Minorities and Democratization

  • View
    31

  • Download
    0

Embed Size (px)

DESCRIPTION

Minorities and Democratization. David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran Columbia University. Bahar Leventoglu SUNY – Stonybrook. Project Background. Interested in Racial Gerrymandering in the US In the 1990’s, saw many Republican-Black Democrat coalitions in redistricting - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Text of Minorities and Democratization

  • Minorities and DemocratizationDavid Epstein & Sharyn OHalloranColumbia UniversityBahar LeventogluSUNY Stonybrook

  • Project BackgroundInterested in Racial Gerrymandering in the USIn the 1990s, saw many Republican-Black Democrat coalitions in redistrictingMakes sense electorally: concentrating black voters in a few districts helps elect Republicans elsewhere But not for policy one side has to do betterSo do this with numbers Estimate plans that maximize substantive represen-tation, and those that maximize descriptive rep.Are they the same, or is there a tradeoff?

  • FindingsIn the 1970s & 1980s, maximize substantive representation by electing blacks to officeBut starting in 1990s, do better by creating districts of no more than 45% blackAt that point, good chance of electing minority rep.But dont lose too much influence elsewhereOn the other hand, maximize # of minorities elected by concentrating up to 75% BVAPNot the same as maximizing substantive rep. So a Pareto Frontier has emerged over time

  • Lessons: AP VersionDistricting can give minority voters:A lot of influence in a few districts, or Less influence in more districtsAt times one strategy is best, at times the other may be superiorIn the US, the answer changed due to:Decreased polarization in the electorateIncreased polarization in Congress

  • Lessons: CP VersionIn a majoritarian system, minorities must form coalitions to influence policyThere are two ways to do this:In elections, via encompassing parties, orIn the legislature, via vote tradingPolitical institutions can favor one of these alternatives over the otherThis holds true for all types of minorities

  • Segue into this paperSo, within majoritarian systems: institutions coalitions min. influenceBut of course, many systems are not majoritarianThis is itself an object of choice and changeMinorities dont always do better w/democracyVoting to ViolenceImportant issue now in many places

  • Questions Reciprocal EffectsHow does the presence of ethnic factionalization affect democratization?Does it make it easier or harder to transition to democracy?Does it matter if the ruling party is from the majority or minority group?How does democratization affect minorities?More discrimination, or less?

  • Model Acemoglu & Robinson Society with two classes: upper (U) and lower (L) Group i is proportion li of the population, with lL>lU Total wealth x in society, U starts with ax, alUUL

  • Model Acemoglu & RobinsonUL0
  • Game TreeU: Democratize?YNL: Set tLU: Set tUL: Revolt?YNtUNaturetUSuccessNotRNote: For A&R,revolutionaryoutcome destroys proportion Y of economy, and U gets 0 utility.For us, lose Y as before, but then move to democracy.RevolutionaryOutcome

  • Model ELO To A&R model, we add a second ethnic group Assume L>U, and 1>2 (so L1 is largest group) Groups decide independently whether to uprise.

  • Revised Game Tree

  • Model ELO So now, two taxes are possible: economic and ethnic Ethnic tax t2 yields discrimination rents to majorityUL12tet2Note: t1 is always 0 in equilibrium.

  • Model ELOUL12 In democracy, L1 makes first proposal for {te, t2} If L1 has a majority, proposal passes Otherwise, form coalition:

  • Model ELOUL12 In democracy, L1 makes first proposal for {te, t2} If L1 has a majority, proposal passes Otherwise, form coalition: L1-U1 (ethnic)

  • Model ELOUL12 In democracy, L1 makes first proposal for {te, t2} If L1 has a majority, proposal passes Otherwise, form coalition: L1-U1 (ethnic) or L1-L2 (class)Note: Reversion policy in case of disagreement is te=t2=0.

  • EquilibriumIn autocracy, U1 sets {te=0, t2=1}No way to credibly commit to any te>0 other than democratizationCheck equilibrium under democracy and see which U1 prefersIf L1 > 50% of the population, then it sets {te=1, t2=1}So focus on L1 < 50% case

  • ImplicationsLess peaceful democratization the larger is l2, the size of the minorityPeaceful democratization occurs at intermediate levels of uprising cost YEither both L1 and L2 revolt together, or L2 alone revoltsProbability of transition independent of size of the economy (x)

  • ExtensionsPower Sharing in AutocracyU1 can attract L1 or U2 as coalition partnerDemocracy can be worse for minoritiesU2 starts off in powerMakes peaceful transitions less likelyTwo-period model with class mobilityInduces upper-lower class sympathyIncreases likelihood of transitions with anti-minority coalition in democracy

  • ConclusionsEthnic diversity reduces the probability of peaceful democratic transitionsUpper class loses discrimination rentsLower class does well in: Autocracy violence potentialDemocracy numbersAddresses question of when politics revolves around an ethnic dimension

    Today I will be presenting work on the impact of majority-minority voting districts on substantive representation of black interests

    Much of this work is joint with David Epstein

    In particular, I will focus on the question of what is the optimal districting scheme if your objective is to maximize minority representation.

    B. Voting Rights Primer

    As background, let me first review a few of the basics of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.

    As many of you know, after Reconstruction many of the Southern states altered their constitutions to include restrictive practices that inhibited the blacks ability to vote.The introduction of literacy tests with and without Grandfather clauses, that is, if you grandfather could vote so could you. Poll taxes; And white only primaries.

    These practices were challenged one-by-one on constitutional groundsBut once one would finally be defeated (like the white-only primary in 1941), another would spring up to take its place.The 1965 VRA was an attempt to provide a universal abolition of vote discrimination and eliminate any further practices from diminishing voters rights.

    B. Voting Rights Primer

    As background, let me first review a few of the basics of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.

    As many of you know, after Reconstruction many of the Southern states altered their constitutions to include restrictive practices that inhibited the blacks ability to vote.The introduction of literacy tests with and without Grandfather clauses, that is, if you grandfather could vote so could you. Poll taxes; And white only primaries.

    These practices were challenged one-by-one on constitutional groundsBut once one would finally be defeated (like the white-only primary in 1941), another would spring up to take its place.The 1965 VRA was an attempt to provide a universal abolition of vote discrimination and eliminate any further practices from diminishing voters rights.