"multiple-without-one". Such unified presentation constitutes what Badiou calls a situation. A situation is thus any presented multiplicity whatsoever. Or again, a situation is the constitution of inconsistent multiplicity: it is literally "the place of taking-place" (BE 24). If the latter is then to have any relation to the place of presentation, it can only be as the "taking-place" anterior to the place itself, that is, the presentation of presentation itself (or presentation "in-itself"): pure presentation prior to the structured presentation that is the situation. As structured presentation, a situation can be anything whatsoever: a July business meeting, Eastern Europe, ontology, several platypuses, a political demonstration, an atom. This concurrently implies that the one and the multiple can quite happily be at the same time both different and the same. Simply, any situation (any presented multiple) admits sub-situations, as much as any situation is itself a sub-situation of another situation (ad infinitum). Badiou terms the operation by which pure multiplicity is "one-ified" (or "situated") the count (or "count-as-one"). The count constitutes the structure of the situation and operates by determining certain elements (multiples) as belonging to the situation. To this effect the situation itself is indistinguishable from the count. The crucial ontological distinction is then found at the level of the situation's being: the pure being of the situation - the "before of the count" - remains beyond the situation itself, inasmuch as its being is uncounted multiplicity. Or to put it another way, the being of consistency is inconsistency. The paradox here is fundamental: the inconsistent being underlying all consistency is itself radically unknowable (inasmuch as all knowledge is necessarily "situated") and to this effect any consideration of what precedes the situation is itself hopelessly compromised by its very situatedness. Inconsistency is therefore the real of presentation, the precise point at which thought butts against its own limit. Which is why Badiou's initial embrace of the multiple (and concurrent assertion that "the one is not") is a pure decision: the actual status of inconsistent multiplicity is itself properly undecidable. Moreover, this is precisely why Badiou's is a subtractive ontology: in the face of a classical metaphysics defined as an "enframing of being by the one", Badiou decides that ontology can be nothing other than the theory of indifferent, inconsistent multiplicity, radically subtracted from the power of the one (TO 34). In formulating his ontology, Badiou must still account for the seemingly irreducible and apparently illogical gap between the (known) consistent multiple and its (radically unknown) inconsistent being. Thus we return to his Platonic reformulation of the Parmenidean thesis "if the one is not, (the) nothing is". We must take his words literally here: 50
"multiple-without-one". Such unified presentation constitutes
whatBadiou calls a situation. A situation is thus any presented
multiplicitywhatsoever. Or again, a situation is the constitution
of inconsistent multiplicity:it is literally "the place of
taking-place" (BE 24). If the latter isthen to have any relation to
the place of presentation, it can only be asthe "taking-place"
anterior to the place itself, that is, the presentationof
presentation itself (or presentation "in-itself"): pure
presentationprior to the structured presentation that is the
situation.As structured presentation, a situation can be anything
whatsoever:a July business meeting, Eastern Europe, ontology,
several platypuses,a political demonstration, an atom. This
concurrently implies that theone and the multiple can quite happily
be at the same time both differentand the same. Simply, any
situation (any presented multiple)admits sub-situations, as much as
any situation is itself a sub-situationof another situation (ad
infinitum).Badiou terms the operation by which pure multiplicity is
"one-ified"(or "situated") the count (or "count-as-one"). The count
constitutes thestructure of the situation and operates by
determining certain elements(multiples) as belonging to the
situation. To this effect the situation itselfis indistinguishable
from the count. The crucial ontological distinctionis then found at
the level of the situation's being: the pure being ofthe situation
- the "before of the count" - remains beyond the situationitself,
inasmuch as its being is uncounted multiplicity. Or to putit
another way, the being of consistency is inconsistency. The
paradoxhere is fundamental: the inconsistent being underlying all
consistencyis itself radically unknowable (inasmuch as all
knowledge is necessarily"situated") and to this effect any
consideration of what precedesthe situation is itself hopelessly
compromised by its very situatedness.Inconsistency is therefore the
real of presentation, the precise point atwhich thought butts
against its own limit. Which is why Badiou's initialembrace of the
multiple (and concurrent assertion that "the one is not")is a pure
decision: the actual status of inconsistent multiplicity is
itselfproperly undecidable. Moreover, this is precisely why
Badiou's is asubtractive ontology: in the face of a classical
metaphysics defined as an"enframing of being by the one", Badiou
decides that ontology can benothing other than the theory of
indifferent, inconsistent multiplicity,radically subtracted from
the power of the one (TO 34).In formulating his ontology, Badiou
must still account for the seeminglyirreducible and apparently
illogical gap between the (known)consistent multiple and its
(radically unknown) inconsistent being. Thuswe return to his
Platonic reformulation of the Parmenidean thesis "ifthe one is not,
(the) nothing is". We must take his words literally here:50
