Marines Spetsnaz Russian Special Forces

8/7/2019 Marines Spetsnaz Russian Special Forces

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FMFRP 3-201

Spe t snaz

U.s. Marine CorpsP N L 1 4 0 U 5 5 L U 1 U U


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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine CorpsWashington, DC 20380-000118 January 1991

FOREWORD1. PURPOSEFleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 3-201, SPETSNAZ, is published to ensure the dissem-ination of useful information which is not intended to become doctrine or to be published in Fleet MarineForce manuals. FMFRPs in the 3-200 series are a special category of publications: Material about contem-porary military organizations and operations.2. SCOPEThis publication was written from a number of unclassified sources dealing with one Soviet organizationknown as SPETSNAZ. The information deals with this organization's mission, organization, tactics, equip-ment, and chain of command. The information presented is pertinent in hostilities with forces employingSoviet-style organizations, doctrine, tactics, or techniques. Marine leaders at all levels are encouraged toreview this material and to apply the knowledge to Marine operations in the future.

3. CERTIFICATIONReviewed and approved this date.BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

.1 ;:._ ,! I. . ...) I t . f. /f-tdi, tt(M. P. CAULIdELDMajor General, U.S. Marine CorpsDeputy Commander for WarfightingMarine Corps Combat Development CommandQuantico, Virginia

DISTRIBUTION: 14U055LUIUU


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SPETSNAZ

TABLEOFCONTENTSPage

1001.Introduction 11002.RolesandMissions 31003.Historical Background 51004.Tactics 8Before War 8After War's Outbreak 9Mode of Attack 11

1005.OperationsinAfghanistan 13Long-Range Patrolling 14Joint Operations with Militia 14Convoy Protection 151006.Operationsvia Minisubmarines 151007.Operationsin the FarEast 171008.SPETSNAZAgents 181009.SPETSNAZCover 201010.Organization 231011.Personnel 281012.Training 321013.Weapons 36

1014.Coordination 37Deep Reconnaissance Companies 37Front Air Assault Brigades 38Airborne Divisions 381015.ResultsJustify Cost 38

1016.Chainof Command 391017.WesternCountermeasures 411018.Conclusions 42

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SPETSNAZ

soviet special purpose forces have manynames--reydoviki (raiders), diversionarytroops, and reconnaissance-sabotagetroops--but they are most popularly knownas SPETSNAZ. The acronym is derived fromthe Russian "spetsialnoye naznachenie,"meaning "special designation" or "specialpurpose." Several articles aboutSPETSNAZ have concentrated on theirsensational and glamorous aspects, suchas being sent on assassination missionsand masquerading in the West as athletes.This sensationalism with its focus onissues of relatively minor importanceimpedes the efforts of those who seek abalanced understanding of SPETSNAZcapabilities and limitations.

The Soviet Union maintains severalkinds of forces that are eitherspecifically structured for specialoperations missions or may be designatedfor them by the soviet Supreme HighCommand. Committee for State Security(KGB) Border Guard troops, Ministry of

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1001. Introduction


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Internal Affairs (MVD) Internal securitytroops, and airborne troops are allsometimes called SPETSNAZ. The currentand former Warsaw Pact allies of thesoviets have similar forces. In thispublication, however, "SPETSNAZ" refersonly to those select Soviet military menand women who are directly subordinate tothe Main Intelligence Directorate(Glavnoe Razvedyyatelnoe Upravlenie orGRU) of the Soviet General Staff and whocan conduct sensitive operations in enemyrear areas.

Stealth, surprise, and cold-bloodedsurgical strike are the tools ofSPETSNAZ. An even more ominous asset maybe our inability to see the threat in ourown background. The following shortaccount gives an excellent example.On the evening of 27 December 1979,during the preliminary stages of thesoviet invasion of Afghanistan, a team ofkillers besieged the palace of the

president of Afghanistan, HafizullahAmin, outside Kabul. The team was led byKGB Colonel Byeronov (head of the KGB'sterrorist-training school) and supportedby a company of SPETSNAZ troops.Moscow's orders were specific: "Thesecret of our action must be rigorouslyprotected. Do not let any person leavethe palace alive."* The palace guardfought with such ferocity that ColonelByeronov had to call in a second SPETSNAZcompany for reinforcement. By daybreak,the president had been assassinated.Almost all those inside the palace hadbeen killed.

One survivor, an Afghan captaintrained in the Soviet Union, succeeded inescaping the massacre. He reported thatlitheSPETZNAZ used weapons equipped withsilencers and shot down their adversarieslike professional killers."*

*Sources unavailable for attribution.

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This action, others like it, and thepotential for similar attacks on othertargets concern Western militaryplanners. The quality and numbers of theSoviet union's special purpose forcesrepresent a serious threat to Western,particularly NATO's, rear area securityand forward operation lifelines.

The very existence of GRU SPETSNAZ forcesis shrouded in secrecy and (leception.Secrecy achieves two desired results.First, it mlnlmlzes the informationavailable not only to the Soviet people,excepting only the highest-rankingmilitary officers, but also to the West.This is a definite advantage for unitswhose success in wartime clandestineoperations is based upon surprise.Second, under the truism that "a littlelearning is a' dangerous thing," smallbits of information released or publishedby Soviet defectors or Western writersare prone to exaggeration. Exaggerationbenefits Soviet propaganda anddisinformation efforts. Secrecy has beenso successful that, to date, much Westernknowledge of Soviet SPETSNAZparticipation in exercises and employmentin military interventions has been basedon conjecture after the fact. Articlesabout sabotage, combat swimmeroperations, and minisubmarines haveappeared in soviet military journals, butthey are all written about "Westerncapabilities."

SPETSNAZ forces conduct what theSoviets call "special reconnaissance"(spetsialnaya razvedka). The SovietMilitary Encyclopedia defines specialreconnalssance as: "Reconnaissancecarried out to subvert the political,economic, and military potential andmorale of a probable or actual enemy.The primary missions of specialreconnaissance are acquiring intelli-gence on major economic and military3

1002. Roles and Missions


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installations and either destroying themor putting them out of action; organizingsabotage and acts of subversion; carryingout punitive operations against rebels;conducting propaganda; forming andtraining insurgent detachments, etc.special reconnaissance is . . . conductedby the forces of covert intelligence andspecial purpose troops."within this broad definition, themain tasks of SPETSNAZ in war would be tooperate as small groups in the enemy rearto--1. Sabotage or disrupt key militaryfacilities and/or neutralize (through

assassination or kidnapping) political ormilitary personnel. This task is alsocarried out by the KGB.2. Gather and report intelligenceon vital targets, including fixed andmobile missiles, air defenses, airfields,port facilities, command and controlfacilities and lines of communication, aswell as on the means to deliver nuclearweapons. primary target emphasis wouldbe placed on enemy nuclear platforms.SPETSNAZ units would either locate themfor attack by other forces, or, ifnecessary, attack these targetsthemselves. The purpose would be toprevent the war from escalating to thenuclear level in the initial stages ofWestern retaliation to Sovietconventional attack.3. Prepare aircraft landing areasbehind enemy lines.4. Prepare for possible use ofchemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.5. Disrupt the enemy's powersystem, the most important targets beingpower stations, oil and gas storagecenters, pipelines, electric power lines,and transformer stations.SPETSNAZ units are not tasked,however, to engage in guerrilla warfare.

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SPETSNAZ probably grew from World War IIspecial.purpose groups. Their primarymission was to parachute into an area andform the nucleus of a partisan group tobe fleshed out with area residents.SPETSNAZ as we know them today wereprobably not formed until the midsixties,perhaps as a response to increased u . s .emphasis on unconventional warfare,exemplified by President Kennedy'ssupport for the u . s . Army Special Forces.SPETSNAZ troops have been deployedin several "peacetime roles" whichindicate their capabilities for wartimeemployment. Before the May 1968 invasionof Czechoslovakia, for example, areconnaissance-sabotage group attached to

the 103d Guards Airborne Division seizedPrague airport to enable the division toland. previously the SPETSNAZ officersand men had been familiarized with theairport and its defenses. They embarkedon a plane that claimed engine troubleand received permission to land atPrague. As the aircraft touched down andslowed, SPETSNAZ forces jumped out,seized guard posts, and helped a controlteam bring in the airborne division.They not only secured vital points untilrelieved by ground forces, but they alsoarrested Communist Party leader AleksandrDubcek and dispatched him, as a prisoner,to Moscow.

The success of the December 1979Afghan operation also hinged on tacticaldeception. Prior to the invasion,SPETSNAZ forces disguised as Sovietmilitary advisors had probably enteredAfghanistan. The presidential palaceassault force wore Afghan militaryuniforms; their vehicles had Afghanmarkings. Soviet military advisorsneutralized Afghan Army units whoseloyalty to the USSR was questionablethrough controlling the fuel supply andthrough deceptions. Examples are having

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1003. Historical Background


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these units turn over their ammunitionfor inventory or having them turn invehicle batteries for winterizing. Thus,in only a few hours, two SPETSNAZcompanies not only secured the airport,opening the runways to cargo planes andparachute assault brigades, but alsokilled the president of the AfghanRepublic, permitting his replacement,Babrak Karmal, a soviet-backed Afghanleader, to assume control.In the late 1960s and early 1970s,four-man SPETSNAZ teams entered vietnamclandestinely to test the then-newDragunov SVD sniper rifle in combat.Midget submarines which were withinterritorial waters of Sweden in October1982 and in Japan in August 1983 probablybelonged to naval SPETSNAZ. They mayhave been delivered to the target area byspecially equipped India-classsubmarines. Discovery of tracks from thesubmarines also coincided with reports ofunknown divers appearing on shore,leading to speculation that SPETSNAZ wereconducting penetration exercises inforeign countries. The true reasons for

these actions may never be known, buttheir boldness undeniably enhanced thereputation of SPETSNAZ.

Approximately 20,000 soviet militarypersonnel are stationed abroad, outsidethe Soviet bloc. Most of these aremilitary aid personnel centrallycontrolled by the General Staff Is MainDirectorate for Foreign MilitaryAssistance, but also complemented by GRUand KGB cadres. SPETSNAZ could be amongthese Soviet military advisors present insuch nations as Cuba, Vietnam, Libya,Peru, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Nicaragua,and Angola. It is believed that SPETSNAZare currently advising and traininginsurgents in Africa and possibly Cuba.

Any connection between SPETSNAZ andthe training of foreign terrorist groupsis murky. However, SPETSNAZ forces, by6


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virtue of their specialized training andpolitical reliability, could be logicalchoices as instructors of terroristcadres. Conjecture about SPETSNAZ linksto foreign terrorism is prevalent in thefree press. The New Year's Eve 1983demolition of the Cuscatlan Bridge in EISalvador is alleged to have beenconducted by freelance Italianmercenaries possibly trained by SPETSNAZpersonnel. Another source claims that inManagua at least 60 SPETSNAZ troopsworked closely with the Cuban GeneralDirectorate of Intelligence and theSandinista Interior Ministry. Sourcessay this SPETSNAZ unit has held jointtraining exercises with members of PuertoRican terrorist groups flown into Managuafrom Cuba. Some intelligence expertsspeculate that the increase insophisticated, apparently coordinated,and unsolved terrorist attacks againstU.S. installations in Europe indicatesSPETSNAZ involvement or training.However, any conclusions should betempered with caution and judgment.These assertions stem from free presssources and not from verifiedintelligence.

SPETSNAZ forces will probablyspearhead Moscow's future militaryoperations in local or global conflicts.In both Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan,SPETSNAZ forces operated under KGBsupervision, probably because the KGB wasalready operating in these areas andcould provide some specializedassistance. Experience suggests that theKGB is oriented toward peacetimepolitical-military and political-economicobjectives, while the GRU is directedmore specifically against an enemy'swarfighting capabilities. In wartime, asin the case of the SPETSNAZ forces whichoperated in Afghanistan, the GRU willcontrol and supervise special purposeforces. Particularly important acts ofterrorism, in peacetime as well as war,would be carried out by specially trainedgroups of foreigners--mainly of Asian7


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1004. Tactics

Before War

origin--who are under the direct controlof the GRU Central Apparatus.

SPETZNAZ missions depend on up-to-dateintelligence. This intelligence comesfrom the GRU which has a separatedepartment just for SPETSNAZ. Duringpeacetime, this department collectsinformation on targets and recruitsIIsleeperllabotage agents. In addition,it commands SPETSNAZ units.The Second Chief Directorate of each

front-level staff (a front is equal tothree or four armies) is responsible forproviding intelligence to its own forces.The Chief Directorate includes separatedepartments for reconnaissance, agent-derived intelligence, SPETSNAZ units,information processing, and signalsintelligence. Under the SPETSNAZdepartment are organized the SPETSNAZbrigade and a dedicated SPETSNAZintelligence unit.

SPETSNAZ IIsleeperllsabotage agents arenot ordinary intelligence agents. Theymight have no other mission than to waitfor the order to commit acts of sabotagein preparation for war. They might alsoacquire safe houses or transportation tosupport the eventual deployment ofSPETSNAZ teams. Besides sleepers, theSPETSNAZ intelligence unit also controls"legal" and lIillegalll agents forinformation collection. Legal agents areaccredited representatives of theirrespective countries (for example,military attaches or Aeroflotrepresentatives) who use their officialroles as covers to conduct intelligenceactivities. Illegal agents operate underdeep cover with no apparent connection to

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the country to which they are sendinginformation.Potential SPETSNAZ agents includesailors on board merchant ships on trips

to the West or truck drivers crossinginternational borders. A Europeancustoms agreement allows trucks marked"TIR" (Transport Internationaux Routiers)to cross borders with minimal customsformalities. These vehicles can, and do,travel near sensitive installations andthrough areas that are off limits toaccredited soviet military personnel.Before the outbreak of war, highly

skilled SPETSNAZ may penetrate enemyterritory. They may, for example, entera country in the guise of tourist groups,delegations, or sports teams or as crewsand passengers on merchant ships, civilaircraft, or commercial trucks.Furthermore, a certain number of SPETSNAZofficers and warrant officers may beposted to soviet embassies and consulatesin the guise of technical personnel,guards, gardeners, drivers, etc. On theeve of war, there may be a concentrationof SPETSNAZ units (on various pretextsand under various covers) in neutralstates to infiltrate into enemy territoryonce fighting has begun. Theinfiltration of SPETSNAZ personnel intoenemy territory is a very risky butnecessary operation especially if nuclearweapons are not being used. The purposewould be to prevent their use.

Massive clandestine infiltration ofSPETSNAZ personnel into enemy territorybefore the outbreak of hostilities wouldrisk possibly alerting enemy forces toSoviet mobilization. Therefore, mostSPETSNAZ teams would probably arriveafterward by fixed-wing Aeroflot aircraftor Mi-6 or Mi-26 helicopters, usingSoviet offensive air operations as cover.9

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The main SPETSNAZ will be droppedsimultaneously on all fighting fronts.Army independent companies will bedropped 100-500 kilometers, and frontbrigades 500-1,000 kilometers, in theenemy's rear. The professional "athlete"regiments will operate within range ofcapital cities, regardless of how farthese are from the front 1ne. Theabsence of heavy weapons and equipmentmakes it possible to use ordinaryAeroflot aircraft to deploy the SPETSNAZ.This in turn makes it possible toconcentrate all the efforts of militarytransport aircraft on backing upoperations by airborne forces.

On landing, the SPETSNAZ units willbury their parachutes before leaving thedrop zone. Their most dangerous threatat this moment is considered to be thehelicopter. After leaving the drop zone,several groups meet and organize adefended base in a safer area where allthe heavier equipment is left. They willmine the area around the base and settrip flares.The gr~ups then set about theirtasks, rang1ng over several tens ofkilometers from the base, leaving severalmen to watch the base from a distance.They will normally relocate the baseevery night. Equipment will be moved fromone hiding place to another. If the baseis discovered, its guards will be alertedby exploding mines and trip flares. Theywill then make their way to a rendezvouspoint to warn the returning groups ofdanger. If enemy transport is captured,

no base will be set up.Naval SPETSNAZ paratroops wouldinfiltrate by air drop in the same manneras ground troops or on naval variants ofthe Mi-24 helicopter. Others wearingscuba gear would most likely be insertedfrom small boats, fishing or merchantvessels, or minisubmarines launched froman India-class "mother ship" submarine.Their efforts will concentrate on naval10


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bases with priority on nuclear submarinesin port.Most SPETSNAZ teams will usecamouflage and avoid contact with enemypatrols. They will attack if ordered orwithout orders if a nuclear missile isreadied for firing. In that case, theteam will try to destroy the missile bysmall arms fire, and, if not successful,will mount an all-out assault. Since.SPETSNAZ commanders operateindependently, front headquarters keepscontact and interference to a minimum andrelies on the initiative and skill of theteam leaders. HQ maintains sufficientcoordination to keep teams out of the way

of other Soviet attacks.It is considered that SPETSNAZoperations can be successful only ifmassive numbers of them take placesimultaneously and if others--airbornetroops, naval infantry, air assaultbrigades, divisional deep reconnaissanceunits, KGB teams, and similar groups fromthe Warsaw Pact allies--are alsooperating in the enemy's rear areas.

The most complicated task of SPETSNAZunits is probably the search for targetsof special importance. Those targetswhose location is accurately known willbe destroyed by missiles or aircraft.SPETSNAZ units will have to deal withthose targets whose location is onlyroughly known. In the search for thesetargets, units will use electronicequipment or will deploy to the limit ofvisual contact before conducting a sweepon foot. During such a sweep, SPETSNAZwill move slowly and make use ofcamouflage. Should they meet the enemy,they will not usually engage in.combat.They will disperse and meet again atprearranged spots. Once the target isfound, they will establish communicationwith the army or front HQ and pass on the11

Mode of Attack


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coordinates of the target for attack bymissiles or aircraft. Then the groupsleave the area rapidly in order not to becaught in the attack.SPETSNAZ will destroy some targetsindependently. These are usuallyinstances when it is impossible toestablish communications with the commandbase, when the mission is expressly theelimination of a target or person or theseizure of documents, or when an enemymissile is ready for firing. In thelatter case, an attack will be made inthe face of any odds, even if the groupcommander is certain that his whole groupwill perish without doing any damage.

The soviets believe that a sudden attack(even if unsuccessful) may cause the u.s.to cancel the launch or to postpone it inorder to recheck all systems andequipment.Having spotted a missile beingreadied on the launcher, the sabotagegroup Cor groups) will usually try todestroy it from a distance, using firefrom sniper rifles or grenade-launchers.If this is unsuccessful, suicide attackswill be made from different directions.sometimes a small group will open firefrom one direction, thereby attractingattention to itself, while other groupsapproach the target silently.More than once during training,SPETSNAZ units have attacked importanttargets in stolen cars, armored vehicles,and even tanks. It is difficult to sayhow saboteurs will behave in a real

situation, but the experience of WorldWar II showed that the spirit needed forsuicide missions was constant andinfectious.Some professional soldiers inSPETSNAZ units, unlike ordinary SPETSNAZsoldiers, will wear civilian clothes.They will make contact with SPETSNAZagents in place for information,transport, or shelter. ProfessionalSPETSNAZ units will operate in towns,

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especially in capital cities, and also inareas where our command centers arelikely to be located.The search for our government and

military leaders may be carried out invarious ways. In this task, accurateintelligence from agents is regarded asone of the most important elements ofsuccess.

soviet special operations in Afghanistanforetell something of how they mayoperate in a major war in Europe or Asia.SPETSNAZ tactics now emerging complementthe standard Soviet approach of usingmassive firepower, applied by large-scalemechanized ground offensives, bombing, orhelicopter assaults, to depopulate areasof the countryside.

The Soviet union undoubtedly gainedvaluable combat experience at all levelsin Afghanistan, but it did not win thewar by any stretch of the imagination.The Soviets were in a low-intensityconflict to support a revolutionaryclient against counter-revolutionaryreactionary forces. The soviets sufferedfrom their inexperience and from adoctrinal emphasis on centralizedcommand. A counterguerrilla war is aplatoon and company commanders' war, butthe only Soviet officers encouraged tothink in terms of independent operationsare in airborne, airmobile, and SPETSNAZunits. As the most flexible, versatile,and independent of soviet forces,SPETSNAZ units are important in thesoviet search for a counterinsurgencydoctrine that does not rely on "cookbook"warfare.

Called "the black soldiers" by theMujahiden because their faces weredarkened for night operations, SPETSNAZcommandoes were highly respected andfeared. They followed their own doctrine13

1005. Operations inAfghanistan


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Long-Range Patrolling

Joint Operations with Militia

in carrying out reconnaissance-orientedoperations in the enemy rear to subvertthe enemy Is ability to resist. Thefollowing were among SPETSNAZ missions inAfghanistan.

Extended dismounted independentoperations interdicted Afghan supplyroutes and night movements. SPETSNAZcommandoes were not roadbound like mostsoviet units and often were inserted byhelicopter. Their "search and destroy"missions identified Mujahiden resistancegroups which controlled 85 per cent ofAfghanistan. They could call in sovietartillery fire or airborne/airmobiletroop landings to drive the rebels intomore open areas. There helicoptergunship and tactical aircraft could thenfire on them.

SPETSNAZ troops were well-suited forindependent dismounted operations becauseof their training. The DemocraticRepublic of Afghanistan (DRA) militiawere well-suited because they providedintelligence, knew the terrain, and werearmed and equipped Iike the Mujahiden.The counterreVOlutionary guerrillasfrequently made local nonaggression pactswith DRA forces, and SPETSNAZ tookadvantage of this vulnerability. Afghansources reported that Soviet troopsdressed as shepherds drove herds of sheepup to Afghan positions and then attacked.To discredit the Mujahiden in areas notunder Soviet control, SPETSNAZ troopsdressed as counterrevolutionaryguerrillas burned mosques and foodsupplies. SPETSNAZ teams similarlydisguised assassinated Ahmed ShahMassoud, one of the more successfulAfghan rebel leaders.

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Lightly armed, physically fit SPETSNAZtroops often established outposts onhills ahead of soviet vehicle convoys toprevent ambush. They landed and departedby helicopter.

Extensive minisubmarine activity began inSwedish and Norwegian territorial watersin October 1982 and in Japaneseterritorial waters in August of 1983.Delivered to target areas by a speciallyequipped India-class submarine or fishingtrawler, minisubmarines are reportedly 20to 50 feet long and carry three to sevenpersons. They are propelled by screwsbut crawl about freely on the sea bottomon two caterpillar treads. Sea-bottomtracks discovered in the Japanese Soyaand Tsugaru straits in August 1984 werethe same as minisubmarine tread tracksidentified by Sweden in 1982 and 1983.Sweden Is discovery also coincided withreports of unknown divers on theirshores. These reports led to speculationthat these penetrations were SPETSNAZexercises.

The Soviets appeared to bereconnoitering prospective opponents:cataloguing the strength and dispositionof their forces, assessing theirstrengths and weaknesses, and identifyingpromising avenues of approach for futureoffensives. The many theories aboutSoviet purposes include the following:

-to collect intelligence ondefensive installations andnavigational conditions near naval bases.-to conduct new weapon systemstrials.-to observe foreign militaryexercises.-to insert or extract SPETSNAZ teamsor agents.

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Convoy Protection

1006. Operations viaMinisubmarines


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-to test adversary militarycapabilities, detection systems, andcrisis management techniques.-to lay passive navigation devicessuch as underwater route markers to safehavens in Swedish and Norwegian fjords.Soviet nuclear-powered fleet ballisticsubmarines could use them in war.-to lay mines.-to remove mines or other underwaterdevices.-to locate and tap NATO underwatercommunication cables. Then they couldcollect intelligence or feed in falsedata.

All of these theories are plausibleand possibly correct. All are in keepingwith the SPETSNAZ doctrinal mission ofspecial reconnaissance. In the event ofwar, such intrusions will probably occurnear the Soviets I key militaryobjectives. These objectives are thestrategic Soya and Tsugaru straits onwhich the Soviet Pacific fleet depends;the strategic Skagerrak and Kattegatstraits in the Baltic which are gatewaysto the North Atlantic; and naval bases,airfields, and defense installationsalong the Baltic littoral. Theseminisubmarine operations could have beenpeacetime rehearsals of plans for wartimedeployment of SPETSNAZ commandoes againstkey political and military targets.

The encroachments against Swedenhave an additional advantage. They maystipport a psychological campaign tointimidate the Swedish government andcondition it to accept a status ofvirtual impotence toward Soviet militarypredominance. The Soviets may hope thatrepeated encroachments will wear down theSwedish will to resist. Thus they mightcrumble the NATO northern flank andextort concessions--such as a tacitlicense to operate in Swedish territory.To continue these submarine intrusions--even after a Whiskey-class submarine ranaground near the Karlskronal Naval Baseon 28 October 1981--increasesintimidation.

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At the outset of any conflict in~urope, the soviet Navy must neutralizethe Swedish Navy quickly to gainstrategic supremacy in the Baltic Sea.rhis would be achieved best by sabotagingas much as possible of the Swedish Navyin port. Deploying SPETSNAZ teams toneutralize Swedish minefields, earlywarning sites, command and controlfacilities, and coastal defenses couldalso provide access for Soviet landingparties bent on sabotage. Minisubmarinescould covertly mine entrances and accessroutes to naval bases, while combatswimmers attach limpet mines to the hullsof ships in port. The outcome of such anoperation would depend on theeffectiveness of Soviet reconnaissanceefforts and the thoroughness of Swedishcountermeasures.

Given the Soviet penchant forplanning, the logic behind minisubmarineincursions in Scandanavia would probablyapply to other areas of wartime strategicimportance. The effectiveness of theSoviet Navy's SPETSNAZ operations in thenorthern theater immediately raisesconcern about bases in the United Kingdomand particularly in scotland which cou~deasily become similar targets. Thepossibility of such operations occurringin a harbor such as Holy Loch isdisquieting.

SPETSNAZ targets in the Far East andPacific regions might include U.S.military facilities and command andcontrol headquarters at Subic Bay, thePhilippines; Yokosuka, Japan; Guam; orPearl Harbor, Hawaii. The Soviet Unioncurrently maintains the world's largestfishing fleet and the third largestmerchant fleet (measured in shipnumbers). These ubiquitous state-ownedcivilian vessels could provideunobtrusive clandestine insertion andsupport platforms for SPETSNAZ teams or17

1007. Operations in the Far East


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1008. SPETSNAZ Agents

minisubmarines during the critical earlyphases of a war.Many U.S. and Japanese strategic

planners believe that the sovietsprobably have detailed plans to gaincontrol of the Soya strait in wartime.with the Soviet fortification of thenorthern territories happening at thesame time, the minisubmarine intrusionswithin Japanese territorial waters areevidence that an invasion of Hokkaidofrom the north could be a Sovietpriority. Japan's self-defense forces areaware of this possibility and havededicated their best airplanes, bestground equipment, and most seasonedtroops to the defense of Hokkaido.SPETSNAZ forces could be crucial tothe success of such an invasion. Theycould neutralize airfields and airdefense sites and sabotage logistic andtransportation networks in the Hokkaidorear area to create confusion and disruptreinforcement. Additionally, navalSPETSNAZ teams, using minisubmarines,

could mine the strategic straits orconduct countermining operations. Themul tipl icity of Asian ethnicnationalities within the soviet unionfrom which to draw SPETSNAZ personnel,the alleged effective soviet intelligenceagent network within Japan, and theomnipresence of the Soviet merchant andfishing fleet would certainly contributeto the success of such plans.

In the USSR, the word "agent" refers onlyto a foreigner recruited by the sovietUnion's intelligence services. Unlikeagents recruited by the GRU, who aresometimes like the spies depicted inthriller novels, SPETSNAZ intelligenceagents carry out more prosaic tasks.Their recruitment is often undertakenfrom within the soviet Union or fromcountries friendly to the USSR (including

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Finland). There are no restrictions onwho can be recruited, but the most valuedare not involved with classified mattersand are of mature age. An agentrecruited while visiting the soviet Unionreturns to his or her own country andrecruits several assistants. In no casedo the clandestine intelligence agents ofarmies and fronts attempt to penetrateinto restricted areas. Instead, usingGRU-supplied money, they buy houses closeto important targets (airfields,bridges,missile emplacements, naval bases, etc).The information they provide is oftenfragmentary and laconic, but, in the caseof important targets, it is verified byother agents who quite separately coverthe same target. The resultingintelligence will be used by SPETSNAZsabotage units to deliver sudden andaccurate strikes.

Compared to ordinary intelligenceagents, SPETSNAZ sabotage agents arerare. A SPETSNAZ sleeper might have noother mission than to wait for the orderto commit sabotage in preparation forwar. Sabotage agents generally find jobsor 1ive close to transport and powerinstallations. Their task, when orderedby the GRU, is to lay explosive chargesand put the installation out of action.Meanwhile, they mayor may not collectinformation. Often such an agent may donothing else that is criminal during hisor her whole life while awaiting thisorder.

Another important task for SPETSNAZsabotage agents is the acquisition inpeacetime of houses and plots of landwhere sabotage groups can find refuge intime of war. These houses and plots areusually in the country, not far from thesea or from a forest or in the mountains.They will usually have an ordinarynuclear bomb shelter which is stockedwith food and water. In addition,SPETSNAZ sabotage agents may providesabotage groups with motor transport,fuel, and supplies. They may also guidethem to their objectives.19


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1009. SPETSNAZ Cover

Both intelligence and sabotageagents come under the command of seniorfront intelligence officers. They can betransferred from one category to theother at any time or, indeed, can beordered to fulfill both roles. Inprinciple, SPETSNAZ agents in peacetimehave little or no contact with Sovietcitizens outside the Soviet Union. Thispreserves their credibility as members ofthe community in which they are living.Their SPETSNAZ handlers have reliablemeans of checking on them so that theycan be reasonably certain that in wartimeforeign recruits will either carry outtheir allotted tasks or at least try todo so.

Because SPETSNAZ are part of the GRU, theordinary citizen in the Soviet Unionknows practically nothing about them.Many precautions are taken to cover uptheir strength, organization, function,deployment, and even the very fact oftheir existence.

All candidates for SPETSNAZ forcesundergo a preliminary loyalty check and,on entry, have to sign a statementpromising to protect official secrets.Breaking this promise is punished asespionage--by death.Most SPETSNAZ units wear the uniformof the airborne forces (VDV) althoughthey have no connection with them. Airassault troops also wear the sameuniform. Distinguishing between thesethree types of troops is, thus, verydifficult. There is a distinction betweenairborne troops and the others, whichwere created after World War II. Duringthe war, all eight airborne divisionsdistinguished themselves in battle andwere awarded the titles of IIGuardlldivisions. Thus, a soldier wearing theuniform of airborne forces without the

guard's badge belongs to either the air20


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assault or SPETSNAZ forces. The solenoticeable difference between SPETSNAZand air assault forces is that theSPETSNAZ are usually deployed byparachute and very seldom usehelicopters, whereas air assault troopsuse nothing but helicopters and have noparachutes. These differences are minorbut can help analysts studyingphotographs and film.

SPETSNAZ forces deployed in EasternEurope are stationed close to largeheadquarters with communications troopsand wear the same uniform, makingidentification almost impossible.SPETSNAZ midget submarine crews wearstandard submariners' uniforms. Allother officers and men in the SPETSNAZnaval brigades wear naval infantryuniform.SPETSNAZ intelligence units aredeployed where there are particularlysensitive targets such as missile androcket bases, penal battalions, andnuclear-weapon storage facilities. NoSPETSNAZ unit is based independently. A

SPETSNAZ unit normally shares barrackswith airborne or air assault troops.Naval SPETSNAZ units are collocated withnaval infantry units. Where SPETSNAZtroops are stationed near other types oftroops, they adopt the latter's uniform.When units share barracks with otherforces, all contact between SPETSNAZpersonnel and those of other units isforbidden. The SPETSNAZ unit has its ownenclosed and well-guarded compound.In the different military districtsand groups of forces, units havedifferent titles. In Ground SecurityForces Germany (GSFG), for instance, theywere called reydoviki (raiders), whereasin the Siberian Military District theyare called okhotniki (huntsmen). As aresult, when SPETSNAZ troops fromdifferent areas meet each other by

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chance, each thinks that the otherbelongs to a different organization. Thegeneric term SPETSNAZ is used only byofficers when talking amongst themselves.SPETSNAZ do not have their ownschools and academies. Officers aretrained at the Reconnaissance Faculty ofthe Kiev Higher Combined-Arms School andat the Special Faculty of the RyazanHigher Airborne School. While at theseschools, SPETSNAZ personnel are almostindistinguishable from their fellowstudents. Higher command personnel andofficers involved in secret service workare trained at the Third Faculty of the

GRU Academy.To limit the circle of those awareof the GRU and the SPETSNAZ in peacetime,SPETSNAZ companies are detached fromtheir army-level commands to becomedirectly subordinate to the staffs ofmilitary districts and groups of forces.The independent companies are grouped toform a battalion in the SPETSNAZ brigadefound at the military district and grouplevel. In the event of war, this

battalion is broken up. The independentcompanies go back under the command oftheir respective armies.To conceal the professional nucleusof the SPETSNAZ, anti-VIP (anti-very-important-person or special target)headquarters companies are detached fromtheir parent brigades to become militarydistrict, group of forces, or fleetathletic teams. SPETSNAZ regiments,

which are manned entirely by professionalsoldiers, are disguised as sporting teamsbelonging to the Central Army SportingClub (ZSKA). The same deceit is used byprofessional KGB saboteurs who belong tothe Dynamo Sporting Club. The SovietUnion's combined Olympic team is, for themost part, made up of professionalSPETSNAZ from these two very wealthy andhighly successful clubs.

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The basic SPETSNAZ operational unit is ateam of eight to ten men. The team iscommanded by an officer and may have awarrant officer or senior sergeant asdeputy. It includes a radio opera-t.or,demolitions experts, snipers, andreconnaissance specialists. Team membershave some degree of crosstraining so thata mission can continue if a specialist islost. (See Figure 1.)

1010. Organization

Each small-arms or tank army has oneSPETSNAZ company or battalion with about91 to 225 men, organized into varyingnumbers of teams and platoons. A companyconsists of a headquarters, threeparachute platoons, a communicationsplatoon, and support unit~. It includesnine officers and eleven warrantofficers. When conducting sabotageoperations in the enemy's rear areas, thecompany may operate as a single unit or

SPETSNAZTEAM

OFF ENL1 4-11

PERSONNEL EQUIPMENTAKS-74/AKSU-74,PMAKS-74/AKSU-74,PMR-350M,AKS-74or AKSU-74,PMRPG-16D,PMAKS-74/AKSU-74,PMAKS-74/AKSU-74,PM

Team Leader (officer)Asst Team Leader (lNO)1-2Radio Operator1-2Wpns Specialist1-2Demo Specialist0-4Recon Specialist

NOTES: 1. Team composition Is not fixed. The organization above shows variations within a typicalSPETSNAZteam.

2. In keeping with Its behind-the-line missions, a SPETSNAZ unit Is lightly equipped. Eachsoldier normally has an assault rifle, a silenced pistol, a knife, and up to eight handgrenades of various types. In addition, a team's equipment normally includes anR-350M burst-transmission radio, an SVD sniper rifle, an RPG-16D antitank grenadelauncher, directional mines, and explosives. The team can also be assigned SA7/14/16shoulder-fired SAMs or man-portable ATGMs.

Figure 1. SPETSNAZ Team, SPETSNAZ Company, Army or Front.

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be divided into smaller groups. Themaximum number of groups is 15.Subdivision of a company is not rigid,however, and the formation can changewhile an operation is in progress. Ifnecessary, each group can operateindependently. The communications platooncan set up and maintain communicationswith all groups over a range of 1,000kilometers. (See Figure 2.)

Each wartime front has generallythree or four armies and one tank army.In support of the armies, but independentof them, SPETSNAZ companies would operatein small groups at depths of 100 to 500kilometers in the enemy rear. Inaddition, three SPETSNAZ long-rangereconnaissance regiments (700-800 men)directly subordinate to the GRU would beallocated to the commander in chief of

SPETSNAZ *OMPANY/BATTALION91/226

JI I I ICOMPANY 1BATTALION SPETSNAZ SIGNALS SUPPLY AND SERVICEHEADQUARTERS (PARACHUTE) PLATOON PLATOONPLATOON/COMPANY1 5 15 60 1 17 1 15

II IPLATOON/COMPANY SPETSNAZ -IHEADQUARTERS TEAM 1

1 * *1 1 4-11 11- - - - - - - - _I

* The structure of army-level SPETSNAZunits is not flxed, Some armies may have a SPETSNAZbattalion,while others may haveonly a company. The chart above represents a provisional assessment of army-levelSPETSNAZstrength and organization, based on fragmentary information from several sources.

* * The total number of teams which an army-level SPETSNAZorganization can deploy varies from 10 to 15.

Figure 2. SPETSNAZ Company or Battalion, Army.

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each strategic directorate (whichconsists of three or more fronts and afleet).The most identifiable SPETSNAZ

formations belong to the GRU. SPETSNAZdiversionary brigades (with a wartimestrength ranging from 900 to 1,300) aresupposedly assigned to each sovietmilitary district (or front, in wartime)and to each of the soviet Is Europeanallies. Each brigade consists of aheadquarters company, three or fourparachute battalions, a signals company,and support units. These brigades,operating in small groups 500 to 1,000kilometers behind enemy lines, pave theway for frontal forces that will attackthrough areas cleared by nuclear action,air attacks, and sabotage. (See Figure3. )

Each of the four naval fleets alsois assigned a naval SPETSNAZ brigade.These brigades reflect an emphasis on seainfiltration. Each has a headquarterscompany, a parachute battalion, aminisubmarine group, and two to threefrogmen/combat swimmer battalions, aswell as a signals company and supportelements. (See Figure 4.)

SPETSNAZ peacetime strength has beenestimated at 15,000 to 30,000 althoughthe lower range seems more realistic. Anaccurate figure is difficult to ascertainfor several reasons. First, the lesscritical military districts (especiallythe interior ones) that are not orientedtoward NATO or China may not deploy afull brigade. Second, all SPETSNAZbrigades may not be maintained at fullstrength in peacetime. Third, theSoviets strive to conceal their truestrength. Soviet defector viktor Suvorovstates that during wartime mobilizationthe number of SPETSNAZ forces could beincreased four- to fivefold by recallingreservists who previously served inSPETSNAZ detachments.

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The soviet Union Is aim is to haxthe following SPETSNAZ units available cthe outbreak of war:-16 SPETSNAZ brigades, one per frOTorganization;-4 SPETSNAZ naval brigades, one pefleet;

SPETSNAZ *RIGADETOTAL 750- 1800

1I I I IBRIGADE SPETSNAZ I-L SIGNALS SUPPORTHEADQUARTERS (PARACHUTE) II COMPANY UNITSIIBATTALION II

TOTAL APPROX. 60 TOTAL 135-360 II TOTAL APPROX. 30 TOTAL APPROX. 2451Ir_ - _ - _ - ( _ - _ - _ - _ - ! . . :

rLIIIIIITOTAL 45-120 1 1....... ___ ' 1 1

1 I 1I---r-----I

SPETSNAZ(PARACHUTE)COMPANY

SPETSNAZTEAM 1- 11* *1I~ ; : = = = = ~ :I

9-10 TEAMS PER COMPANY

TOTAL 5-12

* Brigade structure Is not fixed. This chart represents a provisional assessment of what Is believed tobe a typical SPETSNAZ brigade strength and organization, based on fragmentary information from sev-eral sources.* * A brigade can be expected to deploy about 80 to 100 SPETSNAZ teams.

- - - VariableNOTE: In peacetime, the Independent companies are formed Into a battalion of a SPETSNAZ brigade. Thepeacetime establishment is therefore 4 to 5 battalions and not 3 to 4 as depicted here.

Figure 3. SPETSNAZ Brigade, Front.26


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-20 SPETSNAZ intelligence units, onewith each front and fleet;-3 SPETSNAZ regiments which can beallocated to commanders in chief (CinCs)of the strategic directions (whichconsist of three or more fronts and afleet);-Sabotage agents and detachmentscontrolled centrally by theSecond Chief Directorate of the GeneralStaff (the GRU Central Apparatus).

The groups of forces and militarydistricts (which in war would becomefronts) have at their disposal 800-1,000intelligence agents and 80-110 SPETSNAZagents. The fleets have 160-200intelligence agents and 20-30 SPETSNAZagents. The total number of agentsavailable to the GRUIs Central Apparatuscannot even be estimated. It isimpossible to guess the numerical ratiobetween intelligence and sabotage agents.Suffice it to say that the GRU CentralApparatus has at its disposal a largernumber of agents than all the armies,fleets, and fronts put together.

SPETSNAZNAVALBRIGADE

I I I IHEADQUARTERS MIDGET COMBAT r -I PARACHUTECOMPANY SUBMARINE SWIMMER I BATTALION(ANTI-VIP) GROUP BATTALIONS IIII--------- I

I ISIGNALS SUPPORTCOMPANY UNITS

Figure 4. SPETSNAZ Brigade, Naval.27


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1011. Personnel stringent standards are required of allconscripts assigned to SPETSNAZ.Potential reydoviki must be secondaryschool graduates, intelligent, physicallyfit, and, perhaps most important,politically reliable. Parachute trainingwith a paramilitary youth organization isnaturally a plus. Upon induction,SPETSNAZ conscripts will be asked to signa loyalty oath in which they acknowledgethat death will be their punishment fordivulging details about their service.

Most SPETSNAZ units are manned byordinary, but strong, hardy, and quick-witted conscript soldiers. The selectionprocedure begins long before recruits arecalled up to reception centers to starttheir military service. Before that,every Soviet recruit is categorizedaccording to loyalty to the regime andphysical and intellectual development.Those recruits in the highest category goto the Kremlin Guard, KGB governmentcommunications troops, SPETSNAZ, and KGBfrontier troops. Thus SPETSNAZ canselect the best men even to the detrimentof other elite forces such as airborneforces, strategic rocket troops, andnuclear submarine units.

Once they arrive in their SPETSNAZunits, the soldiers undergo a short, buthighly intensive course of militarytraining during which natural leadersemerge. These leaders are then sent onto SPETSNAZ training battalions to becomesergeants. Each company usually sendsmore soldiers to become sergeants than itneeds. This is an expensive practice,unusual in the Soviet union. In trainingbattalions, competition is so fierce thatonly the best will be awarded the rank ofsergeant. The cour-se is extremely tough;some of the candidates ultimately returnto their units as private soldiers. Evensome of those who become sergeants returnto their parent companies to be employedas private soldiers. Thus, only the very

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best achieve command. This practicemakes it possible to have a permanentreserve of sergeants who can quicklyreplace any other sergeant who is notmaintaining high standards. Knowingthis, men strive at all costs to retaintheir authority. This is possible onlythrough ruthless control of subordinates.More than one third of all SPETSNAZsoldiers pass through the sergeanttraining courses with the result thatheavy losses in war would not seriouslyweaken lower command echelons.

The reserve of warrant officers andofficers is also very high in SPETSNAZunits. Compared to a normal soviet Armycompany's 5 officers and 1 warrantofficer, a SPETSNAZ company has 9officers and 11 warrant officers.

Most soldiers in a SPETSNAZ brigadeare two-year conscripts. IndividualSPETSNAZ teams of these elite conscriptsare led by professional officers. Theheadquarters company assigned to eachbrigade, on the other hand, is mannedentirely by full-time professionals. Theyare fluent in one or more languages oftheir areas of potential operations.They are trained and equipped to operatethere not in camouflage uniform but incivilian clothing or in the enemy'smilitary or police uniforms. Theseheadquarters companies are also the onlySPETSNAZ units that may establish contactand act together with SPETSNAZ agents ina military operation. Headquarterscompanies are maintained in the higheststate of readiness. Cloaked in secrecy,they are supposedly detached from theirparent brigades, posing as parachutists,boxers, wrestlers, martial arts experts,marksmen, and sports teams of themilitary districts, groups of forces, andfleets. Allegedly, many officers andsergeants do not even suspect theexistence of such companies within theirbrigades. The SPETSNAZ regiments of thestrategic directorates are similarlycomposed of full-time professionals.29


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According to unconfirmed reports,the soviet union replaces members of itssports teams with SPETSNAZ personnel.Senior Lieutenant Valentin Yerikalin, whowon a silver medal for rowing at the 1968Olympic games, was an officer of theBlack Sea Fleet naval SPETSNAZ brigade.Several years later, he was arrested byTurkish authorities while trying torecruit agents in Istanbul.

The number of athletes in SPETSNAZis not coincidental. The Soviet unionneeds prestige. One way of providingthis is by winning Olympic medals. Thecountry needs an organization withdraconian discipline to squeeze themaximum effort out of the athletes. Atthe same time, SPETSNAZ needs athletes ofthe highest caliber who have theopportunity to visit areas where they mayoperate in time of war. The athletes,for their part, need opportunities fortraining. They benefit from belonging toan organization that can reward themlavishly for athletic aChievement--givethem apartments and cars, awardpromotions, and arrange trips outside theSoviet Union. SPETSNAZ thus provides afocal point for the interests of stateprestige, military intelligence, andindividuals who have dedicated themselvesto sport.

The ZSKA sends its athletes alloverthe world without hiding their militaryranks. The KGB, which also has the roleof assassinating enemy VIPs, has its ownsimilar organization, the Dinamo.Between ZSKA (Army) and Dynamo (KGB), abitter struggle continues to "poach" thebest athletes from other sports clubs andsocieties. It is of note that the numberof women athletes in SPETSNAZ isunusually high.Very little documentary evidence ofthe activities of these professionalassassins has been published. However,there is one old, but convincing examplefrom the Great Patriotic War (World War

II), before the creation of SPETSNAZ.30


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During the war, the NKVD (now the KGB)had a unit called the MOSBON NKVO USSR,or NKVD independent special servicemotor-rifle brigade. This brigade trainedand launched behind enemy lines 212detachments and groups totaling 7,316men. Their basic task was to killpolitical and military leaders. Inaddition, the brigade wiped out known andpotential enemies in the nations1I1iberatedllby the Red Army. Accordingto official figures (quoted in IIomeForces in the Great Patriotic War"--MOscow, Yuridat 1975, Document No. 278),this one brigade alone annihilated140,000 people. The brigade was made upof IINKVD and state security workers,units of frontier and home troops,distinguished athletes, including manyfamous top-flight names, and antifascistsof various national groups recommended bythe Comintern." In this sentence, wefind all the components which also existin SPETSNAZ today, i.e., ordinary, butcarefully selected and trained soldiers;top-grade athletes; foreigners; and, atthe head of all of these, professionalintelligence men.

SPETSNAZ does not have its ownofficer training schools and academies.To maintain secrecy and ambiguity,officers are recruited from the best inother service branch schools. The highreserve of officers and warrant officersin SPETSNAZ companies is necessary sinceSPETSNAZ commanders operate independentlybehind enemy lines. Team leaders areboth required and authorized to exercisemore initiative than the average Sovietofficer.

SPETSNAZ careerists (officers andwarrant officers) are well-compensated.Each year of service with a SPETSNAZ unitcounts as 1 1/2 years for pensionpurposes. Incentive pay is 50 per centof salary. As in other airborne units,all SPETSNAZ members also receiveparachute jump pay which varies with thenumber of jumps. Jump pay can exceed aconscript's regular salary.


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1012. Training

Despite the seeming isolation ofSPETSNAZ soldiers from other militaryelements for operational securityreasons, SPETSNAZ facilities often appearto be positioned with other militaryunits, albeit in enclosed and well-guarded compounds. As cover, SPETSNAZground forces usually adopt airborne orsignal troop uniforms. Naval SPETSNAZwear naval infantry or submarineruniforms. Their ethnic composition isnot distinctive. To some degree, itmatches the ethnic characteristics of theintended target areas. For example,SPETSNAZ units in the soviet Far East arealleged to include North Koreans andJapanese from Manchuria and the KurileIslands.

The GRU Central Apparatus is responsiblefor SPETSNAZ training battalions,training centers, and communicationscourses. In peacetime, the three elementsof SPETSNAZ--combat units, units ofprofessional athletes, and foreignagents--do not have the opportunity tomeet each other and often do not suspecteach other's existence. Because ofdifferences in their combat roles, theyare also trained separately.

Foreign agents are trained one byone in special training centers mainly onSoviet territory. One such center is inOdessa. The main subjects of thetraining course are security,communications, demolition (theory andpractice), and collaboration withprofessional groups.

Professional athletes are trained insmall groups and sections. Their mainsubjects are physical training (in somecases to Olympic level), foreignlanguages, study of the territories in

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which they are likely to fight (duringsports trips abroad), communications, anddemolition.Basic military training forconscripts is conducted within the units.In addition, SPETSNAZ soldiers learnparachuting; hand-to-hand combat andsilent killing techniques; sabotage usingexplosives, incendiaries, acids, andabrasives; infiltration techniques whichinclude defeating locks and securitysystems; foreign languages and culture;survival; reconnaissance and map reading;and rappelling. Some naval SPETSNAZsoldiers also train in diving andminisubmarine activities. Parachutetraining begins with static line jumpsand for many goes on to high altitude,low-opening and high altitude, high-opening jumps to prepare for covertinsertion. Jumps are made day and nightover all types of terrain regardless ofweather.A SPETSNAZ unit's wartime targetarea determines its foreign language andculture training. The team leader isexpected to be nearly fluent in one ofthe languages of a target country.Enlisted team members are expected toknow the alphabet and basic phrases.This training is intended not only tofacilitate operations but also to enableteams to conduct missions while wearing

enemy uniforms or civilian clothing.The technical training scheduleallows time for rigorous physicaltraining. It includes obstacle coursesand forced marches, often conductedwearing gas masks. Some units are alsotrained in mountain climbing and skiing.Up to half the training year is spent outof qar.r.ion, once or twice a year,selected teams engage in realistic

unannounced exercises conducted underharsh combat conditions. Exerciseobjectives are often operational

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installations guarded by regular troopsor soldiers of the Ministry of InternalAffairs.SPETSNAZ combat training is made to

resemble actual battle as closely aspossible. The role of the enemy inexercises is played by the home forces ofthe MVD, KGB government communicationstroops, local KGB units, and the police.The main task of all these forces is thesecurity of particularly importanttargets and therefore combatingsubversion. For this reason, theleaderships of the GRU, KGB, and MVD areequally interested in carrying outcombined exercises and in the painstakingstudy and analysis of the experienceaccumulated.In an exercise, a SPETSNAZ unitcould be dropped anywhere in the sovietUnion. It could then be required topatrol or ski hundreds of kilometers toneutralize the guards of an actual Sovietmilitary installation and to assault itin a manner approaching actual combat.At the same time, regular Soviet troopsare dispatched on the trail of theSPETSNAZ forces, tracking them throughoutthe region. Casualties often mark suchexercises, but realism serves a dualpurpose. SPETSNAZ teams practice theirown tactics (confronting theirvulnerabilities to helicopters and guarddogs during movement) whil.e they raisethe combat readiness of the home securityforces tasked to repel raids.Once a year, the best SPETSNAZ unitsfrom allover the Soviet Union assembleat the main training center in the regionof Kirovograd. For three months, theyundergo an intensive period of trainingand competition. Coincidentally, thiscenter is adjacent to the Sheltye Vodygroup of uranium mines and concentrationcamps.

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Elaborate brigade training areascontain full-scale mock-ups of enemyweapon systems and enemy facilities fromlikely theaters. They further indicatethe serious intent of SPETSNAZ training.Brigades assigned against NATO forcestypically have models of Lance, Pershing,and ground-launched cruise missiles, aswell as mock-ups of airfields, nuclearstorage sites, air defense sites, andcommunications facilities. These mock-ups are used for both equipmentfamiliarization and demolition training.

As an example of a trainingexercise, the SPETSNAZ brigade of theFifth Army in the Far Eastern MilitaryDistrict (whose headquarters isussuriysk) attacked headquarters andmissile units. On the whole, thebrigade Is operations were successfulexcept for an attack on a nuclear weaponsstore. The SPETSNAZ groups fell into atrap. The store commanders had arrangedtheir vehicles in such a way that, whenthe alarm was sounded, all vehicleheadlights switched on at the same time.Thus, they formed a blazing field oflight around the store and blinded thesaboteurs. The defenders then loosenedguard dogs. The defense was sosuccessful that now most sovietheadquarters, signal units, and missileunits form a circle of vehicles at nightwith a system of signals. On command,the surrounding area can be lit up.During combat training, KGB and MVDunits and also Soviet Army headquartersuse countermeasures against saboteursthat range from a system of total controlof radio traffic to the use ofhelicopters and aircraft. Experience hasalso shown that dogs are still thesimplest and'most effective way ofcombating saboteurs. This opinion isheld by both the KGB and SPETSNAZ.In addition to mock operationsagainst real Soviet military objectives,

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1013. Weapons

SPETSNAZ units also train in centerswhere likely theaters of action arerealistically reproduced in great detail.In the 'Carpathians, in the region ofYavorov, the terrain is reminiscent ofthe French Alps. The Baltic coast islike northern Germany. Inflatable modelsof Lance, Pershing and Pluton missiles,howitzers, aircraft, etc. are used.Despite the effort to replicate equipmentand uniforms, it is considered much moreimportant .torecreate the enemy's tacticsand methods of interrogation. Saboteurswill be subjected to these methods,should they be caught. These lessons arevery instructive and long-remembered.

In keeping with their behLnd-rt.he+Li.ne.smissions, SPETSNAZ teams are lightlyequipped, though armed with the bestweapons available. Each soldier will beissued one of the various Kalashnikovrifle models, designed forairborne/airmobile units--the AKM, AK-74,or the new short-barrelled AKR carbine.In addition, he will carry a silenced 9-mm pistol, ammunition, a knife, up toeight hand grenades of various types, andrations, along with a portion of theteam's gear. This might normally includean RPG-16D grenade launcher and rounds,a Dragunov SVD sniper rifle, an R-350Mburst transmission radio with a range ofmore than 1,000 kilometers, directionalmines, and plastic explosives. If themission demands it, the team might alsobe assigned special weapons such as theSA-7, -14, or -16 surface-to-airmissiles. The SPETSNAZ has no heavyweapons. When operating in the enemy'srear, saboteurs may seize enemy tanks,armored personnel carriers, or othervehicles. While doing this, they mayeven wear enemy uniforms.

In a series of experimentalexercises, SPETSNAZ units have used lightmotorcycles and specially constructed,36


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Front Air Assault Brigades

Airborne Divisions

1015. Results Justify Cost

not usually work with SPETSNAZ. Deepreconnaissance operations range to amaximum of 100 kilometers behind enemylines. This limit allows SPETSNAZ unitsto concentrate their activities fartherin the enemy's rear without beingdistracted by operations close behindthem.

sometimes SPETSNAZ units may guide thecombat helicopters of front air assaultbrigades to their targets, although theymost often operate independently.occasionally combined operations betweenheliborne air assault forces and SPETSNAZsaboteurs are possible. So is the use ofair assault brigade helicopters toevacuate prisoners and wounded SPETSNAZ.

The High Command's plans dictate theoperation of airborne divisions. In theevent of supply difficulties, they switchto purely guerrilla tactics. Althoughthe operations of powerful airbornegroups behind enemy's lines create asituation favorable to the operation ofSPETSNAZ, it is not usual to combinethem. In two situations, a superiorheadquarters will organize directcooperation between units operating inthe enemy's rear: One is when a combinedattack is the only way to destroy orcapture the target. The second is whenSoviet units in the enemy's rear haveincurred very heavy losses. The sovietcommand then improvises groups from theremnants of other units.

The Soviet command is fully aware thatSPETSNAZ operations will involve enormous

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sacrifices. Experience in training andin war shows that losses may be enormousduring an airborne assault. At the sametime, Soviet commanders remember theconsequences of two partisan operationsduring World War II. Operation RAILWAYWAR began on August 3, 1943, at theheight of the battle for Kursk, whenSoviet forces went into an offensive.About 100,000 civilians-turned-guerrillastook part, derailing 836 special trainsand blowing up 556 road bridges and 184railway bridges. The enemy's rear areawas paralyzed over large areas. In oneoperation, 215,000 lengths of railwaytrack were blown up.On an even greater scale wasoperation CONCERTO, in which 120,000guerrillas took part. CONCERTO wasmounted while the Red Army was attackingand forcing the crossing of the riverDnieper. In the opinion of Marshal ofthe Soviet Union A. Yeremenko, "withoutCONCERTO, the forcing of the Dnieperwould have been impossible."

The GRU, also known as the Second ChiefDirectorate of the General Staff, isresponsible for reconnaissance(voiskovaya razedka); agent-derivedintelligence (agenturnaya razvedka);SPETSNAZ training and operations;processing and dissemination ofinformation on the enemy; and radio-intercept, or signals intelligence. TheGRU coordinates operations of allsubordinate levels of Soviet militaryintelligence. In addition, it has itsown very high-powered organization ofclandestine foreign agents, some of whomare recruited for assassination andterrorist activities.

The division of responsibilities atthe GRU level is replicated at levelsbelow it. The second directorate of thestaff at each of the levels where39

1016. Chain of Command


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agents and, in this case, a SPETZNAZnaval brigade.At army level, the SPETSNAZ group ofthe staff's second directorate has underit an independent SPETSNAZ company. The

second directorate commander may giveinformation from the intelligence group'sclandestine agents to the SPETSNAZcompany in order to direct it toward itstargets.

The size and quality of the SPETSNAZestablishment point out the need foreffective security of key Westerninstallations. Awareness of the threatis crucial and demands--

-continued education of the militaryaudience, NATO in particular;-Realistic integration of SPETSNAZplay into Western military exercises;-continued research into SPETSNAZcapabilities, facilitated by bettercooperation among Western intelligenceservices;-Identification of likely SPETSNAZtargets and the development ofappropriate security for them (possiblymobilizing reserve personnel as rear areasecurity forces); and-Greater international cooperationamong intelligence services to monitorsoviet SPETSNAZ activity--including itsfishing and merchant fleet--worldwide.Although it would be impossible to keepsufficient forces to track and target allof the vessels in the soviet Union'sfishing and merchant fleet, a prioritysystem might be established to monitorthe larger and more important vessels.

41

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1018. Conclusions

At the very least, local security forcesshould be on guard when soviet shipslinger nearby.The soviet Union has made anenormous investment in special purpose

forces. The west must also improve itsown special operations forces in order torespond rapidly, flexibly, andappropriately to all levels and types ofaggression, from low-intensity conflictto global confrontation. Improvement isessential, not just because the sovietUnion is doing it, but because theeffectiveness of such forces has beenproven.

The average SPETSNAZ commando is not tenfeet tall. Despite their qualifications,rigorous training, and demonstratedvalue, SPETSNAZ forces have severalweaknesses. Since most SPETSNAZpersonnel are conscripts on two-yeartours of duty, opportunity for cross-training in specialties and languages islimited. Some may lack the degree ofmotivation and professionalism thatcharacterize western unconventionalwarfare forces.

Much of the success of SPETSNAZinfiltrations depends upon how quicklythe west learns of Soviet mobilization.Although SPETSNAZ forces may be composedof hundreds of teams, they cannot all besimultaneously inserted much before D-Day. The chance of compromise is toogreat. In addition, once tensionsincrease or the West receives advancewarning of impending hostilities, many ofthe clandestine means of insertion andsupport will be terminated. Legal agentswill probably be expelled from Westerncountries. Aeroflot landing rights andsoviet merchant vessel port visits willbe terminated. TIR truck passageprivileges will be curtailed.

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In comparison to Westernunconventional warfare forces, SPETSNAZunits lack specialized infiltrationaircraft like the u.s. Air Force MC-130ECombat Talon. This lack severely limitsSPETSNAZ capabilities for clandestineinsertion, particularly just prier to thestart of hostilities. As a result,SPETSNAZ units must rely upon the bruteforce of a Soviet air campaign to covermost infiltration. If Soviet fighter-:-bombers and other means do not inflictthe necessary damage to enemy airdefenses, unarmed transports would beattacked before the teams even arrive ontarget.

Nonetheless, SPETSNAZ forces pose aformidable wartime threat to Western andparticularly NATO's rear areas. From theSoviet perspective, the investment in aforce of several thousand highly trainedmen is small compared to a potentialpayoff: neutralizing ene.ay nucleardelivery capabilities, degrading airdefense and communication systems, and,indirectly, increasing the effectivenessof Soviet aircraft, missiles, and groundforces through SPETSNAZ-assistedtargeting. SPETSNAZ teams are aneffective force multiplier. Byneutralizing enemy nuclear systems, theyincrease the surprise of the main attack,allowing Soviet forces to exploitsuperior margins of conventional militarypower. By creating panic and disruptionin rear areas, they cause forces to bewithdrawn from the front lines to meetthe rear area threat and thus weakenenemy resistance.

The Afghanistan experience gavesoviet leadership a greater degree ofoperational confidence to assert itselfespecially in situations it may havepreviously avoided. It should no longerbe assumed that the Soviet union willproject power in all instances with thesame conservatism. The strength andvaried capabilities of SPETZNAZ forcescan effectively advance Moscow'sstrategic interests in the Third World.43


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This can be done through direct politicalaction against unstable regimes orthrough more indirect means. These couldinclude training and support of anti-Western insurgencies, wars of nationalliberation, or terrorism. In many ThirdWorld conflicts, even a modest militaryinterposition could influence theoutcome. An on-ground Soviet SPETSNAZpresence can quickly supplementindigenous revolutionaries before thearrival of u.S. or allied rapiddeployment forces. Such an action couldpresent the West with a fait accompli.Since surprise is the Soviet trademark,the West's lacks in information andreadiness can be SPETSNAZ's greatestweapons.

Documents

Marines Spetsnaz Russian Special Forces