Probing in Islamic Philosophy:

Studies in the Philosophies of lbn Sina,

al-GhazalI and Other Major

Muslim Thinkers

Michael E. Marmura

University

Global Academic Publishing

Binghamton University

State University of New York at Binghamton

2005

Copyright © 2005

AIJ rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be duplicated in any way without the express written consent of the publisher, except in the form of brief excerpts of quotations for the purposes of review.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Marmura? Michael E., 1929-

Probing in Islamic philosophy : studies in the philosophies of Ibn Sina IMichael E. Marmura.

p.cm.

ISBN 1-58684-254-4 (pbk. : alk. paper)

1. Avicenna, 980-1037. 2. GhaziilI, 1058-1111. 3. Philosophy, Islamic. I. TitleB751.Z7M33 2004181 '.5--dc22 2004018718

Published by Global Academic Publishing Binghamton University, LNG 99 Binghamton, New York 13902-6000 USA Phone: (607) 777-4495. Fax: (607) 777-6132 E-mail: gap@binghamton.eduWebsite: http://academicpublishing.binghamton.edu/

To Betty

A Medieval Islamic Ar\Iument for the

,Intrinsic Value of the Moral Act

y=:>\ne of the main debates in medieval Islamic speculative theology, V kaliim, centered on the question of the source of value of the moral act. Whence does the moral rightness or wrongness, or, to adopt the language normally used by these theologians, the moral "goodness," al-h.usn, and "badness" al-qubh., of such acts derive?1 This question was at the'heart of the controversy between the two major schools oflslamic speculative theology, kaliim, the Mu'tazilite and the Ash'arite.

The first, and earlier, school (which held intellectual and political sway in the first half of the ninth century, when it had official caliphal support) advocated the objective view that the moral value of an act is intrinsic to it. Acts are "in themselves" either morally good or bad.2 This school has often been referred to as "the rationalist" school of kaliim-an appropriate charac­terization, provided one keeps in mind that the members of this school were also "dogmatists," employing reason for theological ends. Their "rational­ism," however, certainly manifested itself in their ethical theory. For they maintained that reason, independently of revelation, perceives the moral val­ues of moral acts. 3 Hence these values are intrinsic to such acts. The second school, the Ash'arite, rejected this view. It maintained vigorously that all acts, considered in themselves, are morally neutral. Acts derive their moral value solely through divine commands and prohibitions. This school which takes its name from the theologian Al-Ash'ari (d. 935) (originally a Mu'tazilite who rebelled against his school) is noted for its occasionalism, for the doctrine that all events are the direct creation of God. The uniformity in nature which the Islamic Aristotelians attribute to the existence of neces­sary causal connection in things is nothing but a "habit," 'iida, arbitrarily de­creed by God. Thus although beings other than God behave as though they have intrinsic causal powers, in reality they do not. In a similar vein, the Ash' arites held that no human act has any intrinsic moral value. Human acts are "good" or "bad" simply because the divine law commands or prohibits them.4

MICHAEL E. MARMURA

The Mu'tazilites, more accurately, Mu'tazilites of the school of Basra (as distinct from the school of Baghdad) offered a number of related arguments to defend the doctrine of the intrinsic value of the moral act. These are re­ported and discussed by the theologian 'Abd al-Jabbar (d. 1025), a leading member of this school who represents Mu'tazilite thought in its maturity. Thus, for example, he reports and discusses an argument from altruism used by Abu 'AII al-Jubba'I (d. 915). According to this argument, acts of altruism are performed by people who have no expectation of reward either in this life or the next. The performance of these acts is not confined to those who accept the revealed law: acts of altruism are also performed by people who do not believe in the resurrection. Thus the altruistic act is performed simply because it is good. 5 Again, 'Abd al-Jab bar reports a related argument of his own teacher, Abu 'Abd Allah al-Ba�rI ( d. ca. 1008), where it is pointed out that people of different religious persuasions and philosophies, including the atheist materialists (al-dahriyya), agree that certain acts are either morally good or morally bad. This indicates that such acts are in themselves good or bad.6

Our concern here, however, will be with one argument in particular which 'Abd al-Jabbar reports and discusses. While it is not unrelated to the arguments mentioned above, it represents a more concrete expression of Mu'tazilite epistemology, as it illustrates the Mu'tazilite view that the moral value of some acts is known rationally sometimes through nazar, that is, theoretical reflection involving inference (as distinct from its being grasped by reason immediately, that is, "necessarily," as will be explained shortly). The argument is attributed to Abu Hashim al-Jubba'I ( d. 933). All things be­ing absolutely equal, he argued, if a person is able to attain an identical de­sirable mundane end either by telling the truth or by lying, he will necessar­ily choose to attain it by telling the truth. This is because telling the truth is in itself good and lying in itself bad.7 Ash 'arite theologians reported and ob­jected to this argument. Our main concern will be with one objection, namely that the proof begs the question, that it assumes the point at issue, the very theory of the intrinsic value of the moral act which it purports to prove. The Mu'tazilites, however, were well aware of such an objection and 'Abd al-Jabbar strove to answer it. Before considering the proof in context, the ob­jection to it, and al-Jabbar's answer, some preliminary remarks about the Mu'tazilite position are in order.

Probing in Islamic Philosophy

II

As presented by 'Abd al-Jab bar, Abu Hashim's argument is the second of five "proofs" to show that a morally good act performed by anyone (God or man) empowered to perform it is in itself good.8 God is certainly empow­ered to perfoJ1ll good acts. Hence these acts are good in themselves. More­over, the divine acts are always good. This is one of the things the Mu'tazilites meant by their doctrine of divine justice (al- 'adl),9 which with the cognate doctrine divine unity (al-tawhfd), formed the basis of their the­ology. A Mu'tazilite was sometimes referred to as an 'adliyy, one who up­holds the doctrine of divine justice, as opposed to a mujbir, one who main­tains that all human acts are determined.10 Divine justice entails the doctrine of man's freedom of the will and of choice. 11 This is related to Mu 'tazilite eschatology. A just God rewards and punishes men in.the .hereafter only for those acts which they themselves have initiated, or""lO use.Mu'tazilite termi­nology, "created." Another principle associated with this is that a just God does not punish or reward acts which are beyond people's capacity (mafawq al-t aqa ). Moreover, a just God does not reward one for "bad" acts and does not punish one for performing "good" acts. His acts of reward or punishment are conditioned, so to speak, by the inherent merit or demerit of freely cho­sen acts, or, as these theologians expressed it, by the desert (al-isti/:tqiiq) of the act. This implies that this merit or demerit of the act is intrinsic to it. 12

Thus both the divine just act and the human morally good act are intrinsi­ca1ly good.

The idea that the divine just act is good in itself and that people perform morally good acts because these are good in themselves is given expression in one of the early Mu'tazilite works that have managed to survive.13 This is the Kitab al-Inti$iir (Book of Triumph) of al Khayyat (d. ca. 902), a promi­nent Mu'tazilite of the Baghdadi school. Al- Khayyat reports an argument between the early Mu'tazillite al-Na'.?,'.?iim (d. ca. 840) and some opponents. As reported in this text, al-N�iam argued that it is impossible for God to commit an unjust act because such an act is only committed by one who is in some need or is ignorant of its badness. Need and ignorance cannot be ap­plied to God. Against this the opponents pointed out what they held to be an empirical fact, namely, that we invariably witness that those who perform just acts do them for some personal gain. In his reply, al- Naiiam does not challenge the statement that this is an empirical fact. He admits it, but adds two points. The first is that while it is true that people perform the just act for

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MICHAEL E. MARMURA

some personal gain, they are nonetheless prompted to doing it by their knowledge of its goodness. The second is that in the case of God, we cannot attribute to Him any such motive of gain without denying Him self­sufficiency. God hence performs the just act because it is in itself noble and good:

[ Al-N aiiam' s] opponents, when he argued that it is impossible to attribute to God the power to do injustice, using as [his] reason for this that injustice only comes about from someone who has a need that impels him to adopt it or one who is ignorant of its badness and consequences, asked him: "Have you found a doer of justice [who does] not [perform it] for the purpose of acquir­ing a benefit and the warding off of some harm?" He said to them: "Even though justice does not come about except for the purpose of acquiring a benefit and warding off some harm, that which prods one to perform it is the knowledge of its goodness. God, however, does not acquire benefits and does not ward off harm [ from Himself], but enacts [justice] because of its goodness and nobility."14

The main point here, which is encountered in Abu Hashim's argument, is the admission that people perform just acts for mundane benefits, but that this is not the primary reason for their doing it. It is the "goodness" and "no­bility" of the act that "prods" them to do it.

Knowledge of the goodness or badness of acts is intimately related to Mu'tazilite epistemology. Here we can only indicate their basic division of knowledge into necessary and reflective as explained in the writings of 'Abd al-Jabbar and his school.15 Rational knowledge, as distinct from knowledge attained directly from the revealed scriptures, is either "necessary" (<Jariir'i or

iftiriir'i) or "reflective" (naiar'i), also designated "acquired" (muktasab).

"Necessary Knowledge" is knowledge created in us by God which we are compelled to accept. It is indubitable knowledge that includes apprehension of our own psychological states, knowledge attained by the senses, self­evident rational truths, 16 but, more to our purpose, it also includes knowl­edge of the moral value of certain types of acts, 17 or "acts having descrip­tions in the sense that when they are of such and such a character, they are good or obligatory."18 These types of acts are regarded as the principles (u�ul) of moral conduct.19 An example of an ethical principle that belongs to the category of being known necessarily is "injustice is bad"; for we know directly, without having to reason about it, the mode I aspect (al-wajh) or

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Probing in Islamic Philosophy

ground (al- llla) that renders it bad.20 In this case its very being injustice is the immediately known mode that renders it bad.

With reflective knowledge, by contrast, ascertaining the explanatory as­pect or ground for the judgement involves further reasoning in some form of inference (istidliil). Thus, for example, in the case of falsehood that brings about a mundane advantage, we recognize it to be falsehood, but not imme­diately as bad. It is through reflection ( either through comparing it with truthfulness when both are either devoid of mundane benefits or when both attain the same mundane benefit) that one ascertains the mode that renders it bad, namely its falsehood.21 One will quickly notice the affinity of this type of reasoning with Abu Hashim's argument to which we will nowtum.

Ill

'Abd al-Jabbar reports Abu Hashim's argument is as follows:

Our Shaykh Abu Hashim, God have mercy on him, relied in· this22 [on the argument] that if for one among us the state of truthfulness and falsehood are equal when enacting either [to at­tain] benefits, so that, [for example], he would know that he would attain a specific dirham he needs, either by enacting false­hood or truthfulness, he would not prefer falsehood to truthful­ness, but would necessarily prefer truthfulness. Nor would the state [ of these two] be for him that of the state of two [ instances of] truthfulness or [two instances] offalsehood in the possibility of his preferring one [ of the same kind] to its cognate.

For if the good were similar to the bad in being enacted for attaining a need and were not enacted for its goodness, then the state of truthfulness and falsehood would be equal for him in en­acting either when their states [in producing] a benefit is the same. It would then be possible for him to choose falsehood in­stead of truthfulness. [(But this is not the case.)] If, then, this is false, it proves that he performs the truthful [act] because of its goodness which specifically characterizes it, not because of what it has by way of benefit and the warding off of harm.

[Abu Hashim] was asked [several] questions about this proof (al-daliila), of which we will produce the strongest in detail and answer them. 23

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'Abd al-Jabbar reports and answers six questions or objections. Al­though all six objections and the answers to them are of both historical and philosophical interest in their own right, our focus will be mainly on those objections that reappear in Ash' arite criticisms, particularly the criticism that the proof begs the question. However, some idea of the kind of objections given and 'Abd al-Jabbar's response to them is needed, if only to put the criticism that the proof begs the question in its proper setting. Hence, before discussing Ash'arite criticisms of the proof we will begin by summing up what we perceive to be the essential points of all six objections and 'Abd al­Jabbar's response to each.

i) Objection. The claim in the proof that truthfulness and falsehood areequal in acquiring one and the same benefit is not true. Truthfulness has praise as its desert; falsehood, blame. Hence one would chose truthfulness because it has praise as an added benefit and would shun falsehood as hav­ing blame, a diminishing of benefit.24

Answer. The elements of blame and praise that may give greater benefi­cial weight to truthfulness can be equalized either by making the enactment of falsehood productive of a greater mundane benefit, or else making the en­actment of truthfulness more arduous. These would balance each other in terms of the benefit attained, in which case truthfulness would be necessarily chosen.25

ii) Objection. The claim in the proof that if truthfulness and falsehoodare on a par as far as attaining the same mundane benefit is concerned, then one would necessarily choose truthfulness, asserts the very point at conten­tion. The proof begs the question.26

Answer. That the rational person in the circumstance described by the proof would necessarily chose truthfulness is something that cannot be re­jected by appealing to experience, just as the notion that one always prefers that which is beneficial as against the harmful cannot be rejected by an ap­peal to experience. 27

iii) Objection. If it is established that one chooses truthfulness and notfalsehood, this does not prove that the .choice was made because of the goodness of truthfulness; rather, the choice is made because of a combina­tion of its goodness and the .benefit that it brings about. This only means that truthfulness gives preponderance to the choice, not that one chooses the act for its goodness alone.28

Answer. If one chooses truthfulness, then we have three possible alterna­tive reasons for the choice: (a) it is chosen only because of its goodness; (b)

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Probing in Islamic Philosophy

it is chosen only because of the benefit it attains; ( c) it is chosen because of both (a) and (b). If (a) is true, then this is what is being argued for. (b) has already been refuted. If ( c) is accepted, then it refutes the idea that one chooses truthfulness only for the benefit it attains. If one then chooses it for both its goodness and the benefit it attains and if then the benefit is removed, one would still choose truthfulness. Hence it would be chosen because of its goodness. 29

iv) Objection. If truthfulness and falsehood as a means for acquiring thesame benefit are posited as equal, and if then it is argued that truthfulness is chosen, this contradicts the initial assumption-the very act of choosing truthfulness shows that it and falsehood are not equal.30

Answer. No one has claimed that truthfulness and falsehood are in them­selves equal. The equality pertains only to the benefit either can attain.31

v) Objection. If the same benefit is attainable by hitting another or bykilling him, one would chose the hitting. This d.Qes not indicate anything about any inherent moral quality in either act. In a similar way, if one chooses truthfulness instead of falsehood for attaining an identical. benefit, this does not mean that this is done because of the inherent goodness. of truthfulness. 32

Answer. In the above example, hitting is chosen because it produces the lesser harm. The killing thus becomes a superfluous act. It is as though there are two acts, the hitting being sufficient for attaining the end, the killing un­necessary.33

vi) Objection. If one chooses the truthful act because of its goodness, itfollows that God performs every act because of its goodness. This leads to His performing an infinite number of acts. If it is argued that He chooses be­tween the good acts, then it follows that in the case of the acts He did not choose, He did not choose them even though they are good. "Do you not see that just as He does not perform the bad [act] because of its badness, it fol­lows necessarily that He does not choose any bad [actJ; and since He prefers the obligatory because of its obligatory [characterJ, He must choose every obligatory act-particularly as you [yourselves] have said to those who op­pose you [ on the question of God's choosing] the most beneficial act, 'if it is incumbent on Him to perform the most beneficial act because it is the most beneficial, it follows necessarily that He would perform an infinite [number of acts].' This also follows necessarily in your statement that He performs the good [act] because of its goodness."34

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Answer. "We did not say that He must prefer the good act because of its goodness, as we have mentioned with respect to the bad and the obligatory. We only said that it is possible for Him to perform it because of its goodness and that once He intended to act, He would choose only the good [act]."35

The last objection helps remind us of the general theological framework of the debate and is significant as an expression of a basic disagreement within Mu<tazilite ranks.36

Our chief concern, however, as we have indicated earlier, is with the second objection and its reiteration by Ash <arite critics. A most detailed criti­cism is made by the Ash'arite al-BaqillanI (d. 1013). Later writers in the Ash<arite tradition, such as al-JuwaynI (d. 1085) and al-ShahrastanI (d. 1153) also criticized the proof, making points similar to those found in some of the objections above. We will hence begin by commenting briefly on some of the criticisms of these two theologians, 37 before turning fuller atten­tion to al-BaqillanI' s critique. None of these three theologians mentions Abu Hashim when presenting and criticizing the proof. Al-BaqillanI, as we shall see, criticizes it in the context of his refutation of the Brahmans. 38

IV

Al-JuwaynI argues that the proof begs the question. He does this by first giving a general criticism of the epistemological basis of the Mu<tazlites' ethical theory. He sums up their view that the moral quality of an act is known either "necessarily," intuitively (alii al-bad"iha) or "by way of reflec­tion" ('ala sabfl al-na1,ar). In their theory of moral acts, he points out, "nec­essary" knowledge is the basis of "reflective" knowledge, so that if their claim of attaining "necessary" knowledge is refuted, their claim that reflec­tion yields knowledge of objective ethical value also falls. Now if, as the Mu <tazilites claim, the principles are known intuitively and "necessarily," al­JuwaynI argues in effect, then these principles must receive universal accep­tance. But these principles are not universally accepted. Hence there is no intuitive, necessary know ledge of such moral values. Objective moral values inhering in acts simply do not exist.39 He then gives a brief version of Abu Hashim's proof and suggests, without elaborating the point, that it assumes the point at issue. It presupposes the principle on which the proof is based, namely that there are moral values of acts that are known "necessarily." He also gives an identical criticism of the first objection to the proof in <Abd al-

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Jabbar' s account-truthfulness and falsehood cannot be equal since the for­mer deserves praise, the latter blame.40

Al-ShahrastanI also rejects the principle that we are able to have imme­diate, necessary know ledge of the moral value of acts. His reasons are simi­lar to those of al-JuwaynI as he points out that there is no universal accep­tance of the. moral principles the Mu<tazilite claim to be necessary and intuitive. He, however, adds in support of this a hypothetical argument, first given by Avicenna (lbn Sina, d. 1037).41 "Ifwe suppose that a human was born all at once," al-ShahrastanI writes, "[endowed] with a perfect natural intelligence and a perfect intellect, without having acquired the moral habits of a people, without having been imbued with the manners of [his] two par­ents, without having attired himself with the garment of the religious law and without having been instructed by a teacher, [if such an individual] is then presented with two [propositions, the first] that [the number] two is greater than one, [the second] that lying is bad in the sense that it deserves blame from God, exalted be He, doubtlessly he would not hesitate [in accepting] the first [proposition], but would [hesitate in accepting] the second."42 In other words the moral dictum is not an intuited necessary truth. Al-Shah­rastanI also sums up Abu Hashim's proofs,43 and, in answering them, reiter­ates the view that a moral dictum, unlike the arithmetical proposition in the example, is not intuitively known.44 Implicit in this criticism is that the proposition "lying is bad" is already assumed as a true proposition in the proof.

To turn then to al-BaqillanI' s treatment of the proof, one must note the context in which it is presented. Al-BaqillanI does not include his presenta­tion and refutation of the proofin his critique of Mu'tazilite doctrine but as part of his refutation of arguments denying the possibility of prophethood attributed in medieval Islam to "the Brahmans" (al-Bariihima). This denial of the possibility of prophethood is also encountered among some medieval Islamic thinkers such as the physician-philosopher al-RazI (d. ca. 926) who used arguments similar to those attributed to the "Brahmans" in his rejection of prophethood. This brings us to the significances from the Ash<arite per­spective, of placing Abu Hashim's argument in this context. For if reason, unaided by revelation, can discern the goodness and badness of acts, this gives support to the view that prophetic revelation is superfluous. In other words the Mu<tazilite position on the moral value of acts in effect gives "aid to the enemy." Al-BaqillanI does not mention the Mu'tazilites by name in this context. He maintains that there are "two groups" of Brahmans, those

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who acknowledge only the prophethood of Adam, and those who do not ac­knowledge any prophet at all.45 Abu Hashim's proof is associated with "the two groups and those who follow them [in this]."46 Presumably, "those who follow them [in this]" are the Mu'tazilites.

Al-BaqillanI' s criticism of the proof (given in a style and idiom all its own) is not always easy to follow. It is hence perhaps best before offering a translation of the text to sum up the main points he makes. After presenting his own wording of the proof, he disputes the claim that, all things being equal, an individual confronted with the choice between truthfulness and falsehood as means for achieving his end would necessarily choose truthful­ness. This is sheer assumption. An individual confronted with such a choice may well belong to a society where truthfulness is not cherished and is not necessarily preferred to falsehood. The opponent, however, may insist that such an individual would still choose truthfulness. But then, al-BaqillanI ar­gues, the opponent is caught in circular reasoning. He at first holds that the proof that truthfulness is good is that (all things being equal) the rational person, in attaining his purpose, would necessarily choose it, not falsehood. When challenged that this is an assumption, the opponent changes his tune and argues that the rational person must nonetheless choose truthfulness be­cause it is good. Thus truthfulness is proved to be good because it is chosen instead of falsehood and then it is argued that it is chosen instead of false­hood because it is good. What is being proved is given as the reason for proving it. It is as if one were to argue, as al-BaqillanI puts it, that "I would not know that Zayd is in the house until I know that 'Amr is in it and I would not know that 'Amr is in the house until I know that Zayd is in it." Al­BaqillanI' s presentation of the proof and his criticisms of it are as follows:

The two [Brahman] groups and those who follow them [in this may] say:47

"The proof that the judgment of the intellect discerns the goodness and badness [of acts] is our knowledge that whoever is able to reach his objective through [both] truthfulness and false­hood must by necessity reach it through truthfulness, not false­hood, and that nothing but this would come about through him. In this he would only abandon falsehood for truthfulness in reaching his objective because of the goodness of truthfulness and the badness of falsehood. Hence it follows necessarily that the mind discerns the goodness of the good and the badness of the bad."48

Probing in Islamic Philosophy

It would [then] be said to them: "If the one seeking the attainment of his objective is one of

those who do not believe in the preferability of truthfulness to falsehood and does not belong to a people who believe this [but to a people] who perceive neither shame in falsehood nor praise and exaltation in truthfulness, who do not discriminate by making [ any J preference between truthfulness and falsehood, between the truthful person and the liar, and who do not take on [the prefer­ability of truthfulness to falsehood] as a religion, would you then [in the case of such an individual] deny that he would choose equally between truthfulness and falsehood? This is just the same as [it is] with the person who believes that he can attain his objective in the same way by either one of two dirhams he pos­sesses, by being silent or speaking, and by moving his right or left [hand], and by paying with [ either J witho1,1t any special merit resulting from paying with one of them [rather than the other]. [Such a person] is free to spend either one of the two dirhams as he wishes, [to choose] between silence or speech, [and between] moving [his] right or left [hand] as long as the state of affairs re� mains for him one and the same and equally balanced. If this, then, is the case, what you have used as argument falls."

If, after [all] this, they say, "it is a necessity that this human being would choose truthfulness by reason of its goodness, not falsehood,"49 it would be said to them:

"This is ignorant speech50 and an abandonment of theoretical reflection." This is because they have made the necessity of at­taining the objective through enacting truthfulness instead of falsehood a proof for the goodness of truthfulness. When we showed them this to be false, they came back making the good­ness of truthfulness the proof for the necessity of enacting truth­fulness as against falsehood. This leads to establishing neither the goodness of truthfulness nor the necessity of enacting it. This is because, if we do not know the necessity of enacting truthfulness unless we know its goodness and we do not know its goodness unless we know the necessity [of enacting it], we have no way for knowing either its necessity or its goodness. Similarly, if one were to say, "I would not know that Zayd is in the house until I know that 'Amr is in it and I would not know that 'Amr is in the house until I know that Zayd is in it," it would be impossible51

that he would know that either Zayd is in the house or that 'Amr is in it. This is because he had made the condition for his know­ing something a condition for that for which it is a condition.This

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is one of the things that renders the occurrence of [ either one J of the two conditioned things impossible.

If this, then, is the case, it becomes established in the course of this [ discussionJ52 that knowledge of the obligatoriness of acts, their prohibition and their permissibility is not apprehended by the judgments of the mind. And it becomes established that there is a necessary need for revealed word53 that unveils that through which reward and punishment are attained and that through which God, honoured and exalted be He, prohibits ignorance of His existence and the abandoning of theoretical reflection leading to the knowledge of Him by those of His creatures whom He ob­ligated [ to pursue such reflection]. This is one of the greatest and most serious of matters whose knowledge is not apprehended through the intellect. Hence the statement of the Brahmans that the intellect suffices for the apprehension of all guided [things] and benefits, is false.

One notices that al-BaqillanI's refutation falls into two parts. The first is the argument that the proof begs the question; the second is that this argu­ment "establishes" that reason alone cannot arrive at the moral value of acts. In what follows, we will begin by commenting briefly on the second part and then consider the first part and cAbd al-Jabbar's reply to the essential point it makes, even though raised much earlier by others.

v

The argument that demonstrating the proof to be fallacious also estab­lishes the doctrine that reason, independently of revelation, cannot arrive at the moral values of acts, is itself invalid. Abu Hashim's proof is not a suffi­cient condition for the truth of the Mu ctazilite theory of moral acts. To dem­onstrate that the proof is circular does not demonstrate that the Muctazilite theory is false. But al-BaqillanI' s conclusion is not without historical signifi­cance. It sums up the Ash c arites' position and highlights their concern. For at stake, as has already been remarked, is the question of whethe� prophets are needed. It also affirms that the prohibition to abandon theoretical reflection "leading to the know ledge of [God] by those of His creatures whom He obli­g_a�ed [t� pursue such reflection]" is known only through revelation. This po­s1t10n differs from that of some of the Basrite Muctazilites who held that

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theoretical reflection leading to the existence of God is an obligation but is known independently of revelation.54

But what about al-BaqillanI' s refutation? Is the proof involved in circu­lar reasoning? Al-BaqillanI' s argument seems unassailable. One must, how­ever, tum to c Abd al-J abbar' s treatment of this question-to see whether he has answereJ:l the objection that the proof begs the question. As we have seen in ill above, cAbd al-Jabbar reports a second question or objection to Abu Hashim's proof. This is the objection that the proof begs the question. His statement is very brief and his answer to it is also not detailed. The main part of the text reads as follows:

They said: "You have claimed that if [truthfulness and falsehood] are

equal to [the person] in terms of [the reaching of a] benefit and the warding off of harm, he would choose truthfulness and cannot choose falsehood. But this is [the very] claimabout.which [the proponents of the proof ] are being disputed."

[To this] it would be said to them: "That which we have claimed, [namely] that the rational per­

son will only choose that which he knows to be good when its state, so far as [ attaining a mundane J benefit and the warding off of harm is concerned, equals the bad, is [ something] that cannot be rejected in experience.55 Similarly one cannot reject [in ex­perience a person's] preference for what is beneficial over that .which is harmful. ... "56

'Abd al-Jabbar thus in his answer appeals to experience. Is it true that we will never find counter instances to people choosing the truthful instead of what is untrue in attaining their end and, for that matter, is it true that we will never find counter instances to people always acting for their self­interest? How can this be shown? One main weakness in Abu Hashim's proof is that it is hypothetical and artificial. Here one cannot but take as valid the criticisms that the hypothesized equality between truthfulness and false­hood with respect to attaining a goal does not obtain. cAbd al-Jabbar's argu­ment that when factors crop up to render the two cases unequal one can "equalize" these by adding and subtracting benefits, a kind of a calculus of benefits, is also artificial. There is always the human factor. An individual who by temperament is extremely cautious and suspicious may know that a minor infraction of the law, a dishonest deed, which brings about a mundane benefit is not detectable. But if the same end is attainable without breaking the law, such a person would choose "truthfulness," simply out of habitual

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prudence. Prudence, rather than some rational apprehension of the "good­ness" of honesty would be the more likely determining factor for the choice. 'Abd al-Jabbar does not really answer the objection that the proof begs the ques_tion. And if this objection remains unanswered, then the "proof " be­comes at best an illustration of what the Mu'tazilites hold, rather than a dem­onstration of the truth of their theory.

'Abd al-J abbar, however, has introduced a very relevant factor in the de­bate, not as an answer to the objection to the proof, but as something that pertains to the Mu'tazilite theory of moral acts as a whole. In this specific context, he speaks of experience, of that which-is observed (ft al-shiihid). Elsewhere his discussions continuously revolve around our normal way of speaking about things, which is also associated with experience. Setting aside for the moment ethical language, in normal discourse we frequently do regard an act as good, not simply because of the objective it attains. Some­times we speak of a lawyer's defence as brilliant, even if he does not win his case, and we admire the skill with which a driver in a car race negotiates successfully a dangerous tum, regardless of the final outcome of the race. It is the performance in such instances that we evaluate. We recognize, that is, "the achieve of, the mastery of the thing," as the poet Hopkins so effectively put it, though in a context all its own. Moreover, normally (whether con­sciously or unconsciously) we regard the value we place on a well-executed act as something that characterizes it objectively.

This also is often a normal way of regarding things in the realm of moral activity as witnessed, for example, in the reaction of audiences in theatrical performances where a moral issue is dramatized and written in large letters, so to speak. Thus, for example,57 when in the final scene of Bellini's opera, the Druid priestess, Norma, "owns up" and, rising above her impulse to wreak vengeance on those who had hurt her, gives herself up to be burned at the stake, the audience-helped by the music, to be sure-immediately ap­prehends "the goodness and nobility" of her deed. It is very doubtful that the audience would be musing: "Sad and tragic as her act is, she did the morally right thing because in the long run her action is likely to produce the greatest amount of happiness to the greatest number of Druids." It is even less likely that her Roman ex-lover in the story, who, moved by the nobility of her deed, decides to die with her, would have had such thoughts. The reaction of the audience is immediate and spontaneous. The action of both these fic­tional characters may be explained in terms of a number of ethical theories,

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not excluding the utilitarian. But, surely, the intuitive theory of moral acts must remain a contender, and a serious one at that.

In recent years the conflict between utilitarians and those who hold an intuitive theory of the moral act may have abated somewhat, or perhaps gone out of fashion, but, as we see it, the difficulties remain unresolved.-The me­dieval Islamic theologians also debated similar issues. The Ash'arites in criticizing the Mu'tazilites developed and presented highly sophisticated epistemological arguments.58 But the Mu'tazilites also made their point, by directing attention to experience and to normal discourse. And one must give at least some attention to the voice of that versatile and original medieval theologian, the Mu'tazilite al-Na��am, who argued that in the final analysis, when a person performs a just act, that which prods him to do it, ma

yalJ,diihu 'alayhi, is the knowledge of "its goodness and nobility."

NOTES

I These tenns are both ethical and aesthetic. l;lusn can mean either "good" or "beauti­ful," qabilJ either "bad" or "ugly." Other tenns were at times also used. Thus according to the Mu'tazilite 'Abd al-Jabbar (d. 1025) in certain contexts a good act may be described as !Jaqq, "right, true"; $awiib, "correct, right"; or $al:i'i!J, "sound"; and a bad act as khata � "an error" (Mughni VI 29-30, 32, 34).

2 Whether the moral value of the act was an attribute (.rifa) or a state (/Jii[) was dis­cussed. 'Abd aj�Jabbar' s position on this is not entirely certain. In discussing the a/Jkiim, the legal categories or qualifications of acts (Mughni VI 7 ff.), he holds that a pennitted act is good (in a naturalistic sense of good-Mughni VI 31) by virtue of an attribute additional to its existence ($i/a ziiida 'Iii wujiidihi) and that an act is obligatory by virtue of an attribute additional to its goodness (.rifa ziiula 'ala !Jusinihi). Sometimes, however, he refers to the moral value of an act as a "state" and gives assent to the doctrine of Abii Hashim al-Jubba'1 (Shar/J 50) that the divine attributes are states, that when, for example, we speak of God as a knower we are affinning a state or a condition that differentiates Him from one who is igno­rant, but that this state is not an ontological entity added to the essence, even though it can only be understood in tenns of the essence, and that it is improper to speak of it as existing or non-existing. 'Abd al-Jabbar also accepts, with some qualification, Abii Hashim's view that aesthetic value, like moral value, is an objective state of affairs (amr), without, however, specifying what this amr is (Mughni VI 55).

3 The exception to these are the acts of ritual and worship, known only through the re­vealed law. These are "instrumentally" good. Some Mu'tazilites seem to have held these are good only because the law commands them. 'Abd al-Jabbar, on the other hand, maintains that they are good in the instrumental sense of promoting intrinsic good and that what the religious law does is to provide us with knowledge of them, not available through independ­ent reason. The implication is that these instrumental goods are also objective, even though,

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unlike intrinsic moral values, they are only known through the law. See, for example, Majmii' 235-36; MughnlVI 58, 105.

4 G. F. Hourani has aptly characterized the Ash 'arite doctrine as "theistic subjectivism."G. F. Hourani, ''Two Theories of Value in Early Islam," Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics (Oxford, 1985), 57.

5 MughniVI, 223-24. 6 Ibid., 227.7 Ibid., 214-15. 8 Ibid., 210. The title of this chapter containing these proofs reads: "that the one em­

powered to do the good may do it for its goodness only, even though he has no need for it." 9 MughniVI 3; Shar/J 301. IO Khayyat 23; Ibn al-Murta9ii, Tabaqat al-Mu'tazila, ed. S. Diwald-Wilzer (Beirut,

1961) 11. 11 For a discussion of the centrality of the belief in man's voluntary action in Mu 'tazilite

thinking and the highly sophisticated analyses of human actions involving motivation, choice, decisions, ability to act, in the thought of 'Abd al-Jabbiir, see R. M. Frank, ''The Autonomy of the Human Agent in the Teaching of 'Abd al-Gabbiir," Le Museon 95 (1982), 323-35.

12 While God never does what is evil and always does what is good, there is no compul­sion on Him to perform a possible good act or a possible best act. He must, however, resur­rect an individual entitled to reward in the hereafter so as to reward him according to his de­serts (Mughni IX, 44-45).

13 By "early" we mean works belonging to the late eighth, ninth, and early tenth centu­ries, that is, works preceding the books of 'Abd al-Jabbiir that have been discovered and are available. It is true that the literateur al-JiilJii (d. 869) was a Mu'tazilite and his works yield information about Mu'tazilism-but these are basically works of literature, not kalam as such.

14 lnti�ar 38.15 For an exposition of this theory with particular relevance to ethics, see G. F. Hourani,

Islamic Rationalism. The Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar (Oxford, 1971 ), particularly Chapters II and IV, section 20.

16 See Shar/J 50, 51; Mughn"i XII, 66. 17 Majmu ' 3, 232-33. 18 Ibid., 3. 19 Ibid., 232. 20 Shar!J 31 O; Majmu ' 233; Mughnf VI, 66.21 Majmu' 233; MughnfVI, 66-67; MughniXII, 66. 22 The reference is to the first proof which 'Abd al-Jabbiir gives to the effect that what-

ever acts God performs are always good and in themselves good. 23 Mughn"iVI, 214-15. 24 Ibid., 215. 25 Ibid., 215-17. 26 Ibid., 217. 27 Ibid., 217-18. 28 Ibid., 218.

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29 Ibid., 218-20. 30 Ibid., 220. The wording in the text is not entirely clear, but this is how we understand

the argument, basing ourselves on the response which is much clearer. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., 220--21. 33 Ibid., 221. 34 Ibid., 221-22. 35 Ibid., 222-23. 36 The dispute here is between the Basra and the Baghdadi Mu'tazilite schools. The

school of Baghdad held that God performs the most beneficial or salutary act for men for this life and the next, the Basra school holding that He always performs what is beneficial, not the most beneficial, for man in this life and the most beneficial for the next.

Al-N�)l:iim, however, disagreed with his own school of Basra on this issue, siding with the school of Baghdad. He is reported to have argued that God must always perform the.most beneficial act for his servants: "It cannot be said that God is capable of performing an act more beneficial than the one He has performed; nqr can jt be said that He is capable of per­forming a lesser act. For, [in the latter case], the performance of a le'!:!er act would be defi­ciency; and it is impossible for God to perform a deficient act. And [in the former case] it cannot be said that He can perform a more beneficial act because, if God were able to do so, but did not, this would be stinginess [on his part]" (Maqalat 576).

To the objection that this argument in effect denies God freedom of choice, al-N�iam answered that there are an infinite number of possible "best" acts from which God chooses (ibid., 555, 574; see also above, n. 12.)

37 Both al-JuwaynI and al-ShahrastiinI have extensive criticisms of the Mu'tazilite doc­trine of moral acts, criticisms that deserve detailed attention. We are, however, confining ourselves largely to their criticisms that Abii Hashim's proof commits petitio principii.

38 The reference is to the Brahmans of India. Al-BaqilliinI' s knowledge of the Brahmans reflects the confusion about them current in medieval Islam. For example, he differentiates between Brahmans who rejected all prophets and those who accepted the prophethood of Adam alone. Medieval Islam gained a better knowledge of Brahmanism after al-BiriinI's work on India, written in Ghazna about 1020 A.O. See F. Ralman, "Bariihima," Encyclopedia of I slam2

I 1031. 39 Al-JuwaynI, al-Irshad (Cairo, 1950), 259-63. 40 Ibid., 263-64. 41 Ibn Sinii, al-lsharat wa al-Tanbihat, ed. J. Forget (Leiden, 1882), 59. Avicenna

agrees with the Ash'arites only in that he holds that acts considered in themselves are mor­ally neutral. They are, however, "good" or "bad" to the extent that they are conducive or not conducive to a good end, namely, happiness in this world or the next. For a fuller discussion of this and related points, see my article, "Ghazali on Ethical Premises," The Philosophical Forum NS 1 (1969), 293-402.

42 Al-ShahrastiinI, Nihayat-al-Iqdam .fi 'llm al-Kalam, ed. A. Guillaume (London, 1934), 371-72.

43 Ibid., 373 44 Ibid., 378-79.45 Al-BiiqilliinI, al-Tamhid, ed. R. J. McCarthy, S. J. (Beirut, 1957), 104.

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46 Ibid., 125. For the proof and al-BaqilliinI's criticism of it, ibid., 125-26.47 The actual structure of the original sentence is a conditional: "If the two groups and

those who follow them say, 'the proof that. . . ,' then it would be said to them .. .. " 48

A literal translation of this last sentence would read: "Hence the mind's judgement (qa{lii') of the goodness of the good and the badness of the bad follows necessarily."

49 A more literal translation of this sentence would read: "It is necessary for this human being to choose truthfulness instead of falsehood because of its goodness."

50 Jahlun min al-kaliim. The general sense suggests that kaliim here should be read in its ordinary sense as "speech," not as the name of the disciple kaliim.

51 Reading lam yajuz, a reading given in the apparatus criticus, instead of lam ya$i/;. 52 Bi hiidhihi al-jumla. Perhaps more literally "by this assemblage [of words]." 53 Al-sam� 54

Abu 'AII al-Jubbii'1 maintained that a rational, sane, human being becomes an "obli­gated creature" when there occurs to this person's mind the thought (al-khiifir) of the possi­ble danger of divine punishment should one refrain from "theoretical reflection" (nazar; Maqiiliit, 481). Cf. also Sharl;, 70-72 on the disagreement about whether the knowledge of this obligation is itself attained through reflection or whether it is known immediately as necessary knowledge.

55 More literally: "That which we have claimed, [namely] that the rational person will only prefer that whose goodness he knows if its state equals the bad with respect to benefit and the warding off of harm is [something] that cannot be rejected in experience."

56 MughnfVI, 217. 57 It is hoped that my choice of an example from the operatic world will indicate that the

continuous acts of generosity over the years of Professor Ronald Smith and his wife Helen of passing on to me their issues of Opera News have not been seeds fallen on entirely barren ground.

58 This is not to suggest that, strictly speaking, they were utilitarians or teleologists, al­though their language at times may suggest teleology. For they do speak of the good act as that which is rewarded in the hereafter; the bad, as that which is punished, so that, in a sense, the good act, for example, has reward "as its consequence." Strictly speaking, however, for these theologians an act is good because God commands it and bad because He prohibits it. A good act is always rewarded in the hereafter and a bad act punished but that is because God has so stated it through His prophets and God does not commit falsehoods.

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IV. Appendix