NASEO Southeastern Regional Meeting ¢â‚¬¢ Cybersecurity Training w/ NARUC ¢â‚¬¢ Cybersecurity Primer for

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    ENERGY Infrastructure Security & Energy Restoration Prepare. Respond. Adapt.

    NASEO Southeastern Regional Meeting DOE SLTT Energy Assurance Activities Matthew D. Duncan – Program Manager Keith Dodrill – DOE ESF#12 Regional Coordinator, Region IV May 3, 2017

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    • Program Overview • FY 17 Energy Assurance Activities • LIBERTY ECLIPSE Key Findings • FY 18 Energy Assurance Planning • DOE ESF#12 Response Regionalization Concept

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    DOE SLTT Energy Assurance Program

    Build Relationships

    Encourage Comprehensive


    Increase Expertise

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    Energy Assurance Activities in FY 17 – DOE HQ

    • SLTT Energy Assurance 2016 Year in Review 2016-year-review

    • Energy Assurance Joint Policy Committee • Comprised of Energy Officials,

    Emergency Managers, & Regulators – April 5, 2017

    • Next Generation of EAGLE-I • Region IV Pilot • Full access for states in Spring ’17

    • Develop Energy Sector Waiver Library on • Common Electricity and Oil and Gas

    waivers during response – May ’17 • Hurricane Season 2017

    • UPDATE EEAC INFO by May 31 •

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    Energy Assurance Activities in FY 17 – DOE HQ

    • Clear Path V will examine the interdependencies between the energy sub-sectors – electricity, oil, and natural gas – and the communications sector. - May 31 – June 1, 2017 in Houston, TX

    • Objectives 1. Establish and reinforce relationships across the energy and communications sectors to

    facilitate future preparedness and emergency response operations. 2. Define interdependencies between the energy and communications sectors, emphasizing

    areas of mutual reliance, resource needs, and mechanisms for effective sharing of information during a multi-state regional incident causing energy and communication system interruptions.

    3. Examine the interactions between state and federal government organizations during an energy emergency to provide resources and assistance to impacted jurisdictions.

    • Observers Welcome! Visit to register.


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    Energy Assurance Activities in FY 17 – N-Groups

    • Energy Assurance Plan Updates w/ NASEO • 12 states in process of updating plans • NASEO updating guidelines/provide technical assistance

    • Cybersecurity Training w/ NARUC • Cybersecurity Primer for Regulators 3.0 – Jan 2017 • Cybersecurity Primer regional training – Summer ‘17

    • Resilience Assessment/ Exec Orders w/ NGA • Develop state resilience assessment tool for states • Develop executive order roadmap

    • Emergency Management Energy Education w/ NEMA • Hosted cyber incident coordination panel in March ’17 • Developing energy focused TTX package for states

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    Energy Assurance Activities in FY 17 – N-Groups

    • Protect Critical Infrastructure Information and Tribal Engagement w/ NCSL • Develop best practices for critical infrastructure

    information protections in legislation • Reengage tribal state energy assurance work

    • Enhance mutual assistance with municipally- owned utilities w/ APPA • Improve outage mapping and information sharing • Support updates and exercising of mutual assistance

    plans and agreements • Reinvigorate local energy assurance activities

    • Reestablish local energy assurance contacts • Identify gaps in local energy assurance capabilities

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    LIBERTY ECLIPSE Key Findings and Recommendations

    LIBERTY ECLIPSE Exercise – Newport, RI, December 8-9, 2016 – Co-hosted w/ NASEO • Cyber-incident in the

    electricity sub-sector affecting other sectors

    • Interdependencies in energy sector

    • 3 FEMA Regions, 13 States, industry, 96 participants

    • AAR released April 18

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    LIBERTY ECLIPSE Key Findings and Recommendations

    1) The cyber incident coordination frameworks at both the state and federal levels need to be further defined and synchronized with industry.

    2) The public will face a great deal of uncertainty following a significant cyber incident that causes physical damage (such as a long-term power outage or petroleum disruption), creating a considerable challenge for public information and expectation management, particularly around restoration times.

    3) The evolving nature of cybersecurity threats makes it difficult for PUCs to accurately quantify the cost of cybersecurity investments for rate recovery.

    Key Findings – Cyber Incident Coordination

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    LIBERTY ECLIPSE Key Findings and Recommendations

    4) While the consequence management activities for the physical impacts caused by a cyber incident are largely the same as they would be for any other hazard—including the potential use of the Stafford Act—the unique conditions of a cyber incident pose additional challenges that necessitate new capabilities and the use of new authorities.

    5) Information sharing and the ability to communicate remain prime concerns in an energy emergency—regardless of the cause.

    6) There is a need to improve state petroleum response plans to make them more operational and detailed and provide for greater consistency across multi-state regions.

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    LIBERTY ECLIPSE Key Findings and Recommendations

    7) Emergency response stakeholders need to have a good understanding of the energy sector supply chains and interdependencies to plan for, and respond to, energy emergencies.

    8) There are substantial resources available to support efforts that would enhance cybersecurity. These resources, and their applicability, are not always well known at the state and local levels by some of the organizations within the energy supply chain.

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    LIBERTY ECLIPSE Key Findings and Recommendations

    Key Findings – Exercise Design 9) The quality of the exercise, the ability to identify planning gaps,

    and action items are affected by the composition of the individuals and organizations that participate in the exercise.

    10) Participants felt that the exercise should have been a more focused set of events targeting a smaller geographic region to allow for more in-depth discussions.

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    LIBERTY ECLIPSE Key Findings and Recommendations

    1) DOE should support SLTT governments and industry partners to improve communication and information sharing consistent with forthcoming cyber-incident coordination mechanisms, and strengthen procedures to facilitate energy restoration. Particular attention needs to be paid to public communication and expectation-setting during significant cyber incidents.

    2) The federal government needs to better define its roles and responsibilities for a significant cyber incident and communicate those roles clearly.

    3) DOE should continue its work with SLTT partners, other federal agencies, and the private sector to ensure that appropriate resources and capabilities are available to reduce the risks to the energy sector from a cybersecurity threat. DOE, DHS, and industry should also work together to ensure that measures are in place for the recovery of critical information technology systems to ensure a more rapid system restoration and to minimize impacts.


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    LIBERTY ECLIPSE Key Findings and Recommendations

    4) DOE should facilitate further dialogue between governments at all levels and industry on developing fuel-shortage response plans, and to evaluate these plans in future regional exercises that focused on the oil and natural gas subsector.

    5) DOE should maintain and expand its energy assurance program to encourage and support planning and preparedness, through regular education, training, and exercises for SLTT partners, with the goal of promoting a better understanding of energy sector supply-chain interdependencies. These efforts should culminate in updated energy assurance plans at all levels.

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    Energy Assurance Activities for FY18 • Three Themes

    • Cybersecurity Preparedness • Information Sharing and Situational Awareness • Regional Interdependencies

    • EAGLE-I Upgrades to include ISERnet content • Possible work on Local Energy Assurance • Cross DOE/Lab Cooperation on analytical

    products focused on resilience and security

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    DOE ESF#12 Response Regionalization Concept

    • 2016 DOE Recruiting Initiative – Ø 92 new responder volunteers

    • Stronger interagency ties at regional level • Increased presence and support to States • Enhanced response capabilities through –

    Ø Relationship building during steady state Ø Regionally based team training Ø Increase SME capability and presence for


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    DOE ESF#12 Response Regionalization Concept

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    DOE ESF#12 Response Regionalization Concept - Region IV Pilot

    Purpose: Test the regionalization concept • Responder refresher training in and on assigned

    region • Increased i