t{tjil-u I" ¡1-rír"r-')ì íì l"

I f:'; i lt"

uiji\,'i-iì'ìll)'.:' ili lì' ;''li: 1i

l-llÍ:.,i. li) I iiC..å"

I ntern ati o n ale Zettsch rift

für VölkeÍ- und Sprachenkunde

lnternational Review

of Ethnology and Linguistics

Revue lnternationale

d'Ethnologie et de Linguistique

Ephemeris lnternationalis

Ethnologica et Linguistica

P sT|TUTUM ANTHROPOS vol. 72 -1977

Prehistoric Ârcþaeology

and the Problem of Ethno Cognition.

Mlxrnnn K. H. Eoconr

Contents :

1, ,The Fallacy of Misconceived Scientific Procedure2. Ttte Fallacy of the Misconceived Nature of Archaeological Data3. Tþe Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness4. The Fallacy of Mistaken Reality5, Conclusion,

In an earlieron the problem of

paper (Eccers 1976b) the author has shown thatprehistoric cognition failed to provide methods

recent publicasuited for

cognitive information from archaeological data. The present paper addresses itself toquestion whether or not such information can be obtained by prehistoricIt is argued that those who favor such an aim fell a victim of four major fallacies duea misconception of scientific procedure, of the nature of archaeological data, of thevs. entity problem, and of reality.

In the last two decades cultural anthropologists have placedemphasis upôn certain theoretical and. methodological issues which are

in fol,k cognition and referred to und.er various labels such as

Ethmosernant'ics, Nea Etknogrøþhy or, most recently, Cognitiue A

* This article grew out of a paper read in K, C. Crr¡Nc's seminar "TopicsIssues in Archaeology" at Yale University in the fall o1 1973. An earlier clraft wasby K. C. Cner.rc, Enxst W. Mür-r-on, \Mrrnpru RÄrzer-, InvrNc Roust, Re¡'¡Br-Usr-an, and Rüorcpn VossBN. Their critical advice, though not always followed,gratefully acknowledged. For detailed discussions of various issues put forward here

am particularly indebted to InvrNo Rouse. Finally, I want to thank especiallyuenrs K. EocenT, who took an essential .part in shaping my ideas as to thediscussed. I should like to add that this paper was prepared while I was holding a

ship of tlne Stwd,iensti,ftung d,es dewtschen Vol'hes and' ltre Dewtsake

respectively.

a/rfiral thropologY ere, address myself to corresponding attempts

Prehistoric Archaeology and the Problem of Ethno-Cognition 243

1969). Some think that these developments promise "a revolution inanthropology" (GleowrN and Srunrrv¡tlr L962 : 72).

Efforts to discover and analyze folk systems of cognition are not conûnedH shallIan

the field of prehistoric archaeology

Ouite a few publications have appeared by now which in one way or the

ãre directed toward the problem of the decipherment of ancient cog-

. Some of them state their concern and objectives in a rather explicit(e. g., GenorN 1965; Cuexc 1967ø, t967b; AnNolo t97I), whereas

approach the subject more indirectly (e. g., Døørz 7967, L968). Stillthough most of them do not purport to deal with prehistoric cognitiveat all, clearly belong into that realm. This is certainly true with regard

the famous debate between Jeltns Fono and Ar.ncnr Speur,oruc aboutarchaeological types are discovered or designed by the archaeologist

L954ø,7954b; SpeuloINc 1,953, 1954). Another case in point is provided

some of the studies concerned with so-called tyþe-uariety systemøtics (e. g.,

t960, 7967, 1963; VossnN 1969, 1970)

Thus far, ethnosemantic analysis in cultural anthropology is based solelylinguistic material or, more precisely, on fol'k classif,cøtions. To my knowl-there does not exist any study which attempts to follow Wrr.r.rert

ANT's suggestion "not to restrict the meaning of ethnoscience to theof l,erminologicøl' systems" (Srunrnvexr 1964: 481). However, Srunrn-himself did not propose any means of implementing his suggestion. If

had been able to do so, his proposal would certainly have proved to be ofimportance for prehistoric archaeology as well. That is to say, the mostproblem encountered by prehistorians interested in the derivation of

meaning from archaeological material stems from its lack of linguistiction. Unless one is able to create a substitute for this very integral

of cognitive anthropology, i.€., to look for phenomena in the materialwhich could have served- as a kind of nonlinguistic communication(see Srunrnv¡Nr 1964:480-481), any attempts toward discovering

cognitive systems are bound to fail.It has been shown elsewhere that in the publications on ancient cognition

cited above, no methods have been worked out for deriving information oft kind from the archaeological record (Eccnnr I976b). In the present

per I should like to address myself mainly to the question whether or nota procedure can be successfully elaborated at all. f propose to accom-

plish this by a discussion of four major and. partlym my judgment have to be considered as fallacies on

interrelated topics whichthe part of prehistorians

ting the study of ancient cognition

1. The Fallacy of Misconceived Scientific Procedure

It is a constantly repeated postulate of students interested in prehistorictive systems that the scientific categories put forward by the prehistorian

be modelled after the classificatory units employed by the bygone

24+ -N[¡Nr'n¡o K. H, EccBnr Anthropos 72.1977

people under investigation. A classical statement of this kind is provided byWerrBn T¡vron in his "A Study of Archeology":

He fthe archaeologist] should try to make his systematic creations (and his typo-logies are just that) conform to those of the former culture. How else can he hope tounderstand it? Inherent in cultural products is the systematics of the people who pro-

duced them... (Tavron 1968:I2B).

K. C. CseNe (1967a: 78), to cite but another example, has been similarlyexplicit in this respect:

The "right" categories are those that reflect or approximate the natives' own

thinking about how their physical world is to be classified, consciously or unconsciously,

explicitly or implicitly, r.vithin which framework they accordingly act.

Obviously, Cuexcls notion of the relationship between "the natives' own

thinking" and their actual behavior is one-dimensional. It is his assumption

that the archaeologist "recognizes causal relations between cognition and

behavior and history of behavior" (Cuaxc 1967b:228) and this accounts for

the statement cited above. However, the character of the interrelationshipof cognition and behavior cannot be assumed beforehand - it is the outcome

rather than the basis of an inquiry. But whatever the individual reasons for

the view exemplified by the statements of Tevr,on and. Cn,A'\rc may be, these

reasons do possess a common denominator. It consists in a certain notion oî

scientific methodology which I should like to label the falløcy of rnisconceiaed,

scientif,c þrocedure. Essentially, this notion mistakes the means of scientiflc

research for its ends or, to put it another way, it overlooks one veryprinciple of that endeavor, namely the differentiation between

methods and aims.One of the most fundamental conditions for the performing of scientiflc

research is the assumption that the explanatory value and power of science

is superior to any other epistemic system and that the latter can be analyzedthe former but not vice versa. It follows that, for example, a native people's

way of looking at and explaining their material and immaterial wolld can

subjected. to scientific inquiry. In order to do so, one has to choose

which meet the standards of anthropoiogy rather than the standards of

natives. That is not to say, however, that the categories in question must

be derived from a native context: as a matter of fact, categories of thatabound in anthropology, e. g., vna.ne, totem, tøbu, etc. Actually, it does

matter at all from what context scientific categories in general stem

HntttpBl's statement that a hypothesis "may even have been suggested

a dream or a hallucination" (Hnuenr 1945: 6) is also valid with ïegard

categories. The important point is the conceptual reformulation which allgories adopted from native sources or from those indicated by Hnupnr-to undergo before they can be employed as means of scientific research.

But the delineation of a particular people's view of the world withaid of such reconceptualized or especially contrived categories does notthat the scientif,c task is accomplished thereby. A further necessary step

to be taken which consists in a d.etailed analysis of the structure of

Prehistoric Archaeology and the Problem of Ethno-Cognition 245

system under study, its internal and external relations, its con-its function within the societ ts development time, Again,OVEI etc.

analysls cannot be achievecl by means of the natiVCS llt terpretation S, buv I

tby a scientifi.c framework designed especially for that purpose.

Returning to our more immediate concern, we may conclude that the

tegories for prehistoric research have to be contrived lvithin a scientific frame

,Jf.r.n." according to the aims of the prehistorian; unmodified categories

as those once used by the prehistoric group under study - even if we

able to derive them from prehistoric remains - would not suit the pre-'s purpose (cf. Durvurw 7977: 134-135)

2. The Fallacy of the Misconceived Nature of Archaeological Data

Having discussed the assumption basic to all attempts of deriving ethno-from archaeological remains, I shall now proceed r,vith a brief outline

some important characteristics of the respective data.W¡r,rBn Tevr.on has argued that the difierence between archaeological,

and ethnographical data "is merely one of degree, not of kind"AyLoR 1968:94; see also p. 111). Such statements are liable to provoke

extensive argument as long as their respective key terms have not been defined.lVhatever one's decision in this case may be, the difference between archae-

and historical-ethnographical evidence is a very important one so

far as the problem with which I am dealing here is concerned.Some clarifying remarks about my use of the terms ørchøeologicø|, histor-

'ical, and ethnogrøþhicøl d,øtø seem necessary. It should be stressed that thefollolving statements about the nature or properties of these three kinds oftlata do not claim to encompass and to be valid for the whole range of sourceswhich are subsumed under these terms. The term archaeological data, forexample, is restricted here to evidence or þrehistoric times. Reference tohistorical and ethnographical data respectively is usually not specified withregard to the particular part of those data for which the arguments r amadvancing hold.

If we are willing neglect peculiarities of both ethnographical andto someda

v

ta, heir respec tiVE manner transmission, not muchwill Iemaln between hese two classes evidence. ethnograph

t fo

ofare he historical data of

t contex IS also shared by both

The

classes of data ofln, rela velv un

tical data of oday tomorrow (.f SrunrnvANT

and historical evidence. thnogra phical anyway WhatIS e evidencetmportant ln the presen

t t460)

tparts thereof respectively) potenthe tial of rendering a ticoncealed OI a least phera waydeci ble informatio abou mentalt n t charactlstics,It is,

rtitudes, beliefs etc. of hose, they directly and/ indirectlyOIof course the particular q ty language, OI rather writing,uali of

accoun for this ca ty

a

t

t refer towhich

er-

tts pacr be more specific conceptualizingto IS its power

I Soes without saylng tha the outcome of ln erpret dependent t ation ISrn each case on a vafle ty of factors, such AS scru tinity of SO urce criticism,

246 l¡I-.rN¡nrl I(. H. Eccnnr Änthropos 72.1977

quality and quantity of the respecti\/e clata, etc. All this, however, does ¡e1affect the indicated potential of (in the widest sense) documentary evidence.

The most salient characteristic of archaeological material in contradis-tinction to histolical-ethnogr:aphical data is its cornplete lack of immediateconceptual information. It is often said that artifacts are "fossilized" or "5sl-idified ideas" (see, e. 9., DnETZ 7967:45; Cr-enxn 7968:20; Rousn 1970:9),and one u'ould hardly argue r,vith this assertion. However, it should be stressed

that this property alone does not lead us very far: it is no more a part ofman-made objects than "being rational is part of being human" (Snrrrn 1971 :

173). That is to say, material forms which are not designed especially forcommunicative purposes are too ambiguous to reflect in an unequivocal rvaythe ideas embodied ir them.

Certainly, some domains of the rnakers' and users' artifact-connectedthinking are more capable of being inferred from the artifacts than others.Technological analysis, for example, might provide data concerning particularprehistoric ideas as to details and peculiarities of manufacture, and analysisof the contextual relationship of archaeological objects might yield informationabout their intended use, etc.

It is also tlue that artifacts clisplay built-in stylistic regularities or, touse InvtNG Rousn's term, "perceptual norms" (Rousn 7972: 165 Fig. 72;285).And it is through these regular-ities, among other things, that we discriminaiearchaeological confi.gurations from each other. These perceptual norms may

be called emic, provided that one reduces K¡NNBrn PrxB's (1967) famousdistinction to the original conception oI þhonetic and þl'toneucic in Bloom-fi.eldian linguistics (Broourrnro 1933, esp. Ch. 5) by detaching it from its

cognitive implications (cf. Bunuwc 1969:98 note 3; LouNsnunv 1955) 1.

Nevertheless, the complex multi-relational context between artifacts and

their bygone makers and/or users, i. e., the total semantic sphere of artifacts,cannot be reconstructed from these objects.

One may design numerous hypotheses as to ancient cognitive systemsand as many or more ways to operationalize them, but this will not solve

the basic problem. '|he Rosettø Stone ol prehistoric archaeology is still missingand one may well doubt that it can be found at all. It is exactly for this

reason that the designation of the method of prehistoric archaeology as "one

of successively nearer approximations" T¡vr.on 1968: 109, 165; cf. also

Ter¿ron 1969:384; L972:28-29) seems to be a misnomer so far as the investi-gation of ancient cognition is concerned.

In concluding these remarks on the nature of archaeological and histor-ical-ethnographical data I should like to summarize the difference by illus-trating the range of the respective evidence.

According to a well-known division of historical sources proper which

'uvas created- by J G DnovsBN in his famous Vorleswngen 'i)ber Enzylrt'oþiidiawnd. Method,ol,ogie der Geschichte (Dnovsnx sI967 : 37-B+) and refi.ned by EnnsT

I IRvTNG Rous¡ originally clrew my attention to the pre-Prxr conceptiorr of

phonetic/phonemic and its applicability in prehistoric archa"eology.

Prehistorlc Archaeology and the Problem of Ethno-Cognition 247

), historical data can be classified in Überreste and Trød'ition,

the two main classes. Both may be subdivided. into written

sources (see v. Bnnxlr l97l: 62-75). The basic difference

(e14but

the "femalns and the tradition 1S due to their lnternal chaTa"c-

the \atter was creat ed especially provide knowledge on the thento

for con porarres and future generations, where AS the former yieldstemInunintentionall ligh this ca egolrzav the of tion it becomes

think, ha his

t tlhat the whole range of archaeological encompasses only þørtdata a

class of the whole range of historical and for that matter ethnograph-

to wit nonwrr tten remalns I 1S obvio üS, It t t tln quantity entails restriction 1n qualit AS well

ISgrounds that I cali he attitude behind demands such ASon hese

should not consider tha the limitations of their finds lmpose

tive strictures upon them any more than upon other students

vt t

t

with past actualitY" (r 968 9+ the fal,la.cy tÍ the y,tisconceiuedAYLOR

tf archøeol,ogicøl' d,øtø more recen statements 1n the same1

for's see, g BrN FORD 96

veln AS

1235 968a. 96Bb 13- 4, 1 Fnnnmer.tt

e 1 7 T 71

; LoNcecnn 1972:9)'There remains yet another aspect of the nature of archaeological evidence

IS pertinent to our discussion. Since it is tied together with what mightthe conceþt as. entity problem, it is best analyzed under the following

3. The Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness

Evidently, the archaeologists' interest in prehistoric cognitive systems,systems, and the like is strongly influenced by current cultural anthro-

In order to learn more about the respective deficiencies of archaeolog-data it is advisable to make some comments on the nature of ethno-

as "revealed" by cognitive anthropologists.The notion that cognitive systems are complex, but nevertheless well

and clear-cut wholes, in which all members of a given culture share,one of the most fundamental misconceptions of the psychological

of so-called ethnowtod,el,s. Cultural anthropologists dealing with ethno-usually seem to be aware of this pitfall, whereas prehistorians,

to "discover" ancient cognition, apparently are not.For the Subanun of Mindanao, for example, CHenr.ns F'RAKE (1964: 119)

pointed out that they do not possess a consistently defined and sharedtheon:

The verbal expositions of this pantheon vary greatly from informant to informantfrom region to region. To present any one of these systems in all of its detail asSubanun pantheon" would do violence to cultural reality.

Jaruns SpR¡tr.By (I972b: 255) in studying sleeping behavior of urban

"the

in Seattle, Wash., has made it very clear that his taxonomic as well

248 M¡Npn¡n K. H. Ecornr Anthropos 72.1977

as his componential deûnition of the respective sleeping places is neitherexhaustive nor necessarily cognitively real.

Pnn Hecn, to cite but another example, after eliciting Munich beer cate-gories, stresses that his informants' "cognitive map of the beer world" dis-plays some degree of individual variation (Hecr 7972:269).

By these and corresponding examples it becomes very obvious thatcognitive systems as derived b)' cultural anthropologists are not culturalentities but rather abstractions, concepts or, to put it even clearer, constructsof the investigator. The opposite notion, no matter whether adhered to bycultural anthropologists or prehistorians, may be subsumed under what A. N.WHrrBnB¡r (7925: 74-82, 85) described as the følløcy of misþtøced, concyeteness.

An ethnographer, in fact, does not come upon a cognitive system whilehe is in the field. He deals, however, with cognitive data, but on an individualrather than on a "societal" level. They are, actually, more or less d.ifierentviews of the respective world of some individuals of the group the ethnog-rapher is studying. These data do not lack systemic relations but as a rulethey are not presented as a system, at least not as one which would meet theethnographer's standards. It is he who generalizes and systematizes the d.ataprovided by his informants.

A consideration of this procedure with respect to prehistoric archaeologyreveals a difference between the source material of these two disciplines whichis highly significant. The archaeological evidence is not only lacking linguisticinformation but, furthermore, usually cannot be differentiated according toind'iaid'wal ancient manufacturers and users of the respective remains (see, e. g.,Nenn 1972). This being so, how is one going to infer prehistoric cognitivesystems when the only possibility by which this could be accomplished is notopen to analysis ?

4. The Fallacy of Mistaken Reality

one of the most striking points in the reasoning of prehistorians con-cerned with the investigation of cognitive systems is their frequent use ofboth the terms "artifi.cial" or "arbitrary classification" and "cultural" or"historical reality". Whereas in cognition-related contexts the first designationrefers to a classification devised according to criteria altegedly chosen atrandom by the investigator, the meaning of the second label is usually notimmediately clear. rlowever, a more closer look reveals that both terms arerelated in their respective usage, namely in a dichotomous way.

The status of cultural reality is assigned to classifi.cations which arebelieved to be non-artifrcial or non-arbitrary. Thus, the respective categoriesare conceived of as "natural" units (e. g., Sraur,nruc 1954 392) and, by thesame token, in the ideal case, should correspond with the "mental templates"and the "folk classiûcation" of the people whose remains are und.er study'Furthermore, these categories are considered axiomaticalty as "culturally" or"historically meaningful", "signifi.cant", "relevant", and the like. Ar,sBRTSraulntNc, for instance, states:

Prehistoric Archaeology and the Problem of Ethno-Cognition 249

,. classifrcation into types is a process of discovery of combinations of att¡ibutesby the mal<e¡s of the artifacts not an arbitrary procedure of the classifrer

ULDIN 953 43)LG

Historical relevance 1n this vlew 1S essentially deri from typological yslsved the analestablished type TS the result sound theof inferences concerning customary

of the makers of the artifacts cannot to have historical meanrng ,ibid 44and fail

Janrs Dantz, to give another example, points out that... any multiattribute typological construct will probably be artificial and of a

low order of utility in cultural interpretation (Danrz 1968:37; but cf. hisinDlrrrz 7967: 5l-52)

The method outlined above also permits a more precise reconstruction of a givenin terms of the templates used in production. We can more closely approxi-

the significant construct as it existed in the mind of the maker, rather than derivemay well be a totally artifrcial device (Dorrz 1968: 39).

Although some consideration has already been devoted to the subjectg., Beyenn 1969: 380-382), the widely advocated concept of cultural or

reality needs still more elaboration. In trying to diminish this desid-at least a little bit, I shall start by challenging the validity of the

ted dichotomy between so-called artificial or arbitrary and culturallyclassifications.Let me fi.rst state the truism that the categorization of archaeological

is an absolutely necessary prerequisite if one intends to acquire anyabout the prehistoric past. The remains þer se do not possesssigniûcance" or "historical meaning"; they are just ïemnants of

past. "Significance", "meaning" or "relevance", however, implies a rela-between the prehistoric data, the past, ønd, the prehistorian. In ap-

the past he has to process the data in a waythat is directly related toresearch objectives. With disparaging implications the term "arbitrary"only be applied to classifi.cation when aimed at procedural deficiencies,as logical inconsistency caused by the unaware classifier.A "culturally real" classification, on the other hand, as believed to be

in a folk taxonomy, is evidently derived by the same "artifi.cial"as its alleged counterpart, namely scientiûc principles of investigation

interpretation. Structurally, however, they are veryheterogeneous. whereasclassifi.cation SCTVES AS a lnean,s an end, sclento a tificall derivedv

classiû.ca tion constitu an end, (which of course,tesitself) but NCVEI a literal means, a means the

should then be prob-1n SENSE scientiûco

properlrrespective of the arguments concerning the feasibility of deriving

ble tosystems from archaeological data put forward so far, it seems ad.-make some further comments as to the general aspects of the problemTo say that the delineation of a certain folk view, adhered_ to at areality

pornt 1n time by the group studied, consti tutes an end of scientiûcby no means implies that it IS the end Folk VlCWS, AS it has alreadvindicated above, are

delineated wha

itself sub ected sclen lnqulry after havrngto tifict I call the fø1,1,øcy o.f rnístøh,en

understanding of these problems so farreøloty has hampered an

250 NI.q.Nrn¡o K. H. Eccrnr ALrthropos 72. 1977

This fallacy essentially consists in equating the so-called cultural reality

- which might better be labeled culturally (or, as for that, socially) d'efi,ned,

leality or, more precisely, "folk reality" - with historical reality in the widest

sense. The latter is, to be sure, culturally or socially deûned as well (by historians

and prehistorians respectively), but according to systematically employed

principles which are accepted as the only means qualified to generate knou'l-

edge in terms of scientif,c standards. Historical reality, then, belongs to r.r,hat

might be called "scientific reality" (or "scientifically defined reality"). Ananthropologist, that is to,say, can investigate folk reality, but he cannot share

in it himself (if he were able to do so at ail) without giving up his scientifrc

aims (see in this context, for example, the problem of "going native" as aparticipant observer: P.A,ur 1953; for Western societies: Mrr.r.Bn 7952).

Finally, it should be noted that folk reality and scientifrc reality are

lelated in a peculiar way: The folk conception of reality, though this "reality"may, according to our criteria, be fictitious, influences the thinking andior

behavior of the group which is holding it. Therewith, the folk reality becomes

effective toward creating phenomena which are to be analyzed both in terms

of scientific reality and in terms of their respective conceptualization by the

group in question. BnoxrslRw MAlrNowsxr's analysis of "Myth in PrimitivePsychology" provides a good example for this kind of interrelationship.According to him,

... an intimate connection exists between the r'vord, the mythos, the sacred tales

of a tribe, on the one hand, and their ritual acts, their moral deeds, their social organiza-tion, and even their practical activities, on the other'(i\{,trrNowsxr 1926:96).

Myth as it exists in a savage cornmunity, that is, in its living primitive forrn, is

not merely a story told but a reality lived. ... it is a living reality, believed to have once

happenecl in primeval times, and continuing ever since to influence the world and

hunran destinies (ibid.: lO0).

It goes without saying that M¡rrNowsKl's analysis presupposes a scientificconceptualization of the problems involved; actually, one can grasp it from

the wording of the quotation.A good illustration of the common discrepancies between folk and scien-

tific reality is provided by the respective conceptions of a given group's past.

As a rule, one can expect that the group's own conceptualization of its his-

tory, i. e., the folk history, does not correspond with the results gained by

a historical, i. e., scientifi.c, inquiry into that very past (for a summary of folkconceptions of history see Scsott 1968).

A case in point is the concept of genealogy among the Tiv of ì{orthernNigeria as studied by Leune Boneuxatr (1952). For a Tiv, genealogies are of

great importance for almost every aspect of life. BoneNNeN (1952: 301) stresses

that

... to unclerstancl things Tiv one must l<now Tiv genealogies. By genealogicalreference a Tiv traces ties of kinship and marriage, claims a place bo live and fatm'argues his case in a moot, conducts natte¡s of magic and ritual, and decides against whoflhc rvill figlrt on any given occasion.

)

Prehistoric Archaeology and the Problem of Ethno-Cognition 25r

Consequently, one would expect that Tiv tradition concerning genealogies

ErouPS involved'Bou¿,NNAN makes it perfectly clear that Tiv criteria of genealogical

truth are not in the least compatible rvith the principles a historian would

apply to the same matter.The Tiv case is also important in quite another respect. It demonstrates

that the folk conceptualization -of certain phenomena does not necessarily

have an immediate impact on behavior related to these phenomena. Hence,

a cognitive concept cannot generally be ascribed explanatory power as to

associated behavior 2. On the other hand, folk conceptions may have an effect

of a far more general and indirect order, which is neither intended nor rec-

ognized by the people themselves. In the Tiv case, for example, it might welllie along the lines of L¡une BonewNerq's speculation that the maintenanceof lineage systems possibly demands a fluid genealogical charter (BoneNNaN

7952:3I4; but cf. LBwrs 1962).

It may be safe to say, furthermore, that indirect functions of this kindwhich, following RosBnr MBnroN (1949), are adequately designed as "latentfunctions", do operate on a much broader scale than usually, if at all, assumed.This means that the respective cognitive systems as generalized and delineatedby the anthropologist, cannot - organized no matter how - þer se serve as anexplanatory device for related behavior. The investigation of latent functions,certainly, has to be based on criteria rvhich virtually exceed the realm of folkcognition. This outcome obviously stands in marked contrast to notions ofa one-dimensional relationship between cognition and behavior as expressedin the above mentioned. conception of Cneuc (see p.244).

In summary, then, it may be said that folk reality, be it ancient or con-temporary, could not and. cannot substitute for a thorough anaiysis of whatts labeled here scientiûc reality. It is only through the latter - supplementedin cultural anthropolog y by a scientific analysis of the folk reality involvedrn the case under study - that we can hope to adequately understand the

2 The concept of explanation used. in this paper embraces causal as well as modal

2s2 Menpnpo K. H. Eco¡nr Anthropos 72.1977

phenomena we are interested in. In this perspective, the general lesson to þsdrawn with respect to the viewpoint exemplified. above by statements ofSpaurorNc andDønrz is obvious: this viewpoint is based on a misconceptionof reality in mistaking folk reality for scientific reality.

5. Conclusion

In the foregoing discussion differently structured evidence has been ad-duced to show the futitity of transplanting the search for ethno-cognition intoprehistoric archaeology. Part of that evidence was of a general methodologicalnature, part of it was derived from a comparison of archaeological and histor-ical-ethnographical data and still another part stemmed mainly from a briefanalysis of some of the implications of cognitive anthropology. The outcomein each and every case has been detrimental with regard to the developmentof appropriate methods for deriving substantive cognitive information fromarchaeological data.

It is obvious that the whole problem as such has slipped into prehistoricarchaeology by way of a constant drive on the part of not a few prãhistoriansto try to be what they definitely are not: cultural anthropologists. Consideringthis, r could easily have added a fifth fallacy, namely the faltøcy of þrehistorica'rchøeology øs cwl,twrø|, ønthroþol,ogy. But because this fallacy would have con-cerned only the general setting, rather than the problem itself as analyzedhere, it seemed more appropriate to deal with it separately (see Eccnnr 1976ø).

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