Journal ofmedical ethics, 1989, 15, 39-44

Moral theories

Voluntarism and realism in medieval ethics

John Haldane University ofSt Andrews, Scotland

Author's abstractIn contrast to other articles in this series on the history ofmoral philosophy the present essay is not devoted toexpounding the views ofa single author, or to examining aparticular moral theory. Instead it discusses an importantdispute between two medieval accounts of the relationbetween theological and moral propositions.

In addition to its historical interest this debate isimportant both because it connects earlier and later ethicalthought - being influenced by Greek moral theories andinfluencing subsequentEuropean philosophy - and becauseit concerns issues that remain important to philosophers andto those who claim that their ethical beliefs are dictated byreligious convictions.

'The point which I should first wish to understand iswhether the pious or holy is beloved by the godsbecause it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of thegods.'

Plato. Euthyphro lOa

IMoral philosophy is not much older than Plato andcertainly the Dialogues present the first systematicattempt to grasp the nature of moral truth. This givesthem one kind of priority among ethical writings butthey also enjoy primacy on two other counts. They arephilosophically great works which raise and discussmost of the fundamental problems that have concernedsubsequent thinkers, and relatedly, they have beenmore influential than other philosophical writings.Accordingly, when trying to make sense of unfamiliarideas in the history of the subject it is always worthasking: How do these thoughts relate to Plato'sconcerns? Since often what is at issue is a problemintroduced with great clarity in one of the Dialogues.

This is certainly the case with the topic to bediscussed here. Unlike other essays in this series thisarticle is not concerned with the ideas of a singlethinker, nor even with those of a single philosophical

Key wordsVoluntarism; ethical realism; medieval moral philosophy;religious ethics; naturalism.

tradition. The reference to medieval ethics in the title,therefore, is not to a movement whose members wereunited by their common view ofthe nature of morality.Rather it indicates a period in the history ofphilosophyroughly bounded by the birth of Scotus Erigena 'Johnthe Scot' (c 800-870) and the death of Nicholas ofCusa(1401-1464) during which a wide range of moraltheories was developed.Of course, there is one crucially important common

thread running through Western medieval philosophy:the assumption of the truth of the central doctrines ofJudaeo-Christianity. The religious dimension is ofgeneral relevance when trying to understand theconcerns of writers in this era and has particularsignificance for the present attempt to explain thefundamental division among moral theories of theperiod. The latter task is also helped by looking toPlato. The main point at issue among the medievalswas the relation between morality and religion;between the moral character of a person, action or stateof affairs and God's attitude to these things. And thephilosophical problem this raises is easily and acutelystated in a form derived from Socrates's question toEuthyphro quoted above: Does God love andcommand what is good because it is good, or is it goodbecause God loves and commands it?Those who asserted the latter are thereby known as

Voluntarists from the Latin voluntas, (inclination orwill): they claim that God's inclination and will givethings their moral status. Those who argue for theformer contrary thesis are best described as Realistssince they hold that ethical propositions are true orfalse in virtue of how things are in realityindependently of what attitudes anyone has towardsthem - including those of God Himself.The interest of this dispute in the present context is

threefold. Firstly, it was important in shaping moralphilosophy in the intervening period between Classicalantiquity and the Modern age and has had considerableinfluence on subsequent ethical, political, legal andtheological thought. Secondly, while in general,religious belief has declined dramatically since themiddle ages it is apparent that Christians are among themost active and committed participants incontemporary discussion ofmatters ofsocial and moralconcern, for example defence policy, foreign aid and

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40 Moral theories: Voluntarism and realism in medical ethics

sexual and medical ethics and it is usual for them to

relate their views on these issues (and their practice) to

what they believe to be the will of God. Thirdly,consideration of the Euthyphro dilemma and ofmedieval responses to it quickly leads one beyond itstheological dimension to a position from which one can

see that what underly this issue are a set of problemsnot only for religious ethics but for moral philosophygenerally, chief among which is that of giving accountof the relationship between ethical judgements and thevarious non-moral claims which are taken to support

them.

II

In regard to the first point of interest the three maincontributors to the voluntarism/realism dispute belongto the classical period of medieval philosophy. Theyare: St Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274); Duns Scotus(1266-1308); and William of Ockham (1290-1350).Each was a major figure who made importantcontributions to various branches of the subject andwho viewed philosophy as essentially systematic, withthe corollaries that their views on ethics are bestunderstood in the context of a study of their overallphilosophies and that the differences between themwith regard to the character of morality are paralleledelsewhere, for example in their theories of knowledgeand of the nature of reality in general. In the presentcircumstance, however, it is possible to illuminate thecentral elements of their moral philosophies byfollowing the order of their lives and taking theposition advanced by Aquinas as providing a startingpoint and background for the voluntarist/realist.

IIISince Aquinas' moral theory is itself the subject ofanother essay in this series (1) I shall simply indicatesomething of its general character as this bears uponthe issue of Divine Commands. Firstly, then, his viewis naturalist, teleological and eudaimonistic. That is to sayhe argues for an account ofmoral value as consisting inthe obtaining of a state of affairs in which one's activityis in accord with the perfection of one's nature quahuman being. The natural end of human life isparticipation in the life ofGod through a beatific visionofHim but this involves the perfection of every aspectof human nature: intellectual, emotional, social andorganic. Thus questions about the conduct of life are tobe answered by reference to the character of humanflourishing. Those things are good which promote our

natural well-being and thereby lead to perfecthappiness. Correspondingly, evil consists in theimpediment of life's progress - and at worst itsdestruction.

In the terms of the dispute Aquinas is clearly a realistsince he takes the truth of moral propositions to bewholly determined by the natural facts which obtainindependently of anyone's conception of them. Giventhe existence of any being with a natural constitution,it is a determinate and wholly objective fact whether or

not it is good for it to be in a certain state or to behave

in a certain manner. Inhaling solvents causes damageto cells thereby impairing the proper functioning of thehuman body with the result that the addict is unable torealise his or her natural potential. These empiricalfacts explain why glue-sniffing is a bad practice, avicious habit, and are evidence for the normativejudgement that it ought not to be engaged in.For Aquinas, therefore, the moral vocabulary and

the propositions into which it enters have their properfoundation in non-moral descriptions of the createdorder. Of course without God there would be nocreation and ipso facto no moral truths concerning thebehaviour of parts of it. In the sense in which He is theauthor of all things, therefore, God is the author ofmorality. For He ordains the ends of His creatures.

'Since all natural things have been directed by a certainnatural inclination toward their ends by the firstmover, God, whatever is willed or intended by God isthat to which everything is naturally inclined. Butinasmuch as God's will can have no other end thanHimself, and he is essentially goodness, everythingmust be naturally inclined to good' (2).

Nonetheless, God does not ordain moral factsindependently of this general creative activity. Theteleology or proper pattern of development of anorganism is both necessary and sufficient to establishthe set of values appropriate to it independently ofwhatever attitude God might subsequently adopt. Asthe quoted passage indicates, Aquinas maintains thatGod is Himself essentially good and that He makescreatures such that in their perfected state theyparticipate in His glory. From this St Thomasconcludes that it would be contrary to the nature ofGod to command creatures to behave in ways harmfulto them (3) and thus he is able to claim that the twoexpressions:

a) 'That which is good', andb) 'That which God commands',

are necessarily co-extensive, ie apply to all and only thesame things. Where he differs from the voluntarist is indenying that a) and b) are co-intensive ie have the samemeaning. God commands benevolence but itsgoodness is logically independent of this fact. WereHe, contrary to His own benevolent nature, to will thatmurder be done this would be wrong and His beliefthat murder is good would be false. Thus DivineCommands do not serve to create moral features but todisclose them to creatures whose ignorance of their ownnature and of what best befits it would otherwise leadthem to harm themselves (4).

Aquinas's moral philosophy has much to commendit and his response to the Euthyphro dilemma is subtle.Indeed this version of realism came to be widelyadopted in the following centuries in consciousopposition to voluntarism. There are, however,problems facing both the general position of ethical

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John Haldane 41

naturalism and its theological implications. Thesedifficulties are best approached by turning to the workof Scotus who knew and was partly critical of StThomas's moral theory.

IVLike Aquinas, Scotus argues that the naturalconstitution of things establishes a range of values forthem and that while God could act to eliminate thegoodness of intellectual endeavour or friendship, say -for he has absolute power (potentia absoluta), this couldonly be done by destroying the actual natural order invirtue of which these features are good. Thissuggestion goes some way to meeting the theologicalclaim, which is the principle support of voluntarism,that by His will God can achieve all things. However,it is neither adequate nor appropriate as an explanationof those episodes related in Judaeo-Christian Scripturein which God is presented as dispensing with thenatural moral law (lex naturalis) and commandingactions apparently at odds with it. The two cases mostfrequently discussed by medieval authors are God'scommand to Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac (5) andHis order to the Israelites to despoil the Egyptians (6),in which it seems He prescribes murder and theft.

In discussion of the second example Aquinas appealsto the notion of mutatio materiae (7). Ethical naturalismproposes that values are properties of properties, thatis: they are features which supervene, or areconsequent upon natural characteristics ofthings. Thissupervenience thesis implies that if two things are alikein all their natural properties they are alike also in theirmoral qualities, and that if something ceases to exhibita moral feature it also has changed with regard to itsnatural characteristics. The possibility mentionedabove of God's making false some particular claim, forexample about the value of friendship, by destroyingthe world is a dramatic and limiting case of the latterimplication of the supervenience thesis. Clearly,though it is not appropriate to invoke this possibility inexplanation of how God was able, in the cases quoted,to dispose with the natural law precepts against murderand theft. However, a logically similar move can bemade by means of mutatio materiae; the proposalbeing that while the prohibition against stealinganother's property still obtains, God has the power tochange the circumstances of an action so that whatwould otherwise have been theft is renderedpermissible - though it retains the appearance ofrobbery. In the particular case of the Israelitesdespoiling the Egyptians the usual suggestion is thatthe mutatio involved the transfer by God of propertywhich is truly His from one group to the other (8).

Ingenious as this response may be, Scotus perceivesits implausibility as an explanation of all the problemcases presented by Scripture (9) where the materialcharacter ofwhat God wills is no different from actionswhich reason judges are naturally bad. Accordingly hetries to show how God has the power to dispense withcertain moral requirements while retaining the basicassumption of ethical realism, viz, that values are

objectively fixed by nature (10). This attempt to tracea via media is perhaps ultimately incoherent andcollapses into one or other of the opposing positionsbut it introduces some interesting and important ideas.

Firstly, Scotus points out that ethical naturalismmay explain why actions, character traits, etc, are goodor bad, virtuous or vicious but it seems unable to accountfor such features of morality as requirements,prohibitions and duties. By studying human teleologyone may derive reasons in favour or against a particularaction but this kind of thinking seems to belong to theprovince of prudence and to concern what is naturallygood (naturaliter bonus) rather than to be strictly moraldeliberation, the proper object of which is obligation.The gap between natural value and duty is bridged inScotus's theory by the Divine Will: if and only if Godcommands it does an action which it would in any casebe good to perform become obligatory (likewise God'scommand is necessary and sufficient to render a badaction prohibited).

This thought is both clever and philosophicallyfruitful. It makes good a deficiency in Aquinas's ethicalnaturalism by providing an explanation of duty. Itremains fundamentally realist in claiming that whilethe deontological form and binding force of moralrequirements derive from God's will yet their contentis provided by the objective good for man. It shows thenecessity of revelation, as reason alone can onlydetermine the value of actions and not whether they arecommanded. And finally, it allows the possibility ofDivine dispensations, since God can choose on someoccasions not to command a good action or prohibit abad one and thereby deprive them of their customaryobligatory status.

Notwithstanding its merits, however, this qualifiednaturalism is no better placed than Aquinas's appeal tomutatio materiae to explain cases in which God ispresented as entirely transforming the moral characterof an action; not merely ceasing to command the goodbut apparently commanding the bad. It is in order toaccount for these episodes that Scotus introduces asecond important (though less plausible) idea whichinvolves a further move in the direction ofvoluntarism.Scotus assumes that the basic principles of the naturallaw which are ascertainable by reason and are alsogiven (with added deontological force) throughrevelation are necessary truths. Thus he concludes thatin all possible worlds it is wrong to commit murder andnot even God can dispense with this fact.

'[The primary precepts of the law of nature] are eithernecessary principles [ethical axioms] known throughunderstanding their terms, or conclusions followingfrom them by [logical] necessity. But in one way oranother they possess necessary truth. Therefore, Godcannot make them to be false. Therefore, He cannotmake what they command to be done to be good, andwhat they prohibit, not to be evil; and consequently,He cannot make such forbidden cases to be permitted'(1 1).

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42 Moral theories: Voluntarism and realism in medical ethics

The argument can be presented simply as follows:

1) God cannot perform a logically impossible feat.2) It is logically impossible to make a contradictiontrue.3) The negation of an ethical axiom, for examplemurder is wrong (thus: it is not the case that murder iswrong), is a contradiction.4) Therefore, God cannot dispense with, ie negate,ethical axioms.

Ockham solves the problem presented by the Biblicalcases by denying this conclusion but as we shall see thisinvolves an unacceptable cost. Scotus meanwhileaccepts premises 1) -3) and the conclusion they entail,but suggests that there is a broader conception of thenatural law in which it includes, as well as axioms andtheir logical consequences, a number of secondaryprecepts which while being 'consonant' (sic) with theformer are logically distinct from them and are notthemselves necessary truths (11).

Consequently no contradiction is involved innegating one of these and ipso facto it is within God'spower to do so if He chooses. Scotus discusses theexample of private ownership and suggests that whilethis may be good in some circumstances it is notabsolutely so and hence God may require that someonebe deprived of their property. Thereby an action whichwould otherwise have been bad is made good.

It is important to recognise that the distinctionScotus appeals to is unconnected with the Thomistmutatio materia solution. Scotus is not claiming that aprecept remains true but that God changes thecircumstances so that it no longer applies in theparticular case. Rather his proposal is that any memberof the class of secondary moral precepts can bedispensed with by God in a circumstance which is in allother respects identical to situations in which the sameprecept applies. Put in this way it is clear that Scotushas departed from the position of ethical naturalism.For, what he proposes directly conflicts with thesupervenience thesis stated above to which realism iscommitted. More precisely his moral theory straddlestwo positions and seeks to retain the strengths of eachwhile avoiding their weaknesses. For all that histhought is philosophically creative, however, the finalproduct is irrevocably flawed. It attempts to bindtogether opposing elements and only failure can result.One must choose between realism and voluntarism andcannot have them both.

VThe most forthright statement of the latter position isthat provided by Ockham according to whom 'Evil [inrespect of action] is nothing other than doingsomething when one is under an obligation to do theopposite' (12). That is to say, the moral is simplyconstituted by God's will. Some later writers,particularly in the tradition of Protestant Christianity,have been drawn towards the voluntarist position.John Calvin, for example, claims that 'God's will is so

much the highest rule of righteousness that whateverHe wills by the very fact that He wills it, must beconsidered righteous' (13). No writer other thanOckham, however, has produced such powerfultheological and philosophical arguments forvoluntarism and anyone disposed to reject it must takeaccount of these.The central assumption of Ockham's case against

ethical realism is that God is omnipotent and free towill (and thereby bring about) whatever He chooses.Certainly God cannot do what is logically contradictorybut this is not a limitation on His part. Any statementpurporting to be a description of God's performing alogically impossible feat is itself a contradiction and,therefore, not possibly true. For example, to say that itis logically impossible that 2 + 2 = 5 is to say that thereis no possible world in which 2 + 2 = 5. If God coulddo the logically impossible then the followingstatement could be true: God made a world in which 2 +2 = 5 and there is no possible world in which 2 + 2 = 5.However, this statement is contradictory and hencecould never be true; consequently it is simplyincoherent to suppose that anyone, even God, couldachieve the logically impossible.

For Ockham, then, God can do anything that is notcontradictory. Moral propositions he contends are notnecessary, ie unlike Aquinas and Scotus he argues thatthere is no incoherence in supposing that murdershould be done - the concepts involved in this thoughtare not contradictory. One may be mistaken inbelieving it but not in the way one would be wrong inbelieving that a bachelor is married. Accordingly, it iswithin God's power to will that murder be done or thatit not be done. To propose that His choice must beconstrained by the moral facts and, therefore, that Hecould not bring it about that murder is obligatory is inOckham's view to impose a non-logical limit on God'spower. In short, it is to suggest that He is notomnipotent, which in turn is to imply that the being inquestion is not God.

Starting from the assumption of Divineomnipotence the conclusion is reached that it cannot bethe case that God commands something because it is(independently) good but that something is goodbecause and only because God commands it (14). In theterminology employed earlier, Ockham's view is thatthe expressions 'is good' and 'is commanded by God'are co-extensive - true of all and only the same things,because they are co-intensive - have the same meaning,ie are synonymous.The strength of this position is further revealed by

considering a familiar argument against it. Ifvoluntarism were true then ifGod commanded murderand theft, etc, these would be good; but this is absurdfor they are clearly evil and could never be otherwise;consequently either God can do evil or voluntarismmust be false. Ockham's reply is that this argument issimply question-begging. He allows that we believesuch actions to be wrong and contrary to the law ofGodand explains these facts by pointing to Scripture andindicating where God forbids them. The latter event is

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John Haldane 43

the complete explanation of their evil since Divineprohibition constitutes moral badness. It also showswhy ifGod were by His absolute power and freedom tocommand them, murder, theft and even misotheism(hatred of God) would be virtuous.

'For as was said, deformity in an act of commission isonly the very act itself elicited against the divinecommand and expresses nothing else at all. And if yousay that God would then sin in causing such a deformedact, just as the created will sins when it causes such anact, I reply that God is under obligation to no one; andhence He is neither bound to cause that act, nor theopposite act, nor not to cause it' (15).

This reply also provides a solution to the Problem ofEvil, ie the argument that the occurrence ofnatural andmoral evil is incompatible with the existence of anomnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent Creator. IfGod's will is necessary and sufficient for the goodnessof whatever it brings about then whatever God hasmade is good. Thus God cannot be charged withcausing or permitting the occurrence of evil.

It should be clear that Ockham's espousal of strictvoluntarism is not unsupported piety. He takes it to belogically implied by Christian theology - to bederivable from the Divine attributes - and to showthe necessity of Revelation as the only means by whichwe could be apprised of God's Will.

VIDuring and after the Reformation the dispute betweenrealism and voluntarism came to be aligned with moregeneral theological and philosophical disagreementsbetween Catholic and Protestant Christianity. Thereasons for this are complex but relate to their differentconceptions of reason, will, human nature and therelationship between God and man. Outside of theChristian religion the problem of the logicalrelationship between the Law of God and moralgoodness is a main theme of Jewish and Muslimphilosophy from the middle ages onwards (16).The decline ofreligious beliefmay have removed the

issue from the centre of current moral philosophy butit has not yet been resolved and remains an importanttopic for enquiry. The foregoing sections showsomething of the philosophical wealth of medievaldiscussions and of why current neglect of them isunfortunate. As well as their general interest they arevaluable for the way in which they articulate a clearconceptual structure within which thought aboutreligious ethics may proceed. This said it is appropriateto conclude with some brief remarks about the relativemerits of realism and voluntarism.Ockham derives from Scotus the insight that

morality is not simply concerned with value, or thegood, but also with obligation, or the right, and inaddition takes from him the idea that duty is onlyexplicable by reference to a person. These thoughtstogether with his concern for the omnipotence and

freedom of God yield the view that 'is good' and 'iscommanded by God' have one and the same meaning -so that whatsoever God might command would begood. However, this thesis faces two problems.

Firstly, even ifvoluntarism is true it remains the casethat we make moral judgements independently ofknowing (or even considering) whether theycorrespond to God's will. The moral values andprinciples appealed to in such judgements constituteour ethical world view and it is in large part bycomparison with it that we assess the claim ofsomeoneor something to be a source of moral insight. Thecriterial status of this world view has the consequencethat were it claimed by X that God now commandsmurder, torture and rape we should rightly discountX's testimony. Thus, even if God's commandsconstitute the moral facts our naturally formed beliefsare our only guide to them.

Secondly, it is not at all clear what it means to claimthat God's approval creates the moral order in themanner required by voluntarism. Earlier it was seenthat Aquinas regards moral features as characteristicsof natural properties of things. This accords with ourpractice of giving reasons for our moral judgements byappealing to other features of the items in question.Voluntarism by contrast supposes that everything canremain exactly the same yet the moral facts alterthrough a change in God's attitude to the world. Thisimplies that God's view of how things should be isunconstrained by how they actually are and in turnsuggests an account ofHim as irrational and capricious- taking attitudes to the world regardless of itscharacter.Ockham was drawn to voluntarism out ofrespect for

the Divine attributes but the price of unrestrictedmoral omnipotence is the ascription to God ofirrational, ethical subjectivism. If this is to be avoidedGod must be viewed as issuing commands related tothe actual character of the world He has created:commanding the good because it is good. Whatevermay be the correct version of it, ethical realismpresents itself as the only credible option. Thisconclusion should be welcome for it implies thatreligious believers and others can engage in rationaldiscussion in agreement that, so far as concerns thegood at least, (17) the final authority is simply that ofthe facts.

J7ohn Haldane BA BA PhD, is Lecturer in theDepartment ofMoral Philosophy and Director of the Centre forPhilosophy andPublic Affairs, University ofStAndrews,Fife, Scotland, KY16 9AL.

References(1) McInerney R. Aquinas' moral theory. Journal of medical

ethics 1987; 13:31-33.(2) Aquinas, De veritate, Q 22, al.(3) Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, I, c 95.(4) Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia, q 1, a 1.(5) Genesis 22.

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44 Moral theories: Voluntarism and realism in medical ethics

(6) Exodus I1v 12.(7) Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia, IIae, q 100.(8) See reference (7): q 100, a 8.(9) There are several episodes, especially in the Old

Testament, in which God is apparently portrayed aseither enjoining, or Himselfperforming actions contraryto precepts of the Law. In addition to the Genesis andExodus examples see: Joshua 6:21 and Ezekiel 16 (forcases of mass murder) Job 1 (for the seeminglygratuitous infliction of suffering) and Hosea 1 (forprostitution and adultery).

(10) Scotus, Opus oxoniense, III, and Questiones quodlibetalesq 18, a 1: 'The source of moral goodness and badness'.

(11) Scotus, Opus oxoniense, III, d 37.(12) Ockham, Reportatio, II, q 5.(13) Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 3, 23, 2.(14) Ockham, Reportatio, IV, q 9.(15) Ockham, Reportatio, III, q 12.(16) Leaman 0. An introduction to medieval Islamic philosophy

Cambridge: University Press, 1985: Ch 4.(17) As regards moral obligation the view developed by

Scotus discussed in Section IV has much to commend itthough I cannot explore it further here.

Select bibliographyUnfortunately there are few good introductions to medievalphilosophy. Among the best is F C Copleston, A History ofMedieval Philosophy (London: Methuen, 1972) and for moredetailed accounts of the work of the authors discussed abovesee the relevant chapters of his History ofPhilosophy, Vols IIand III (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1950 and 52).A further useful source ofmaterial is The Cambridge History of

Later Medieval Philosophy (eds) Kretzman, Kenny andPinborg (Cambridge: University Press 1982), though itscontents reflect the fact that most of the contemporaryinterest in the middle ages is concerned with its logic andmetaphysics.

Fashion also explains the dearth of studies of medievalmoral philosophy. Of those available three deserve mention:D J O'Connor, Aquinas and Natural Law (London:Macmillan, 1967), R McInerney, Ethica Thomistica(Washington DC: the Catholic University of America Press,1982), and A S McGrade, The Political Thought ofWilliam ofOckham (Cambridge: University Press, 1969). Readerswanting a further brief introduction to moral philosophyduring this period might consult Haldane J. Medieval andRenaissance Ethics, in P. Singer (ed) A Companion to Ethics(Oxford: Blackwell, forthcoming).As regards primary sources apart from writings of Aquinas

translations of medieval texts are rare and not easily available.TheSumma Theologiae of St Thomas has been published in 60volumes (London: Blackfriars and Eyre & Spottiswoode,1963-75) and his Summa Contra Gentiles in 4 volumes (ed)A G Pegis et al (Notre Dame University Press, 1975). TheQuodlibetal Questions of Scotus are translated by Alluntis &Wolter as God and Creatures (Princeton: University Press,1975). Relevant material is contained in Ockham:Philosophical Writings (ed) Boehner (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1964). Finally, short extracts from the work of Scotusand Ockham are included in Hyman & Walsh (eds)Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Indianapolis, Hackett, 1973).On the general issue of religious ethics and the Euthyphro

problem see the collection of essays Divine Commands andMorality (ed) Helm, (Oxford: University Press, 1981) and foradditional relevant literature consult the bibliographycontained in this volume.

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