observation is somewhat arbi-trary. We have the same problem with com-munication. Communication is not neces-sarily limited to human social communities or societies. dirk Baecker, a close follower of Luhmann’s system theory, argues in favor of