Manual Of Ideas 14 Presentations

7/21/2019 Manual Of Ideas 14 Presentations

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Selected Session Highlights from Best Ideas 2014

SAHM ADRANGI,PORTFOLIOMANAGER,KERRISDALE CAPITALMANAGEMENT

JONES LANG LASALLE(NYSE: JLL): Industry leader in real estate advisory services. Asset-lite,

service-based business model (roughly 40% of revenue is recurring). Prestigious brand name with

global footprint can attract and retain talent. Leading competitive position in an oligopoly industry (#1

market share in Europe and Asia). One of only two brokerages (C.B. Richard Ellis) with global scale

and full product suite. Financial crisis has allowed JLL to consolidate weaker, regional brokerages.

Ability to reinvest cash flows at attractive ROIs. Roll-up of boutiques provides for continued

compounding (generally preferably to buybacks; pays 78x EBITDA for its deals, translating into

immediate value creation ). Global commercial real estate transaction volume remains 35% below

pre-recession levels. JLLs 14.5x 2014 P/E multiple appears too cheap given its competitive position

and projected earnings growth of 15%+ based on European real estate recovery, a strengthening

U.S. economy, and emerging market growth. Even after deducting revenue contributed from

acquisitions, JLL has grown at a 12% CAGR over the past seven years. Margin expansion opportunity

as JLLs EBITDA margin is ~300bps below CBRE and newly installed, GE-trained CFO may drive

cost efficiencies. Advisory-focused investment banks (Lazard, Evercore, Greenhill) are a decent

comparable and they trade at 22x 2014E P/E versus JLL at 15-16x. At a 22x 2014 P/E multiple,

which, is warranted given JLLs growth prospects, competitive position in a oligopoly market, and

exposure to the emerging markets, JLL would be worth $155 per share, or a 50% increase from the

recent share price. Adrangi's discounted cash flow model yields a $150 per share fair value.

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http://www valueconferences com/2014/01/ideas14 sahm adrangi/

JEFF AUXIER,CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,AUXIER ASSETMANAGEMENT

LABCORP(NYSE: LH): ~15% share price decline since mid-November provides an opportunity to

buy a compounder in the attractive clinical lab industry and benefit from a shareholder-friendly

management team. Recent concerns about declining volumes and pressures on reimbursement rates

are likely temporary as doctor visits have been delayed due to a slow recovery out of the recession

and uncertainty over health care legislation. But, in time, this will change as patients cannot delay

critical health testing forever (similar to Zimmer's experience over the past few years in knee and hip

replacements). Bigger picture: long runway for demand growth as 10,000 people a day are turning 65

and that age group has historically been the biggest user of lab tests. Also, recent negative Supreme

Court ruling related to competitor Myriad Genetics may provide opportunities for increased volumes

for certain products. LabCorp has historically invested well in technology and relationships with

doctors and through its increasing scale has become the low-cost provider in an effective duopoly

with Quest. Potential for value-enhancing acquisitions as temporary pressures on volumes and

reimbursement rates disproportionately hurt smaller-scale providers. Generating $600+ million ofFCF, which implies a high single digit free cash flow yield. CEO David King has been a disciplined

capital allocator (50% of cash flow has historically gone into buybacks, rest into acquisitions). Since

2002 shares are down from 147 million to 86 million.

http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-jeff-auxier/

CHRIS CRAWFORD,CHIEF INVESTMENT OFFICER,CRAWFORD FUNDMANAGEMENT

MYRIAD GENETICS (NASDAQ: MYGN): Stock out of favor (~30% decline since November end
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DAVID ROLFE,CHIEF INVESTMENT OFFICER,WEDGEWOOD PARTNERS

EMC(NYSE: EMC): EMC stub valued at just 4-5x earnings, adjusting for VMware stake at market

value (~$30 billion) and net cash (~$8.5 billion), which account for about 75% of EMCs recent market

capitalization. EMC's forward P/E, on a non-adjusted basis, is still only 11.5x. This is too low given

EMC's entrenched ecosystem (services represent ~45% of revenue), sticky customers and

unparalleled distribution (direct sales force). Companys strategy of both R&D and scalable

acquisitions drives competitive product/service offerings. At the recent valuation, the bear case

(current decelerated growth is secular, not cyclical; flash storage and software-defined storage will

cannibalize traditional hard disk drives; public cloud is only a threat and not an opportunity; VMwares

entrenched vSphere gets displaced by Open-Source and Microsofts Hyper-V; and recent premium-

priced acquisitions of Data Domain and Isilon are evidence of lack of internal product development)

has to be so overwhelmingly right as to render EMC a broken growth company. - which Rolfe does

not see materializing. Therefore, the new $6 billion stock buyback should be quite accretive at current

valuation. Rolfe see downside of about 10% to $22 and fair value of $32-35, or 30%+ upside.

http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-david-rolfe/

JAKE ROSSER,MANAGING PARTNER,COHO CAPITALMANAGEMENT

UCP(NYSE: UCP): One of the cheapest ways to participate in the recovery of the U.S. housing

market. Asymmetric return potential with low downside risk and significant upside. Simple NAV story,a dollar trading for $0.50 based upon undeveloped land. UCP is a hybrid land developer and home

builder focused on high growth western markets with three quarters of operations based in California
http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-david-rolfe/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-david-rolfe/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-david-rolfe/


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PAUL LOUNTZIS,PRESIDENT,LOUNTZIS ASSETMANAGEMENT

PEPSICO(NYSE: PEP): Potential separation of snacks and beverages businesses to create value

(50%+ upside from recent share price). While investors still think of Pepsico as a beverages business,

the majority of value is in the snacks business, which has better growth prospects than beverages.

While management's willingness to effect a spinoff and an eventual timeframe are difficult to predict,

Lountzis believes Yum! Brands, which was spun-off by Pepsico in 1997, represents a precedent for

spin-off success at the company. Another issue favoring a spin-off is that Frito's volume weakness in

recent years is likely linked to the weakness in the Americas beverages business. Lountzis agrees

with shareholder Trian that the status quo is not a viable long-term option. However, Lountzis prefers

the option of a simple separation of snacks and beverages to the more complex alternative (also

proposed by Trian) of merging Pepsico and Mondelez, followed by a snacks/beverages separation.

Separately, Lountzis also likes the following two preferred stock ideas for income-oriented investors:

USB SERIES F(FRAP), WFC SERIES R(FRAP)

http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-paul-lountzis/

CHRIS SWASBROOK, PORTFOLIOMANAGER,ELEVATION CAPITALMANAGEMENT

POST HOLDINGS(NYSE: POST): Third-largest cereals business in the U.S. (market share: 10%)

after Kellogg (34%) and General Mills (33%) undergoing a significant, yet still underappreciatedtransformation under hall of fame capital allocator and CEO Bill Stiritz of Ralston Purina fame. A dollar

invested with Bill Stiritz when he became CEO of Ralston Purina was worth $57 nineteen years later.
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peers) due to structural advantages (owns midstream assets; shipper status on pipelines; relationship

with Walmart; small format). This gives the company competitive fuel gross margins while also being

a low-cost provider and making the business less sensitive to oil price swings. Recent insider buying.

Likely year-end portfolio clean-up selling pressure (spin-off). Trading at discount to peers and

absolute sum-of-the-parts value: 7.1x LTM EBITDA-capex (normalized), 7.0x base case CY2014E

EBITDA-capex. Growth opportunity: plans to open 60 stores per year with 200 openings over the next

three years and 400-500 more through 2020 within Walmart network. Equity offers 50%+ near-term

upside. Downside protection: Retail segment real estate worth more than current enterprise value.

Strong balance sheet. Catalysts: 1) sale of non-core ethanol plants; 2) increased appreciation of the

quality of the business and its near-term growth prospects; 3) margin expansion from higher mix of

larger floor plan stores; 4) announcement of dividend or restructuring (conversion to REIT or MLP).

http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-eric-delamarter/

CHRIS KARLIN,CHIEF INVESTMENT OFFICER,AQUITANIA CAPITALMANAGEMENT

CHIMERA INVESTMENT(NYSE: CIM): Mortgage REIT formed in 2007 and managed by FIDAC, a

subsidiary of Annaly Capital Management. Owns non-agency residential mortgage backed securities.

Why this company might be mispriced: 1) financial statements are not current due to accounting

restatement; 2) potential NYSE delisting resulting from non-current financials; 3) limited

communications with investors; 4) GAAP accounting treatment deviates from cash economics; 5)

priced below $5 per share; and 6) trades with agency mortgage REIT peer group although facingdifferent set of risks and opportunities. Karlin views Chimera as effectively a closed-end bond fund

selling at a deep discount to NAV. Closed-end because of delinquent filer status (which should
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long ways off. In the meantime, investors collect a 4% dividend yield on a debt-free balance sheet.

Earnings growth and multiple expansion are likely due to improving business sentiment in the U.K.,

possible higher utilization of balance sheet, and moving past prior issues (ICM, Sanofi). If, as Olesen

believes, Creston is 30% undervalued (at a low teens fair value earnings multiple), and value

increases 10% per year, a 20% IRR is possible if the stock is fairly valued in three years.

http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-christian-olesen/

RANDALL ABRAMSON,PORTFOLIOMANAGER,TRAPEZE ASSETMANAGEMENT

MANITOK ENERGY(Canada: MEI): Western Canada oil and gas company trading at $2.15 per

share compared to Abramson's estimated value of $4.50 and growing. Short term noise has created

an opportunity as the recent flow-through financing created an overhang on the stock and the

company revised downward 2013 guidance (due to disappointing third quarter results) related totiming issues and production mix. In addition, the Entice acquisition created uncertainty about the

future direction and the COO left the company. However, management are astute buyers of the stock

and there has been insider buying recently. Currently trading at an enterprise value of $35,000 per

boe/d, 4.5x Q3 annualized cash flow and 2.3x 2014 cash flow guidance. It is also trading at a discount

to its 2012 reported reserve-based NAV per share of $2.84. Value added through 2013 and the

addition of Entice should raise the current NAV to about $3.50. Abramson's private market value

estimate is $5.75 per share in a takeout scenario based on an EV per boe/d of $85,000.

http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-randall-abramson/
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BEST IDEAS 2014: January 7-8, 2014*

Ideas sorted by company (as compiled by the ValueConferences team)

Price at Close

Instructor Company Ticker 6-Jan-14 Link to Session Recording

Josh Young Austex Oil Australia: AOK AUD 0.15 http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-joshua-young/

Jean-Pascal Rolandez Bourbon France: GBB 20.08 http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-jean-pascal-rolandez/

Chris Karlin Chimera Investment NYSE: CIM $3.04 http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-christopher-karlin/

Christian Olesen Creston UK: CRE 0.95 http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-christian-olesen/

David Rolfe EMC NYSE: EMC $24.86 http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-david-rolfe/

Robert Deaton H&R Block NYSE: HRB $28.48 http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-robert-deaton/

Sahm Adrangi Jones Lang LaSalle NYSE: JLL $102.79 http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-sahm-adrangi/

Jeff Auxier LabCorp NYSE: LH $90.35 http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-jeff-auxier/

Randall Abramson Manitok Energy Canada: MEI CAD 2.12 http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-randall-abramson/

Eric DeLamarter Murphy USA NYSE: MUSA $41.78 http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-eric-delamarter/

Chris Crawford Myriad Genetics Nasdaq: MYGN $21.03 http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-chris-crawford/

Paul Lountzis Pepsico NYSE: PEP $82.28 http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-paul-lountzis/

Chris Swasbrook Post Holdings NYSE: POST $49.50 http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-chris-swasbrook/Jake Rosser UCP NYSE: UCP $14.50 http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-jake-rosser/

The Manual of Ideas - Top Ideas from Best Ideas 2014 Issue: Best Ideas 2014 Issue (click on link below, then look in right sidebar)

The Manual of Ideas Harvest Natural NYSE: HNR $4.54 http://www.valueconferences.com/events/ideas14/

The Manual of Ideas Strayer Education Nasdaq: STRA $35.18 http://www.valueconferences.com/events/ideas14/

The Manual of Ideas Weight Watchers NYSE: WTW $31.89 http://www.valueconferences.com/events/ideas14/

* Discla imer:

The content presented here is not an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any security in any jurisdiction. The content is distributed for informational purposes only and should not be

construed as investment advice or a recommendation to sell or buy any security or other investment, or undertake any investment strategy. There are no warranties, expressed or implied, as to the

accuracy, completeness, or results obtained from any information set forth here. BeyondProxys officers, directors, employees, principals and/or contributing authors may have positions in and may,

from time to time, make purchases or sales of the securities or other investments discussed or evaluated herein. This summary is meant in no way to limit or otherwise circumscribe the full scope and

effect of the complete Terms of Use available at: http://www.beyondproxy.com/terms/
http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-joshua-young/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-jean-pascal-rolandez/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-christopher-karlin/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-christian-olesen/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-david-rolfe/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-robert-deaton/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-sahm-adrangi/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-jeff-auxier/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-randall-abramson/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-eric-delamarter/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-chris-crawford/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-paul-lountzis/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-chris-swasbrook/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-jake-rosser/http://www.valueconferences.com/events/ideas14/http://www.valueconferences.com/events/ideas14/http://www.valueconferences.com/events/ideas14/http://www.valueconferences.com/events/ideas14/http://www.valueconferences.com/events/ideas14/http://www.valueconferences.com/events/ideas14/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-jake-rosser/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-chris-swasbrook/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-paul-lountzis/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-chris-crawford/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-eric-delamarter/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-randall-abramson/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-jeff-auxier/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-sahm-adrangi/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-robert-deaton/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-david-rolfe/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-christian-olesen/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-christopher-karlin/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-jean-pascal-rolandez/http://www.valueconferences.com/2014/01/ideas14-joshua-young/


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CONFIDENTIAL INVESTOR PRESENTATION

Manual of Ideas: Best Ideas 2 14January 2014 Kerrisdale Capital Management, LLC

1212 Avenue of the Americas, 3rd Floor

New York, NY 10036

Tel: 212.792.7999Fax: 212.531.6153

Email: [email protected]


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Page 1/ Confidential

Jones Lang LaSalle (NYSE:JLL)

Industry leader in real estate advisory services

Transaction-based: Leasing, capital markets, and property development

Recurring: Property management, advisory (valuation/consulting), and investment management

Operations in 1,000 locations spanning 70 countries

Leading competitive position in Asia and Europe

Source: August 2013 Investor Presentation


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Asset-lite, service-based business model

Roughly 40% of revenue is recurring

Prestigious brand name with global footprint can attract and retain talent

Leading competitive position in an oligopoly industry

One of only two brokerages (C.B. Richard Ellis) with global scale and full product suite

Financial crisis has allowed JLL to consolidate weaker, regional brokerages

Global commercial real estate transaction volume remains 35% below pre-recession levels

$500m expected in 2013 versus $758m in 2007

Industry cap rates have largely priced in future interest rates increases

14.5x 2014 P/E, mid-single digit FCF yields, and projected earnings growth of 15%+

JLL will benefit from a recovery in EMEA transaction volume, a falling U.S. unemployment

rate, and long-term exposure to emerging market growth

Margin Expansion Opportunity

JLLsEBITDA margin is ~300bps below itsclosest competitor, CBRE

Newly installed, GE-trained CFO may drive cost efficiencies

Investment Highlights


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Modest valuation relative to growth expectations

JLLs14.5x 2014 P/E multiple appears too cheap given its competitive position

European real estate recovery, a strengthening U.S. economy, and emerging market growth

should lead to 15 20% EPS growth for the next few years

Capitalization & Multiples Financial Statistics

Fiscal Year End Dec 31st 2009 2010 2011 2012 LTM

Share Price (US$) $102.63 Americas $1,032.7 $1,261.2 $1,525.3 $1,746.7 $1,850.3

Diluted Shares 45.2 EMEA 646.5 728.8 973.7 1,048.9 1,165.3

Market Cap $4,635.1 % Growth (25.8%) 12.7% 33.6% 7.7% 28.8%

Add: Debt 815.6 Asia Pacific 541.2 678.5 816.5 875.6 933.7

Add: Deferred Obligations 130.3 Invest Mgmt 260.2 245.5 275.5 285.4 275.5

Less: Cash (119.7) Corporate 11.4 (6.4) (23.9) (23.9)

Enterprise Value $5,461.3 Total Revenue $2,480.3 $2,925.5 $3,584.9 $3,932.8 $4,200.9

% Growth (8.0%) 17.9% 22.5% 9.7% 9.6%

Trading Multiples

EV / LTM EBITDA $475.8 11.5x EBITDA(1) $238.6 $336.8 $394.9 $436.2 $475.8

EV / 2014E EBITDA 530.6 10.3x Capex (44.2) (47.6) (91.5) (94.8) (95.1)

LTM P/E $5.62 18.3x EBITDA - Capex $194.3 $289.1 $303.4 $341.4 $380.7

2014E P/E 7.07 14.5x EPS(2) $1.75 $3.77 $4.83 $5.48 $5.62

2015E P/E 8.08 12.7x ROE 5.7% 11.3% 13.2% 13.5% 13.0%

Source: JLL Corporate Filings

(1) Excludes non-recurring restructuring and acquisition costs

(2) Excludes non-recurring and intangible amortization expense


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Top-Tier brand with leading position in Europe and Asia

JLL's Holds Leading Market Share in Europe and Asia

2010 2011 2012 LTM

Americas Revenue

Jones Lang LaSalle $1,261.2 $1,525.3 $1,746.7 $1,850.3

C.B. Richard Ellis 3,217.5 3,673.7 4,103.6 4,393.1

Europe Revenue

Jones Lang LaSalle $728.8 $973.7 $1,048.9 $1,165.3

C.B. Richard Ellis 936.6 1,076.6 1,031.8 1,141.9

Asia Revenue

Jones Lang LaSalle $678.5 $816.5 $875.6 $933.7

C.B. Richard Ellis 669.9 788.8 817.2 866.1

#1 market share inEurope and Asia

Lipsey's Commercial Real Estate Brand Survey

Firm 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009

C.B. Richard Ellis (CBRE) 1 1 1 1 1

Jones Lang LaSalle 2 3 3 3 4

Colliers 2 2 2 2 3

Cushman & Wakefield 3 4 4 2 2

Newmark Grubb Knight Frank 4 5 5 6 5

Cassidy Turley 5 7 8 8 9

Source: Lipsey Commercial Real Estate Training


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Global real estate transaction volume continues to recover

Transaction volume remains 35% below pre-recession levels

$500m expected in 2013 versus $758m in 2007

JLL expects global transaction volumes to grow by 10% in 2014

Source: JLL Q4 2013 Market Perspectives


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European volumes are accelerating

Source: JLL Q4 2013 Market Perspectives

EMEA transaction volume grew 31% in Q3 2013

JLL's EMEA Division is Under-Earning

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 LTM

Americas

Revenue $933.0 $1,032.7 $1,261.2 $1,525.3 $1,746.7 $1,850.3

EBITDA 115.0 134.0 184.0 201.0 210.0 214.1

% Margin 12.3% 13.0% 14.6% 13.2% 12.0% 11.6%

EMEA

Revenue $870.8 $646.5 $728.8 $973.7 $1,048.9 $1,165.3EBITDA 50.0 11.0 38.0 57.0 75.0 95.7

% Margin 5.7% 1.7% 5.2% 5.9% 7.2% 8.2%

Asia

Revenue $536.2 $541.2 $678.5 $816.5 $875.6 $933.7

EBITDA 18.0 44.0 62.0 70.2 78.0 79.6

% Margin 3.4% 8.1% 9.1% 8.6% 8.9% 8.5%

JLLsEMEA business should experience operating leverage as it grows

Source: Company filings


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Industry consolidation has favored the largest competitors

The 2009 financial crisis led to an industry reshuffling

Grubb & Ellis, formerly a Top-5 firm, filed for bankruptcy in February 2012 and merged with

Knight Frank in April 2012

Poorly positioned middle-market brokers have lost market share

Full product-suite model has cost advantages over boutiques

Transitionally-oriented boutiques (HFF, Eastdil Secured, Marcus & Millichap, etc.) generally

dontoffer property management and leasing services

JLL can underbid on transactional fees in order to win recurring property management

business and long-term client relationships

Along with CBRE, JLL is the only firm with a truly global footprint

Real estate is a local business, and global clients demand expertise in various geographies

Representatives for multi-million dollar transactions are risk-averse

Harder to be fired for hiring a top-tier brand like JLL or CBRE

The real estate services business has evolved more and more into two models, the global model where you have mulitiple service

lines and very broad geography to service clients around the globeThen you have the niche models. Anything in the middle is hard

because either youre competing against a global company with clout and infrastructure or a niche player who does a single job in a

single location better than anyone.Cushman & WakfieldsCEO (March 2012)


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Ability to reinvest cash flows at attractive ROIs

JLL has taken advantage of the crisis by investing in growth

55% of earnings have been reinvested into acquisitions over the past three years

Roll-up of boutiques provides for continued compounding (generally preferably to buybacks)

Generally pays 7 8x EBITDA for its deals, translating into immediate value creation

Acquisitions have translated into robust growth over the past three years

13% revenue and 18% EPS 3-year CAGR expected in 2013


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Long-term Organic Growth CAGR

Even after deducting revenue contributed from acquisitions, JLL has grown at a 12%

CAGR over the past seven years

This compares favorably against 16% total revenue growth

JLL's Organic Growth (Illustrative)

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Total Revenue $1,390.6 $2,013.6 $2,652.1 $2,697.6 $2,480.7 $2,925.6 $3,584.5 $3,932.8

% Revenue CAGR 16.0%

Inorganic Revenue Contribution2006 - Spauling & Slye ($150m) 97.3

2007 - 13 bolt-on deals 151.0

2008 - 15 Deals incl. Staubach 386.0

2009 - No acquisitions

2010 - No acquisitions

2011 - King Sturge ($350m) 197.0

2012 - 4 deals ($16m) 8.0

Implied Organic Revenue $1,390.6 $1,916.2 $2,403.7 $2,063.2 $1,846.4 $2,291.3 $2,753.2 $3,093.5

% Organic Growth 37.8% 25.4% (14.2%) (10.5%) 24.1% 20.2% 12.4%

% Organ ic CAGR 12.1%

Source: Company filings, press releases, CapitalIQ

(1) Based on management's estimate of 7% growth contribution for H1 2006

(2) Management indicated that M&A added 5-10% to 2007 growth

(3) Deals contributed $193m to 2008 revenue, and we annualized that figure since Staubach closed in July 2008

(4) Undisclosed. We assume that JLL paid 2x revenue

(1)

(2)

(4)

(3)


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New CFO may improve JLLs cost structure

JLLsconsolidated EBITDA margins remain 300 bps below CBRE

Christie Kelly, former CFO of Duke Realty and a 20-year veteran of General Electric, joined

as JLL as the CFO in May 2013

Margin expansion is one of Ms. Kellystop priorities

Begun to exit unprofitable segments (e.g. closure of U.K. branch offices, sale of Swedish

asset management business, etc.)

Will introduce new internal productivity measures to balance growth versus profitability

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 LTM

C.B. Richards Jones Lang LaSalle

Comparative EBITDA Margins

300bps gap

Source: Company filings


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Interest rate risks are overblown

Average U.S. cap rates are 6.5% - 7.0%, representing a 400bps spread to 10-yr treasuries

This wide spread reflects a well-choreographed expectation of higher interest rates

Source: HFF Q3 2013 report


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Transaction activity is more dependent on a strengthening economy

Indicators such as GDP growth, unemployment rate, and the health of capital markets are

more predictive of transaction volumes

Leasing, in particular, is highly correlated to the unemployment rate

Leasing revenue, representing 32% of JLLs business, has lagged the transactional

segments on high E.U. and U.S. unemployment

Source: HFF Q2 2013 report


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JLL is under-covered by Wall Street

$5bn business covered by a small hand-full of analysts

J.P. Morgan and Barclays are the sole bulge bracket analysts

Business model mismatch: J.P. Morgansanalyst covers the REIT industry

The sellside focuses on relative rather than absolute valuation

Relative valuation is not applicable when an entire sector becomes cheap

Moreover, a direct comparison to CBG fails to capture JLLs exposure to a European

recovery, long-term Asian growth, and margin expansion opportunity

Source: Bloomberg


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We believe JLL should trade at a premium to the S&P

Advisory-focused investment banks are a decent comparable

Business posses robust capital efficiency, strong brand names, and minimal principal risk

At a 22x 2014 P/E multiple, JLL would be worth $155/share, or a 50% increase from the

current share price

We believe a 20x 25x P/E is warranted given JLLsgrowth prospects, competitive position

in a oligopoly market, and exposure to the emerging markets

A European real estate recovery, a strengthening U.S. leasing market, and growth in Asia

should drive consistent EPS growth of 15 20%+

Valuation Capital Efficiency

LTM EV / LTM 2014 LTM LTM

Mkt Cap EV EBITDA P/E P/E ROA ROE

Investm ent Bank s

Lazard 5,765 n.a. n.a. 25.1x 18.5x 3.6% 14.5%

Evercore 2,175 n.a. n.a. 37.0x 21.4x 7.2% 14.6%

Greenhill 1,726 1,737 21.5x 37.3x 25.8x 12.2% 15.3%

Average 33.2x 21.9x 7.7% 14.8%

Global CRE Brok ers

Jones Lang LaSalle $4,635 $5,461 11.5x 18.3x 15.5x 6.0% 13.0%

C.B. Richard Ellis $8,735 $10,253 10.4x 21.1x 16.1x 6.3% 21.6%

Sources: Company filings, CapitalIQ


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An illustrative discounted cash flow model yields a $150 fair valueHistorical Est Illustrative Kerrisdale Projections Term Value

($ in Millions) 2011A 2012A 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E

Americas $1,525.3 $1,746.7 $1,921.4 $2,113.5 $2,324.9 $2,510.8 $2,661.5 $2,821.2

% Growth 20.9% 14.5% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 8.0% 6.0% 6.0%

EMEA 973.7 1,048.9 $1,206.2 $1,387.2 $1,595.2 $1,754.8 $1,895.2 $1,971.0% Growth 33.6% 7.7% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 10.0% 8.0% 4.0%

Asia 816.5 875.6 $945.6 $1,002.4 $1,082.6 $1,212.5 $1,358.0 $1,520.9

% Growth 20.3% 7.2% 8.0% 6.0% 8.0% 12.0% 12.0% 12.0%

Investment Mgmt + Corp 269.1 261.5 $253.7 $261.3 $269.1 $277.2 $285.5 $294.1

% Growth 4.7% (2.8%) (3.0%) 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0%

Total Revenue $3,584.6 $3,932.7 $4,326.9 $4,764.3 $5,271.8 $5,755.3 $6,200.1 $6,607.1 $6,572.1

% YoY Growth 22.5% 9.7% 10.0% 10.1% 10.7% 9.2% 7.7% 6.6% 6.0%

EBITDA $396.5 $437.5 $484.6 $571.7 $685.3 $805.7 $930.0 $991.1 $985.8

% Margin 11.1% 11.1% 11.2% 12.0% 13.0% 14.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0%EBIT $313.7 $358.7 $397.9 $476.2 $579.7 $690.4 $805.8 $858.7

Less: Taxes (25% Rate) (78.4) (89.7) (99.5) (119.1) (144.9) (172.6) (201.4) (214.7)

Net Operating Profit After Tax $235.3 $269.0 $298.4 $357.2 $434.8 $517.8 $604.3 $644.0

Add: Depreciation & Amortization $82.8 $78.8 $86.7 $95.5 $105.6 $115.3 $124.2 $132.4

Less: Capital Expenditures (excl M&A) (91.5) (94.8) (100.0) (118.2) (127.0) (138.7) (149.4) (159.2)

Less (Add): Changes in Working Cap (99.5) (7.7) (34.1) (37.9) (43.9) (41.9) (38.5) (35.2)

Free Cash Flow $127.1 $245.3 $251.0 $296.6 $369.5 $452.6 $540.7 $582.0

Discount Factor (10% Discount Rate) 0.95 0.87 0.79 0.72 0.65 0.59

Exit EBITDA Multiple 10.0x

Implied Terminal Value $9,858.2

Discounted Terminal Value $5,836.3

Add: Discounted Forecast Period Cash Flows 1,726.0

Less: Existing Net Debt (826.2)

Discounted Cash Flow Valuat ion $6,736.1

/ Diluted Shares Outstanding 45.2

Fair Value per Share $149.15


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Wall

Streets

Clouded

View

on

EMC


25/361

EMC:The

Alphabet

Soup

of

Data

InformationStorage70%ofrevenues. Virtualization23%of Products(Hardware&Software)55%ofRevenues. Services4revenues.

GrossProfitSplit: 65%Storage&31%Virtualization. EMCsAlphabetSoupofProducts(AGeeksWonderland): StoNetwork(SAN),NetworkAttachedStorage(NAS),DirectAttac(DAS),VirtualSAN,AllFlashXtremIO,Atmos,Avamar,,DataDIsilon,Pivotal,ViPRSoftwareDefinedStorgae,VMAX,VNX(CeCLARiiON),VNXe,VPLEX,VSPEX.


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The

Bear

Case

EMCscurrentdeceleratedgrowthissecular,notcyclical.Flash

storage

and

software

defined

storage

will

cannibalize

trharddiskdrives.

Publiccloudisonlyathreat(andnotanopportunity)thatdisintermediatesITspendfrombothEMC(hardware)andVM

(software).

VMwaresentrenchedvSpheregetsdisplacedbyOpenSourceMicrosoftsHyperV.

Recent

premium

priced

acquisitions

of

Data

Domain

and

Isiloevidenceoflackofinternalproductdevelopment.


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ValuationandTheBullCase

EMCforwardP/Eonly11.5X. EMCstubvaluedatjust45XeVMwarestake($30billion)andnetcash($8.5billion)accoun

EMCs

market

cap

($51

billion).

TheBearCasehastobesooverwhelmingrightastorenderEbrokengrowthcompany.

Given

the

Companys

entrenched

ecosystem,

sticky

customersunparalleleddistribution(directsalesforce)keynewproducPivotal(theAndroidoperatingsystemofcloudcomputing),andViPRshouldrampupquicklyinthehundredsofmillions

Companys

new

$6

billion

stock

buyback

quite

accretive

at

cuvaluation.


28/361


29/361

The information and statistical data contained herein have been obtained from sources,whic

reliable,but

in

no

way

are

warranted

by

us

to

accuracy

or

completeness.

We

do

not

undertake

to

a

changeinfiguresorourviews.Thisisnotasolicitationofanyordertobuyorsell. We,ouraffiliadirectororstockholderoranymemberoftheirfamilies,mayhaveapositioninandmayfromtimorsellanyoftheabovementionedorrelatedsecurities. Pastresultsarenoguaranteeoffutureres

Thisreportincludescandidstatementsandobservationsregardinginvestmentstrategies,individeconomicandmarketconditions;however, there isnoguarantee that thesestatements,opinioprovetobecorrect. Thesecommentsmayalsoincludetheexpressionofopinionsthatarespecul

shouldnot

be

relied

on

as

statements

of

fact.

WedgewoodPartnersiscommittedtocommunicatingwithourinvestmentpartnersascandidlyawebelieveourinvestorsbenefitfromunderstandingourinvestmentphilosophy,investmentprocmethodologyand investortemperament. Ourviewsandopinionsincludeforwardlookingstateormaynotbeaccurateover the long term. Forwardlookingstatementscanbe identifiedbywthink, expect, anticipate, or similar expressions. You should not place undue reliance o

statements,

which

are

current

as

of

the

date

of

this

report.

We

disclaim

any

obligation

to

update

orlookingstatements,whetherasaresultofnewinformation,futureeventsorotherwise. Whilewreasonable basis for our appraisals and we have confidence in our opinions, actual results may dif


30/361

Fat Pitch Capital, LP

"... we try to exert a Ted Williams kind of discipline. In his book The Science ofHitting, Ted explains that he carved the strike zone into 77 cells, each the size

of a baseball. Swinging only at balls in his "best" cell, he knew, would allow him

to bat. .400; reaching for balls in his "worst" spot, the low outside corner of thestrike zone, would reduce him to .230.

In other words, waiting for the Fat Pitch would mean a trip to the Hall of Fame;swinging Indiscriminately would mean a ticket to the minors."

Warren Bu ffet

Robert W. Deaton, CFA

Managing PartnerFat Pitch Capital, LP

1355 Greenwood Cliff, Suit #150Charlotte, NC 28204

T# +980-207-0252Cell# +704-996-0828

[email protected]

R. J. Meurer, Jr.

Managing PartnerFat Pitch Capital, LP

1355 Greenwood Cliff, Suit #150Charlotte, NC 28204

T# +781-452-7365Cell# +781-812-3407

[email protected]


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High Percentage Idea for Manual of Ideas Conference 2014

THE

MANUALOF

IDEAS

TM


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Our high percentage idea for 2014 is H&R Block. The companys

stock looks good when viewed through the prism of our checklist.

The Fat Pitch Capital Checklist:

Durable competitive advantage with fortress balance sheet

High returns on invested capital with low capital intensity

Shareholder oriented management team

A price that affords a margin of safety


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Durable competitive advantage

World's largest tax preparer

12,000 offices with 80,000 tax professionals

98% brand awareness(similar to Coca-Cola, McDonalds and Walmart)

Over 25 million tax returns filed in 2013

Industry leading client retention


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Fortress Balance Sheet

No net debt

Foolish flow ratio:

(current assets - cash) / current liabilities = 26.18%


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High returns on invested capital with low capital intensity:

ROA (TTM): 11.9%*

ROE (TTM): 51.8%*

Cap-ex as % of revenue: 4%

*Source: Morningstar


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Shareholder oriented management team:

William Cobb became CEO in May 2011

Streamlined operations

Shareholder friendly capital allocationFY 2012Dividends $200 millionShare Repurchases: $200 million

FY 2013Dividends: $217 millionShare repurchases: $315 million


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H & R Block in 2011


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H & R Block Today

Tax Preparation Assisted Online, Mobile, Desktop International

Financial Services Emerald Prepaid Debit Card

Refund Transfer Emerald Advance Line of Credit Peace of Mind


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A price that provides a margin for safety:

Rev 2900

Ebitda margin 0.3

Ebitda 870

Cap ex% 0.04

Cap ex 116

Taxes 214

FCF 540

FCF yield 7%

Shares outstanding 274

Market price 29.53

Market cap 8,091

Net cash 285

Enterprise value 7,806

Free Cash Flow 540

FCF yield 7%


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Price Target

Target price = $38, based on 5% FCF yield

Current price = $29.28

Discount to estimated intrinsic value = 30%


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Potential catalysts and opportunities

Sell bank

Affordable Care Act expands market byapproximately 24 million

Online returnsgrowing faster thanleading competitors

Tax plus: Continued growth of Emerald Debit Card


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HR Block = Fat Pitch


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M U R P H Y U S A I N C . ( N Y S E : M U S A )

B E S T I D E A S 2 0 1 4

Half Moon Capital


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2

Half Moon Capital

DisclaimerHalf Moon Capital, LLC (HMC)is not providing investment advice through this material. This presentationis provided for informational purpose only as an illustration of HMCsinvestment philosophy and shall not beconsidered investment advice or a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any securities discussedherein. As of the date of this presentation HMC continues to own the securities discussed herein. Theseopinions are not intended to be a forecast of future events, a guarantee of future results, or investment advice.Past performance is not indicative of future results, and no representation or warranty, express or implied, ismade regarding future performance.

HMC or its affiliates may engage in securities transactions that are inconsistent with this communication andmay have long or short positions in such securities. The information and any opinions contained herein are asof the date of this material, and HMC does not undertake any obligation to update them. Informationcontained in this presentation has been obtained from sources which we believe to be reliable, but we do notmake any representation as to its accuracy or its completeness and it should not be relied on as such.

This material does not take into account individual client circumstances, objectives, or needs and is notintended as a recommendation to any person who is not a client of HMC. Securities, financial instruments,products or strategies mentioned in this material may not be suitable for all investors. HMC does not providetax advice. Investors should seek tax advice based on their particular circumstances from an independent taxadvisor.

In reaching a determination as to the appropriateness of any proposed transaction or strategy, clients shouldundertake a thorough independent review of the legal, regulatory, credit, accounting and economicconsequences of such transaction in relation to their particular circumstances and make their ownindependent decisions.


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3

Half Moon Capital

Overview

Launched July 1, 2011

Classic value-oriented investment partnership in the spirit of BenjaminGraham and the original Buffett Partnership

Focused on equity securities in less efficient areas of the market Intensive research driven investment process

Concentrated portfolio of best ideas

Goal: Consistent, positive returns compounded over the longer-term

Top 10 performance in 2012 and YTD 2013 in long-bias hedge fund category*

*Per Barclay Hedge rankings


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4

Half Moon Capital

Investment Philosophy

Value: Trading price significantly divergent from intrinsic value

Technical and behavioral dynamics lead to inefficiencies in the near and medium-term

Disconnects create asymmetrically skewed risk/ return opportunities

Emphasis on margin of safety for downside protection

Selectively contrarian mindset

Unbiased analysis of overlooked and out-of-favor companies

Generalist approach

Flexible mandate to look across all industries and sectors for the most appealing opportunities

Concentrated fund of high conviction ideas Deep knowledge of each situation provides an edge and mitigates risks


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5

Half Moon Capital

Sources of Opportunity

Small and mid-capitalization companies

Frequently neglected or lack institutional following ($300M - $5B market capitalization)

Out-of-favor and misunderstood companies

Structural shifts in company and industry dynamics Market overreaction to a large, but solvable challenge

Special situations

Corporate actions and market events create mis-pricings

Perceived complexity or lack of easily accessible information causes investor aversion

Spin-offs, post-reorg equities, stressed/distressed, demutualizations, merger securities, recaps, etc.


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6

Half Moon Capital

Investment Strategy and Process

Identify mispriced securities

- Idea generation: Systematic screens, news media, recurring situations, personal network, etc.

Evaluate reason for the mispricing through intensive research- Assess fundamentals: FCF generation, earnings quality, ROIC and asset value relative to price- Public filings, primary calls, management, trade publications, etc.

Find catalysts that may lead to value realization

Size Position

- Particular consideration to conviction/ edge, liquidity, leverage and market/ sector exposure

Closely monitor and track


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7

Half Moon Capital

Eric DeLamarter - Curriculum Vitae

Prior to founding Half Moon Capital in 2010, Eric DeLamarter earned an M.B.A.from The Heilbrunn Center for Graham & Dodd Investing at Columbia BusinessSchool, with a concentration in applied value investing. While attending ColumbiaBusiness School, Eric was a research analyst at Stelliam Investment Management,

a value-oriented hedge fund, where he focused on identifying and evaluatinginvestment opportunities across various sectors. Prior to Columbia BusinessSchool, from 2006 to 2008, Eric was an associate at Lineage Capital, LLC, amiddle-market private equity fund, where his responsibilities included evaluatingand structuring leveraged buyouts. From 2003 to 2006, Eric was an investmentbanking analyst at RBC Capital Markets and during 2001, Eric was an equityresearch summer associate at Merrill Lynch. Eric earned a B.A. in history from theUniversity of Michigan in 2002.


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Half Moon Capital

Murphy USA Inc. (NYSE:MUSA)

8


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9

Murphy USA (MUSA)

Summary Gas stations adjacent Walmart

Misunderstood business model

Obscured fundamentals

Underappreciated return and growthprofile

Overstated risks

Insider buying

Several catalysts

+50% upside

30.00

32.00

34.00

36.00

38.00

40.00

42.00

44.00

46.00

48.00

Aug-13

Aug-13

Sep-13

Sep-13

Sep-13

Oct-13

Oct-13

Oct-13

Nov-13

Nov-13

Nov-13

Dec-13

Dec-13

NYSE:MUSA - Share Price

Note: Net debt includes $131 net proceeds from 12/17 sake if ND ethanol plant

Current Trading Statistics

(USD in Millions)*

Ticker NYSE:MUSA Net Debt / LTM EBITDA 0.7x

Date 12/27/2013

52-Week Range $46.91 - $36.12 EV / LTM EBITDA 5.9x

Stock Price $41.88 EV / 2014 EBITDA 6.4x

Shares Out. (Basic) 47.0 EV / LTM EBITDA - capex 6.3x

Market Cap $1,968.4 EV / 2014 EBITDA - capex 7.0x

Net Debt $249.0

Enterprise Value $2,217.4

Earnings Yield (LTM EBIT/EV) 13.9% EV / LTM FCF 9.5x

Earnings Yield (2014 EBIT/EV) 12.2% EV / 2014 FCF 10.4x

FCF Yield (LTM FCF/EV) 10.5%

FCF Yield (2014 FCF/EV) 9.6%

ROIC (LTM) 28.4%Float 95.6% Target Price $65.00

Short Interest 8.8% Premium to Current 55.2%

ADTV 20.6

*Except per share data; Note: FCF = EBITDA - capex - cash taxes - chg. WC


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10

Background

Regional owner and operator of small-format retail gas stations Founded in 1996 based on the European kiosk-style gas station in retail parking

lots

Focused on volume sale of retail fuel vs C-store merchandise

1,200 locations in the SE and MW, 85% adjacent to Walmart

Murphy Oil (MUR) Spin-off

Spun-off from $12B market cap E&P and S&P 500 constituent MUR on August19, 2013

Rationale: focus business and unlock value


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11

Murphy USA (MUSA)

Thesis

Consensus erroneously focus on lower margins and consolidated financials (which include volatile,non-core segments that have been sold or are being sold)

Obscured higher EBITDA and FCF, attractive return profile (ROIC 2x peers) and structuraladvantages which make the on-going business less sensitive to oil price swings

Cursory sell-side coverage, wait and see mentality from buy-side

Meaningful recent insider buying; likely year-end portfolio clean-up selling pressure (spin-off)

Trading at significant discount to peers and absolute SOTP value

7.1x LTM EBITDA-capex (normalized), 7.0x base case CY2014E EBITDA-capex

Equity offers +50% near-term upside

Downside protection: Retail segment real estate worth more than current EV

Strong balance sheet

Catalysts

Sale of non-core ethanol plants Estimated after-tax value: $44M-47M

Removes low return, volatile segment and focuses the business

Increased awareness and appreciation for the quality of the business and its near-term growthprospects

Margin expansion from increased composition of larger floor plan stores

Announcement of dividend or restructuring (conversion to REIT or MLP)


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12

Investment Merits: Overview

Operational Advantages1. Own midstream assets

2. Shipper status on pipelines

3. Relationship with Walmart

4. Small format

Result

Maintain competitive fuel gross margins while also being a low cost provider

Lower % margins, but much higher dollar margins at the unit level

More rapidly manage oil price fluctuations Highly scalable business


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13

Investment Merits: Strategic Assets

Fuel Sourcing Advantages Midstream Assets: Owns 6 terminals

Wholesale business (fuel sales toexternal customers)

Priority is to source low cost gas for retailsegment, remainder sold in the market

Consolidated within its retail segment numbersfor competitive reasons

1B gallons were sold wholesale (to externalcustomers) at a 4c per gallon margin in 2012

Shipper status on Colonial pipeline:

Procure gas at lower prices than competitors

Opportunistically sell space on the pipeline whenprices are elevated (as it did in 2012 for 8c agallon rather than sell wholesale at 4c)

Real Estate

Owns +90% of locations

Current Station Sites

Midstream Assets

x


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14

Investment Merits: Walmart Relationship

Walmart Relationship

+10 year relationship

910 of 1,200 MSUA locations with agreement to purchase and build +200 moreover next 3-years

Discount program: 1-3c per gallon customer reward paid by WMT

Walmart card reduces interchange fee Proximity to highly trafficked supercenters supports high volume model

MUSA owned land provides independence


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15

Investment Merits: Unit Economics

Store Metrics

Lower overhead

Lower breakeven

Higher GM/ ft2

Higher EBITDA

ROIC 2x peers Optimized layout

Margins will convergewith its peers asconverts and rolls out

more 1,200 ft2

stores

* NACS 2012 State of the Industry Report; CST, PTRY, CASY, ATD reportingNote:- Existing footprint: 208 ft2 (77% of locations) and 1,200 ft2 (4% of locations). Average size for CASY, CST, PTRY and SUSS is 3,000 ft2- Top Quartile' includes MUSA; 'Large Franchises' is comprised of 28 companies (including MUSA) that each have >500 stores

Unit Economics Comparison (Annual per Store)

($000s, except unit l evel data) MUSA Industry*

208 ft2Layout 1,200 ft

2Layout Average Top Quartile Large Franchises

Capital Costs

Capex - Buildout & Land 1,850 2,100 2,460 2,460 2,460

Capex - Maintenance 26 31 37 43 38

Fuel

Gallons Sold 3,324 3,324 1,526 1,985 1,477

Cents/ Gallon 12.9 12.9 18.1 13.2 17.7

Gross Margin 428 428 267 364 262

Breakeven Margin (Cents/ Gallon) 5.5 5.5 8.5 7.5 5.0

Merchandise (Including Foodservice)

Revenue 1,860 1,980 1,384 1,968 1,626

Revenue/ ft2 8.942 1.650 0.461 0.656 0.542

Gross Margin 242 307 392 632 540

GM%Revenue 13.0% 15.5% 28.4% 32.1% 33.2%

GM/ ft2($s) 1,163 256 131 211 180

Total

Gross Margin 670 735 659 996 801

Overhead (SG&A, CC, etc) 360 360 526 714 593

EBITDA 310 375 132 282 209

EBITDA-Maint. Capex 285 344 95 239 171ROIC 15.4% 16.4% 3.9% 9.7% 6.9%


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16

Investment Merits

Result

Maintain competitive fuel gross margins while also being a low cost provider

Operates at 56% of the average industry operating costs with lower breakeven fuel margins*

Cash breakeven: 6.6c vs 12.1c industry ave

High volume, low cost position leads to lower % margins than its peers, but

much higher dollar margins at the unit level Per store: 50% higher EBITDA and 65% higher FCF per store and 2x the ROIC

More rapidly manage oil price fluctuations

Largest GM drop from 2010-2011 was 34bps vs 300bps for its public peers

Since 2009 fell below cash breakeven only once in Q109

*Per NACS 2013 data


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18

Management

CEO Andrew Clyde

Joined at the spin-off

Formerly downstream industry consultant at Booz & Co.

Strategy consultant to MUSA

Architect of the optimized 1,200ft2format

Insider Ownership

Hold 6% of S/O

Insider purchases

CEO Clyde, 2k shares (12/13-12/16)

Direct Deming, 25k shares (11/25)


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19

Non-core Assets

Ethanol Facilities

Began sale of both plants following the spin-off

Dec. 19: Sold Hankinson, ND plant for $170M, $131M after-tax

130M gallon capacity sold for $1.31/ gallon

Remaining Hereford, TX plant being sold ($47M after-tax value)

105M gallon capacity estimated sale at $0.60/ gallon

Result

Removes non-core, low ROIC, volatile business

Performance drag: Drought in 2012 compressed corn crush for ethanol,

resulting in a $38M hit to MUSA consolidated earnings Proceeds used for debt reduction and future growth capex


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20

Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs)

Overview

RINs are created by blending ethanol and bio-diesel fuels

Sold in the market (exchange trading started on CME in May) to companiesthat are unable to meet annual quotas as set by the EPA

In 2012 D6 ethanol RINs traded for $0.05-0.10 per gallon

FDAs increasing requirements under Renewable Fuel Standards 2 (RFS2) ledto a spike in RIN prices (ethanol RINs up to $1.45 per gallon in July 2013)

RINs prices currently $0.30

MUSA

RINs created in MUSA Wholesale business (not related to ethanol plants) 15M RINs per month capacity with 100% contribution margin

Normalized EBITDA: $30M per year ($0.25 per RIN, 10M RINs/ month)
http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/refined-products/d6-ethanol-rins-argus-2013_quotes_globex.htmlhttp://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/refined-products/d6-ethanol-rins-argus-2013_quotes_globex.html


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21

Financial Performance

On-going Retail Business

Excludes: ethanol and refining(divested in 2011)

Strong FCF Profile: Lowmaintenance capex and zero toslightly negative WC

requirements


($000s)

Revenue 2010 2011 2012 LTM

Petroleum 13,377,841 16,586,845 16,854,985 16,253,824

Merchandise 1,969,220 2,115,567 2,144,347 2,162,496

Other (RINs) 9,042 9,538 11,708 79,954

Total Revenue 15,356,103 18,711,950 19,011,040 18,496,274

Fuel Gross Profit 484,186 625,683 556,668 602,641

Fuel GM 3.6% 3.8% 3.3% 3.7%

Merchandise Expense 1,717,177 1,851,867 1,855,641 1,881,595

Merchandise GM 12.8% 12.5% 13.5% 13.0%

Total Gross Profit 745,271 898,921 857,082 963,496

Total GM 4.9% 4.8% 4.5% 5.2%

Total EBITDA 263,026 374,110 300,448 377,596

Margin 1.7% 2.0% 1.6% 2.0%

EBITDA (ex-RINs) 253,984 364,572 288,740 297,642

Capex

Growth 147,347 48,626 72,895 178,145

Maint. (Including Terminal 29,900 28,890 30,250 23,050

Total Capex 177,247 77,516 103,145 201,195

EBITDA-Maint. Capex 233,126 345,220 270,198 354,546

Less: Chg. WC

Less: Taxes (38%) 81,380 123,618 92,059 121,965

Unlevered FCF 151,746 221,602 178,139 232,581

h


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22

Murphy USA (MUSA)

Risks Secular decline in gasoline consumption: MUSAs stations are located in the SE and

MW, regions with a lower adoption of alternative fuel vehicles and limitedtransportation alternatives to cars

Spike in oil prices: low cost sourcing and history of effectively managing throughchallenging pricing environments

Walmart relationship: MUSA is not permitted to sell higher margin prepared foods,but are allowed to sell fountain drinks. WMT also has right of first refusal on thesale of any MUSA land. Mutually beneficial relationship mitigates risk of separation.MUSA owns land limiting WMTs leverage

Downside Protection

Real estate value of retail network greater than current EV Strong balance sheet

Asset base could be a source of liquidity (collateral for an ABL or through sale-leasebacks)

l i


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23

Valuation

Relative Basis

5.9x EV/ LTM EBITDA, 3-4 turns less than its closest peers

EBITDA-mcapex and EBIT multiple gap even more pronounced

More attractive return profile, growth prospects, competitive advantages andasset-base (terminals, ethanol plants and 90% of store real estate owned)

9-10x LTM EBITDA implies $65-75 per share, 55-80% upside tocurrent ($59-67 per share, 40-60% upside normalized *)

Peer Comparison(US$ in Millions)

LTM LTM EV/ Stores EBITDA/ EBIT/ RE EBITDA Total Fuel Fuel % Capex

EV EBITDA EBIT EBITDA EBITDA-MCapex EBIT (000s) Stores Stores ROIC % Owned Margin GM GM of GM % Rev.

Casey's General Stores, Inc. CASY $3,404 $375 $254 9.1x 11.5x 13.4x 1,749 $214.7 $145.3 16.4% 99% 5.2% 16.5% 14.2% 23% 4.4%

Alimentation Couche-Tard Inc. TSX:ATD.B $17,436 $1,522 $986 10.9x 13.5x 16.7x 5,878 $258.9 $167.8 13.1% 23% 3.7% 12.8% 22.5% 26% 1.5%

CST Brands, Inc. CST $3,368 $399 $277 8.4x 9.4x 12.2x 1,034 $385.9 $267.9 23.0% 61% 3.3% 9.8% 18.8% 47% 1.8%

The Pantry, Inc. PTRY $1,283 $205 $88 6.2x 9.0x 14.6x 1,562 $131.5 $56.2 6.0% 26% 2.9% 11.4% 11.4% 26% 1.0%

Murphy USA Inc. MUSA $2,217 $378 $307 5.9x 6.3x 7.2x 1,179 $320.3 $260.7 28.4% 90% 2.1% 5.8% 12.9% 68% 0.9%

*RINs: 10M gallons/ month x 30c/RIN

l i


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24

Valuation

Absolute Basis

Good business at a low quality business price

Normalized LTM: 6.6x EV/ EBITDA, 9.0% FCF yield

Normalized 2014: 6.4x EV/ EBITDA, 9.5% FCF yield


($000s)

Revenue 2010 2011 2012 LTM 2014E 2015EPetroleum 13,377,841 16,586,845 16,854,985 16,253,824 16,994,880 18,338,880

Merchandise 1,969,220 2,115,567 2,144,347 2,162,496 2,427,840 2,619,840

Other (RINs) 9,042 9,538 11,708 79,954 36,000 30,000

Total Revenue 15,356,103 18,711,950 19,011,040 18,496,274 19,458,720 20,988,720

Total Gross Profit 745,271 898,921 857,082 963,496 928,231 992,791

Total GM 4.9% 4.8% 4.5% 5.2% 4.8% 4.7%

Total EBITDA 263,026 374,110 300,448 377,596 346,561 365,121

Margin 1.7% 2.0% 1.6% 2.0% 1.8% 1.7%

EBITDA (ex-RINs) 253,984 364,572 288,740 297,642 310,561 335,121

EBITDA-Maint. Capex 233,126 345,220 270,198 354,546 316,261 332,624

Unlevered FCF 151,746 221,602 178,139 232,581 213,828 223,137

Assumptions:- RINs: 10M gallons/ month x 30c/ RIN; Fuel margin: 13c/ gallon; tax rate: 38%; Ave stores: 1,265 (2014), 1,365 (2015)

V l i


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25

Valuation

Sum-of-the-Parts Analysis

(US$ in Millions)*

Downside Base Upside Notes

MUSA Stores (Core bus iness )

EV/ EBITDA 1,500.0 2,800.0 3,150.0 6x $250M EBITDA, 8x and 9x $350M LTM EBITDA (peers trade 8-10x)

EV/ EBITDA-mcapex 1,840.0 3,200.0 4,160.0 8x $230M, 10x and 13x $320M LTM EBITDA-capex (peers trade 10-13x)

Retail Franchis e As set Value 2,458.0 2,693.8 2,811.7 1,179 x $2.0, $2.2M and $2.3M per owned s tore + $100M term inal as sets

MUSA Current (Average above) 1,932.7 2,897.9 3,373.9

MUSA Growth Plan 210.0 300.0 300.0 200 stores over next 2-3 years, cost $2.1M/ store, 20% IRR

Ethanol Assets

Hankinson, ND 131.0 131.0 131.0 Sold 12/19 for $170M, 130M gallons x $1.31/ gallon ($131M after-tax)

Hereford, TX 44.0 47.0 47.0 105M gallons x $0.50-0.60/ gallon; after tax (acquired in 2010 for $40M)

Total Proceeds - Assets for Sale 175.0 178.0 178.0

Enterprise Value 2,317.7 3,375.9 3,851.9

Total Debt 642.4 642.4 642.4

Total Cash 262.5 262.5 262.5 Excludes proceeds from Hankinson plant sale

Less: Current Net Debt 379.9 379.9 379.9

Equity Value 1,937.8 2,996.0 3,472.0

Equity Value per Share $41.23 $63.75 $73.87 47M shares outstanding

Premium to Current (1.6%) 52.2% 76.4%

*Except per share data

M h USA (MUSA)


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26

Murphy USA (MUSA)

Catalysts

Sale of remaining ethanol plant

Estimated after-tax value: $44M-47M

Removes low return, volatile segment and focuses the business

Increased awareness and appreciation for the quality of the business and itsnear-term growth prospects

Demonstrated stand-alone financial performance

Margin expansion from increased composition of larger floor plan stores

Announcement of dividend or restructuring (conversion to REIT or MLP)

H lf M C i l


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Half Moon Capital

Appendix

27

M h USA (MUSA) D t il d Fi i l


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28

Murphy USA (MUSA): Detailed Financials

Notes:- Historically MUSA consolidated financials includedrefining in 2010 (divested in 2011) and ethanol (being sold)

- MUSA does not provide separate financial information forthe wholesale segment for competitive reasons

- Any fluctuations in its financial contribution can beconsidered intercompany since the wholesale businessspurpose is to support retail

- In order to estimate contribution separately from core-retail, wholesale and RIN, retail EBITDA per store isassumed to be is $320k per year and RIN revenue is

assumed to have 100% EBITDA margins


($000s, except unit level data)

Revenue 2010 2011 2012 LTM

Petroleum 13,377,841 16,586,845 16,854,985 16,253,824

Merchandise 1,969,220 2,115,567 2,144,347 2,162,496

Other (RINs) 9,042 9,538 11,708 79,954

Total Revenue 15,356,103 18,711,950 19,011,040 18,496,274

Fuel Expens e 12,893,655 15,961,162 16,298,317 15,651,183

Fuel Gross Profit 484,186 625,683 556,668 602,641

Fuel GM 3.6% 3.8% 3.3% 3.7%

Merchandis e Expens e 1,717,177 1,851,867 1,855,641 1,881,595

Merchandise GM 12.8% 12.5% 13.5% 13.0%

Total Gross Profit 745,271 898,921 857,082 963,496

Total GM 4.9% 4.8% 4.5% 5.2%

Station Expense 396,053 433,821 447,102 458,464

SG&A 86,192 90,990 109,532 127,436

D&A 55,336 61,136 66,913 70,219

Other 261 449 1,893 2,043

EBIT 207,429 312,525 231,642 305,334

Taxes 81,380 123,618 92,059 121,965

Tax % 39% 40% 40% 40%

EAT 126,049 188,907 139,583 183,369

Total EBITDA 263,026 374,110 300,448 377,596 Includes overhead

Margin 1.7% 2.0% 1.6% 2.0%

EBITDA (ex-RINs) 253,984 364,572 288,740 297,642

EBITD A (R etai l, ex-w ho le sal e) 34 3,680 3 56,48 0 3 67 ,0 40 37 2,640 $32 0k/s tore

Implied Wholesale EBITDA 9,042 9,538 11,708 4,956

Capex

Growth 147,347 48,626 72,895 178,145

Maint. (Including Terminals) 29,900 28,890 30,250 23,050

Total Capex 177,247 77,516 103,145 201,195

EBITDA-Maint. Capex 233,126 345,220 270,198 354,546

Less: Chg. WC

Less: Taxes (38%) 81,380 123,618 92,059 121,965

Unlevered FCF 151,746 221,602 178,139 232,581

M h USA (MUSA) U it Fi i l


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29

Murphy USA (MUSA): Unit Financials

Unit Level (Per store) 2010 2011 2012 LTM

Stores

Start 1,048 1,099 1,128 1,150

New 51 30 37 30

Closed (1) (1)

End 1,099 1,128 1,165 1,179

Avg Number Stores 1,074 1,114 1,147 1,165

Revenue and Costs

Fuel margin per gallon (dollars) 0.114 0.156 0.129 NA

Gallons sold per month 307 278 277 NA

Merch. revenue per month 154 158 156 NA

Merchandise margin 13.1% 12.8% 13.5% 13.0%

Fuel Costs (Annual) 12,005 14,328 14,210 13,440

Merchandise Costs (Annual) 1,599 1,662 1,618 1,616

Station Costs (Annual) 369 389 390 394

SG&A (Annual) 80 82 95 109

M h USA (MUSA)


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30

Murphy USA (MUSA)

M&A Appeal: Private Equity FCF profile and asset base (ie. real

estate, terminals) support leverage

Lower economic sensitivity

Fragmented industry presents

consolidation opportunity for anestablished platform such as MUSA

H lf M C it l


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31

Half Moon Capital

Half Moon Capital, LLC

304 Park Avenue South, 11thFloor

New York, NY 10010

Ph: 646.490.6744

[email protected]

www.halfmooncapital.com


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Land Developer Needs TLC

Build your dream portfolio with UCP


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Company Overview

IPO in July 2013 at $15.00 per share UCP is a hybrid land developer and home

Primarily acquires and develops land forresidential use

Increased push into home building promisunlock significant value

Focused on high growth western markets three quarters of operations based in Cali

and a growing presence in Washington

Ticker: UCP

Price: $14.50

Capitalization

Mkt Cap: $266M

UCP


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UCP, an Orphaned Home-Builder LookinHome

Poorly received IPO Underwhelming results from conglomerate parent diminished deman

Small market-cap ($266M) failed to attract institutional interest

Poorly timed IPO

Concurrent with IPOs of several mainstream homebuilders includingTPH and TMHC

Taper tantrum hammered housing stocks immediately after IPO

Hybrid business model focused on development first and busecond adds complexity.


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Wilbur Ross LikeHistory

Markings of a Wilbur Rossdistressed industry roll-up

PICO capitalized UCP in 2008 totake advantage of fire-sale prices

during the worst of the housingcrisis.

Over $190M in capital deployed totake advantage of dislocation inhousing market.

Over 80% of lots acquired between

Lots by Vin


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Significant Land Holdings consisting of 6,Lots in Strategic Coastal Locations


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Land Portfolio to Fuel Future Growth

Ample land supply provides visibility into futuredevelopment potential No need to recycle cash flow into land replenishment

Existing holdings equate to 8 years of supply at current

Deliveries through 2015 sourced from current inventory Land pipeline should allow UCP to grow through t

housing recovery Guidance for revenue growth of 100% in 2014


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Hybrid Homebuilding and Land Development StrateProvides Optionality

Flexibility of land development and home buildingfor highest return of capital

Less capital intensive than home building alone resultininventory carrying costs

Land sale versus development decision is determined capital

Land holdings are a hidden asset dampening the needreinvestment and creating potential for capital return to

shareholders.


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Significant Value Capture through Home Building

Funds raised from IPO will allow UCP to develop its land ho

Home building subsidiary, Benchmark Communities, launch

Increased community count from 2 to 9 over the last year

Expects a doubling of community count in 2014 withapproximately 1,100 lots

Existing land portfolio capable of supporting 62 commu

Increased home deliveries from 5 to 62 on year over year bQ3

Rise of 27% in Y/Y home ASPs from $271K to $345K

Lower gross margins at 22% compared to 33% for land dev


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What is UCP worth?

Book value analysis P/B multiple of 1.2 compared to industry average of 2.2

Return of 83% with industry multiple

Newly minted Homebuilding IPO peers including TPH, WLH, WCIC apossess a P/B value of 1.7

Return of 67% with rerating to IPO peer P/B

Direct comp of TPH has a P/B value of 1.9 indicating a potential retu

Trades below liquidation value Enterprise value of $208M including net cash of $58M

Compare to $171M in real estate assets, carried at historical cost,alo


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Long-lived Assets Understate True Economic Value

GAAP accounting standards require land be carried at lowehistorical cost or fair value

Accounting treatment materially undervalues UCPs raw land holding

More than 80% of lots purchased before 2012 with the majority of pu

incurred in 2008/2009, the worst years of the housing crisis. According to Case-Schiller, in UCPs core markets of San F

and Seattle, housing prices have risen 53% and 25% respectrough levels.


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UCP Markets Have Seen Rapid Price Appreciation Over the P


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Private Buyer Recent Deals Highlight Value

Tri-Points (TPH) acquisition (Nov, 2013) of Weyerhaeusershomebuilding lots.

A total of 27,000 lots spread across Arizona, California, Nevada and $2.7B or $100k per lot

On balance, lots in CA are more expensive than lots in AZ, NV and T

Applying comp to UCP equates to $665.9M a 2.2x return from curren

Toll Brothers (TOL) acquisition (Nov, 2013) of lots owned byheld Shapell Industries

A more direct geographical compare to UCPs geographic footprint

A total of 5,200 lots concentrated in San Francisco, Los Angeles

TOL paid $1.6B for the lots for a price per lot of $308K. We apply a 7

to TOLs per price to account for TOLs focus on higher-end homes. Applying comp to UCP equates to $615M a 2x return from curre


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Housing Fundamentals Support Strong Case for Apprec

According to the Case-Shiller 20-city Composite Home Pric

home prices remain 20% below peak levels. According to NAR, homes are more affordable now than anprevious 40 years prior to the crash in 2008.

Current cycle has legs Most up-cycles in home prices last 5-10 years

The US is clearly in a home-price up-cycle that has a lot of room to Zandi, Chief Economist for Moodys Analytics

Household creation dipped to .5M for five years between 20compared to normalized levels of 1M suggesting significant

demand


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Historic collapse in housing starts


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Household Formation has Recovered More Quic

Housing Starts


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US Households Have Restored Their Balance S


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Risks

Real estate cycle Job growth, interest rates, population growth, and consumer confide

strength and duration of cycle

Execution risk Build-out of new communities must show attractive returns on capita

investors Small market cap and thin trading liquidity (75K shares per

Limited float and small market cap make it less likely that UCP is incestate ETFs and index funds

Less attractive to institutional investors

Majority ownership


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Catalysts

Valuation is its own catalysts - trades below liquidation valu

Ramp in Home-building operations should spur developmevalue

Increase in housing starts increases the value of UCPs land

Attractive buyout candidate


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Conclusion

Homebuilding operations should catalyze growth in book vaexpand margins while creating a long run-way for growth.

One of the cheapest ways to participate in the recovery of thmarket

Asymmetric return potential with low downside risk and signupside

Simple NAV story, a dollar trading for $0.50 based upon undland

Buyout candidate Homebuilders are land constrained and UCP provides exposure to h

west coast markets$


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Thank You

We try to profit by always remembering the obv

from grasping the esoteric. It is remarkable how m

term advantage people like us have gotten by try

consistently not stupid instead of trying to intelligent.

CHARLIE


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CRAWFORD CAPITAL PARTNER

Crawford Fund Management, LLC

Two Oliver Street, 6th FloorB MA 02109

Best Ideas 2014 Conference

January 8, 2014


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Important Notices

This presentation is not intended as, and does not constitute, an offer to sell any

solicitation of any person or any order to purchase any securities. No person sh

information in this document, but should rely exclusively on the Confidential O

Memorandum in deciding whether to invest in the partnership. This presentatio

informational purposes only and should not be construed as investment, legal, tadvice.

Investments in the Fund are subject to risks and uncertainties, including the risk

principal as described in the Funds Offering Memorandum. Investors are enco

the Offering Memorandum and direct any questions to management of the Fun

investing. There can be no assurance that the Funds objectives will be met or

not be incurred.

This confidential document has been prepared solely for the information of the

whom it has been delivered on behalf of the Fund and may not be reproduced o

other purpose. Each person accepting this document agrees to return it to Craw


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Leading well-managed player in genetic based diagnostic medicine

Exposed to high growth segments in early innings of adoption

Innovative companyan R&D leader with a promising pipeline of new pr

MYGN($21.11)


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Myriad Current Products


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Myriad Market Opportunity


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New Product Pipeline


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Current New Product Launches


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MYGN: Core Investment Tenets

Innovative long-term focused company exposed to high growth markets in their infancy IP pioneer in gene diagnostics; leading creator of new products

Important growth fieldgene tests add insight to save lives and costsdoctors must adopt to stay relevan

Competent management with meaningful stock ownership, Excellent sales, marketing and R&D

Protective moats around the business

Beyond the tests, MYGN has built proprietary database of gene variants with superior error performance t

Reputation built over years with prescribing physicians dealing with critical diseases on a daily basisnee

comparability, fast turnaround timesvery hard to do thisrequires much more than a lab

Largest portfolio of IP resulting from focused accumulation of R&D investment conducted in licensed lab

Strong business economics and financial position

Strong FCF generator; High and rising ROIC (see appendix), Adding to intrinsic value rapidly

No debt and 516 mil in cash ($6.22/share) for buybacks and reinvestment

Overblown fears and static sell-side analysis create buying opportunity

Supreme court ruling limited in scope leaving much IP intactnotably MYGN-created cDNA

Reimbursement cut headlines sound draconian, but in reality are likely to be slower and more moderate th

Myriad is a step ahead of competition with recent launches and pipeline


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MYGN: Investment Risks/Concern

Probable end of BRAC Monopoly: Supreme court ruling ended patenta

naturally occurring genes; Synthetic genes created by MYGN remain

they will now have to fight to defend them

New competition: Major labs with scale (Quest/ Bio-Reference) and smhave launched competing product with much lower price points

Radical reimbursement cuts: Medicare rates (10-15% of revenue) hav

proposed 48% cuts; private payers may follow suit; court ruling and com

catalyzed

Extreme short interest: Sometimes the shorts are the smart moneym

bear case seriously


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MYGN: Valuation Metrics

MYGN


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MYGN: Valuation Summary

Our pessimistic DCF valuation suggests a value of: $34/share

Pricing for all tests collapses 30% across entire revenue base over 24 months

Myriad unit growth fades faster due to competition and despite lower pricing and higher quality produc

Net margin drops from 24% to 15%; Operating margin from 37% to 22%; Cost restructuring keeps it fr

Our optimistic DCF valuation suggests a value of: $52/share

Pricing drop for all tests contained to 15% over 24 months

Myriad unit growth continues on prior trajectory--market share losses offset by higher industry unit gro

Net margin drops from 24% to 18.5%; Operating margin from 37% to 28%; Cost restructuring keeps it

Relative valuation metrics (P/E, P/FCF, EV/Sales) look attractive relative to history

potential; P/B looks attractive relative to historical and prospective ROE

No Credit for additional imbedded call options: Crescendo Bioscience, PARP C

Companion Diagnostic JVs; Value accretion from large repurchases of undervalued


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Appendix: MYGN ROIC Component


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Appendix: MYGN Pessimistic Case Sum


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Appendix: MYGN Optimistic Case Sum


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Crestonplc

SmallUKmarketingservicesholdingcompanytradingaround8x

Presented by Christian Olesen

StopsmokingcampaignconductedbyEMO,oneof

Crestonsagencies,fortheUKDept.ofHealth


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Summary

Crestonplc(LSE:CRE,95pasof1/7/14)

Owns~20

small

advertising,

PR

and

other

marketing

agencies,mostlyintheUK

Attractivebusinesswithverylowcapitalrequiremenmostlyvariablecosts (labor) stable,highfreecash

Debtfree balancesheet

Tradesat8.4xadj.trailingearnings

AcquisitionbycompetitorHavas orotherbuyerisa

ibilit b t b l ff


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Agenda

I. BusinessOverview Communications

II. BusinessOverview Health

III. BusinessOverview

Insight

IV. HistoryandManagement

V. MarginDecline

VI. KeyFinancialandValuationData

VII. Peers

VIII. Catalysts

IX. Conclusion

X Q&A


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BusinessOverview Communicat

Crestonisaholdingcompanythatownsseveralsma

agencies,whichareengagedinadvertising,PR,mark

research,andothermarketingservices.

3segments:

Communications

55%ofrevenues,46%ofoperatingincome

11agenciesengagedinadvertising,mediarelations,brandconsultin

marketing,websitecreation,dataplanningandmanagement,crisis

directmarketing,customerrelationshipmanagement(CRM),instore

outdoormarketing,eventmarketing,andmanyotherareas.

AgenciesincludeTullo MarshallWarren,NelsonBostock andEMO

Traditional media, online, mobile.


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BusinessOverview

Heal

Health


9agenciesprovidingadvertising,branding,crisismanagement,publigraphicdesign,internalcommunications/salesforceeducation,pati

etc.,primarilytolargehealthcarecompanies

AgenciesincludeCooney/Waters,TheCorkery Group,RedDoorCom

Topclients(yearindicateswhenclientrelationshipwasestablished):

CDC(99),

Amgen

GlaxoSmithKline

JV(11),

Astellas (07),

UCB

(08)

Approx.halfofrevenuesgeneratedinU.S.,therestmostlyUK

2530%operatingmargin


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BusinessOverview

Insig

Insight


2agencies(ICMandMarketingSciences)providingvariousmarketreservices,suchasbrandtrackinganddevelopment,categorymanage

panels,politicalpolling,customerchurn/retentionanalysis,etc.

Topclients:Danone Baby(99),Sainsburys(07),Tesco(92),Reckitt

(12),Canon(01)

2030%

operating

margin

Halfofrevenuesfromtop20clients,withavg.tenur

~20differentagencies

Consolidated operating margin 1318% (after ~ 2.5


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Historyand

Management

Formedin2001asreversemergerbyDonElg

BarrieBrien

isCOO

&CFO

Builtthroughseveralacquisitions,20012006

Financedbymixofearnouts,equityanddebt

SoldDLKWin2010atgoodprice,paidbackd 3small,conservativeacquisitions,20102012

Elgie andBrienown~4%total;Ibelieveall

employees and directors own 1215% (mostly


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MarginDecline

Marginshavedeclinedsincetherecession DepartureofkeypeopleatICM

LossofSanofi account

SluggishUKeconomy;poorbusinessconfidence

18.5% 18.3%

20.2%

18.5% 19.2%

17.9%

15.9%

13.9% 13.5%12.8%

10%

15%

20%

25%

ConsolidatedOperatingMargin

Documents

Manual Of Ideas 14 Presentations