Miller Writing Sample Tech Writing

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For Academic Purposes Only

Elizabeth (Betsy) Miller, SEST 543, Fall 2011

UNCLASSIFIED February 10, 2012

ACTION MEMO FOR SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

FROM: DSElizabeth H. Miller,

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Diplomatic Security

SUBJECT: Management Policy 019: Travel of Department of State Personnel to Iraq

Recommendation: The Department of State should reverse Management Policy 019 to allowemployees operating under Chief of Mission (COM) authority to travel to the Baghdad

International Airport (BIAP) via commercial carriers.

Approve __________ Disapprove __________

Summary:Per your request, I recently traveled to Iraq on a 30 day fact-finding mission to

analyze the feasibility of the Senate Foreign Relations Committees recent recommendations for

the Department of State (DoS) in regard to the Iraq transition. As the majority of remaining

military personnel are scheduled to depart Iraq at the end of December, making way for the entry

of at least 5,000 additional DoS civilians and contractors, one of the committees

recommendations requires your immediate attention and action. In their report, the Senate

suggested that DoS reconsider the use of the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), alluding to

the COM mandate that DoS employees enter Baghdad via the military or western side of the

airport on official Embassy Air Iraq flights. The report argues that it is enormously

expensive, inefficient for smaller groups and undiplomatic not to use a countrys international

airport. DoS can maximize its use of BIAP by allowing civilians to fly into the eastern side ofthe airport via commercial aircraft. Management Policy 019 states that DoS employees are

required to obtain COM approval to enter and exit Baghdad on commercial flights. Management

Policy 019 should be immediately reversed due to the decreased threat to commercial carriers

entering BIAP, the decreased feasibility of solely relying on official transport, and the significant

cost savings for the U.S. government.

Background:The United States government took control of BIAP, formerly the Saddam

International Airport, during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Major security concerns developed as a

result of several attacks on aircraft attempting to land at the airport by Man-Portable Air Defense

Systems (MANPADS). In one particular incident, a DHL cargo plane was shot down at 10,000feet by a heat-seeking missile, heightening concerns that commercial aircraft could not land

safely at BIAP. Despite these threats, control of the airport was returned to the Iraqi government

on August 25, 2004, and state-sponsored Iraqi Airways resumed commercial flights to several

neighboring countries. BIAP and the surrounding transport routes experienced persistent security

concerns until the 2008 surge in U.S. troops mitigated threats from Iraqi insurgents. A number of

commercial carriers have resumed service to Baghdad in response to the decrease in violence,


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including those falling under the Star Alliance conglomerate. Despite the fact that commercial

fliers can now enter Baghdad from cities all over the world, BIAP only services 600,000

passengers a year via commercial flights only 8% of its total capacity. COM policies requiring

that DoS personnel enter Baghdad on official carriers should be reconsidered based on the

following:

Decreased MANPADS Threat to Commercial Carriers: In 2003, DoS initiated multilateral

talks with 32 foreign governments to account for and secure the one million MANPADS in

existence worldwide. Of the 36 recorded MANPADS attacks on commercial carriers, only one

has occurred in Baghdad, and unlike other prominent attacks of this kind, the 2004 incident at

BIAP did not result in casualties. This indicates that the MANPADS threat to commercial planes

is an industrial security issue that imperils every airport in the world, not a local threat specific to

BIAP.

Despite that fact that the airport has been singled out as especially dangerous by COM policies,

more than 75 commercial aircraft fly safely in and out of BIAP each day. Beyond existingmultilateral efforts to mitigate international MANPADS security concerns, DoS and DoD have

worked with the Iraqi government to overcome threats to civilian aircraft by adequately staffing

air traffic controllers at BIAP, limiting the types of civilian aircraft permitted to land at the

airport, improving security perimeters, and altering landing procedures to evade missile attacks.

The altered landing procedures require that pilots descend in a corkscrew pattern, spiraling

down quickly in circles to minimize any damage from a potential MANPADS attack. The

combination of these efforts has successfully prevented attacks on all commercial flights landing

at BIAP since 2004, signifying that the Departments continued reliance on official transport into

Baghdad is based upon security concerns that are no longer relevant.

Decreased Feasibility of Solely Relying on Official Transport: The military draw-down in

Iraq necessitates that DoS provide for its own domestic and international aviation needs with

internal resources. DoS responded to new requirements by creating a small air force, Embassy

Air Iraq. By February 2012, Embassy Air Iraqs fleet will consist of 5 Dash 8 aircraft for

international flights and 36 helicopters for domestic flights. The Dash 8 planes can seat 40

passengers each and make flights four days a week to Amman and Kuwait City for a total of

8,320 annual round-trip flights to each location.

Open source statistics indicate that the planes available for international flights will not be able

to sufficiently accommodate all DoS personnel travelling to and from Baghdad, or even the10,000 Foreign Service and contract employees on assignment at Embassy Baghdad. Most DoS

Iraq assignments allow employees up to five flights per year for Rest and Recuperation (R&R)

breaks. If all employees assigned to Embassy Baghdad take five round-trip flights a year, in

addition to routine arrivals and departures, Embassy Air Iraq would be required to conduct a

minimum of 60,000 flights per year. This estimate far exceeds the 16,640 round-trip flights

scheduled for 2012. In the best case scenario, Ambassador Jeffrey will have to place strict


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limitations on the number of R&R flights permitted each year. In the worst case scenario, DoS

will not be able to fulfill its mission in Iraq because it will not be able to transport employees to

their duty stations in a timely and efficient manner.

Cost Savings for the U.S. Government: In January of 2010, the Iraqi government awarded G4S

Solutions a $22.5 million contract to provide aviation security at BIAP, covering the cost of 24/7surveillance and physical security at all vulnerable checkpoints. The GS4 contract is only one of

many funding commitments dedicated to ensuring adequate aviation security at BIAP, including

a $17.5 million grant from USAID in 2003 that funded the airports reopening. By continuing to

rely on official transport into BIAP, DoS signals that U.S. investments in the airports safety and

efficiency are largely sunk costs as they add little benefit to the conduct of American diplomacy.

The costs associated with Embassy Air Iraq are prohibitively expensive in our current budget

climate. The basic flight costs exceed commercial options by up to $1,900 per round-trip from

Dulles IAD to Baghdad. DoS could save up to $16 million in FY2012 if the 8,320 round-trip

flights scheduled from Baghdad through Amman are made on commercial carriers instead ofEmbassy Air Iraq. The costs of the flights alone are dwarfed by the administrative and logistical

costs associated with Embassy Air Iraq, including each additional $27 million Dash 8 plane that

will be required to meet burgeoning aviation needs. Each flight involves extensive coordination

with the Iraq Support Unit (staffed by 10 employees) and an overnight stay at the Sully

Compound while waiting for a flight assignment. These expenses, along with the 542 contractors

employed by Embassy Air Iraq and the costs of creating an air force from the ground up, drive

up travel costs to hundreds of millions per year.

Conclusion:Management Policy 019 threatens the effective completion of the DoS mission in

Iraq. It should be reversed immediately or critical DoS funding will continue to be wasted every

day. The MANPADS threat to commercial aircraft has been effectively addressed at both the

international and domestic level, allowing for the safe arrival and departure of 75 civilian flights

per day at BIAP. Now that this threat has been mitigated, it is critical that DoS encourage the use

of commercial options, since the sole reliance only Embassy Air Iraq is both inefficient and

prohibitively expensive. At its current capacity, Embassy Air Iraq can accommodate

approximately 1/4 of required flights in FY2012. Instead of encouraging continued government

waste by allowing Embassy Air Iraq to grow, DoS personnel should utilize existing commercial

options at an overall cost savings, better serving U.S. tax payers and facilitating diplomatic goals

in Iraq.

Type of Carrier Estimated Round-trip Cost Cost per Year (8,320 flights)US Air Iraq: Amman $3,400 $28,288,000

US Air Iraq: Kuwait City $2,600 $21,632,000

Austrian Airways $1,500 $12,480,000

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