Mediterranean 2020: The Future of Mediterranean Security and Politics

8/3/2019 Mediterranean 2020: The Future of Mediterranean Security and Politics

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Mediterranean PaPer SerieS 2011

Mediterranean 2020

the Future oF Mediterranean Security

and PoliticS

the WeStern Mediterranean in 2020:

ScenarioS For regional Security and cooPeration aFter

the arab uPriSingS

the eaStern Mediterranean and the gulF region in 2020: alternative

ScenarioS For the regional Security environMent

d. e S l

d. ts dks


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2011 Te German Marshall Fund o the United States. All rights reserved.

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Cover photo: Benghazi residents hold a oating protest in the port outside the ibisti Hotel in Benghazi Libya as the Arican

Union delegation meets inside to discuss a truce plan between Gaddaf and the rebels.

Katie Orlinsky/Corbis


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Mediterranean 2020:he Future o Mediterranean Security

and Politics

he Western Mediterranean in 2020:Scenarios or Regional Security and Cooperation

ater the Arab Uprisings

D. E S L

he Eastern Mediterranean and the Gul Region in 2020:

Alternative Scenarios or the Regional SecurityEnvironment

D. T Dk

Mediterranean Paper Series

December 2011


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Mediterranean 2020 iii

A - A S , A - . I , , A . M k , , , k .

-, - x x. I, M E N A j , x . I , k k . I, .

A - , A , x , U S E. x M E N A k . x M ,

A S. D. E S L z WM D.

Dk E M. k , M k k .

. - , k, ,

E. E W M , M E - N A. A , M j , S, . L, , A, k ,

.I k k , x , . I , () M .

Dr. Emiliano Alessandri

Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund of theUnited States

Washington, DC, December 13, 2011

Foreword


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Mediterranean 2020 1

Scenarios remain v

open, and moving i

one or other directi

depends primarily o

the success of poli

transitions and the

prospects for regiostability.

Introduction1

T A W , j q W

M . S D , A , . I , , MG 4- L,

j , I , E, M, z .

A q x . Y, . k.

W q ? W ? WI ( ) ? C - ? x ?

A j W

M x .S , , -GL. H,

M .I EU, . U S EU x , , k

z, , k, .

WM, - x N A (M, A,, M, L) S E (P, S, F, I, M). A

.I , x . , , N A , , E , . ,, W M

, , .


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The German Marshall Fund of the United States2

Fear of radicalization

nd instability was used

a means to legitimate

the regimes authority

nd, in parallel, upgrade

security cooperation

with internationalactors.

B , M, j A , z k

. P , , k k . F z , , . M k

.A A , q k A, , L j . -- , , (37 35 M A

7 ).

I , j k , , , , , .F , q .

S, , Sk, L () W AR? R F R E Dz E, L Y,MediterraneanPolitics, 15, 1, . 99-7; K, K MS S A W, FRIDE WorkingPaper, 4, N . S, M-F, Kj (9) S E M CMed.2008,Mediterranean Yearbook,B: IEM/CIDOB, . 85-89; , A , D-A H, L ()L A : q LAnne du Maghreb V | 9.

, A 99, - dcenie noire,

. S , , A , q . S, k A Q

I M.3 , U S E .

I , EU U S M j S M E, . S E , , x,

z . I , , z, ,

3 S, : S., G & W, I(7) A Q M SWP Comments, 6, M7 F, J P (9) A-Q IM: A C G ? CarnegiePapers Middle East Programme, 4; Nz V, J,H, B; Kk; Mz (9) : z S, M: L C; F, J P (),C A-Q A S?, Carnegie Papers

Middle East Program, .

he Old Paradigm2


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The centrality of se

needs overshadow

and undermined

attempts by both th

United States and t

EU to promote polit

reforms.

.4 A , M , , . z, ,

k NAO M D 5+5 .5 O , . M S, U S A, L I, , ,-, ,

4 S, , J, G (8) E U,D C- M,Journalof Common Market Studies, 46, , .47-7, Lk,Dk (6) P M,

Mediterranean Politics,, , . 598; W, S (8)B M: , x , Cambridge Review of International

Affairs, , , . 53-7.5 5+5 D R 99 W M B:M, M, A, , L, M, I,F, S, P.

-, z, x x z .6

The centrality of these security needs U S EU . , , U.S.- M E P I(MEPI), , , , , . EU j j k B P E

I D H R6 W, S (7) E z . V, Revista CIDOBdAfers Internacionals, 79-8, .7-3. Z, Y(9) L -U A: , Maghreb-Machrek, , .7-9;V, A () I L: R SR, The International Spectator, 45, 3, . 7-3.

Table 1: Membership in Multilateral Organizations

Source: Own elaboration

European

Union

Arab

Maghreb

Union

Union for the

Mediterranean

NATO

Mediterranean

Dialogue

5+5

Dialogue

Portugal

Spain

France

Italy

Malta

Morocco

Mauritania Algeria

Tunisia

Libya O


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The stagnation of

eform processes in the

egion and the paralysis

of the negotiations on

the Western Sahara

onflict indicate that, so

far, the status quo haseen fairly convenient to

the elites in power.

x . I 4, EU E N P (ENP), , M B.

I , W S. , M , .7 S 99,

, UN- .8 P V W, UN W S P [ -] , M , S C .9I 7 , I C G ,

k .

WS , , status quo . I

7 M-F, Kj (997) Sahara Occidental, Les enjeuxdun conflit rgional, P: CNRS 8 J, Ek (5) Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate,L R, L S, (9) W

S: A Y UN I M.9, MYk, B: IEM/CIDOB, . 65-68.9 P V W S , ElPais, 8 A 8, [E -: ://..///S///////888_5/] I C G W S: O IMiddle East/North Africa Report N66, J 7,..

x - . , . M, M- z WS , A Izk L M .

W S ,

S-M . S 98, S z . H, Pj/L, qU.S. .3I S-M

, F-A R 8 F C L I.

D , S-S .E - A M U, 989,

G Lz, B () S-M:

, Poltica Exterior, 5, 39, . 38-46. H L, M (9) MP S, : M P A B. B: N, . 38-6.3 S, C, I (6) V j; E M. B: GxG; G, R (6) S LI: A N C WM, I P, 43, , . -3.


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Most analysts,

observers, and

politicians did not

anticipate that Arab

ocieties were reaching

a saturation point.

T W M, M, M

. j ME N A (MENA) , 967 , 978 C D , 979 I R I, M E. I , N A A W,

- .7

M , , A , , , I . I ,

, , UNDPA H D R. : , , , , , , .

A S Bz, - ,

. M Bzz, , ,

7 S, B, A () L M N I, 9, A M, op cit.

, , Z E A B A. E , k H Mk, A .D , M G , , .

A A , M, , : ) , ,) - , 3) z , 4) x , , , . , .

Tunisia, x , . x - . Y, .8 I , 5 x W S

I S , ,8 k j : M C& V G (3), Le Syndrome Autoritaire, P:P S P, H, B (6) La force delobissance: conomie politique de la rpression en Tunisie, P :L ; B R, M () Tunisie :Etat, conomie et socit - Ressources politiques, lgitimation etrgulations sociales, P : P.

2011: A Point o No Return3


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With a single major

in the new Constitu

Assembly, Ennahda

will play a major ro

shaping Tunisian p

in the months and

to come but will nereach agreements

other political parti

8, j G k .9D , , x, k .I, D J

, , . , z P

. z , k, z . D B A

9 G, E () G M B : B A [O- : ://.-./-55786_] A I () Tunisia in Revolt, State Violenceduring Anti-Government Protests [ -: ://..////MDE3////9994--498-7-395949/3.]

, , k . A B A , 959C . E C A O 3 E, I R

G, 37 . W j C A,E j .

Algeria x J , B O q A C , , .Uk ,

, , A . x, , 99,

Table 2: Socio-Economic Indicators in the Maghreb

Source: World Bank, International Transparency, Reporters Without Borders, FAO, International Labour Organization.

*International Transparency 0= Highly Corrupt; 10= Very Clean

CountryHDI 2011

(ranking)

Youth

Unemployment

% 2009

Corruption

Perception

Index*

Gini

Index

2011

Press

Freedom

2010

(ranking/

mark)

Gender

Inequality

Index

2011

Food

Import

Dependency

2008

Morocco 3 .9 3.4 4.9 95/ 8.38 .5 %

Algeria 96 4.3 .9 35.3 33/47.33 .4 9%

Tunisia 94 3.7 4.3 4.8 64/ 7.5 .93 9%

Mauritania 59 . .3 39 95/ 8.38 .65 %

Libya 64 . . . 6/ 63.5 . .


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hile the new Moroccan

constitution has

introduced significant

political reforms,

there are doubts as to

whether the content

and form of this reformwill calm the protest

movements.

. S, - z , , . , , , k . F, k . , A

. Y, PAzz Bk .

Morocco k , W

E U .3

I, - Y L. H, x k k, , , j N I H D.M , ,

A, L () W D P A F G M? Foreign Policy, M 3, .

A F G . IF G () A S A: E E C A Notes Internacionals CIDOB,3.3 S R A W: x M,Mediterranean Politics, , J , 9.

z. F E , x - - M F.4 I ,K M VI M 9 , J , N5. F x, J D P, I , . W x

, j , z Az , . H , z, - , M , k , M- W S,

,q, k .5

4 F , x I . R E , k z M . F , D, () D :

z j MARI85/, M: R IE.5 A M O, .S; O, M () N M C:R C M S?, Commentary CarnegieEndowment for International Peace, J , .


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I 3, G Libya W M D , U.S. E A Q.6 L .7H, -F,G Jamahiriya . k L , E .8

R G , UN S C R 973 - z .9 z , L , k . L

6 S, , J, G & P, E ()L F P: D Oj, W, G M F U S; B,G (8) P W M D: C L International Relations, , . 5-6;Z, Y (7) U S & L: FC - R G F B, A, Les Etats-Unis et le Maghreb Regaindintrt, A: CREAD, 5 - 5 Mz, L (6)L, MediterraneanPolitics, , , . 5-65.7 P, E () M : L, The Journal of North African Studies, 6, , .5-3.8 G , , M E

. H E .9 S k , () k L A J, Bz, x L R 973() S C 6498 , M 7, .

: , , z k L - .

Mauritania M , , 5 8, . , MO A Azz, 8

9 .S F , . M .3 L, S , . P k z q. Y, M

A . , A-Q M, A, M.3 U, Nk A-Q, j k .3 , , j M .

3 L, K M Arab ReformBulletin, M 8, .3 A A, L () L M , Notes Internacionals CIDOB, . 9.3 O M M, , AQMI k M J.

The new Libya face

enormous challeng

to hold the country

together, and the

disarmament and

demobilization of th

militias.


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A . European Union z . EU EN P . B . , EU k,

, x.33 I S, EU SPRING P (S P,R, I G) , -, , 35. A E , L, k

, E U - .

S E W M .34France, B

33 S, , , N () EU A S: A (M?) O R E N P, EuroMeSCoBrief, . B, R () A S, C M, EU: S S? European Policy Center brief, J ; S L, E & V, E () R EN P: A k Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 36; B: CIDOB.34 S A, R . () S E M: N A P, M P S, GMFUS/IAI.

A , , , L , M G8 , k $4 A .Italy z x, F A M, FF, k x I L.35 W I

q L, I j NAO L, I MP A . Spain, M, E . , P, , ,

L. I M, S .S F I , S q .

W S E : )

k ; ) 35 S F C S, F 3, L: F, x. E [ -: ://../MAE/EN/S_S/ANz/A///4_L_z_.]

The EUs response

reflects the structural

roblems of a European

Union self-absorbed

in the management of

the effects of its own

conomic and financialcrises.


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A E ; 3) k . H, , S I, .

I , , - A x,

N A z . ,, , , ( x) z, - .

M U S, EU, EU F, I, S . S, A , , , , , k M.

The Arab uprisings

a window of opport

to revise security

strategies, to redef

the relation betwee

security, stability, a

democracy, to dissonational security fr

the regimes securi

and to reformulate

accordingly security

political dialogue a

security cooperatio

frameworks in the

Mediterranean.


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T W M , , . I M,

, , . S, EU S E . S , , , , .

The Struggle Between Democratic

and Reactionary Forces

S J , M x : B A ;M A k , x ; M z

z; , L -G z .

, , . M

. I -, :

;

;

k j ;

.

I -, - :

, , I , , j AKP k;

;

q -

;

, ;

;

x ,

, .

- k. M x; z

Drivers o the New Decade4

The coming years

will lay the ground for

the formation of new

political systems, for

egional cooperative or

competitive dynamics,

nd for the resolution oreterioration of regional

conflicts.


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. I , . Lk, A W M. S, E x - .

I M, E, A W, z . , , - M, A, . G z - .O z k ,k, ,

R acquis. z B A Mk, , .

Regional Stability and Prospects

for Integration

C ? W k W

M ? L, W S R A z M . A

W M , M S z .

- L , , L . F, , x E.36 S, k , q

, A.37 , L k . F, S E (F, I, S) L, L j N-S W M.

x k W S : ? C P k 99 - k M?C S M- k L? H M

36 F G, A Jz (J 5, )

L , j z: , k -Q I M x L $ L L .37 S B, A () Op cit, . -3.

The persistent

mobilization of a

generation that

succeeded in

overthrowing Ben A

and Mubarak, but

also their capacityto endorse political

compromises, will

determine whether

democratic forces

withstand the offen

of authoritarian an

reactionary sectors


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S? WA k P? C P ?

F , M z.R S , -

k. M S . I , M , , z .

Y, - , - . O , , A, rapproachment A M.38 I, K , xM z 994.39 O , E x z -

38 98, A M-A

987 - ( Z 988, U AM q P M, z 99 -).39 M K A.Al Arabiya. J 3, (A ://..///7/3/65. )

S .4

I x M S. M S N A (C M) k j M . k M R x,

M . I , S z .

Overcoming the European Crisis

I EU, 8 , k E . A - E, E M U, E,

E EU j.

D x , EU . I , , k , j E. E k. EU

q

4 S F Dk, L S M S . F , - M S .

Morocco relies on the

me factor, its domestic

olitical reform process,

and international

fears for regional

destabilization to

strengthen its positionin the Western Sahara

conflict.


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E . R , , EU, . U, .

E

, SM. N A E k,, k E . B k, S E z , N A q. P

x .A , - -kE S M.

I , EU , - , , SM . k EU,

. A - EU - M, -, , .

Troubled Neighborhoods

A , W M k S M E. I , z A Q IM j W

M k N, M, C. O L z .4 A k W A, G G S E, j j

.O q z S 4 O-M, M M () MF A Q I M, GCSP Policy Paper,5, M .

Figure 1: Area of Activity of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

Source: Agence France Press

The effects of an

unresolved Europe

crisis can have a

global impact but

its effects could be

particularly strong

neighboring regionincluding the South

Mediterranean.


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q, q -, j , A M. A , x .4

A M E, A-I A , M. A

M E, k I, N A . P I

4 C, D & F R () A Q I M (AQIM): I A R I R IAI Wk P, /7 (A).

, , . M, z P q k , , . I , P P .

A Shifting Regional Balance of Power

I A S,

E, S A, k, I .S C D 978 I 979, M E - -W I- . . W k E M M,

.

E k - -P I.43 SA - G S B. W A , S

G C C43 S, , H, O N E ,Al Masry al Youm, A ; N, H E Al Masry al Youm, M 3, ; B-M, A E , The Jerusalem Post, M, ,Bk B H E ?Al Jazeera, J 9, ,

Figure 2: Cocaine Seizures

in North-Western Africa

Source: World Drug Report 2011, UNODC

As has happened

before, the terrorist

threat also could be

exploited to induce

international actors

to be less demanding

about democraticreforms.


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(GCC) J M.44S x, M,M-M OM, SA k

A - .45k, M E, A .46 Ak

k AKP , I x

44 E-K, M () G C CE: G R, Notes InternacionalsCIDOB, 33, (B: CIDOB).45 W S A S?, The Washington Note,J 4, .46 A k A ( , Gk, N E N: C kI? G M F U S On Turkey,M 5, ) , k z C W CA R M E ( Ak, M(5). k M Dz ME,Arab Studies Quarterly, 7, -. .-7.

.47 M,k

E-k x , , Bk S N V S.48 I, ,

47 I K, k , Todays Zaman M 3 k A S, , k A, M B E, -N M , H P A

E , k . K A k k , k48 k E . The New York Times S 8, (A: ://..//9/9///k-------.?=).

Figure 3: Migrants Smuggling Routes from Africa to Europe

Source: Migrant smuggling routes from Africa to Europe. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Organized

Crime and Irregular Migration from Africa to Europe Report, 2006

Turkey, a country

that has rediscover

its Middle Eastern

neighbours, is often

described as a mod

or as a source of

inspiration for Arabcountries.


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, S z j . D A x I z , k I x .49

A , M E M.

I , A M 96.H, M GCC, k N A, Iz , S A A M , E-S .5

The EU and the United States:

Readapting or Resetting Policies?

U S E , A S, z . , S

49 M A S F I ( F F) Council on Foreign Relations, A 7, .5 N, B E-S A A A O-, J 6, . B &Mk A(FIIA B , 76, M ) A C W - G .

L . N, ,, -.

EU x , , - , , , . , EU , S E , EU

M .C EU, x , EU k -k k .D E S M, EU

- - M. I, EU .

U S k , .5 k -A , E A , U.S. ,

W H, q z O 9 U.S.-A . H,U.S. , M, k

5 Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North AfricaM 9, .

The effects of this

reconfiguration of

regional alliances and

the changing spheres

f influence of the main

regional powers are

more profound in theMiddle East than in the

Maghreb.


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, M E .

U S , , : ) M EC (P U.S. ), )

U.S. , 3) I I .

Global Trends, Regional Effects

z x . A , , , , , k WM .

I , A .

A x k E .5 A , E M , E k x k .

I , k NA ( 3). P k A.Cq, x ( ) .

5 I M F. R E Ok.M E C A, M 9.

Table 3: Food Price Index (1990-2011)

Source: FAO, 2011

75

100

125

150

175

200

225

2011

2010

200

9

200

8

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

Foodp

ricei

ndex

The impact of the r

of food prices and

the popularization

new communicatio

tools during the 20

uprisings are two te

and recent examplehow global trends a

regional dynamics.


25/63


E- , z .U j , . I , x L A

z - M.I , k .

I , j (- k A).

z . - Fk A Jz

. Y,

k .

A , xz M

. C ,-x , , .53 I S , x, , . ,

M A, x , , - .

F, , U S E W M. - BRICS .54 C A -

53 A -x

MEDSEC Environment andSecurity Issues in the Southern Mediterranean Region -: ://..///__.]54 S, : M, R & W, E (New Players in the Mediterranean, M P S,W: G M F; BRIC N A: C N G?

AfDB; North Africa Quarterly Analytical, .

Table 4: Internet Data (Per 100 Inhabitants)

Source: World Bank, International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

Country 2000 2005 2010

Algeria .49 5.84 .5

Morocco .6 5.8 49Libya .9 3.9 4

Tunisia .75 9.66 36.8

Mauritania .9 .67 3.

Table 5: Facebook Data (2010)

Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

Country Population Users Penetration

Algeria 34,895, 878,66 .4%

Morocco 3,85,74 ,767,38 5.6%

Libya 64, 43,96 .%

Tunisia ,486,339 ,554,76 4.9%

Mauritania . . .

High energy prices are

a necessary condition

to allow rentier states

to maintain heavily

subsidized policies

and appease social

tensions.


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M .55 Y,

Bz-A j,56 R-A ,57 S A I M .58 O BRICS , , N A x ( 6).

55 L, F (7) L C A, Rk. M , . 45-55.56 A, S & N, J (9) L B, ?, Futuribles, 359, . 3-9.57 A - R : P M,LExpression, A 7, 6; A-R : U , El Moudjahid, O 6, 58 A M W, (op. cit, . 9), I M .

W M :

; (.. k ); , , E U.S. .

Figure 4: Desertification in the Mediterranean

Source: MedSec

The United States

and Europe are no

longer the only gam

in town in the West

Mediterranean. The

so-called BRICS are

broadly regarded anew players in the

region.


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Table 6: North African Export Trends to the BRICS

Source: African Development Bank (AfDB), The BRICs in North Africa: Changing the Name of the Game? AfDB; North Africa QuarterlyAnalytical, n.1, p. 3


28/63


D , ,

x, A S. A M , x [] .59I, k x .

. W M . O,

, q, . W , .

A dream-world scenario WM ,, . A , . L x, . I , k AKP x, j . M, z.S

.

N M -

59 M, A () A S, E S,BEPA monthly brief, 46, . .

j .D , W S , x, - x . S M A, x j j, - . M

W . N-A .6C N A S , .

I , E , , . N M , ,

, - M. E U , U S, N A -. S -A - -z , -- , -x,, j -

j. I , U S, EU, N A ,

6 Maghreb Regional and Global Integration: A dream to befulfilled, P I G E, WDC, O 8.

Scenarios or the WesternMediterranean in 20205

A dream-world sce

consists of the Wes

Mediterranean

becoming an area

prosperity, freedom

stability.


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j , , , A .

A nightmare scenario, , S R W M . , M

Table 7: Western Mediterranean, Road to 2020/Certainties and Uncertainties on

the 2020 Western Mediterranean Road

Relative Certainties Uncertainties

J j M

C I

S

I k S M

D z M E

E

F M

S E M

G

I

C/F

P/Ex I

R -

R , ,

A

Sz L -

R W S

D/I M- A

S M

S , E M

R x E

S E

S E I M

E W M

W

5+5, UM NAO M D

U.S. N A M E

E

O


30/63


E A , . B I, , . M A ; k , , ;L , z

, A;M . Ex I SA N A S M.

( ) z , , - . A-M, W S( S M- ), , , M

S, - / M ( M Bk), A ( K), L( ).A

- . k. , , x , E.

I , E , . P x

, E k, k E U. I - , E .E M . Cq, , E, .

M A .

F, mixed z ,k , z , EU U.S. . I , , x, .

L, A, M M .

A nightmare scena

on the contrary, im

that the Southern

Rim of the Western

Mediterranean cou

become a new arch

crisis.


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, W S , L S j . B , . I-M , x , , ,

. H, .

W , EU U.S. A S k, , , N A. E ,

S E k. B , E , x, EU : , z . A , k M

A L A .

mixed scenario would

be characterized by

disparate political

volutions in the region,

deadlocked regional

integration, frozen

conflicts, and limitedansformative influence

of EU and U.S. policies.


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Table 8: Scenarios for Western Mediterranean 2020

Key Drivers Nightmare Scenario Mixed Scenario Dream-World Scenario

Struggle between

democratic and

reactionary

forces in the

Maghreb

-

Nx

S

O

I , S,

x

-

S L, A,

M

D

I

R z

D

Regional stability

and prospects for

integration

L , z

S MA, W

S,

C

N M S

L

W S

D

L

M S

R z L

V W S

D A-M

R

M R

EU Crisis

C E

P

R x

N

E(z SE)

E

S ( SE)

A EU

E

I

A


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Troubled

Neighborhoods

S -

S I-P z

M

S

S q ME

S x

P ME P P

Shifting regional

balance of power

(Egypt, Turkey,

Saudi Arabia,

Iran)

V / N A

B N A

R N A

EU and U.S.

policies towardsNorth Africa and

the Middle East

EU N A

U S

M E

S-

Lk EU U.S.

EU U.S.

EU US j -

D-zM


34/63



Global Trends

S -

F

N

S ,

O

W

S

M

E (.. )

M A L A

G

Sz

N

E M

M


35/63


W

M? O, , z , , ? , , , , . B ,

x , .

, L

, WM . , , , , I , , - , , k

, x.R EU, x ,

, z k .

EU U S , , M, W M , , . q

, ,

EU, U S, , , ,

Conclusions and Policy Implicationsor the ransatlantic Community6

OIL AND

FOOD

PRICES

INTERNATIONAL

FINANCIAL CRISIS

ENVIRONMENTAL

DEGRADATION

EFFECTS

EMERGING POWERS

IN A MULTIPOLAR

WORLD

INFORMATION AND

COMMUNICATION

TECHNOLOGIES

POLITICAL

TRANSITIONS

Social

demands

Civil-military

relations

New forms

of radicalism

Ethnic and

communitarian

tensions

Authoritarian

resilience

Islamist

parties

Ongoing

reforms

Constitutional

pacts

TROUBLED SAHEL

SHIFTING

REGIONAL

BALANCE

OF POWER:

Egypt,

Turkey,

Saudi Arabia

and Iran

EU/US

POLICIES

EU CRISIS

MIDDLE EASTCONFLICTS

SPILL-OVER

EFFECT

OF LYBIAN

CONFLICT

WESTERN

SAHARA

CONFLICT

SPANISH

MOROCCAN

TERRITORIAL

DISPUTES

ALGERIA

MOROCCO

RELATIONS

Figure 5: Factors Defining Western Mediterranean Security

and Cooperation Dynamics

Source: CIDOB

The successes or

frustrations of ongoing

transitions and reform

rocesses are the most

crucial factor in the

nfiguration of Western

Mediterranean securityand cooperation

dynamics for 2020.


36/63


. S, EU , - M EU . F E M .

D , EU U S

z, , . I , k k, k , , , j .

k k , , z , , . A k .

I L - , - L, , , z,

. A k L, UN-, z A U A L, EU .

M, , M , W M E-M -A ,

x L. N EU U S M . I , U M,NAO M D, 5+5D W M

. A M A . I z ME N A . A status quo ante . W

A E , , - .

Despite its pressing

internal difficulties

the EU and the Uni

States still have som

margin of maneuve

contribute to politic

stabilization, democonsolidation, and

economic dynamis

the region.


37/63

he Eastern Mediterranean and the Gul Region in 2020:Alternative Scenarios orthe Regional Security Environment

D. T DkD-G, H F E & F P


38/63


T E M j G z ,

H.A P-I , Iq, I , S Y, , M z , , , .

EM G , M E, C W, 9/ U.S. Iq A. A x

. I x, k

, : q

x ( , , - I , , );

(C, I) (R) x- M, (k, I);

Introduction1

EU U S M;

q z , x, .

A , , ( I-P/A , K , C), ,

I , Iq U.S. , A .

x z x . x . G, E M, M E j

M. I x, F B M ? D M x , -, , M E, Bk, ?W x , j . A , - : E M (Mq), , WM (M), . S M - .I , k x M, E W, , j P G, /C A, -S A, H A.

The Arab revolts wi

probably cause an

exponential increas

in the regions vola

and unpredictability


39/63


k .

A k , k ( - , / , , ) .

, k 3 x:

D 4 : E, k, I,S A, I;

k : ) I-P/A ;) I G ; ) K Iq k; ) ;

F , B Bz . H

x k x , . (B Bz, P, States and Fear. An Agenda forInternational Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. NYk, 99, . 94).3 A M D D,C D C, . (Global Strategic Trend - Out to2040, S P, UK M D,4 , J , . 6) F NAO, . (Future Security Environment (FSE) 2025, SA C, , Nk, V, J7, . ) J Lj

. (J Lj,C B F -3: S F A D P, Defense & Security

Analysis, V. 7, N. , J , . 49).4 D , , . (R C, EH, P K (.), The Pivotal States, W.W. N &C, N Yk, 999, . 4).

H : ) W ; ) x ; ) j ;

C x-: U S, EU, R, C, I. Cq , ;

S : ) z , -, ; ) ( z); ) ( /); ) (,); ) / (-S A); ) z. D ()-() ;

G (.. I I ; ; j; j -- ; , .)

A z , :) H (

); ) H ( ); 3) E( ).

here is an obvious link

with global trends and

changes.


40/63


[Relevant] Global rends*

T x k U.S.

,5 U S primus inter

pares, C ( j US x ), I, J, EU, . I ,

q . A G7/8 G, k G (US C). CHIMERICA U S C z .6 A , modus vivendi . A

, M E.

,7

5 BRIC(S) ( Bz, R, I, C, S A) G S . , , .6 Strategic Trends 2011: Key developments in global affairs (.D Mk, : M H, P M,D Mk, R P), C S S, EHZ, , . .7 D , ( k, ,-z , , , []k, ( Lj, .49-5).

[ ].8 x. N , RP/ , , , .

D . G 7 k x 8 5. I -, 98.4 k , x j: I, C ( ),9 Pk, N,B, I. A , , E,

8 EU I S S (EU-ISS), Global Governance2025: At a Critical Juncture, P, , . ; R H -, , - . ( Lj . 54).9 C . xC 975; 35 C . (, .7) HBj z , ? (N E, D I,Foreign Affairs, V. 89, N. 6, N/D , . 59)F , Jk A.G, N P B. F M W C W, Foreign Affairs, V. 89, . ,J/F , . 3-43. FSE 5, . 65; EU-ISS, . 5; E x , -S A, B Pk k (E, . 56).

2

Ambitious regional

powers will cause

turbulence and ten

in various parts of t

world, the Middle E

included.

* NAO . Cq, () (FSE 5, . ). A DCDC, (Global Strategic Trends- Out to 2040, . 6).


41/63


. 44 5.

A 98 34 E 33 J, 3 47 E, 5 J, 39 U S ( 37 ). A , M E, x, ( I 7 3).3

O k

(, , k ). , x k [ .6 k q ]. B 5, 3 , -OECD .4 W - . D 8,43 x .5 I J R.

, , , , . A , , - .6 x Fk . F,

J C. G, G & Ez F,

2010 State of the Future, M Pj, WD.C., , . 4. C C & J G (.), Global Forecast 2011.International security in a time of uncertainty, CSIS, . 4.3 FSC 5, . 65.4 EU-ISS, . 53; 2010 State of the Future, . 4 & 4.5 C & G, . 6.6 Ibid, . 48.

, - x k x.

A , , x , k, . G q k k

.

7

Exk,-- k, x 8 z .9 S .

E , , . -x , q , k , . H, x ,, .

A , . : M E, N7 EU-ISS, . 9.8 C & G, . 4.9

S x, P. W. S, Wired for War. The RoboticsRevolution and Conflict in the 21stCentury, P P,N Yk, 9. U.K. P O S ,

Adapting to climate change in developing countries, O6, . . J P & P O, S I C C, The Washington Quarterly, 3:, W7/8, . 5-6.

Environmental issues

will increasingly affect

economic, social, and

political developments

throughout the world.


42/63


A, S z, S A, CA, A (j , B, Pk,I, C) P, L A( A Az) C, G Mx, A.

G A C G C, World inTransition: Climate Change as a Security Risk, B, 7, . 7;D G Z, ClimateChange and Security Challenges for German DevelopmentCooperation, E, A 8, . 7; Climate Change and

International Security, P H R E C E C (S3/8),4 M 8, . 6-8.


43/63


Domestic Developments and Foreign Policies

of Pivotal Regional States: Egypt, Turkey,

Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran

T A k ( x E,

k Mk x, ). z (

x q ) . A E S , WM : S RS C A U, A , , , , , ,

.3

A A , M E z , x . C , , S S A I. L- ,

, q W A ( )

3 E S I L, The Western Mediterranean in 2020:Scenarios for regional security and cooperation after the Arabuprisings, GMFUS, , 6.

. A k 4 zM.

Egypt k 5 A . E M E.6 I, E ,

-- W I, I ,

. B E A, G , SA S S I. I , , E . , E .7

Iran M E.I , S Hz, j ; ; . H,

4 I , , , / (N , State (un)Sustainability inthe Southern Mediterranean and Scenarios to 2030: The EUsResponse, MEDPRO P P . /A , . 3).5 A N , M E E . I -A k I k (, . 7).6 C & G, . 64 & 66.7 I k .

Main Drivers in the Middle East3

As a result of the Arab

revolts, todays Middle

East can be compared

to a seismic faultline

which will continue to

produce tremors of

unpredictable size invarious parts of the

region, at least for the

next few years.


44/63


3, I x . I A , z k .F, W, , x Hz H, I. I x

x ( ), . , x I , q -k . Q I , : k k ;

, , V- q( j) ; I -- , I, W, k ( ) E.

A Israel ,

O A( , U.S.-I U.S. ), N P

k I .8 A E ( J)

-- I W. F I -: ) P , k , k I x , .. (

M I P x) ) I ( A I).

K A Saudi Arabia , ( z).

A H S /, x . U B SA GCC , - . D I S A , B . A , W , q

I . S A k x ,

8 A Kz S B k I (A Kz & SB, I R Sk in Strategic Survey forIsrael 2011, INSS, -A, , . ).

King Abdullahs

succession in Saud

Arabia will not

necessarily be a

smooth process, an

the country has alr

been faced with sosocial tension.


45/63


x E (A) k , C (, x, I) S x W.

Turkeys - z . P A D,

AKP ,q k O x/ k ME, Bk, . UAk , ( ) M ( -x I ).

S q AKP k I- K - k , , W ( k?). k -x (..

j), . j k k W , EU ,

E k . Kq k E I x k , I, k , K .

Regional Conflicts

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

P , I-P ,

, , M E. I , , M j j(). :

. A - (C-D

[], , S P I, GI, .). A M F (MNF) . P I, S, L x

Important Variables for

the Palestinian Problem

L Hz I ( S?)

S

H

U.S.

D I ( x )

If not resolved in a

mutually acceptable

and viable manner,

[the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict] will continue

to cause tension and

suffering in all partiesinvolved, and to be

used by radicals in

the Muslim world as a

stifying cause for their

jihad(s).


46/63


M E P . - [] ;

. C status quo. A k ;

3. S . F , P k x , k I ,

. S 3 M E , I.

Gulf Security29

R I , W I . G M E q x: , ,

. Wk, , (Iq,L, P) -x k E, k S A, , I.3 B G , Iq Y, GCC I, U.S. , GCC 9 F G , The GCCCountries and the World: Scenarios to 2025. x ( F G, S, O) q: () () .3 A, D, C, S, F, S & S,Azz,Middle East Perspectives, G P N.4,G C S P, G, 8.

.

O Iq. U.S. Iq . A , Iq . O :

Important Variables for Stability in Iraq

k K N Iq;

I Iq;

D U.S. ;

D I S A

The Kurdish Issue

K

. 5 3 , k, Iq, I, S. K . K N Iq j k q . I j .D k K

Iq, Ak K K k K. , x, K I S.

Regional security

problems are not li

to the Iranian nucle

issue, although this

perceived by Weste

countries and some

of Irans neighborsbeing the most pre

security concern.


47/63


Iq , ( K ), I . , -W, -W. Iq ;

Iq . K jde facto , de

jure Iq. I , . -W. Iq q ;

Iq . K , - . I -W,

I . A K / K ( k).

New Types of Conflict

I , ME. F x, ( N -/ ), S-S ,

- .3

Hard Security Threats/Risks

WMD Proliferation

D I q . AI x, I N ,

3 S x, G D, Climate Wars, O,Ox, . A, J Mz, Climate Conflict, IISS/R, .

Figure 1: Areas of Physical and Economic Water Scarcity

Dealing with Irans

nuclear file is

undoubtedly the

most critical strategic

question in the

proliferation field and

a very important issuen todays international

security agenda.


48/63


.

k q I q . I , , k x k -k. z I , ,

. z, I , E, S A, k ( ) .3 A q k , I

k q . O Iz k k.

I.I q I - k k-k. q I z

I, I , / W 3 C B , , I k SA, E x 4 I . (C B, Rethinking Iran: From Confrontationto Cooperation, C P , A 8, EU-ISS,P).

. I I ? A k , ,

I.R H q I . A I - ? A k U S, E, I, I ?

C x I q . I

- (NWS) , , k x NWS . , , . W x ,

Important Variables

R G

D I k GCC

S P A key issue remain

of course, whether

deterrence will be

sufficient to ensure

restraint in the cas

Iran.


49/63


. O , .33

( ) . k -k C3I -- q

. A k , k .

W I z? I I , q ( ), q k z. I , , k ?

( ) :

. P I . I . A, I q

33 A E K (K, E(.), Israel and a Nuclear Iran. Implications for Arms Control,Deterrence and Defense, M 94, INSS, J 8) I z x k , z I , . k I I , x, , , .

, , W I , ;

. I ( U.S. ?) z I . H G I . I ;

3. z, I q .U I I. A , . z.

R , I (CW) CW SCUD

B . I x (BW) , , BW . S VX. BW R& D . I, . I CW E.

M F, S S

However small the

risk of each individual

scenario may be, one

ould also consider the

umulative risk of all the

ossible dangers arising

from assumed nuclearproliferation.


50/63


x .34

Iq (A-A A-H) - . A , SCUD-B -C, I k S-3 , NK , , k.A IISS M B, S 94+ FROG, SS-, SCUD B/C/D , x 85 . I ,

x J , k 5, k.

O 7 (4 , E, I, I, S) 75, - , k. A , - : q, , q

.35

, I A - , U.S.- PARIO , NAO x ( I ).

34 I , . I , q q

. G W, NBC .35 D G, H A C-M, Survival, V. 4, N. , S 998, . 93 & 95; MkS, A M P G L& Bk S (), Fighting Proliferation - EuropeanPerspectives, C P N. 66, EU-ISS, P, D3, . 6-8.

Military Expenditures and the Possibility

of a Conventional Arms Race

S 96, q A-I , M M E GNP q . I -99, , q. D x

4 -9 9 $3 . N, z GCC .

W x I, k,S M j ( ), k - k . W x, -- ,

, , C4I , , , . .A W , M M E q S U/E . A k M M E,I

q R, C, N K,

With the exception

Israel, and perhaps

Turkey, Southern

Mediterranean stat

do not have a powe

projection capabilit


51/63


. I ,- , , - . x x .36

A , M M E ,

z . I q q x q ( ). I , , .

Jihadist Terrorism

A Q U.S. 9/ j . x j I x z , A-Q j z I 37 M I

36 q SIPRI Yk M B IISS. F q , Dk, A R M Med.2008, IEMED-CIDOB, B, 8,. 68-7.37 Strategic Trends 2011, . 9.

k .38

k O-L. , j x W.39 , , / M E, k q .

Changing Role and Influence of Extra-Regional

Actors: United States, EU, Russia, China,

and IndiaC M E . C - A G .4 R , I x k . F , C, x, I , U.S. . B

. A ,

C G , I N M A 9, C - G Pk4 5 S Hz, j k-C

38 W MC, A Q C, Foreign Affairs,S/O , . .39 S x, IISS, Strategic Survey 2011, . 5-53.4 I C 5

M E. C M E x - x- 3, 7 8 . j I q .(Strategic Trends 2011, . 5 & 64); Ez E, G C: C W C F P R,Foreign Affairs, V. 89, N. 6, N/D , .4.4 Strategic Trends 2011, . 65.

It is argued by several

analysts that Jihadist

terrorism should no

onger be perceived as

an existential threat to

Western security.


52/63


x . A , U S EU ( G, EU q , E M).4

O EU . I , EU , x , EU

. . EU . EU U k, M , . I , EU , N , -- M E. U M

, .N S M q k.

4 EU-ISS x EU : ) k , ) , 3) Ex, 4) : (EU-ISS, . 4-5). V Lj EU: ) EU , j U S. A , ; ) U U S; 3) U ;4) U ; 5) EUx z, ( Lj . 5). S , Project Europe 2030,Challenges and Opportunities, A E C R G F EU 3, M.

U S A M. I M . A, :

. U S P . I ,, M E M j ;

. U S P

G. I j , US ;

3. A U.S. R I . U S M E.

I ,

, , M E - W ( , ) j M E .

Soft Security Drivers

Demographic Trends and Population Movements

D E

z E , . I,E - k x 5 E . EU -

The wider Middle E

gradually evolving i

a multiplayer secur

system and the We

concept which prob

needs redefinition,

anyway) may have adjust to a new rea

where its influence

the Middle East wil

decline.


53/63


6 M, N A. I x N A M E

[] k EU G , , . NA M E j 4 99 5 .43 D z, , k j ( M M). , , .

43 G W, The Role of NATOs Mediterranean Initiative,G P, I., N Yk & L, , . .

Natural Resources

. O j . C - k, M

E . E ME , . I ,

j , k S-S N-S.44

I, q W ME x k .45

44 A I L , , , M x . I M - . I . (IL, Security and Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean,

ELIAMEP P P N 5, A, 5, . 4).45 A A C, M E x. (AC, Evolving Threats in the Middle East: TheirImplications for U.S. Defense Planning, ME A P H A SC, S 8, 5, . ).

Table 1: Populations of ajor Mediterranean Countries

Country 1960 2000 2025

Greece 8.3 .5 .France 45.7 58.8 6.8Italy 5. 58. 56.Spain 3.5 39.6 4.6Portugal 8.8 9.9 .Total Mediterranean North 43.5 76.7 77.9Morocco .6 3.7 47.5Algeria .8 3.7 5.8unisia 4. 9.8 3.4Libya .3 6.4 .9Egypt 5.9 64.8 93.5urkey 7.5 68. 9.9Syria 6.4 7 34Total Mediterranean South 87.7 3.3 346.

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 1993, World Development Report 1994

One of the most critical

geopolitical questions

haunting the West is

whether the Middle

East will be a reliable

supplier of oil and gas

ports at market drivenprices.


54/63


, . O , M E

x x. I , E , NAO ( EU) .

A

- . x z I C

S M E .

Climate Change

I , x , , , , , .46 -.47 I j M E , , - /.

46 W Bk 75-8 , , , 3, $75 $4 -

. EU $3 - (The State of theFuture 2010, . 67).47 W , , , (J P & P O, S I C C, The Washington Quarterly, 3:, W7/8, . 6).

Figure 2: Crude Oil (2007)

Table 2: Per Capita Availability of Water

Country 1990

(m3/per

capita/

year)*

2025

(estimate)

Algeria 75 38

Libya 6 6

Morocco , 68

Tunisia 53 33

Egypt ,7 6

Israel 47 3

Jordan 6 8

Lebanon ,6 96

Saudi Arabia 6 5Cyprus ,9 ,

United States 9,94 8,6

Canada 9,389 9,88*M q , 3/ /.

It is projected that p

of the Middle East

be affected by clim

change in terms of

desertification and

production, availab

of water resources,environmentally-ind

refugees/migrants.


55/63


Cyber-Warfare, Organized Crime,

and Maritime Security

A C H , C k , , C , C .48Cyber-warfare , , q M E, k. SUXNE I

48 P K, D L, D C, CYk, On Cyber Warfare, A C H R, N, . . S , R Ck & R Kk, CyberWar. The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do AboutIt, HC, N Yk, .

x , . O , - - z .

transnational organized

crime ( $5-9 ) .

q j

M E x . , k.

A S R S I O , , , maritime security,

EU . A , M M 5 , 5 , k

Source: Climate Change: Addressing the Impact on Human Security, ELIAMEP Policy Paper, May

2008, p. 61

Figure 3: Conflict Constellations in Selected Hotspots

Although it can be

argued that piracy in

the Southern Red Sea

and the Indian Ocean

is, for the time being,

more a nuisance than a

eal threat for maritimecommerce, there is

increasing concern

bout maritime security,

especially among EU

countries.


56/63


, , q .49 S - .

Fragile and Failed States

, , , zq j . I , k ( x, A /A-Q ). -S A .5 I , - , . I , S, . O ME , , Y, x, , ,

.5 A Gz. O ,

.

Globalization

Gz 5 q , x,

49 Maritime security in the Mediterranean: Challenges and policyresponses, SDA D , J , . .5 J Mz, Climate Conflict, .87-8.5 S, x, S P, Yemen and the Politics ofPermanent Crisis, IISS/R, Ox, J .5 IISS News, D , . 8.

.53

B C () G () z z M E: (I) (M E), . k , , , z.54 A z , (Fk, ,

, A-Jz, A-A) A S .

53 U MEDPRO j, S M 3 GDP 3 ( , 9 k I). R A & C S, What scenarios for theEuro-Mediterranean in 2030 in the wake of the post-Arab spring?, MEDPRO P P N. /O .54 B, The Pentagons New Map. War and Peace inthe 21stCentury, P, N Yk, 4, . 49 & 93.

The emergence of

fragile, unstable,

dysfunctional, or

failed states can ha

important destabili

consequences not

beyond their bordebut also in adjacen

regions.


57/63


T .W k ,

q . Ex , I I, ( I,

), j - q, k k , j ( x, - ), .O k .

Game Changers4

The Road to 2020

Relative Certainties Uncertainties

P

P E

P ,

N W

C q

M E A

R U S EU

I C(+I?)

J j (A S )

D

C : I-P ,K , Iq, I

L

P z*

S S A I

R I -W

* R H k (R H, A S , Financial Times, J 6, ).


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Three Scenarios for Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East in 20201

Key Drivers Hell Earth Heaven

Domestic

developments and

foreign policies of key

regional states: Egypt,

Turkey, Israel, Saudi

Arabia, Iran

V / k

, k

S , , k -W

Regional conicts: 1)

Israeli-Palestinian/

Arab conict; 2) the

Iranian problem and

security in the Gulf

region; 3) the Kurdish

issue and resulting

problems of stability

in Iraq and Turkey; 4)

new conicts

S I-P;

L G ; Iq k;

k K ;

W , , .

C q P;

H G ;

k Iq q;

K ;

W , ,

V P;

D G;

Iq K ;

N

Hard security threats:

1) WMD proliferation;

2) conventional arms

race; and 3) terrorism

I z;

N ;

Q q zq;

R J

Cz I k; I ;

H x ;

J

P I ;I ;

L x;

J

A R A & C S:. Iz E-M . S EU-M U ( k k )3. E-M (k )4. S - EU-M - ( ) (A & S . ).


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Changing role and

inuence of extra-

regional actors: United

States, EU, Russia,

China, India, GCC,*

and NATO

EU ( )x;

United States I

; China

G ;

Russia India W ;

Lk x ; Z

- ; C ;

Oz kNATO GCC

EU: B (.. );

United States I P ;

G Chinese ;

L Russia India; ;

L NATO GCC

EU NP -- M E;

United States P

M E; W-

j :China, Russia,

India W ;

GCC

Gulf;

NATO P G

* GCC J M j C. A, IISS, GCC A (IISS, S S , . 58).


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Soft security drivers:

organized crime,

cyber-warfare,

maritime security;

demographic trends

and population

movements

impact of climate

change on already

fragile ecosystems

natural resources failed/dysfunctional

states

pace and impact of

globalization

Oz ,-, ;

Mj ;

S ;

M E ;

S q ;

S / ;

N

Oz ,-, ;

P EU;

U (, );

N /;

Gz

Oz ,-, ;

A N & S k;

S ;

E ;

M ;

N /

; N

k-z


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J j k

. F, - q, , k x . W , , k (x ,, j x

) ME . R , , x, , . I .

I, x - q. I , q : W

? W U S, EU, NAO, z ? A ?F, k /j ?

A

, :

A . F

E U S;

S, , , - M M E S E ( - M , , ).

EU U ;

R P ;

W j I , . O

;

I k , G. B . I x, x- ;

I ,

( ) ;

I x G , k

Conclusion5


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I , , q G M E.

M E .


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Mediterranean 2020: The Future of Mediterranean Security and Politics