Moranbah Ammonium Nitrate Appendix f

Appendix F

Hazard and Risk

41/16537/350755 Supplementary Report for the proposed Moranbah Ammonium Nitrate ProjectResponses to issues raised

Dyno Nobel Asia PacificLimited

Proposed Ammonium NitratePlant, Moranbah, Queensland

Hazard and Risk Assessment

December 2006

Proposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant, Moranbah, QueenslandHazard and Risk Assessment

41/15824/346030

Contents

Executive Summary i

1. Introduction 1

1.1 Background 1

1.2 Objectives 2

1.3 Scope of Work 3

1.4 Relevant Queensland and Australian Legislative Documents 3

1.5 Risk Assessment Methodology 4

1.6 Facility Description 6

1.7 Power Station 6

1.8 Ammonia Manufacture 6

1.9 Nitric Acid Manufacture 6

1.10 Ammonium Nitrate Manufacture 7

1.11 Prill Manufacture 7

1.12 Emulsion Manufacture 7

1.13 AN Dispatch 7

1.14 Safety Systems 8

1.15 Vent System 8

1.16 Process Interlocking and Alarm Systems 8

1.17 Gas Detectors and Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) 9

1.18 Operations 9

2. Local Neighbourhood and Environment 11

2.1 Site Location and Surrounding Populations 11

2.2 Environment 13

2.3 Topography 13

2.4 Meteorology 14

3. Hazard Identification, Impact and Risk Criteria 17

3.1 Hazardous Material Identification 17

3.2 Consequence Impact Criteria 18

3.3 Ammonia 19

3.4 Nitrogen Oxides 20

3.5 Ammonium Nitrate 21

3.6 Individual Risk Criteria 23

3.7 Societal Risk 24

Proposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant, Moranbah, QueenslandHazard and Risk Assessment

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3.8 Major Accident Events (MAEs) 25

4. Hazardous Scenario Development 26

4.1 Screening of Hazards 26

4.2 Natural Events 26

5. Consequence Analysis 31

5.1 Toxic Releases 31

5.2 Explosion Events 36

5.3 Missile Generation and Strike 42

5.4 Ground Shocks 42

6. Frequency Analysis 44

6.1 Toxic Release Events 44

6.2 Ammonium Nitrate Explosion Events 44

6.3 Security Vulnerability Impact on Frequencies 45

7. Risk Analysis 47

7.1 Offsite Location Specific Individual Risk 47

7.2 Societal Risk Results 48

8. Discussion 49

8.1 Toxic Release Scenarios 49

9. Conclusions 50

10. Recommendations 51

11. References 52

Appendices

A Hazard RegisterB Assumptions RegisterC Consequence AnalysisD Frequency AnalysisE Material Safety Data Sheets

i41/15824/346030 Proposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant, Moranbah, QueenslandHazard and Risk Assessment

Executive Summary

GHD Pty Ltd have been commissioned by Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific Limited (DN) toconduct a Hazard and Risk Assessment (H&RA) in response to issues raised withinthe EIS.

This H&RA will form part of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) beingdeveloped by GHD to address the offsite risk to surrounding populations hencedemonstrating the adequacy of location with respect to Land-Use Safety Planning(LUSP) requirements.

The H&RA following remodelling of changes as raised, proposed Ammonium Nitrateproduction facilities remain compliant with the relevant Queensland CHEM ServicesLand-Use Safety Planning (LUSP) criteria for offsite individual risk presents theLocation Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) contours developed in this study. The landto the north and west of Moranbah is privately owned and access to the area is viathe industrial service road (Goonyella Rd). Transfield and Enertrade have adjacentsites, which are currently undeveloped and are expected to be unmanned1. A gas-fired power station is located onsite to the north of the facility.

Figure 1 Dyno Nobel Proposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant LSIR Profile

The major risk contributors are releases from the Ammonia Tank Storage situated atthe AN Facility. The tank inventory (5000 tonnes) means that the risk profile willalways remain high, as Ammonia is a highly toxic chemical.

1 This is based on discussions with staff from each company.

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ii41/15824/346030 Proposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant, Moranbah, QueenslandHazard and Risk Assessment

RecommendationsThe following recommendations have been considered by DN for incorporation intothe design:

1. Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific Limited to introduce a minimisation program to reduce,where possible, (by engineering design) the number of small-bore fittings,valves, and flanged joints on equipment operating with toxic chemicals. Theseequipment items were assessed to constitute the greatest proportion of leaksaffecting offsite areas. This reduces the volume stored and potential leaks.This matter should also be addressed in the development of the piping materialspecification. Screwed joints should not be used.

2. Update the Quantitative Risk Analysis once the facility design is finalised andmodify the Safety Management System (SMS) via the Major Hazard FacilitySafety Case. The update will incorporate onsite risks and any potential changesto the population in the area since the H&RA was completed.

3. An integrated communication system encompassing mines/council (emergencyservices)

iii41/15824/346030 Proposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant, Moranbah, QueenslandHazard and Risk Assessment

GlossaryALARP As Low As Reasonably PracticableAN Ammonia NitrateAS Australian StandardBOM Bureau of MeteorologyDCS Distribution Control SystemDME Department of Mines and EnergyDN Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific LimitedEIS Environmental Impact StatementERPG Emergency Response Planning GroupGHD GHD Pty LtdH&RA Hazard and Risk AssessmentHIPAP Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory PaperLSIR Location Specific Individual RiskLUSP Land-Use Safety PlanningMHF Major Hazard FacilityNDT Non-destructive TestingNEQ Net Equivalent QuantityNOHSC National Occupational Health and Safety CommissionPFD Process Flow DiagramPHAST Process Hazard Analysis Software ToolPLL Potential Loss of LifePPE Personal Protective EquipmentPSA Pressure Swing AdsorptionQLD QueenslandQRA Quantitative Risk AssessmentSMS Safety Management SystemSSAN Security Sensitive Ammonium Nitrate

1Proposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant, Moranbah, QueenslandHazard and Risk Assessment

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1. Introduction

1.1 BackgroundGHD Pty Ltd (GHD) were commissioned by Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific Limited (DN) toconduct a Hazard and Risk Assessment (H&RA) of the proposed Ammonium Nitrateand Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion Facilities (the project) to be built on the site alongGoonyella Rd near Moranbah, Queensland. This H&RA update will form part of theEnvironmental Impact Statement (EIS) being developed by GHD EnvironmentalDepartment (Brisbane), by addressing the offsite risk to surrounding populationshence demonstrating the adequacy of location with respect to Land-Use SafetyPlanning (LUSP) requirements after comment by relevant stakeholders.

The project will now produce approximately 330,000 tonnes per year of AmmoniumNitrate (AN) Prill with storage of up to 12000 tonnes (this includes AN movingthrough the manufacturing process) of AN product distributed between storagecontainers of AN prill, and emulsion tanks. The project will use coal seam methanegas from the nearby coal deposits as a feedstock to the Ammonia plant.

Technical grade AN prill and emulsion are the major raw materials for the mostwidely used explosives in open cut mining operations. Prilled AN is produced assmall, solid, round non-volatile granules and is classified as a Class 5.1 oxidisingagent under the Queensland Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 and associatedcodes and regulations. This product is stable and non-volatile. AN emulsion is aprecursor for in-situ explosives manufacturing and AN is used in the emulsionmanufacturing process. Ammonium Nitrate is classified as an Explosive under theExplosives Regulation 2003, which is regulated by the Explosives Inspectorate ofthe Department of Mines and Energy.

DN is looking to increase its production capabilities within Australia to meet growingdemands in the region. Demand for AN is high in Queensland and the timing of newsupply will be consistent with the development of new mines within the area. DNtherefore proposes to construct and operate an AN Prill and Emulsion plant in theMoranbah area, Queensland, if the timing can meet customer expectations.However, like any other processing or storage facility, if not designed, sited, andoperated correctly, it has the potential to cause harm to workers/public, damage toproperty and the environment, and/or disruption to adjacent/dependent businesses.

The Queensland Dangerous Goods Safety Management Act 2001 regulatesfacilities storing significant quantities of Hazardous Materials as Major HazardFacilities (MHF) in accordance with the requirements of the NOHSC. Accordingly,the proposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant will be classified as a Major Hazard Facilitydue to the large quantities of Schedule 1 materials produced and stored there(namely Ammonia and Ammonium Nitrate), to which the aforementioned standardapplies. It is a requirement of the Safety Assessment associated with the NationalStandard that all potential Major Accidents2 are identified. [Note that the Control of

2 Under the NOHSC standard, a Major Accident is defined as a sudden occurrence (including a particularmajor emission, loss of containment, fire, explosion or release of energy) leading to serious danger orharm to people, property or the built environment, whether immediate or delayed.


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Major Hazard Facilities - National Standard (NOHSC: 1014) and Code of Practice(NOHSC: 2016) give minimum threshold quantities in Schedule 1 as 200 T forAmmonia and 2,500 T of AN]3. Since this study identifies events with the potential tocause injury or death to people offsite, it may be used as a starting-point for therequired MHF Safety Assessment. However, this risk assessment does not addressonsite risk nor commissioning and/or operational issues, as these issues will need tobe subsequently addressed within the Facility’s Safety Case.

The Australian Standard for Risk Management AS/NZS 4360:2004 [Ref 2] details aclassical risk assessment methodology, which is consistent with the approach takenin this study. The methodology is shown below.

Figure 2 Risk Assessment Procedure AS NZS 4360:2004

1.2 ObjectivesThe primary objectives of this study are to:

Establish a preliminary quantitative offsite individual fatality risk profile 4 of theproject, and assess this against the relevant criteria;

3 It is noted that all storage/manufacturing facilities storing in excess of 2500 tonnes for UN 1942 and5000 tonnes for Ammonium Nitrate Fertilizer of UN Classification No.s 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071 or2072 are classified as a Major Hazard Facility (MHF), which requires a site specific risk assessment tobe conducted for the purpose of land use planning to determine the minimum separation distances tothe various types of developments and to minimise all risks to as low as reasonably practicable.

4 Hazard and Risk Assessments (H&RAs) are typically conducted to demonstrate the adequacy of aproposed project concept / location for Land Use Safety Planning purposes (i.e. Show that the relevantrisk criteria will be met by the proposed facility as part of the development approval). H&RA’s aretypically conducted before the full engineering details are available and in order to ensure that the finalas-built design of the activity does not exceed the risk profile of the H&RA, a conservative approach istaken throughout the study. As the design develops, and full engineering details are finalised (includingall Safety related systems, etc), a more precise analysis can be conducted that should not exceed theprevious results.


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Review the risk associated with the project and assess the level of impact thefacility will have on neighbouring locations of interest;

Identify recommendations for ensuring the risks of offsite impacts are reduced toa level that is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) at the proposed sites.

1.3 Scope of WorkThe scope of this expanded study is limited to the assessment of acute safety risk tooffsite populations resulting from onsite operations associated with the project. Mostof the modelled events would be classified as Major Accidents according to theNational Standard5. As such, the findings of this report may be used as a starting-point for a more exhaustive analysis once detailed design/operational informationbecomes available.

The physical scope of this H&RA covers all normal processes and utility operationsassociated with the project from the point at which the coal seam gas supply crossesthe site boundary from the off-site pipeline, to the point where the products are takenoffsite by trucks.

The scope does not cover risk to onsite populations in detail nor to offsitepopulations during abnormal circumstances, such as neighbouring constructionactivities, maintenance campaigns and/or temporary shutdowns.

1.4 Relevant Queensland and Australian Legislative DocumentsThe following regulations, codes of practice and information documents areapplicable for the project:

Australian Explosives Manufacturers Safety Committee (AEMSC) – Code ofGood Practice – Precursors for Explosives, Edition 1, 1999 [Ref 13].

Council of Australian Government (COAG) Document “Principles for theRegulation of Ammonium Nitrate” [Ref 16]

Explosive Act 1999 and Explosive Regulation 2003 [Ref 17]

Dangerous Goods Safety Management (DGSM) Act 2001 and Regulation [Ref18]

Declaration of SSAN as an Explosive 29 Oct 2004 [Ref 19]

Explosives Information Bulletin No 41 – Persons Appropriateness to Access [Ref20]

Explosives Information Bulletin No 53 – Storage Requirements for SSAN 2006[Ref 21]

Australian Standard AS 4326 – The Storage and Handling of Oxidising Agents[Ref 22]

Australian Code for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road and Rail (6th

Edition) 1 Jan 1998 (ADG Code) [Ref 23]

5 Control of Major Hazard Facilities National Standard [NOHSC: 1014 (2002)]


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Australian Code for the Transport of Explosives by Road and Rail (2nd Edition)Mar 2000 [Ref 24]

AS 2187.1 Explosives: Storage, Transport and Use, Part 1 [Ref 25]

1.5 Risk Assessment Methodology

1.5.1 Definitions

Anything with the potential to cause harm is defined as a hazard. Accidents are therealisation of the hazards that result in harm. Accidents may range from small leaksof gas that disrupt the plant operation but cause no other damage, up to majorfailures of pipes or vessels or explosions causing extensive damage to property andthe death of one or more people in the area.

The concept of risk describes how likely such accidents are to occur. Risk may bedefined as the likelihood of a specific type of harm being caused over a given timeperiod. Risk therefore is the combination of two key components:

The likelihood or frequency of accidents occurring.

The consequences, or harm cause if the accident does occur.

Safety may be loosely defined as the inverse of risk. The higher the standard ofsafety at the facility, the lower the risk profile. With any facility dealing withdangerous goods, it is never possible to achieve absolute safety in the sense of"zero risk", as no matter how many precautions are taken the chance of an accidentwill always remain. This is frequently referred to as the residual risk and comprisesof an inherent risk component and a component that incurs cost in grossdisproportion to the benefit to reduce risk. The only way to achieve zero risk is toremove the facility altogether. In practice, most people consider an installation to be"tolerably safe" once the risks have been made As Low As Reasonably Practicable(ALARP).

1.5.2 QRA Methodology

A Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA) was conducted for the plants H&RA as thisform of assessment is appropriate for demonstrating the adequacy of location withrespect to Land Use Safety Planning requirements. The following section illustratesthe QRA process utilized. The emphasis of this study, in line with the QueenslandCHEM Services risk criteria [Ref 12], was to assess the risk of a potential fatalitybeyond the site boundary. The classical QRA process is shown in and described inthe following text.

1. Define System. Defines the intent of the study and identifies systemoperations, environment, and boundaries. Criteria relevant to the study areidentified at this point.

2. Hazard Identification. During this step, the identification and preliminaryscreening of hazardous events is conducted.


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Y

N M a te ria lC ha ng e

Ide n ti fy a ll M a jo r In c ide n ts(S ys te m a tic B rea k )

C o n seq u en ce A sse ssm e nt:- D isch arg e- D isp ers ion- F la m m ab le E ffec ts- Im pa c t…

F re q uen cy A na lys is :- H is to rica l Le ak D a ta- Ign itio n P rob ab i li ty…

R isk A s sessm en t(A g a in s t C ri te ria / P e rfo r m an ce S ta n da rds )

A d eq ua te D es ign(R isk R ed uce d A L A R P )

A d eq ua teC o n tr o l?

D e fine S ys te m- O b je c tives a nd S cop e- M eth od o lo gy a nd C ri te ria- Ins ta lla tio n & E n viro n m en t

Inp u t to S a fe ty M a na g em en t- C h an g es to de s ig n (o pe ra tion )- S a fe ty C rit ica l E qu ip m e nt P ro ced u res- E m erge nc y S c en arios- Inc ide n ts to m on ito r

Y

N M a te ria lC ha ng e

C ha ng ep ro cess o rco n tro l






C o n seq u en ce A sse ssm e nt:- D isch arg e- D isch arg e- D isp ers ion- D isp ers ion- F la m m ab le E ffec ts- F la m m ab le E ffec ts- Im pa c t…- Im pa c t…



F re q uen cy A na lys is :- H is to rica l Le ak D a ta- H is to rica l Le ak D a ta- Ign itio n P rob ab i li ty…- Ign itio n P rob ab i li ty…
















3. Consequence Analysis. The consequences of each event are determinedusing either empirical means or by consequence modelling software. In thisstudy, the consequence package PHAST was used for process releases.

4. Frequency Analysis. The frequency for each event (identified in Step 2) isdetermined by assessing and comparing the scenario against either a relevanthistorical record or by determining the likelihood of its contributing events.

5. Risk Assessment. Risk is determined by the combination of frequency andconsequence for each event. The overall risk profile may then be assessedagainst the study criteria defined in Step 1. Where the overall level of risk isdetermined not to be tolerable, action can be taken to reduce the risk toALARP levels through the identification and management of risk driving events.Software for the Assessment of Fire, Explosion, and Toxic Impact (SAFETI) isa software program used for the consequence and frequency analysis.SAFETI provides the ability to produce a full spectrum of individual risk at givenlocations, societal risk curves, and various other risk result presentations.

6. Input into Safety Management System (SMS)6. The QRA may be used as atool to support the subsequent design activities used in the proposed facilitySMS, by providing insight into risk-based activities (control, maintenance, etc)or as a starting point for compliance to MHF requirements.

Figure 3 The QRA Process

6 The findings from all risk assessments should be included in the SMS Report, as per the MHFrequirements.

GHD Scope


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1.6 Facility DescriptionAlthough the design of the plant has not been fully completed, it will be similar toother DN Ammonium Nitrate and AN Emulsion plants (i.e. Moura Joint Venture [Ref1]). The description presented in the following sections details the key processesand utilities handling toxic and / or explosive materials relevant to the offsite riskassessment. (overleaf) presents a Process Flow Diagram (PFD), which shows theoverall process from the coal seam gas inlet pipe, to the storage of AN Prill andEmulsion.

1.7 Power StationA 18 MW gas-fired facility will be situated to the north of the proposed AmmoniaNitrate Plant in Moranbah. The facility will be three times the power of 2 MW x 60 Hzand four times 3 MW x 50 Hz plus some spare power generation capacity.

The size of the footprint of the facility will be approximately 150m x 200m (3 Ha) forthe layout of the engines. The additional facilities, including the control room,workshop, switch room, switchgear transformers and let-down station, etc, willoccupy additional space.

The Natural Gas pipeline to the power generation facility will be a branch off theexisting gas pipeline running to the Ammonia plant. The power station will beancillary to the operation of the Ammonia Nitrate Plant and will be incorporated intothe site. The facility is anticipated to be unmanned.

1.8 Ammonia ManufactureCoal Seam methane entering the plant is compressed and transferred to a reformingplant. After the reforming stage the reformed gas is cooled before entering a shiftreactor. Hydrogen is then separated from other undesired products in a PressureSwing Adsorption (PSA) unit.

Nitrogen is also separated from air in an air separation unit. A mixture of purifiedhydrogen and nitrogen is then sent to a converter where Ammonia is formed. TheAmmonia gas is cooled and condensed before being stored in a refrigerated storagetank. This Ammonia is then used in the nitric acid plant and the Ammonium Nitrateplant

1.9 Nitric Acid ManufactureThe Nitric Acid Plant uses Ammonia and air as raw materials. Anhydrous liquefiedAmmonia will be supplied at high pressure from the Ammonia tank. The Ammoniawill be vaporised in the Ammonia Evaporator and Superheater to a pressure ofapproximately 1300 kPag and 100 °C. Ammonia will then be fed at a lower pressureinto a mixer where it is combined with filtered clean air. The Ammonia/air mixture willthen be fed into a Burner where the mixture is reacted over catalytic platinum gauze.The reaction produces a mixture of nitrogen oxides and steam.

After the Burner, the hot reaction products are passed through a series of heatrecovery processes including a Tail Gas Heater, an Economiser, and a Gas Cooler-


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Condenser. The gas mixture will be cooled to less than 60 °C resulting in productionof weak nitric acid solution, which is then separated out and fed as weak nitric acidinto the Absorption Tower. The non-dissolved nitrogen oxide gases (NOX) aresubsequently absorbed into the weak acid in the Tower to form nitric acid at aconcentration of approximately 60% w/w. The acid flows from the bottom of theTower to storage tanks.

1.10 Ammonium Nitrate ManufactureAnhydrous liquid Ammonia at approximately 1600 kPag is fed to the AmmoniumNitrate Plant where it is vaporised in the Ammonia Evaporator and Superheater to apressure of approximately 530 kPag and 70 °C before being fed to the pipe reactor.

The plant uses liquid nitric acid and gaseous Ammonia as raw materials in theprocess to produce Ammonium Nitrate solution in a reactor. The exothermic reactionprovides sufficient energy to maintain non-saturated water in a vapour phase, whichis separated as process steam in the Reactor Separator. Approximately 40% of theprocess steam flow passes to a number of heat exchangers, all of which return thecondensate to the Concentrated Process Condensate Tank. The Ammonium Nitratesolution flows under gravity to a flash tank where the solution is concentrated. Thesolution is then pumped to an evaporator and collects in a tank before being fed tothe prilling processes.

1.11 Prill ManufacturePrilling is the process of forming solid particles from a solution maintained at ahigher temperature than its saturation and the crystallization temperatures. LiquidAmmonium Nitrate is passed through spray nozzles with suitable size holes throughwhich the solution flows. The counter-current flow of air cools and solidifies the prillduring their fall. The prill is then dried, cooled, screened, coated, weighed and sizedfor product quality. Prill, which is out of specification, is returned to the system. On-spec prill is conveyed to silos transferred to shipping container and/or dispatch.

1.12 Emulsion ManufactureAmmonium Nitrate solution is blended with process oils (emulsifiers, mineral oils,and diesels), then cooled and stored as an emulsion. The emulsion plant producescontinuously with storage of 3 x 140 tonnes of Ammonium Nitrate emulsion.Storages are protected against missile impact by mounding, and are suitable forsensitisation (density lowering, gassing) in the bulk vehicles used in the surroundingmining operations.

1.13 AN DispatchThe product is dispatched to customers in bulk. The prill is transported either(mainly) in bulk tippers or 20 tonne shipping containers, both loaded from aconveyor and hopper (gravity fed). Shipping containers are loaded onto trucks usinga forklift or alternatively using a side lifter truck. AN prill and emulsion will be


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transported in accordance with the requirements of the National Code for Transportof Dangerous Goods.

Figure 4 Facility Process

1.14 Safety Systems

Whilst the risk of significant fire or explosion is low onsite, fire-fighting facilities suchas hydrants with hoses will be provided consistent with normal practice. Fire fightingequipment will be fitted out in such a manner that the plant operators are able tofight fires and rapidly provide cooling water to at risk equipment.

Safety equipment including firewater monitors with fogging nozzles, hydrants, mobileand portable fire extinguishers, protective clothing and self-contained breathingapparatus will be provided. Fixed water spray systems will be installed for key facilitycomponents.

1.15 Vent System

The vent system will collect and discharge relief gases and liquids as well as wastegases such as Ammonia and steam to a remote location where they will be safelyvented. Combustion products will consist almost entirely of carbon dioxide, watervapour, and elemental nitrogen, with trace quantities of NOX from Ammonia streams.The flare system is an emergency device and under normal operation will only burnpilot gas.

1.16 Process Interlocking and Alarm Systems

An interlocking system is the safest method of controlling a complex chemical plant.One control system interlocks with another to ensure the plant (and processes) are


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controlled as an integrated system and not independently. The interlocks of the plantare divided into safety relevant trip functions and process related interlocks. Safetyrelated trips are realized in a separate emergency shutdown system (SafeInstrument Systems (SIS)) that consists of a certified, failsafe Programmable LogicController (PLC).

The process related trips are connected to a Distributed Control System (DCS). TheSIS will be connected to the DCS via a signal link (data bus). Alarm management(display and data logging) will be executed at the DCS operator stations. The stationwill allow operators to recognise the alarms in the order in which they appear.Shutdown actions will be announced by an audible signal from the DCS togetherwith a flashing display of the pertaining tag number.

1.17 Gas Detectors and Personal Protection Equipment (PPE)

Gas detectors will monitor the atmosphere surrounding potential leak points ofcombustible or toxic gases (pumps, compressors, pressure relieving devices, valvestations) to prevent injury to personnel. Gas detectors will be installed if necessaryat strategic locations such as classified indoor locations; air intakes and outlets forbuildings; permanent ignition sources such as furnaces in the gas let-down station,coal seam gas, Ammonia plant, Ammonia storage and possibly the reformer (CO).PPE includes canister-type gas masks and Self Contained Breathing Apparatus(SCBA) and will be provided at appropriate points throughout the plant. Safetygoggles, rubber gloves, boots, and aprons will be worn for dangerous work asindicated by procedures established for plant operators. Additionally DN hasdiscussed with current underground mines that they should have ammonia detectionmonitors.

1.18 Operations

1.18.1 Transportation

DN sells to its customers who are responsible for transportation of products. DNunderstands at the date of the EIS that Ammonium Nitrate Prill and AN Emulsion willbe transported in accordance with Explosives Act 1999 [Ref 17]. GHD haveconducted a pavement impact assessment as part of the technical requirementsunder the EIS submission, (Section 4.11).

This report presents the proposed haulage routes of AN prill and AN Emulsionthrough the QLD state controlled road network. It is predicted that the largest supplyof AN Prill and AN Emulsion will be transported to the Central Highlands andMackay (Eastern Basin) Regions of QLD from the proposed AN Prill and ANEmulsion facility. It is estimated that up to 43% (120, 742 te) and 39% (109,668 te)of AN Prill that will be produced from the Dyno Nobel AN prill facility, in the BowenBasin (Moranbah), will be transported to the Central Highlands and Mackay (EasternBasin) Regions of QLD. In the case of AN Emulsion, it is estimated that up to 48%(33, 582 te) and 37% (25,572 te) of AN Emulsion that will be produced from theDNAP AN prill facility will be transported to the Central Highlands and Mackay(Eastern Basin) Regions of QLD.


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It is estimated that the impact from the proposed expansion of the AN Plant willincrease the existing traffic movements, which currently consists of AB triple and Btriple combinations plus two trailer road trains and B doubles. The haulage from theproposed plant will be a 7 day 24 hour operation along routes approved for Type 1Road Trains.


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2. Local Neighbourhood and Environment

2.1 Site Location and Surrounding PopulationsThe Ammonium Nitrate and Emulsion Facilities will be located approximately 4.5 kmnorth of the town of Moranbah on the western side of the Goonyella road and northof the railway line. The preferred area is in the vicinity of the existing Ergon PowerStation. Figure 5 shows the general location of Moranbah, Queensland, whilstFigure 6 shows the site location of the AN Facility within the Moranbah area.

Figure 5 Moranbah, Queensland

Local population groups influence the societal risk measures developed for theproposed plant and ultimately the acceptability of the development by the regulator.Approximate population numbers for facilities nearby the proposed plant arepresented in Table 1. The AN Plant is approximately 4.5km to the North-west ofMoranbah. It faces Goonyella Rd, which is used predominantly by non-commercialpopulation. Figure 6 provides a layout of the Moranbah area.

Table 1 Local Population Groups

PopulationGroup

Distance Population Ref. Source

Site Office (toAmmoniaPlant)

0.12km 40 personnel on dayshift with 10operators on the

l t t ti

QNP MouraAmmonium NitratePlant Expansion(QN2) O t 2005


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plant at any time (QN2), Oct 2005.

Emulsion Plant(to AN Plant)

~0.1km 3 personnel (5hrs aday)

Meeting with DN7

GoonyellaRoad

~0.9km 3670 vehicles perday

QLD Main Roads

TransfieldPower Station(proposed)

1.2km (from onecentre of propertyto the other)

1 (occasionalmaintenance)

Phone conversationwith Transfield

EnertradeFacility(proposed)



Phone conversationwith Enetrade

Ergon PowerStation



Email from Ergon8

Moranbah(Residentialtown area)

4.3km 6673 people Planning Informationand Forecasting UnitQLD Dept of LocalGovernment Planning,Sport and Recreation,

7 Meeting at GHD Office Perth with Alistair Burch (15/5/06)8 Email from Brodie Chester from Ergon (5/5/06)


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Figure 6 Moranbah, Area

2.2 EnvironmentThe plant site is located in the Belyando Shire, which has several industrialdevelopments in the surrounding regions. Moranbah is the service centre for theBHP Billiton Coal Mines of Peak Downs and Goonyella/Riverside, the gasfields,Moranbah North Coal Mine and a number of coal mines to the south.

2.3 TopographyThe plant is situated at 260m above sea level and the levels of significant locationsfrom the plant are shown in Table 3. The distance between each of the significantlocations are shown in Table 5. The topographical surroundings in Moranbah areshown in Figure 7. The difference between relative levels will have negligible affecton the consequence models and therefore has not been specifically used in thisanalysis.

Table 3 Sea Level of Surrounding Locations

Location Sea Level

Grosvenor Creek 235m

Moranbah Township 235m

Railway Line 240m

Moranbah Township


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Table 5 Distance from the Plant to Significant Offsite Locations

Location Distance from Plant

1. Grosvenor Creek ~2.0km

2. Moranbah Township 4.3km*

3. Railway Line 2.6km

* This is the distance to the nearest residence from the edge of the Facility.

Figure 7 Topographical Map of Moranbah

2.4 MeteorologyWind speed and atmospheric stability affect the dispersion of vapour clouds, whilethe wind direction determines the bearing of the cloud. Wind speed also influencesthe rate of evaporation of liquid pools.

Meteorological data was obtained from the Bureau of Meteorology’s (BoM)Moranbah station. The wind data consists of over 1000 samples taken over the year2004 and covers direction, speed, and stability groupings. In addition temperature,humidity, and solar flux values were obtained from annual summaries.

Wind data was obtained for 16 cardinal compass points, which make up therepresentative wind model for the dispersion modelling, as presented in Figure 8,

1

2

3


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and indicates that the prevalent wind occurs from the South-East. Pasquil stabilitycategories are used to define dispersion coefficients used by the consequencemodelling packages involved in this assessment. The coefficients dictate the degreeof vertical dispersion of a vapour cloud hence the concentrations received atdistances from the release point. Pasquil stability categories are shown in Table 7.The BoM data was group into three broad weather categories consideredrepresentative for the site as shown in Table 7. In addition of the wind stability anddirection data previously mentioned, Table 11 presents the temperature andhumidity averages obtained from the Moranbah BoM weather station. Thisinformation is used as the input to the SAFETI model.

Figure 8 Moranbah Weather Station Wind Rose

Moranbah Wind Rose

0.0%5.0%

10.0%15.0%20.0%25.0%348.75 - 11.25

11.25 - 33.7533.75 - 56.25

56.25 - 78.75

78.75 - 101.25

101.25 - 123.75

123.75 - 146.25

146.25 - 168.75168.75 - 191.25

191.25 - 213.75213.75 - 236.25

236.25 - 258.75

258.75 - 281.25

281.25 - 303.75

303.75 - 326.25

326.25 - 348.75

Table 7 Pasquil Stability Class Definitions

Class Type Description

A VeryUnstable

Daytime – sunny, light winds (strong insolation)

B Unstable Daytime – moderately sunny, light to moderate winds

C Unstable /Neutral

Daytime – moderate winds, overcast or windy and suny

D Neutral Daytime – windy, overcast or Night-time – windy

E Stable Night-time – moderate winds with little cloud or lightwinds with more clouds

F Very Stable Night-time – light wind, little cloud (strong temperatureinversion)

ïêProposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant, Moranbah, QueenslandØ¿¦¿®¼ ¿²¼ Î·µ ß»³»²¬

ìïñïëèîìñíìêðíð

Table 9 Moranbah Weather Categories (%)

Wind Direction Probability (%)

N NNE NE ENE E ESE SE SSE S SSWSW WSWW WNWNW NNWWind StabilityCategory

Wind Speed(m/s)

360 20 50 70 90 110 130 160 180 200 230 250 270 290 310 340

Ú ï ðòêû ðòðûðòðûðòêûëòèû ëòîûïíòðûðòîûðòêûðòðû ðòìû ðòðû ðòðûðòìû íòçûïòïû

Ü í ïòíû ðòëûïòçûïòèûèòîû ëòìûéòéû ðòëûðòìûðòïû ðòèû ðòðû ïòðûðòîû íòëûðòêû

Þ íòí ïòçû ðòíûîòéûïòçûïðòëûìòìûíòïû ðòìûïòèûðòêû îòïû ðòíû ïòéûðòíû ïòëûðòëû

Table 11 Moranbah Weather Station Air Properties.

Property Day Night

ß·® Ì»³°»®¿¬«®» îç±Ý ïè

±Ý

Î»´¿¬·ª» Ø«³·¼·¬§ íì û èð û

41/15824/346030Proposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant, Moranbah, QueenslandØ¿¦¿®¼ ¿²¼ Î·µ ß»³»²¬

íò Ø¿¦¿®¼ ×¼»²¬·º·½¿¬·±²ô ×³°¿½¬ ¿²¼ Î·µ Ý®·¬»®·¿

3.1 Hazardous Material Identification

Ø¿¦¿®¼±« ³¿¬»®·¿´ ·¼»²¬·º·»¼ ¿ ¾»·²¹ »·¬¸»® °®±¼«½»¼ ±® ½±²«³»¼ ·² ¬¸»

ß³³±²·¿ô ²·¬®·½ ¿½·¼ô ß³³±²·«³ Ò·¬®¿¬»ô ¿²¼ñ±® »³«´·±² °´¿²¬ ¿®» °®»»²¬»¼ ·²

Ì¿¾´» ïíò

Table 13 Hazardous Materials addressed in the AN and AN EmulsionFacilities

RefNo.

HazardousMaterialç Phaseïð Produced/Use

MaximumQuantities inAssessed Siteson the AN & ANEmulsionFacilities

ï ß²¸§¼®±«ß³³±²·¿

Ô·¯«·¼ ¿²¼Ù¿

Ð®±¼«½»¼ ¿¬ ¬¸»ß³³±²·¿ °´¿²¬ ¿²¼½±²«³»¼ ·² ¾±¬¸ ¬¸»ßÒ ¿²¼ Ò·¬®·½ ¿½·¼°´¿²¬ º±® ¬¸»°®±¼«½¬·±² ±º ¿½·¼ ¿²¼ßÒò

Í¬±®¿¹» ±º «° ¬±ëððð ¬±²²»ò

î ß³³±²·«³Ò·¬®¿¬»

Í±´«¬·±²ôÐ®·´´ô ¿²¼Û³«´·±²

Ð®±¼«½»¼ ·² ßÒ °´¿²¬òÚ¿½·´·¬§ »²¼ °®±¼«½¬

Í¬±®¿¹» ±º «° ¬±ïîôððð ¬±²²» ±º°®·´´ ¿²¼ »³«´·±²ø¬¸· ·²½´«¼»³¿¬»®·¿´ ³±ª·²¹¬¸®±«¹¸ ¬¸»°®±½» ±² ·¬»÷ò

í Ò·¬®±¹»²±¨·¼»ø³±²±¨·¼»ô¼·±¨·¼»ô¬»¬®±¨·¼»ô²·¬®±«÷

×²¬»®³»¼·¿¬»Ù¿

Ð®±¼«½»¼ ¿²¼½±²«³»¼ ·² ß½·¼°´¿²¬ º±® ¬¸»°®±¼«½¬·±² ±º ¿½·¼ò

×²ó·¬« «¿¹»ò Ò±¬±®¿¹» ±º ¹¿ò

ì Ò·¬®·½ ¿½·¼ Ô·¯«·¼ Ð®±¼«½»¼ ·² ß½·¼ °´¿²¬¿²¼ ½±²«³»¼ ·² ßÒ°´¿²¬ ¬± °®±¼«½» ßÒò

Í¬±®¿¹» ±º «° ¬±îððð ¬±²²»

ë ß´µ§´ ¿³·²»ø½±¿¬·²¹¿¹»²¬÷

Ô·¯«·¼ Ý±²«³»¼ ·² ßÒ °´¿²¬º±® °®·´´ ¬¿¾·´·¿¬·±²ò

Í¬±®¿¹» ±º «° ¬±ïðð ¬±²²»

ê Û³«´·±²¿¹»²¬ ø±·́ ô¼·»»´÷

Ô·¯«·¼ Ý±²«³»¼ ·²»³«´·±² °´¿²¬ò

Í¬±®¿¹» ±º «° ¬±îðð ¬±²²»

é Í¬»¿³ Ù¿ Ð®±¼«½»¼ ¿²¼

½±²«³»¼ ¾§ß³³±²·¿ô ß³³±²·¿

Ò± ¬±®¿¹» ±º

¬»¿³

ç Ì¸» ¬§°·½¿´ ÓÍÜÍ º±® ¬¸»» ½¸»³·½¿´ ½¿² ¾» º±«²¼ ·² ß°°»²¼·¨ Ûò

ïð Í»» Ì¿¾´» íëô Ì¿¾´» íé ¿²¼ Ì¿¾´» íç º±® º«®¬¸»® ¼»¬¿·´ò


RefNo.

HazardousMaterialç Phaseïð Produced/Use

MaximumQuantities inAssessed Siteson the AN & ANEmulsionFacilities

²·¬®¿¬» ¿²¼ ²·¬®·½ ¿½·¼°´¿²¬ò

è Ò·¬®±¹»² Ð®»«®·»¼Ô·¯«·¼ ¿²¼Ù¿

Ý±²«³»¼ ¾§ ¾±¬¸°´¿²¬ ¿ °«®¹»ò

Í¬±®¿¹» ±º «° ¬±íðð ³

í

Ñº ¬¸» ³¿¬»®·¿´ ³»²¬·±²»¼ ¿¾±ª»ô ±²´§ ß²¸§¼®±« ß³³±²·¿ô Ò·¬®±¹»² Ñ¨·¼» ¿²¼

ß³³±²·«³ Ò·¬®¿¬» ©»®» ½±²·¼»®»¼ ½¿°¿¾´» ±º ¸¿ª·²¹ ¿² ±ºº·¬» ¿º»¬§ ®·µ ·³°¿½¬ò

Ì¸»» ³¿¬»®·¿´ ¿®» ¼·½«»¼ ·² ¬«®² ·² ¬¸» º±´´±©·²¹ »½¬·±²ò Ì¸» ®»³¿·²¼»® ±º

³¿¬»®·¿´ ³»²¬·±²»¼ ¿¾±ª» · ½±²·¼»®»¼ ¬± ±²´§ ¸¿ª» ´±½¿´·»¼ »ºº»½¬ô ¿

¼·½«»¼ ¾»´±©æ

Ò·¬®·½ ¿½·¼ ¿²¼ Í¬»¿³ ©·´´ ½¿«» »ª»®» ¾«®² ©·¬¸ ¾±¼·´§ ½±²¬¿½¬ ¸±©»ª»® ©·´´

²±¬ ¬®¿ª»´ «ºº·½·»²¬ ¼·¬¿²½» «°±² ®»´»¿» ¬± ¿¬³±°¸»®» ¬± ¿ºº»½¬ ¿² ±ºº·¬»

°±°«´¿¬·±²ò

Ì¸» ½±¿¬·²¹ ¿¹»²¬ ø¿´µ§´ ¿³·²»÷ ¿²¼ »³«´·±² ¿¹»²¬ ø°®±½» ±·́ ô ¼·»»´÷ ©·´´

½¿«» ´±½¿´·»¼ °±±´ º·®»ô ·º ¬¸»§ ¾»½±³» ·¹²·¬»¼ô ¬¸¿¬ ´·µ»©·» ©»®» ½±²·¼»®»¼

«²¿¾´» ¬± ¿ºº»½¬ ¿² ±ºº·¬» °±°«´¿¬·±²ò Ì±¨·½ ³±µ» °´«³» ©·´´ ²±¬ ¿ºº»½¬ ±ºº·¬»

°±°«´¿¬·±² ¼«» ¬± ¬¸» »°¿®¿¬·±² ¼·¬¿²½» ±º ¬¸» ¬±®¿¹» ñ °®±¼«½¬·±² º¿½·´·¬·»

º®±³ ¬¸» ·¬» ¾±«²¼¿®§ò

Ò·¬®±¹»² °±» ¾±¬¸ ¿ °±¬»²¬·¿´ ¿°¸§¨·¿¬·±² ¿²¼ º®±¬¾·¬» ¸¿¦¿®¼ ¬± °»®±²²»´

¸±©»ª»® ¿´´ Ò·¬®±¹»² ®»´»¿» ©·´´ ®¿°·¼´§ ¼·°»®»ô ¬± ¿º» ½±²½»²¬®¿¬·±²ô ¾»º±®»

®»¿½¸·²¹ ¬¸» ·¬» ¾±«²¼¿®§ò

Ì¸»» ·¬»³ ©·´´ ¬¸»®»º±®» ²±¬ ¾» ¼·½«»¼ º«®¬¸»® ©·¬¸·² ¬¸· ®»°±®¬ò

3.2 Consequence Impact Criteria

×³°¿½¬ ½®·¬»®·¿ ©»®» »¬¿¾ ·́¸»¼ º±® ¬¸» ¿»³»²¬ ±º ¸¿¦¿®¼±« »ª»²¬

½±²»¯«»²½» ø¼·°»®·²¹ ¹¿ ½´±«¼ô »¨°´±·±²ô »¬½÷ïï

±² ¸«³¿² ¿²¼ ¾«·´¼·²¹ò

Û¨°´±·±² ±ª»®°®»«®» ½®·¬»®·¿ ¿®» ©»´´ó¼»º·²»¼ ¿²¼ «»¼ ¬¸®±«¹¸±«¬ ·²¼«¬®§ ñ

³·´·¬¿®§ ¿ ½±²·¼»®¿¾´» ·²º±®³¿¬·±² ¸¿ ¾»»² ³¿¼» ¿ª¿·´¿¾´» º®±³ ®»°«¬¿¾´»

±«®½» øÌ¿¾´» ïç÷ò Û¨°´±·±² ±ª»®°®»«®» ½®·¬»®·¿ øßÒ÷ ¿®» ¾¿»¼ ±² ¬¸» ·³°¿½¬

¬¸» ±ª»®°®»«®» ½¿² ½¿«» ¬± ¾«·´¼·²¹ ¿²¼ ·²º®¿¬®«½¬«®»ô ¿²¼ ¿´± ·³°¿½¬ ¬±

¸«³¿²ò Ì¸» ®»´¿¬·±²¸·° ¾»¬©»»² ±ª»®°®»«®» ¿²¼ º¿¬¿´·¬·» · ½±³°´»¨ ¿²¼ º±® ¬¸»

°«®°±» ±º ¬¸· ¬«¼§ô ¬¸» ½®·¬»®·¿ ¯«±¬»¼ ·² ¬¸» ÒÍÉ Ø¿¦¿®¼±« ×²¼«¬®§ Ð´¿²²·²¹

ß¼ª·±®§ Ð¿°»® øØ×ÐßÐ÷ Ò±ò ì ÅÎ»º èÃô ¸¿ª» ¾»»² «»¼ô ¿ ¼»¬¿·́ »¼ ·² Ì¿¾´» ïçò Ì¸·

½®·¬»®·¿ · ©·¼»´§ ¿½½»°¬»¼ ¬¸®±«¹¸±«¬ ß«¬®¿´·¿ò

ïï Ì¸» ·³°¿½¬ ±º ¿ º·®» ±²·¬» ©¿ ½±²·¼»®»¼ ¿¬ ¬¸» ß³³±²·¿ °´¿²¬ô ¾«¬ «´¬·³¿¬»´§ ¬¸» ½±²»¯«»²½» ¼±²±¬ ½±²¬®·¾«¬» ¬± ¬̧ » ±ºº·¬» ®·µ °®±º·´»ò


Ì±¨·½ »¨°±«®» ½®·¬»®·¿ øß³³±²·¿ ¿²¼ ÒÑ¨÷ ½¿² ¾» °®»»²¬»¼ ·² ¬»®³ ±º °®±¾·¬ ±®

¼¿²¹»®±« ¼±»ò Ð®±¾·¬ ½¿´½«´¿¬·±² ®»´¿¬» ¬¸» °®±¾¿¾· ·́¬§ ±º º¿¬¿´·¬§ ¬± ¿ °®±¾·¬

½±»ºº·½·»²¬ ¬¸¿¬ · ¼»¬»®³·²»¼ º®±³ ¿² »¨°±«®» ¼±» ¬± ¿ °¿®¬·½«´¿® ³¿¬»®·¿´ ÅÎ»º íÃò

Ó±¼»®² ½±²»¯«»²½» ³±¼»´́ ·²¹ °¿½µ¿¹» «» °®±¾·¬ ½¿´½«´¿¬·±² ¬± ¹»²»®¿¬» º¿¬¿´·¬§

°®±¾¿¾·´·¬§ º±±¬°®·²¬ «·¬¿¾´» º±® ½®»¿¬·²¹ ®»¿±²¿¾´» ®·µ ³»¿«®»³»²¬ò ß

¼¿²¹»®±« ¼±» · ¿ ·²¹´» ½®·¬»®·±² ¬¸¿¬ ¼»º·²» ¿ ½»®¬¿·² ¼±» ¬¸¿¬ ©·´́ ®»«´¬ ·² ¿

½»®¬¿·² °®±¾¿¾·´·¬§ ±º º¿¬¿´·¬§ò Ü»¬¿·´ ±º ¬¸» Ð®±¾·¬ «»¼ º±® ß³³±²·¿ ¿²¼ Ò·¬®±¹»²

Ü·±¨·¼» ®»´»¿» ¿®» °®»»²¬»¼ ·² ß°°»²¼·¨ Ýô Ì¿¾´» ìïò

3.3 Ammonia

ß³³±²·¿ · ¿ ¬±¨·½ ¹¿ô ©¸·½¸ ©¸·´» ¿´± º´¿³³¿¾´»ô ·¬ · ¿½µ²±©´»¼¹»¼ ¬± ¾»

»¨¬®»³»´§ ¼·ºº·½«´¬ ¬± ·¹²·¬»ò Ý±²·¼»®·²¹ ¬¸·ô ¬¸» º´¿³³¿¾´» »ºº»½¬ ±º ß³³±²·¿ ©»®»

½®»»²»¼ º®±³ ¬¸» ¬«¼§ ©·¬¸ ·¬ ¬±¨·½·¬§ ¾»·²¹ ¬¸» °®·²½·°¿´ ·«» ½±²·¼»®»¼ ·² ¬¸·

¿»³»²¬ò Ì¸» ·¹²·¬·±² ±º ß³³±²·¿ · ¼·½«»¼ º«®¬¸»® ·² ß°°»²¼·¨ ßò

ß´¬¸±«¹¸ ß³³±²·¿ · ´·¹¸¬»® ¬¸¿² ¿·®ô ¿ °®»«®·»¼ ±® ½±´¼ ®»´»¿» ±º ß³³±²·¿ ³¿§

º±®³ ¿ ¼»²» ½´±«¼ ø¼«» ¬± ´±© ¬»³°»®¿¬«®»÷ ¿º¬»® »¨°¿²·±² ¬± ¿¬³±°¸»®·½

°®»«®» ±® º±®³ ¿ º±¹ò ß³³±²·¿ ½¿² ¾» ®»¿¼·´§ ¼»¬»½¬»¼ ·² ¬¸» ¿¬³±°¸»®» ¾§

³»´´ ¿¬ ½±²½»²¬®¿¬·±² ¿ ´±© ¿ ë °°³ ×¬ · ¿ °±©»®º«´ ·®®·¬¿²¬ ¬± »§» ¿²¼ ³«½±«

³»³¾®¿²» ±º ¬¸» ®»°·®¿¬±®§ ¬®¿½¬ò ×²¸¿´¿¬·±² ±º ¸·¹¸ ½±²½»²¬®¿¬·±² ±º ¬¸» ª¿°±«®

³¿§ ½¿«» °«´³±²¿®§ ±»¼»³¿ô ©¸·½¸ ³¿§ ¾» º¿¬¿´ò ß¬ ´±© ½±²½»²¬®¿¬·±² ·² ¿·®ô

ß³³±²·¿ ª¿°±«® ·®®·¬¿¬» ¬¸» »§»ô ²±» ¿²¼ ¬¸®±¿¬ò ×²¸¿´¿¬·±² ±º ¸·¹¸

½±²½»²¬®¿¬·±² °®±¼«½» ¿ »²¿¬·±² ±º «ºº±½¿¬·±²ô ¯«·½µ´§ ½¿«» ¾«®²·²¹ ±º

®»°·®¿¬±®§ ¬®¿½¬ ¿²¼ ³¿§ ®»«´¬ ·² ¼»¿¬¸ò Ì¸» ¬±¨·½·¬§ ±º ß³³±²·¿ · ®»°±®¬»¼ ·²

Ì¿¾´» ïëò


Table 15 Toxicity of Ammonia

Concentration(ppm) Exposure Effects Exposure Duration

ëÑ¼±«® ¼»¬»½¬¿¾´» ¾§ ³±¬°»±°´»ò

Ð®±´±²¹»¼ ®»°»¿¬»¼ »¨°±«®»°®±¼«½» ²± ·²¶«®§ò

ïððÒ± ¿¼ª»®» »ºº»½¬ º±®¿ª»®¿¹» ©±®µ»®ò

Ó¿¨·³«³ ¿´´±©¿¾´»½±²½»²¬®¿¬·±² º±® èó¸±«® ©±®µ·²¹¼¿§ò

íððóéððÒ±» ¿²¼ ¬¸®±¿¬ ·®®·¬¿¬·±²òÛ§» ·®®·¬¿¬·±² ©·¬¸ ¬»¿®·²¹ò

×²º®»¯«»²¬ô ¸±®¬ øï ¸®÷»¨°±«®» ¬§°·½¿´´§ °®±¼«½» ²±»®·±« »ºº»½¬ò

îðððóíðððÝ±²ª«´·ª» ½±«¹¸·²¹ô»ª»®» »§» ·®®·¬¿¬·±²ò

Ò± °»®³··¾´» »¨°±«®»ò

ëðððóéðððÎ»°·®¿¬±®§ °¿³ô ®¿°·¼¿°¸§¨·¿ò

Ò± °»®³··¾´» »¨°±«®»òÎ¿°·¼´§ º¿¬¿´ò

Ì¸» ¬±¨·½·¬§ ´»ª»´ ¿²¼ »¨°±«®» »ºº»½¬ ¿®» ¾¿»¼ ±² ¬¸» ¼» É»¹»® ñ ÌÒÑ Ù®»»²

Þ±±µ ÅÎ»º ìÃ °®±¾·¬ º±® ¼»¬»®³·²·²¹ ß³³±²·¿ º¿¬¿´·¬·»ò Ì¸» ÛÎÐÙóí ½±²½»²¬®¿¬·±²

º±® ¿²¸§¼®±« ß³³±²·¿ · éëð °°³ò

3.4 Nitrogen Oxides

Ò·¬®±¹»² ±¨·¼» ø²·¬®±¹»² ³±²±¨·¼»ô ¼·±¨·¼»ô ¬»¬®±¨·¼»ô ²·¬®±« ±¨·¼»ô »¬½÷ ¿®»

°®±¼«½»¼ ·² ¬¸» ²·¬®·½ ¿½·¼ °´¿²¬ º±® ¬¸» °®±¼«½¬·±² ±º ¿½·¼ò Ò·¬®±¹»² ¼·±¨·¼» øÒÑî÷ ·

¬¸» ³±¬ ¬±¨·½ò ÒÑî · ¿ ®»°·®¿¬±®§ ·®®·¬¿²¬ô ¸±©»ª»® ·¬ ³¿·² ¼¿²¹»® ´·» ·² ¬¸» ¼»´¿§

¾»º±®» ·¬ º«´´ »ºº»½¬ «°±² ¬¸» ´«²¹ ¿®» ¸±©² ¾§ º»» ·́²¹ ±º ©»¿µ²» ¿²¼

½±´¼²»ô ¸»¿¼¿½¸»ô ²¿«»¿ô ¼·¦¦·²»ô ¿¾¼±³·²¿´ °¿·² ¿²¼ ½§¿²±·ò ×² »ª»®»

½¿»ô ½±²ª«´·±² ¿²¼ ¼»¿¬¸ ¾§ ¿°¸§¨·¿ ³¿§ º±´´±©ò Ì¿¾´» ïé ±ª»®ª·»© ¬¸»

¬±¨·½·¬§ ±º ²·¬®±¹»² ¼·±¨·¼» ÅÎ»º ëÃò Ì¸· ¬«¼§ «»¼ ¬¸» Ø¿®®· ÜÍÓéè °®±¾·¬ º±®

¼»¬»®³·²·²¹ ²·¬®±¹»² ¼·±¨·¼» º¿¬¿´·¬·»ò Ì¸» ÛÎÐÙóí ½±²½»²¬®¿¬·±² º±® ²·¬®±¹»²

¼·±¨·¼» · íð °°³ò

Table 17 Toxicity of Nitrogen Dioxide

Concentration(ppm) Exposure Effects

ðòï Ñ¼±«® °»®½»°¬·±²ò Í¸±®¬ó¬»®³ ·³°¿·®³»²¬ ±º ²·¹¸¬ ª··±²ò

ðòî Ñ¼±«® ¬¸®»¸±´¼ º±® ïððû ®»½±¹²·¬·±²ò

íÎ»½±³³»²¼»¼ ÌÔÊ º±® ½±²¬·²«»¼ ©±®µ°´¿½» »¨°±«®» ©·¬¸²± ¿¼ª»®» »ºº»½¬ò

çð Ô±©»¬ ¬±¨·½ ½±²½»²¬®¿¬·±² º±® ¸«³¿²ò Ý¿«» °²»«³±²·¿¿²¼ ¾®±²½¸·¬· ¿º¬»® ìð ³·²«¬» »¨°±«®»ò Ó±¼»®¿¬» ·®®·¬¿¬·±²

¼


Concentration(ppm) Exposure Effects

¬± »§» ¿²¼ ²±»

îððÔ±©»¬ ´»¬¸¿´ ½±²½»²¬®¿¬·±² º±® ¸«³¿² ¿º¬»® ±²»ó¸±«®»¨°±«®»ò

îëðß½«¬» »¨°±«®»ò Ý±²½»²¬®¿¬·±² ³¿§ ®»«´¬ ·² ½±«¹¸·²¹ôº»ª»®ô ª±³·¬·²¹ ¿²¼ ¼»¿¬¸ò

Ò·¬®±« ±¨·¼» øÒîÑ÷ · ¿ ²±²ó¬±¨·½ ¿²¿»¬¸»¬·½ ¸±©»ª»® ³¿§ ½¿«» º¿¬¿´·¬§ ¼«» ¬± ¿²

¿°¸§¨·¿¬·±² »ºº»½¬ ¾§ ¼·°´¿½·²¹ ±¨§¹»²ò Ð»®±²²»´ »¨°±»¼ ¬± ²·¬®±« ±¨·¼» ¿®»

´·µ»´§ ¬± º»»´ ´·¹¸¬ó¸»¿¼»¼ ¿²¼ ¿²¿»¬¸»¬·»¼ ¾»º±®» ¿°¸§¨·¿¬·±² ±½½«®ô ¸±©»ª»®

½±²½»²¬®¿¬·±² ±º ¿°°®±¨·³¿¬»´§ ïëðôððð °°³ ±º ¹¿ ¿®» ®»¯«·®»¼ ¬± ¼·°´¿½» ±º

±¨§¹»² ½±²¬»²¬ ±º ¿·® ¬± ´» ¬¸¿² ïèû ©¸·½¸ · ½±²·¼»®»¼ ¿ ¬¿®¬·²¹ó°±·²¬ º±®

¿°¸§¨·¿¬·±² ÅÎ»º êÃò Ò·¬®±« ±¨·¼» ©¿ ½®»»²»¼ º®±³ ¬¸» ¿²¿´§·ô ¿

½±²½»²¬®¿¬·±² ´»¿¼·²¹ ¬± ¿°¸§¨·¿ ©·´´ ²±¬ ¾» ®»¿½¸»¼ ¾»§±²¼ ¬¸» ·¬» ¾±«²¼¿®§ò

3.5 Ammonium Nitrate

ß³³±²·«³ Ò·¬®¿¬» øßÒ÷ · ¿ ¬®±²¹ ±¨·¼··²¹ ¿¹»²¬ ¬¸¿¬ ©·´´ «°°±®¬ ½±³¾«¬·±² ±º

±®¹¿²·½ ¿²¼ ³»¬¿´ °±©¼»® ¿ ·¬ °®±¼«½» ±¨§¹»² ¿ ±²» ±º ·¬ ¼»½±³°±·¬·±²

°®±¼«½¬ò É¸»² «¾¶»½¬»¼ ¬± ¸»¿¬ô ßÒ «²¼»®¹±» ¿ »®·» ±º ½±³°´»¨

¼»½±³°±·¬·±² ®»¿½¬·±² ¬¸¿¬ °®±¼«½» ´±© ´»ª»´ ±º ¬±¨·½ ²·¬®±¹»² ±¨·¼» ø²¿³»´§

²·¬®±« ±¨·¼»÷ ¿¬ ¿¬³±°¸»®·½ °®»«®» ÅÎ»º éÃò ×º ¬¸» ®»¿½¬·±² · ½±²º·²»¼ ¿²¼ ¬¸»

¹¿» ¿®» ³¿·²¬¿·²»¼ ¿¬ ¬¸» ¬»³°»®¿¬«®» ¿¬ ©¸·½¸ ¬¸»§ ©»®» º±®³»¼ô º«®¬¸»® ¹¿

°¸¿» ®»¿½¬·±² ½¿² ±½½«® ¹·ª·²¹ ±ºº ²·¬®·½ ±¨·¼» ¿²¼ ²·¬®±¹»² ¼·±¨·¼» ¹¿»ò

Ò·¬®±¹»² ¼·±¨·¼» · ¬¸» ³±¬ ¬±¨·½ °®±¼«½¬ ¬¸¿¬ ³¿§ º±®³ «²¼»® ¬¸»» ½±²¼·¬·±² ¿²¼

· ¼·½«»¼ ·² ¬¸» °®»ª·±« »½¬·±²ò

Ì¸» °´«³» ±º ½±³¾«¬·±² °®±¼«½¬ ®»«´¬·²¹ º®±³ ¿² ß³³±²·«³ Ò·¬®¿¬» º·®» ·²

°®»ª·±« ¬«¼·» ø»¹ò Þ«²¾»®¹² Ø¿®¾±«®ô »¬½÷ ¸¿ª» ¾»»² ¸±©² ¬± ¾» ¾«±§¿²¬ ¼«»

¬± ¬¸» ¸·¹¸ ¬»³°»®¿¬«®» ·²ª±´ª»¼ô ¿²¼ ¼·°»®» ¬± ²±²ó¸¿¦¿®¼±« ½±²½»²¬®¿¬·±²

¾»º±®» ®»¬«®²·²¹ ¬± ¹®¿¼»ò Ñ² ¬¸· ¾¿·ô ¬±¨·½ »ºº»½¬ º®±³ ßÒ º·®» ¿®» ½®»»²»¼ ±«¬ò

Ì¸» »²·¬·ª·¬§ ±º ß³³±²·«³ Ò·¬®¿¬» ¬± ¼»¬±²¿¬·±² · ´¿®¹»´§ ¼»°»²¼¿²¬ ±² ¬¸®»»

ª¿®·¿¾´»å ¸·¹¸ ¬»³°»®¿¬«®»ô ½±²º·²»³»²¬ ¿²¼ ½±²¬¿³·²¿¬·±²ò É·¬¸±«¬ ¿²§ ±²» ±º

¬¸»» ¾»·²¹ °®»»²¬ô ß³³±²·«³ Ò·¬®¿¬» ©±«´¼ ®»¯«·®» ¿ ¬®±²¹ ·²·¬·¿¬·±² ½¸¿®¹» ø·ò»ò

¸·¹¸ »¨°´±·ª»÷ ¬± ¼»¬±²¿¬» ¿¬ ¿´´ò

Ê¿®·¿¾´» ·² ¬¸» ½¿´½«´¿¬·±² ±º ±ª»®°®»«®» ½±²»¯«»²½» º®±³ ¿² ß³³±²·«³

Ò·¬®¿¬» »¨°´±·±² ·²½´«¼» ¬¸» °®±°±®¬·±² ±º ³¿¬»®·¿´ °®»»²¬ ¬¸¿¬ · »²·¬·»¼ ¬±

¼»¬±²¿¬·±²ô ¬¸» °®±°±®¬·±² ±º ¬¸» »²·¬·»¼ ³¿¬»®·¿´ ¬¸¿¬ ¿½¬«¿´´§ ¼»¬±²¿¬» ·² ¬¸»

»¨°´±·±² ø»ºº·½·»²½§÷ô ¿²¼ ¿² »¯«·ª¿´»²½§ ±º ¬¸» »²·¬·»¼ ³¿¬»®·¿´ ¬± ¬¸¿¬ ±º ÌÒÌ

ø»¯«·ª¿´»²½§÷ò Ì¸· ¬»½¸²·¯«» · «»¼ ¾»½¿«» ±º ¬¸» ·¹²·º·½¿²¬ ¯«¿²¬·¬§ ±º

·²º±®³¿¬·±² ±² ¬¸» ½±²»¯«»²½» ±º »¨°´±·±² ·²ª±´ª·²¹ ÌÒÌ ¿²¼ ¬¸» ½¿®½·¬§ ±º

®»´·¿¾´» ·²º±®³¿¬·±² ±² ¬¸» »¨°´±·ª» ²¿¬«®» ±º ³¿²§ ±¬¸»® ³¿¬»®·¿´ò


×² ¬¸· ¿²¿´§·ô ¬¸» ·³°¿½¬ ½®·¬»®·¿ °®»»²¬»¼ ·² ¬¸» ¬¸·®¼ ½±´«³² ±º Ì¿¾´» ïç ©»®»

«»¼ ¬± ¼»º·²» º¿¬¿´·¬§ »²ª»´±°» ø±ºº»¬ ¿®»¿ ±º ¬¸» º¿½·´·¬§ ·² ©¸·½¸ °»±°´» °®»»²¬

¿®» »¨°»½¬»¼ ¬± ¾» µ·´´»¼÷ ©·¬¸ ¬¸»·® ®»°»½¬·ª» º¿¬¿´·¬§ °®±¾¿¾·´·¬·»ò Ì¸» ½®·¬»®·¿ ©»®»

½¸±»² ¬± °®±ª·¼» ½±²»®ª¿¬·ª» ®»«´¬ ¿°°®±°®·¿¬» º±® ÔËÍÐ ¿°°®±ª¿´ °«®°±»ò ß

¼»¬¿·´»¼ »¨°´¿²¿¬·±² ±º ¬¸» ß³³±²·«³ Ò·¬®¿¬» »¨°´±·±² ³±¼»´·²¹ ½±²¼«½¬»¼ ·² ¬¸·

®»°±®¬ · ¹·ª»² ·² ß°°»²¼·¨ Ýò

Table 19 HIPAP Overpressure Effects

ExplosionOverpressure Recognised Effects Overpressure Criteria

used in this Study

íòë µÐ¿ øðòë °·÷

çðû ¹´¿ ¾®»¿µ¿¹»ò

Ò± º¿¬¿´·¬§ ª»®§ ´±© °®±¾¿¾·´·¬§ ±º·²¶«®§ò

é µÐ¿ øï °·÷

Ü¿³¿¹» ¬± ·²¬»®²¿´ °¿®¬·¬·±²¿²¼ ¶±·²»®§ ¾«¬ ½¿² ¾» ®»°¿·®»¼ò

Ð®±¾¿¾·´·¬§ ±º ·²¶«®§ · ïðûò Ò±º¿¬¿´·¬§ò

ïì µÐ¿ øî °·÷Ø±«» «²·²¸¿¾·¬¿¾´» ¿²¼ ¾¿¼´§½®¿½µ»¼ò

îï µÐ¿ øí °·÷

Î»·²º±®½»¼ ¬®«½¬«®» ¼·¬±®¬ò

Í¬±®¿¹» ¬¿²µ º¿·´ò

îðû ½¸¿²½» ±º º¿¬¿´·¬§ º±® ¿°»®±² ·² ¿ ¾«·´¼·²¹ò

Ñ²»¬ ±º Ú¿¬¿´·¬·» ±º °»±°´»·² ¬¸» ±°»²ô ½±²»®ª¿¬·ª»´§»¬·³¿¬»¼ ¿¬ ïðû

íë µÐ¿ øë °·÷

Ø±«» «²·²¸¿¾·¬¿¾´»ò

É¿¹±² ¿²¼ °´¿²¬ ·¬»³±ª»®¬«®²»¼ò

Ì¸®»¸±´¼ ±º »¿®¼®«³ ¼¿³¿¹»ò

ëðû ½¸¿²½» ±º º¿¬¿´·¬§ º±® ¿°»®±² ·² ¾«·´¼·²¹ ¿²¼ ïëû

½¸¿²½» ±º º¿¬¿´·¬§ º±® ¿ °»®±² ·²±°»²ò

Ú¿¬¿´·¬·» ±º °»±°´» ·² ¬¸»±°»² ½±²»®ª¿¬·ª»´§

»¬·³¿¬»¼ ¿¬ íðû

éð µÐ¿ øïð °·÷

Ì¸®»¸±´¼ ±º ´«²¹ ¼¿³¿¹»ò

ïððû ½¸¿²½» ±º º¿¬¿´·¬§ º±® ¿°»®±² ·² ¿ ¾«·´¼·²¹ ±® ·² ¬¸»±°»²ò

Ý±³°´»¬» ¼»³±´·¬·±² ±º ¸±«»ò

Ú¿¬¿´·¬·» ±º °»±°´» ·² ¬¸»±°»² ½±²»®ª¿¬·ª»´§»¬·³¿¬»¼ ¿¬ ïððû

3.5.1 Ammonium Nitrate Prill

Ì¸» °®±°±»¼ Ó±®¿²¾¿¸ ßÒ ¬±®¿¹» º¿½·´·¬§ ©·´´ ¬±®» ¿ ³¿¨·³«³ ïðôððð ¬±²²» ±º

ßÒ Ð®·´´ ¾»¬©»»² º±«® ¿´´±½¿¬»¼ ¬±®¿¹» ¿®»¿ øî ¨ íôððð ¬±²²» ¿²¼ î ¨ îôððð

¬±²²»÷ò Ì¸» ½±²»¯«»²½» º®±³ ¿ íôððð ¬±²²» ßÒ Ð®·´´ »¨°´±·±² ø¾¿» ½¿»÷ ¿®»

·¼»²¬·º·»¼ ·² Ì¿¾´» îçò


Ñ²» ±º ¬¸» ·«» ¿±½·¿¬»¼ ©·¬¸ ßÒ Ð®·´´ »¨°´±·±² · ¬¸» ¯«¿²¬·¬§ ·²ª±´ª»¼ ¼«®·²¹

¿² »¨°´±·±²ò Ì¸» ¯«¿²¬·¬§ ±º ßÒ Ð®·´´ ·²ª±´ª»¼ ·² ¿² »¨°´±·±² ½¿² ¾» ¼»¬»®³·²»¼

¬¸®±«¹¸ ½±²·¼»®¿¬·±² ±º ¸·¬±®·½¿´ ·²½·¼»²¬ò Û»²¬·¿´´§ ¬¸» Ì±«´±«» »¨°´±·±²

ÅÎ»º çÃ ·²ª±´ª»¼ ±³» ìðð ¬±²²» ±º ½±²¬¿³·²¿¬»¼ ßÒ ³¿¬»®·¿´ ¹·ª·²¹ ¿² ±ª»®¿´´

ÌÒÌ »¯«·ª¿´»²½» ±º ¾»¬©»»² îð ¬± ìð ¬±²²» ø·ò»ò ëóïðû »¯«·ª¿´»²½»÷ò Ò±¬»æ Ì¸· ·

º»®¬· ·́¦»® ¹®¿¼» ßÒ ¿²¼ · ´·µ»´§ ¬± ¸¿ª» ¿ ´±©»® »¯«·ª¿´»²½» ¬¸¿² Ì»½¸²·½¿´ ¹®¿¼»

ßÒò Ï«»»²´¿²¼ Ù«·¼¿²½» Ò±¬» ì ø©¸·½¸ ®»º»®»²½» ¬¸» ÝÑßÙ Ù«·¼»´·²»÷ô

°»½·º·» ¿² ±ª»®¿´´ ÒÛÏ ±º íîû ¬± ¾» «»¼ º±® ßÒ Ð®·´´ò Ì¸» ÝÑßÙ Ù«·¼»´·²»

º±®³ ¬¸» ³±¬ ½±²»®ª¿¬·ª» ²«³¾»® «»¼ ±«¬ ±º ¬¸» ¬¸®»» ½¿» ¿²¼ ©·´´ ¬¸»®»º±®»

¾» «»¼ ¿ ¬¸» ¾¿» ½¿» ò

3.5.2 Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion

Ì¸» °®±°±»¼ ßÒ ¬±®¿¹» º¿½·´·¬§ ©·´´ ¬±®» ¿ ³¿¨·³«³ ±º ìîð ¬±²²» ±º »³«´·±² ·²

¬¸®»» ¬±®¿¹» ¬¿²µò Ì¸» ½±²»¯«»²½» º®±³ ¿ ïìð ¬±²²» ±º ßÒ Û³«´·±² ¬¸¿¬ ©·´´

¿ºº»½¬ ±ºº·¬» °±°«´¿¬·±² ¿®» ·¼»²¬·º·»¼ ·² Ì¿¾´» îçò Ò±¬»æ Ì¸» ßÒ Û³«´·±² ¬¿²µ øí

¨ ïìð ¬±²²»÷ ©·´´ ¾» °®±ª·¼»¼ ©·¬¸ ¿ ½±²½®»¬» ©¿´´ ±² ¬¸®»» ·¼» ±º ¬¸» ¬¿²µò Û¿½¸

¬¿²µ ©·´´ ¾» »°¿®¿¬»¼ ¾§ ê³ ø¼·®¬ º·´´»¼÷ô ¬± °®»ª»²¬ ¿²§ °±¬»²¬·¿´ µ²±½µó±² »ºº»½¬ò

Ì¸» ½±²½®»¬» ©¿´´ ®»¿½¸ ¿ ¸»·¹¸¬ ±º ï³ ¿¾±ª» ¬¸» »³«´·±² ¬¿²µò

ß² »¨°´±·±² ²»¬ »¯«·ª¿´»²¬ ¯«¿²¬·¬§ ±º éðûï øïððû »ºº·½·»²½§ ¿²¼ éðû ÌÒÌ

»¯«·ª¿´»²½§÷ ©·¬¸ ïìð ¬±²²» ¸¿ ¾»»² «»¼ ¿ ¬¸» ¾¿» ½¿» ·² ¬¸· ¬«¼§ º±® ßÒ

»³«´·±² ¬¸¿¬ ®»°®»»²¬ ¬¸» ¬±¬¿´ ¬±®¿¹» ½¿°¿½·¬§ ©·¬¸·² ¿ ·²¹´» ¬±®¿¹» ¬¿²µò Ì¸·

»ºº·½·»²½§ ª¿´«» ¿«³» ½±²»®ª¿¬·ª»´§ ïððû ±º ¬¸» »³«´·±² · ·²ª±´ª»¼ ·² ¬¸»

»¨°´±·±²ò

3.6 Individual Risk Criteria

ß ¿ °¿®¬ ±º ¬¸» ¿°°®±ª¿´ °®±½» º±® ²»© ·²¼«¬®·¿´ ¼»ª»´±°³»²¬ ·² Ï«»»²´¿²¼ô

°®±°±²»²¬ ¿®» ®»¯«·®»¼ ¬± ¼»ª»´±° ¿ ®·µ ¿»³»²¬ ¿²¼ ½±³°¿®» ¬¸» ®»«´¬ ©·¬¸

¬¸» ·²¼·ª·¼«¿´ ®·µ ½®·¬»®·¿ ¼»º·²»¼ ·² ¬¸» ÝØÛÓ Í»®ª·½» Ø¿¦¿®¼±« ×²¼«¬®§

Ð´¿²²·²¹ º±® Í¿º»¬§ ¹«·¼»´·²» ¿ «³³¿®·»¼ ¾»´±©ò Ì¸» ÏÔÜ ×²¼·ª·¼«¿´ Î·µ

Ý®·¬»®·¿ ¿®» ¸±©² ·² Ì¿¾´» îïò

×²¼·ª·¼«¿´ ®·µ · ¼»º·²»¼ ¾§ ¬¸» ×òÝ¸»³òÛ øïççî÷ ¿ ¬¸» º®»¯«»²½§ ¿¬ ©¸·½¸ ¿²

·²¼·ª·¼«¿´ ³¿§ ¾» »¨°»½¬»¼ ¬± «¬¿·² ¿ ¹·ª»² ´»ª»´ ±º ¸¿®³ º®±³ ¬¸» ®»¿ ·́¿¬·±² ±º

°»½·º·»¼ ¸¿¦¿®¼ò Ì¸» °«®°±» ±º ½®·¬»®·¿ ¾¿»¼ «°±² ¬¸· ®·µ ³»¿«®» · ¬± »²«®»

¬¸¿¬ ²± ·²¹´» °»®±² · ±ª»®»¨°±»¼ ¬± ®·µò ×² ¬¸· ®»°±®¬ ·¬ · ¬¿µ»² ¬± ¾» ¬¸» ®·µ ±º

¼»¿¬¸ °»® §»¿® ¿²¼ · °®·³¿®·´§ ®»°±®¬»¼ ·² ¬¸» º±®³ ±º ¿² ·±ó®·µ ½±²¬±«® °´±¬ò

ï Ú±® ¬¸» °«®°±» ±º ¬¸· ¿»³»²¬ ¿² Ò»¬ Û¯«·ª¿´»²¬ øÒÛÏ÷ º¿½¬±® ±º éðû ©»®» ¬¿µ»² ¬± ®»°®»»²¬ ¬¸»

¾»¬ »¬·³¿¬»¼ ½±²»®ª¿¬·ª» ²«³¾»® «»¼ º±® ß³³±²·«³ Ò·¬®¿¬» Û³«´·±² ¾¿»¼ ±² ¼·½«·±² ©·¬¸×²¼«¬®§ ¿²¼ ¬¸» Î»¹«´¿¬±® øÉß÷ò


Table 21 Individual risk criteria based on QLD CHEM Services Limit ofTolerability Risk Criteria

Developmentclassification forDifferent LandUses

(Fatalities per yr)

(Scientific notation (Fatalities per yr)Typicaldevelopments

Í»²·¬·ª» ðòë ·² ¿ ³·´´·±² ë ¨ ïðóé

Ø±°·¬¿´ô ½¸±±´ô

ß¹»¼ ½¿®»

½»²¬®»ò

Î»·¼»²¬·¿´ ï ·² ¿ ³·´´·±² ï ¨ ïðóê Î»·¼»²¬·¿´

¸±«·²¹

Ý±³³»®½·¿´ ë ·² ¿ ³·´´·±² ë ¨ ïðóê

Í¸±°°·²¹Ý»²¬®»ô¸±©®±±³

Ð«¾´·½ ïð ·² ¿ ³·´´·±² ï ¨ ïðóë

ß½¬·ª» ±°»²°¿½»ô Í°±®¬·²¹½±³°´»¨»

×²¼«¬®·¿´ ëð ·² ¿ ³·´´·±² ë ¨ ïðóë

Î»º·²»®·»ôÝ¸»³·½¿´ Ð´¿²¬ôÞ«´µ ¬±®¿¹»

3.7 Societal Risk

Í±½·»¬¿´ ®·µ ³»¿«®» ³¿§ ¾» «»¼ ¬± ¿» ¿½½»°¬¿¾·´·¬§ ±º ®·µ ¬± ¿ °»½·º·½

°±°«´¿¬·±² ¹®±«° ø©±®µº±®½»ô ½±²¬®¿½¬±®ô ½±³³«²·¬§ »¬½÷ò Í±½·»¬¿´ ®·µ ³»¿«®»

®»´¿¬» ¬¸» º®»¯«»²½§ ±º ¿² ·²½·¼»²¬ ±½½«®®·²¹ ©·¬¸ ¬¸» ²«³¾»® ±º °»±°´» ¿ºº»½¬»¼ò Ì¸»

°«®°±» ±º ½®·¬»®·¿ ¾¿»¼ ±² ¬¸· ®·µ ³»¿«®» · ¬± ½±²¬®±´ ®·µ ¬± ±½·»¬§ ¿ ¿ ©¸±´»ò

×² ¬¸· ®»°±®¬ ±½·»¬¿´ ®·µ · ®»°±®¬»¼ ·² ¬¸» º±®³ ±º Ð±¬»²¬·¿´ Ô± ±º Ô·º» øÐÔÔ÷

ª¿´«»ò

Ì¸» Ï«»»²´¿²¼ Î»¹«´¿¬±®§ ¾±¼·» ¸¿ª» ²±¬ §»¬ °»½·º·»¼ ¿²§ ¼»º·²·¬·ª» ½®·¬»®·¿ º±®

¬¸» ¿»³»²¬ ±º ±½·»¬¿´ ®·µò Ø×ÐßÐ ß¼ª·±®§ Ð¿°»® Ò±ò ì ¬¿¬» ¬¸¿¬ ¬¸» ¬©±

½±³°±²»²¬ ±º ±½·»¬¿´ ®·µ ¿®»æ

ïò Ì¸» ²«³¾»® ±º °»±°´» »¨°±»¼ ¬± ´»ª»´ ±º ®·µå ¿²¼

îò Ì¸» ´¿®¹»® ½¿´» ³«´¬·°´» º¿¬¿´·¬·»ò

Ü«» ¬± ¬¸» ·±´¿¬»¼ ¿®»¿ ¿¬ ©¸·½¸ ¬¸» °´¿²¬ · ´±½¿¬»¼ô ¿²¼ ¬¸» ª¿¬ »°¿®¿¬·±² ±º ¬¸»

°´¿²¬ º®±³ ¬¸» ½±³³«²·¬§ô ¬¸» ±½·»¬¿´ ®·µ º®±³ ¬¸» Ó±®¿²¾¿¸ Ú¿½·´·¬§ ©¿ ²±¬

º«®¬¸»® ·²ª»¬·¹¿¬»¼ ¾»§±²¼ ½¿´½«´¿¬·²¹ ¬¸» °±¬»²¬·¿´ ´± ±º ´·º» øÐÔÔ÷ ª¿´«» º±®

«®®±«²¼·²¹ ´±½¿¬·±²ò Ì¸· ¸±«´¼ô ¸±©»ª»®ô ¾» ¿¼¼®»»¼ ·² ¬¸» Ó¿¶±® Ø¿¦¿®¼

Ú¿½·´·¬§ Í¿º»¬§ Ý¿»ò


3.8 Major Accident Events (MAEs)

Table 23 Major Accident Events

No. Major Accident Events Cause(s)

ï Ú·®» ·² ßÒ ¬±®¿¹» ¿®»¿ ïò Û´»½¬®·½¿´ º¿·´«®»ò

îò Ý±²¬¿³·²¿¬·±² ±º ßÒò

íò Ú®±²¬ »²¼ ´±¿¼»® ±°»®¿¬·±² ·² ßÒ¬±®¿¹» ¿®»¿ò

ìò Ó¿´·½·±« ¬¸·®¼ °¿®¬§ ·²¬»®ª»²¬·±²ò

ëò Ë²´±¿¼·²¹ ¬®«½µò

êò Ô·¹¸¬²·²¹ò

î Ü»º´¿¹®¿¬·±² »ª»²¬ ·² ßÒ¬±®¿¹» ¿®»¿

ïò Ú·®»ò

îò Ó¿´·½·±« ·²¬»®ª»²¬·±²ò

íò Ø§¼®±½¿®¾±² ½±²¬¿³·²¿¬·±²ò

ìò Ð®±¼«½¬ ½±²¬¿³·²¿¬·±²ò

ëò Í§³°¿¬¸»¬·½ ¼»¬±²¿¬·±² ¿±½·¿¬»¼ ©·¬¸»¨°´±·ª» ¸¿²¼´·²¹ò

í Ú·®» ·³°·²¹»¼ ±² ßÒ»³«´·±² ¬¿²µ

ïò ßÒ ¼»´·ª»®§ ¬®«½µ ½±´´·¼» ©·¬¸ ¼·»»´ª»»´ò

îò Ü·»»´ ¬®«½µ ½±´´··±²

ì Ü»º´¿¹®¿¬·±² »ª»²¬ ·² ¿² ßÒ»³«´·±² ¬±®¿¹» ¬¿²µ

ïò Ô·¹¸¬²·²¹ ¬®·µ»ò

îò Ó¿´·½·±« ¬¸·®¼ °¿®¬§ ·²¬»®ª»²¬·±²ò

íò Ê»¸·½´» ·³°¿½¬ò

ìò Þ«¸ º·®»ò

ëò Ý±²¬¿³·²¿¬·±²ò

ë Ô± ±º ½±²¬¿·²³»²¬ ±º ¬¸»ß³³±²·¿ ¬¿²µ

Ú·¬¬·²¹ º¿·´«®»

Ì¸·®¼ Ð¿®¬§ ×³°¿½¬

Ó··´» ×³°¿½¬

ß´´ ¬¸» ÓßÛ ¼»½®·¾»¼ ·² Ì¿¾´» îí ¿®» ®»º´»½¬»¼ ·² ¬¸» º¿·´«®» ½¿» ³±¼»´»¼ º±® ¬¸·

¬«¼§ò


ìò Ø¿¦¿®¼±« Í½»²¿®·± Ü»ª»´±°³»²¬

4.1 Screening of HazardsØ¿¦¿®¼±« »ª»²¬ ©»®» ·¼»²¬·º·»¼ ¬¸®±«¹¸ ¿²¿´§· ±º ¼»½®·°¬·ª» ·²º±®³¿¬·±²

®»´»ª¿²¬ ¬± ¬¸» º¿½·́ ·¬§ ³¿¼» ¿ª¿·´¿¾´» ·² ½±³¾·²¿¬·±² ©·¬¸ ¬¸» ½®·¬»®·¿ ø¬±¨·½ô

º´¿³³¿¾´» ¿²¼ ±ª»®°®»«®»÷ »¬¿¾´·¸»¼ ·² ¬¸» °®»ª·±« ½¸¿°¬»®ò

Ì¸» ¼·¬¿²½» ¬± ·¬» ¾±«²¼¿®·» ¿®» ¸±©² ·² Ì¿¾´» îëò

Table 25 Distances from Plant to Site Boundaries

Í±«¬¸óÉ»¬ Þ±«²¼¿®§ö ìêð³

Ò±®¬¸óÛ¿¬ Þ±«²¼¿®§ êìð³

Í±«¬¸óÛ¿¬ Þ±«²¼¿®§ êîð³

Ò±®¬¸óÉ»¬ Þ±«²¼¿®§ èêð³

ö Ü·®»½¬·±² ¿®» ¾¿»¼ ±² Ì®«» Ò±®¬¸ò

×² »¿½¸ ½»²¿®·±ô »ª»²¬ ²±¬ ½±²·¼»®»¼ ½¿°¿¾´» ±º ®»¿½¸·²¹ ¬¸»» ¼·¬¿²½» ·²

´»¬¸¿´ »ºº»½¬ ø·ò»ò ½¿«·²¹ ±ºº·¬» º¿¬¿´·¬·»÷ ©»®» ½®»»²»¼ ±«¬ò ß º«´´ ´·¬ ±º ¬¸»

¸¿¦¿®¼ ¿²¼ ¬¸»·® ¼»¬¿·´»¼ ·²º±®³¿¬·±² · ¸±©² ·² ß°°»²¼·¨ ßò

Ñª»®¿´´ô ïè »ª»²¬ïî

©»®» ½±²·¼»®»¼ ¬± ¸¿ª» ¬¸» °±¬»²¬·¿´ ¬± ½¿«» ±ºº·¬» º¿¬¿´·¬·»

¬¸®±«¹¸ »·¬¸»® ¬±¨·½ ±® ±ª»®°®»«®» »ºº»½¬ ¿²¼ ©»®» ¬¸»®»º±®» ·²½±®°±®¿¬»¼ ·²¬± ¿

³±®» ¼»¬¿·´»¼ ½±²»¯«»²½» ¿²¼ º®»¯«»²½§ ¿²¿´§· ¬± ¼»¬»®³·²» ¬¸» °´¿²¬ ±ºº·¬»

®·µò

4.2 Natural EventsÌ¸» º±´´±©·²¹ ²¿¬«®¿´ »ª»²¬ ©»®» ½±²·¼»®»¼ º±® ¬¸» Ó±®¿²¾¿¸ ¿®»¿æ

ïò Ý§½´±²»å

îò Û¿®¬¸¯«¿µ»å

íò Þ«¸ Ú·®»å

ìò Ú´±±¼·²¹å ¿²¼

ëò Ô·¹¸¬²·²¹ò

4.2.1 Cyclones

Ì¸» ³¿·² ®·µ ¬± ¬¸» °´¿²¬ ·² ¬¸» »ª»²¬ ±º ¿ ½§½´±²» ©±«´¼ ¾»æ

ïò É·²¼ ´±¿¼ô ¿²¼

îò Ú´±±¼·²¹ ¼«» ¬± ¸»¿ª§ ®¿·²º¿´´ò

ïî Ì¸»» »ª»²¬ ©»®» ¬¿µ»² º®±³ ¬¸» ´·¬ ·² ß°°»²¼·¨ô ß ©¸·½¸ ©»®» ²±¬ ½®»»²»¼ ±«¬ò


Ì¸» ¿°°´·½¿¾´» ½±¼» º±® ©·²¼ ´±¿¼·²¹ øßÍïïéðòî÷ ·²¼·½¿¬» ¬¸¿¬ Ó±®¿²¾¿¸ · ²±¬ ·² ¿

½§½´±²·½ ¦±²»ò Ó±®¿²¾¿¸ · ´±½¿¬»¼ ·² Î»¹·±² ßì ó ²±² ½§½´±²·½ò

Ì¸» Þ«®»¿« ±º Ó»¬»±®±´±¹§ ¿¼ª·» ¬¸» ³¿¨·³«³ ©·²¼ °»»¼ »ª»® ®»½±®¼»¼ ¿¬

Ó±®¿²¾¿¸ · ïíòç³ñ ó ©»´́ ¾»´±© ¿²§ ¿°°´·½¿¾´» ¼»·¹² ª¿´«»ò

Ì¸» ®·µ ±º º´±±¼·²¹ º®±³ ¿ ½§½´±²» »ª»²¬ ø±® ®¿·² ¾»¿®·²¹ ¼»°®»·±²÷ · ¿´± ´±© ±®

ù·²·¹²·º·½¿²¬ù ø»» ³¿·² ¾±¼§ ±º Û×Í÷ò Ì¸» ·¬» ¬±®³ ¼®¿·² §¬»³ ©·´´ ¾» ¼»·¹²»¼

º±® ¬¸» ¿°°´·½¿¾´» ®¿·²º¿´´ »ª»²¬ ·² ¿½½±®¼¿²½» ©·¬¸ ¬¸» ®»´»ª¿²¬ ß«¬®¿´·¿²

Í¬¿²¼¿®¼ò

4.2.2 Earthquakes

ß ¸±©² ·² Ú·¹«®» çô ¬¸»®» · ²± ®»½±®¼»¼ ¸·¬±®§ ±º »¿®¬¸¯«¿µ» ²»¿® Ó±®¿²¾¿¸ô

Ï«»»²´¿²¼ò ß² »¿®¬¸¯«¿µ» ¼±» ²±¬ °®»»²¬ ¿ ½®»¼·¾´» ®·µ ½»²¿®·± º±® ¬¸»

°®±°±»¼ º¿½·´·¬·»ò Ü»·¹² ©·´´ ¾» ·² ½±³°´·¿²½» ©·¬¸ ¬¸» Þ«·´¼·²¹ Ý±¼» ±º ß«¬®¿ ·́¿ô

©·¬¸ ®»°»½¬ ¬± Û¿®¬¸¯«¿µ» °®±¬»½¬·±²ò

Figure 9 Earthquake Map for the Mackay Area in Queensland

Moranbah


4.2.3 Bush Fires

ß ¸±©² ·² Ú·¹«®» ïðô ¬¸»®» · ¿ ´±© ¬± ³»¼·«³ ®·µ ±º ¿ ¾«¸ º·®» ²»¿® Ó±®¿²¾¿¸ò

Ì¸» ¾«¸ ©·´´ ¾» ½´»¿®»¼ ¬± ¿ °»½·º·»¼ ¼·¬¿²½» ø¿§ îðð ³÷ º®±³ ¬¸» ¿®»¿ ±º ¬¸»

³¿·² °´¿²¬ ¿²¼ »ª¿°±®¿¬·±² ´¿¹±±² ¾«¬ ³±¬ ©±«´¼ ®»³¿·² ±² ¬¸» °´±¬ò Ì¸»®»º±®»ô ¿

¾«¸ º·®» ½¿«·²¹ ·³°¿½¬ ±²·¬» · ²±¬ ¿ ½®»¼·¾´» ½»²¿®·± º±® ¬¸· ´±½¿¬·±²ò

Figure 10 Bushfire Risk Analysis for Belyando Shire

4.2.4 Flooding

ß ·²¼·½¿¬»¼ ¾§ Ú·¹«®» ïïô Ó±®¿²¾¿¸ »¨°»®·»²½» ±²´§ í ¼¿§ °»® §»¿® ©¸»² ¬¸»

®¿·²º¿´´ ¬±¬¿´ · ¿¾±ª» ëð³³ò Ì¸» ®·µ ±º ¿ º´±±¼ ·² ¬¸» ¿®»¿ · ·²·¹²·º·½¿²¬ò ×¬ ¸±«´¼

¿´± ¾» ²±¬»¼ ¬¸¿¬ ¬¸» °´¿²¬ ´·» ±² ¸·¹¸ ¹®±«²¼ ø»» Í»½¬·±² ëòí÷ ¿²¼ ©±«´¼

¬¸»®»º±®» ²±¬ ¾» «½»°¬·¾´» ¬± º´±±¼·²¹ò


Figure 11 Average Number of Days with Rain Greater Than 50mm

4.2.5 Lightning

Ì¸» ¿®»¿ «®®±«²¼·²¹ Ó±®¿²¾¿¸ »¨°»®·»²½» ïðóïë ¼¿§ ±º ¬¸«²¼»® °»® §»¿®ô ¿

¸±©² ·² Ú·¹«®» ïîò Ì¸±«¹¸ ¬¸«²¼»® ¿²¼ ´·¹¸¬²·²¹ ¿®» ²±¬ ³«¬«¿´´§ »¨½´«·ª»ô ¬¸»

³¿° ¼±» ¹·ª»² ¿² ·²¼·½¿¬·±² ±º ¬¸» ¬¿®¹»¬ ¿®»¿ º±® ´·¹¸¬²·²¹ò ß ´±²¹ ¿ ¿´´

»¯«·°³»²¬ · »¿®¬¸»¼ ¿²¼ ¼»·¹² ¬± ½±³°´§ ©·¬¸ ßÍ ïéêè øÔ·¹¸¬²·²¹ Ð®±¬»½¬·±²÷ô

´·¹¸¬²·²¹ ¸±«´¼ ²±¬ ¾» ¿² ·«» ±²·¬»ò


Figure 12 Average Annual Day Map

íëProposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant, Moranbah, QueenslandØ¿¦¿®¼ ¿²¼ Î·µ ß»³»²¬


Ì¸» ÛÎÐÙ ª¿´«» ©»®» ®»½±®¼»¼ º±® ¬¸±» »ª»²¬ô ©¸·½¸ »¨°»®·»²½» ®»´»¿» ±º ÛÎÐÙ î

¿²¼ í º±® ¿ °»®·±¼ ¹®»¿¬»® ¬¸¿² ±²» ¸±«®ò Ì¸»» ¼·¬¿²½» ®»°®»»²¬ ±½·¿´ ·²¶«®§ ½®·¬»®·¿ ¿

°»® Ø×ÐßÐ ÅÎ»º èÃò

Table 28 – Toxic Release Injury Consequences

Plant Plant Iso-sectionïé

EventDescription

Distance toERPG-3 (m) inF-1m/sïè

Distance toERPG-2 (m)in F-1m/s19

Ý±²ª»®¬»®Ûºº´«»²¬ Ù¿

ïðð ³³ ´·¯«·¼´»¿µ

ïîêð îèðð

Ô·¯ ß³³±²·¿Ð®±¼«½¬ß½½«³«´¿¬±®

ïðð ³³ ´·¯«·¼´»¿µ îêèð êìîë

íðð ³³ ´·¯«·¼´»¿µ

îëðð ëëðð

ß³³±²·¿Ð´¿²¬

ß³³±²·¿ Ì¿²µ

Î«°¬«®» êëðð ïíððð

ïé ß² ·±ó»½¬·±² · ¿ »½¬·±² ±º ¬¸» °®±½»ô ©¸·½¸ ½¿² ¾» ·±´¿¬»¼ ¾§ ¿² ¿«¬±³¿¬»¼ ª¿´ª»ô ¿²¼ ¬¸»®»º±®» ¬¸»³¿¨·³«³ ·²ª»²¬±®§ ¬± ¾» ´±¬ °»® »½¬·±² · ¬¸» ª±´«³» ¾»¬©»»² ¬¸» ¿«¬±³¿¬»¼ ª¿´ª»ò

ïè Ì¸» ÛÎÐÙóí ß³³±²·¿ ½±²½»²¬®¿¬·±² ±º éëð°°³ô · ¬¸» ³¿¨·³«³ ¿·®¾±«®²» ½±²½»²¬®¿¬» º±® ©¸·½¸ ²»¿®´§ ¿´´·²¼·ª·¼«¿´ ½¿² ¾» »¨°±»¼ º±® «° ¬± ï ¸® ©·¬¸±«¬ »¨°»®·»²½·²¹ ±® ¼»ª»´±°·²¹ ´·º» ¬¸®»¿¬»²·²¹ ¸»¿´¬¸ »ºº»½¬ò

ïç Ì¸» ÛÎÐÙóî ß³³±²·¿ ½±²½»²¬®¿¬·±² ±º ïëð°°³ô · ³¿¨·³«³ ¿·®¾±®²» ½±²½»²¬®¿¬·±² ¾»´±© ©¸·½¸ô ·¬ · ¾»´·»ª»¼ô²»¿®´§ ¿´´ ·²¼·ª·¼«¿´ ½¿² ¾» »¨°±»¼ º±® «° ¬± ï ¸±«® ©·¬¸±«¬ »¨°»®·»²½·²¹ ±® ¼»ª»´±°·²¹ ·®®»ª»®·¾´» ¿¼ª»®»¸»¿´¬¸ »ºº»½¬ ±® §³°¬±³ô ©¸·½¸ ½±«´¼ ·³°¿·® ¿² ·²¼·ª·¼«¿´ù ¿¾·´·¬§ ¬± ¬¿µ» °®±¬»½¬·ª» ¿½¬·±²ò

íêProposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant, Moranbah, QueenslandØ¿¦¿®¼ ¿²¼ Î·µ ß»³»²¬


Ì¸» ·²ª»²¬±®§ ©·¬¸ ¬¸» ³±¬ ·¹²·º·½¿²¬ ½±²»¯«»²½» · ¬¸» ß³³±²·¿ Ì¿²µ Í¬±®¿¹»ò Ì¸» ¬¿²µ

· ·²¬»²¼»¼ ¬± ¾» ¼±«¾´» ©¿´´»¼ô ·² ±®¼»® ¬± °®±ª·¼» »½±²¼¿®§ ½±²¬¿·²³»²¬ ·² ¬¸» »ª»²¬ ±º ¿

½®¿½µ ±® ´»¿µ ·² ¬¸» ·²²»® ¬¿²µ ¸»´´ò Ñ²» ±º ¬¸» µ»§ ·«» ©·¬¸ ®»º®·¹»®¿¬»¼ ¬±®¿¹» ¬¿²µ ·

¬¸» º·´´·²¹ °±·²¬ò Þ§ ·²¬¿´´·²¹ ¿² ±«¬´»¬ °·°» ©·¬¸ °«³° ¬± ¬¸» ¾¿» ±º ¬¸» ¬¿²µô ¬¸» ¬¿²µ

·²¬»¹®·¬§ · ½±³°®±³·»¼ ¿ ¬¸· °´¿½» ¿ °·»½» ±º »¯«·°³»²¬ ³±®» «½»°¬·¾´» ¬± ´»¿µ ¿²¼

º¿·´«®» ¿¬ ¬¸» ¾¿» ±º ¬¸» ¬¿²µò Í¸«¬¼±©² ª¿´ª» ¿®» ´±½¿¬»¼ ¿¬ ¬¸» ¬¿²µ ±«¬´»¬ ¬± °®»ª»²¬ ´±

±º ½±²¬¿·²³»²¬ ±º ¬¸» ¬¿²µ ·²ª»²¬±®§ò

ß ïëð³³ ®»´»¿» º®±³ ¬¸» ¬¿²µ ©±«´¼ ¾» ¼«» ¬± ¿² ±«¬´»¬ °·°»©±®µ ´»¿µ ±® ½±²²»½¬·±² º´¿²¹»

´»¿µò Ì¸» ´·²» · ¿¾´» ¬± ¾» ·±´¿¬»¼ ·² íð³·²ò

ß ®«°¬«®» ½±²·¬ ±º ¿ ¾®»¿µ¼±©² ·² ¬¸» ¬®«½¬«®¿´ ·²¬»¹®·¬§ ±º ¬¸» ¬¿²µ ¿²¼ ¬¸» ¬¿²µ ´·̄ «·¼ ·

®»¬¿·²»¼ ¾§ ¬¸» ¾«²¼å ¬¸»®» · ²± ½±²¬¿·²³»²¬ ±º ª¿°±«®ò

5.2 Explosion Events

Ì¸» ¯«¿²¬·¬§ ±º ßÒ ·²ª±´ª»¼ ·² ¿² »¨°´±·±² ©¿ ¼»¬»®³·²»¼ ¬¸®±«¹¸ ½±²·¼»®¿¬·±² ±º

¸·¬±®·½¿´ ·²½·¼»²¬ò Û»²¬·¿´´§ ¬¸» Ì±«´±«» »¨°´±·±² ÅÎ»º çÃ ·²ª±´ª»¼ ±³» ìðð ¬±²²» ±º

±ººó°»½ ñ ½±²¬¿³·²¿¬»¼ ³¿¬»®·¿´ ¹·ª·²¹ ¿² ±ª»®¿´´ ÌÒÌ »¯«·ª¿´»²½» ±º ¾»¬©»»² îð ¬± ìð

¬±²²»ò Ì¸» ½»²¿®·± ·²ª»¬·¹¿¬»¼ ·² ¬¸· ¬«¼§ ·²ª±´ª» ¾»¬©»»² îððð ¬± êððð ¬±²²» ±º

«²½±²¬¿³·²¿¬»¼ ³¿¬»®·¿´ ·²ª±´ª·²¹ ¿ ´·³·¬»¼ ñ ½±²¬¿³·²¿¬»¼ º®¿½¬·±² øïðû ¾¿»¼ «°±² ¬¸»

º·²¼·²¹ ±º ¬¸» Ì±«´±«» ¬«¼§÷ ©·¬¸ ±ª»®¿´´ ÌÒÌ »¯«·ª¿´»²½·» ®¿²¹·²¹ ¾»¬©»»² éð ¬± ííð

¬±²²» ±º ÌÒÌò

×¬ · ¿½µ²±©´»¼¹»¼ ¬¸¿¬ ¬¸» ËÕ ØÍÛ °»½·º·» ³±®» »ª»®» ®¿¬·± º±® ¬¸» ¼»¬»®³·²¿¬·±² ±º ¿²

±ª»®¿´´ ÌÒÌ »¯«·ª¿´»²½» ¸±©»ª»® ¬¸»» ¿®» °®·³¿®·´§ ¾¿»¼ º±® ¬¸» °«®°±» ±º ³¿´´ ½¿´»

¬±½µ°·´·²¹ º¿½·´·¬·» ©·¬¸ °±¬»²¬·¿´´§ ´» ®±¾«¬ ¯«¿´·¬§ ½±²¬®±´ ³»½¸¿²·³ò Ï«»»²´¿²¼

Ù«·¼¿²½» Ò±¬» ì ø©¸·½¸ ®»º»®»²½» ¬¸» ÝÑßÙ Ù«·¼»´·²»÷ô °»½·º·» ¿² ±ª»®¿´´ ÒÛÏ ±º íîû

¬± ¾» «»¼ º±® ßÒ Ð®·´´ò Ì¸· ½±²»®ª¿¬·ª» ²«³¾»® ©·´´ ¾» «»¼ ¿ ¬¸» ¾¿» ½¿» ò

Ì¸» »ºº»½¬ ¼·¬¿²½» ±º ß³³±²·«³ Ò·¬®¿¬» »¨°´±·±² ©»®» ½¿´½«´¿¬»¼ «·²¹ ¬¸» ËÍ Ó·´·¬¿®§

ÌÒÌ ±ª»®°®»«®» »¯«¿¬·±² ¿ ¼»¬¿·´»¼ ·² ß°°»²¼·¨ Ýò Ì¸» »¯«¿¬·±² · ¾¿»¼ «°±² ¿ ®±¾«¬

»³°·®·½¿´ ®»´¿¬·±²¸·° ¿²¼ · ¿°°®±°®·¿¬»´§ ½±²»®ª¿¬·ª» º±® ¬¸» ´»ª»´ ±º ¼»¬¿·´ ®»¯«·®»¼ ·² ¬¸·

ØúÎßò

41/15824/346030 Proposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant, Moranbah, QueenslandØ¿¦¿®¼ ¿²¼ Î·µ ß»³»²¬

Figure 13 Distance of AN Prill Explosions to Site Boundary

ßÒ ±´«¬·±²ô ßÒ Ð®·´´ ¿²¼ »³«´·±² »¨°´±·±² ©»®» ½®»»²»¼ º®±³ ¬¸» ±ºº·¬» ®·µ

¿²¿´§· ¼«®·²¹ ¬¸» °®»´·³·²¿®§ ½±²»¯«»²½» ³±¼»´ ·́²¹ ¬¿¹» ±º ¬¸» ¬«¼§ ¿

³»²¬·±²»¼ ·² ß°°»²¼·¨ ß ¿²¼ «°°±®¬»¼ ¾§ ¬¸» º·¹«®» ¾»´±©ò Ò»ª»®¬¸»´» ¬¸»

·³°´·½¿¬·±² ±º µ²±½µó±² »ª»²¬ ¾»¬©»»² ßÒ ±´«¬·±²ô ßÒ Ð®·´´ ¿²¼ »³«´·±²

»¨°´±·±² ¬± ¬¸» ¿³³±²·¿ ¬±®¿¹» ¬¿²µô ®»«´¬·²¹ ·² ¬±¨·½ ®»´»¿» ©»®» ½±²·¼»®»¼

·² ¬¸» ½±²»¯«»²½» ¿²¼ ±ºº·¬» ®·µ ¿»³»²¬ò Ì¸· ©¿ ¿¼¼®»»¼ ¾§ ½±²·¼»®·²¹

¬¸» »¨°´±·±² ±ª»®°®»«®» ´»ª»´ ®»¯«·®»¼ ¬± ½¿«» ·²¬»¹®·¬§ º¿·´«®» ±º °®±½»

»¯«·°³»²¬ò ß² ¿»³»²¬ ±º ¬¸» ßÒ °®·´´ ¿²¼ ßÒ »³«´·±² »¨°´±·±² ±ª»®°®»«®»

¼·¬¿²½» ¿¬ îï µÐ¿ ©¿ ³¿¼» ¬± »¬·³¿¬» ¬¸» »¨¬»²¬ ±º ¼¿³¿¹» ±² ¬¸» ß³³±²·¿

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»ª»²¬ º¿·´«®» º®»¯«»²½§ ¬¸» ®·µ ±º ¬¸· °±¬»²¬·¿´ »½¿´¿¬·±² ³»½¸¿²·³ ©¿

½±²·¼»®»¼ ©·¬¸·² ¬¸» ¬±¬¿´ ±ºº·¬» ®·µ °®±º·´»ò

Ì¸» ¿²¿´§· ¼·¼ ²±¬ ´±±µ ¿¬ §³°¿¬¸»¬·½ »¨°´±·±² ¾»¬©»»² ¬¸» ßÒ ¬±®¿¹»

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ÅÎ»º ïïÃ ·²¼·½¿¬» ¬¸¿¬ ¬¸· »ª»²¬ · ²±¬ ½®»¼·¾´» ·² ¬¸» ·²¬¿²½» ±º »°¿®¿¬»¼

«²»²·¬·»¼ ßÒò Ü§²± Ò±¾»´ ß·¿ Ð¿½·º·½ Ô·³·¬»¼ ©·´´ ¬±®» ¬¸» ßÒ Ð®·´´ ·² º±«®

¿´´±½¿¬»¼ ¬±®¿¹» ´±½¿¬·±²ô ½±²¬¿·²»¼ ©·¬¸·² ¸·°°·²¹ ½±²¬¿·²»® ø·² ¿½½±®¼¿²½» ©·¬¸

ßÍ ìíîê÷ ©·¬¸ ¿¼»¯«¿¬» »°¿®¿¬·±² ø¿ °»® ¼·½«·±² ©·¬¸ ÜÓÛ÷ ¬± °®»ª»²¬

½±³³«²·½¿¬·±² ±º ¬¸» »¨°´±·±² º®±³ ±²» ¬±®¿¹» ´±½¿¬·±² ¬± ¬¸» ²»¨¬ò


Ñª»®°®»«®» ñ ·³°«´» ´»ª»´ ®»«´¬·²¹ ·² ©·²¼±© ñ ¹´¿ ¾®»¿µ¿¹» ¿²¼ ²±²ó

®»·²º±®½»¼ ¾«·́ ¼·²¹ ½±´´¿°» ©»®» ²±¬ ½±²·¼»®»¼ º«®¬¸»® ¿ ²± ½±²¬·²«±«´§ ±½½«°·»¼

±® ®»·¼»²¬·¿´ °®±°»®¬·» ¿®» ´±½¿¬»¼ ²»¿®¾§ò ß¼¼·¬·±²¿´´§ô ¬¸» µ»§ ¿«³°¬·±² ±º

½¿´½«´¿¬·²¹ Ô±½¿¬·±² Í°»½·º·½ ×²¼·ª·¼«¿´ Î·µ ®»ª±´ª» ¿®±«²¼ ¬¸» ½±²¬·²«±«´§

°®»»²¬ ¿²¼ ª«´²»®¿¾´» ·²¼·ª·¼«¿´ ²±¬ ¾»·²¹ ¿ºº±®¼»¼ ¿²§ °®±¬»½¬·±²ò

Ì¸» ¼»¬±²¿¬·±² ±º ¿² »²¬·®» íôððð ¬±²²» ¬±®¿¹» ¿®»¿ ±º ½±²¬¿³·²¿¬»¼ ßÒ ø©±®¬

½¿» ½»²¿®·± ±² ¬¸» ·¬»÷ ©¿ ½±²»®ª¿¬·ª»´§ ½¿´½«´¿¬»¼ ¬± ¹·ª» ±ª»®°®»«®» ´»ª»´

«ºº·½·»²¬ ¬± ½¿«» ¬¸» ¼»¿¬¸ ±º ïðû ±º ±«¬¼±±® ¸«³¿² °»®±²²»´ ¿²¼ ¼¿³¿¹»

®»·²º±®½»¼ ¬»»´ ¬®«½¬«®» øîï µÐ¿÷ ¿¬ ¼·¬¿²½» ±º «° ¬± êíð ³»¬®» º±® ¬¸» íôððð

¬±²²» ßÒ Ð®·´́ ½¿»ô ¿ ¸±©² ·² Ú·¹«®» ïëò

Figure 14 AN Prill (3,000 tonnes) Explosion Overpressures

Ì©± »²·¬·ª·¬·» ©»®» ®«² «·²¹ ¼·ºº»®»²¬ »ºº·½·»²½·» ±º ßÒ øîëû÷ô ·² ±®¼»® ¬±¼»³±²¬®¿¬» ¬¸» ®»´¿¬·±²¸·° ¾»¬©»»² ¬¸» »ºº·½·»²½§ ±º ¬¸» »¨°´±·±² ¿²¼ ¬¸»¼·¬¿²½» ±º ·³°¿½¬ò Ì¸»» »²·¬·ª·¬·» ¿®» ¸±©² ·² Ì¿¾´» îçò Ì¸» ´¿®¹»¬ °±¬»²¬·¿´»³«´·±² »¨°´±·±² ©±«´¼ °®±°¿¹¿¬» íðð³ ¬± ¬¸» îïµÐ¿ ±ª»®°®»«®» ³¿®µô ¿²¼ ¬¸»½±²»¯«»²½» ¿®» ©·¬¸·² ¬¸» ·¬» ¾±«²¼¿®§ô ¿ ®»º»®»²½»¼ ·² Ú·¹«®» ïêò

--------- éééðððµµµÐÐÐ¿¿¿

--------- íííëëëµµµÐÐÐ¿¿¿

--------- îîîïïïµµµÐÐÐ¿¿¿


Figure 15 AN Emulsion (140 tonnes) Explosion Overpressures

--------- éééðððµµµÐÐÐ¿¿¿

--------- íííëëëµµµÐÐÐ¿¿¿

--------- îîîïïïµµµÐÐÐ¿¿¿

ìïProposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant, Moranbah, QueenslandØ¿¦¿®¼ ¿²¼ Î·µ ß»³»²¬


×² ¿½½±®¼¿²½» ©·¬¸ ¬¸» ßÛÓÍÝ Ý±¼» ±º Ù±±¼ Ð®¿½¬·½» ÅÎ»º ïíÃô ¬¸» º±´´±©·²¹ ¼·¬¿²½» ¿®» ®»¯«·®»¼

º®±³ »¿½¸ ¬±®¿¹» ¿®»¿æ

Table 31 Required Distance to Vulnerable and Protected Works (Class A & B)

Material Stored NetExplosiveQuantity(NEQ)20,kg

DistancetoVulnerableFacilities21

Distance toProtectedWorks (ClassA)22

Distance toProtectedWorks (ClassB)23

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ø³¿¨ ±º íôððð¬±²²»ô íîûÛ¯«·ª¿´»²½»÷

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5.3 Missile Generation and Strikeß ¼»¬¿·´»¼ ·² ¬¸» Ø¿¦¿®¼ ×¼»²¬·º·½¿¬·±² ¬¿¹» ±º ¬¸» °®±¶»½¬ô ¬¸» °±¬»²¬·¿´ º±® ³··´»

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Calculated Peak ParticleVelocity (mm/s)

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6.1 Toxic Release Events

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6.2 Ammonium Nitrate Explosion Events

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6.3 Security Vulnerability Impact on Frequencies

6.3.1 Terror Threat Groups

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ß¹¿·²¬ °»®±²²»´ øÕ·¼²¿°°·²¹ô »¨¬±®¬·±²ô ¿¿«´¬÷

×²º±®³¿¬·±² ¬¸®»¿¬ ø¸¿®¼ ½±°·»¼ ·²º±®³¿¬·±²ô »´»½¬®±²·½ »¿ª»¼®±°°·²¹ô

·²º±®³¿¬·±² ¾®±µ»®·²¹ô º¿´·º·½¿¬·±² ±º ´¿¾ ®»«´¬÷ò

Ì¸» ¿»³»²¬ ½¸¿®¿½¬»®·» ¬¸» ¬¸®»¿¬ ¹®±«° «·²¹ ¬¸» º±´´±©·²¹ ½¸¿®¿½¬»®·¬·½æ

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Ó±¬·ª¿¬·±² ø¼¿³¿¹»ô ¬»®®±®÷

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6.3.2 Security Vulnerability

ß½½±«²¬·²¹ º±® ¬¸» ®·µ ¿±½·¿¬»¼ ©·¬¸ »½«®·¬§ ª«´²»®¿¾·´·¬§ ©·´´ ®»«´¬ ·² ½¸¿²¹» ·²

»ª»²¬ º®»¯«»²½·» °®»ª·±«´§ ½¿´½«´¿¬»¼ò ß ¿ ¾®»¿½¸ ±º »½«®·¬§ · ½±²·¼»®»¼

½®»¼·¾´»ô ¬¸»·® ·³°¿½¬ ©·´´ ¾» ½±²·¼»®»¼ ·² ¬¸· ¿»³»²¬ò

Ì¸» °®±¾¿¾·´·¬§ ±º ¿² »³°´±§»» ·²¬»²¼·²¹ ¬± ·²¬·¹¿¬» ¿² ·²½·¼»²¬ ©¿ ¼»¬»®³·²»¼

«·²¹ ¸·¬±®·½¿´ ¼¿¬¿ò Ì¸» ·²¬¿²½» ±º ¬¸· ²¿¬«®» ±½½«®®·²¹ ·² ¬¸» µ²±©² ìðð

º¿½·´·¬·» ±ª»® ìð §»¿® ¿®» ¹·ª»² ¬± ¾» ðòé »ª»²¬ò Ì¸»®»º±®»ô ¬̧ » ´·µ»´·¸±±¼ · º±«²¼

¬± ¾» ±²½» ·² îëô ððð §»¿® øìòï ¨ ïðóë

°¿÷ò

Ì¸» º®»¯«»²½§ ±º ¿ «½½»º«´ »½«®·¬§ ®»´¿¬»¼ ·²½·¼»²¬ ¿´± ¿½µ²±©´»¼¹» ·²¼·ª·¼«¿´

¿¾·´·¬§ ¬± °»®º±®³ ¿¾±¬¿¹»ò ß«³·²¹ ·²¼·ª·¼«¿´ ¿½½» ¬± ®»¬®·½¬»¼ ¿®»¿ øëðû÷ô

µ²±©´»¼¹» ±² ¸±© ¬± »¨»®½·» ¬¸» ¿½¬·ª·¬§ øçðû÷ô ¿²¼ ¬¸» ¿¾·´·¬§ ¬± »¨»®½·» ¬¸»

ìêProposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant, Moranbah, QueenslandØ¿¦¿®¼ ¿²¼ Î·µ ß»³»²¬


·²·¬·¿¬·²¹ ¬»° ¬± °®±°»´ ¬¸» ·²½·¼»²¬ô «½¸ ¿ ³¿²·°«´¿¬·²¹ »¯«·°³»²¬ øëðû÷ô ¿²

±ª»®¿´´ »¬·³¿¬» ±º ±²½» ·² ïïðô ððð §»¿® øçòî ¨ ïðóê

°¿÷ ©¿ ¼»¼«½¬»¼ò

Ì¸» º®»¯«»²½·» ±º ¬±¨·½ ®»´»¿» ¿²¼ ¿³³±²·«³ ²·¬®¿¬» »¨°´±·±² »ª»²¬ ½«®®»²¬´§

¼± ²±¬ ½±²·¼»® ·²¬»²¬·±²¿´ ¼¿³¿¹»ô ¿²¼ ©·´´ ·²½®»¿» ¿ ¿ ®»«´¬ ±º »½«®·¬§

ª«´²»®¿¾·´·¬§ò Ì¸» °®±¾¿¾·´·¬§ ±º »½«®·¬§ ª«´²»®¿¾· ·́¬§ · ¿´́ ±½¿¬»¼ ¬± ¬±¨·½ ®»´»¿» ¿²¼

¿³³±²·«³ ²·¬®¿¬» »¨°´±·±² »ª»²¬ ¿ ëû ¿²¼ çëû ®»°»½¬·ª»´§ò Ì¸» ®»«´¬ ±º

·²¬»¹®¿¬·²¹ »½«®·¬§ ª«´²»®¿¾·´·¬§ · ¿ º±´´±©æ

Ì¸» »ª»²¬ º®»¯«»²½§ ±º ¿ ¬±¨·½ ®»´»¿» ®»«´¬·²¹ ·² ¿² ¿½«¬» ¬±¨·½ ±ºº·¬»

·³°¿½¬ · ½«®®»²¬´§ ±²½» »ª»®§ ¬¸·®¬§óº·ª» §»¿® øîòç¨ïðóî °¿÷ò Ì¸» »½«®·¬§

®·µ ·²½®»¿» ¬¸· ¿³±«²¬ ¾§ ¿ ²»¹´·¹·¾´» ¿³±«²¬ øìòêï ¨ ïðóé °¿÷ô

®»³¿·²·²¹ ±²½» ·² íë §»¿®ò

ß³³±²·«³ ²·¬®¿¬» »¨°´±·±² ©»®» ·¼»²¬·º·»¼ ¿ ±½½«®®·²¹ ¿°°®±¨·³¿¬»´§

±²½» »ª»®§ »ª»²¬»»² ¬¸±«¿²¼ §»¿® øêòð¨ïðóë

°¿÷ò Ì¸» »½«®·¬§ ®·µ

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ìéProposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant, Moranbah, QueenslandØ¿¦¿®¼ ¿²¼ Î·µ ß»³»²¬


éò Î·µ ß²¿´§·

Ì¸» ½±°» ±º ¬¸· ØúÎß · ¬¸» ¿»³»²¬ ±º ±ºº·¬» º¿¬¿´·¬§ ®·µ ·² ®»°±²» ¬± Ô¿²¼ó

Ë» Í¿º»¬§ Ð´¿²²·²¹ øÔËÍÐ÷ ®»¯«·®»³»²¬ò Ì¸» º±´´±©·²¹ »½¬·±² °®»»²¬ ¬¸» ®·µ

¿²¿´§· ®»«´¬ ¿¹¿·²¬ ×²¼·ª·¼«¿´ Î·µ Ý®·¬»®·¿ô ¿²¼ Í±½·»¬¿´ Î·µ Ý®·¬»®·¿ò

7.1 Offsite Location Specific Individual Risk

Ú·¹«®» ïê °®»»²¬ ¬¸» ±ºº·¬» Ô±½¿¬·±² Í°»½·º·½ ×²¼·ª·¼«¿´ º¿¬¿´·¬§ Î·µ øÔÍ×Î÷

½±²¬±«® ¹»²»®¿¬»¼ º±® ¬¸» °®±°±»¼ ß³³±²·¿ô ²·¬®·½ ¿½·¼ô ß³³±²·«³ Ò·¬®¿¬» °´¿²¬ô

°®·´´ ¬±®¿¹» ¿²¼ »³«´·±² °´¿²¬ò Ì¸» ÔÍ×Î ½±²¬±«® ¸±©² ·² Ú·¹«®» ïêò

·²¼·½¿¬» ¬¸¿¬ ¬¸» °´¿²¬ ½±³°´§ ©·¬¸ ¿´´ Ø×ÐßÐ ±ºº·¬» ¿º»¬§ ®·µ ½®·¬»®·¿ò Ì¸»

½±²¬±«® ¸±© ¿ °®»ª¿·´·²¹ ©·²¼ ·² ¬¸» Ò±®¬¸óÉ»¬ ¼·®»½¬·±² øº®±³ ±«¬¸ó»¿¬»®´§

©·²¼÷ô ©¸·½¸ ¿½½±«²¬ º±® ¬¸» ½±²¬±«® ¬®»¬½¸·²¹ ¿ ¹®»¿¬»® ¼·¬¿²½» ·² ¬¸· ¼·®»½¬·±²ò

Figure 16 Dyno Nobel Proposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant Individual RiskProfile

ß² ¿²¿´§· ±º ¬¸» ®·µ ¼®·ª»® ¿¬ ¬¸» ·¬» ¾±«²¼¿®·» · ½±²¼«½¬»¼ ·² ¬¸» º±´´±©·²¹

»½¬·±²ò Ì±¨·½ ®»´»¿» ¼®·ª» ¬¸» ®·µ °®±º·´»ô ¬¸» ³¿¶±® ½±²¬®·¾«¬±® ¾»·²¹ ¬¸» ®»´»¿»

º®±³ ¬¸» ¿³³±²·¿ ¬¿²µò Ì¸» ¬¿²µ ·²ª»²¬±®§ øëôððð ¬±²²»÷ ³»¿² ¬¸¿¬ ¬¸» ®·µ

°®±º·´» ©·´´ ¿´©¿§ ®»³¿·² ¸·¹¸ò Ì¸» ¿³³±²·¿ ¬¿²µ ´»¿µ º®»¯«»²½·» «»¼ º±® ¬¸·

¿²¿´§· ©»®» ¾¿»¼ ±² ®»»¿®½¸ ·²¬± ¸·¬±®·½¿´ ®»´»¿» º®»¯«»²½·» º±® ®»º®·¹»®¿¬»¼

¬±®¿¹» ¬¿²µò Ì¸» ±¬¸»® ·¹²·º·½¿²¬ ½±²¬®·¾«¬±® ©¿ ®»´»¿» º®±³ ¬¸» Ô·¯«·¼

ß³³±²·¿ °®±¼«½¬ ¿½½«³«´¿¬±® ·±ó»½¬·±²ò

--------- ëëë ¨̈̈ ïïïðððóóó ëëë

ñññ§§§®®®

--------- ïïï ¨̈̈ ïïïðððóóó ëëë

ñññ§§§®®®

--------- ëëë ¨̈̈ ïïïðððóóó êêê

ñññ§§§®®®

--------- ïïï ¨̈̈ ïïïðððóóó êêê

ñññ§§§®®®

--------- ïïï ¨̈̈ ïïïðððóóó ééé

ñññ §§§®®®

ìèProposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant, Moranbah, QueenslandØ¿¦¿®¼ ¿²¼ Î·µ ß»³»²¬


7.2 Societal Risk Results

Í·²½» ¬¸»®» · ²± ±½·»¬¿´ ®·µ ½®·¬»®·¿ «»¼ ¬± ¼»¬»®³·²» ¬¸» ¿½½»°¬¿¾´» ´»ª»´ ±º

±½·»¬¿´ ®·µ ·² Ï«»»²´¿²¼ô ¬¸» Ð±¬»²¬·¿´ Ô± ±º Ô·º» øÐÔÔ÷ ª¿´«» ©»®» ½¿´½«´¿¬»¼

¿¬ °»½·º·½ ´±½¿¬·±²ò

Table 33 Potential Loss of Life Values

Population of Interest PLL (per year)

Ù®±ª»²±® Ý®»»µ ø»¬·³¿¬»¼ °·½²·½ ±º ì °»®±²÷ Ò±¬ ®»½±®¼¿¾´»îï

Ó±®¿²¾¿¸ Ì±©²¸·° ø½´±»¬ °±·²¬÷ Ò±¬ ®»½±®¼¿¾´»îì

Û²»®¬®¿¼» Ð®±°±»¼ Ú¿½·´·¬§ îòëð ¨ïðóïî

Ì®¿²º·»´¼ Ð®±°±»¼ Ð±©»® Í¬¿¬·±² îòî ¨ïðóç

Û®¹±² Ð±©»® Í¬¿¬·±² Ò±¬ ®»½±®¼¿¾´»îï

îì Ê¿´«» ±º ×²¼·ª·¼«¿´ Î·µ Ð»® ß²²«³ ©¿ ´» ¬¸¿² ïð

ïî ¿²¼ ¬¸»®»º±®» ¼·¼ ²±¬ °®±¼«½» ¿ ª¿´«» ·² ¬¸»

ÍßÚÛÌ× ³±¼»´ò

ìçProposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant, Moranbah, QueenslandØ¿¦¿®¼ ¿²¼ Î·µ ß»³»²¬


èò Ü·½«·±²

8.1 Toxic Release Scenarios

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³·¨¬«®» · «° ¬± ïðððó¬·³» ¹®»¿¬»® ¬¸¿² ¬¸¿¬ º±® ¬§°·½¿´ ¸§¼®±½¿®¾±² ³·¨»ò

Ý±²·¼»®·²¹ ¬¸· ø¿²¼ ¬¸» º¿½¬ ¬¸¿¬ ¬±¨·½ ß³³±²·¿ »ª»²¬ ©·´´ ¸¿ª» ¹®»¿¬»® »ºº»½¬

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¿ ¬±¬¿´ ±º ïíç ß³³±²·¿ó®»´¿¬»¼ ·²½·¼»²¬ ©»®» ¿»»¼ ÅÎ»º ïðÃò Ì¸» ¬«¼§ º±«²¼

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41/15824/346030

Appendix C

Consequence Analysis

Consequence Modelling and ExplosionImpact for the Ammonia, AN andEmulsion Plants


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Consequence ModellingThe following sections describe the basic theory behind the consequencemodelling conducted during this assessment in SAFETI.

A part of the risk assessment process involves generating consequences forthe release events identified. The steps involved in determiningconsequences are:

Determine release conditions based upon materials involved, processconditions and available inventory etc;

Based on release conditions, determine the types of events, which willoccur (eg toxic cloud, evaporating pool or explosion etc);

Calculate the extent of the consequences; and

Establish the impact of the consequence (e.g. proportion of people killedwhen exposed to a toxic dose)

The consequences are calculated using empirically derived models, whichcan then be used to determine which release cases generate offsite effectsand should be included in the risk model. The level at which fatalconsequences are considered to occur will directly influence the risks.

This Appendix discusses basic concepts and theory behind the variousconsequence models used in the analysis. The models discussed are:

Discharge modelling

Dispersion

Toxic Effects

Explosions

Overpressure Effects

Discharge ModellingIf there is a hole in a pipeline, vessel, flange or other piece of processequipment, the fluid inside will be released through the opening, provided theprocess pressure or static head is higher than ambient pressure. Theproperties of the fluid upon exiting the hole play a large role in determiningconsequences, eg, vapour or liquid, velocity of release etc. Figure 18illustrates an example scenario.


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Figure 17 Typical Discharge

The discharge can be considered to have two stages, the first is expansionfrom initial storage conditions to orifice conditions, the second from orificeconditions to ambient conditions.

The conditions at the orifice are calculated by assuming isentropicexpansion, ie, entropy before release = entropy at orifice. This allowsenthalpy and specific volume at the orifice to be calculated.

The equations for mass flow rate ( m ) and discharge velocity ( 0u ) are then

given by:

iood HHACm 02

And id HHCu 00 (2

Where Cd = Discharge coefficients

Ao = Area of the orifice

o = density of the material in the orifice

Ho = Enthalpy at the orifice

Hi = Enthalpy at initial storage conditions

The discharge parameters passed forward to the dispersion model are asfollows:

release height (m) and orientation; ( m )

thermodynamic data: release temperature (single phase) or liquid massfraction (two-phase), initial drop size;

for instantaneous release: mass of released material (kg), expansionenergy (J)

for continuous release: release angle (degrees), rate of release (kg/s),release velocity (m/s), release duration (s).

Orifice

Equipment item


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DispersionWhen a leak occurs, the material will be released into the atmosphere. Uponbeing released it will start to disperse and dilute into the surroundingatmosphere. The limiting (lowest) concentration of interest is related toflammable and toxic limits for flammable and toxic substances respectively.The model used to determine extent of release is described below, alongwith some of the key input parameters.

The dispersion-modelling package PHAST utilises the Unified DispersionModel (Witlox et al, 1999). This models the dispersion following a groundlevel or elevated two-phase unpressurised or pressurised release. It allowsfor continuous, instantaneous, constant finite duration and general timevarying releases. It includes a unified model for jet, heavy and passive twophase dispersion including possible droplet rain out, pool spreading and re-evaporation.

For a continuous, pressurised release, the material is released as a jet, i.e.,high momentum release. The jet eventually loses momentum and dispersesas a passive cloud. Figure 19 below shows a typical release and the variousphases involved.

Figure 18 Jet Dispersion

The cloud is diluted by air entrainment until it eventually reaches the lowerlimit of concern. During the jet phase, the mixing is turbulent and much air isentrained. In the passive phase, less air is potentially entrained, and itoccurs via a different mechanism to the turbulent jet phase. The calculationof the plume therefore depends on many factors, the key parameters being:

Material released, specifically molecular weight;

Discharge conditions including phase(s) of release, velocity etc;

Atmospheric conditions (a cloud will generally travel further in morestable conditions with lower wind speeds).


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Toxic ImpactIf the release is a toxic material, then it is necessary to attempt to relate thespecific atmospheric concentrations and durations of exposure following arelease to the level of toxicity produced within the surrounding population.The impact is determined from reports of accidental single exposure ofhumans to the airborne substance, or generated in single exposureinhalation studies in animals. All the data available in this area relate to toxiceffects, which become apparent soon after exposure (acute impact).

Other effects, including mutagenicity, carcinogenicity and teratogenicity, mayalso arise as a result of a single exposure. These chronic impacts are notconsidered in this report.

GHD has found that commonly used secondary sources of information maybe unreliable, in that the toxicological values given may be inaccuraterepresentations of the original results, or that the primary sources of suchvalues are either difficult to verify or of doubtful quality. Therefore, all thedata used in the assessment of individual substances should be obtainedfrom the original reports.

However, for most substances, existing reliable data on acute effects arisingfrom a single exposure in humans are sparse.

For a few substances some information is available from their use in warfare(e.g., chlorine, phosgene). Nevertheless, for most substances the data arelimited to a few reports of accidental exposures, often involving only a fewpeople and rarely containing accurate measurements or even estimates ofexposure concentrations and times.

Consequently, heavy reliance has to be placed on the results of experimentson animals, in attempting to predict the responsiveness of a humanpopulation. In general, extrapolation from laboratory animals to humans witha comfortable degree of accuracy and reliability is difficult, principallybecause of the inadequate information.

Even so, for most substances it is necessary to make the assumption thatresults from animal experiments will be representative of effects on thehuman population, in terms of both the nature of the effects produced andthe dose-effect relationships observed.

Toxicity of a material can be measured against criteria for either fatality orsurvivability. Fatality criteria can be presented in terms of probits ordangerous dose. A probit is a mathematical system for estimating theprobability of fatality based on the concentration and time exposed to aparticular material. A dangerous dose is single criteria that defines a certainlevel of dosage received over any time period that will result in fatality.Survivability criteria are those that if a person is exposed to levels below thecriteria there is strong confidence that he or she will survive. There can beconsiderable separation between survivability and fatality criteria, whichmakes them difficult to compare.


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Probit FunctionsA method of measuring toxic effects is to use the probit function. It is ameasure of time dependent probability of fatality from exposure to toxicchemicals. For toxicity it is a function of concentration of exposure and timeexposed to this concentration. The general form of the function is:

tCkk nlnPr 21

Where Pr = Probit value

C = Concentration of interest

t = time exposed to concentration, C

k1, k2, n = coefficients specific to each material

It is converted to a probability of fatality via the function:

25Pr1

21)( erfdeathP

From a review of the most suitable probit functions the following probits andsubsequent figures have been used.

Table 41 Probits used

Material Ammonia Nitrogen Dioxide

Probit Co-efficient: a -16.33 -13.79

Probit Co-efficient: b 1 1.4

Probit Co-efficient: n 2 2

Source TNO Green Book,CPR16: “Methods forDetermining possibleDamage”, 2002.

DSM Memo 1156CVM/78 “Inloed vanToxische Stoffen”, tenBerge W.F., 1978

ERPG-3 Value 750 ppm for 1 hour 25 ppm for 1 hour

Equivalent ToxicDose to ERPG-3

d = cNt = 7502 × 60

= 3.4E7 ppm2.min

d = cNt = 302 × 60

= 5.4E4 ppm2.min

Consequently, the probit values listed in Table 41 are used by PHAST tocalculate the portion of people fatally exposed to the toxic releases.

It is also important to report information useful for planning emergencyresponse to potential release scenarios. For this purpose reporting distancesto the Equivalent Toxic Dose to ERPG-3 has been quoted. The use of theEquivalent Toxic Dose to ERPG-3 is conservative with respect to fatalities as


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it is a dose, which “nearly all individuals can be exposed to for an hourwithout experiencing or developing life threatening health effects”.

In addition, though many of the releases are of short duration, the cumulativedose at some points may reach the ERPG-3 Equivalent Toxic Dose and sothis calculation incorporates the range of concentrations which wash over apoint during the course of the release.

Emergency Planning Response Group CriteriaThe following is provided for background on the emergency planning criteriaused. In the case of the Emergency Planning Response Group (a committeeof the American Industrial Hygiene Association), the three criteria theypublish are provided to assist emergency response workers to know whatlevel of population will require evacuation given a toxic release. Hence theexposure time is for a full hour, to try and account for the time to effect anevacuation. The three ERPG concentrations are quoted below in Table 43:

Table 43 ERPG Concentrations for Chemicals of Interest.

Category Definition Ammonia NitrogenDioxide

ERPG-1

The maximum airborne concentrationto which nearly all individuals couldbe exposed for up to 1 hour withoutexperiencing other than mild transienthealth effects or perceiving a clearlydefined objectionable odour.

25 ppm 1 ppm

ERPG-2

The maximum airborne concentrationbelow which, it is believed, nearly allindividuals can be exposed for up to 1hour without experiencing ordeveloping irreversible adverse healtheffects or symptoms, which couldimpair an individual's ability to takeprotective action.

150 ppm 15 ppm

ERPG-3

The maximum airborne concentrationbelow which, it is believed, nearly allindividuals can be exposed for up to 1hour without experiencing ordeveloping life threatening healtheffects.

750 ppm 30 ppm


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Explosion ImpactThe following sections detail the scenarios that can result in the detonation ofAmmonium Nitrate, the modelling of the resultant overpressure and fatalitiesand finally the risk that this poses on the facility and offsite.

Detonability of Ammonium Nitrate

Ammonium Nitrate as prepared by DN to UN 1942 specification is classed asan oxidiser and has the following characteristics:

It cannot burn without a combustible material present

It melts at 169 ºC

It begins to decompose after melting, releasing fumes of NOX, HNO3, NH3

and H2O

At roughly 290 ºC decomposition reactions of both exothermic andendothermic types generate an equilibrium keeping the temperatureconstant at this temperature, noting that this is dependant upon thedecomposition gases being able to vent.

The sensitivity of Ammonium Nitrate to detonation is largely dependant onthree variables; high temperature, confinement and contamination. Withoutany of these three being present, Ammonium Nitrate requires a stronginitiation charge (an example being high explosives) to detonate.

Higher temperature makes Ammonium Nitrate more sensitive to detonationas detailed below:

Higher temperature causes decomposition, the Ammonia which isevolved causes the pH of the remaining Ammonium Nitrate to drop,leading to greater detonation sensitivity.

High temperature decomposition can lead to bubbles in the moltenAmmonium Nitrate which reduces the density of the liquid making it moresensitive to detonation

Confinement makes Ammonium Nitrate more sensitive to detonation asdetailed below:

Confinement of molten Ammonium Nitrate increases the sensitivity todetonation by restraining the decomposition gases. In other words, it isalso affected by high temperatures.

For UN 1942 grade Ammonium Nitrate, whilst it is normally extremelydifficult to detonate under normal atmospheric conditions in itsuncontaminated form, detonation could occur if a very large amount ofenergy is applied (i.e. in excess of 80 atmospheres pressure (gauge))and/or if the presence of contaminants exists within the AN (such asvoids or bubbles or organics matter or fuel).


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However, it is noted that Contamination makes Ammonium Nitrate moresensitive to detonation as detailed below:

Combustible material is limited to no more than 0.2% in the UN 1942specification, if more is added, this increases the sensitivity to detonation,up to 1% hydrocarbon which is the most sensitive.

Other impurities such as some metals, acids (or low pH fromdecomposition) and salts have a strong catalytic effect on thedecomposition of Ammonium Nitrate and hence increase its sensitivity todetonation.

Interactions between heat, confinement and contamination combine togetherto increase the detonation sensitivity of Ammonium Nitrate, often combiningin a manner greater than their individual effects.

Detonation from Heat

Heat alone has never been recorded to cause detonation of AmmoniumNitrate, which is not confined or contaminated. However heat can lead toAmmonium Nitrate melting and flowing to areas where confinement orcontaminants may also be contributors. There toxic gases can also beemitted due to heating of Ammonium Nitrate, although these would actlocally considering the mostly enclosed storage shed.

If a vehicle fire in the Ammonium Nitrate prill store occurs the material couldexhibit decomposition behaviour due to the catalytic effect of certain types ofcompound fertilizers. Under certain exceptional conditions, such as if thespontaneous heating of the AN material occurs in a highly confined area withinsufficient ventilation, this would increase the sensitivity of the ammoniumnitrate. This would lead to a considerable pressure build-up in material andwould result in the detonation of the AN prill. However, if burning fuel fromthe vehicle were to mix with molten Ammonium Nitrate and an explosionfrom the vehicle cause high-velocity shrapnel to impact the moltencontaminated Ammonium Nitrate, an explosion is possible, an event borneout by the historical record [Shah, 1996 - Table 4, No. 24].

Detonation from Confinement

Confinement alone has never been recorded to cause detonation ofAmmonium Nitrate, which is not heated or contaminated. However heatedAmmonium Nitrate will decompose and release vapours which if confinedlead to increased pressure and greater sensitivity to detonation. For UN1942 grade Ammonium Nitrate, it has been reported that that in itsuncontaminated form very high pressures, in excess of 80 atmospheres, arerequired for detonation [Babcock, 1960]; a pressure far beyond that which isfound in a bulk pile of prill or in a ship’s hold. However, sensitisation of theAN prill can occur with the addition of contaminants, which could result in alowered activation energy state in the AN material, e.g. it may becomeconceivable to detonate the contaminated for of 1942 grade Ammonium


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nitrate in excess of the pressure for detonation can drop to 20 atmospherescompared to the uncontaminated pure AN grade.

Hence the historical record shows several fatalities caused by maintenancework on screw conveyor shafts, which have become filled with AmmoniumNitrate over time. The heat from welding causes decomposition of thetrapped Ammonium Nitrate, the pressure increases leading to detonationand injuries or fatalities [Shah, 1996 - Table 4, No. 6, 10, 25, 29, 31, 61].

Detonation from Contamination

Contamination can lead to catalytic decomposition of Ammonium Nitrate andcan also (if a combustible material) lead to fire, which adds heat to thescenario. Accordingly Australian Standard “AS 4326-1995: The storage andhandling of oxidizing agents” directs that the storage of Ammonium Nitratebe free of contaminants and details the housekeeping requirements toensure this.

In the instance that Ammonium Nitrate solution is stored in acidic conditions,the decomposition can lead to bubbles forming in the solution which withheating may result in detonation [Shah, 1996 - Table 4, No. 48, 60, 69].

Credible Detonation Scenarios

Table 7(first table in section 3) in the main report details the significantAmmonium Nitrate inventories throughout the project. Each one is thenassessed for credible scenarios leading to detonation. Note that potentialfire or fumes as an outcome is not detailed here, only detonation. From theinventories that are identified in Table 7, the explosion results are presentedin Table 15 of the main report. The table includes sensitivities conducted onthe explosion equivalency. Consequences were determined via the followingsteps.

The potential decomposition fires that produce NOx are expected to presenta more localised risk issue and not impact off-site populations. The hotplume from a fire would carry the NOx away from the ground (and thuspeople) making harmful exposure to the NOx unlikely to off-site populations.

Proportion Sensitised to Detonation

The proportion of material sensitised to detonation help define theconsequences of an explosion. The action of higher temperature,confinement and contaminants sensitise Ammonium Nitrate to explosion.However, the effects of heat, confinement or contamination are not expectedto extend to the entire inventory. Reviewing the inventories of AmmoniumNitrate onsite, the following cases are identified:

Tanks under the influence of heat, confinement and contaminants areconservatively assumed to contain Ammonium Nitrate homogeneous in itssensitivity to detonation. For this reason, the entire tank’s inventory is


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assumed to be sensitised to the same degree and hence if an explosionwere instigated, the entire contents of the tank are assumed to be involved.

Bulk Ammonium Nitrate prill stored in a warehouse in freestanding piles,hence it is considered difficult for the influence of heat, confinement andcontaminants to carry throughout the entire inventory. A review of significantAmmonium Nitrate accidents since 1961 [Shah 1996, GHD Review]identifies two instances where bulk prill has exploded. In both cases only asmall proportion of the Ammonium Nitrate present was detonated:

Toulouse [Dechy, 2004, event occurred in 2001]. The Toulouse incidentinvolved an explosion of contaminated and offspec prill. In the Toulouseincident, the overall equivalence of Ammonium Nitrate to TNT wasconsidered to be 5-10% [Dechy, 2004].

Cherokee [Shah 1996, Table 4, Entry 24, event occurred in 1973]. TheCherokee incident involved a fire from a front-end loader. This issignificant as despite the fact that the warehouse was at capacity (14,000tonnes), only the contaminated AN exploded not the entire contents of thepile.

A worst-case scenario for the AN facilities has been identified as thedetonation of 100% of an entire 3,000 tonne stockpile, which is compliancewith Ammonium Nitrate Guidance Note No.4: Siting of New Facilities. This isobviously overly conservative, in relation to historical incidents.

Efficiency

The proportion of the sensitised material that detonates in an explosion iscalled the efficiency. If the explosion is slow (in detonation speed terms,which Ammonium Nitrate is) then a large proportion of the material presentwill be blown away before becoming part of the chemical reaction, which isthe detonation.

The following efficiencies were used in this study:

10% for Ammonium Nitrate solution (for concentrations greater than 80%), this efficiency value is supported by the events that occurred at PortNeal, USA 1994 when two vessels containing a total of 81 tonnes ofAmmonium Nitrate exploded consecutively. However, only a total of 7tonnes of Ammonium Nitrate detonated, therefore implying 9% efficiency.10% was taken as a conservative efficiency.

100% for Ammonium Nitrate prill.This value is conservatively used tomodel the efficiency with accordance with Ammonium Nitrate GuidanceNote Number 4 : Citing of New Facilities.

70% efficiency for AN Emulsion. This value is a conservative estimatebased on industry knowledge and the explosive characteristics ofemulsion.


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Equivalency

When calculating the consequences from accidental explosions, one of themost common techniques used is to characterise a material as if it was anequivalent quantity of TNT. This technique is used because of the significantquantity of information on the consequences of explosions involving TNT andthe scarcity of reliable information on the explosive nature of many othermaterials.

There are many ways to calculate "TNT equivalence". The key parameter isblast energy produced. Where this information is not available, otherinformation is used as a surrogate such as the heat of combustion.

Heat of Explosion

For TNT, the heat of explosion is 1080 kcal/kg (4522 kJ/kg) [Fedoroff 1969]obtained from field experiments on large charges. For Ammonium Nitrate,which does not consume any appreciable quantity of external oxygen duringan explosion, the chemical reactions that occur during combustion are thesame as those that occur during an explosion. Thus the heat of combustionis often used as a surrogate for the heat of explosion.

However, there are conflicting literature values for the heat of combustionand heat of explosion of Ammonium Nitrate. Some sources list the heat ofcombustion and the heat of explosion of Ammonium Nitrate to be 346kcal/kg, the heat of combustion at constant volume to be 627.8 kcal/kg (2628kJ/kg) and at constant pressure to be 616.9 kcal/kg (2583 kJ/kg).

A Livermore software program called CHEETAH (v2.0), derived from morethan 40 years of experiments on high explosives at Lawrence Livermore andLos Alamos national laboratories, predicts detonating Ammonium Nitrate(with density 780 kg/m3) to have detonation energy of 378 kcal/kg (1583kJ/kg).

The range of TNT equivalents calculated using the previous data is givenbelow in Table 45.

Table 45 Ammonium Nitrate to TNT equivalencies

Heat of explosionSource Ammonium

Nitrate TNTEquivalenceValue

Encyclopedia of Explosives andRelated Items Vol. 4, 1969(Fedoroff and Sheffield)

1449 kJ/kg 4522 kJ/kg 0.32

Encyclopedia of Explosives andRelated Items, Vol. I, 1960)quoting Medard and Thomas(1953)

2583 kJ/kg 4522 kJ/kg 0.57


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Heat of explosionSource Ammonium

Nitrate TNTEquivalenceValue

CHEETAH model 1583 kJ/kg 4580 kJ/kg 0.35

These estimates of TNT equivalence can be compared with the value givenin the Ammonium Nitrate Guide quoted in Lees (1996, p9/104). "The Guide(FMA Ammonium Nitrate guide, 1989) discusses the hazard of explosion ofAmmonium Nitrate and considers the consequences of deflagration of astack of 300 tonne of Ammonium Nitrate.

It obtains for such an explosion a TNT equivalent of 41 tonne based on anAmmonium Nitrate TNT equivalent of 55% …". This value is contradicted byMarie-Astrid Kordek of the Certification Division, France National Institute forIndustrial Environment and Risks (INERIS) who recently presented a paperon an Analysis of the explosion effects of the accident on 21 September2001 in Toulouse. In this paper the quoted TNT equivalence estimates usedwere ~0.3 for AN fertiliser grade. These two estimates are consistent withthe dichotomy noted above. There are thus two different estimates of theTNT equivalence for Ammonium Nitrate (~55% and ~32%). Both of theseestimates have been previously used in consequence calculations forexplosions of Ammonium Nitrate.

The main reason for the difference in TNT equivalence estimates is thedifference in heat of combustion estimates, which were used as surrogatesfor heat of explosion estimates.

Heat of Combustion

The physical property "heat of combustion" is a standard chemical property.This is defined to be the heat evolved when a material is combusted with air,starting with the reactants at 25 ºC and one atmosphere pressure andending with the products at 25 ºC and one atmosphere pressure. Thus anyH2O produced in the combustion reaction is considered to be in the liquidphase.

However, during an isentropic expansion, such as occurs in an explosion,the pressure will reduce rapidly and the temperature will follow more slowly.Clearly, if water condensation is included in the calculations, the latent heatof condensation is considered to be part of the blast energy. Yet, suchcondensation does not contribute to the blast effects.

Thus, for consideration of the TNT equivalence, the H2O produced should beconsidered to be in the vapour phase as any condensation of water vapouroccurs long after the explosion has finished. This is considered to be themost likely reason for the dichotomy of heat of combustion and heat ofexplosion estimates for Ammonium Nitrate. The estimates from physical


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property databases, not concerned with potential explosive effects, quoteheats of combustion around 620-630 kcal/kg (2596-2638 kJ/kg), whichinclude the heat of condensation of water vapour. The estimates fromexperiments associated with explosive properties of materials quote heats ofexplosion around 340-380 kcal/kg (1424-1591 kJ/kg), which do not includeany effects from condensing water.

This reasoning is supported by the Encyclopaedia of Explosives and RelatedItems, Vol. I (1960) which quotes the US Army (1955) for the heat ofcombustion at constant volume (H2O liquid) to be 630 kcal/kg (2638 kJ/kg)and the heat of combustion at constant volume (H2O vapour) to be 346.3kcal/kg (1450 kJ/kg). These values, being obtained at constant volume,cannot be used directly in the TNT equivalence calculations but are similar tothe previously quoted estimates at constant pressure (617 kcal/kg, 346kcal/kg and 378 kcal/kg).

Overpressure vs. Distance Model

Using the efficiency and equivalence factors, a mass of Ammonium Nitrate isequated to a mass of TNT. The distances to defined overpressures ofinterest are calculated using the ‘TNT overpressure vs. scaled distance’relationship. This method was first discovered by Hopkinson in 1915 [Bulson1997] and has proven since then to be a robust method of explosiveconsequence prediction [Ref 32].

An ‘Overpressure vs. Scaled Distance’ relationship can take the form of anequation or graph. In this case an equation is used which is sourced fromthe US Army [Bulson 1997] and has the form:

3131

23

203

1602:

5.391054120

lbsftZandW

RZ

gaugepsipwhereZZZ

p

o

o

The process of using this equation is:

1. Convert the explosive of interest into an equivalent mass of TNT inpounds (W).

2. Choose the overpressure of interest in psi ( po).

3. Solve the equation for R, the distance in feet the overpressure is felt at.

References

1. AIHA, Emergency Response Planning Guidelines, AIHA, Akron, 1989.

2. Babcock, C.I., Ammonium Nitrate – behaviour in fires, National FireProtection Association, NFPA Q 53-10, January 1960.


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3. BHP Petroleum Pty Ltd, Offshore FSA, Standard Data and MethodologyRule Sets, Doc No. rtx02rv0 Rev 0 September 1999.

4. Bulson, P.S. 1997, Explosive Loading of Engineering Structures, E & FNSpon, Melbourne.

5. Chamberlain, G. A., 1987, Developments in design methods forpredicting thermal radiation from flares, Chem. Eng. Res. Des. v65(1987).

6. Cox, A., Lees, F., and Ang, M., Classification of Hazardous Locations,Institute of Chemical Engineers, Warwickshire, 1990.

7. Daubert, T.E. and Danner, R.P. 1989, Physical and thermodynamicproperties of pure chemicals, Data compilation by Design institute forphuysical property data and American institute of chemical engineers,Hemisphere Publishing Corporation.

8. Dechy, N & Mouilleau, Y, 2004, Damages of the Toulouse Disaster, 21st

September 2001, 11th International Symposium Loss Prevention 2004,2004

9. Department of Planning, Sydney, 1992, Risk Criteria for Land UseSafety Planning, Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No. 4.

10. Det Norske Veritas 1990, Port Risks in Great Britain from MarineTransport of Dangerous Goods in Bulk: A Risk Assessment, The Healthand Safety Executive, DNV C1216, 1990,

11. Environmental Protection Authority Western Australia, 2000, Guidancefor Risk Assessment and Management: Off-site individual risk fromHazardous Industrial Plant No. 2.

12. Fedoroff, B.T., Aaronson, H.A., Sheffield, O.E., Reese, E.A. and Clift,G.D. 1960, Encyclopedia of Explosives and Related Items, vol. 1,Picatinny Arsenal.

13. Fireworld (2004), http://www.fireworld.com/incidents/May2004.htm,Mihailesti, Romania, May 24, 2004

14. Guiochon, G. 2001, What might and might not have happened inToulouse (France) on September 21, 2001 [Online], Available:http://www.sfc.fr/Guiochon%20VO/jeucadresGGok.htm [2001, Dec. 20].

15. Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No. 6 “Guidelines forHazard Analysis”, NSW Department of Planning. 1992.

16. Institute of Makers of Explosives, TNT Equivalence Calculator, web pagecurrent in September 2002, http://www.ime.org/calculator/index.html.

17. Kordek, M.A. 2001, Analysis of explosion effects further to the accident21 September 2001 in Toulouse, Certification Division ,National Institutefor Industrial Environment and Risks (INERIS), web page current in

http://www.fireworld.com/incidents/May2004.htm

http://www.sfc.fr/Guiochon%20VO/jeucadresGGok.htm

http://www.ime.org/calculator/index.html.


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September 2002 http://mahbsrv.jrc.it/ispra-AN/AN_INERIS_Analysis2_OK/tsld001.htm.

18. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Cheetah Model Description,web page current in September 2002, http://www.llnl.gov/str/Fried.html.

19. Lees, F.P. 1996, Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2 nd edn,Butterworth Heinemann.

20. Lees, F.P., "Loss Prevention in the Process Industries", Vol 2,Butterworth Heinemann, Oxford, United Kingdom, 1996.

21. Médard, L. and Thomas, M., 1953, Heats of Combustion and Formationof AN, Materials Properties, vol. 35, pp. 155, 160 & 172, quoted inFedoroff, et.al.

22. Mellor J.W 1967, Mellor's comprehensive treatise on inorganic andtheoretical chemistry, vol. 8(2) Nitrogen Part II, Longmans London,quoted in Daubert and Danner.

23. Morony, R 1999, email from Martin Braithwaite, dated 8 March 1999,titled TNT equivalence of Ammonium Nitrate.

24. Risk Assessment Guidelines, prepared for Altona Chemical Complex &Victorian Government (Agencies); DNV Technica, October 1995.

25. SAFETI (Software for the Assessment of Fire Explosion and ToxicImpact) v6.3 help file.

26. SAFETI Modelling Software User Manual, DNV, 1995.

27. Shah, K.D. (1996), “Safety of Ammonium Nitrate Fertilisers”,Proceedings No. 384 of The International Fertiliser Society.

28. Ten Berge, W.F. Swart, A, Appelman, L.M. ‘Concentration – TimeMortality Response Relationship or Irritant and Systematically ActingVapours and Gases, Journal of Hazardous Materials, (1986), 301 – 309.

29. TNO Yellow book, 2nd edition, TNO, The Netherlands (1992).

30. US Army 1955, Military Explosives, US Army TM 9-1910 and US AirForce TO 11A-1-34 (April 1955), US Government Printing Office,Washington 25, DC, pp 119-23, quoted in Fedoroff, et.al.

31. Wiltox, H.W.M. and Holt, A., “A unified model for jet, heavy and passivedispersion including droplet rainout and re-evaporation’, CCPS 1999ADM paper.

32. Orica Submission to EIS Response.

http://mahbsrv.jrc.it/ispra-

http://www.llnl.gov/str/Fried.html.


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Appendix D

Frequency Analysis

Frequency Calculations for the Ammonia,AN and Emulsion Plants


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Leak Frequency Data and AnalysisThis Appendix describes the leak and explosion frequencies employed byGHD as the basis for determining the relative likelihood of releases fromonshore process equipment.

Leak Data Overview

During the 1990s, the offshore process industry in the North Sea made themost comprehensive collection of leak frequency data that is currentlyavailable in any industry, which has now become the standard data sourcefor offshore risk analyses (HSE 2001). After careful consideration of thestrengths and limitations of different data sources available, and theexpected differences in leak frequencies between offshore and onshoreindustries, GHD has concluded that it is appropriate to use the high-qualityoffshore data for onshore QRAs with very few exceptions (until verifiableonshore experience becomes available). The relevant arguments aresummarised below.

The UK Health & Safety Executive data cover a large population ofequipment over a considerable period of time, providing a valid statisticalbasis for estimating the frequency with which different sizes of leaks shalloccur. Data previously collected was frequently from indirectly relatedsources, inconsistently collected and representative of a poorly definedequipment population – factors that combine to introduce considerableuncertainty. The UK HSE data set was initially collected over 10 years from1990 – 2000. It is updated regularly and thus takes some account of therecent technological developments and current industry best practice thatreduce the likelihood of a release.

The HSE 2001 data provides a detailed breakdown of hole sizes forindividual equipment items. The hole size of a leak and frequency for arelease of that size are found to be inversely proportionate. For example, fullbore rupture is expected to occur much less frequently than a pinhole sizeleak. Given the data is categorised into different leak sizes, an accuratecalculation can be made of leak frequencies for various hole sizes.

The HSE 2001 data has been collected from offshore operations, whichexperience a harsher environment then that of onshore plant equipment(being assessed in this QRA). The offshore environment frequently hasmore sand or other impurities in the process streams than onshore plants,which can lead to corrosion / erosion leaks. Moreover, the salt-waterenvironment means the atmosphere is also more corrosive. In addition tothis, the closely spaced nature of an offshore plant can lead to increasedleaks from eg collisions / impact. However, the HSE data set shows thatcorrosion / erosion is a minor contributor as a cause to potential leaks, withoperational / procedural faults and mechanical defects being the primarycauses.


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In the case of infrequent events such as Ammonium Nitrate explosions,historical events are reviewed and those applicable to the situation underassessment are applied using conservative best estimates.

Leak Data Source

In order to improve the quality of the data used in risk assessments GHD hasmodified the leak frequencies in HSE 2001 in the manner described below:

Frequencies for small populations of similar equipment have been combinedwhere appropriate, in order to obtain frequencies for all types of equipmentand to minimise differences that are not statistically reliable.

For each equipment item, several leaks are not associated with a hole sizebut are labelled ‘n/a’. It is unclear what the cause or size of these leaks wasand therefore the UK HSE data set does not attribute them to one particularsize. These leak events were therefore excluded from leak frequencyderivation.

As a result of the above modifications, the leak frequencies used in thisreport may differ from the base HSE 2001 data. However, they areconsidered to be a more suitable basis for risk analysis.

Leak Size Groups

In this appendix, the leak frequencies are given for representative hole sizes,as shown in Table 47. The nominal size for each leak size range is thesuggested size of a hole to be used in discharge and consequencemodelling.

Table 47 Leak size groups

Range Nominal

< 10 mm 5 mm

10–50 mm 25 mm

50 -100 mm 100 mm

> 100 mm Full-bore


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Equipment Type

This section of the Appendix reports the leak frequency data for the followingequipment types:

Process pipes

Flanged joints

Small bore fittings

Valves

Flexible hose

Centrifugal pumps

Centrifugal compressors

Atmospheric storage tanks

Heat exchangers

Filters

Pressure vessels

Table 49 gives leak frequencies for typical pipe diameters (Ø) and hole sizecategories. Leak frequency for pipes represents the number of leaks per meter peryear.

Table 49 Summary of Process Pipe Leak Frequencies

Hole Diameter Leak Frequency (per metre year)

Range Nominal < DN 25 DN 25 DN 50 DN 80 <

<DN 150

DN 200,250

> DN 250

< 10 mm 5 mm 1.6 x 10-4 1.6 x 10-4 1.6 x 10-4 4.4 x 10-5 4.4 x 10-5 3.5 x 10-5

10–50 mm 25 mm - *2.5 x 10-5 *2.5 x 10-5 3.1 x 10-6 3.1 x 10-6 4.6 x 10-6

50 -100 mm 50 mm - - 1.2 x 10-5 *2.2 x 10-6 2.2 x 10-6 -

> 100 mm 100mm - - - - - -

Full-bore - - - - 5.8 x 10-6 9.2 x 10-6

TOTAL 1.6 x 10-4 1.9 x 10-4 2.0 x 10-4 4.9 x 10-5 5.5 x 10-5 4.9 x 10-5

* Constitutes a full-bore rupture

These values are appropriate for liquid, gas and liquefied gas service.

The principal failure modes for pipes are:

1. External leak through the pipe wall or welds

2. Blockage, due to deformation or objects inside

3. Unacceptable deformation or corrosion (without leakage or blockage)

Causes of failure in pressure systems in general are discussed by Lees (1996p12/80). The main causes of failures of pipes are mechanical failures (typically dueto combinations of overloading and inadequate design) and corrosion.

Flanged Joints

The estimate of leak frequencies from flanged joints is provided by HSE 2001 data.Table 51 reports leak frequencies for typical flange sizes and hole size categories.


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Leak frequencies are quoted as leak per joint year (ie flange – gasket – flange = 1joint).

Table 51 Summary of Flange Leak Frequencies

Hole Diameter Leak Frequency (per joint year)

Range Nominal DN25, DN50 DN 80 DN 150 DN 200,DN 250

> DN 250

< 10 mm 5 mm 3.1 x 10-5 3.1 x 10-4 4.7 x 10-5 4.7 x 10-5 8.4 x 10-6

10–50 mm 25 mm 8.6 x 10-5 * 7.2 x 10-6 5.1 x 10-6 5.1 x 10-6 3.7 x 10-6

50 -100 mm 100 mm n/a 1.4 x 10-6 * 3.8 x 10-6 * 5.7 x 10-7 3.7 x 10-6

> 100 mm Full-bore n/a 3.4 x 10-6 7.3 x 10-6

TOTAL 1.2 x 10-4 3.2 x 10-4 5.6 x 10-5 5.6 x 10-5 2.3 x 10-5

* constitutes a full-bore rupture

These values are appropriate for liquid, gas and liquefied gas service. In theabsence of better data they are considered suitable for all types of gaskets inflanges and for other types of mechanical pipe connections (e.g. Grayloc clamps).

Leaks from a flanged joint are most commonly due to failure of the gasket, andmany data sources do not distinguish flange leaks from gasket leaks. However,leaks can occur through the flange itself with the gasket intact (see Lees 1996p16/160). Major leaks tend to result from bolt failures or incorrect assembly of theflanged joint. Complete parting of the flanged joint may in effect cause a full-borerupture of the pipe.

Small Bore Fittings

The best estimate of leak frequencies from small-bore fittings is taken to be the leakfrequency for instruments in provided in the Offshore Hydrocarbon ReleaseStatistics (HSE, 2001). Table 53 gives leak frequencies for typical instrument sizesand hole size categories. Leak frequency is quoted as leak per fitting year.

Table 53 Summary of small bore fitting leak frequencies

Hole Diameter Leak Frequency

(per fitting year)

Range Nominal

< 10 mm 5 mm 4.7 x 10-4

10–50 mm 25 mm 1.2 x 10-4

TOTAL 5.9 x 10-4

* Maximum hole size for small bore fittings is 25 mm.


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Small-bore fittings are instrument connections and other branches less than 50 mmin diameter from larger pipes. Pressure, temperature or flow measuring instrumentsare typically attached to pipes or vessels by small-diameter pipes, with isolationvalves and flanged connections. This concept is convenient in a QRA, becauseeach small-bore fitting can be represented in a generic manner, instead of analysingtheir actual pipe lengths, numbers of flanges etc.

The only failure mode considered is ‘external leak of process fluid’. External leaks ofinstrument air, steam, nitrogen etc are analysed by Sterling (1999). Based on asurvey of 12 US industrial plants in 1998, an average of 12% of fittings were leaking.The median leak rate was 1 ml/min and the mean was 500 ml/min. The leak ratedistribution was not correlated with internal pressure.

Valves

The estimate of external leak frequencies from valves is taken from HSE 2001 data.A statistically significant difference is reported between manual and actuated valvesand these are treated separately. Table 55 and Table 57 give leak frequencies formanual and actuated valves. Leak frequencies are quoted as per valve year ofoperation.

Table 55 Summary of valve external leak frequencies for manual valves

Hole Diameter Leak Frequency (per valve year)

Range Nominal <DN 80 DN 80 DN 80 < DN 150 > DN 150

< 10 mm 5 mm 6.3 x 10-5 6.3 x 10-5 6.3 x 10-5 6.3 x 10-5

10–50 mm 25 mm 2.4 x 10-5 * 2.4 x 10-5 2.4 x 10-5 2.4 x 10-5

50 -100 mm 100 mm n/a 3.8 x 10-6 * 6.9 x 10-6 * 3.8 x 10-6

> 100 mm Full-bore n/a 3.1 x 10-6

TOTAL 8.7 x 10-5 9.1 x 10-5 9.2 x 10-5 9.2 x 10-5


Table 57 Summary of valve external leak frequencies for actuated valves

Hole Diameter Leak Frequency (per valve year)

Range Nominal <DN 80 DN 80 DN 80 < DN 150 > DN 150

< 10 mm 5 mm 5.5 x 10-4 5.5 x 10-4 5.5 x 10-4 5.5 x 10-4

10–50 mm 25 mm 1.3 x 10-4 * 1.7 x 10-4 1.3 x 10-4 1.3 x 10-4

50 -100 mm 100 mm n/a 1.8 x 10-5 * 3.1 x 10-5 * 1.8 x 10-5

> 100 mm Full-bore n/a 1.3 x 10-5

TOTAL 6.7 x 10-4 6.9 x 10-4 7.0 x 10-4 7.0 x 10-4



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The valve leak (Table 25 covers external leaks – most of the failure modes beloware internal) frequency includes the valve body and control system but not theflanged connections to the piping.

The principal failure modes for valves are:

1. External leak

2. Internal leak (when closed)

3. Blockage

4. Failure to open

5. Failure to close

6. Spurious operation (i.e. without command)

In a QRA, any of these failure modes may be important, depending on the valve’sfunction. The most important ones are typically:

External leak for all valve types

Failure to close for ESDV (internal)

Failure to close for NRV (internal)

Failure to close for EFV (internal - excess flow valve)

Failure to open for PRV (external)

Failure to open for BDV (external)

Flexible Hose

The operations involving flexible hosing onshore and offshore are considerablydifferent, in terms of duration of operation and flows. For the purpose of onshoreflexible hose release statistics the data employed is derived from leak frequenciesfrom motor spirit road tankers during unloading, determined by ACDS (1991) basedupon experience in Cheshire and Cleveland, UK, during 1987-88. Hole sizedistribution for flexible hoses is also provided in this data set. The risk for thisoperation is at least 10 times greater than for fixed hoses – these are constantlybeing connected and disconnected Table 59 shows the leak frequency for flexiblehoses. Leak frequency is reported per operation.

Table 59 Summary of flexible hose leak frequencies

Hole DiameterRange Nominal

Leak Frequency(per operation)

< 10 mm 5 mm 9.0 x 10-6

10–50 mm 25 mm 9.0 x 10-6

50 -100 mm 100 mm n/a> 100 mm Full-bore 1.8 x 10-6 *

TOTAL 2.0 x 10-5

* Maximum hole size is 50 mm.

The leak frequencies considered here consider only the loading equipment itself,including quick release couplings, but not flanges or valves connecting it to other


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equipment, e.g. transfer pumps – these are covered separately. Causes of the hosefailures include mechanical damage during handling or storage of the hose,corrosion, surge pressure and incorrect material.

Centrifugal Pumps

Pumps are devices to transfer liquids through pipes. Centrifugal pumps are themost common type of process pump. It uses an impeller, consisting of bladesmounted on a shaft, rotating within a casing. The pump failure frequency does notinclude the flanges, which connect a pump to process piping, nor any valves (egisolation, check) in the suction or discharge piping. These are consideredseparately.

The estimate of external leak frequencies from pumps is taken from HSE 2001 data.Table 61 below shows the leak frequency for centrifugal pumps. Frequency isreported per pump year; if pumps are not running continuously a correction to thetabulated frequency is made.

These are appropriate for both single-seal and double-seal pumps, in both liquid andliquefied gas service. The main causes of failures on centrifugal pumps are (Lees1996 p 12/40):

Bearing failure - typically due to misalignment, possibly resulting in seal failure.

Gland/seal failure - a common cause of minor leaks.

Maloperation damage, which may be due to:

Cavitation - vaporisation of a liquid close to its boiling point within the pump,causing pitting and eventually serious damage to the impeller.

Deadheading - pumping against a closed outlet, causing overpressure of thepump.

Dry running - loss of supply to the pump, causing internal damage.

Mechanical damage due to major internal failures may cause large leaks.

In most cases the leak occurs while the pump is in normal operation.

Table 61 Summary of centrifugal pump leak frequencies

Hole Diameter

Range Nominal

Leak Frequency (per pump year)

< 10 mm 5 mm 4.8 x 10-3

10–50 mm 25 mm 7.2 x 10-4

50 -100 mm 100 mm n/a

> 100 mm Full-bore n/a

TOTAL 2.0 x 10-5

Centrifugal Compressors


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Compressors are devices to increase the pressure of gases. A centrifugalcompressor is the most common type of compressor. It uses an impeller (or rotor),consisting of blades mounted on a shaft, rotating within a casing. It is suitable forgeneral compression and refrigeration.

The leak frequencies tabulated cover failures in the compressor itself. Acompressor is normally connected to pipes by flanges and valves (eg check,isolation); failure of these is not included. The principal failure modes forcompressors are:

External leak through compressor casing or seals

Internal explosion

The estimate of external leak frequencies from centrifugal compressors is takenfrom HSE 2001 data. Table 63below shows the leak frequency for centrifugalcompressors. Frequency is reported per compressor year; if it is not runningcontinuously a correction to the tabulated frequency is made.

Table 63 Summary of centrifugal compressors leak frequencies

Hole Diameter

Range Nominal

Leak Frequency

(per compressor year)

< 10 mm 5 mm 6.7 x 10-3

10–50 mm 25 mm 1.7 x 10-3

50 -100 mm 100 mm

> 100 mm Full-bore

TOTAL 8.4 x 10-3

Heat Exchange Equipment

Heat exchangers are devices to transfer heat from one fluid to another. Shell andtube heat exchangers and fin fan coolers are only two of the many types of heatexchangers available.

Shell and tube type - the most common type of heat exchanger. It contains onefluid in a bundle of small tubes, positioned inside an outer shell containing thesecond fluid.

Fin-fan (or air-cooled) type- the fluid is held in a bank of tubes, cooled by air froman electric fan.


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The boundary for failures of heat exchange equipment includes only failures in theheat exchanger itself, including failures of the shell, tubes and gaskets. A heatexchanger is normally connected to pipes by flanges, which are not included. Themain failure mode of interest in a QRA is external leak of the process fluid. This canbe the indirect result of other failure modes, such as blockage, coolant supply failureetc. The principal causes of external leaks from heat exchangers depend on thedesign, as follows:

1. Shell and tube type:

Leaks through the shell.

Rupture of tubes, causing failure of the shell due to overpressure. This mayoccur when there is high pressure gas in the tubes and low pressure liquidin the shell. Such heat exchangers have overpressure protection (PRV’s),and this failure mode requires this to fail.

2. Fin-fan (or air-cooled) type. Leaks may occur in the headers or individual tubes.Being open, they are vulnerable to impacts.

The estimate of leak frequencies from heat exchangers is taken from HSE 2001data. Table 65 gives leak frequencies for heat exchange equipment. The leakfrequencies are quoted in units of per heat exchanger per year of operations. Thesevalues are appropriate for liquid and gas service.

Table 65 Summary of heat exchange leak frequencies

Hole Diameter Leak Frequency (per heat exchanger per year)

Range Nominal Shell & Tube, (h/cin shell)

Shell & Tube, (h/cin tube)

Fin FanCooler

< 10 mm 5 mm 3.7 x 10-3 2.5 x 10-3 2.3 x 10-3

10–50 mm 25 mm 8.2 x 10-4 2.3 x 10-4 n/a

50 -100 mm 100 mm n/a n/a n/a

> 100 mm Full-bore n/a n/a n/a

TOTAL 4.5 x 10-3 2.7 x 10-3 2.3 x 10-3

Pressure Vessel

The chosen source of leak frequencies for hydrocarbon process pressure vessels isthe Smith and Warwick (1981) data. The event frequency for this type of release isconsidered sufficiently low to render the HSE 2001 data less suitable. The Smith &Warwick data is widely used because it includes a description of every event,allowing the data to be screened according to the requirements of the study.Screening has eliminated leaks from associated pipes, and allocated the data to sizecategories. Table 65 shows the leak frequency for vessels in units of per vessel peryear.


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Table 67 Summary of pressure vessel leak frequencies

Hole Diameter

Range Nominal

Leak frequency

(per vessel per year)

< 10 mm 5 mm 3.7 x 10-5

10–50 mm 25 mm 9.6 x 10-5

50 -100 mm 100 mm 9.7 x 10-6

> 100 mm Catastrophic 6.5 x 10-6

TOTAL 1.5 x 10-4

20,000 pressure vessels were covered by the study giving a total of 310,000 vessel-years. Thus the overall screened leak frequency is 1.5 x 10-4 per vessel year. Thetable gives the size breakdown. The catastrophic failure frequency of 6.5 x 10-6 isbased on only 2 events, and its 90% statistical confidence range extends from afactor of 3 higher to a factor of 5.5 lower.

Pressure vessels are process or storage vessels operating under pressure of atleast 0.5 bar (according to the code it is lower than this and also depends on thevolume). They include a wide variety of vessels, and the frequencies quoted in Table67 have been used for pressure vessels, columns and process reactors. Thedefinition of these equipment items is:

Process reactors - vessels in which batch or continuous chemical reactionprocesses take place involving high temperature or pressure.

Process vessels - vessels used for temporary storage of process fluids. Theseinclude:

Gas-liquid separators used in preliminary processing of fluid from hydrocarbonwells.

Knock-out drums used to remove liquids from compressor and flare systems.

Feed/surge drums used to even out fluctuations in the flow of process fluids.

Hydrocyclones used to remove hydrocarbons from water.

Columns - tall vertical cylindrical process vessels used for distillation, absorption,stripping and extraction. These include fractionating columns used in crude oilrefining, catalytic cracking and delayed coking processes (Perry & Green 1997p13-90).

The leak frequencies include the pressure vessel itself and any equipment directlyassociated with it, i.e. nozzles and instrumentation (with associated flanges), and theinspection cover (man-way). Connection points are included up to the first flange,although the flange itself is not included. Any lines into and out of the vessel and theassociated flanges and valves are not included in the leak frequency are includedseparately.

The principal failure modes for pressure vessels are:


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External leak (including rupture) through the vessel wall, welds or fittings

Hot rupture due to fire impingement (e.g. boiling liquid and vapour cloudexplosion (BLEVE))

Rupture due to overpressure (in shell-type steam boilers)(PRV malfunction)

Causes of failure in pressure systems in general are discussed by Lees (1996p12/80). The main causes of failures of pressure vessels are mechanical failures(typically due to operational overloads and fatigue), and corrosion, although manyfailures have elements of both. Many failures of process vessels and reactors aredue to reactions specific to the fluid contents.

Smith (1986) reports that 93% of pressure vessel failures result from crackformation, and of these 71% occurred in the weld or heat-affected zone. Almost allcracked welds were at discontinuities or attachment welds. These are usually filletwelds, which before BS5500:1982 were exempt from code inspection requirements,which only specified examination of the main seam butt welds. Over 40% of crackswere traced to defects existing before the component went into service, and afurther 32% were due to fatigue, which could also imply a pre-existing defect.


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Facility Parts Count

The parts count conducted on the project indicated that leaks could occur from thefollowing equipment items, as shown in Table 71 and Table 73. The count wascompleted based on P&IDs from the Moura site and preliminary PFDs available atthe time of the study.

Table 71 Dyno Nobel Proposed Ammonium Nitrate Plant Parts Count

Equipment / mm HNO3-Feed

HNO3-EvapL

HNO3-EvapV

HNO3-React

HNO3-NOX

AN-Liquid

ANVapour

Automatic Valve - 50 mm 1 1


Automatic Valve - 100 mm 1


Flange - 50 mm 1

Flange - 200 mm 2

Flange - 600 mm 1 2 2

Manual Valve - 50 mm 12 6 12 1 3 7 14.5

Manual Valve - 75 mm 2

Manual Valve - 100 mm 0.5

Manual Valve - 200 mm 1 3

Pipe - 50 mm 1 8 2 100 30

Pipe - 75 mm 10 10 30

Pipe - 100 mm 350 50 15

Pipe - 150 mm 20

Pipe - 200 mm 20 150

Pipe - 350 mm 4

Pipe - 450 mm 12

Pipe - 600 mm 10 5

Pipe - 700 mm 10

Heat Exchanger - Shell 2 1 1 2

Heat Exchanger - Tube 2

Small Bore Fitting 10 2 4 6 6

Vessel - Smith/Weston 1 1 1 1.5 2 2


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Release events modelled in the consequence analysis were first screened toeliminate those events not found to affect offsite populations. Releases from each ofthe major plant areas were then grouped into several simple categories for whichfrequency estimates were obtained.

Pinhole leaks (less than 10 mm in diameter), were estimated to occupyapproximately 85% of the total failure probability distribution however were screenedfrom the analysis at an earlier stage. Table 75, Table 77 and Table 79 presents thefrequency groupings for the medium/large and rupture leaks for the Nitric Acid andAmmonium Nitrate Plants; Ammonia Plant; and the Ammonia Tank, respectively.

Table 75 Grouped Release Frequencies for Nitric Acid and AN Plants

Base frequencies (per year) TotalsCase ID

5 mm 25 mm 50 mm 100mm Rupture QRA

HNO3-Feed 0.00E+00 2.02E-03 0.00E+00 5.36E-04 0.00E+00 2.56E-03

HNO3-EvapL 0.00E+00 1.73E-03 0.00E+00 5.38E-04 0.00E+00 2.27E-03

HNO3-EvapV 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 8.77E-04 0.00E+00 1.51E-04 1.03E-03

HNO3-React 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00

HNO3-NOX 0.00E+00 1.43E-03 0.00E+00 2.31E-04 3.25E-06 1.67E-03

AN- Liquid 0.00E+00 6.03E-03 0.00E+00 1.43E-03 0.00E+00 7.46E-03

AN Vapour 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 9.98E-04 0.00E+00 1.55E-03 2.55E-03

Total 0.00E+00 1.12E-02 1.88E-03 2.74E-03 1.71E-03 1.75E-02

0% 64% 11% 16% 10% 100%

Table 77 Grouped Release Frequencies for Ammonia Plant

Base frequencies (per year) TotalsCase ID

25 mm 100mm Rupture QRA

Saturator, Shift Converter, desaturator 6.87E-03 1.23E-03 6.70E-04 8.77E-03

PSA Unit, Methanator 7.40E-03 2.14E-03 1.58E-04 9.70E-03

Ammonia Compressor and Converter 6.49E-03 1.34E-03 3.15E-04 8.15E-03

Converter Effluent Gas to Flash vessels 8.55E-03 1.72E-03 5.85E-04 1.09E-02

Liquid Ammonia Product Accumulator 1.85E-03 2.76E-04 1.13E-04 2.24E-03

TOTAL 3.12E-02 6.71E-03 1.84E-03 3.98E-02

78% 17% 5% 100%


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Table 79 Ammonia Tank Release Frequencies for Ammonia Storage

Base frequencies (per tank year) TotalsCase ID

300 mm Rupture QRA

Ammonia Tank 6.0E-05 5.0E-07 6.5E-05

Leak Frequencies for Ammonia Tank Storage

Frequencies for leak rates of a double walled refrigerated tanks were taken from“New Failure Rates for Land-use Planning QRA: Update” by Gould, J.H. andGlossop, M. (2000). The failure rates have been derived for large flat-bottomedrefrigerated storage vessels that are cylindrical, constructed on site, and operatedupright (vertically) and at atmospheric pressure. They have been derived form anumber of studies. In these studies, no LNG vessel failures were recorded. Thissuggests that the failure values for vessels on LNG duty may well be lower thanthose given above. The failure rates were not intended to be applied to refrigeratedliquefied oxygen vessels.

References1. ACDS (1991), “Major Hazard Aspects of the Transport of Dangerous

Substances”, Advisory Committee on Dangerous Substances, Health & SafetyCommission, HMSO.

2. Dechy, N & Mouilleau, Y (2004), “Damages of the Toulouse Disaster, 21st

September 2001”, Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the ProcessIndustries, 11th International Symposium.

3. Det Norske Veritas 1990, Port Risks in Great Britain from Marine Transport ofDangerous Goods in Bulk: A Risk Assessment, The Health and SafetyExecutive, DNV C1216, 1990,

4. Fireworld (2004), http://www.fireworld.com/incidents/May2004.htm, Mihailesti,Romania, May 24, 2004

5. HSE (2001): Offshore Hydrocarbon Releases Statistics 2001, OffshoreTechnology Report, United Kingdom HMSO.

6. Lees, F.P. (1996), “Loss Prevention in the Process Industries”, 2nd Edition,Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, UK.

7. Perry, R.H. & Green, D.W. (1997), “Perry’s Chemical Engineers’ Handbook”, 7th

edition, McGraw-Hill, New York.

8. Rijnmond Public Authority (1982), “A Risk Analysis of Six Potentially HazardousIndustrial Objects in the Rijnmond Area - A Pilot Study”, COVO, D. ReidelPublishing Co., Dordrecht.

9. Shah, K.D. (1996), “Safety of Ammonium Nitrate Fertilisers”, Proceedings No.384 of The International Fertiliser Society.

http://www.fireworld.com/incidents/May2004.htm


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10. Smith, T.A. and Warwick, R.G. (1981), “A Survey of Defects in Pressure Vesselsin the UK for the Period 1962-78, and its Relevance to Nuclear PrimaryCircuits”, UKAEA Safety and Reliability Directorate Report SRD R203.

11. Smith, T.A. (1986), “An Analysis of a 100 te Propane Storage Vessel”, UKAEASafety and Reliability Directorate Report SRD R314.

12. Sterling, A.M. (1999), “Fugitive Emissions from Tube Fittings: Prevalence andMagnitude (Revisited)”, Department of Chemical Engineering, Louisiana StateUniversity, Baton Rouge.

13. Gould, J.H. and Glossop, M. (2000). New Failure Rates for Land-use PlanningQRA: Update.


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Appendix E

Material Safety Data Sheets

MSDSs taken from various sources

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Material Safety Data SheetDate of Issue: July 2002

Not Classified as Hazardous according to criteria of Worksafe Australia

Note: This substance is classified Class 5.1 Dangerous Good® Registered Trade Mark of Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific Limited.

COMPANY DETAILS

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HEALTH HAZARD INFORMATION

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PRECAUTIONS FOR USE

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SAFE HANDLING INFORMATION

Storage and Transport

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Spills and Disposal

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OTHER INFORMATION

Information on ß³³±²·«³ Ò·¬®¿¬» ©¿ »ª¿´«¿¬»¼ ¿¬ ëô ïðô îë ¿²¼ ëð ³¹ øÒØì÷ñÔòEcological Effects Ì¸» º»®¬·´·¬§ ±º Ü¿°¸²·¿ ³¿¹²¿ ©¿ ¼»½®»¿»¼ ¿¬ ëð ³¹ñÔò Ð±¬

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...END OF REPORT...

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Material Safety Data Sheet8of

Infosafe No. LPSA2 April 2004 ISSUED by DYNONOBIssue Date :

TITAN 2000 EMULSIONProduct Name :Not classified as hazardous according to criteria of NOHSC

1. IDENTIFICATION OF THE SUBSTANCE/PREPARATION AND COMPANY/UNDERTAKINGProduct Name TITAN 2000 EMULSION

Company Name Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific Limited

Address Level 20, AGL Building 111 Pacific Highway North SydneyNSW 2060

Emergency Tel. 1800 098 836

TelephoneNumber/Fax

Tel: +61 2 9968 9000 Fax: +61 2 9964 0170

2. HAZARDS IDENTIFICATIONName CAS ProportionIngredients

60-100 %6484-52-2Ammonium Nitrate10-30 %7732-18-5Water0-10 %Oils and other oxygen negative

materials0-10 %EMULSIFIER0-10 %Inorganic oxidisers0-10 %Ingredients determined not to be

hazardous.

3. COMPOSITION/INFORMATION ON INGREDIENTSHazards Identification

This material is classified as a Class 5.1 Dangerous Good according to theAustralian Code for the Transport of Dangerous Goods.

Other Information Severe overexposure may interfere with the ability of the blood to carry oxygen(methemoglobinemia). This can cause headache, weakness, to have dizziness and ablue color to the skin and lips. Higher levels may cause trouble in breathing,collapse and even death.

4. FIRST AID MEASURESInhalation Remove victim from exposure - avoid becoming a casualty. Remove contaminated

clothing and loosen remaining clothing. Allow patient to assume most comfortableposition and keep warm. Keep at rest until fully recovered. If patient findsbreathing difficult and develops a bluish discolouration of the skin (whichsuggests a lack of oxygen in the blood - cyanosis), ensure airways are clear ofany obstruction and have qualified person give oxygen through a face mask. Applyartificial respiration if patient is not breathing. In event of cardiac arrest,apply external cardiac massage. Seek immediate medical advice.

Ingestion Do NOT induce vomiting. Wash out mouth with water. Do not give anything by mouthto an unconscious person. Where vomiting occurs naturally have victim place headbelow hip level in order to reduce risk of aspiration. Seek immediate medicalattention. For advice, contact a Poisons Information Centre 131 126 or a doctor(at once).

Skin If skin or hair contact occurs, remove contaminated clothing and flush skin andhair with soap and running water until all oils and oxidiser (ammonium nitrate)are removed. Remove contaminated clothingimmediately. Wash contaminated clothing before re-use. If irritation occurs seekmedical advice.

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Eye If in eyes, hold eyelids apart and flush the eye continuously with runningwater. Take care not to rinse contaminated water into the non-affected eye.Continue flushing until advised to stop by the Poisons Information Centre or adoctor, or for at least 15 minutes. Remove clothing if contaminated and washskin. Seek immediate medical assistance.

First Aid Facilities Eye wash and normal washroom facilities.

Advice to Doctor Treat symptomatically. May cause methaemoglobinemia. Clinical effects: Thesmooth muscle relaxant effects of nitrate salts may lead to headache, dizzinessand marked hypotension. Cyanosis is clinically detectable when approximately 15%of the haemoglobin has been converted to methaemoglobin (ie. ferric iron).Symptoms such as headache, dizziness, weakness and dyspnoea occur whenmethaemoglobin concentrations are 30% to 40%; at levels of about 60%, stupor,convulsions, coma and respiratory paralysis occur and the blood is chocolatebrown in colour. At higher levels death may result. Spectrophotometric analysiscan determine the presence and concentration of methaemoglobin in blood.Treatment:1. Give 100% oxygen.2. In cases of (a) ingestion: use gastric lavage, (b) contamination of skin(unburnt or burnt): continue washing to remove salts.3. Observe blood pressure and treat hypotension if necessary.4. When methaeoglobin concentrations exceed 40% or when symptoms are present,give methylene blue 1 to 2 mg/kg body weight in a 1% solution by slowintravenous injection. If cyanosis has not resolved within one hour a seconddose of 2 mg/kg body weight may be given. The total dose should not exceed 7mg/kg body weight as unwanted effects such as dyspnoea, chest pain, vomiting,diarrhoea, mental confusion and cyanosis may occur. Without treatmentmethaemoglobin levels of 20-30% revert to normal within 3 days.5. Bed rest is required for methaemoglobin levels in excess of 40%.6. Continue to monitor and give oxygen for at least two hours after treatmentwith methylene blue.7. Consider transfer to centre where haemoperfusion can be performed to removethe nitrates from the blood if the condition of the patient is unstable.8. Following inhalation of oxides of nitrogen the patient should be observed inhospital for 24 hours for delayed onset of pulmonary oedema.Further observation for 2-3 weeks may be required to detect the onset ofinflammatory changes of bronchiolitis fibrosa obliterans.

5. FIRE FIGHTING MEASURESSpecific Hazards Not known to be a fire or explosion hazard under normal conditions of use. Will

explode if suitably primed. Avoid extreme conditions of heat or shock. If theproduct ignites then mass cooling by heavy dousing with water should effectivelyextinguish small fires.DO NOT FIGHT LARGE FIRES. If a fire becomes established immediately isolate areaand evacuate personnel to a safe distance. Toxic fumes may be generated as theproduct decomposes.

6. ACCIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES

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Other Information Shut off all possible ignition sources. Contain the source and spread of thespill and ensure that the material does not enter any waterways or drains.Small spills should be scooped up and placed in clean, approved containers whichare then labelled and sealed. Where possible, all residues should be scraped upfor disposal and an inert absorbent material such as sand or vermiculite spreadover the area.For large spills, collect as much of the material as possible and place inclean, approved containers which are then labelled and sealed.Contaminated bulk product recovered from a spill should be passed through a 10mmscreen before pumping. The screened material should only then be pumped using adouble diaphragm positive displacement pump.Surplus or defective explosives must not be placed in any waterway, buried,thrown away, discarded or placed with rubbish.

7. HANDLING AND STORAGEStorage Store material in a cool, well ventilated store suitably licensed for Class 5.1

Oxidising liquids.Store in accordance with Local, State and Federal Regulations and the NationalFire Protection Association regulations. Store away from heat, naked flames orsparks.Do not store or consume food, drink or tobacco in areas where they may becomecontaminated with this material.Ammonium Nitrate is incompatible with, and must be stored away from,tetranitromethane, dichloroisocyanuric acid, trichloroisocyanuric acid, anybromate, chlorate, chlorite, hypochlorite or chloroisocyanurate or any inorganicnitrite.

8. EXPOSURE CONTROLS/PERSONAL PROTECTIONOther ExposureInformation

None established for product. During preparation of this material, ammoniumnitrate dust - nuisance dustTLV (TWA) 10 mg/m 3 total (NOHSC)mineral oil mist -TLV (TWA) 5 mg/m 3 (NOHSC)As a result of detonation of this product, oxides of nitrogen or carbon fumesmay be liberated. Nitrogen oxides are skin, eye and respiratory systemirritants. Systematic toxicity resulting from oxidation of lung tissue andbronchopneumonia. Acute exposure can lead to death from asphyxia or pulmonaryoedema. In animals, nitrogen oxide caused methemoglobinemia, was notcarcinogenic, but caused embryotoxicity and reproductive effects.Carbon dioxide is a colourless, odourless gas. It is a simple asphyxiant,attacking the lungs, skin and cardiovascular system. Concentrations of 5% mayproduce shortness of breath and headache and concentrations of 10% can produceunconsciousness and death from oxygen deficiency. Adequate ventilation willprovide sufficient protection from any carbon dioxide accumulations.Carbon monoxide is a colourless, odourless, tasteless gas which, when inhaled,combines with haemoglobin to form carboxyhemoglobin which interferes with theoxygen-carrying capacity of blood. Symptoms include headache, dizziness,drowsiness, nausea, vomiting, collapse, coma and death. Carbon monoxide attacksthe central nervous system, lungs, blood and cardiovascular system.Do not enter any area where accumulations of these gases are suspected withoutappropriate breathing apparatus.

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Respiratory Protection If engineering controls are not effective in controlling airborne exposure thensuitable respiratory protective equipment should be used. Reference should bemade to Australian Standards AS/NZS 1715, Selection, Use and maintenance ofRespiratory Protective Devices; and AS/NZS 1716, Respiratory Protective Devices.Final choice of appropriate respiratory protection will vary according toindividual circumstances. This can include methods of handling, and engineeringcontrols as determined by appropriate risk assessments.

Eye Protection Safety glasses with side shields or goggles should be worn as described inAustralian Standard AS/NZS 1337 - Eye Protectors for Industrial Applications.Final choice of appropriate eye/face protection will vary according toindividual circumstances. This can include methods of handling, and engineeringcontrols as determined by appropriate risk assessments.

Hand Protection Wear gloves of impervious material such as NEOPRENE, conforming to AS/NZS 2161:Occupational protective gloves - Selection, use and maintenance. Final choice ofappropriate glove type will vary according to individual circumstances. This caninclude methods of handling, and engineering controls as determined byappropriate risk assessments.

Body Protection Suitable workwear should be worn to protect personal clothing, eg cottonoveralls buttoned at neck and wrist. When large quantities are handled the useof plastic aprons and rubber boots is recommended.

Eng. Controls Use in a well ventilated area.Hygiene Measures Ensure a high level of personal hygiene is maintained when using this product.

Always wash hands before eating, drinking, smoking or using the toilet.

9. PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIESAppearance Translucent golden emulsion, oily to touch.

Melting Point Not applicableBoiling Point Not applicable

Solubility in Water Insoluble but dispersible with water jets.

Specific Gravity(H2O=1)

1.36 - 1.40 g/cm3

Vapour Pressure Not applicable

Flash Point Not applicable

Flammability Combustible. Eliminate all ignition sources.

Flammable LimitsLEL

Not applicable

10. STABILITY AND REACTIVITY

11. TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATIONToxicologyInformation

No toxicity data is available for this specific product, however toxicity datafound for constituents are stated below:For AMMONIUM NITRATE:Oral LD50 (rat): 2217 mg/kg. (Reference: RTECS).

Inhalation Inhalation of mists or spray may irritate the nose, throat and respiratorysystem. May cause dizziness.

Ingestion Ingestion of large amounts may cause cyanosis, nausea, collapse, vomiting,abdominal pain, rapid heartbeat and breathing, coma, convulsions and death mayoccur.

Skin May irritate skin resulting in redness, itching and dermatitis. This productcontains a substance (ammonium nitrate) which may be absorbed through intactskin with resultant toxic effects.

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Eye May irritate eyes. On eye contact this product may cause tearing, stinging,blurred vision, and redness.

Chronic Effects Repeated or prolonged exposure may cause irritant contact dermatitis.Overexposure can cause nausea and vomiting, headache and collapse.

12. ECOLOGICAL INFORMATIONEnviron. Protection Avoid contaminating waterways.

Mobility Not available

Persistence /Degradability

Not available

Bioaccumulation Not available

Ecotoxicity No ecotoxicity data is available for this specific product, however toxicitydata for constituents are stated below:For Ammonium Nitrate:Ammonium Nitrate was evaluated at 5, 10, 25 and 50mg (NH4)/L. The fertility ofDaphnia magna was decreased at 50 mg/L. Post embryonic growth of crustacea wasimpaired at 10, 25 and 50 mg/L.40 hr LC50 (Aspergillus niger): 15 mg/L (36°C).

13. DISPOSAL CONSIDERATIONS

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DISPOSAL:Destruction of explosives must be carried out by suitably qualified personnel.If necessary, the relevant statutory authorities must be notified.In all circumstances, detonation is the preferred method of disposal.DETONATION:The explosives to be destroyed must be placed in direct contact with freshpriming charge in a hole which is at least 0.6 m deep and then adequatelystemmed. No detonators are to be inserted into defective explosives. Personnelmust be evacuated to a safe distance in accordance with relevant localregulations prior to initiation of the charge.NOTE: Detonations in loose or stony ground may be expected to cause fly rock.BURNING:Burning may result in the detonation of explosives. Burning explosives producestoxic fumes eg. oxides of nitrogen and carbon.Make a sawdust bed or trail adequate for the quantity of explosives to be burnedapproximately 250mm wide and 25mm deep, upon which the explosive will be laid.If sawdust is not available, newspaper may be used. Normal precautions should betaken against the spread of fire.Individual trails should not be closer together than 600mm and should containnot more than 12kg of explosive.Trails should be side-by-side, not in a line, and not more than four should beset up at one time.Remove any explosive that is not to be burnt to a distance of at least 300m.Sufficient diesel oil (never petrol or other highly flammable liquid)should be used to thoroughly wet the sawdust (or paper). At least 4L per trailis recommended.Light the trail from a long rolled paper 'wick' which should be placed downwindand in contact with the 1m of trail which is not covered with explosive.The wind should blow so that the flame from the wick (and later from the burningexplosives) will blow away from the unburned explosives as detonation is morelikely to occur if the explosives are preheated by the flame.If plastic igniter cord (slow) is available, its use for lighting is recommendedinstead of paper. One end should be coiled into or under the paper and theother end lit from a minimum distance of 7m from the trail. Retire to at least300m or to a safe place.Do not return to the site for at least 30 min after the burning has apparentlyfinished.If the fire goes out do not approach for at least 15 minutes after all traces offire has gone. Do not add more diesel oil unless certain that the flame iscompletely extinguished.

14. TRANSPORT INFORMATION

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Road and Rail Transport:UN-No : 3375Class : 5.1Hazchem code : 1[Y]EPacking group : Packing Group IIProper Shipping Name: AMMONIUM NITRATE EMULSION, intermediate for blastingexplosives, liquid.This material is classified as a Class 5.1 Dangerous Good according to theAustralian Code for the Transport of Dangerous Goods.Class 5.1 oxidising agents are incompatible in a placard load with any of thefollowing:- Explosives (class 1), Flammable Gases (class 2.1),- Toxic Gases (class 2.3), Flammable Liquids (class 3),- Flammable Solids (4.1),- Spontaneously Combustible Substances (class 4.2),- Dangerous When Wet Substances (class 4.3),- Organic Peroxides (class 5.2),- Toxic Substances (class 6)(where the toxic substances are fire risksubstances),- Radioactive Substances (class 7),- Corrosive Substances (class 8),- Miscellaneous Dangerous Goods (class 9)(where the miscellaneous dangerousgoods are fire risk substances), and fire risk substances other than dangerousgoods.

U.N. Number 3375

EPG Number 5A1

IERG Number 31

15. REGULATORY INFORMATIONRisk Phrase

Safety Phrase S17 Keep away from combustible material.S2 Keep out of reach of children.S24/25 Avoid contact with skin and eyes.S26 In case of contact with eyes, rinse immediately with plenty of water andseek medical advice.S35 This material and its container must be disposed of in a safe way.S37/39 Wear suitable gloves and eye/face protection.

Poisons Schedule Not Scheduled

16. OTHER INFORMATION

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Contact Person/Point Mt Thorley Technical CentreTelephone: (02) 6574 2500Fax: (02) 6574 6849DISCLAIMER: The information and suggestions above concern explosive productswhich should only be dealt with by persons having appropriate technical skills,training and licences. The results depend to a large degree on the conditionsunder which the products are stored, transported and used.While Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific makes every effort to ensure the details containedin the data sheet are as current and accurate aspossible the conditions underwhich its products are used are not within Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific Limited'scontrol. Each user is responsible for being aware of the details in the datasheet and the product applications in the specific context of the intended use.Buyers and users assume all risk, responsibility and liability arising from theuse of this product and the information in this data sheet. Dyno Nobel AsiaPacific Limited is not responsible for damages of any nature resulting from theuse of its products or reliance upon the information. Dyno Nobel Asia PacificLimited makes no express or implied warranties other than those impliedmandatory by Commonwealth, State or Territory legislation.

SDS History SDS created: April 2004.

...End Of MSDS...

AMMONIA (ANHYDROUS) ICSC: 0414

Date of Peer Review: March 1998ø½§´·²¼»®÷

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Page 1 of 3AMMONIA (ANHYDROUS) (ICSC)

13/08/2006http://www.intox.org/databank/documents/chemical/ammonia/eics0414.htm

http://www.intox.org/databank/documents/chemical/ammonia/eics0414.htm

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See Also:Ammonia (EHC 54, 1986)Ammonia, anhydrous (CHEMINFO)

AMMONIA (ANHYDROUS) ICSC: 0414

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Page 1 of 2Safety (MSDS) data for diesel

13/08/2006http://physchem.ox.ac.uk/MSDS/DI/diesel.html

http://physchem.ox.ac.uk/MSDS/DI/diesel.html

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Page 2 of 2Safety (MSDS) data for diesel

13/08/2006http://physchem.ox.ac.uk/MSDS/DI/diesel.html

http://physchem.ox.ac.uk/MSDS/DI/diesel.html

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Page 1 of 3NITRIC ACID (ICSC)

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ENVIRONMENTAL DATA

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See Also:Nitric acid (CHEMINFO)

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Safety (MSDS) data for nitrogen dioxide

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Page 1 of 2Safety (MSDS) data for nitrogen dioxide

13/08/2006http://physchem.ox.ac.uk/MSDS/NI/nitrogen_dioxide.html

http://physchem.ox.ac.uk/MSDS/NI/nitrogen_dioxide.html

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Page 2 of 2Safety (MSDS) data for nitrogen dioxide

13/08/2006http://physchem.ox.ac.uk/MSDS/NI/nitrogen_dioxide.html

http://physchem.ox.ac.uk/MSDS/NI/nitrogen_dioxide.html


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41/16537/350755 Supplementary Report for the proposed Moranbah Ammonium Nitrate ProjectResponses to issues raised

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