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Middle East and North Africa Overview

The Middle East and North Africa region continues to bethe region of greatest concern in the global war on terror-ism. Iraq witnessed extensive terrorism and violence byforeign jihadists, former regime elements, and Islamic ex-tremists. Numerous attacks in Iraq targeted foreign aidworkers, contractors, and other non-combatants. Majorterrorist attacks also occurred in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, andIsrael. Active groups in the Middle East included al-Qa’ida,the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), Hizballah,Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade(Fatah’s militant wing), the Popular Front for the Libera-tion of Palestine (PFLP), Ansar al-Islam and its offshootAnsar al-Sunna, and Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s organiza-tion Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, or theal-Qa’ida Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Riv-ers (formerly Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad). There wasan increase in terrorist groups affiliating themselves withal-Qa’ida or expressing support for al-Qa’ida’s ideology.In December, the United States amended the Foreign Ter-rorist Organization (FTO) designation of Zarqawi’s groupto include its new name and aliases and designated theLibyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) as an FTO. Leba-nese Hizballah’s television network, al-Manar, was alsoadded to the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL).

Almost all countries in the region continued significantinternational counterterrorism cooperation and undertookefforts to strengthen their counterterrorism capabilities andeffectiveness. Many countries continued to provide sup-port to Coalition efforts to bring peace and stability to Iraqand Afghanistan. The United States continued to providetraining throughout the region to assist US allies to en-hance their counterterrorism capacity. In November,Bahrain hosted the first meeting of the newly-establishedFATF-style regional body, the Middle East and North AfricaFinancial Action Task Force (MENA FATF), the creation ofwhich should strengthen members’ efforts to combat moneylaundering and terrorist financing in countries in the region.

Iraq’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism was offi-cially rescinded on October 20, and the United Statescontinued to work closely with the Iraqi Interim Govern-ment (IIG) and Iraqi Security Forces to combat terrorismin Iraq. Nevertheless, terrorists and insurgents endeav-ored to prevent the establishment of a free, sovereign, anddemocratic Iraq through numerous attacks, includingbombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and beheadings.

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait undertook aggressiveactions to prevent terrorists and insurgents from crossingtheir borders into Iraq. Syria also took some measures tointercept Iraq-bound foreign jihadists, but those efforts wereonly partly successful.

Terrorist attacks in Israel in 2004 killed almost 100 people,a significant decrease from the year before. HAMASclaimed responsibility for the deadliest attack of the year,the August 31 double suicide bombing of two buses inBeersheva that killed 16 people and wounded 100.

In Egypt on October 7, terrorists attacked three tourist tar-gets in Taba and Nuweiba on the Sinai peninsula, killing34 people, including Egyptians, Israelis, Italians, a Rus-sian, and an American-Israeli dual national, and injuringover 140. By the end of the year, the Egyptian Govern-ment assessed that of the nine individuals responsible forthe attacks, two had been killed in the attacks, five werein custody, and two were still at large.

In Saudi Arabia, terrorists killed dozens of foreigners andSaudi citizens in 2004, including six Americans. Saudiauthorities aggressively pursued terrorists and succeededin capturing or killing many on their most-wanted list. OnDecember 6, an attack on the US Consulate in Jeddahkilled four Consulate locally engaged staff and one contractguard, and significantly injured ten employees. Three of theattackers were killed at the site, and one died later of his

In Baghdad’s Haifa Street, on December 19, several employees ofIraq’s Independent Electoral Commission are killed by unidentifiedgunmen after being dragged from their car. (AP Photo/STR)

A Yemeni employee of the US Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,wounded during a December 6 attack on the Consulate, talks withtwo Saudi men at a Jeddah hospital the day following the terroristattacks. (AP Photo/Hasan Jamali)

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Saudi forces gathered outside the US Consulate in Jeddah onDecember 6 after terrorists threw explosives at the gate, forced theirway in, and held hostages at gunpoint. Three of the five terrorists werekilled during the attack and a fourth later died of wounds. (AP Photo/Saudi Gazette)

Public Diplomacy

The foundation of the US Government’s public diplomacystrategy is to engage, inform, and influence foreign pub-lics in order to increase understanding of American values,policies, and initiatives. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11,reaching foreign audiences with core policy messages ondemocracy, tolerance, and the universal values of libertyand freedom remains at the center of US efforts to counterextremist rhetoric and disinformation coming from hos-tile groups.

Support for and understanding of the United States gohand-in-hand with strengthening moderate voices as anantidote to extremism. Through public diplomacy pro-grams such as Fulbright academic exchanges, InternationalVisitor Leadership projects, speaker programs, journalisttours, English-language development, Internet websites,and digital video conferences, the US Government is com-municating American principles and values. At the sametime, these programs work to increase mutual understand-ing and respect between the people of the United Statesand those of other countries.

Through public diplomacy the United States calls for dia-logue with key communities, while encouraging thegrowth of moderation, based on mutual interests of de-mocracy, security, prosperity, and shared values. In 2002,the Department launched Partnerships for Learning (P4L),which directs exchanges toward youth and youthinfluencers and focuses on the universal need for educa-tion and opportunity. A powerful component of the USGovernment’s public diplomacy programs is the broadrange of American academic institutions, NGOs, and pri-vate citizens who play a vital role in hosting approximately30,000 academic, cultural, and professional exchange visi-tors annually.

One of the most effective public diplomacy tools is Ameri-can Corners. Often housed in educational institutions,American Corners in 201 cities in 89 countries serve asplatforms for public outreach, especially to young people,offering them knowledge about life in the United States,American government, and American culture throughcomputers, books, magazines, and information.

Radio, television, Internet and video products continue tobe powerful tools for bringing America’s foreign policymessage to worldwide audiences. The State Departmentproduces a wide array of print and electronic materialsdescribing for foreign audiences, in their own languages,the need to counter those who have committed or wish tocommit terrorist acts, as well as the achievements madein that struggle. The US Agency for International Devel-opment (USAID) carries out foreign assistance programsthat support key US foreign policy interests and have apositive public diplomacy impact for many people in the

injuries. The fifth is in Saudi custody. Two groups associatedwith al-Qa’ida claimed responsibility for the attack.

Jordan’s State Security Court sentenced eight men to death,including Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, for the 2002 murder ofUSAID official Laurence Foley. In Yemen, the Sana’a Pri-mary Court, in separate trials, convicted the defendants inthe USS Cole and French M/V Limburg attacks. Both caseswere under appeal at the end of 2004.

Algeria killed or apprehended key leaders of the SalafistGroup for Call and Combat (GSPC) and the Armed IslamicGroup (GIA), and arrested more than 400 other GSPC andGIA terrorists during 2004. On October 12, Algerian Presi-dent Abdelaziz Bouteflika opened the African Union’sCenter for Study and Research on Terrorism in Algiers.

Morocco continued its aggressive action against suspectsin the May 2003 Casablanca bombing.

Algeria

Algeria continued strong support for US counterterrorismefforts and demonstrated its overall support of the globalwar on terror. Algeria made impressive gains against boththe Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC - also knownas the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) and theArmed Islamic Group (GIA). In June, GSPC “Emir” NabilSahraoui (aka Abu Ibrahim Mustapha) was killed by secu-rity forces during an armed clash. In October, Amari Saifi,a.k.a. Abderazak al-Para, the GSPC leader responsible forthe 2003 kidnapping of 32 European hostages in Algeria,was apprehended through cooperation with the Chadianand Libyan authorities, and returned to Algeria after beingheld by a Chadian rebel group, the Movement for De-mocracy and Justice, for several months. In earlyNovember, Algerian security forces captured GIA leaderNouredine Boudiaf and three of his associates along witha large cache of weapons near the Algiers airport. Alge-

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rian authorities arrested more than 400 other GSPC andGIA terrorists during 2004.

According to Algerian authorities, fewer than 800 terror-ists remain active in Algeria, down from a possible high of28,000 terrorists in the mid-1990s. The Government’s suc-cess in capturing or killing a number of GSPC and GIAleaders has further weakened the effectiveness of thesetwo groups. The GSPC, however, carried out several op-erations in Algeria in 2004, including the August ambushof a military convoy in which 40 members of the securityforces were killed. On June 21, GSPC terrorists explodeda vehicle-borne explosive device outside the El-Hammaelectric power generating facility in central Algiers, caus-ing no casualties but knocking out 210 MW of generatingcapacity for several months. Members of the cell respon-sible for the El-Hamma bombing were reportedly killedby security forces in October. Numerous smaller inci-dents occurred in 2004, mainly in the Boumerdes areaand in parts of Kabylie.

Algeria’s neighbors, including Mali, Niger, Chad, andMauritania, continue to be affected by the GSPC’s activi-ties. The GSPC conducts smuggling activities betweenAlgeria and neighboring countries. There are also finan-cial links between GSPC cells in Europe and Algeria. TheGSPC issued several communiqués on its website threat-ening foreigners in Algeria and pledged renewed allegianceto al-Qa’ida and global jihad. Algeria cooperates closelywith its neighbors in the Sahel. This cooperation led to theapprehension of Abderrazak al-Para.

On October 12, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika hosted ahigh-level African Union (AU) conference oncounterterrorism in Algiers and opened the new AU Cen-ter for Study and Research on Terrorism. This center isintended to facilitate information exchange and trainingfor AU member states in the fight against terrorism. In thefinancial arena, Algeria drafted legislation to criminalizemoney laundering activities. A financial intelligence unit(FIU), which turns over actionable information to thecourts, became operational.

Bahrain

Bahrain provides important support to US counterterrorismefforts, particularly efforts to block the financing of terrorgroups. Bahrain has continued to respond positively torequests for assistance to combat terror financing and hasfrozen about $18 million in terrorist-linked funds. In No-vember, Bahrain hosted the inaugural meeting of theMiddle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force(MENA FATF). Bahrain worked closely with FATF for sev-eral years to establish this regional body. Located inBahrain, the new MENA FATF secretariat will promote FATFrecommendations to combat money laundering and ter-rorist financing.

developing world. USAID’s humanitarian aid programsand its activities in the areas of economic growth, agricul-ture, trade, global health, democracy, and conflictprevention help reduce the risk of countries becomingbreeding grounds for terrorism. In Afghanistan, USAID ishelping to build a safe, stable society that meets the needsof its people and eliminates an environment in which ter-rorist groups have flourished. USAID has been on thefront lines of support to tsunami-affected countries, gar-nering goodwill toward the United States among peoplein the hardest-hit areas.

At the Sea Island summit hosted by the United States inJune 2004, the G8 launched the Broader Middle East andNorth Africa (BMENA) Initiative to support reform effortsunderway in the region in the areas of democratization,economics, and education. A key component of theBMENA initiative is the Forum for the Future, which bringstogether annually foreign, education, and economic min-isters, as well as civil society and business representatives,from the Broader Middle East and the G8 to discuss waysto support reform. In addition to the forum, the G8 agreedto support a Democracy Assistance Dialogue, a Networkof Funds, Entrepreneurship Centers, a microfinance ini-tiative, a literacy initiative, an Investment Task Force, anda private enterprise partnership at the International FinanceCorporation.

Also of public diplomacy significance, the Middle EastPartnership Initiative (MEPI), launched in December 2002,is a Presidential initiative established to support economic,political, and educational reform in the Middle East andexpand opportunity for all people of the region, especiallywomen and youth. By working closely with governmentsin the Arab world, academic institutions, the private sec-tor, and non-governmental organizations, MEPI increasessupport for core democratic values and self-generated re-form efforts in the Middle East.

Among the hallmark activities being conducted under theauspices of MEPI are plans for the creation of a MiddleEast Justice Institute, multiple sessions for Middle East En-trepreneurship Training in the United States for men andwomen, and regional campaign schools teaching politi-cal skills to female candidates. In addition, “PartnershipSchools” help transform the classroom learning experi-ence through innovative alternatives that can serve asmodels for governments as they build new schools andreform educational systems.

The success of public diplomacy efforts is not measuredin days or weeks; it is a long-term commitment measuredin the course of generations.

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Bahrain is an active participant in the US Government’sAntiterrorism Assistance Program. Bahrain continued tocooperate with the US on intelligence and law enforce-ment matters.

The Government actively monitored terrorist suspects, butdomestic legal constraints, including the absence of com-prehensive conspiracy legislation, have at times hamstrungthe Government’s ability to detain and prosecute suspects.In June, the Government arrested six Bahrainis and placedone Bahraini under house arrest on suspicion of plottingterrorist attacks. All seven were released within two days.The Government re-arrested the six individuals in mid-July. The court ordered the release of two of the individualsin mid-September and ordered the release of the remain-ing four in early November pending trial. Preliminaryhearings for the case began in early December. The courtreferred to the Constitutional Court a motion contestingthe constitutionality of the charges against the suspects.One of the four escaped the courtroom during a hearingin mid-September and was recaptured the same day. Hewas convicted in mid-November for the escape attemptand began serving a six-month sentence.

Egypt

The Egyptian and US Governments maintained close co-operation on a broad range of counterterrorism and lawenforcement issues in 2004. A high-level Egyptian judi-cial delegation visited the United States in June and metwith representatives of the US Departments of Justice, State,and the FBI to discuss cooperation in the areas ofcounterterrorism, law enforcement, and the mutual legalassistance treaty. In September, 20 generals from Egyp-tian security services attended a crisis managementseminar in Washington funded by the Department of State’sAntiterrorism Assistance Program.

The Egyptian and US Governments also exchanged infor-mation on a variety of terrorism, security, and lawenforcement matters during the course of the year. In thepast two years, Egypt has tightened its assets-freezing re-gime in keeping with relevant UN Security CouncilResolutions. Egypt passed strong anti-money launderinglegislation in 2002 and established a financial intelligenceunit in 2003. Egypt maintained its strengthened airportsecurity measures and security for the Suez Canal, and con-tinued to institute more stringent port security measures.

Egypt was a victim of terrorism in 2004. On October 7,terrorists attacked tourist targets in Taba and Nuweiba onthe Sinai peninsula in three separate but coordinated ac-tions. Thirty-four people were killed, including Egyptians,Israelis, Italians, a Russian, and an American-Israeli dualnational, and over 140 were injured. On October 25, theMinister of Interior announced that the Government hadidentified nine individuals responsible for the attack. Ac-cording to the Egyptian Government, a Palestinian resident

in North Sinai was the group’s ringleader. The Govern-ment reported that the Palestinian and an accomplice werekilled in the course of the attack in Taba, and that fiveothers had been taken into custody. At year’s end, two ofthe nine named by the Government remained at large.The Government asserted that the nine perpetrators werenot part of a wider conspiracy and did not receive assis-tance from international terrorist organizations.

The Egyptian judicial system does not allow plea bargain-ing in most cases, and terrorists have historically beenprosecuted to the full extent of the law. Defendants aretried in military tribunals or emergency courts. In March,an emergency court pronounced its verdict in the trial of26 persons accused of attempting to reconstitute the Is-lamic Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami), which wasbanned in Egypt in 1974 for its efforts to overthrow theEgyptian Government. The court sentenced 12 of the de-fendants (including three UK citizens) to prison. In April,Ahmad Hussein Agiza, an Islamist militant returned toEgypt by Sweden in 2001, was sentenced by a militarycourt to 25 years in prison for membership in a bannedorganization, although his sentence was subsequentlycommuted to 15 years.

Egypt continued to release from prison members of theterrorist Islamic Group (IG) who recanted their past ac-tions and renounced the use of violence. Approximately700 people were released over the course of the year, ofwhich the majority were reportedly IG members. TheGovernment characterized the releases as the result of atransformation in the ideological and theological positionsof the imprisoned IG leadership, reflected in a number ofbooks, pamphlets, and interviews in which they espouseda new non-violent philosophy. Some IG members in Egyptand abroad rejected the leadership’s move to adopt non-violence.

Egypt continued to work with Israel to crack down on long-established smuggling tunnels through the Sinai to Gaza.Egypt has destroyed more than 40 tunnel openings since2003 and long ago cleared sensitive portions of the bor-der area spanning the tunneling area. Egypt has activelyengaged Palestinian leaders on the question of reorganiz-ing the Palestinian Authority’s security services to betterpolice the border area.

Iraq

Iraq remains the central battleground in the global war onterrorism. Former regime elements as well as foreign fight-ers and Islamic extremists continued to conduct terroristattacks against civilians and non-combatants. These ele-ments also conducted numerous insurgent attacks againstCoalition and Iraqi Security Forces, which often had dev-astating effects on Iraqi civilians and significantly damagedthe country’s economic infrastructure. Following the re-turn of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG)

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on June 28, 2004, Iraqi authorities began to implement anew legal regime and to undertake needed law enforce-ment action to counter terrorist activity. Iraqi Security Forces(including the Police, Border Enforcement, National Guard,and Iraqi Armed Forces) worked closely with the Multi-Na-tional Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) to combat terrorism in Iraq. OnOctober 20, 2004, Iraq’s designation as a state sponsor ofterrorism was rescinded by the United States.

Prior to the IIG, the governing Coalition Provisional Au-thority (CPA) implemented several orders (bindinginstructions or directives that have the force of law) gov-erning the creation of a revised penal code, new policieson border security, management of the court system, andnew security forces. IIG cooperation with MNF-I forceswas enshrined in Article 59 of the Transitional Administra-tive Law (TAL), which established the framework for Iraq’stransition from the CPA through the sovereign IIG and even-tually to a permanent sovereign Iraqi Government. TheTAL names the Iraqi Armed Forces as the MNF-I’s “princi-pal partner…pursuant to the provisions of United NationsSecurity Council Resolution 1511 (2003)…until the ratifi-cation of a permanent constitution.”

At the United Nations, the IIG consistently responded posi-tively to US requests to co-sponsor the listing of al-Qa’ida-related entities and individuals pursuant to UN Se-curity Council Resolution 1267 and related resolutions thatprovide for the imposition of sanctions against entities asso-ciated with Usama bin Ladin, al-Qa’ida and the Taliban.

Terrorist attacks against a variety of targets increased inlate 2004 in the run-up to the January 30, 2005, electionsfor the Transitional National Assembly and regional par-liamentary bodies.

Jordanian-born Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and his organiza-tion emerged in 2004 to play a leading role in terrorist

activities in Iraq. In October, the US Government desig-nated Zarqawi’s group, Jama’at al Tawhid wa’al-Jihad, asa Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). In December, thedesignation was amended to include the group’s new nameTanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (or “The al-Qa’ida Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers”)and other aliases following the “merger” between Zarqawiand Usama bin Ladin’s al-Qa’ida organization. Zarqawiannounced the merger in October, and in December, binLadin endorsed Zarqawi as his official emissary in Iraq.

Zarqawi’s group claimed credit for a number of attackstargeting Coalition and Iraqi forces, as well as civilians,including the October massacre of 49 unarmed, out-of-uniform Iraqi National Guard recruits. Attacks that killedcivilians include the March 2004 bombing of the MountLebanon Hotel, killing seven and injuring over 30, and aDecember 24 suicide bombing using a fuel tanker thatkilled nine and wounded 19 in the al-Mansur district ofBaghdad.

In February, Zarqawi called for a “sectarian war” in Iraq.He and his organization sought to create a rift betweenShi’a and Sunnis through several large terror attacks againstIraqi Shi’a. In March 2004, Zarqawi claimed credit forsimultaneous bomb attacks in Baghdad and Karbala thatkilled over 180 pilgrims as they celebrated the Shi’a festi-val of Ashura. In December, Zarqawi also claimed creditfor a suicide attack at the offices of Abdel Aziz al-Hakim,leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolutionin Iraq (SCIRI), one of Iraq’s largest Shi’a parties, which killed15 and wounded over 50. Zarqawi has denied responsibil-ity for another significant attack that same month in Karbalaand Najaf, two of Shi’a Islam’s most holy cities, which killed62 Iraqi civilians and wounded more than 120.

Terrorists operating in Iraq used kidnapping and targetedassassinations to intimidate Iraqis and third-country na-

Family members grieve for Musab al-Awadi, deputy chief of tribalaffairs at the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, who was shot on July 26 at hisBaghdad home in a drive-by shooting. Two of his bodyguards werealso killed. (AP Photo/Karim Kadim)

One of a series of coordinated explosions that struck major Shiiteshrines in the holy city of Karbala on March 2 during the commemora-tion of Ashura. (AP Photo/APTV)

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tionals working in Iraq as civilian contractors. Nearly 60noncombatant Americans died in terrorist incidents in Iraqin 2004. Other American noncombatants were killed inattacks on coalition military facilities or convoys. In June,Zarqawi claimed credit for the car bomb that killed thechairman of the Coalition-appointed Iraqi GoverningCouncil. In April, an American civilian was kidnappedand later beheaded. One month later, a video of his be-heading was posted on an al-Qa’ida-associated website.Analysts believe that Zarqawi himself killed the Americanas well as a Korean hostage, kidnapped in June. Zarqawitook direct credit for the September kidnapping and mur-der of two American civilians and later their Britishengineer co-worker, and the October murder of a Japa-nese citizen.

In August, the Kurdish terrorist group Ansar al-Sunnaclaimed responsibility for the kidnapping and killing of12 Nepalese construction workers, followed by the mur-

der of two Turkish citizens in September. Many other for-eign civilians have been kidnapped. Some have beenkilled, others released, some remain in their kidnappers’hands, and the fate of others, such as the director of CARE,is unknown.Other terrorist groups were active in Iraq. Ansar al-Sunna,believed to be an offshoot of the Ansar al-Islam groupfounded in Iraq in September 2001, first came to be knownin April 2003 after issuing a statement on the Internet. InFebruary 2004, Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility forbomb attacks on the offices of two Kurdish political partiesin Irbil, which killed 109 Iraqi civilians. The Islamic Army inIraq has also claimed responsibility for terrorist actions.

Approximately 3,800 disarmed persons remained residentat the former Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK) military base atCamp Ashraf; the MeK is a designated US Foreign Terror-ist Organization (FTO). More than 400 membersrenounced membership in the organization in 2004. Forty-

Contributions to Iraq’s Security

Iraq remains the central front for the global war on terrorism. UN Security Council Resolution 1546 authorizes theMultinational Force (MNF) to conduct stability, reconstruction, and humanitarian assistance missions in Iraq. US forces,which numbered approximately 138,000 troops at the end of 2004, and Coalition partners have aggressively targetedterrorists and terrorist networks in Iraq. In preparation for Iraqi elections in January 2005, the MNF launched a series ofoffensive strikes throughout the fall of 2004 in Najaf, Samarra, and Tal Afar. In November 2004, Coalition and Iraqiforces liberated Fallujah from former regime elements and their terrorist allies, specifically members of the al-Zarqawinetwork.

Over the course of 2004, in addition to the United States, 36 countries contributed troops to support Coalition efforts inIraq, including Albania, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, ElSalvador, Estonia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova,Mongolia, The Netherlands, Nicaragua, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore,Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. Fiji contributed to the security of the UNAssistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) in 2004. As of December 2004, 28 of the 36 troop-contributing countries wereproviding approximately 25,000 troops to MNF operations in Iraq.

On June 28, 2004, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to assist in the training of Iraqi security forces; the firstmission personnel arrived in Iraq just two days later. The mission’s focus is training and mentoring mid- and senior-levelpersonnel from the Iraqi security forces and assisting with equipping those forces. At year’s end, the NATO ForeignMinisters approved increasing the mission from about 50 personnel to over 300. This will step up the ongoing trainingand mentoring of senior-level Iraq security forces, and lead to establishment of a NATO-supported Iraqi Training, Educa-tion, and Doctrine Center near Baghdad in 2005. Though distinct from the MNF’s Security Transition Command-Iraq(MNSTC-I), the NATO training mission shares the same commander in a “dual-hatted” arrangement, which facilitatesclose coordination of the two complementary efforts. The NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) continues the signifi-cant efforts of the international community to develop Iraqi security forces that can provide security for Iraq. Bulgaria,Canada, Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States all con-tributed personnel to the NTM-I during 2004.

Donor governments other than the United States pledged $8 billion for the reconstruction of Iraq, in addition to at least$5.5 billion in lending by the IMF and World Bank. Contributors of financial or in-kind assistance included: Australia,Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, theEuropean Commission, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Jordan, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait,Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines,Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thai-land, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam.

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one additional defectors elected to return to Iran, and an-other two hundred were awaiting ICRC assistance forvoluntary repatriation to Iran at the end of the year. PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel, a designated foreign terrorist group,maintains an estimated 3,000 to 3,500 armed militants innorthern Iraq, according to Turkish Government sourcesand NGOs. In the summer of 2004, PKK/KADEK/KongraGel renounced its self-proclaimed cease-fire and threat-ened to renew its separatist struggle in both Turkey’sSoutheast and urban centers. Turkish press subsequentlyreported multiple incidents in the Southeast of PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel terrorist actions or clashes between Turkish se-curity forces and PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel militants.

Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza

Israel maintained staunch support for US-ledcounterterrorism efforts in 2004. Palestinian terroristgroups conducted a large number of attacks in Israel, theWest Bank, and Gaza Strip in 2004. HAMAS, PalestinianIslamic Jihad (PIJ), the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and thePopular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) — allUS-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations — were re-sponsible for most of the attacks, which included suicidebombings, shootings, and mortar and rocket firings againstcivilian and military targets. Terrorist attacks in 2004 killedalmost 100 people (mostly Israelis, as well as a number offoreigners, including one US citizen), a decrease from thealmost 200 people killed in 2003.

The October 15, 2003, attack on a US diplomatic convoyin Gaza that killed three Americans is the most lethal at-tack ever directly targeting US interests in Israel, the WestBank, or Gaza. The Popular Resistance Committees (PRC),a loose association of Palestinians with ties to various Pal-estinian militant organizations such as HAMAS, PIJ, andFatah, claimed responsibility, although that claim was laterrescinded. Official investigations continued and resultedin the arrests of four suspects. A Palestinian civil courtordered the four suspects freed on March 14, citing a lackof evidence. Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Arafatrescinded the order and kept the suspects in custody untilPalestinian gunmen attacked the Gaza prison and releasedthe four suspects on April 24. Since the April 24 incident,the PA has failed to re-arrest the four suspects or to iden-tify and bring to justice the perpetrators of the October2003 attack.

Palestinian terrorist groups in Israel, the West Bank, andGaza continue to focus their attention on the Palestinians’historical conflict with Israel, attacking Israel and Israeliinterests within Israel and the Palestinian territories, ratherthan engaging in operations worldwide.

Israel employed a variety of military operations in itscounterterrorism efforts. Israeli forces launched frequent raidsthroughout the West Bank and Gaza, conducted targetedkillings of suspected Palestinian terrorists, destroyed homes— including those of families of suicide bombers — im-

posed strict and widespread closures and curfews in Pales-tinian areas, and continued construction of an extensivesecurity barrier in the West Bank. Israeli counterterrorismmeasures appear to have reduced the lethality of attacks;continuing attacks and credible threats of attacks, however,show that the terrorist groups remained potent.

Israel also took action in February to block what it labeledterrorist funding in two Palestinian banks. The Israeli De-fense Forces (IDF) and Shin Bet raided the West Bank officesof the Arab Bank and the Cairo-Amman Bank, seizing al-most $9 million in cash from 310 accounts. Israeli lawdoes not allow seizure of funds via correspondent accountsin Israel, and the Israeli Government claimed that the PAhad failed to act on earlier intelligence. PA officials as-serted that the funds belonged to reputable clients, withno connection to terrorism. The funds remain seized byorder of an Israeli court.

HAMAS was particularly active in 2004, carrying out at-tacks that included shootings, suicide bombings, andstandoff mortar and rocket attacks against civilian and mili-tary targets, many of them joint operations with othermilitant organizations. HAMAS was responsible for thedeadliest attack of the year in Israel — the August 31 doublesuicide bombing of two buses in Beersheva that killed 16people and wounded 100. HAMAS was also responsiblefor an increase in Qassam rocket attacks. A rocket attackon Sderot on June 28 was the first fatal attack against Is-raelis using Qassam rockets. Two Israelis died in the attack.In September, two Israeli children were killed in Sderotfrom another Qassam rocket attack. In response to thecontinued Qassam rocket fire, the IDF launched a three-week operation on September 28, in which 130 Palestinians(among them 68 HAMAS and Palestine Islamic Jihad mili-tants) and five Israelis died, according to press reports.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)was active in 2004. The group was responsible for theNovember 1 suicide bombing at the Carmel Market in TelAviv, which killed three people and wounded 30. Pales-

Israeli police officers examine the scene of a double-bombing in thesouthern Israeli city of Beersheba, August 31. (AP Photo)

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tinian Islamic Jihad conducted numerous attacks on Is-raeli settlements and checkpoints, including the April 3attacks on the Avnei Hafetz and Enav settlements in theWest Bank which killed one Israeli and seriously woundeda child.

Fatah’s militant wing, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, con-ducted numerous shooting attacks and suicide bombingsin 2004. It was responsible for two suicide bus bombingsin Jerusalem during January and February. The attackskilled 21 people and wounded over 110. Al-Aqsa alsoclaimed responsibility along with HAMAS for the March14 suicide attack in the port of Ashdod. The double sui-cide attack killed ten people and wounded at least 15.The group also claimed responsibility for a suicide bomberattack which killed two people and wounded 17 at a check-point near Jerusalem on August 11. On May 2, Palestiniangunmen belonging to the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and PIJshot and killed an Israeli settler and her four daughters inthe Gaza Strip. The group also claimed responsibility for asuicide bomber attack which killed two people and wounded17 at a checkpoint near Jerusalem on August 11.

Lebanese Hizballah remained a serious threat to the se-curity of the region, continuing its call for the destructionof Israel and using Lebanese territory as a staging groundfor terrorist operations. Lebanese Hizballah was also in-volved in providing material support to Palestinian terrorist

groups to augment their capacity and lethality in conduct-ing attacks against Israel.In December, Israel convicted and sentenced an Israeliman for membership in the “New Jewish Underground,”a terrorist organization that aimed to carry out attacks onArab civilians. On September 29, a group of five Israelisettlers attacked and seriously wounded two US citizens,members of an NGO, who were escorting Palestinian chil-dren to school near Hebron. As of the end of 2004, theIsraeli police had not arrested those responsible.

The Palestinian Authority’s efforts to thwart terrorist op-erations were minimal in 2004. The PA security servicesremained fragmented and ineffective, hobbled by corrup-tion, infighting, and poor leadership. Following theNovember 11 death of PA Chairman Arafat, Prime Minis-ter Ahmed Qurei and then PLO Chairman MahmoudAbbas engaged in an effort to convince militant Palestin-ian groups to agree to a cease-fire. Cease-fire talks wereinconclusive by the end of 2004. Palestinian officials, in-cluding Mahmoud Abbas, and some Palestinianintellectuals have called for an end to armed attacks againstIsraelis.

Jordan

Jordan continued its strong support for the global war onterrorism in 2004. Jordanian security services disruptednumerous terrorist plots during the year, including severalthat targeted US interests in Jordan. It has aggressivelypursued the network of fugitive Jordanian terrorist AbuMus’ab al-Zarqawi, deemed responsible for numerousplots and attacks in Jordan and Iraq. In the most seriousplot disrupted to date in Jordan, security services in Aprilarrested Zarqawi affiliates in the advanced stages of a planto launch truck bombs against Jordanian Government tar-gets and the US Embassy in Amman. In an unprecedentedmove, the Jordanian Government aired the plotters’ con-fessions on state-run television, emphasizing their plansto kill thousands, including Jordanian citizens. In late April,Government officials, including Queen Rania, joined thou-sands of Jordanians in a street march against terrorism.The Government publicly condemned terrorist acts through-out the world. King Abdullah was an outspoken critic ofterrorism and Islamic extremism, and in September directedreligious authorities to deliver the “Amman Message,” a dec-laration that rejects religious extremism and terrorism, andseeks to promote moderate Islam and dialogue.

Jordan’s State Security court, which has purview over ter-rorism-related cases, maintained a heavy caseload overthe year, most of which involved Zarqawi-affiliated sus-pects. The Court in April sentenced eight men to death,including Zarqawi and five others in absentia, for themurder of USAID official Laurence Foley in front of hisAmman home on October 28, 2002. The Governmentannounced in July that Muammar al-Jaghbir, sentenced todeath in absentia for his role in the Foley murder, was in

Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair meets US Secretary of StateCondoleezza Rice for bilateral talks at the “Supporting the PalestinianAuthority” meeting in London on March 1, 2005. (AP Photo/John DMcHugh, Pool)

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Jordanian custody and would be re-tried according to Jor-danian law. In May, the Court found guilty three Jordanians— including one of Zarqawi’s nephews — for plotting at-tacks against US and Israeli tourists in the country. In June,the Court sentenced Ahmad al-Riyati and eight men be-ing tried in absentia (including Zarqawi and reputed Ansaral-Islam leader Mullah Krekar) to prison for plotting againstUS interests. In October, the Court sentenced Bilal al-Hiyari, a Zarqawi fundraiser, to six months in jail for hisactivities. It also indicted suspected Zarqawi affiliateMiqdad al-Dabbas for planning attacks against Jordanianinterests in Iraq. In November, the Court began the trial ofthe 13 suspects accused in the April plot, includingZarqawi in absentia.

In one of the few non-Zarqawi related terrorism cases, theState Security Court in September indicted two Jordani-ans for plotting to attack foreign diplomats in Amman.Separately, the Court in November acquitted four men ofcharges they plotted attacks against US and Israeli targetsin Jordan, although they were sentenced to one year in jailfor possession of an automatic weapon. In late December,the court convicted 11 men on weapons charges in a plotagainst the US Embassy and US military forces in Jordan.

The State Security Court also moved forward on other long-standing terrorism cases. In June, the Court affirmed itsguilty verdict (first handed down in September 2000)against ten men accused of plotting attacks during Jordan’smillennial celebrations, sentencing two to death. In Oc-tober, Jordan’s Court of Cassation, which hears appealsfrom the State Security Court, upheld the lower court’sguilty verdict of US-Jordanian citizen Ra’ed Hijazi, one ofthose sentenced to death for his role in the plot, but com-muted the death sentence, sentencing him to 20 years injail with labor. The decision is final, and no more appealswill be heard.

Border security remained a top concern of Jordanian offi-cials in 2004, as the Jordanian Government continued tointerdict weapons and potential infiltrators at its borders.In July, Jordanian border officials intercepted and killedarmed individuals attempting to infiltrate northern Israelfrom Jordan. Jordanian border officials allegedly inter-cepted suspects involved in the April Zarqawi plot as theytried to enter Jordan from Syria. In November, a terroristdriving a vehicle loaded with explosives tried to cross theIraqi-Jordanian border, but was stopped before the explo-sives detonated.

Kuwait

Kuwait continued to engage with the US Government andits neighbors to thwart domestic threats to Kuwaiti andforeign interests. It also continued to provide significantsupport to US efforts to stem terror financing. Followingthe four terror attacks carried out against Operation IraqiFreedom and Coalition forces in Kuwait between Octo-

ber 2002 and December 2003 that resulted in the deathof one US Marine and a US defense contractor, the Gov-ernment of Kuwait sought to strengthen domesticcounterterrorism efforts, but the potential for further at-tacks remains a serious concern.

The Kuwaiti Government has taken significant measuresto bolster security and enhance protection for Coalitionforces transiting Kuwait. Kuwait responded quickly to USconcerns about a possible terror attack in December 2004.Kuwaiti officials have heightened security along their bor-der with Iraq to prevent terrorist infiltration and have alsoworked with Syria and Iran to develop procedures to in-crease intelligence sharing and enhance customs andborder-monitoring cooperation. In July, Syria repatriatedto Kuwait seven people recruited to carry out suicide bombattacks in Iraq. Kuwait subsequently arrested a dozen Ku-waitis reportedly being trained to attack US and Coalitionforces in Iraq. By the end of 2004, all but two of them hadbeen released on bail.

The Kuwaiti Government was able to identify and arrestterror suspects in some cases, but was on occasion un-able to secure convictions, citing a lack of evidence foruse in court. Those actually sentenced to jail on terrorismcharges often had their sentences reduced.

As part of its campaign against terror, the Governmentformed in October a ministerial committee chaired by theMinister of Islamic Endowments and Islamic Affairs to de-velop strategies to combat terror and extremists. InNovember, the Government forbade Kuwaiti ministries andreligious institutions from extending official invitations to26 Saudi clerics who reportedly signed a statement in sup-port of jihad in Iraq. No entry ban was imposed, however,and at least one cleric visited the homes of some Mem-bers of Parliament and other private gatherings, sparkingwidespread public criticism of the cleric’s presence. TheIslamic political bloc in the Kuwaiti Parliament has beencritical of the Government’s methods in confronting anddealing with Islamic extremists.

Lebanon

Lebanon remains host to numerous US-designated terror-ist groups. Beirut continued to demonstrate anunwillingness to take steps against Lebanese Hizballah,Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for theLiberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), theAbu Nidal organization (ANO), and HAMAS. In contrast,the Lebanese Government moved vigorously through le-gal and operational initiatives against Sunni extremistgroups, including those similar in ideology to al-Qa’ida.

The Lebanese Government recognized as legitimate resis-tance groups organizations that target Israel and permittedthem to maintain offices in Beirut. Lebanon also exemptswhat it terms “legal resistance” groups, including Leba-

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nese Hizballah, from money laundering and terrorism fi-nancing laws. Lebanese leaders, including President EmileLahud, reject assessments of Lebanese Hizballah’s globalterror activities, though the group’s leadership has openlyadmitted to providing material support for terror attacksinside Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Hizballah, whichholds 12 seats in the Lebanese parliament, is generallyseen as a part of Lebanese society and politics.The Lebanese Government has failed to comply with nu-merous UN resolutions to extend sole and effectiveauthority over all Lebanese territory. The Lebanese secu-rity forces remain unable or unwilling to enter Palestinianrefugee camps, the operational nodes of terrorist groupssuch as Asbat al-Ansar and other Palestinian terror groups,and to deploy forces into areas dominated by LebaneseHizballah, including the Beka’a Valley, southern Beirut,and the south of the country up to the UN-demarcatedBlue Line.

Syria’s predominant role in Lebanon facilitates the Leba-nese Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist presence in portionsof Lebanon. In addition, Syrian and Iranian support for Leba-nese Hizballah activities in southern Lebanon, and forPalestinian terrorist groups throughout the country, help pro-mote an environment where terrorist elements flourish.

The Lebanese and Syrian Governments have not fully com-plied with UN Security Council Resolution 1559, whichcalls for, among other things, respect for the sovereigntyand political independence of Lebanon, and the disarm-ing and disbandment of all Lebanese and non-Lebanesemilitias. Lebanese Hizballah militiamen operate freely insouthern Lebanon without interference from Lebanesesecurity forces. Lebanese Government officials haveopenly and publicly condoned Lebanese Hizballah op-erations against Israel. Lebanese authorities furthermaintain that the Government’s provision of amnesty toLebanese individuals involved in acts of violence duringthe civil war prevents Beirut from prosecuting many casesof concern to the United States, including the hijacking in1985 of TWA 847 and the murder of a US Navy diver onthe flight, and the abduction, torture, and murder of UShostages from 1984 to 1991. US courts have brought in-dictments against Lebanese Hizballah operativesresponsible for a number of those crimes, and some ofthese defendants remain prominent terrorist figures. De-spite evidence to the contrary, the Lebanese Governmenthas insisted that Imad Mugniyah, wanted in connectionwith the TWA hijacking and other terrorist acts, who wasplaced on the FBI’s list of most-wanted terrorists in 2001,is no longer in Lebanon. The Government’s legal systemalso has failed to hold a hearing on the prosecutor’s ap-peal in the case of Tawfic Muhammad Farroukh, who —despite the evidence against him — was found not guiltyof murder for his role in the killings of US AmbassadorFrancis Meloy and two others in 1976.

Lebanon’s Special Investigation Commission (SIC), an in-

dependent legal entity with judicial status empowered toinvestigate suspicious transactions, investigated over 176cases involving allegations of money laundering and ter-rorist financing activities in 2004.

Lebanon has taken other counterterrorism measures in2004, primarily directed against Sunni extremists. InMarch, a Lebanese military tribunal sentenced eight al-leged Sunni extremists, for periods varying from five to 20years imprisonment with hard labor, who were accusedof carrying out terrorist attacks against foreign interests inLebanon (including bombings of McDonalds and PizzaHut restaurants) and plotting to assassinate the US Am-bassador. Lebanese security services, in concert withItalian and Syrian authorities, rounded up members of aSunni extremist cell in September that was allegedly plan-ning to bomb the Italian and Ukrainian Embassies, andassassinate Western diplomats. The alleged cell leaderlater died in Lebanese custody. In October, a Lebanesemilitary tribunal found guilty and sentenced two peopleto imprisonment with hard labor on charges of bringingan explosives device to US Embassy premises. One wassentenced for seven years and the other for three years.

Morocco

The Government of Morocco continues to be a staunchally in the war on terror. King Mohammed VI has been asteadfast supporter of efforts to confront terrorism, inparticular by promoting internal reforms designed to com-bat sources of terrorism over the long-term. Towards thisend, during 2004 Morocco implemented reforms to theMinistry of Islamic Affairs to promote religious modera-tion and tolerance. Domestically, Morocco’s historicalrecord of strong vigilance against terrorist activity re-mained unwavering.

Following the May 16, 2003, Casablanca attacks in whichsuicide bombers from the “Salafiya Jihadiya” group killed42 and wounded approximately 100 others, the Govern-ment arrested several thousand people, prosecuted 1,200and sentenced about 900 for various terrorism-relatedcrimes. The Minister of Justice announced that these ar-rests represented approximately 90 percent of those soughtby the Government. The remaining ten percent were sub-jects of international arrest warrants. A spate of May16-related terrorist arrests since June 2004, however, inAgadir, Beni Mellal, Fes, Khourigba, and Meknes suggeststhat the number of at-large suspects has likely decreasedfurther. The Government also aggressively pursued SalafiyaJihadiya terrorist cells in several Moroccan cities.

The al-Qa’ida-affiliated Moroccan Islamic CombatantGroup (GICM) continues to pose a threat in Morocco aswell as in Europe. Moroccan extremists, associated withthe GICM, were among those implicated in the March 11terrorist attacks in Madrid.

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Oman

Oman continued to provide support for the global war onterrorism, and has been responsive to requests for Coali-tion military and civilian support, making arrests as wellas working with its neighbors to improve cross-border se-curity. During the last three years, the Government ofOman has implemented a tight anti-money launderingregime, including surveillance systems designed to iden-tify unusual transactions, with plans to require financialinstitutions to verify customer identities using sophisticatedbiometric technology. Omani financial authorities havealso demonstrated their commitment to freeze the assetsof any UN-listed individual found in Oman.

Qatar

The Government of Qatar provided the United States withsignificant counterterrorism support during 2004, build-ing on the bilateral cooperation it has maintained sinceSeptember 11, 2001.

No terrorist attacks occurred in Qatar in 2004, and theQatari security services had some successes against ter-rorist targets. In March, Qatar passed the CombatingTerrorism Law. The law defines terrorism and terrorist acts,lists specific punishments for terrorist crimes to includethe death penalty, provides measures against terrorist fi-nancing or fundraising activities, and gives the Governmentsweeping authority to take action against terrorist crimesand activities. The law incorporates existing laws such asQatar’s penal code, criminal procedures code, judicial law,law on weapons, ammunitions and explosives, and theanti-money laundering law.

In March, the Government passed a new law to establishthe Qatar Authority for Charitable Works, which monitorsall domestic and international charitable activities. TheSecretary General of the Authority approves internationalfund transfers by the charities. The Authority has primaryresponsibility for monitoring overseas charitable, devel-opmental, and humanitarian projects, and is to reportannually to concerned Government ministries on the sta-tus of all projects. The Authority was still in the process ofdeveloping concrete measures to exert more control overdomestic charity collection.

In October, the Government appointed a member of theruling al-Thani family as director of its financial intelli-gence unit (FIU). The FIU is responsible for reviewing allfinancial transaction reports, identifying suspicious trans-actions and financial activities of concern, and ensuringthat all Government ministries and agencies have proce-dures and standards to ensure proper oversight of financialtransactions.

Saudi Arabia

In 2004, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia continued to sup-port the global war on terror. Terrorists killed dozens offoreigners and citizens, including six Americans, in attacksthroughout the country. The attacks consisted ofkidnappings, armed assaults, targeted shootings, bomb-ings, and beheadings. In the first half of 2004, the al-Qa’idapresence in Saudi Arabia kept up a steady tempo of at-tacks, surpassing the number and lethality of attacksconducted in the previous year. In the second half of theyear, facing concerted pressure from Saudi authorities, thenetwork appeared to be largely on the defensive, and didnot mount a major operation until the December 6 attackon the US Consulate General in Jeddah. Five foreign na-tionals — four locally engaged staff and one local guard— working at the Consulate were killed. This attack waslater claimed by “al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula,”which also claimed credit for other deadly attacks againstAmerican citizens in 2004. Two car bombs, one aimed atthe Ministry of Interior, exploded December 29, killingone passer-by and injuring several others.

In response to the wave of terrorist violence in the King-dom, the Saudi Government aggressively pursued terroristsand achieved successes, including the capture or killingof all but seven of the Kingdom’s 26 most-wanted terror-ists and most of the known terrorist leadership in SaudiArabia. Saudi forces launched dozens of security sweepsthroughout the country, dismantling several al-Qa’ida cells,some of which were directly involved in attacks againstUS citizens and interests. More than thirty members ofthe Saudi security forces lost their lives in this campaign.

Saudi Arabia continued a public outreach campaign inthe war against terror. As custodian of the two holymosques in Mecca and Medina, the Saudi Governmentworked to delegitimize the inappropriate use of Islam tojustify terrorist attacks. During the year, Saudi authoritiesaired confessions of militants and interviews with fathersof wanted men as part of a campaign to rally the publicagainst radicals who carried out attacks in the Kingdom.In June, the Grand Mufti Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Al al-Shaykhissued a fatwa condemning terrorist acts and calling oncitizens to report “saboteurs and anyone planning or pre-paring to carry out terrorist acts to the concernedauthorities.” Also in June, six senior religious leaders is-sued a statement denouncing terrorist attacks as “heinouscrimes.” A November “fatwa” issued by 26 radical Saudiclerics, who called on Iraqis to resist Coalition forces inIraq by force, was rebutted by senior members of the Saudiofficial religious establishment, including the Grand Mufti.The Government also focused on internal social, politi-cal, and economic reforms as a method to reduce theappeal of radical ideologies. The media reported widelyon each of the attacks conducted by terrorists in the King-dom and the subsequent Government crackdown, leadingto widespread public recognition that terrorism is a seri-

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ous threat in the Kingdom, not only to foreigners, but toSaudis as well.

During the year, the Government launched intensivesearches and counterterrorism sweeps in the country, of-ten involving thousands of Saudi security personnel. OnJune 23, Crown Prince Abdullah issued an ultimatum toterrorists: surrender in 30 days or suffer the full force ofthe state. The ultimatum prompted several notable extrem-ists to turn themselves in, including one terrorist suspecton Saudi Arabia’s 26 most-wanted list. On June 29, thePrince Nayif Security Academy began training employeesof the national oil company (Saudi ARAMCO) oncounterterrorism measures. On the same day, the Minis-try of Interior announced a 60-day pardon for persons tosurrender unlicensed weapons.

In July, reporting on the results of a mutual evaluation con-ducted in 2003, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)concluded that Saudi Arabia’s financial regime met thegeneral obligations of the organization’s recommendationsfor combating money laundering and financing of terror-ism. The Government continued to take steps to makeoperational a financial intelligence unit (FIU) establishedin 2003 under anti-money laundering and antiterrorist fi-nancing law. Concerned about the possible misuse ofcharitable organizations for terrorist purposes, the Gov-ernment issued a set of bylaws for the Commission forRelief and Charitable Work Abroad, designed to overseeall Saudi charities. In this regard, the Government orderedthe closure of the al-Haramain Foundation, a Saudi char-ity with a number of overseas offices that had beendesignated by the UN Sanctions Committee for providingsupport for terrorist activities. The Government also main-tained its prohibition, imposed in 2003, on the collectionof cash donations at mosques or commercial establish-ments and its restrictions on the bank accounts of charities,including prohibiting fund transfers out of the country. Themedia reported during the year that Saudi banks froze morethan 250,000 accounts for noncompliance with anti-money laundering and terrorist finance laws. During the

year, the Saudi Government requested that the UN 1267Sanctions Committee add entities and individuals sus-pected of terrorist activities or of supporting terrorists toits consolidated list.

Tunisia

The Government of Tunisia publicly supported the inter-national coalition against terrorism and respondedpositively to US requests for information and assistance inblocking financial assets. Tunisia’s active stance againstterrorism has been reinforced by its own experience withinternational terrorism. In April 2002, a suicide truck bombdetonated outside the el-Ghriba synagogue on the islandof Djerba, killing at least twenty.

The Government of Tunisia has taken steps to strengthencounterterrorism laws. The Tunisian legislature in Decem-ber 2003 passed a comprehensive law to “support theinternational effort to combat terrorism and money laun-dering.” The first prosecution of suspected terrorists underthe law’s provisions commenced in February 2004. Tuni-sia has consistently emphasized the threat that terrorismposes to security and stability in the region. Further, it hasencouraged Libya to abandon terrorism. Domestically, theTunisian Government has prohibited the formation of re-ligious-based political parties and groups, which it believespose a terrorist threat.

United Arab Emirates

In 2004, the United Arab Emirates continued to providestaunch assistance and cooperation to the global waragainst terrorism. In July, late President Sheikh Zayed is-sued an antiterrorism law defining terrorist crimes andpunishment, and specifically criminalizing the funding ofterrorist organizations. In December, the United Statesand the Emirate of Dubai signed a Container Security Ini-tiative Statement of Principles aimed at screeningUS-bound containerized cargo transiting Dubai’s ports.The UAE also undertook several security measures alongits land border and at sea to deter terrorists from reachingUAE soil.

In October, the UAE hosted an international conferenceon Islam intended to encourage moderation and condemnterrorism and extremism. The conference included ses-sions by prominent international and Emirate Muslimreligious figures, and called for moderate Islamic preach-ing, increased training of imams, and reforms of the Islamicstudies education curriculum.

In suppressing terrorist financing, the UAE Central Bankcontinued to enforce anti-money laundering regulationsaggressively. Tightened oversight and reporting require-ments for domestic financial markets resulted in a strongerlegal and regulatory framework to deter abuse of the UAEfinancial system. The Central Bank has provided training

The Ministry of the Interior was damaged by an explosion when terror-ists launched coordinated car bombings and battled security forces inRiyadh on December 29. (AP Photo/STR)

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programs to financial institutions on money launderingand terrorist financing. In April, the Central Bank hostedthe Second International Hawala Conference, which wasattended by 375 participants from around the world todiscuss how to better monitor money flows occurring out-side the formal banking structure. (Hawalas are informalmoney remittance and exchange businesses common inthe Middle East and South Asia.) The conference includedinteractive panels, overviews of anti-money launderingsystems in various other countries, and presentations frommultilateral organizations such as the International Mon-etary Fund, World Bank, FATF, and the United NationsOffice on Drugs and Crime. The Central Bank has alsoinvestigated financial transactions and frozen accounts inresponse to UN resolutions and internal investigations,and continued the process of registering hawala dealers.

Yemen

In 2004, the Republic of Yemen continued to provide sup-port for the global war on terrorism and took action againstal-Qa’ida and local extremists, arresting several individu-als suspected of having al-Qa’ida ties and prosecuting theperpetrators of several terrorist acts.

On August 28, the Sana’a Primary Court convicted 14 al-Qa’ida members for the October 2002 attack on the Frenchtanker M/V Limburg, the murder of a Ministry of Interiorofficer during the November 2002 attack on an oil com-pany helicopter, a plot to attack the Civil Aviation andMeteorology Authority, a plot to attack four foreign em-bassies in Sana’a and to kill the US Ambassador, and forforging documents for the purpose of carrying out terror-ism. Two defendants received death sentences, one inabsentia. The other defendants were sentenced to prisonterms ranging from three to ten years. Under Yemeni law,both defendants and the prosecution have the right to ap-peal rulings. All defendants have appealed their sentences,as has the prosecution, the latter arguing that some of thesentences were too light. The appeals process is expectedto conclude in early 2005.

On September 10, the Sana’a Primary Court concludedthe trial of five defendants for the October 12, 2000, at-tack on the USS Cole in Aden that killed 17 US sailors andinjured 35. This included suspects Jamal al-Badawi andFahad al-Quso, who were re-apprehended on March 10by Yemeni authorities following their escape from an Adenprison in April 2003. On September 29, the court issuedtwo death sentences for the ringleaders of the bombing(al-Badawi and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in absentia). Threeothers were convicted and sentenced to prison terms rang-ing from five to ten years for their roles in the attack. Thesecases were under appeal by both the Government and thedefense at the end of 2004.

The Yemeni Supreme Court heard appeals on the deathsentences of Abed Abdulrazak al-Kamel and Ali AhmedMohamed Jarallah for the December 30, 2002, shootingsof three American citizens in Jibla. No final decision hasbeen issued in these cases.

Yemen has expressed a willingness to fight internationalterrorists by denying them the use of its territorial seas andports. Over the past year, Yemen has increased its mari-time security capabilities. The US Government providedextensive training and eight boats to the Yemeni CoastGuard, which is now a visible patrolling force along thecoastline. Coast Guard operations are expanding to stemthe use of Yemen as a way station for smuggling of per-sons, drugs, weapons, and explosives.

Land border security along Yemen’s extensive frontier withSaudi Arabia remains a major concern. In February, Yemenand Saudi Arabia agreed to bolster cooperation in orderto combat the cross-border smuggling of arms and people.The two countries also agreed to establish joint patrolsand increase monitoring.

The Government’s capacity for stemming terrorism financ-ing remains limited. In February, the UN 1267 SanctionsCommittee designated prominent Yemeni sheikh and op-position Islah party leader Abd al-Majid al-Zindani for hisassociation with al-Qa’ida. The Yemeni Government hastaken no action to bar his travel or to freeze his assets incompliance with its UN obligations, and Zindani contin-ues to appear prominently at public events.

Yemen utilized its Islamic Dialogue Committee, headedby a leading judge, to continue its dialogue with detain-ees arrested for connections to terrorist groups andextremist elements. In a 2004 Ramadan amnesty theGovernment released over 100 security detainees, claimingthat they had been rehabilitated and had made commit-ments to uphold the Yemeni constitution and laws, the rightsof non-Muslims, and the inviolability of foreign interests.

Several terrorist organizations continued to maintain apresence in Yemen throughout 2004. HAMAS and Pales-tinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) are recognized as legalorganizations, and HAMAS maintains offices in Yemen.Neither organization has engaged in any known terroristactivities in Yemen, and PIJ does not have any known op-erational presence. HAMAS conducts extensive fundraisingthrough mosques and other charitable organizationsthroughout the country. While al-Qa’ida’s operationalstructure in Yemen has been weakened and dispersed,concerns remain about the organization’s attempts to re-constitute operational cells in Yemen.

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South Asia Overview

South Asia continued in 2004 to be a major theater of theglobal war on terrorism, and partner countries achievedseveral notable successes in countering terrorist groups.Afghanistan ratified a new constitution in January, andHamid Karzai became the country’s first popularly electedleader in October’s presidential election. The Afghan Na-tional Army (ANA), while still limited in its capabilities,has lent support to US-led Coalition forces against anti-government elements in the country’s southern and easternregions. The number of trained Afghan National Police(ANP) also continued to grow, playing an increasingly im-portant role in deterring terrorist and extremist activity.

Security remained a key concern in the region. Insurgentand terrorist elements in Afghanistan continued to targetinternational military forces, international and non-gov-ernmental organizations (IOs and NGOs), the AfghanGovernment, and Afghan civilians. The Coalition soughtto address security concerns by extending its activities intothe Afghan provinces, aided by a growing network of pro-vincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). For its part, theNATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)expanded into northern Afghanistan and worked on plansto extend its reach into the country’s western regions.

Pakistan also achieved notable gains in the war on terror-ism. Assassination attempts against key Governmentofficials and numerous terrorist attacks were thwarted, asPakistan continued its close cooperation with the UnitedStates. Counterterrorist activities and military operationsin the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, where elementsof al-Qa’ida and other groups continue to hide, disruptedterrorist command and control capabilities and killed orcaptured hundreds of militants. Authorities continued toarrest members of al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groupsthroughout the country while providing many new leadsfor future investigations and arrests.

India joined the United States in a renewed commitment tocooperate in a broadening range of counterterrorism mea-sures. India suffered hundreds of attacks from both foreignand domestic terrorists this year, but security forces wereincreasingly effective, particularly in Kashmir, where thelevel of terrorist violence declined. The Indian Governmentcooperated with both Nepal and Bhutan in these countries’counterterrorist efforts. The Indian legislature modified itscounterterrorism law regime in December, removing con-troversial elements while maintaining or strengtheningprovisions essential to fighting the war on terror.

Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh experienced mixed re-sults in 2004. Violence in Sri Lanka increased as fightingbroke out between differing factions of the Liberation Ti-gers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). While the ceasefire betweenthe Government and the LTTE was generally observed,the LTTE repeatedly struck at dissident members of theTamil community. Both sides failed to resume the nego-tiations broken off by the LTTE in 2003, but the December26 tsunami may have an impact on reconciliation in 2005.In Nepal, the Maoist insurgency continued, accompaniedby increased anti-US and anti-Indian rhetoric. The Maoiststhreatened numerous companies, shut down business op-erations, and called for several general strikes throughoutthe country. They continued to extort money from Nepalisand foreign tourists. In September, suspected Maoistsbombed the American Center in Kathmandu. Political vio-lence increased in Bangladesh, where political ralliessuffered from attacks with explosives. The United Statesconcentrated its assistance on strengthening Bangladesh’sweak institutions and laws to combat terror.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan made great strides towards building democ-racy and rebuilding the country in 2004. In January, Afghandelegates ratified a new national constitution that em-braced democracy and pluralism in the context of Afghan

US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Christina Rocca(right) meets with Sri Lankan President Kumaratunga (left) in Colombo,Sri Lanka, on May 14, stating that Tamil Tiger rebels should disarm,renounce terrorism and enter into peace negotiations to end the islandnation’s civil war. (AP Photo/Eranga Jayawardena)

Pakistan’s six most wanted terrorists, including a top al-Qa’ida operativeaccused of masterminding two attempts to assassinate PresidentMusharraf. (AP Photo/Anjum Naveed)

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Contributions to Afghanistan’s Security

Security Operations

During 2004, US military, Coalition, and NATO forces conducted a wide range of security operations throughoutAfghanistan. In southern, southeastern, and eastern Afghanistan, US and Coalition forces continued combat operationsagainst al-Qa’ida terrorists, anti-Coalition militias, and Taliban insurgents. Coalition operations included provincialreconstruction teams (PRTs), which provide security and reconstruction assistance to the Afghan Government; trainingfor the Afghan National Army; security for the Afghan presidential election; and a range of combat operations. TheNATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), meanwhile, conducted ongoing security operations in Kabuland northern Afghanistan. NATO also runs PRTs in northern Afghanistan.

Anti-government activity targeting Afghan security forces, civic leaders, and international and national aid workerscontinued to destabilize the southern and eastern regions of the country. The frequency of attacks rose steadily until theweek of the Presidential election in October, but tapered off with the onset of winter. This gradual improvement at theend of the year was reflective of Afghanistan’s slow but steady progress back from 25 years of Soviet-era invasion andoccupation, civil war, and Taliban misrule. Presidential elections were held in October, with President Karzai winninga majority of votes cast. Over 10 million Afghans registered to vote, and over 8 million cast ballots on election day;more than 40 percent of whom were women. The success of the election was a blow to the Taliban insurgency, whichproved unable to significantly disrupt the process or intimidate voters from participating. Parliamentary elections arescheduled for September 2005 to complete the political roadmap laid out by the Bonn Process.

Afghanistan remains a security challenge. The Taliban and associated elements, such as those loyal to former primeminister and mujahideen commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (a group often referred to as Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin, orHIG), regrouped in 2003 and continued in 2004 to conduct low-level insurgency in the “Pashtun belt,” primarilyremote rural areas of southern, southeastern, and eastern Afghanistan dominated by Pashtun tribes. They use clan andfamily ties, propaganda, violence, weak national government control, religious fundamentalism, and intimidation tomaintain a foothold in several provinces. For aid and support, the Taliban and others rely on sympathizers in thesouthern, southeastern, and eastern provinces, and on supporters in the largely autonomous Federally AdministeredTribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.

Nations contributing troops to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) efforts in Afghanistan during 2004 included Austra-lia, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, France, Italy, Lithuania, Mongolia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, andUzbekistan provided support to OEF troops en route to Afghanistan. Turkmenistan provided support to OEF humanitar-ian efforts. Germany was active in OEF efforts outside of Afghanistan. The Republic of Djibouti hosts OEF Coalitionforces from several countries on a rotating basis, including France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom, andserves as a refueling point for US military forces in the region. Japan continues to contribute rear-area logistical supportfor maritime interdiction operations.

A number of countries also supported UN-mandated efforts to assist the Afghan Government in maintaining securitythrough troop contributions to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Countries contributing troops toISAF are Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, TheNetherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and theUnited Kingdom. Tajikistan and Ukraine provided support to ISAF troop contributors.

Reconstruction Assistance

The international community has pledged almost $13 billion in assistance for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Do-nors include the Aga Khan Foundation, Asian Development Bank, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark,ECHO (Humanitarian Aid Department of the EU), the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,Hungary, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Islamic Development Bank, Japan, Kuwait, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, NewZealand, Norway, the Organization of Islamic Conference, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, SaudiArabia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the UnitedStates, and the World Bank.

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and Islamic traditions. On October 9, over eight millioncitizens defied terrorist and extremist threats and small-scale attacks by voting in Afghanistan’s first democraticpresidential election. Hamid Karzai became the country’sfirst popularly elected leader and was inaugurated asAfghanistan’s president on December 7. Both the electionand inauguration occurred without any major security in-cidents, despite Taliban threats to disrupt the democraticprocess. Other achievements included: the growing ef-fectiveness of the Afghan National Army (ANA), with over18,000 personnel in its ranks; a build-up to 33,000 per-sonnel in the Afghan National Police (ANP); major gainsin the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration(DDR) process; arrests of suspects in the August and Oc-tober Kabul street bombings; and the expansion ofreconstruction efforts. In the coming year, Afghans willface the challenge of building upon these gains, especiallythrough holding parliamentary, provincial, and districtelections.

President Karzai and his Government remained stronglycommitted to the war on terrorism. The ANA stepped upits role alongside the US-led Coalition in fighting insur-gents and terrorists in Afghanistan’s south and east. TheANA and ANP, along with the Coalition and the Interna-tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF), played a key rolein thwarting extremist attempts to disrupt the October presi-dential election. The Afghan people were also instrumental

in thwarting terrorist threats against the election, provid-ing information that in some cases resulted in the discoveryof improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Terrorist and insurgent elements targeted Afghan Govern-ment, US, Coalition, and ISAF assets in Kabul, as well asin southern and eastern provinces. Four American non-combatants are known to have died in internationalterrorist incidents in Afghanistan in 2004. Terrorists andother extremists hampered reconstruction efforts with at-tacks on NGOs and UN facilities and personnel in anunsuccessful attempt to drive the international commu-nity out of Afghanistan. These elements also targetedAfghan citizens who were trying to participate in theircountry’s political process, in some cases reportedly kill-ing people for possessing voter registration cards. Despitethese concerted efforts, they failed to disrupt the October9 presidential election.

Afghan troops continued to carry out joint operations withCoalition forces against the Taliban, al-Qa’ida, and otheranti-government elements. The Tripartite Commission,formed in 2003 by the United States, Afghanistan, andPakistan, continued to improve the sharing of informationand coordination of border security efforts and to discussother political issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh supports the global war on terror but its ability tocombat terrorism is undermined by weak institutions, porousborders, limited law enforcement capabilities, and debilitatingin-fighting between the two major political parties.

Bangladesh’s long tradition of inclusive, moderate Islamis increasingly under threat from extremist alternatives,already offering an attractive breeding ground for politi-cal and sectarian violence. Endemic corruption, poverty,and a stalemated political process could further contrib-ute to the type of instability and widespread frustration

In Kandahar, an Afghan woman shows her voter registration card asshe prepares to vote in Afghanistan’s historic presidential electionOctober 9. (AP Photo/Elizabeth Dalziel)

Afghan President Hamid Karzai takes the oath of office as Afghanistan’sfirst popularly elected president during a ceremony at the PresidentialPalace in Kabul December 7. (AP Photo/Shah Marai, Pool)

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that has elsewhere provided recruits, support, and safehaven to international terrorist groups.

There was an increase in political violence using explosivesin 2004. In May, the British High Commissioner and morethan 70 others were injured in a grenade attack in Sylhet. InAugust, approximately 20 Awami League supporters werekilled, and 200 injured during an attack on the party’s oppo-sition rally in Dhaka.

Bangladesh, with US technical assistance, is strengthen-ing police institutions with a professionalization program,enhancing police and banking capabilities to combat ter-rorist financing, and strengthening border control systemsto detect suspicious travel and improve the integrity ofBangladeshi travel documents. The United States is as-sisting Bangladesh in developing new, stronger laws toenhance banking oversight and enforcement and in cre-ating a financial intelligence unit (FIU). The Governmentis committed to enforcing UN Security Council resolu-tions and actions related to terrorism, including theidentification and freezing of assets of individuals and or-ganizations designated as terrorists or terrorist supporters,such as the Saudi-based charity al-Haramain Foundation.It also ordered the closure of the local Rabita Trust officeand the departure from Bangladesh of its expatriate staff.

The Bangladesh military maintains a large presence in theChittagong Hill Tracts, and has been successful in locat-ing hidden weapons. In April it seized a large cache ofweapons in Chittagong harbor. Bangladesh is taking stepsto improve its effectiveness in preventing maritime smug-gling and its capabilities in terrorist interdiction operations.

India

India remains an important ally in the global war on ter-ror. Cooperative counterterrorism training expanded duringthe year, with hundreds of Indian military and law en-forcement officers trained under State Department andDepartment of Defense programs. In 2004, both the US-India Counterterrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG) andthe Indo-US Cyber Security Forum, which includescounterterrorism prevention and detection discussions, metin New Delhi and Washington, respectively. These con-sultations improved information exchanges and underlinedpolitical commitment in both countries to counterterrorismcooperation as a strong pillar of the bilateral relationship.In November, the Indian Cabinet ratified the US-IndiaMutual Legal Assistance Treaty, which will come into forceonce the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

Separatist terrorists and insurgents staged hundreds of at-tacks on people and property in 2004, especially in Jammuand Kashmir, in the northeastern states, and the “Naxalite(Maoist) belt” in eastern India. The Government noted asignificant decline in infiltration from Pakistani Kashmirduring 2004, attributing the drop in large part to the fenceit constructed during the year-long cease-fire with Paki-

stan and more effective counter-insurgency methods.Nevertheless, in Jammu and Kashmir insurgent and ter-rorist groups made numerous attempts to kill Indian andKashmiri politicians, targeted public areas frequented bytourists, and attacked security forces. More than 500 ci-vilians were killed in these attacks. Foreign TerroristOrganizations Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), operating through front groups in Indiaunder a number of new names, claimed responsibility forattacks on prominent Indian politicians and for killing theuncle of a prominent Kashmiri religious and politicalleader. In eastern India, the primary Naxalite groups tooksteps towards consolidation by combining to form theCommunist Party of India (Maoist). Naxalite violencedropped significantly in 2004, but the future of peace talkswas uncertain at year’s end.

The Government further engaged other neighbors in theregion, supporting Bhutanese and Nepalese counterterrorismefforts, and continues to pursue counterterrorism diplomacyat international and multilateral fora.

In December, India modified its counterterrorism legisla-tion, repealing the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) andsimultaneously amending the Unlawful Activities Preven-tion Act (ULPA). The new legislation retained POTA’s salientaspects and maintained India’s compliance with UNSCR1373, expanded the legal definition of terrorism to includeextraterritorial acts, and strengthened Government wire-tapping authority in terrorism cases. In November, theGovernment also announced a review of its policy on theresolution of hostage crises.

Indian authorities began issuing machine-readable pass-ports in New Delhi and Mumbai, and plan to expand thisprogram to other major cities. The Cabinet approved theestablishment of a financial intelligence unit (FIU) in No-vember, although by year’s end had yet to issue theregulations needed to make this unit fully effective. TheGovernment was also unable to complete the requirements

Doctors treat a boy injured during a raid by terrorists reportedly fromLashkar e-Tayyiba and Hizbul-Mujahedin’s Pir Punjal Regiment who mas-sacred 11 Muslim civilians sleeping in their homes and injured 10 othersin Surankot, Kashmir, India on June 26. (AP Photo/Channi Anand)

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to accept the Financial Action Task Force’s long-standinginvitation to join.

Nepal

In April 2003, Nepal signed an agreement with the US Gov-ernment establishing an antiterrorism assistance program.The Government continued its strong support of the globalcoalition against terrorism in 2004, and was responsive toboth US and multilateral efforts to police international ter-rorism. Nepal’s primary focus, however, remained the Maoistinsurgency, active in Nepal since February 1996.

After unilaterally withdrawing from a seven-month cease-fire in August 2003, the Maoists resumed full-scalehostilities. In 2004 alone, Maoists were responsible forthe deaths of at least 383 civilians and 214 Governmentsecurity forces, with some estimates running as high as831 victims. The Government has stated that Nepalesesecurity forces have arrested thousands of suspectedMaoists and killed more than 1,555 during the year.

Repeated anti-US rhetoric suggests the Maoists view USsupport for Kathmandu as a key obstacle to their goal ofestablishing a communist dictatorship in Nepal. Maoistsupreme commander Prachanda issued a press statementin July 2004 threatening to use “more violent means” ifpeace talks with the Government of Nepal were not forth-coming or were unsuccessful. In August and September,Maoists threatened almost 50 companies and forced themto shut down operations. In August, a Maoist-affiliatedgroup stated that it had decided to close down all multi-national corporations in Nepal with US investmentpermanently. All companies reopened in mid-Septemberafter an agreement was reached between the Maoist-af-filiated group and the Government of Nepal.

In addition to the threats against American-affiliated busi-ness enterprises, Maoists have threatened attacks againstUS and international NGOs, including those associatedwith Peace Corps programs. In September, Maoists attackedan American NGO worker in midwestern Nepal. Theysought to extort money from Nepalis and foreigners toraise funds for their insurgency. The Maoists’ public state-ments have criticized the United States, the UnitedKingdom, and India for providing security assistance toNepal. On September 10, Maoists bombed the AmericanCenter in Kathmandu. The attack occurred during non-duty hours and there were no injuries, but the blastdamaged the facility.

Security remains weak at many public facilities, includ-ing Tribhuvan International Airport in Kathmandu. TheUnited States and other donor countries are actively work-ing to improve this situation, but limited Governmentfinances, weak border controls, and poor security infra-structure could make Nepal a convenient logistic and transitpoint for outside militants and international terrorists.

Pakistan

Pakistan continues to be one of the United States’ mostimportant partners in the war on terrorism. Few countriessuffered as much from terrorism in 2004 as Pakistan, andfew did as much to combat it. After the two near-missassassination attempts against President Musharraf in De-cember 2003, groups linked to al-Qa’ida tried toassassinate a corps commander in Karachi in June, andthe Finance Minister (now Prime Minister) in July. Nearly200 people were killed in major Sunni-Shia sectarian at-tacks. Al-Qa’ida declared the Government of Pakistan tobe one of its main enemies, and called for its overthrow.

The Government of Pakistan continues to pursue al-Qa’idaand its allies aggressively through counterterrorist policemeasures throughout the country and large-scale militaryoperations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)along the rugged Afghanistan-Pakistan border. PakistaniArmy and Frontier Corps units destroyed key al-Qa’idasafe havens in South Waziristan Agency (part of the FATA),killing over 100 foreign terrorists and dispersing severalhundred more. These operations significantly degradedal-Qa’ida’s command and control capabilities in the re-gion, but at a cost of approximately 200 Pakistaniservicemen killed in action. Parallel to this military effort,the Government pursued a strategy to win the support ofthe tribes in the FATA with a combination of negotiationsand economic development investments.

In addition to counterterrorism operations in the tribal ar-eas, Pakistani security services are cooperating closely withthe United States and other nations in a successful cam-paign to eliminate terrorism both within Pakistan andabroad. Over 600 suspected operatives of al-Qa’ida andother groups have been killed or captured by Pakistaniauthorities since September 2001. Individuals detained in2004 have provided leads that aided investigations by se-curity agencies around the world. Particularly notable in

A man injured in a mosque bombing that killed 22 people andwounded dozens at a local hospital, May 31, in Karachi, Pakistan. (APPhoto/Mohammad Ali)

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2004 were the capture of al-Qa’ida communications ex-pert and Heathrow bomb plot suspect Naeem Noor Khanin July, the arrest of 1998 US Embassy bombing suspectAhmed Khalfan Ghailani the same month, and the killingof Daniel Pearl murder-suspect Amjad Farooqi in Septem-ber. The Government also cracked down on several groupsthat had been active in the Kashmir insurgency, detainingthe head of Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) for severalmonths and arranging the extradition of the head of Harakatul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI).

Pursuant to its obligations under UN Security CouncilResolution 1267 and subsequent resolutions, Pakistan con-tinues to work with the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee tofreeze the assets of individuals and groups identified asterrorist entities linked to al-Qa’ida and the Taliban.Pakistan’s Parliament passed an amendment to the 1997Antiterrorism Act that increased penalties and prohibitedbail for those who finance terrorism. Pakistan also draftedand won agreement for a regional convention against ter-rorist financing. However, the Government’s failure to passan anti-money laundering or counterterrorist financing lawthat meets international standards has inhibited Pakistan’sability to cooperate internationally on counterterrorismfinance issues.

Pakistan’s Antiterrorism Courts continue to prosecute ter-rorism cases. In 2004, the courts convicted a suspect inthe 2003 bombing of the US Consulate in Karachi, sev-eral suspects in the assassination attempts against PresidentMusharraf, seven suspects in the 2002 attack on a Chris-tian school, and nine suspects in the bombing of theMacedonian Consulate in Karachi.

US-Pakistan joint counterterrorism efforts have been ex-tensive. They include cooperative efforts in border securityand criminal investigations, as well as several long-termtraining projects. A Joint Working Group onCounterterrorism and Law Enforcement, established in

2002, met in September to assess joint efforts and discussenhanced cooperation.

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka supports the global war on terror and continuesto demonstrate a strong commitment to combating terror-ism. The Sri Lankan Government has cooperated with USefforts to track terrorist financing, although no assets havebeen identified in Sri Lanka to date. The United States hasworked with the Government of Sri Lanka to develop anti-money laundering legislation, develop a Sri Lankanfinancial intelligence unit, and provide training for rel-evant Government agencies and the banking sector. SriLankan police provided investigative assistance in responseto US requests.

The 2002 ceasefire between the Sri Lankan Governmentand the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a desig-nated Foreign Terrorist Organization, continued to holddespite lack of progress in resuming the negotiations bro-ken off by the LTTE in April 2003. The Sri Lankan Armyremains deployed across the country for counter-insur-gency purposes. The paramilitary Special Task Force police(STF) is deployed in the east.

Numerous violations of the ceasefire agreement were re-portedly committed, primarily by the LTTE, during the year.Fighting broke out between a dissident LTTE faction, ledby eastern military commander Karuna, and the main-stream LTTE in March, leading initially to the deaths of atleast 120 LTTE cadres and civilians in the east. Followingthe split, the LTTE began a campaign of targeted assassi-nations against political opponents, members of the Karunafaction, and suspected Sri Lankan Army informants, kill-ing at least another 80 individuals during the year. Inaddition, at least 26 members of the mainstream LTTE werekilled by suspected Karuna sympathizers, while six mem-bers of the Sri Lankan security forces were killed in isolatedincidents by suspected LTTE terrorists. On July 7, a sus-pected LTTE suicide bomber detonated herself while beingquestioned inside a Colombo police station, killing her-self and four policemen. Her intended target was believedto be the Minister of Hindu Affairs, a Tamil politician op-posed to the LTTE.

The renewed violence in Sri Lanka has done much to dis-sipate the cautious optimism that surrounded the processlast year. In September, State Department Coordinator forCounterterrorism Cofer Black affirmed that the UnitedStates would maintain the designation of the LTTE as aForeign Terrorist Organization until it unequivocally re-nounces terrorism in both word and deed.

In Islamabad, on September 2, Pakistan’s Interior Secretary TariqMehmud, left, receives J. Cofer Black, right, former US Coordinatorfor Counterterrorism, for two days of official talks. (AP Photo/B.K.Bangash)

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Western Hemisphere Overview

Terrorism in the Western Hemisphere historically has beenperpetrated by groups advocating internal political changeand by criminal organizations seeking to intimidate soci-ety and governments to allow them to exist and operateunfettered. The focus of terrorist groups has been prima-rily domestic. In the last year alone, Colombia’s threeUS-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) —the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), theNational Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-De-fense Forces of Colombia (AUC) — were responsible formurdering approximately 3,000 people, mostly Colombi-ans. Shining Path’s bloody 30-year campaign in the 1980sand early 1990s left over 35,000 Peruvians dead.

Terrorists in the region are becoming increasingly activein illicit transnational activities, including the drug trade,arms trafficking, money laundering, contraband smuggling,and document and currency fraud. The WesternHemisphere’s lightly-defended “soft” targets — its tour-ism industry, large American expatriate communities,thriving aviation sector, and busy ports — as well as sys-temic disparities between countries in border security, legaland financial regulatory regimes, and the difficulty of main-taining an effective government presence in remote areas–represent targets and opportunities for domestic and for-eign terrorists to exploit.

Although the threat of international terrorism in the West-ern Hemisphere remained relatively low during 2004compared to other world regions, terrorists may seek safe-haven, financing, recruiting, illegal travel documentation,or access to the United States from the area and pose seri-

ous threats. International terrorists have not hesitated to makethe Western Hemisphere a battleground to advance theircauses. The attacks of September 11, 2001, in the UnitedStates and the bombings of the Israeli Embassy in BuenosAires in 1992 and the Argentine-Jewish Cultural Center in1994 are stark reminders of this. Americans have fallen vic-tim to terrorists elsewhere in the region; since 1992, theFARC has murdered at least 10 US citizens and currentlyholds three US Government civilian contractors hostage.

Various countries participated in joint counterterrorismtraining and simulations during 2004, including “Panama2004” in August and “Fuerzas Comando 2004” (El Salva-dor) in July. Many countries in the Western Hemisphereare also active participants in the Counterterrorism ActionGroup (CTAG) meetings hosted by local US embassies.An initiative coming out of the US Government’s chair-manship of CTAG in 2004, these meetings bring togetherlocal representatives of the G8, host government, and otherregional governments to discuss counterterrorism capac-ity-building assistance. The countries of the hemisphereare also active in the OAS Inter-American CommitteeAgainst Terrorism (Spanish acronym, CICTE).

Significant developments in specific countries and sub-regions:

Colombia suffered continued terrorist violence as theRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and othernarcoterrorist groups conducted car bombings,kidnappings, and political murders, as well as targetedcritical infrastructure (water, oil, gas, electricity) and trans-portation systems. Three Americans, whose plane madean emergency crash landing in southern Colombia on Feb-ruary 13, 2003, continue to be held hostage by the FARC.

Mexican President Vicente Fox shakes hands with US Secretary ofState Condoleezza Rice when she arrived at the Los Pinos presidentialresidence in Mexico City on March 10, 2005. (AP Photo/EduardoVerdugo)

Members of the Salvadoran Special Forces participate in the inaugura-tion ceremony of the “Fuerzas Comando 2004,” a joint operation ofCentral American, South American, Dominican, and US troops to com-bat terrorism. (AP Photo/Edgar Romero)

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At the time of the crash, the FARC murdered a fourth Ameri-can and a Colombian soldier. Under President Uribe, theColombian military, police, and intelligence forces con-tinued successfully to disrupt the activities of Colombianterrorist groups. Acts of terrorism, homicides, massacres,and kidnappings dropped significantly in 2004, while theColombian Government captured FARC leaders, includ-ing Nayibe Rojas Cabrera (aka “Sonia”) and Juvenal OvidioRicardo Palmera (aka “Simon Trinidad”) who were extra-dited to the United States. Colombia demobilizedthousands of AUC members, and continued aggressivecoca and poppy eradication.

The United States continued strong cooperative relation-ships with Canada and Mexico on a range ofcounterterrorism issues, including border, aviation, mari-time, and transportation security. In September 2004,Canada hosted a border symposium for the 34 OAS mem-ber states in Vancouver to demonstrate US-Canadacooperation on border security and encourage more ac-tive border security measures by CICTE members.

The primary focus in 2004 for many of the countries inthe region was to strengthen capabilities to prevent or dis-rupt possible terrorist fundraising activity in their territories,and to bolster their ability to combat transnational crime,including activities that terrorists could undertake to sup-port terrorism. In Central America, governmentsconcentrated on strengthening intelligence collection andsharing capabilities, and on their ability to respond to ter-rorist threats and incidents. Efforts were made more difficultby widespread, unfounded media reports alleging formallinks between transnational criminal gangs and Islamicextremists in the region.

The United States strengthened its cooperative dialoguewith the “Three Plus One” partners Argentina, Brazil, andParaguay, and provided advice and training support to ElSalvador after Islamic terrorists threatened attacks to pun-

ish El Salvador’s participation in the Coalition fighting toliberate Iraq. In the Caribbean, the US Government begana series of assessments requested by countries to deter-mine ways to improve their counterterrorism regimes, andassisted countries to comply with new international normsfor port security. Governments stepped up efforts to tightenborder secuirty and in general, vigilance against the de-velopment of Islamic extremism or other potential misuseof their territories, whether from within or from abroad.

Bolivia

Despite considerable political and economic instabilityin 2004, Bolivia continued to work closely with the USGovernment to combat terrorism both domestic and for-eign. In late 2004, Bolivia’s Financial Investigation Unitcollaborated with the US Government to share informa-tion about possible terrorist-linked financial transactionsand enhance the monitoring and enforcement of finan-cial networks. The Bolivian Government established in2004 a counterterrorism coordination unit in the Ministryof the Presidency, including elements of the Bolivian Na-tional Police and military, to develop nationalcounterterrorism policy, manage terrorism-related infor-mation, and coordinate Bolivian Government agencies(military, police, diplomatic, intelligence) to address ter-rorist threats and activities. The Bolivian Government isan active participant in Counterterrorism Action Group(CTAG) meetings.

Although no significant acts of international terrorism oc-curred in Bolivia in 2004, domestic terrorism relatedmainly to the drug trade continued to be a threat, thoughrelatively less than in 2003. Bolivia remains vulnerableto terrorists seeking to exploit its porous borders, resourceconstraints, corruption, and lack of investigative expertiseto disrupt recruiting and fundraising. Members of the Revo-lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Peru’s ShiningPath (SL, in Spanish) and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary

Thousands attend the tenth anniversary of the 1994 bombing of theBuenos Aires Jewish community center AMIA in Buenos Aires,Argentina, on July 18. (AP Photo/Daniel Luna)

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) leader RicardoPalmera (aka “Simon Trinidad”) escorted by Colombian authorities inBogota, Colombia, after his arrest in Ecuador in January. Laterextradited to the United States, Palmera is the most senior FARC leaderto face US drug and terrorism charges. (AP Photo/Javier Galeano, File)

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Movement (MRTA) have at times been identified in Bo-livia; FARC and SL are US Government-designated ForeignTerrorist Organizations (FTOs). More than 300 membersof Shining Path and MRTA have been resettled in El Altounder United Nations auspices. Many maintain contactsin Peru and may have contributed to politically motivatedviolence in Bolivia. The widespread availability of explo-sives and miners skilled in detonation techniques hascomplicated Bolivia’s counterterrorism efforts. On at leasttwo occasions, domestic groups planned to attack the Con-gress with dynamite and small arms. Police acted quicklyto quell the threats, although one distraught miner in March2004 detonated charges inside the parliament, killing twopolicemen and himself, while injuring bystanders.

Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN) member Fran-cisco “Pacho” Cortes — arrested in 2003 on espionageand terrorism charges while attempting to create an ELN-Bolivia branch — remains in custody, but the presidingjudge in the case has ruled Cortes eligible for bail. NGOsand Cortes’ supporters are attempting to raise funds forhis release. The Bolivian Government continues to huntfor organized crime head Marco Marino Diodato, who es-caped from prison in early 2004. Diodato is suspected oforchestrating the fatal car bombing of Bolivian prosecutorMonica von Borries in mid-2004, and has reportedly madethreats against members of the US Embassy and other Ameri-cans in Bolivia. Little progress was made in the investigationof the 2000 torture and murder of police officer DavidAndrade and his wife, and the suspects remain at large.

Bolivia maintained its policy of forced coca eradicationin the Chapare growing region, despite continued threatsof violence against Government eradicators there. Vio-lence in the Chapare dropped off, however, after theGovernment and coca grower syndicates signed an ac-cord in October 2004 allowing for a limited exception of3,200 hectares to remain untouched for one year. At thesame time, there were incidents of violence in the Yungasgrowing region, a lawless area of both legal and illegalcoca cultivation. Coca growers dynamited USAID alter-native development projects, threatened police and othergovernment officials, and delayed construction of a po-lice checkpoint.

Bolivia has signed the Inter-American Convention AgainstTerrorism and the August 2003 Asuncion Declaration, inwhich several South American nations committed them-selves to support the Colombian Government in its ongoingstruggle against terrorism and drug trafficking.

Canada

The Canadian Government continued in 2004 to be astrong ally of the United States in the fight against interna-tional terrorism. Counterterrorism cooperation withCanada remains excellent. The Canadian Government hasresponded quickly to requests from the United States for

assistance in areas ranging from information-sharing todisrupting terrorism activities.

Day-to-day cooperation between US and Canadian lawenforcement agencies is close and continuous. Canada’s2001 Antiterrorism Act strengthened its ability to identify,deter, disable, prosecute, convict, and punish terroristgroups. It also provides investigative tools for Canadianlaw enforcement agencies, while providing substantialsafeguards to privacy and due process. In December 2003,the Canadian Government established Public Safety andEmergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), a counterpartof the US Department of Homeland Security, and gave itthe mandate of protecting Canadians from criminals andterrorists.

Canada cooperates closely with the United States on in-vestigations. There is a heavy volume of extraditionrequests between the two countries. Canadian privacylaws, limited resources, and criminal procedures limit afuller and more timely exchange of information with theUnited States.

The diplomatic engagement between the United States andCanada on counterterrorism issues remains strong, main-tained in long-standing bilateral fora. For over 15 years,the US-Canada Bilateral Consultative Group (BCG) hasbrought together government officials to develop ways toenhance cooperation on a broad range of counterterrorismissues, including technical research and development, ter-rorist designations, threat alerts, and cross-border crime.Canada plans to host the next round of the BCG in 2005.

On December 12, 2001, the United States and Canadasigned the Smart Border Declaration, which sets forth a30-point (later expanded to 32-point) action plan basedon four pillars: the secure flow of people, the secure flowof goods, secure infrastructure, and coordination and in-formation-sharing in the enforcement of these objectives.Under the Smart Border Declaration, 15 Integrated Bor-der Enforcement Teams (IBETS) are coordinating US andCanadian efforts to disrupt cross-border criminal and po-tential terrorist activity. Canada and the United Statescooperate on shared immigration issues through the Bor-der Vision process, which began in 1997 and seeks todevelop a joint regional approach to migration throughinformation and intelligence sharing, policy coordination,joint overseas operations, and border cooperation.

Canada and the United States coordinate judicial effortsat the US-Canadian Cross-Border Crime Forum, which lastmet in Ottawa in October 2004 and has a sub-group oncounterterrorism. Through the 1995 Shared Border Ac-cord, Canada and the United States continue to streamlineprocesses for legitimate travelers and commercial goods,provide enhanced protection against drug smuggling andthe illegal entrance of people, and promote internationaltrade. Canada was the first country to join the United States

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in developing the Container Security Initiative (CSI) to screenincoming container shipments, and Canada has been anactive participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative.

Canada and the United States also work multilaterally, infora such as in the G8’s Counterterrorism Action Group(CTAG) and the OAS Inter-American Committee AgainstTerrorism (CICTE), to build legal and financialcounterterrorism capacity globally and to strengthen se-curity at ports, airports, and land borders around the world.In September 2004, Canada hosted a border symposium,which brought representatives from the 34 OAS memberstates to Vancouver to view US-Canada cooperation onborder security (land, air, and sea). Participants are ex-pected to report on their border security programs toCICTE.

Canada implements terrorist finance listings in compli-ance with UN requirements and coordinates closely withthe United States on plans to freeze assets. Efforts tocounter terrorist financing include implementing the pro-visions of UN Security Council Resolution 1373,promoting the Special Recommendations on Terrorist Fi-nancing of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), andactively participating in the G7, G8, and G20. UnderCanadian law, all terrorist entities listed by the UnitedNations are automatically designated on a domestic basiswithin Canada as well. Although they are subject to pros-ecution under the Criminal Code of Canada, the lawremains untested and no prosecutions have yet taken place.

Chile

Chile is a steadfast ally in the global war on terrorism. In2004 Chile served as chair of the UN’s al-Qa’ida andTaliban sanctions committee, and moved to address thepotential threat from Islamic extremist fundraising in its freetrade zone of Iquique. As host of the 2004 Asia-Pacific Eco-nomic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, Chile emphasizedsecurity and counterterrorism issues on the agenda.

There were no significant incidents of international terror-ism in Chile in 2004, although various domestic groupsfirebombed a McDonald’s restaurant and planted or deto-nated low-powered bombs outside banks, ATM machines,a subway, and in a restroom in the Brazilian consulate inSantiago. There were no injuries or deaths.

Chilean law enforcement agencies were consistently co-operative in investigating links to international terrorism,but, hampered by a restrictive law, the Investigative Po-lice were unable to bring any investigation to prosecution.Chile has a 200-person designated counterterrorist forcein the national uniformed police. In October 2004, a newNational Intelligence Agency became fully operational asthe coordinator of intelligence gathering for Chile. A num-ber of Chilean Government entities and officials benefitedfrom US-sponsored training during 2004, including the

Chilean Air Force and law enforcement personnel at vari-ous levels.

Chile’s money laundering statute covers terrorist financ-ing and expands the Government’s ability to freeze andseize assets, although the Government has yet to chargeanyone under that law or to apply it against terrorist assetsidentified by other governments or international institu-tions. Chile launched in June 2004 its financial analysisunit (UAF) charged with investigating suspicious transac-tions. However, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled some ofthe UAF provisions to be unconstitutional. Efforts areunderway to amend the laws to provide the UAF withgreater investigative authority.

Colombia

Colombia remained a steadfast ally of the United States inthe fight against narcoterrorism in 2004. The ColombianGovernment, through bilateral, multilateral, military, andeconomic activities, continued to assist US Governmentcounterterrorism efforts and to disrupt terrorist acts, blockterrorist finances, and extradite terrorists to face justice inthe United States.

The US Government has designated three Colombianarmed groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs):the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), theNational Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-De-fense Forces of Colombia (AUC). In February 2004, theUS Government also designated the FARC and the AUCas significant foreign narcotics traffickers under the King-pin Act. All three Colombian FTOs are primarily focusedon domestic change in Colombia and on maintaining theirown influence and viability but recently have been sus-pected of assisting violent groups in other countries suchas Paraguay. In 2004, the three FTOs conducted car bomb-ings, kidnappings, political murders, and the indiscriminateuse of landmines. They also targeted critical infrastruc-ture (water, oil, gas, electricity), public recreational areas,and modes of transportation.

Some examples in 2004 included the FARC’s ChristmasEve kidnapping of seven people in Antioquia Department(Province) and New Year’s Eve massacre of at least 17people for suspected affiliation with the AUC; the FARC’sbombing in May of a popular nightclub in Apartado,Antioquia, which killed five and injured almost 100; thesuspected FARC bombing in August of Medellin’s annualflower festival that injured approximately 38; the FARC’sattempted mass kidnapping in February in a condominiumcomplex in Neiva, Huila Department (one hostage was re-leased two months later and three hostages remain incaptivity); and the ELN’s July kidnapping of the Bishop ofYopal, Casanare Department. Paramilitaries continued todisplace forcibly civilians who resided along drug and weap-ons transit corridors or who were suspected of being guerrillasympathizers. In late June, the AUC kidnapped former Sena-

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tor Jose Eduardo Gnecco and his family. Both FARC and theELN continued attacks against the country’s infrastructureand oil pipelines, albeit at reduced levels. Many more at-tacks were thwarted nationwide by the ColombianGovernment’s excellent intelligence and security work.

All three FTOs carried out attacks in and around majorurban areas in Colombia, including at supermarkets, placesof entertainment, and other areas frequented by US citi-zens and expatriates. Colombia’s FTOs continued tothreaten and target US citizens in 2004. Historically,American victims of kidnappings and murders have in-cluded journalists, missionaries, scientists, human rightsworkers, US Government employees, and business people,as well as tourists and family visitors, and even small chil-dren. On February 13, 2003, a plane carrying five crewmembers (four US citizens who were US Governmentdefense contractors and one Colombian citizen) crashedin a remote section of Colombia. Two crew members (theColombian and one of the Americans) were killed by theFARC and the remaining crew members were taken hos-tage. The FARC continues to hold captive the three UScitizens. In the past four years, 30 American citizens havebeen reported kidnapped in Colombia.

President Uribe’s Government has made significantprogress in achieving the goals of his national securitystrategy: to regain control of national territory fromColombia’s FTOs, promote desertion and reintegration offormer illegal armed militants, and demobilize AUC blocs.Colombian statistics for 2004 indicate that acts of terror-ism fell by 42 percent, homicides by 13.2 percent,massacres by 43.5 percent, and kidnappings by 42.4 per-cent. At least 20 mid-level FARC leaders and financiersand at least 11 paramilitary field commanders have beenkilled or captured. Nayibe Rojas Cabrera (aka “Sonia”),who managed the finances and drug trafficking of theFARC’s Southern Bloc, was captured in February 2004 andlater extradited to the United States. In November, the Co-lombian Army killed FARC’s Teofilo Forero Mobile ColumnDeputy and Operations Chief Humberto Valbuena (aka“Yerbas”), who had replaced Victor Hugo Navarro (aka“El Mocho”) after he was killed by the Colombian Armyin October 2003. On December 13, the Colombian Gov-ernment arrested Rodrigo Granda Escobar, a reported FARCGeneral Staff member, considered the FARC’s “foreign min-ister.” Nearly 7,000 insurgents and paramilitaries havebeen captured and more than 4,000 terrorists have de-serted their FTOs. Approximately 1,100 extortionists and400 kidnappers have been captured and 120 civilian hos-tages have been rescued. Government presence has beenrestored in all municipalities and internal displacement isdown 50 percent.

The US-Colombian extradition relationship continues tobe one of the most successful in the world; President Uribe’sadministration has extradited more than 180 individuals tothe United States through the end of 2004. On December

31, the Colombian Government extradited senior FARC com-mander Juvenal Ovidio Ricardo Palmera (aka “SimonTrinidad”) to the United States on charges of kidnapping,providing material support to terrorists, and narcotics traf-ficking. The threat of extradition has been cited as asignificant concern of the FARC, ELN, and AUC leaders.

The Colombian Government’s peace process with theAUC, involving AUC demobilization, made substantialprogress in 2004 with the removal of nearly 3,000 AUCparamilitaries from combat in November and December2004. This effort should further reduce overall violenceand atrocities, disrupt drug trafficking, and serve as a modelfor future peace processes with the FARC and ELN.

Although kidnappings have declined, Colombia still suf-fers from the world’s highest kidnapping rate (over 1,500in 2004). The US Government has provided $25 millionto support the Colombian Government’s Anti-KidnappingInitiative, which trains and equips Colombian Army andColombian National Police anti-kidnapping units(GAULAs); is developing an anti-kidnapping database tocollect, analyze, and disseminate information onkidnappings; and has established a training facility nearBogota. US-trained GAULA units have rescued over 48hostages, arrested over 200 hostage takers, and seized over$7 million paid as ransom money.

In September, Colombia’s Constitutional Court struck downthe 2003 Antiterrorism Bill (proposed by President Uribe)that would have allowed the Colombian Government toconduct wiretaps, search residences, and detain suspectsmore easily.

Colombia continued to cooperate internationally in thewar against terror. On December 16, 2004, the BogotaAppeals Court reversed an earlier decision to acquit threeIRA members of providing support to the FARC, sentencedthem to 17 years in prison, levied heavy fines, and or-dered their recapture. It is unclear, however, whether theyare still in Colombia, having been released under condi-tional parole based on earlier acquittal. This case reportedlycame from an exchange of information by Interpol in 2000about a possible three-way link among the FARC, the IRA,and ETA. Less than a year later, Colombian authorities ar-rested the IRA members, who had been preparing to leavethe country; one of the three was the official Sinn Feinrepresentative to Havana. Even though the IRA-ETA link iswell established, there is little indication that ETA has everactively engaged with the FARC.

Counterterrorism cooperation has paid dividends for Co-lombia, as illustrated by Ecuador’s capture and deportationto Colombia in January 2004 of “Simon Trinidad.” Canadaand the European Union have added the FARC, ELN, andAUC to their terrorist lists. Mexico closed the official FARCoffice there in April 2002. Colombia continued to take anactive role in the OAS Inter-American Committee Against

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Terrorism (CICTE) to enhance hemisphericcounterterrorism cooperation, information-sharing, andcapacity-building. In August 2003, the Chiefs of State ofArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uru-guay signed the Asuncion Declaration supportingColombia’s struggle against terrorism and condemningterrorism and narcotic trafficking.

The use of areas along Colombia’s porous border by theFARC, ELN, and AUC to find logistical support and rest, aswell as to transship arms and drugs, poses a serious chal-lenge to Colombia. Colombia seeks to cooperate with itsneighbors to enhance border security. The situation onthe Venezuelan side of the Colombian border, which allthree Colombian FTO’s exploit, is especially disconcert-ing. Even though the Colombian Government repeatedlymade offers to Venezuela to enhance counterterrorism co-operation, the level and quality of cooperation fromVenezuela has been very limited. This is despite the issu-ance by the Colombian Government of a strong statementcondemning an alleged paramilitary plot against Venezu-elan President Hugo Chavez in May 2004, and the releaseof prison records and criminal information on all indi-viduals arrested.

Colombia continued to cooperate fully with the UnitedStates in blocking terrorist assets. The Colombian Finan-cial Information and Analysis Unit collaborated with theUS Government to close suspicious bank accounts. InAugust, the Colombian military, police, and investigativeunits produced an estimate of FARC finances. The Gov-ernment plans to continue this research and expand it toinclude other terrorist groups in Colombia, which will as-sist in further developing strategies to cut off the FARC’sfinancial resources. In September, US Secret Service andColombian National Police seized $3.6 million counter-feit dollars from the FARC, which had planned to use themto purchase weapons and explosives. The Governmentalso took steps to reorganize and streamline its Inter-Insti-tutional Committee Against Subversive Finances.

Colombia made significant strides in combatingnarcotrafficking, the primary source of revenue forColombia’s terrorist organizations. Eradication programstargeting coca and opium poppies continued throughoutthe year with record results for the third straight year. Inter-diction operations also resulted in record seizures this year.

Ecuador

The Ecuadorian Government continued in 2004 to sup-port US efforts to combat terrorism. Ecuadorian securityforces were receptive to US requests to investigate do-mestic terrorist incidents and assist with internationalterrorism investigations. Ecuador shared terrorism-relatedinformation with US counterparts. Ecuador’s Banking Su-perintendency cooperated in requesting that Ecuadorianfinancial institutions report transactions involving known

terrorists, as designated by the US Government or by theUN 1267 Sanctions Committee.

In 2004, the Ecuadorian Armed Forces (FFAA) and Na-tional Police (ENP) sustained an aggressive campaign toprevent Colombia’s narcoterrorism from spreading to Ec-uador, and in doing so, disrupted several Colombiannarcoterrorist encampments in Ecuador. The FFAA in Janu-ary and November conducted large-scale operations inSucumbios province near the Colombian border, captur-ing several FARC members. FFAA has reportedly tripledits force posture to approximately 8,000 soldiers along itsnorthern border with Colombia. Since 2003, Ecuadorianarmed forces have interdicted thousands of gallons ofsmuggled petroleum ether, a precursor used in Colom-bian cocaine laboratories. The US Government providesassistance to Ecuadorian security forces to enhance bor-der security along its northern border with Colombia.

Although no significant international acts of terrorism oc-curred in Ecuador in 2004, Ecuadorian police suspectseveral groups of domestic subversion and probable in-volvement in a dozen pamphlet and incendiary bombs.Prime among the suspected groups is the “Popular Com-batants Group” (GCP, in Spanish), which reportedlynumbers roughly 200 and is an armed faction of the Marx-ist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador.

Ecuador’s porous borders, endemic corruption, and well-established illegal migrant networks may serve as attractivegateways for terrorists to exploit. The Revolutionary ArmedForces of Colombia (FARC), a US-designated Foreign Ter-rorist Organization, continues to utilize Ecuador forresupply, rest, and recuperation. However, the FARC real-izes that Ecuador is less hospitable than before. Limited lawenforcement (especially prosecutorial capacity) and militaryresources limit Ecuador’s counterterrorism capabilities.

High rates of migrant smuggling from Ecuador to the UnitedStates remain a concern. In response, the EcuadorianGovernment operates a US Government-supported anti-smuggling police unit (COAC, in Spanish), which suppliedinformation that led to the 2004 conviction in the UnitedStates of an Iranian smuggler, Mehrzade Arbade, whomthe COAC had arrested in Ecuador in 2003. In December2004, the Ecuadorian Government sought US Governmentassistance and technology to establish a comprehensiveentry/exit control system. Ecuador’s four international portsmet International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS)technical requirements in 2004.

Cooperation between Colombian and Ecuadorian policeforces improved in 2004. On January 3, Juvenal OvidioRicardo Palmera (aka “Simon Trinidad”), the most seniorFARC official to be captured in decades, was detained bythe ENP in Quito and deported to Colombia. Cooperationbetween the two countries continued to grow through theyear, leading to a meeting of Colombian and Ecuadorianlaw enforcement in Pasto, Colombia, in December 2004.

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The Ecuadorian Government has signed and submittedfor ratification to its Congress the Inter-American Conven-tion Against Terrorism. In 2004, the EcuadorianGovernment also submitted comprehensive anti-moneylaundering legislation that is moving through its legislature.

Mexico

Mexico is a key ally of the United States in combatingterrorism. The Mexican Government works closely withthe US Government to enhance aviation, border, mari-time, and transportation security; protect US citizens,businesses, and Government facilities and personnel inMexico; secure critical infrastructure; and combat terror-ism financing.

The Mexican and US Governments have participated in arange of bilateral fora that sought to address sharedcounterterrorism-related concerns, including the US-Mexico Border Partnership Action Plan, Senior LawEnforcement Plenary, the Bi-National Commission, andthe Mexico-US Committee on Transborder Critical Infra-structure Protection. On the multilateral front, Mexicohosted the Special Summit of the Americas in Monterreyon January 12-13, 2004, during which issues of regionalcounterterrorism cooperation were advanced.

In 2004, Mexico continued to offer outstanding coopera-tion in improving border security. The United States andMexico continued to follow through on implementationof the US-Mexico Border Partnership Action Plan, signedin March 2002 in Monterrey, to improve infrastructure atports of entry, expedite legitimate travel, and increase secu-rity related to the movement of goods. The US Governmenthas provided $25 million in support. Law enforcement offi-cials on both sides of the border participated in a workshopon emergency responses to chemical incidents and terroristattacks. Mexico’s Plan Centinela, initiated in 2003, contin-ued to integrate security efforts to manage issues along thenorthern and southern Mexican border, to protect infrastruc-ture, and to enhance airport security.

The Mexican military continued to take steps to improvethe capabilities of their counterterrorism forces with addi-tional training and equipment. The Secretariat of the Navyincreased security operations for passenger cruise shipsand military vessels calling on Mexican ports. The Mexi-can Navy also established an offshore rapid response basefor the protection of oil production infrastructure. Mexicohas effectively undertaken implementation of InternationalShip and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) and related portsecurity efforts.

A continuing issue of strategic concern in 2004 to US-Mexico counterterrorism efforts remained the existenceand continued exploitation of smuggling channels travers-ing the US-Mexico border. Despite active and prolongedcooperation by the Mexican Government to address these

smuggling routes, many smugglers have avoided prosecu-tion. The Mexican Government continued in 2004 to stepup efforts to address the flow of illegal migrants intoMexico, many of whom sought eventually to reach theUnited States. In October and November, a comprehen-sive operation targeting gangs and migrant smugglersbegan along Mexico’s southern border that resulted inhundreds of arrests.

Panama

Panama is a stalwart supporter of the United States in thewar on terror. As the custodian of key infrastructure astridea strategic location, Panama takes the threat of terror seri-ously, and is taking appropriate measures.

There were no significant incidents of international terror-ism in Panama in 2004.

Panama’s immediate terrorism concern is incursions byColombian narcoterrorists into Panama’s remote Darienregion. Following the murder of four Panamanians bynarcoterrorists in 2003, Panama entered into a border se-curity cooperation agreement with Colombia andstrengthened police presence in Darien, and along thefrontier. To confront challenges in the medium and longerterm, Panama is taking other steps.

Panama’s new antiterrorism legislation mandates severepenalties for a variety of activities in support of terrorists.Heavy caseloads, lack of expertise for complex interna-tional investigations, and extra-legal influence hinder thepolice and judicial system, however. Panama’s securityand anti-money laundering authorities have taken goodadvantage of US-provided training opportunities andequipment. The Government could bolster its alreadystrong political will to combat terrorism by devoting moreof its own resources to counterterrorism efforts.

Panama has increased the security of its key infrastructureand of the Panama Canal significantly. The Governmenthas installed surveillance technology at critical points, suchas the Bridge of the Americas and container ports. ThePanama Canal Authority has improved its collection ofinformation on ships that use the Canal and has modern-ized its incident management center. Panama has alsostrengthened the capabilities of its national security au-thorities to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence.Anti-money laundering authorities are extremely coop-erative in preventing terror financing through Panamanianinstitutions.

In 2004, Panama signed an agreement with the UnitedStates under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) thatfacilitates boarding procedures to search vesels suspectedof carrying cargoes of proliferation concern. Panama alsoprovided enhanced force protection for US warships tran-siting the Canal.

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Shortly before leaving office in September 2004, Presi-dent Moscoso pardoned four foreigners arrested in 2000and jailed for illegal possession of explosives. The Gov-ernment of Cuba alleged that the suspects were plottingto kill Fidel Castro, who was attending the Ibero-Ameri-can summit in Panama, and sought their extradition.Panama refused, on grounds that they would not be ac-corded a fair trial in Cuba. Upon their release, the CubanGovernment suspended diplomatic relations with Panama.Relations were later restored.

Panama has a significant Muslim population, augmentedrecently by an influx of South Asian immigrants, that hastraditionally remained apolitical and focused on businessinterests centered around the Colon Free Trade Zone andprovincial towns. While rumors persist of ties betweenPanama’s Muslim community and terrorist groups in theMiddle East, there has been no credible evidence to sup-port such speculation. The Panamanian Governmentremains cognizant of the potential threat posed by immi-grants from countries associated with Islamic extremism.

Peru

Peru remained a supporter of US counterterrorism effortsin 2004. Even though the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso,or SL), a US Government-designated Foreign Terrorist Or-ganization (FTO), remains small and isolated, SL continuesto pose a threat to US and Peruvian interests. SL con-ducted several deadly attacks in remote Peruvian areas in2004. SL has a few hundred armed members concentratedin the coca-growing valleys where they reportedly are in-creasing their involvement in the drug trade, gaining moreresources for terrorist activities. Lack of an effective Gov-ernment presence in these areas has complicated effortsto disrupt SL activity. A purported SL leader threatenedattacks against US and Peruvian coca eradication effortsin Huanaco Department (Province). Armed terrorist inci-dents fell to 40 in 2004 from 100 in 2003. Reports suggestthat SL is trying to rebuild support in the universities wherethey excercised considerable influence in the 1980s.ThePeruvian Government arrested 161 suspected SL mem-bers, including alleged key leader Gavino Mendoza. Perusuccessfully extradited from Spain suspected SL leaderAdolfo Olaechea in 2003; his case will be tried in 2005.

The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) wassignificantly reduced in numbers in recent years, but itappears to be quietly trying to rebuild its membership.The MRTA has not conducted a significant terrorist attacksince the December 1996 hostage siege at the JapaneseAmbassador’s residence in Lima, and posed a very lim-ited threat in 2004. The Peruvian Communist Party (PatriaRoja) has not engaged in terrorist acts but has been sus-pected of advocating violent confrontation with Peruviansecurity forces.

There is only limited evidence of the Revolutionary ArmedForces of Colombia (FARC) or Colombia’s National Lib-eration Army (ELN) operating inside Peru or working withSL. In January 2004, a FARC member and several Peruvi-ans were arrested for arms trafficking in northern Peru. In2004, Peru, Colombia, and Brazil signed a border secu-rity agreement to enhance cooperation to combat terrorismand arms trafficking.

President Toledo has pledged increased funding for secu-rity forces and social development projects in areas whereSL and other terrorist groups operate. The Peruvian Con-gress approved the President’s request to create a NationalDefense and Security Fund, totaling $40 million for 2005.The Peruvian Congress created a national security systemdesigned to improve inter-governmental cooperation andstrengthen prosecutors. The National Police (PNP) Direc-torate of Counterterrorism (DIRCOTE) is the primaryPeruvian agency coordinating counterterrorism efforts,along with the Peruvian Army, which operates approxi-mately 75 bases.

President Toledo has repeatedly extended a state of emer-gency, which suspends some civil liberties and gives theArmed Forces authority to maintain order, for successiveperiods of up to 60 days in parts of Peru’s five departmentswhere SL is believed still to have armed members. ThePeruvian Government and civil society are working toimplement the 2002 recommendations of the Truth andReconciliation Commission to heal wounds from the ter-rorist conflict of the 1990s. President Toledo’s Peace andDevelopment Commissions, formed in 2002, continuedto promote cooperation between police, military, and resi-dents in the areas where SL and MRTA conflicts had beenthe greatest.

The Government continued to prosecute terrorist suspectsaggressively. Peru’s special antiterrorism court is retryingaround 750 of the 1,900 overturned convictions, in con-formance with the findings of the Inter-American Court ofHuman Rights (IACHR), of SL and MRTA defendants whohad been tried on Fujimori-era decree laws on terrorism.All the cases must be re-tried by January 2006 or the de-fendants will be released in accordance with Peruvian law.A retrial (“megatrial”) of SL founder Abimael Guzman and15 co-defendants began in November 2004. The retrialof 13 MRTA leaders, including its founder Victor Polay,together in another “megatrial” began in December 2004.Six SL members remain in various stages of trials and ap-peals for complicity in the March 2002 bombing near theUS Embassy that killed ten people; two defendants werereleased for lack of evidence. A principal SL leader, OsmanMorote, was acquitted of charges relating to a 1992 tele-vision station bombing, although three other SL memberswere convicted and sentenced. Morote continues to servean 18-year sentence on a previous terrorism convictionand is one of the “megatrial” defendants.

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In May 2004, the IACHR issued its decision in the casebrought by Lori Berenson, a US citizen and convictedMRTA member, who claimed that the terrorism law en-acted to deal with the overturned terrorist convictions stillviolated international due process of law. While the Courtfound against Peru on some claims, the Court did not in-validate Berenson’s conviction or 20-year sentence.

Peru passed legislation in July 2004 to strengthen and ex-pand the authorities of its financial intelligence unit (FIU).The new legislation included counterterrorist finance ac-tivities among the FIU’s functions; greatly expanded theFIU’s capacity to engage in joint investigations and infor-mation-sharing with foreign FIU’s; enhanced the FIU’scapacity to exchange information and pursue joint caseswith other agencies of the Peruvian Government; and re-quired that individuals and entities transporting more than$10,000 in currency or monetary instruments into or outof Peru file reports with Peruvian Customs. The US Govern-ment continued to provide assistance, including a technicaladvisor and funding for hardware and software, to help Perufight money laundering and other financial crimes.

All of Peru’s major seaports achieved UN and private sec-tor security certifications. The US Government supports aport security program in Peru that focuses onnarcotrafficking but also counters terrorist threats and armssmuggling. Airport security in Peru has been enhancedwith US assistance.

Peru has ratified the Inter-American Convention AgainstTerrorism and signed the August 2003 Asuncion Declara-tion, by which several South American nations committedthemselves to support the Colombian Government in itsongoing struggle against terrorism and drug trafficking.Peru has been an active participant in the United Nationsand OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism(CICTE).

Triborder Area (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay)

The countries of the Triborder Area (TBA) — Argentina,Brazil, and Paraguay — have long been concerned aboutthe pervasiveness of transnational crime in the regionwhere the three nations converge. In the early 1990s, thecountries established a mechanism for addressing jointlyarms and drug trafficking, contraband smuggling, docu-ment and currency fraud, money laundering, and themanufacture and movement of pirated goods. In 2002, attheir invitation, the United States joined them in a consul-tative mechanism — the “Three Plus One” Group onTriborder Area Security — to strengthen the capabilitiesto fight cross-border crime and thwart money launderingand terrorist fundraising activities. The United States re-mains concerned that Hizballah and HAMAS raise fundsamong the sizable Muslim communities in the region, andthat the high incidence of illicit activity could tempt ter-rorist groups to seek to establish safe havens in this largelyuncontrolled area. Persons suspected of ties to terrorist

groups have been spotted in the TBA, but no operationalactivities of terrorism have been detected.

In December 2004, the United States hosted the fourthhigh-level meeting of the “Three Plus One,” at which thepartners exchanged views on measures taken and progressconfronting the region’s security challenges. Argentina,Brazil, and Paraguay agreed to develop guidelines for de-tecting and monitoring potentially illegal flights in the TBA,to exchange information on cargo flights, and to explorethe feasibility of conducting joint patrols on Iguacu water-ways. They also agreed to meet in 2005 to strengtheninstitutional ties among prosecutors, to consider integratedborder and customs controls, to enhance cooperationamong their financial analysis units, and to begin lookingat charities to prevent their abuse of fundraising. Brazilannounced the creation of a Regional Intelligence Centerin Foz do Iguacu, and Argentina and Paraguay committedto designate liaisons to it. The parties agreed to continueto work among themselves and with the United States toconfront transnational crime and continue to deny the TBAto terrorists.

Individually, the TBA countries maintained strong stancesagainst international terrorism.

Argentina continued to cooperate with the United Na-tions, the OAS, its neighbors, and the United States on anumber of counterterrorism initiatives. Argentine securityforces have been especially vigilant in monitoring illicitactivity and its potential links to Islamic radical groups inthe TBA. There is no credible evidence that operationalIslamic terrorist cells exist in Argentina. Argentina main-tains a leading role in the OAS Inter-American CommitteeAgainst Terrorism (CICTE), established on Argentina’s ini-tiative in the 1990s.

There were no significant acts of international terrorism inArgentina in 2004. In November, small explosive devicesset to detonate after hours at three foreign bank branches(one US) killed a security guard and injured a policeman.No group has claimed responsibility. In September, a three-judge panel acquitted all 22 Argentine defendants chargedin connection with the 1994 terrorist bombing of theBuenos Aires Jewish Community Center, in which at least85 persons were killed. The panel faulted the investiga-tion of the original judge and prosecutors and called foran investigation of their handling of the case and trial. AnArgentine criminal court judge reconfirmed the validityof international arrest warrants against 12 Iranian nation-als, including diplomats stationed in Buenos Aires in 1994,and one Lebanese official believed to head Hizballah’sterrorist wing. There were no new developments in theinvestigation of the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy,in which at least 29 persons were killed.

Draft legislation to criminalize terrorist financing intro-duced in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies in 2003remained stalled through 2004. The draft provides penal-

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ties for violations of international conventions, includingthe UN’s Convention for the Suppression of the Financingof Terrorism. Argentina’s lower legislative chamber willconsider the new legislation once it ratifies the UN pact,as well as the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism.

Argentine executive branch officials and the Central Bankcontinued to be extremely cooperative in 2004, respond-ing quickly and effectively to ensure that the assets ofterrorist groups identified by the United States or the UNwould be frozen if detected in Argentine financial institu-tions. New regulations require travelers to report thecross-border transport of currency in excess of $10,000,whether inbound or outbound and the country is estab-lishing an automated entry/exit system at ports of entry.

Brazil continues to extend practical and effective supportfor US counterterrorism efforts on all fronts, including in-telligence, law enforcement, and finance. There were nointernational terrorism incidents of significance in Brazilin 2004, and no credible evidence of the existence of op-erational terrorist cells. The United States remainedconcerned about the possible use of Brazilian territory fortransit by terrorists using established illegal migrant smug-gling groups or for fundraising for terrorist groups.

In May 2004, the Government of Brazil created a techni-cal team from five key ministries and the Armed Forces toformulate a national policy to combat terrorism. Thegroup’s recommendations are intended as the basis of abill to establish a national authority for combating terror-ism. By the end of 2004, however, the administration ofPresident Lula da Silva had yet to submit a bill to the leg-islature. Also awaiting legislative action were a billintroduced in 2003 aimed at preventing terrorist attackson Brazil’s cyber infrastructure and measures to updateBrazil’s money laundering law that dates back to 1978.There are no significant impediments to the prosecutionor extradition of suspected terrorists by Brazil, althoughBrazil’s legal procedures can be protracted.

Brazil is increasingly capable of monitoring domestic fi-nancial operations and effectively utilizes its FinancialActivities Oversight Council (COAF, in Portuguese) to iden-tify possible funding sources for terrorist groups. The UnitedStates recently provided assistance and training to COAFto upgrade its database and data collection mechanism.In January 2005, the Brazilian Federal Police will inaugu-rate a regional field office in Foz do Iguacu to coordinateits law enforcement efforts in the TBA.

Paraguay has cooperated in the global war against terror-ism by actively supporting counterterrorism initiatives atthe UN and the OAS. In December 2004, at the fourthmeeting of the “Three Plus One”, Paraguay offered to hosta conference of TBA financial intelligence units in the firsthalf of 2005.

In September 2004, Cecilia Cubas, the daughter of a formerpresident of Paraguay, was abducted and subsequentlymurdered. The Paraguayan Government charged, credibly,that what appeared as a kidnap for profit gone awry wasreally the work of a radical leftist group with possible tiesto the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

Paraguay remained vigilant throughout 2004 against ex-tremists seeking to raise funds among Paraguay’s Muslimcommunity for terrorist activities outside Paraguay. Therewas no credible evidence of operational Islamic terroristcells in Paraguay.

The executive branch’s strong political will to combat ter-rorism notwithstanding, the Government remainedhampered by weak or non-existent legislation and by lim-ited law enforcement and intelligence capabilities. Inparticular, Paraguay lacks an antiterrorism law that wouldafford authorities the special powers needed to investi-gate and prosecute terrorism-related crimes. Lacking sucha law, and adequate money laundering legislation, theGovernment is only able to prosecute suspected terroristfinanciers for tax evasion or other crimes. To address thesedeficiencies, the Government in 2004 prepared for con-sideration by the legislature draft legislation to strengthenParaguay’s anti-money laundering regime and an antiter-rorism bill that would outlaw support for terrorists. Bothneed to be adopted by the legislature. These initiativesare key to Paraguay meeting its internationalcounterterrorism obligations as set forth in UN SecurityCouncil Resolutions.

Despite the lack of specific antiterrorist statutes, Paraguayhas actively prosecuted suspected terrorist fundraisersunder other statutes. Hizballah fundraisers Sobhi Fayadand Ali Nizar Dahroug were sentenced to lengthy prisonterms in November 2002 and August 2003, respectively,for tax evasion. A major accomplishment in 2004 was thesuccessful prosecution and conviction in May of Hizballahfundraiser Assad Ahmad Barakat on charges of tax eva-sion, following his extradition from Brazil. He wassentenced to six and one-half years. The Government isconsidering additional charges of bank fraud, pendingconcurrence by Brazil. (The terms of the Paraguay-Brazilextradition treaty prohibit prosecution of extradited sus-pects on charges other than those that were the basis forextradition.) Separately, in March Paraguay opened a caseof tax evasion against a money exchange house and 46individuals suspected of involvement in money launder-ing. In August, Paraguay brought charges of documentfraud against Barakat’s brother Hatem Barakat, also a sus-pected terrorist financier. Paraguay’s antiterrorist policeSecretariat for the Prevention of International Terrorism(SEPRINTE) continued to provide excellent support in theseand other investigations.

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Uruguay

The Government of Uruguay cooperates fully with theUnited States and international institutions in the war onterrorism, but has not devoted great resources to the ef-fort. There were no significant incidents of internationalterrorism in Uruguay in 2004.

Uruguayan banking and law enforcement agencies pro-fess to search for financial assets, individuals, and groupswith links to terrorism, but they have not discovered anyterrorist assets in Uruguayan financial institutions, nor anyterrorist operatives in Uruguay. The Government has oc-casionally assisted in monitoring the possibility ofextremists raising funds for terrorist groups from Muslimcommunities in the Triborder area and along Uruguay’snorthern frontier with Brazil.

In September 2004, Uruguay approved legislation that sig-nificantly strengthened its anti-money laundering regime.It also signed the Asuncion Declaration in support ofColombia’s efforts against terrorism and drug trafficking.Uruguay seconded personnel to the Executive Secretariatof the Organization of American States’ Committee toCombat Terrorism (CICTE) and, as CICTE Chair, hosted theannual meeting in Montevideo in January 2004.

Venezuela

In 2004, Venezuelan-US counterterrorism cooperationcontinued to be inconsistent at best. Public recrimina-tions against US counterterrorism policies by PresidentChavez and his close supporters overshadowed and de-tracted from the limited cooperation that exists amongspecialists and technicians of the two nations.

Venezuela continued in 2004 to be unwilling or unableto assert control over its 1,400-mile border with Colom-bia. Consequently, Colombia’s three US-designatedForeign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) — the Revolution-ary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the NationalLiberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forcesof Colombia (AUC) — continued to regard Venezuelanterritory near the border as a safe area to conduct cross-border incursions, transship arms and drugs, rest, andsecure logistical supplies, as well as to commit kidnappingsand extortion for profit. Weapons and ammunition —some from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities — con-tinued flowing from Venezuelan suppliers andintermediaries into the hands of Colombia’s FTOs. It isunclear to what extent and at what level the VenezuelanGovernment approves of or condones material support toColombian terrorists. President Chavez’s close ties to Cuba,a US-designated state sponsor of terrorism, continue toconcern the US Government.

Current Venezuelan law does not specifically mentioncrimes of terrorism, although the UN Convention on Ter-

rorist Bombings of 1997 and the UN Convention on Ter-rorism Financing of 1999 became law in Venezuela inJuly 2003. Venezuela neither maintains a foreign terroristlist nor designates groups as such. Venezuela signed theOAS Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism in June2002 and ratified it in January 2004. Legislation consid-ered throughout 2004 — including the organized crimebill, anti-terrorism bill, and proposed changes to the pe-nal code — defined terrorist activities, establishedpunishments, facilitated investigation and prosecution, andfroze the assets of terrorism financiers. However, otherproposed changes to the penal code would undercut po-litical freedoms. The law modifying the penal code passedin the Assembly on January 6, 2005, and is awaitingChavez’s signature.

President Chavez’s stated ideological affinity with FARCand ELN — both US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organi-zations (FTOs) — further limited Venezuelancounterterrorism cooperation with Colombia, which in2004 continued to receive less cooperation from Venezu-ela than from its other neighbors. Venezuelan andColombian military and police cooperated on some ter-rorism and drug-related cases. Moreover, the September17 murder of at least six Venezuelan National Guard mem-bers and a civilian engineer near the border with Colombia,reportedly by FARC forces, publicly upset Chavez andraised expectations that border policing would be steppedup with additional resources and political will.

However, President Chavez’s and the VenezuelanGovernment’s acerbic reaction to the December 13 de-tention of Rodrigo Granda Escobar, a reported FARCGeneral Staff member who is considered the FARC’s “for-eign minister,” complicated efforts to enhanceVenezuelan-Colombian counterterrorism cooperation.Granda had reportedly been captured in Venezuela bybounty hunters, and then brought to Cucuta, Colombia(near the Venezuelan border), where he was detained byColombian officials. President Chavez and the Venezu-elan Government publicly accused the ColombianGovernment of infringing on Venezuela’s sovereignty, sus-pended trade and business accords with Colombia, andrecalled Venezuela’s Ambassador to Colombia. PresidentChavez rejected Colombian President Uribe’s offer to meetface-to-face to resolve the impasse and conditioned anymeeting with Uribe — as well as the resumption of traderelations and return of Venezuela’s Ambassador to Colom-bia — on Uribe’s apologizing to Chavez and acceptingresponsibility for violating Venezuela’s sovereignty. In early2005, Chavez and Uribe resolved to move past this inci-dent. However, future counterterrorism cooperationbetween Venezuela and Colombia remains uncertain.

Following the killing of prosecutor Danilo Anderson onNovember 18, 2004, President Chavez orderedVenezuela’s National Defense Council to define an anti-terrorism strategy to include tighter border and

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communications security. At President Chavez’s instruc-tion, the National Assembly formed a committee todevelop an antiterrorism law, and the Supreme Court des-ignated a group of judges to handle terrorism cases.Nevertheless, there are concerns within Venezuela, basedon preliminary details of the antiterrorism law, that Chavez’srecent attention to “terrorism” may be intended to targetdomestic opponents of his Government. An increasinglypoliticized judiciary and the recent appointment of Venezu-elan Government supporters to fill the 12 new seats addedto the Supreme Court (plus five vacancies) cast serious doubtson the judges’ independence and impartiality.

Terrorist tactics were employed throughout 2004 by uni-dentified domestic groups attempting to influence thetenuous political situation, particularly in Caracas. A se-ries of small bombs and threats throughout the year werein some cases blamed on supporters of President Chavezor on the Government’s political opponents. The Venezu-elan Government alleged in 2004 that exile groups andthe US Government sought to overthrow or assassinatePresident Chavez, but offered no proof to support its claims.The Government claimed on May 8 that some 100 Co-lombian paramilitaries were training secretly near Caracas;those detained turned out to be unarmed Colombian agri-cultural workers.

Venezuela’s limited document security, especially for citi-zenship, identity, and travel documents, makes it an

attractive venue for persons involved in criminal activi-ties, including terrorism. Venezuela could serve as a transitpoint for those seeking illegal entry into the United States,Europe, or other destinations.

Most examples of positive counterterrorism cooperationwith the United States pre-date 2004. In the wake of 9/11, Venezuela supported the invocation of the Inter-Ameri-can Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (“The Rio Treaty”),which calls for the collective self-defense of OAS memberstates in response to an attack on any member. Venezuelahad provided limited cooperation to the US Governmenton counterterrorism and counterterrorist finance efforts,as well as US Government counternarcotics initiatives. InNovember 2002, a US Financial Systems Assessment Team(FSAT) visited Venezuela and met with Venezuelan Gov-ernment officials to assess Venezuela’s counterterrorismfinance regime. Venezuelan officials have participated invarious US Government counterterrorism finance courses,identified by the FSAT. The Venezuelan military has re-ceived anti-kidnapping training from the US military.Venezuela helped provide evidence that led to the indict-ment of FARC members for the 1999 murder of threeAmerican indigenous activists. Future counterterrorismcooperation with the United States remains uncertain,especially given President Chavez’s and the VenezuelanGovernment’s actions in 2004.

Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE)

A continuing positive trend in the Western Hemisphere has been the high level of political will to combat terrorism.Although counterterrorism capacity and expertise remain lacking in many states in the hemisphere, countries continuedefforts to strengthen their counterterrorism regimes on all fronts, with an emphasis on cooperation.

At the heart of this cooperation lies the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism(CICTE, in Spanish), which continued in 2004 to enhance regional counterterrorism cooperation and capacity-building.Then-Coordinator for Counterterrorism Cofer Black led the US delegation to the January 2004 CICTE Fourth RegularSession in Montevideo, Uruguay, during which CICTE expanded its mission beyond disrupting terrorism financing andenhancing border security to addressing threats to transportation security (aviation and seaport) and cyber security. Toaccomplish this enhanced mission, CICTE has four ongoing counterterrorism capacity-building programs: airport secu-rity training, border security (land, air, sea) and financial controls, policy engagement exercises, and counterterrorismneeds assessments.

CICTE has delivered over $3 million in counterterrorism capacity-building assistance in the region. In 2004, CICTEprovided training to over 300 port and airport security officials from 28 member states to help meet the requirements ofthe International Maritime Organization’s International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code, and the InternationalCivil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) new air security standards. CICTE has advised 15 member state governments onhow to meet the requirements of UNSCR 1373, the 12 UN conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, and theInter-American Convention Against Terrorism.

In 2004, Chile, Dominica, Honduras, Panama, and Venezuela ratified the Inter-American Convention Against Terror-ism, bringing the total number to 12. Having received the 10th ratification, a meeting of states parties, as called for inthe Convention, will be held in 2005. The Convention has been signed by all but one OAS member state, and it cameinto force July 10, 2003. The Convention complements and expands on the 12 UN conventions and protocols relatingto terrorism.

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State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview

Iraq, as it transitioned to democracy, ceased to supportterrorism and its designation as a state sponsor of terror-ism was rescinded in October 2004. Libya and Sudantook significant steps to cooperate in the global war onterrorism in 2004. Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria,however, continued to maintain their ties to terrorism.Although some countries in this latter group have takensteps to improve cooperation with global counterterrorismefforts in some areas, all have also continued the actionsthat led them to be designated as state sponsors.

State sponsors of terrorism impede the efforts of the UnitedStates and the international community to fight terrorism.These countries provide a critical foundation for terroristgroups. Without state sponsors, terrorist groups wouldhave a much more difficult time obtaining the funds, weap-ons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan andconduct operations. Most worrisome is that these coun-tries also have the capabilities to manufacture weapons ofmass destruction and other destabilizing technologies thatcould fall into the hands of terrorists. The United Stateswill continue to insist that these countries end the supportthey give to terrorist groups.

Cuba

Throughout 2004, Cuba continued to actively oppose theUS-led coalition prosecuting the global war on terrorism.Cuba continues to maintain at the UN and other fora thatacts by legitimate national liberation movements cannotbe defined as terrorism, and has sought to characterize as“legitimate national liberation movements” a number ofgroups that intentionally target innocent civilians to ad-vance their political, religious, or social agendas. TheCuban Government claims, despite the absence of evidence,that it is a principal victim of terrorism sponsored by Cuban-Americans in the United States. The Cuban Government’sactions and public statements run contrary to the spirit ofthe UN conventions on terrorism that it has signed.

In 2004, Cuba continued to provide limited support todesignated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, as well assafehaven for terrorists. The Cuban Government refusesto turn over suspected terrorists to countries that havecharged them with terrorist acts, alleging that the receiv-ing government would not provide a fair trial on chargesthat are “political.” Havana permitted various ETA mem-bers to reside in Cuba, despite a November 2003 publicrequest from the Spanish Government to deny them sanctu-ary, and provided safehaven and some degree of support tomembers of the Colombian FARC and ELN guerilla groups.

Many of the over seventy fugitives from US justice thathave taken refuge on the island are accused of commit-ting violent acts in the Unites States that targeted innocentsin order to advance political causes. They include JoanneChesimard, who is wanted for the murder of a New Jersey

State Trooper in 1973. On a few rare occasions the Cubangovernment has transferred fugitives to the United States,although it maintains that fugitives would not receive afair trial in the United States.

Iran

Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in2004. Its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministryof Intelligence and Security were involved in the planningand support of terrorist acts and continued to exhort avariety of groups to use terrorism in pursuit of their goals.

Iran continued to be unwilling to bring to justice senioral-Qa’ida members it detained in 2003. Iran has refusedto identify publicly these senior members in its custodyon “security grounds.” Iran has also resisted numerouscalls to transfer custody of its al-Qa’ida detainees to theircountries of origin or third countries for interrogation and/or trial. Iranian judiciary officials claimed to have triedand convicted some Iranian supporters of al-Qa’ida dur-ing 2004, but refused to provide details. Iran also continuedto fail to control the activities of some al Qa’ida memberswho fled to Iran following the fall of the Taliban regime inAfghanistan.

During 2004, Iran maintained a high-profile role in en-couraging anti-Israeli terrorist activity, both rhetorically andoperationally. Supreme Leader Khamenei praised Pales-tinian terrorist operations, and Iran provided LebaneseHizballah and Palestinian terrorist groups — notably

State Sponsor: Implications

Designating countries that repeatedly provide support foracts of international terrorism results in the imposition offour main sets of US Government sanctions:

1. A ban on arms-related exports and sales.2. A requirement for notification to Congress of any

license issued for exports that could make a significantcontribution to the state sponsor’s military potential orcould enhance their ability to support acts ofinternational terrorism.

3. Prohibitions on foreign assistance.4. Miscellaneous financial and other restrictions,

including:• US opposition to loans by the World Bank and other

international financial institutions.• Providing an exception to sovereign immunity to

allow families of terrorist victims to file civil lawsuitsin US courts.

• Restrictions on tax credits for income earned in statesponsor countries.

• Denial of duty-free treatment of goods exported to theUnited States.

• Prohibition of certain Defense Department contractswith companies controlled by state sponsors.

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HAMAS, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Mar-tyrs Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation ofPalestine-General Command — with funding, safe haven,training, and weapons. Iran provided an unmanned aerialvehicle that Lebanese Hizballah sent into Israeli airspaceon November 7, 2004.

Iran pursued a variety of policies in Iraq during 2004, someof which appeared to be inconsistent with Iran’s statedobjectives regarding stability in Iraq as well as those ofthe Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) and the Coalition. Se-nior IIG officials have publicly expressed concern overIranian interference in Iraq, and there were reports thatIran provided funding, safe transit, and arms to insurgentelements, including Muqtada al-Sadr’s forces.

Libya

Following Libya’s December 19, 2003, announcement thatit would eliminate its weapons of mass destruction andnon-Missile Technology Control Regime class missiles, theUnited States, the United Kingdom, and relevant interna-tional agencies worked with Libya to eliminate theseweapons in a transparent and verifiable manner. In rec-ognition of Libya’s actions, the United States and Libyabegan the process of improving diplomatic relations. OnFebruary 26, the United States lifted its restriction on theuse of US passports for travel to Libya and eased someeconomic sanctions. On April 23, the United States easedmore sanctions and terminated the applicability of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act provisions to Libya. On June 28, theUnited States reestablished direct diplomatic relations withLibya by upgrading its Interests Section to a US LiaisonOffice. On September 20, the President terminated thestate of emergency declared in 1986 and revoked the re-lated executive orders. This rescinded the remainingeconomic sanctions against Libya under the InternationalEmergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

Libya remains designated as a state sponsor of terrorismand is still subject to the related sanctions. In 2004, Libyaheld to its practice in recent years of curtailing support forinternational terrorism, although there are outstandingquestions over its residual contacts with some past terror-ist clients. Libya has provided cooperation in the globalwar on terrorism, and Libyan leader Muammar Qadhaficontinued his efforts to identify Libya with the interna-tional community in the war on terrorism. Prior to the January30, 2005, elections in Iraq, senior Libyan officials made state-ments that defended insurgent attacks on US and Coalitionforces; following strong US protests, Libya encouraged Iraqiparticipation in the elections, indicating its intent to recog-nize the upcoming Transitional Iraqi Government, andsupport reciprocal diplomatic missions with Iraq.

Following Libya’s steps to eliminate its weapons of massdestruction and the September 20 revocation of US eco-nomic sanctions related to the national emergency, Libya

authorized a second payment of $4 million per family tothe families of the 270 victims of the 1988 Pan Am 103bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland. This payment was partof a deal concluded in 2003 between Libya and the fami-lies in which Libya agreed to pay $10 million per family,or $2.7 billion, contingent upon the lifting of UN and USsanctions and removal of Libya from the state sponsors ofterrorism list. By year’s end, UN and US sanctions werelifted and the families had received a total of $8 millioneach, even though Libya remained designated as a statesponsor of terrorism. A remaining $2 million per familyremained in a third-country escrow account, pendingLibya’s removal from the terrorism list.

Libya resolved two other outstanding international disputesstemming from terrorist attacks that Libya conducted dur-ing the 1980s. In January, the Qadhafi Foundation agreedto pay $170 million to the non-US families of victims ofthe 1989 bombing of a French UTA passenger aircraft.Separate cases for compensation filed by US victims’ fami-lies are still pending in the US courts. In 2001, a Germancourt issued a written opinion finding that the Libyan in-telligence service had orchestrated the 1986 bombing ofthe La Belle nightclub in Berlin, in which two US service-men and a Turkish woman were killed and 229 people wereinjured. The Court convicted four individuals for carryingout the attack. In August, the Qadhafi Foundation agreed topay $35 million to compensate non-US victims of the LaBelle attack. In reaching the agreement to pay compensa-tion, Libya stressed that it was not acknowledgingresponsibility for the attack, but was making a humanitariangesture. The families of the US victims are pursuing sepa-rate legal cases, and Libyan officials publicly called forcompensation for their own victims of the 1986 US air strikesin Libya.

In October, Libya was instrumental in the handover ofAmari Saifi, also known as Abderrazak al-Para, the num-ber two figure in the Salafist Group for Call and Combat(GSPC), to Algeria. Al-Para, responsible for the kidnap-ping of 32 Western tourists in Algeria in 2003, had beenheld by a Chadian rebel group, the Movement for De-mocracy and Justice, for several months. In August,Abdulrahman Alamoudi pled guilty to one count of unli-censed travel and commerce with Libya. Alamoudi statedthat he had been part of a 2003 plot to assassinate SaudiCrown Prince Abdullah at the behest of Libyan officials.The United States expressed its serious concerns aboutthese allegations and continues to evaluate Libya’s De-cember 2003 assurances to halt all use of violence forpolitical purposes.

In December 2004, the US designated the Libyan IslamicFighting Group (LIFG) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

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North Korea

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is notknown to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bomb-ing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987.

At a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi inPyongyang in September 2002, National Defense Com-mission Chairman Kim Jong Il acknowledged theinvolvement of DPRK “special institutions” in the kidnap-ping of Japanese citizens and said that those responsiblehad already been punished. Pyongyang in 2003 allowedthe return to Japan of five surviving abductees, and in 2004of eight family members, mostly children, of thoseabductees. Questions about the fate of other abducteesremain the subject of ongoing negotiations between Ja-pan and the DPRK. In November, the DPRK returned toJapan what it identified as the remains of two Japaneseabductees whom the North had reported as having diedin North Korea. Subsequent DNA testing in Japan indi-cated that the remains were not those of Megumi Yokotaor Kaoru Matsuki, as Pyongyang had claimed, and the is-sue remained contentious at year’s end. Four JapaneseRed Army members remain in the DPRK following theirinvolvement in a jet hijacking in 1970; five of their familymembers returned to Japan in 2004.

Although it is a party to six international conventions andprotocols relating to terrorism, Pyongyang has not takensubstantial steps to cooperate in efforts to combat interna-tional terrorism.

Sudan

In 2004, despite serious strains in US-Sudanese relationsregarding the ongoing violence in Darfur, US-Sudanesecounterterrorism cooperation continued to improve. WhileSudan’s overall cooperation and information sharing im-proved markedly and produced significant progress incombating terrorist activity, areas of concern remain. InMay, the US Government certified to Congress a list of coun-tries not fully cooperating in US antiterrorism efforts. For thefirst time in many years, this list did not include Sudan.

Sudan increased cooperation with Ugandan authoritiesto diminish the capabilities of the Lord’s Resistance Army(LRA), a Ugandan group which has terrorized civilians innorthern Uganda and has claimed that it wants to over-throw the current Ugandan Government. The Ugandanmilitary, with Sudanese Government cooperation, inflicteda series of defeats on the LRA at its hideouts in southernSudan, forcing its leaders to flee into Uganda and engagein peace talks with the Ugandan Government.

Domestically, the Government of Sudan stepped up ef-forts to disrupt extremist activities and deter terrorists fromoperating in Sudan. In March 2004, a new HAMAS repre-sentative arrived in Khartoum. According to some press

reports, he was received by Sudanese officials in an offi-cial capacity. In response to ongoing US concern, theSudanese Government closed a HAMAS office inKhartoum in September. In August, Sudanese authoritiesarrested, prosecuted, and convicted Eritreans who hadhijacked a Libyan aircraft and forced it to land in Khartoum.In October, the United States designated the Khartoum-based NGO Islamic African Relief Agency as a supporterof terrorism under EO 13224 for its support of Usama binLadin and al-Qa’ida.

The Sudanese Government also took steps in 2004 tostrengthen its legislative and bureaucratic instruments forfighting terrorism. In January, Sudan co-hosted a three-day workshop on international cooperation oncounterterrorism and the fight against transnational orga-nized crime with the United Nations Office of DrugControl. Neighboring countries from the Horn of Africaand member states of the Inter-Governmental Authorityon Development (IGAD) attended the workshop, whichculminated in the “Khartoum Declaration on Terrorismand Transnational Organized Crime,” in which IGAD mem-ber states reaffirmed their commitment to the fight againstterrorism. The Khartoum Declaration also focused on thetechnical assistance needs of the IGAD member states withregard to implementing the 12 international conventionsand protocols against terrorism.

Syria

The Syrian Government in 2004 continued to providepolitical and material support to both Lebanese Hizballahand Palestinian terrorist groups. HAMAS, Palestinian Is-lamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation ofPalestine (PFLP) and the Popular Front for the Liberationof Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), among oth-ers, continue to operate from Syria, although they havelowered their public profiles since May 2003, when Dam-ascus announced that the groups had voluntarily closedtheir offices. Many of these Palestinian groups, in state-ments originating from both inside and outside of Syria,claimed responsibility for anti-Israeli terrorist attacks in2004. The Syrian Government insists that these Damascus-based offices undertake only political and informationalactivities. Syria also continued to permit Iran to use Dam-ascus as a transshipment point for resupplying LebaneseHizballah in Lebanon.

Syrian officials have publicly condemned internationalterrorism, but make a distinction between terrorism andwhat they consider to be the legitimate armed resistanceof Palestinians in the occupied territories and of LebaneseHizballah. The Syrian Government has not been implicateddirectly in an act of terrorism since 1986, although Israeliofficials accused Syria of being indirectly involved in theAugust 31, 2004, Beersheva bus bombings that left 16 dead.

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Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism

Production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems constitutes a major threat tointernational peace and security. The threat is compounded by the interests of terrorists in acquiring WMD.This would undermine the foundations of international order. We pledge to use all means available to avertWMD proliferation and the calamities that would follow.

Joint statement by President George W. Bush, European Council President Konstandinos Simitis,and European Commission President Romano Prodi

The September 11, 2001, attacks confirmed that terrorists will seek to produce mass casualties whenever they believe itserves their purposes. Although terrorists will probably continue to rely on traditional terrorist tactics, several groups —including al-Qa’ida — increasingly look to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materials as a meansto cause mass casualties rivaling or exceeding those of September 11. Troublesome amounts of dangerous materials,and information about how to create and deliver CBRN weapons, remain available to terrorists.

Usama bin Ladin has said he sees the acquisition of WMD as a “religious duty,” and he has threatened to use suchweapons. This rhetoric was underscored by reports that documents retrieved from al-Qa’ida facilities in Afghanistancontain information on CBRN materials.

However, the threat is not limited to bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida. Information indicates that small but growing numbers ofother terrorist groups are also interested in CBRN materials. In Europe, French police seized a chemical contaminationsuit and arrested a terrorist cell in December 2002 that allegedly was planning an attack using chemical agents.

CBRN terrorism events to date have generally involved crude and improvised delivery means that have been onlymarginally effective. With the exceptions of the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attacks inTokyo and the 2001 US anthrax attacks,the materials employed in these events also have been crudely manufactured. Other events have involved dual-usematerials that have legitimate civilian applications, such as industrial chemicals, poisons, pesticides, and radiologicalsource materials embedded in legitimate measuring instruments. Although terrorist events involving these materials andimprovised delivery systems can cause significant casualties, damage, and disruption, such events pale in comparisonto the casualties and damage that could occur if terrorists acquired WMD and the ability to deliver them effectively.

Preventing the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials and technologies has long been apillar of national security. Since September 11, the nonproliferation of WMD has become an even more urgent priority.President Bush made this clear in his December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, inwhich he set out a comprehensive strategy to prevent WMD proliferation, including to terrorists.

In May 2003, President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a global multilateral arrangement toseize sensitive cargoes that may be in transit to and from states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern. PSI is aninterdiction program. PSI participants jointly explore and train in the best use of counterproliferation tools — diplo-matic, intelligence, and operational — to stop proliferation at sea, in the air, and on land. The United States is workingwithin multilateral non-proliferation regimes and other international fora. Bilaterally, the United States promotes morestringent non-proliferation policies and programs; strengthened export controls; and improved border security to pre-vent terrorists or their state sponsors from acquiring WMD, their delivery systems, related materials, or technologies. Asthe President’s National Strategy notes, however, should diplomatic efforts fall short, the United States will be preparedto deter and defend against the full range of WMD threats.

Damascus has cooperated with the United States and otherforeign governments against al-Qa’ida and other terroristorganizations and individuals; it also has discouraged signsof public support for al-Qa’ida, including in the mediaand at mosques.

In September 2004, Syria hosted border security discus-sions with the Iraqis and took a number of measures to

improve the physical security of the border and establishsecurity cooperation mechanisms. Although these andother efforts by the Syrian Government have been partlysuccessful, more must be done in order to prevent the useof Syrian territory by those individuals and groups sup-porting the insurgency in Iraq.