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APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY: AN Ih'TERNATIONAL REVIEW, 1990.39 (1) 77-87 Metacognitive and Metalinguistic Language: Learning to Talk about Thought Janet W. Astington Ontario Instintre for Studies in Education, Canada David R. Olson McLuhan Program in Culture and Technology, Universiry of Toronto, Canada Apprendre aux enfants a reflechir et a exprimer leurs pensees est une fonction importante de la scolarite. De ce fait, les enseignants doivent diriger leur attention sur les processus d'elaboration et d'expression de la pensee dans le langage. Discuter de ces processus en termes specifiques s'imposait. C'est ainsi que des termes metacognitifs et metalinguistiques sont dkcrits, et analysee l'importance de I'acquisition d'un set differend de termes. Une &ude de comprehension de quelques-uns de ces termes par des Ctudiants est rapportke. On demanda a des etudiants des grades 6 a 12, et a des adultes, de choisir des verbes appropnes, mktacognitifs et metalinguistiques, en remplacement des verbes simples penrer et dire dans 12 histoires. Un developpement significatif de la comprehension de ces verbes, apparait dans les dernieres annees d'ecole. Les scores a cette tiche des etudiants des grades 8 A 12, furent compares a leurs scores a un test standard de vocabulaire et a un test de pensee critique. Teaching children to think and to express their thoughts is an important function of schooling, hence teachers must direct attention to the processes of thinking and expressing thoughts in language. To discuss these processes suitable terms are required. Such mefacognitive and metdinguisric terms are described and the importance of the acquisition of a differentiated set of terms is discussed. A study of students' understanding of some of these terms is reported; students in grades 6 to 12, and adults, were asked to choose appropriate metacognitive and metalinguistic verbs to replace the simple verbs rhink and say in 12 stories. A significant development of understanding of these verbs occurs during the high school years. Grade 8 and grade 12 students' scores on this task were compared with their scores on a standard vocabulary test, and a test of critical thinking. Requests for reprints should be sent to Janet W. Astington, Centre for Applied Cognitive Science, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. 252 Bloor Street West, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1V6. Canada. We are grateful to the Spencer Foundation for their supporr of the research reported here 0 1990 International Association of Applied Psychology

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APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY: A N Ih'TERNATIONAL REVIEW, 1990.39 (1) 77-87

Metacognitive and Metalinguistic Language: Learning to Talk about Thought

Janet W. Astington Ontario Instintre for Studies in Education, Canada

David R. Olson McLuhan Program in Culture and Technology, Universiry of Toronto,

Canada

Apprendre aux enfants a reflechir et a exprimer leurs pensees est une fonction importante de la scolarite. D e ce fait, les enseignants doivent diriger leur attention sur les processus d'elaboration et d'expression de la pensee dans le langage. Discuter de ces processus en termes specifiques s'imposait. C'est ainsi que des termes metacognitifs e t metalinguistiques sont dkcrits, et analysee l'importance de I'acquisition d'un set d i f f e r e n d de termes. Une &ude de comprehension de quelques-uns de ces termes par des Ctudiants est rapportke. On demanda a des etudiants des grades 6 a 12, e t a des adultes, de choisir des verbes appropnes, mktacognitifs et metalinguistiques, en remplacement des verbes simples penrer et dire dans 12 histoires. Un developpement significatif de la comprehension de ces verbes, apparait dans les dernieres annees d'ecole. Les scores a cette tiche des etudiants des grades 8 A 12, furent compares a leurs scores a un test standard de vocabulaire et a un test de pensee critique.

Teaching children to think and to express their thoughts is an important function of schooling, hence teachers must direct attention to the processes of thinking and expressing thoughts in language. To discuss these processes suitable terms are required. Such mefacognitive and metdinguisric terms are described and the importance of the acquisition of a differentiated set of terms is discussed. A study of students' understanding of some of these terms is reported; students in grades 6 to 12, and adults, were asked to choose appropriate metacognitive and metalinguistic verbs to replace the simple verbs rhink and say in 12 stories. A significant development of understanding of these verbs occurs during the high school years. Grade 8 and grade 12 students' scores on this task were compared with their scores on a standard vocabulary test, and a test of critical thinking.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Janet W. Astington, Centre for Applied Cognitive Science, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. 252 Bloor Street West, Toronto, Ontario M 5 S 1V6. Canada. We are grateful to the Spencer Foundation for their supporr of the research reported here

0 1990 International Association of Applied Psychology

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78 ASTINCTON AND OLSON

INTRODUCTION

An important, if not the most important, function of schooling is to teach children to think and to express their thoughts in spoken and written form. In order to do this teachers cannot focus only on the representations, that is, on the content of what is thought and expressed, but they must also focus on the manner of representing, that is, on the processes of thinking, speaking, and writing. In order to do this terms are needed in which to discuss these processes, what we might call metarepresenracional terms. This paper reports an experimental study of students’ knowledge of some of these terms. namely, an important set of rneracognirive and mefalinguis- ric verbs. These are terms which are used in most subject areas to discuss types of propositional attitude and illocutionary force or , more simply, to discuss the processes of thinking and saying; terms such as infer, imply, assume, inrerpret.

Simple terms in which to discuss these processes, for example, k n o w , rhink. guess, remember, s a y , tell, ask , are known by pre-schoolers (Shatz, Wellman. & Silber. 1983) although there is evidence that the distinctions marked by their contrastive use are not well understood until the early school years, at least in experimental situations (see Olson & Astington, 1986, for review). But even then this semantic field is only roughly mapped out. During the later school years a precise set of terms is acquired to mark finer distinctions. We argue that this elaborated set of terms is not just obscure ornamentation, but a crucial part of the language, introduced into English in the 15th and 16th centuries as it became the language of law. theology. science and philosophy, and now a vital part of educational discourse, of what we might call the literate, standard language (Olson & Astington, in press).

There is indeed an enormous set of metacognitive and metalinguistic terms. and there are many lists of them in the literature, the longest of which includes 4800 items (Austin. 1962; Ballmer & Brennenstuhl, 1981 ; Fraser, 1974; McCawley, 1977; Ohmann, 1972; Searle, 1975; Vendler. 1970; Verschueren. 1980). This lexical differentiation, or elaboration. of the set of terms can be viewed from a number of different perspectives:

few terms + many terms

child adult Old English modern English vernacular standard colloquial formal general specialised spoken language written language

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These perspectives suggest a number of reasons why the elaboration of this set of terms has occurred. For example: (1) for increased precision in technical discourse, such as the distinction between recognise and recall as types of remembering; (2) to permit the lexicalisation in written language of the extralinguistic and paralinguistic features of the spoken language; for example, “I insist . . .” replacing an insistent tone; (3) to permit reference to others’ mental states; for example, I can say, “I think i t will rain” or , equivalently, “It might rain”, o r “Possibly it will rain”. T h e metacognitive verb think here marks the uncertainty of the proposition from my point of view, in just the same way as the modal might, o r the adverb possibly marks that uncertainty. However, if I want to mark another’s uncertainty I cannot use the modal o r the adverb, I have t o use a metacognitive verb, and say, “John thinks i t will rain”. Of course, I can use the modal a n d o r the adverb as well as the mental verb, “John thinks i t might rain”, or “John thinks that possibly it will rain”, or even “John thinks it might possibly rain”. The point is, I cannot use just the modal or adverb.

There is some evidence that metacognitive verbs are applied to oneself before they are applied to others (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982), and i t is possible that when they are used in this way they are equivalent t o modals and adverbs. It is only when children apply metacognitive verbs to others, a s well as to themselves, that we can infer their understanding of mental states. Using metacognitive verbs to characterise others’ mental states is a more complex procedure because it includes implicit reference to one’s own state. For example, consider know versus think: when used to characterise one’s own mental state it simply marks degree of certainty, “I know i t will rain” is more certain than “I think it will rain”. But when used to characterise another’s mental state it not only marks the other’s degree of certainty, it also marks his mental state vis-a-vis one’s own. If he thinks what I take to be true, I say “He knows”, but if I take it not to be true I say “ H e thinks”, although the proposition and his attitude towards it may be identical, from his point of view. Thus some of the elaboration of these terms may be due to marking another’s mental state o r speech act and simultaneously marking one’s own stance towards it; for example, we may say “X says . . .” to report X’s statement, but “X claims . . .” when we disagree.

That is to say, the precise use of these terms depends on the particular context. The question we address here is: can students choose an appropri- ate term in a particular context? We are not interested in simply discover- ing whether or not a particular student knows a particular word, in simply producing a vocabulary test. We are interested in seeing whether students can distinguish between a set of related terms, sometimes quite closely related terms, by choosing appropriate ones for different contexts. Sub-

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jects were given stories in which a character said or thought something, which was marked in the story with the verb say or rhhink. Given the context of the story, the simple verb could be replaced by a more complex metalinguistic or metacognitive verb.

METHOD

Subjects

Subjects were 100 students attending public junior and high schools in a mixed-income neighbourhood of Toronto. There were 25 grade six stu- dents (mean age, 11;8 (11 years 8 months]), 28 grade eight students (mean age, 13;9), 26 grade ten students (mean age, 15;11), and 21 grade twelve students (mean age, 17;j). In addition, 78 undergraduates, from the Faculty of Arts and Science, University of Toronto, were also tested. This was an evening class that included a range of adult ages.

Mater ia ls

The materials consisted of 12 stories in which a character said or thought something, which was marked in the story with the simple verb say or think. Given the context of the story, the simple verb could be replaced by a more complex term, characterising the particular speech act or mental state reported. The appropriate verbs were:

SOY think

assert remember concede doubt imply infer predict hypothesise interpret conclude confirm assume

For each story the appropriate verb was given with three distractor items. The text of the stories, and the distractors, are given in Appendix A.

In addition, students in grades 8 and 12 were given the reading vocabul- ary subtest of the Canadian Achievement Tests (Level 19), and the Cornell Critical Thinking Test (Level X, Parts 111 and IV) (Ennis &L Millman, 1982).

Procedure

The order of stories and of alternative verbs was counterbalanced across subjects within each grade. Students were asked to choose the most appropriate verb, from the set of four, to replace the simple verb say or

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think in each story. The instructions read:

The words say and think are very common and we often use them for all kinds of saying and thinking. However, there are many other words for saying and thinking that give more information, such as how something was said, or the circumstances in which something was thought. For example:

or: ( 2 ) John declares he has won. (We know he said i t strongly and firmly.) This test is to find out whether you know some of these other words for

saying and thinking. In the test you first have to read a brief story in which someone says or thinks something (which is marked by underlining). Then you have to read the four alternatives that use other words instead of say or think, and you have to choose which one of the four would fit best into the story.

(1) John says he has won

At the end of each story four alternatives were given, from which subjects were to choose another verb instead of say or rhink. The task was administered as a written test to class groups. The vocabulary test and the critical thinking test were given as written tests to class groups in grades 8 and 12 on a separate day.

RESULTS

The adult data were used as a control, because we wanted to compare students’ performance to educated adult usage, not to some experimentally defined criterion. Adults agreed on their choice for an item 92% on average (range 85% t o 99’/0), except for story 5 , on which only 54% agreed on the choice of imply (40% chose assert), and so this item was dropped in the subsequent analysis.

Because this was a multiple choice test, students’ scores were corrected for guessing, by subtracting 0.33 for each wrong answer; negative scores count as zero. Table 1 shows the mean scores out of a possible total of 11, with ranges and standard deviations for each grade and for the adult group.

TABLE 1 Mean Corrected Score, Standard Deviation, and Range, at Each Grade Level, and for

the Adult Group

Mean Correcred Srandard Range Mean Age Grade Score (max = 11) Deviarion Minimum Maximum n Years Monrhs

6 5.40 2.37 0.33 8.33 25 1 I ;8 x 5.07 2.89 0 00 9.67 28 13;9

10 7.10 2.32 1.67 9.67 26 I 5 ; l l I2 8.53 2.07 300 11.00 21 175 Adult 9.80 I 7 3 0.33 11.00 78 n/a

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Analysis of variance of the school students' scores showed a significant difference across the grades (F(3 ,96) = 10.03, P C 0.001). Post hoc comparisons between the groups (Newman Keuls test) showed significant differences at the 0.05 level between grade 12 and grades 6 and 8 and between grade 10 and grades 6 and 8. That is to say, students' knowledge of the metacognitive and metalinguistic vocabulary tested here increases over the high school years. Less than one-quarter of the grade 6 students, compared with more than three-quarters of the grade 12 students. were correct for 80% or more of the items.

The test scores for students in grades 8 and 12 were correlated with their reading vocabulary and critical thinking test scores. The pooled within-cell correlations (which control for the effects of age) were: metacognitive and metalinguistic verbs with reading vocabulary, r = 0.45 ( P < 0.01), and metacognitive and metalinguistic verbs with critical thinking, r = 0.49 ( P < 0.01). This suggests that students' acquisition of the metacognitive and metalinguistic vocabulary tested here is partly, but not entirely, due to the general increase in vocabulary during these years. The correlation with critical thinking supports the suggestion that this vocabulary is important for such activities.

DISCUSSION

In addition to considering students' general increasing competence on this task it is interesting to look at the ways in which the story context and the set of alternative verbs contribute to students' difficulty with particular items at different ages. As in any test of this type, the difficulty of individual items depends not only on the particular verb being tested, but on the story context and the distractors given, but here the interaction between context and alternative verbs is the focus of interest. For example, the remember story is set in a science class. Although remember is a verb known by three-year-olds. 400/b of the grade 6 students inappropriately chose the verb hypothesise instead of remember because of the context. This tells us as much, if not more, about their understanding of hypothesise as of remember. They knew that hypothesise is a "science" word but they did not know precisely what it meant. In contrast, only 9% of the adult group and 14% of the grade 12 group chose hypothesise for this item.

Although the study reported here is only a preliminary investigation of students' understanding of some terms for characterising thought and talk, i t does show that there is an important set of metacognitive and meta- linguistic verbs which are not well known, or at least which are not systematically applied. by students at t he beginning of their secondary education. Their understanding of these terms is much improved by the end of high school.

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Perhaps the most important question concerning these verbs is: what d o students gain when they acquire these terms-just some new items of vocabulary, o r something more? Infants have beliefs, and when they learn to talk they can express those beliefs as assertions, without knowing the terms believe or assert. However, it is important to distinguish between having beliefs and making assertions, and having a concept of believing and userring. Even so, it would be a bold claim to say that until children know the word, they do not have the concept. It is true that appropriate use of a term is a sufficient condition for possession of a concept (Geach, 1957) but surely it is not a necessary one. The essence of many metacognitive and metalinguistic concepts can probably be represented using the simple verbs that children acquire at a very early age, along with some modals and conjunctions. For example:

believe predict interpret infer

I think that it is true I say that i t will . . . because I think that it will I think (or say) that i t means . . . I don’t know for sure but I think it must be so because I see [some clue].

What is the difference between “It must be so . . .” and “I infer . . .”? The most important difference is that the former focuses on states of affairs in the world, and the latter on mental states. If we differentiate three stages: (1) making the inference, (2) recognising it as an inference, (3) knowing the term infer, then where does the shift in focus from the world to the mind come: with recognition of the inference, or with knowing the term? Three-year-olds make inferences, and can mark them with must (Wells, 1979), although the modal may simply mark certainty, as might in “ I t might rain” marks uncertainty. But later the inference may be marked by “I think it must be so . . .”. Now what is the difference between that and “I infer . . .”?

Thus the problem is: what is added by knowing more metacognitive and metalinguistic terms? A Whorfian view might help. Remember the often- quoted examples: the Inuit have many words for snow and other Cana- dians d o not; English people have many different words for mist and fog; Arabs have many different words for camels, etc. It is not that only the Inuit can perceive the difference between different kinds of snow and talk about them, or that only the English can perceive the difference between different kinds of fog and talk about that; others can, but circuitously. The elaboration of a set of terms for snowlfogkamels or (in the present case) talk and thought facilitates discussion of them, and raises consciousness of the distinctions between them.

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Although that discussion might be pursued using only phrases con- structed from simple terms, and no complex (but compact) specialised terms, there must be some limit to the number of periphrases that can be included in a single utterance for it to remain intelligible to the hearer. Compare: “He showed me a picture, then he didn’t just think that it might be because he didn’t know enough to be sure, he thought it must be because he saw my expression, and knew that I knew that I had seen her before even though I couldn’t bring her back into my memory on my own”, with: “He showed me a picture, then he didn’t just guess , he inferred from my expression that I recognised her even though 1 couldn’t recall her”.

Not only is communication made easier and meaning made clearer, using precise terms rather than periphrases, but the elaboration of the set of terms may raise consciousness of the distinctions between different processes. The distinction between guessing and inferring, for example, may be more easily conceptualised than the distinction between thinking i t may be so without having enough facts to be sure, and thinking it must be so because of the facts available.

Thus, elaboration of the set of terms for thought and talk is important because it allows distinctions to be made between related but different processes, for example, forms of thinking (e.g. guess versus in fer ) , forms of remembering (e.g. recognise versus recall), and forms of telling (e.g. describe versus explain) . The acquisition of an elaborate set of metacogni- tive and metalinguistic terms may lead to increased awareness of one’s own processes of representing, to reflection on them, and to greater mastery of them. A point made by Papert (“the ability to articulate the processes of thinking enables us to improve them”, 1980, p . 158) and made by Vygotsky (1962, pp. 91-92) some time ago: “In perceiving some of our own acts in a generalizing fashion, we isolate them from our total mental activity and are thus enabled to focus on this process as such and to enter into a new relationship to i t . In this way, becoming conscious of our operations and viewing each as a process of a certain kind-such as remembering or imagining-leads to their mastery.”

That is to say. we suggest that knowledge of metacognitive and meta- linguistic language will facilitate thought and talk about mental states and speech acts. Use of these te rns will help children recognise the distinctions between different mental states, and different speech acts, and between a speech act and its corresponding mental state.

Manuscript rcceived August 1988 Rrvised manuscript reccived March 19x9

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REFERENCES Austin, J . L. (1962). How to do rhings with word . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press. Ballmer, T. & Brennenstuhl, W. (1981). Speech act classification: A study in rhc lexical

analysis of English speech activiry verbs. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. Bretherton, I. & Becghly, M. (1982). Talking about internal states: The acquisition of an

explicit theory of mind. Developmenial Psychology, 6 . 906-921. Ennis, R . H . & Millman, J . (1982). Cornell Crirical Thinking Test, Level X (rev. ed . ) .

Champaign, Ill.: Illinois Thinking Project, University of Illinois. Fraser, B. (1974). An analysis of vernacular performative verbs. In R . W. Shuy & C.-J.

Bailey (Eds.). Towards tomorrow’s linguisrics (pp. 139-158). Washington, D.C.: George- town University Press.

Geach. P. E. (1957). Menial acu: Their content and heir objecu. London: Routledgc & Kegan Paul.

McCawley, J. (1977). Remarks on the lexicography of performative verbs. In A . Rogers, R. Wall. & J. Murphy (Eds.). Proceedings of the Texas Conference on Performatives. Presupposiriom and lmplicarure (pp. 13-25). Arlington, Virginia: Center for Applied Linguistics.

Ohmann, R. . (1972). Instrumental style: Notes on the theory of speech as action. In B. B. Kachm & H . F. W. Stahlke (Eds.), Currenr trends in sfylistics (Papers in linguistics; Monograph series. 2 ) (pp. 115-141). Edmonton, Ill.: Linguistic Research.

Olson, D. R. & Astington. J . W. (1986). Children’s acquisition of metalinguistic and metacognitivc verbs. In W. Demopoulos & A. Marras (Eds.), Langungr learning and concept acquisition: Foundational issues. Nonvood, N.J.: Ablex.

Olson, D. R . & Astington. J . W. (in press). Talking about text: How literacy contributes to thought. Journal of Pragmatics.

Papert, S . (1980). Mindsrorms: Children, computers, and powerful idem. New York: Basic Books.

Searle, J. R. (1975). A taxonomy of illocutionary acts. In K. Gunderson (Ed. ) , Language. mind and knowledge, Minnesora srudies in rhe philosophy of science (pp. 344-369). Minneapolis: Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.

Shatz. M.. Wellman, H. , & Silber, S . (1983). The acquisition of mental verbs: A systematic investigation of the first reference to mental state. Cognrrion, 14, 301-321.

Vendler, Z. (1970). Say what you think. In J. L. Cowan (Ed.), Studies in thought and language (pp. 79-97). Tucson, Ariz.: University of Arizona Press.

Verschueren, J. (1980). On speech acf verbs. Amsterdam: John Benjarnins B.V. Vygotsky, L. S . (1962). Thoughr and language. Cambridge. Mass.: MIT Press. Originally

Wells, G. (1979). Learning and using the auxiliary verb in English. In V. Lee (Ed.), published in Russian in 1934.

Language development (pp. 250-270). London: Croom Helm.

Appendix A

Remember Last week in science class Mr. Jones showed Dave that acid solution turns litmus paper pink. This week there’s a test. The first question says “What colour will litmus paper be when you dip i t in acid solution?” Dave thinkr that ir will be pink.

A . Dave remembers that i t will be pink. B. Dave hyporhesises that i t will be pink. C. Dave in fm that it will be pink. D. Dave observes that it will be pink

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86 ASTINGTON AND OLSON

Asserr Kevin is supposed to empty the garbage before he goes to school but he often forgets and his mother has to d o it. Today he remembcrrd It. Just as he's leaving for school his mother says. "Did you empty the garbage today? You forgot yesterday." Kevin says. "Well I did ii roday. fo r sure. "

A. Kevin concludes that he emptied the garbage today. B. Kevin c l a i m that he emptied the garbage today. C Kevin assens that he emptied the garbage today. D . Kevin arsurnes that he emptied the garbage today.

Doubr Lisa and John are visiting the zoo. They see an animal with long horns. John wonders if it is a gazelle. or perhaps a gnu. Lisa rhinkr rhar ii K nor a gnu. Then they see a sign which tells them that the animal is an elk.

A. Lisa denies that it is a gnu. B. Lisa doubrs that it is a gnu. C . Lisa declares that it is a gnu. D. Lisa believes that i t is a gnu.

Concede Jane and Kate are arguing about which is the best place lo eat . Jane thinks Harvey's IS best but Kate thinks McDonald's I s . Kate says thar McDonald's is nearer, bur Jane still thinks Harvey's is the best one to go to because the burgers taste better. She says ro Kare, " l i ' s rme McDonald's is nearer. but I'd rather go to Harvey's."

A. Jane conrradicu that McDonald's is nearer. B. Jane doubrs that McDonald's is nearer. C. Jane suggesrs that McDonald's is nearer. D . Jane concedes that McDonald's is nearer.

Imply It's Adam's birthday tomorrow. Barbara is just sneaking out of the house to buy a present for him when he sees her and asks her where she is going. Barbara says. "We're oui ofmilk. I'm going ro ihe siorc. "

A . Barbara meam that she is going out to buy milk. B. Barbara concedes that she is going out to buy milk. C . Barbara usserfs that she is going out to buy milk. D. Barbara implies that she is going out to buy milk.

Infer Stephen leaves a candy bar on the kitchen table. While he's out his mother sees it there and puts i r Into the cupboard. When Stephen comes back he can't find the candy bar. Then he goes up to his sister's room. He sees an empty candy bar wrapper on the floor. just like the one that he'd had. Srephen rhrnkr rhai hrs sitrer must have earen his candy bar.

A. Stephen kno~rs that his sister has eaten his candy bar. B. Stephen rnfers that his sister has eaten his candy bar. C. Stephen proves that his sister has eaten his candy bar. D. Stephen ditcovers that his sister has eaten his candy bar.

Predic-r Susan and Eva are planning 10 go on 3 picnic. They want to choose a nice day. One morning they wake up early. Eva says. "Shall h e go today?" Susan looks out of the window and she say.^, "I! will be sunny all duv. "

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A. Susan predicts that i t will be sunny all day. B. Susan knows that it will be sunny all day. C. Susan interprets that i t will be sunny all day D. Susan implies that i t will be sunny all day.

Hyporhesire Jason is very good at making all sorts of models. One day Jason’s brother makes a model aeroplane but i t won’t fly properly. Jason rhinkr ihaiii willfly ifhe puts a counterweight in the tail, so he goes to find a weight to try out his idea.

A . Jason remembers that i t will fly if . . . B. Jason dircovers that it will fly i f . . . C. Jason hypothesires that it will fly i f . . . D. Jason erplainr that it will fly if . . .

Inrerprer Bob is reading a scene from one of Shakespeare’s plays for English homework. H e comes to the lines: “. . . that she may feel how sharper than a serpent’s tooth i t is to have a thankless child”. He knows the words but he doesn’t understand i t , so he goes to ask his mother. She says it m e a m ”King Lear wants Cordelia to know how painful i t is to have a child who is ungrateful.”

A . Bob‘s mother understandr the lines. B. Bob’s mother interprets the lines. C. Bob’s mother criricires the lines. D. Bob’s mother defines the lines.

Conclude Mary gets home early from school and finds no one there. She wonders where everyone’s gone. She looks around and sees that the car‘s not in the garage and her brother Bill’s hockey stuff is gone from the hall. Mary rhinks rhar her morher is driving Bill 10 hockey pracrice.

A. Mary concludes that her mother is driving Bill to hockey practice. B. .Mary knows that her mother is driving Bill to hockey practice. C . Mary mserts that her mother is driving Bill to hockey practice. D. Mary proves that her mother is driving Bill to hockey practice.

Assume Karen and Jill always go to gymnastics together on Saturday morning. They always meet at the bus stop at 9 o’clock and travel together to the gym. One Saturday morning when Karen is getting ready to go out her mother says, “Did you call Jill and arrange to meet her?” Karen says, “No. but I rhink she’ll be at rhe bus srop.”

A. Karen knows that J i l l will be at the bus stop. B. Karen infers that Jill will be at the bus stop. C. Karen confirms that Jill will be at the bus stop. D. Karen assumes that Jill will be at the bus stop.

Confirm Ted is studying in hii room at home. Suddenly the bookcase wobbles and things move on the shelves. Ted says. ”What’s going on? Maybe it’s an earthquake.“ At dinner that night Ted’s farher savs, “There was an earrhquake loday. I just heard i t on the news.”

A. Ted’s father predicrs that there was an earthquake. B. Ted’s father concedes ihat there was an earthquake. C. Ted’s father confirms that there was an earthquake. D. Ted’s father denies that there was an earthquake.