March 2016 Resilient Organisation or Mock Bureaucracy€¦ · The concept of organisational resilience was born out of organisations’ strong sensitivity to perturbations on any

Emergency Planning College

Occasional Papers New Series

Number March 2016

Resilient Organisation or Mock Bureaucracy:

Is your organisation “crisis-prepared” or “crisis-prone”?

Dr Kevin PollockEmergency Planning College

16

Please Note:

This Occasional Paper is a discussion article, written and published in order to

stimulate debate and reflection on key themes of interest to the resilience community.

It is part of a series of papers published by the Emergency Planning College on the

Knowledge Centre of its website and available freely to practitioners and researchers.

The opinions and views it expresses are those of the author. This paper does not

constitute formal guidance or doctrine of any sort, statutory or otherwise, and its

contents are not to be regarded as the expression of government policy or intent.

For further information, including a submissions guide for those who wish to submit a

paper for publication, please contact:

Mark Leigh

Emergency Planning College

T: 01347 825036

E: [email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

© Emergency Planning College 2016 1

Contents

Foreword ............................................................................................................ 2

Executive Summary ........................................................................................... 3

Resilience .......................................................................................................... 4

Crisis Management: a Tool to Achieve Resilience ............................................. 6

Crisis-Prone & Crisis-Prepared Organisations ................................................... 8

Mock Bureaucracy - Why Crisis-Prone Organisations Fail to Learn ................ 11

Organisational Resilience ................................................................................ 13

High Reliability Organisations .......................................................................... 14

Benchmarking Organisational Resilience ........................................................ 16

Adaptive Capacity .............................................................................................. 17

Planning ............................................................................................................. 19

Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 21

Appendix A: Transforming the Crisis Prone Organisation – Evaluating Your

Organisation ..................................................................................................... 23

Appendix B: New Model of Organisational Resilience ..................................... 26

References ....................................................................................................... 27


Foreword

The concept of organisational resilience was born out of organisations’ strong

sensitivity to perturbations on any scale. Recent disruptive events have made

governments aware that it had become crucial to develop a culture of resilience within

organisations (Robert et al., 2010). The UK Government states that ‘building a more

resilient society will help ensure that we are better prepared for and able to recover

from emergencies’ (Cabinet Office, 2015).

The term resilience is used in a wide variety of fields that include ecology, psychology,

supply chain, strategic management and safety engineering (Bhamra et al., 2011).

This has led to some confusion. The purpose of this Occasional Paper is to contribute

to the existing body of knowledge by collating and analysing key writings on the topic,

and making recommendations that have a practical application in crisis and

emergency management.

It also critically reviews whether organisations can truly become High Reliability

Organisations (HROs) by adopting key characteristics attributed to such

organisations. Furthermore it specifies essential tasks required to become a ‘learning

organisation’. This would prevent them from becoming a ‘mock bureaucracy’ by

ensuring that lessons from crises are reflected in the organisational strategies,

structure, culture, and individual beliefs and values. But above all, it sets out what

practices are necessary to ensure that organisations can become more resilient and

crisis prepared rather than crisis prone.


Executive Summary

The current focus on organisational resilience represents a relatively new field of

research and practice. It is being applied to understand the adaptive capacities of

organisations faced with uncertainty in the context of complexity (Jiwani & Milley,

2009). This is essential in crisis and emergency management. In this context,

resilience helps an organisation to achieve its objectives and fulfil its core purpose.

The resilient organisation is able to anticipate, respond and adapt to acute or sudden

shocks and chronic or incremental changes, so that it survives and prospers into the

future (BSI, 2014).

Resilience can be viewed as both a dynamic process and an outcome of particular

strategies (Cascio, 2009). Current literature predominately refers to or emphasises

resilience as a means to recover from disturbances. But adaptive capacity is an

essential component of resilience because it reflects the learning aspect of the

organisation in response to crises (Carpenter et al., 2001). If an organisation does

not learn from crises it will remain crisis-prone. Between the crisis-prone and

crisis-prepared organisations is a continuum where an organisation’s crisis orientation

can be described (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). This paper provides guidance on how

organisations can improve their crisis-preparedness and their learning capacity

(Garvin, 2000).

Resilient organisations are crisis-prepared. They avoid failure by learning from

their own crises and the experience of others. This learning shapes the precautionary

norms the organisation has in place (Smith & Elliott, 2007). It embeds lessons

identified during crises by ensuring that, at the individual and organisational levels,

beliefs, values and defence mechanisms are changed to reflect the new understanding

of the potential threats now faced and the necessary response capability. Some writers

(Weick & Roberts, 1993; Roberts, 1990; Rochlin, 1993; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 2007)

highlight nuclear power plants and aircraft carriers as examples of High Reliability

Organisations, which demonstrate particular characteristics that make them

especially resilient; although others dispute this (Sagan, 1993; Boin & Schulman,

2008).

Despite the recent emphasis on resilience many organisations do not have the

capacity or capability to confidently withstand disruption. Nor do they have effective

systems to learn from crises. They do, however, have plans and procedures in place.

Unfortunately these do not reflect the values, culture and beliefs of the organisation

and its people. The plans and procedures remain separate and discreet, at a

superficial level of the organisation. They do not become embedded in the culture or

psyche of the organisation or those who work within it. In short these organisations

are ‘mock bureaucracies’ (Gouldner, 1954).

A ‘mock bureaucracy’ could be described as a ‘fig-leaf’. In this metaphorical sense it

covers up something embarrassing. The implication being that the cover is only a


token gesture and the truth is obvious to all who choose to see it. According to

Gouldner (1954) mock bureaucracies exist where the lack of perceived legitimacy of

particular rules results in a pattern of overt organisational non-compliance with those

rules.

Policies, plans and procedures are present but ignored. The plans and procedures are

no more than a ‘fig-leaf’. In other words ‘a counterfeit front deceitfully designed to

impress key stakeholders with appropriate principles and well-ordered practices, while

hiding internal fragmentation and ad hoc operations’ (Jermier et al., 1991). This can

have serious consequences for an organisation and can easily precipitate crises

(Hynes & Prasad, 1997). Thus the concept of ‘mock bureaucracy’ provides one

explanation why organisations do not learn.

To avoid failure and ensure crisis-preparedness, resilient organisations must capture

learning and feed back into every layer of the organisation to ensure that, in addition

to the policy and procedures changing, there is a change in organisational culture and

personal practices.

Resilience

Measuring and benchmarking resilience would enable organisations to assess their

current resilience management strategies and improve performance by addressing

any capability gaps. However, the term resilience has been used in many different

contexts and there is general confusion about what it actually means. Resilience has

been described as a multidimensional, sociotechnical phenomenon that addresses

how people, as individuals or groups, manage uncertainty (Lee A.V et al., 2013). But

a recent comprehensive review found that ‘resilience’ is a malleable and nebulous

term which has been appropriated across a multiplicity of different application domains

and blended with a range of other related concepts (Banahene et al., 2014). Moreover,

resilience appears to be as much a set of attitudes about desirable actions by

organisational representatives, as it is about developing new capabilities (Kendra &

Wachtendorf, 2003).

Reactive Resilience

Resilience is often considered as the ability to continue or recover a steady state after

a disruption or crisis. This is reactive. For example, Somers (2009: 13) argues that

‘resilience is demonstrated after an event or crisis has occurred’. Mallak (1998: 1)

describes resilience as ‘the ability of an individual or organisation to expeditiously

design and implement positive adaptive behaviours matched to the immediate

situation’. Hollnagel (2006: 16) considers that the ‘essence of resilience is the intrinsic

ability of an organisation (system) to maintain or regain a dynamically stable state,

which allows it to continue operations after a major mishap and/or in the presence of

continuous stress’. Applied to an organisation, once the crisis occurs the reaction

would emphasise flexibility, coping with the unexpected and unplanned situation and


responding rapidly to events, with excellent communication and mobilisation of

resources to intervene at critical points.

Proactive Resilience

Others consider resilience in proactive terms that encompass the ability to avert the

crisis from occurring in the first place, but being able to cope with it should it actually

happen. Leveson et al (2006) describe resilience as the ability of systems to prevent

or adapt to changing conditions in order to maintain control. The system or

organisation must be resilient in terms of avoiding failures and losses, as well as

responding appropriately after the disruption. Resilience has also been described as

‘the characteristic of managing the organisation’s activities to anticipate and

circumvent threats to its existence and primary goals’ (Hale & Heijer 2006: 35). In

terms of an organisation, there are mechanisms to foresee potential disruptions and

the adaptive capability to quickly change the structures and procedures within the

organisation to mitigate its effects.

Combining Both Reactive & Proactive Approaches to Resilience

In civil emergencies resilience is viewed as the qualities that enable the individual,

community or organisation to cope with, adapt to and recover from a disaster event

(Buckle et al, 2000). The two key aspects in relation to resilience and civil emergencies

are whether it is about simply reacting to a change in the environment when it actually

happens with the aim of ‘bouncing back’, or whether resilience means being pro-

actively alert to potential disturbances and preventing them from occurring by adapting

to them before they occur, and should they occur responding effectively.

The reactive-proactive distinction is reflected by Wildavsky’s (1991) contrast of

resilience and anticipation. Anticipation being a central mode of control where efforts

are made to predict and prevent potential dangers before damage is done. Whereas

resilience is the capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become

manifest, learning to bounce back. Wildavsky proposes that strategies of anticipation

work best against known problems, whereas strategies of resilience work best against

unknown ones. Each strategy is appropriate to specific conditions. Resilience

strategies are appropriate when there is greater uncertainty and anticipation

strategies apply best when the environment is in steady state and predictable mode.

However, Comfort et al. (2001) contend that they are complementary. Likewise,

Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003) argue that rather than being conceptually distinct,

anticipation is an integral dimension of resilience. Resilience is achieved by

preparing, not for a particular event, but rather for the maintenance of a range

of capabilities or functions that will be needed after any kind of event. In their

view, anticipation is about the design of the organisation needed to respond.

Boin and Lagadec (2000) also combine both strategies. They acknowledge that

resilience is the key to coping but that it is important for organisations to plan and


prepare accordingly; so achieving resilience through an anticipatory approach.

Organisational preparation should consist of a continuous programme of training,

testing and learning from experience, hence ensuring that crisis management

becomes embedded in core organisational processes and values. In relation to

resilience, organisations require monitoring systems for detecting warning

signals together with processes and communication channels to quickly

activate appropriate response units with strategic authority to act in all crisis

situations.

Similarly, according to Hollnagel (2006), improved resilience requires monitoring

and response capabilities, learning abilities, and anticipation. Monitoring

supports preparedness and includes knowing what to look for and being able to

monitor what could positively or negatively affect the system’s performance.

Importantly, monitoring should also cover the system’s own performance, as well as

the wider environment. Such situational awareness improves the ability to respond, by

knowing what to do, or being able to react to regular and irregular changes,

disturbances, and opportunities. This might include activating prepared actions or

adjusting current modes of functioning to prevent significant adverse effects. As does

knowing what has happened, and being able to learn and adapt from experience, in

particular to learn the right lessons from experiences. This in turn enhances

anticipation, which is, knowing what to expect or being able to anticipate potential

disruptions, novel demands or constraints, new opportunities or changing operating

conditions.

This paper considers resilience in terms of anticipation and planning (Boin &

Lagadec, 2000). It takes the view that as a concept, resilience is as much about

attitudes and culture than structures and procedures. But an essential component is

the ability to learn from crises. In the next section approaches to organisational crises

will be discussed and the use of crisis management as a means to achieve resilience

introduced.

Crisis Management: a Tool to Achieve Resilience

The Crisis Management Approach

Crisis management and organisational resilience are dominated by systems thinking

and a general systems approach (Stead & Smallman, 1999). It has been argued that

in adopting a crisis management approach, ‘an organisation accepts that failure is a

basic property of systems and the failure is an outcome of the complex interaction

between system elements’ (Swartz et al., 1995: 17).

Crises are the result of multiple causes, which interact over time to produce a threat

with devastating potential but ‘the ultimate cause of the crisis lies in the inability of a

system to deal with the disturbance’ (Boin & ‘t Hart 2007: 46). Examples of the

application of systems theory to the field of resilience and crisis management include


Coles (2003) systems based discussion of UK national vulnerability and Comfort et

al.’s (2001) discussion of risks emerging from the interaction between private and non-

profit organisations.

Complex Crises & Resilience

It is recognised that crises are becoming more complex in nature and are increasingly

transboundary and interconnected (Boin & Lagadec, 2000). A crisis occurs when a

community of people – an organisation, a town, or a nation – perceives an urgent

threat to core values or life-sustaining functions, which must be dealt with under

conditions of uncertainty (Rosenthal, Boin & Comfort, 2001). Ultimately, a crisis is

when policymakers experience ‘a serious threat to the basic structures or the

fundamental values and norms of a system, which under time pressure and highly

uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions’ (Rosenthal, Charles & ‘t

Hart, 1989: 10).

There are usually visible stages to a crisis and most move through five of them. These

are:

Signal detection;

Preparation/prevention;

Containment/damage limitation;

Recovery, and;

Learning (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992).

The first two phases indicate proactive types of crisis management, which if successful

will prevent many crises from actually happening. Containment/Damage Limitation

and Recovery are reactive activities, done after the crisis has happened, in an attempt

to contain its damage and recover from its effects. The learning phase indicates an

interactive type of crisis management: either part of the planning in the absence of

crisis or as a result of experiencing a crisis.

In relation to signal detection, a crisis usually sends off a persistent trail of early

warning signals or symptoms. If not attended to a major crisis is likely. However, early

warning signals are difficult to interpret, so it is important that organisations have

mechanisms in place to track and analyse them. To avoid crises organisations need

to have tested, in-place prevention and preparation mechanisms. The purpose of

prevention is to proactively probe the organisation for signs of weakness before a crisis

incubates.

Preparation involves developing and testing plans, as well as training people, to

ensure they are familiar with their response roles. In the event of a crisis actually

happening, the containment and damage limitation mechanisms are activated to

prevent the crisis spreading across the organisation. The emphasis on tested and in-

place recovery mechanisms is crucial. Without such foresight it is unlikely that

responders will be able to deal with the crisis efficiently. The last phase of crisis


management is the continual learning from crises and reassessment of arrangements

to improve on what has been done in the past. Interactive learning is vital (Pauchant

& Mitroff, 1992).

Crises can occur when organisations fail to effectively manage their risks. Major

accidents are usually preceded by periods where the organisation drifts towards states

of increasing risk until the events occur that lead to loss (Rasmussen, 1997). One

reason is that organisations fail to see the warning signs or do not understand their

significance (Fink, 2002). But an awareness and understanding of the situation and

potential consequences could prevent the accumulation of unnoticed events (Turner,

1976). Turner (1978) proposed the notion of an incubation period of actions and

events during which the change is effected and the potential for systems failure

initiated. He focused on failures of foresight, or crisis events where some forewarning

was potentially available but there was a failure to act to prevent the crisis. To

proactively avoid such failures, organisations must effectively manage the crisis by

using their awareness and understanding of the situation to continuously move ahead

of their current performance curve.

What Does an Organisation Need to Do to Improve Resilience?

The management of crises covers activities rooted in organisational structure, culture

and policies (Carmeli & Schaubroeck, 2008). Pearson and Clair (1998) describe crisis

management as a systematic attempt by the organisation and its external stakeholders

to prevent a crisis occurring, and if it does, effectively managing it. This reflects the

need for combining anticipation and resilience for an effective response to crises (Boin

& Lagadec, 2000; Comfort et al., 2001; Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003). Hills (2000)

discusses resilience as a quality or characteristic displayed by an organisation in

response to change or pressure. He links resilience and crisis management, and

suggests that resilience is an outcome or goal, and that crisis management is a

strategy or tool which organisations can use to achieve it. That is they need to become

crisis-prepared organisations, rather than crisis-prone. An organisation that invests in

effective crisis management will enhance its resilience capability and make it less

prone to crises.

Crisis-Prone & Crisis-Prepared Organisations

Between the crisis-prone organisation and crisis-prepared organisation is a continuum

where an organisation’s crisis orientation can be described. The crisis-prone and the

crisis-prepared organisations exhibit different characteristics (Weick & Sutcliffe,

2001).Crisis-prepared organisations invest in both crisis prevention and response

capability, whereas crisis-prone organisations focus on response, not prevention

(Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003). Moreover, crisis-prepared organisations have integrated

crisis planning, flexible and adaptive structures and low rationalisation and denial

about the likelihood of crises impacting on the organisation.


Crisis-prone organisations, on the other hand, have few, if any, plans, inflexible

structures and high rationalisation and denial about the impact of crises on their

organisation (Mitroff et al., 1989). Examples of rationalisations that hinder

organisational crisis management, and therefore organisational resilience, include ‘our

size will protect us’, ‘certain crises only happen to others’ and ‘crisis management and

crisis prevention is a luxury’ (Mitroff & Pearson, 1993).

All organisations develop their own cultural beliefs and create rules, regulations and

procedures based on a set of expectations, which may or may not be met. A

precondition for some organisational crises is ‘sloppy management’ (Turner, 1994).

Examples of which include, communication failures, blinkered outlook and groupthink

(Janis, 1982), complacency and neglect, together with inadequate assumptions about

the vulnerability of the organisation. Turner argued that these management

inadequacies and examples of unprofessional behaviour could be addressed by the

development of a safety culture, with commitment from the top, which would mitigate

the incubation of hazards. The successful implementation of such a culture would also

enhance organisational resilience.

Mitroff et al. (1989) argue that organisational culture is the most influential factor on

crisis management. To determine where an organisation sits on the continuum

between crisis-prepared and crisis-prone, Pauchant and Mitroff’s onion model (1992)

below identifies 4 layers of an organisation that can be peeled away.

(Source: Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992:49)

The two outer layers represent the visible elements of the organisation, while the two

inner layers represent the invisible and unconscious aspects. The outer layer consists


of organisational strategies, programmes and procedures to deal with crises; the next

layer is the organisational structures, which may or may not inhibit the organisation

responding effectively in crisis; then there is the organisational culture layer, consisting

of the organisation’s unwritten rules, codes of conduct and beliefs; and the final layer

is the core of the organisation, namely the subjective experiences of individuals and

their anxieties and defence mechanisms in relation to crises.

The layers are not separate and distinct; rather each layer influences the others. ‘The

strategies implemented in an organisation influence, and are influenced by, the

organisation’s structure and culture and the psyche of individuals’ (Pauchant & Mitroff,

1992: 52). To ensure successful crisis management an organisation must perform well

through all layers (Mitroff et al., 1989).

The following table shows the major differences between crisis-prone and crisis-

prepared organisations:

Crisis-Prone Versus Crisis-Prepared Organisations: A Synthesis

Layers of Onion Model

Crisis-Prone Crisis-Prepared

4. Strategy

Traditional strategic management

Focus on survival and growth

Restricted purpose; fragmented stakeholders

Mostly reactive strategy in crisis management

No special crisis management strategies

Challenged assumptions

Focus on development and learning

Shared purpose; enlarged view of stakeholders

Reactive, proactive and interactive strategies

3. Structure

No special structure for crisis management

Focusing on balancing flexibility and control

No special mechanisms for crisis management

Effective Crisis Management Units

Focus on balancing life and death

Special rewards, tasks and training

Challenged concepts of time and space

2. Culture

Self-inflated cultures

Extreme use of faulty rationalisations

No awareness of cultural ties

Mostly unconscious, unchallenged

Culture moving toward positive self-regard

Low use of faulty rationalisations

Awareness of cultural ties

Challenged and accepted

1. Character

Strongly bounded emotionally and cognitively

Constant search for existence/ego satisfaction

High defence mechanisms against anxiety

Less bounded

More concerned about addressing problems

Adequate defence mechanisms embracing anxiety

(Source: adapted from Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992: 146)

The essential difference in crisis-prepared organisations is that they see crisis

management as a strategic necessity to ensure reliability and not as a cost.

Pauchant and Mitroff developed an Ideal Crisis Management Strategy that


organisational crisis managers could use to determine their own organisation’s needs.

The strategy is based on the Onion Model, with the Strategic layer being split into

‘strategic actions’ and ‘evaluation and diagnostic actions’; the structural layer into

‘technical and structural actions’ and ‘communication actions’; and the culture and

character layers combined into ‘psychological and cultural actions’. The strategy is

reflected in the questionnaire that Pauchant and Mitroff developed to enable an

organisation to compare their preparedness with that of an ideal crisis-prepared

organisation. The questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix A.

Mock Bureaucracy - Why Crisis-Prone Organisations Fail to Learn

Failure to Learn

One of the reasons that some organisations become crisis-prone and are likely to

experience failure is that they fail to learn from their environment. Turner (1976)

studied organisational crises to find out why many organisations fail to heed what in

retrospect were signs of impending failure. He found that the conditions under which

large scale intelligence failures occur include: rigid institutional beliefs, a disregard of

outside complaints, difficulty with handling multiple sources of information, and the

tendency to minimise danger. These elements incubate until they become part of the

organisational culture, setting the stage for a serious problem triggered by an event

that in other circumstances might be easily dealt with.

Turner argues that organisations perform poorly when faced with ill-structured

problems, which they generally attempt to address by simplifying reality, falling back

on habit or ritual, or resorting to rules of thumb. Some organisations attempt to deal

with uncertainty by identifying goals and developing plans to achieve them. But in

contingent and complex situations they have difficulty knowing whether they have

done enough. Thus, organisations that fail to take steps to develop flexible,

complexity-embracing, problem-seeking capabilities, and fail to develop organisational

cultures that learn from their environments are likely to experience a crisis in one form

or another.

Failure of Hindsight

Toft & Reynolds (2005) refer to the inability to learn from past mistakes as a ‘failure of

hindsight’. But even when there is a significant international event, such as the 9/11

terrorist attacks, organisations still fail to learn. An investigation into whether

organisations increased their crisis response planning following the attacks found that

the majority of organisations, even those that were directly affected by 9/11, remained

unprepared for crisis (Hurley-Hanson, 2006).

Consequently, it has been argued that despite the national impact of the 9/11 attacks

on the psyche of the USA, it has ‘not changed our long-term attitudes toward the

importance of crisis management in the day-to-day course of business’ (Mitroff, 2005:


376). In other words, the crisis did not result in a change in the affected organisations

precautionary norms, leading to greater prioritisation of crisis-preparedness. Instead

the attitudes to crisis management remained the same as they were before the

attacks.

Mock Bureaucracy

One explanation of this phenomenon of organisational non-compliance is Gouldner’s

concept of ‘mock bureaucracy’ (1954), which has been defined as ‘an organisation

with a counterfeit front deceitfully designed to impress key stakeholders with

appropriate principles and well-ordered practices, while hiding internal fragmentation

and ad hoc operations’ (Jermier et al., 1991: 189).

Gouldner (1954) studied a gypsum plant to determine variations in bureaucratic

patterns. He focused on ‘no-smoking’ regulations which were reinforced by

bureaucratic cues, such as signs, posters and inspections. Despite the rules and

reminders, most personnel disregarded the no-smoking regulation. The reason for

such non-compliance was the lack of legitimacy attaching to the rules. However,

organisations that fail to comply with safety regulations, especially when there are few

consequences for non-compliance, may generate conditions for crisis incubation

(Smith, 1990; Turner, 1994; Reason, 1990; Perrow, 1984). Therefore, the

development and enactment of ‘mock bureaucracies’ can have serious consequences

for organisations, and can easily precipitate crises (Hynes & Prasad, 1997). Moreover,

such organisations will fail to realise that it is their culture of non-compliance that

contributes to the crisis generation.

Learning Organisations

Gouldner’s (1954) findings highlight the importance of organisational culture in

achieving and maintaining compliance through shared values embedded at an

individual and organisational level, similar to the inner layers of Pauchant and Mitroff’s

Onion Model (1992). Such a culture is essential to achieve effective crisis

management, overcoming barriers to learning and becoming a learning organisation.

According to Garvin (2000), there are six specific tasks critical to organisational

learning:

1. Continually collect intelligence about the environment.

2. Learn from the best practices of other organisations.

3. Learn from your own experiences and past history.

4. Experiment with new approaches.

5. Encourage systematic problem solving among all members of the

organisation.

6. Transfer knowledge throughout the organisation.

However, true ‘learning organisations’ are rare even though the idea is widely

accepted (Christenson, 2007). Successful ones will have a defined learning agenda


based upon identified knowledge gaps. They will be open to discordant information so

news does not get watered down before it is sent up the command chain. Reports will

be trusted because relationships and reporting systems will be healthy. Opposing

viewpoints will be sought out and explored for effective learning opportunities. They

will avoid repeated mistakes because a ‘learning organisation’ will regularly reflect on

experiences, distil useful lessons, share knowledge, follow through and be supportive

in the implementation of refined processes. In other words a ‘learning organisation’

overcomes Turner’s (1976; 1978) barriers to learning and in doing so becomes a much

more resilient organisation. Organisational resilience is discussed in detail in the

following section.

Organisational Resilience

Gibson and Tarrant (2010: 7) argue that ‘resilience is an outcome and not a

process, management system, strategy or predictive measurement’. They see

organisational resilience as an outcome influenced by a dynamic complex combination

of environmental factors, including the organisation’s risk culture, which may range

from being reactive to adaptive to potential threats. It is the ability to anticipate, prepare

for, respond and adapt to events – both sudden shocks and gradual change. That

means being adaptable, competitive, agile and robust (BSI BS 65000: 2014).

Organisational resilience is a capability which enables organisations to adjust to

perturbation, moderate the effects of risk and uncertainty and take advantage of

emergent opportunities (Banahene et al., 2014). For Weick et al. (1999), it comprises

coping skills, which materialise when events get outside of normal operational

boundaries, and knowledgeable people who can self-organise into ad hoc networks to

provide expert problem solving.

Measuring Resilience

One measure of resilience in an organisation is the ability to create foresight, which is

to anticipate the changing shape of risk, before failure and harm occurs (Woods,

2005). In this sense, organisational resilience represents the capacity of an

organisational system to anticipate and manage risk effectively. It does this through

appropriate adaptation of its actions, systems and processes, to ensure that its core

functions are carried out in a stable and effective relationship with the environment

(McDonald, 2006). Organisational resilience is, therefore, ‘a balancing act between

risk and resources, between vulnerabilities and escalating or unmanageable

catastrophe’ (Comfort et al., 2010: 273).

Organisations can achieve improved resilience through anticipating and preparing for

crises and their consequences by using knowledge, social collaboration and

innovation (Comfort et al. 2010). But organisational resilience is a continuously moving

target, which contributes to performance during business-as-usual and crisis

situations (Mitroff, 2005). It requires organisations to adapt and to be highly reliable


(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), and enables them to manage disruptive challenges

(Durodie, 2003).

In terms of organisational resilience, high reliability is a desirable trait (Vogus &

Sutcliffe, 2008). Reliability is an increasingly critical quality and competency for

organisations responding to crises. It has been defined as ‘the capacity to

continuously and effectively manage working conditions’ (Bigley & Roberts, 2001:

1281). Reason (2000) argues that High Reliability Organisations offer important

models for what constitutes a resilient system. This view will be critically analysed in

the following section.

High Reliability Organisations

High Reliability Organisations have been described as resilient organisations (Weick

& Sutcliffe, 2001). In their study of High Reliability Organisations, Weick and Sutcliffe

(2001) found HROs experience fewer problems because they have developed ways

of acting and styles of leading that enable them to manage the unexpected better than

most other kinds of organisations. Such organisations were able to maintain reliable

performance because of certain key characteristics:

Preoccupation with failure – treating any lapse as a symptom that something is

wrong with the system, encouraging reporting of errors, learning lessons from

near misses and being wary of complacency.

Reluctance to simplify interpretations – knowing that the world is complex,

unstable and unpredictable, they encourage individuals to look beyond their

own boundaries and to be sceptical towards received wisdom.

Sensitivity to operations – scrutinising normal operations in order to reveal

deficiencies in supervision, safety procedures and training, hazard identification

etc., and encouraging continuous adjustments that will prevent errors from

accumulating and enlarging, encouraging people to speak out about their

concerns.

Commitment to resilience – developing capabilities not only to detect problems

but also to be able to continue working when things go wrong.

Deference to expertise – decisions are delegated to those on the front line and

with the most expertise (not necessarily the highest rank or most service) in

that field.

(Adapted from Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001: 10-17)

High Reliability theory describes the extent and nature of the effort that people, at all

levels in an organisation, have to engage in to ensure consistently safe operations

despite its inherent complexity and risks (Dekker & Woods, 2010). It is argued that

High Reliability Organisations are able to shift seamlessly from routine operating

modes, where formal attributes such as hierarchical authority and standard operating


procedures dominate organisational activities, to high tempo activities, where more

informal organisational norms dominate.

During high tempo periods, operating experts are given great latitude to control

operations, communication flows where needed (unhindered by the chain of

command), and the problem is the focus of everyone’s activities, regardless of their

formal position in the organisation (Rochlin et al., 1987). The ability to switch between

two modes of operations, one emphasising planning and routines, the other focusing

on contingency and rapid response and adaptation appears to reconcile the competing

requirements of both anticipation and resilience in highly reliable organisations

(LaPorte, 2006).

The view of High Reliability theorists is that if appropriate organisational design and

management techniques are in place safe operations are possible even when using

extremely hazardous technologies (Sagan, 1993). But Perrow (1999) argues that

serious accidents within complex technology systems are inevitable and simply a

characteristic of a ‘normal system’.

Another criticism of High Reliability Theory is that few organisations have the

extremely complex technology that is evident in these High Reliability Organisations;

therefore the lessons to be learned from them are limited and not necessarily

applicable to mainstream organisations (Luo Carlo et al., 2004; van den Eede & van

den Walle, 2005).

Boin and Schulman (2008) outline other limitations of the High Reliability Theory,

including that the research is based on a snapshot of a small number of particular

types of organisations. Our knowledge of the origins of the characteristics attributed

to High Reliability Organisations is limited. It is not always clear whether they are:

imposed by regulatory environments, the outcome of institutional evolution or the

product of leadership. But, importantly, those characteristics have not been

conclusively linked to the reliability of the organisation’s performance. Nor is it clear

how High Reliability Organisations evolve the capability to avoid catastrophic failure,

especially as the opportunities to learn through trial and error are limited. Therefore,

in their view High Reliability Theory ‘stands not as a theory of causation of high

reliability but rather as a careful description of a special set of organisations’ (Boin &

Schulman, 2008: 1053). For the practitioner, this is – perhaps – a more useful

interpretation anyway.

Sagan (1993) also acknowledged that High Reliability Theory provided useful insights

but concluded that ‘historical evidence provides much stronger support for the ideas

developed by Charles Perrow in Normal Accidents’ (Sagan, 1993: 252). Sagan

reached this conclusion as a consequence of having identified ‘a long series of close

calls with US nuclear weapons systems: serious accidents or near-accidents that

could have led to catastrophes had they occurred in somewhat different, but

nonetheless plausible, circumstances’ (Sagan, 1993: 252).


If High Reliability Theory is difficult to replicate in a normal organisation, what practical

ways are there for organisations to measure and benchmark their resilience and

demonstrate that it is improving? The following section outlines a model of resilience

developed for that purpose.

Benchmarking Organisational Resilience

Following a study of 10 organisations, McManus et al. (2008) proposed that

organisational resilience was a function of:

an organisation’s overall situational awareness,

its management of keystone vulnerabilities and

its adaptive capacity.

Situational awareness is being aware of what is happening around you and

understanding what that information means to you now and in the future (Endsley et

al., 2003). Keystone vulnerabilities are those components that, if lost or impaired,

can cause exceptional effects throughout the organisational system (McManus et al.

2008). An organisation’s adaptive capacity is its ability to continuously design and

develop solutions to match or exceed the needs of its changing environment (Lee et

al., 2013).

However, after an empirical review of the findings of the McManus study, Lee et al

(2013) propose a New Model of Organisational Resilience based on two factors:

adaptive capacity and planning, with 13 indicators. Appendix B shows the New

Model and includes a definition of each indicator.

Organisations can use the model to discuss the components of resilience and to think

about where their strengths and weaknesses might be, as well as what their current

strategies actually address and what they don’t (Stephenson, 2010).The two factors

are summarised in the table below:

Adaptive Capacity: Planning:

Minimisation of silos

Internal resources

Staff engagement and involvement

Information and knowledge

Leadership

Innovation and creativity

Decision making

Situation monitoring and reporting

Planning strategies

Participation in exercises

Proactive posture

External resources

Recovery priorities

(Source: Lee et al., 2013)


In the following section each factor is considered in detail. This highlights the close

relationship between the resilience factors and indicators and the crisis management

components, through cross referencing the resilience model with crisis management

literature.

Adaptive Capacity

Minimisation of Silos – The minimisation of divisive social, cultural, and behavioural

barriers, which are most often manifested as communication barriers creating

disjointed, disconnected, and detrimental ways of working.

Fenwick et al. (2009: 3) discuss the term silo mentality arguing that ‘it is used to

describe inwardly focused organisational units where external relationships are given

insufficient attention’. Those in silos will look to their own interests rather than that of

the organisation as a whole (Wisner, et al., 2004). Silo mentality is a significant barrier

to preparedness and can hinder organisations at any level (Guelke, 2005). Silos

prohibit the creation of shared views within organisations, which has been described

in cultural terms as the opposite of a communication culture (Powers, 2004). The

consequence is a lack of effective communication, which is a common cause of failure

in crises (Smith, 1990).

Internal Resources – The need here is for the management and mobilisation of the

organisation’s resources to ensure its ability to operate during business-as-usual, as

well as being able to provide the extra capacity required during a crisis.

Crises are characterised by disruption and uncertainty affecting the availability of

existing organisational resources (Boin & Lagadec, 2000; Pearson & Clair, 1998;

Mallak, 1998). Comfort (1990) suggests that conflict among organisations seeking to

respond to the sudden, extraordinary demands in crisis is a recurring and well-

recognised problem. But a common thread in resilient and reliable organisations is

active and engaged management by highly trained professionals.

Staff Engagement & Involvement – This requires the engagement and involvement

of staff who understand the link between their own work, the organisation’s resilience,

and its long-term success. Staff are empowered and use their skills to solve problems.

Effective collaboration and network management requires reciprocity, representation,

equality and the participation of those with different skills and experiences (deLeon &

Varda, 2009; Moynihan, 2005). This requires organisations to define their resilience

culture and ensure that it is spread throughout the organisation and embedded.

Elwood (2009) argues that organisations need to develop an understanding of

resilience that goes beyond just business continuity or risk management. Staff

engagement and involvement are essential. This is because ‘no amount of planning,

expenditure, use of resources or ingenious mitigation measures will ever guarantee


triumph if the espoused resilience culture is only visible within the readily accessible

corporate values’ (Elwood, 2009: 247).

Information & Knowledge – Critical information needs to be stored in a number of

formats and locations and staff should have access to expert opinions when needed.

Roles are shared and staff are trained so that someone will always be able to fill key

roles.

According to Weick (1993), if everyone knows the roles and responsibilities of

everyone in the team, resilience will be enhanced because even in the event of a crisis

the role system remains intact in the individual’s mind. He referred to this as a ‘virtual

role system’. Knowledge of the system is important; especially being able to identify

and interpret what is going on within the organisation and its environment. These are

characteristics of a resilient organisation (Hale et al., 2006; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).

One way of searching for these weak signals is by creating an awareness of

vulnerability. Processes to identify and analyse vulnerabilities, such as risk

management and business impact analysis, are well established - but organisations

often neglect to actually address issues identified as critical (Birkland, 2009).

Leadership – Strong crisis leadership is required to provide good management and

decision making during times of crisis, as well as continuous evaluation of strategies

and work programs against organisational goals.

Leaders’ perceptions, or their resilience ethos, will influence the crisis management

approach taken by the organisation (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Mitroff (2004) argues that

crisis leadership is proactive. It attempts to identify crises and prepare the

organisation as a whole before a crisis occurs. In his view, crisis leaders need to be

proactive before, during and after crises. This involves ensuring organisation

readiness through vulnerability audits, the development of skills and capabilities which

can be enacted during the crisis, and after the crisis reassessing performance in order

to design and implement new procedures. Furthermore, Crichton et al. (2005) suggest

that a key leadership skill is gathering information to enable effective decision making,

whilst Grint (2005) argues that leaders need to be more collaborative, especially when

dealing with complex crises.

Innovation & Creativity – Staff should be encouraged and rewarded for using their

knowledge in novel ways to solve new and existing problems - and for utilising

innovative and creative approaches to developing solutions.

Because of the unique nature of crises, innovation and creativity are critical skills for

crisis response (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003; Hamel & Välikangas, 2003). Weick

(1993) opines that improvisation and bricolage are important elements of resilience.

He suggests that bricoleurs are able to remain creative under pressure because they

routinely act in chaotic conditions. Therefore, they are able to improvise and create

solutions with available resources. Those that are successful have a high adaptive

capability and are able to cope with change and respond to it quickly and effectively


(Denevan, 1983). Such adaptive learning centres on the ability of an organisation to

make a number of changes simultaneously and keep itself aligned with its evolving

environment (Daft & Weick, 1984; Murray, 2002).

Decision Making – This suggests the need for staff to have the appropriate authority

to make decisions related to their work, with authority is clearly delegated to enable a

crisis response. Highly skilled staff are involved, or are able to make, decisions where

their specific knowledge adds significant value, or where their involvement will aid

implementation.

In the context of crisis management, much of the literature discusses decision-making

as a potential source of error (Pearson & Clair, 1998; Smits & Ally, 2003; Smith, 2006).

Smart and Vertinsky (1977) advocate varying the membership of crisis teams to

ensure that leaders are exposed to new points of view, can discuss alternatives with

others outside of the crisis decision unit, and can invite experts to comment on

decisions and processes. Eisenhardt (1989) found those with deep knowledge of their

business can maximise decisions within time constraints by considering several

alternatives simultaneously, especially when the entire team was conditioned to work

with each other in turbulent situations. An important characteristic, attributed to High

Reliability Organisations, is deference to expertise. This suggests that decisions

should be delegated – not necessarily to those in command but to those with the most

appropriate knowledge applicable in the circumstances (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).

Situation Monitoring & Reporting – This requires staff to be vigilant about the

organisation, its performance and potential problems. Staff are rewarded for sharing

good and bad news about the organisation including early warning signals and these

are quickly reported to organisational leaders.

Organisations that create an awareness of vulnerability by seeking out signals that

may indicate unexpected activity are more resilient (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). In such

resilient organisations situational monitoring and reporting is a notable characteristic

(Hale et al., 2006). Failure to heed these signals may result in the incubation of crisis

(Turner, 1976) and drift towards failure (Woods, 2005). But successful monitoring is

dependent on risk and business continuity management processes being well

established; together with an ‘attitude of wisdom’ that means that although staff may

not initially understand the situation immediately, because they have never seen it in

that particular form before, they are aware that their response to the situation may be

improvised (Weick, 1993).

Planning

Planning Strategies – This involves the development and evaluation of plans and

strategies to manage vulnerabilities in relation to the business environment and its

stakeholders.


Spillan and Hough (2003) emphasise the importance of planning and argue that every

organisation should have a plan. Planning is an important component of an effective

response (Banerjee & Gillespie, 1994; Pearson & Clair, 1998). It not only reduces

organisational vulnerability, but assists crises managers to cope with the challenges

of response (Chong, 2004). But the existence of a plan is not enough to guarantee

success (Paraskevas, 2006), other components required include leadership,

competence, preparation, a healthy organisation, equipping of staff, strong

relationships and financial commitment (Grigg, 2003).

Participation in Exercises – This requires the participation of staff in simulations or

scenarios designed to practice response arrangements and validate plans.

Resilience can be enhanced through adequate resources appropriately trained in the

various roles they may be called to perform. Crisis teams should use scenario building

and exercises (Smart & Vertinsky, 1977). The most common means of training UK

emergency services is through simulation and role play exercises (Borodzicz, 2005).

Such exercises help individuals develop personal skills specific to certain types of

incidents (McDonald et al., 1992). They have also been recognised as a means to

practice together and provide the opportunity for the development of liaison

arrangements (LESLP, 1992).

Proactive Posture – This is the strategic and behavioural readiness to respond to

early warning signals of change in the organisation’s internal and external environment

before they escalate into crisis.

Mitroff (1988) suggests that crisis management should consist of the design and

implementation of key plans, procedures and mechanisms to prepare for crises. But

it should also involve being able to ability to detect and contain crises when they occur.

Furthermore; it involves being able to make a full recovery, including learning from the

experience. Learning from failure can also go beyond the immediate organisation or

the system that the crisis occurred in. Toft and Reynolds’s (2005) view is that failure

in one system or organisation will have the propensity to recur in a ‘like’ system. This

may be superficially different, but if it contains the same or similar components it will

be susceptible to common modes of failure. Being aware of the likelihood of common

modes of failure in similar systems (or organisations) enables pre-emptive remedial

action to be taken to mitigate potential failure.

External Resources – This requires an understanding of the relationships and

resources the organisation might need to access from other organisations during a

crisis, and planning and management to ensure this access.

Without such partnerships and understanding, there is potential tension because of

the emergent demands of crisis and the bureaucratic procedures of the typical

emergency response agencies (Schneider, 1992). To avoid such tensions, Mulford

(1984) suggests designated individuals act as ‘boundary spanners’. The role of the

‘boundary spanner’ is to link the various organisations within the network by


encouraging and promoting participation and the recognition of mutual benefits, which

can result in effective outcomes. Granot (1999) states that effective boundary

spanners need to be systematic and involve the active participation of policy making

personnel.

Recovery Priorities - An organisation wide awareness of what the organisation’s

priorities would be following a crisis, clearly defined at the organisation level, as well

as an understanding of the organisation’s minimum operating requirements.

During the recovery phase lessons must be learned about the causes and effects of

the response (Mitroff, 1988; Mitroff & Pearson, 1993; Stern, 1997). Turner (1976,

1978) suggests the result will be a readjustment of organisational culture to reflect the

lessons learned. But there are barriers to learning (Smith & Elliott, 2007), including the

rigidity of an organisation’s core beliefs, values and assumptions, and ineffective

communication. Furthermore, the ‘politics of crisis management’ can affect the

learning process (Boin et al., 2010). Included in the recovery element is learning

lessons (Stern, 1997; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Boin et al., 2005) which help to generate

organisational resilience (Smith & Elliott, 2007). However, the challenge is feeding the

lessons back into pre-existing policy networks (Boin & ‘t Hart, 2007).

Conclusion

The intention of this research was to explore the concepts of organisational resilience

in relation to crisis and emergency management. In doing so, it recognised that

measuring and benchmarking resilience would enable organisations to assess their

current resilience management strategies and improve performance by addressing

any capability gaps.

Effective resilience requires organisations to anticipate and plan for disruptive events.

They need to understand their adaptive capacities when faced with uncertainty and

complexity, which are inherent in crises, and plan how the organisation may respond.

Such effective organisational resilience helps organisations to achieve their objectives

and fulfil their core purpose, by enabling them to anticipate, and respond and adapt

to, acute or sudden shocks, as well as incremental change.

Crisis management is essential in developing resilience. Ineffective crisis

management will result in a crisis-prone organisation, which is likely to fail. One of the

reasons for such failure is that crisis-prone organisations do not learn from their

environment. They not only suffer from the failure of foresight but also the failure of

hindsight. To avoid failure and ensure crisis-preparedness resilient organisations

must capture learning and feed back into every layer of the organisation to ensure

that, in addition to the policy and procedures changing, there is a change in

organisational culture and personal practices. Adaptive capacity is an essential

component of resilience because it reflects the learning aspect of the organisation in


response to crises. To help organisations improve their crisis preparedness an ‘ideal’

crisis management strategy and questionnaire has been included.

However, despite the recent emphasis on resilience many organisations do not have

the capacity or capability to confidently withstand disruption. The concept of ‘mock

bureaucracy’ explains why organisations do not learn. The lessons identified are not

considered to be legitimate. They do not chime with the shared values of the

individuals and the organisation. Because the shared values which recognise and

embrace learning have not been embedded, at the individual and organisational

culture level, it cannot become a learning organisation.

High Reliability Organisations were examined as a means of identifying the

characteristics of a resilient system. But while there were useful lessons, it was found

that the High Reliability Theory is based on a non-representative sample of high risk

and technically complex organisations that do not reflect most organisations.

Therefore its general application is limited.

However, a new model of Organisational Resilience, which will enable organisations

to measure and benchmark themselves, was introduced. Focusing on adaptive

capacity and planning, the model described a number of components necessary to

enhance organisational resilience. The model has been empirically tested and is

supported by crisis management theory and practice.

Resilience and crisis managers will be able to make use of the resources included in

this paper to improve their organisations’ crisis management capabilities and in doing

so enable their organisations to become crisis-prepared and more resilient. But above

all else, they should aim to avoid becoming a ‘mock bureaucracy’.


Appendix A: Transforming the Crisis Prone Organisation –

Evaluating Your Organisation

Transforming the Crisis-Prone Organization Rating Your Organization Against an Ideal Crisis-Prepared Profile

Instructions: Below is a list of activities that would be undertaken and carried out by an ideally crisis-prepared organization. Please evaluate the extent to which your organization is expert in each of these activities by circling the appropriate numbers.

Strategic Not at all Somewhat in the

process Well-established

1. Managing drastic changes in corporate philosophy

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

2. Integration of crisis management in corporate excellence

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

3. Integration of crisis management in strategic process

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

4. Inclusion of outsiders on board, crisis management unit, etc.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

5. Holding effective training and workshops in crisis management

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

6. Using crisis simulations effectively

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

7. Using diversification and portfolio strategies to generate intra-organisational learning

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Technical & Structural Not at all Somewhat in the


8. Creatiing a crisis management unit

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

9. Creating dedicated budgets for crisis management

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

10. Developing and changing emergency policies and manuals on a regular basis

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

11. Having computerised inventories of plants’ employees, products etc.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

12. Creating strategic emergency room or facilities

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

13. Reducing hazardous products, services and production

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

14. Improving overall design and safety of products and production

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

15. Having technological redundancy, such as computer network backups

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

16. Using outside experts and services in crisis management

1 2 3 4 5 6 7


Evaluation & Diagnosis Not at all Somewhat in the


17. Using legal and financial audit of threats and liabilities

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

18. Modifying of insurance coverage

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

19. Carrying out environmental impact audits and respect for the regulations

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

20. Ranking most critical activities necessary for daily operations

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

21. Using early warning signals detection, scanning, issues management

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

22. Driving dedicated research on potential hidden dangers

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

23. Showing critical follow-up of past crises

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Communication Not at all Somewhat in the


24. Using media training for crisis management

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

25. Making major public relations efforts

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

26. Increasing information to local communities

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

27. Improving relationships with intervening groups (police, media)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

28. Increasing collaboration with stakeholders

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

29. Using various communication technologies and channels

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Psychology & Culture Not at all Somewhat in the


30. Demonstrating strong top-management commitment to crisis management

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

31. Creating relationships with activists groups

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

32. Improving acceptance of whistle-blowers

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

33. Increasing knowledge of criminal behaviour

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

34. Increasing visibility of crises’ human impact to employees

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

35. Providing psychological support to employees

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

36. Showing stress management and management of anxiety policies

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

37. Making use of symbolic reminders of of past crises and dangers and successes

1 2 3 4 5 6 7


Directions for scoring: Total the scores for all questions. If your total score is above 183, then your organisation is in the ‘safety zone’. If it is between 77 and 183 then your organisation is in the ‘question mark zone’. If it is below 77, your organisation is in the ‘danger zone’.

Source: Transforming the Crisis-Prone Organization, by Thierry C. Pauchant and Ian I. Mitroff. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Copyright © 1992. Permission to reproduce and distribute material (with copyright notice visible) is hereby granted. If material is to be used in a compilation to be sold for profit, please contact publisher for permission.


Appendix B: New Model of Organisational Resilience

Factors Indicators Definition

Adaptive Capacity

Minimization of silos

Minimisation of divisive social, cultural, and behavioural barriers, which are most often manifested as communication barriers creating disjointed, disconnected, and detrimental ways of working.

Internal resources

The management and mobilisation of the organisation’s resources to ensure its ability to operate during business-as-usual, as well as being able to provide the extra capacity required during a crisis.

Staff engagement and involvement

The engagement and involvement of staff who understand the link between their own work, the organisation’s resilience, and its long-term success. Staff are empowered and use their skills to solve problems.

Information and knowledge

Critical information is stored in a number of formats and locations and staff have access to expert opinions when needed. Roles are shared and staff are trained so that someone will always be able to fill key roles.

Leadership

Strong crisis leadership to provide good management and decision making during times of crisis, as well as continuous evaluation of strategies and work programs against organisational goals.

Innovation and creativity

Staff are encouraged and rewarded for using their knowledge in novel ways to solve new and existing problems and for utilizing innovative and creative approaches to developing solutions.

Decision making

Staff have the appropriate authority to make decisions related to their work and authority is clearly delegated to enable a crisis response. Highly skilled staff are involved, or are able to make, decisions where their specific knowledge adds significant value, or where their involvement will aid implementation.

Situation monitoring and reporting

Staff are encouraged to be vigilant about the organisation, its performance and potential problems. Staff are rewarded for sharing good and bad news about the organisation including early warning signals and these are quickly reported to organizational leaders.

Planning Planning strategies

The development and evaluation of plans and strategies to manage vulnerabilities in relation to the business environment and its stakeholders.

Participation in exercises

The participation of staff in simulations or scenarios designed to practice response arrangements and validate plans.

Proactive posture

A strategic and behavioural readiness to respond to early warning signals of change in the organisation’s internal and external environment before they escalate into crisis.

External resources

An understanding of the relationships and resources the organisation might need to access from other organisations during a crisis, and planning and management to ensure this access.

Recovery priorities

An organisation wide awareness of what the organisation’s priorities would be following a crisis, clearly defined at the organisation level, as well as an understanding of the organisation’s minimum operating requirements.

(Source: Lee et al., 2013)


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