CAMBRIDGE CONCISE HISTORIES A Concise History This is a serics of illtisrratcd 'concisc liistorics' ofsclcctcd individual countries, inrended both a.i universiry and colicgc tcstl>ooks and as i

of Poland historical itirrodilctio~is for gcneral rcadcrr, irnuellers :ind

rnentbers of the husiness community. SECOND EDITION

For i7 list of titles in the s~vies, see aizd o[l~ook.

280 1'11iund. after r7qj pre-war eastern Poland, werc particularly cmbittcred by the war's outcome. The existence of the Corps and of all the other Polish :irnled forniations in the west was now a s ~ u r c e of political eniharrassment and a financial burden for the British government; these units had also been swollen hy Poles released from German prisoner-of-war camps and h y Polcs who had hcen coilscripted by tlie \Y'uhrtnncht and who had changed sides ar the earliest oppor- runin.. Ilowever, although the nem Rritish 1.ahour government urged all Polish servicemen n1 1-cturn home (and indeed about a half did so), it refused to hand over overall command of the Polisli armed forces in tlie west to rhe new pm-Soviet ai~rhoritics in \Yt?rsaw. Most of the remaining l'olish forces wcre movcd to Great Nritain: rheir anihiguous legal status was resolved by tlie creation in 1946 of the Polish Rrsettlen~ent Corps, a transirional non- combatant unit in tlie Ilritish army, which was to prcpare the denrobilized incn and women for civilian life in Britaiii. 111 1951 rlu,frc wcre I jb.ooc Prrlc:. i l l ) Br~tish soil, of mhom qq,ooo i\:ci-e in I.(>ndon. forriling rhcrr rlic aecond largcst cthnic ininorit!. until the mid-rqjos. Altogether. alwut yoo,ooo Poles chose polirical exile and ~iltirnarelv a new lifc In thc wnest: primarily in Rritain, North hrncrica and !iustr.llla.

In I'oland rh

2.82 Poland, after 179 f

;IS A L i ~ w t ~ e ! < > I ,,, , , r v 887 rt(\t7cLl '\Y':r5,an, spr81,g cL>.+5. r \ ~ l ~ ~ ~ n ~ i : l ~ , > v < > 80 p c ~ ccnr of \Y;ti-\a\\ 1i;ld heen dciii\r.lrcd, Inany tormcr inhahitants who had sul-vivrd rhc \Y'arsn\v Rising i,t ,944 soon started to rcrurn m the city,

n e n t of the new regime, perished in this internecine struggle. Anti- Semitic o~rthursts against Jews who hail survived the I~lolocaust, the [nost notorious in Kielcc in Jr~ly 1946, were also a grim feature of this unsettled period. 'The Jewish hackground of some of the most promninmr mcmbers o i the new communist leadership exacer- bated anti-Jewish feclings at the end of the war; disputes over ex- Jewish homes and property, which had acquired new occupiers, also aggravated inter-communal tensio~is. In these circumstances a large number of the remaining J e w opted for emigration. And in thc extreme south-east of the country the forcible eviction of the local Ukrainian population. a5 part r j f the communist campaign to build a nationally homogeneous scatc, rcsiilred in a brutal counter- insurgent), canlpaigv against nnrionslisr Ukrainian partisans who waged a forlorn strugglc againsr iornmunisr-led I'ollsh arid Soviet iorccs.

F:ir more dan::croits for rlic P1'R \van tlic ne\vly rcconsr~ruted Pol~sh llcasarit Parry (I'SLl. Icd hy ~ ~ l i k o l n j s ~ ~ k : wirli it< i~iillion members ;ir the end of 1945 i r \ x i s niore rha~i twice [he sizc of rhe PPR. The PSI.. enlilyed \ridcsprcad support 1r1 the villages and, in thc ahccnce of the main prc-\var ce111tist and right-wing parties, it also hcc:~mr the forus for r11~1iy clcniciits i l l Polish socie t~ opposed to the ct~rn~;i~~iiists. (:o~lsciou, of irs wcaknesr, and desperate to avoid the kind o t clcctoral disii,tcr t l ~ n t hefell 1.Iungary's cornlnun- isrs in Sosembc~. I $145, the 1'1'11 resisicil Mikolaiczyk'~ insistence or1 the free elections p~.om~sed for P ~ l d r i ~ i hy tlie Ya1r;i agreement.

Using intimidation, violcnic and electural fraud, it took the communists ji~sr ovcr two years to clin~itiatc the PSL from public life. To delay an clcctoral contest the commi~nists resorted to the plov of a nation~il referendum on j o June 1946, with three qurstions relating to the abolition of the Senatc, approval of the governnient's economic politics, and endorsement of the Oder- Ncisse frontier. It was hoped chat all voters would vote unani- mously tor the government propositions and thus endou, the authorities with a degree of legitimacy. To assert their indepen- dence, the PSL recommended a 'no' vote to the first question; the anti-conununisr underground called for t\vo or even three 'no' votes. The communists, who retair~cd sole control of the electoral commissions, claimed that 68 per cent of the voters l ~ a d cndorsed

:ill three of their proposals; the real figure, as revealed by confi- dc~~r ia l L'PK records, urns only 27 per cent. The falsification of the rcierendum result was to remain one of the most closcly guarded iccrers of the comniunisr era. The final confrontation with the I'S1. occurred during the general election which finally took place on l g Jnnuary 1947. The PSL refused to join a siligle electoral list under I'I'R auspiccs. and sroocl as a distinct rival party. Thousands of 1'SL .ii.rivists and ovcr roo I'SL candidates were detained by the .~lithorities; the niiniber of polling stations was drastically reduced; over a fif th of the electorate was discnfrar~chizcd for nllegcd right- \?.lng sympathies. A vicious prnpasaiida campaign presented the 1'Sl. as stooges of the west. The officially annol~nced ourconlc of tlic rigged election was hnrdly surprising: rile PPK-led bloc ohtairi- (ti Ro pcr cent of the votes, and the PSL only l o per cent. Recent ir:1gilenr3ry s t ~ ~ d i e s suggcst rhat cven with ihis heavy intimidatir,n rile I'SL received henvrcn 60 and -3 pcr ccnr of rhc popular votr. Itic ircc elc,ctions promised at Y,ilm werr: l~ttlc nitlrc rh;m 3 farce. \~nericnn :rnd Br~tish prorcsrs had l o cffcct, h ~ i ~ ihr nllrurr of the

~i,mmunist take-over i ~ i Polalid conrl-~borcd to the i4:irIening of riic rifr lxtween rhe\Ylestern Po\vcrsand tlie 1!SSH.

i l i r ncn. go\.ernrncnt formed in February 1947 (nr, l

1947) and rhe avoidance of sovietization. They hoped r l~a t Poland mould retain a pluralism of autonomvus social organizations, trade unions and co-operatives. Yet by associating themselves with the iniqoiries of the PPR and by so-operating with the I'PR during the 1947 election, the I'PS liad allowed rhcmselves to be tarred with the same hrush.

In 1947 and '948, in the cvcr~worseihing clininre of the Cold E'ar, Moscow tighrened irs grip oi,cr its satellites. Not only were they obliped to abandon any in\-olveinenr v i t h thc h4xrshall Plan bur they were also forced to accelerate the adoption of the Soviet model of political, economic and social control. In 1948, after Sralin's split with Tito. steps u8cre wkcn to clirn~n;rte all so-called 'Titoisr' or 'nariclnalist' de~ ia r io~ i s nrithin r11c communist parrics of rhe Soviet hloc. I11 Septernlwi- 194s Wladgslau, Gomolka. rlie advocare of a mildcr 'Polish' road rri socialism, was dismissed froin his posr as ( ~ T ~ L I C > prlrne 111ini5re1- ,~ncI \ws rcplaced ;is ~ecrerary of the ccnrrel ccrnirnirrcu o f thc PPR 1,) Klcrur. In Dccemhcr 1948 a rhoroughly purged and hrc~whcatc~i PPS :tgrced to i~nirc with the I'I'K to forni rlie I'ZPR (Pr,li.;h llnircrl \XTi)rkrrs' Parry), under which appellation thc commu~iisrs wrrr rr, rule P11I:lnd i~nril 1989.

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29% Polorrd. after r7y 5 Cotr7,nu!zis1?r rrrld t l ~ c Cold LT'or, I 945-1 989 293

Church's loyalty to the state was rewarded with a degree of independent activity, many church-run organizariol~, and charities were dissolved, religious activities were banned from schools, hospitals and the army, and church attendance was discouraged; priests and bishops were harassed. Diverse ploss were iised to split the Churcl~ f ~ o m tlie inside; schemes were even li.irillcil 10 scvcr illt I'olish Church's links wirh Rome ;and ro crenre a smte-conrrollec natiollal ch~trch. Bierur's grotesque plan to secularize \Viirso\v'! skylinc by cutting off all church spires \\.as fortunately n e w i~iiplernentcd, hut in q j r there arose in the ccntrc o f the city ; Palace of Culture 2nd Science, Sralin's 'gift' to Poland and : towering symbol of Soviet domination.

Tlic hciglit of the anri-Church campc~ign \c is rr;iclicd in r 9 j j when rllc stare unilnrcrally asrumcd the pnacr ro i.(r~lrol all church nppnintmciirs kuid demanded ail oath of lo)-~ilry tc the stare from : ~ l l clergy. Tlir lic\v prilnntc. hrchl,ishop Srcfnn \Y7v,/yilrki. cvcntu- .~lly nd\.iscd coillpiiance but himsclf plilrlicly .liid syniI)~lically refuscd: 'We arc nor permitted to place the rhings of God on the alrar o i Caesar. Non possumus!' His rcsulr;int derention was tr~llowed hy larpc-scalc arresrs of bishoy\ nlld ilcipy, arid the c1nsu1.u ot numerous mr,ri:~steries : ~ n d c11urcl1r.s. The leoding Catholic \\:~cklp, Tygodnik Pou,srcchn~ (Ilni\cr\:iI \X:t.rklyi of Krakhn. was hanned for rcfusi~ig to publish ;i pai~eg!;ric upon Sralin's drnrl~ on j hlal-ch i y j j . 'X'liilc \V!;\ryhski remained isolilred in cletcntion, the episcopate br~a:e~l in Scptcn~ber r q j j ro rhc state's demands.

As Stalinism tightened its grip on Polanrl, thc Polislr exiles in Great nritain, numbering some r ~ o , o o o , maintained a veritable 'stare in exile'. The csiled President Ilaczkiewicz contitiucd in nffice. as did Arcis%ewski's government, still recognized hy the Vatican, Spain and a handful of lesser states. Most prc-war parties, and rrew political ~ r o ~ ~ p i n g s , continued to opcrate in Britain and maintained branches around the world wherever Polish communities existed. Despite difficulties oi life in cxile and the exiles' physical dispersal across Britain, Polish cultural and social life thrived, bolstered by ex-servicemen's assnciations arid by scores of social, educational and religinl~s organizations. Something of the atmosphere of pre-war Poland was recreated in 'f't~lish 1.ondon' h?

Marian Hernar's satirical cabaret and institutions such as the 'Polish Hearth Club' in Exhibition Road. Journals, newspapers, scholarly works and wartime mernoirs poured off emigre presses. The exiles waited fnr international changes that would favour their legitimist cause, and shunned anyone tainted with collaboration 3 , s i r l i tllc ci,r~l~n~ini.;rs; rllis inclocie~l \likoldjc~yI;, a,lio :irrivcd i i i London after liis escape fr-om Poland in 1747. h i i k o l ~ j c z ~ k soon ~ilovcd ro tllc Unitcd S r a ~ t s wlicre be scc~rred [lie CO-~perarioii of rhc Con~ress of American Poles. the largest Polish organization in 1 1 1 ~ USA; many Poles in l:raricc also followcd his lead.

jest as the 'Great Emigration' of the 1830s and 1840s iiad warlietl rhc wcsr boot 'Tsarisr dcsp~r is~i i , SO Iinw r h ~ . post-I ~ ) + j csiles. regarded by sornr as the 'Second Cruat Emigration', pro- moted ;In 'nrilrcncss in rlir wesr o f the dnnpers of Soviet cornmun- ism and o f rhc realities of So\.icr atrocities. Thc? scored a norahlc ,iicicss whcn i n Dcccnihcr icijr r l ~ r llS IIOIIZP of Reprcsenwrives dcclared thc USSR responsihlc tor ihe Icaryn iiiassacrc. Thc our- Llrrak of thr Korean War rnisccl ernisre l i i ~ p ~ tliar rhc Polish issue rnol~ld return ro the international forum. The US go\rcrn~iicnr tisclincd Gr11cr.ll Anders' otfer to rccrcate a Polirh army iii tlie west, bur it [Ild dm\\, a vnricry of exilr ::roups into pro-i\meric:in cspionape acti~iry: somcrhtng which inevirnbly damaged the cinigre cnusc. h'lorc co~istrucrive dild loiig~lasting w,is 14mericati support f ~ ~ r rhe Polish-language Radio 'Free Loropr'. rstahltshed in 1 9 5 2 :ind dirrcred h: Jan N o w k Jcziurafiski. a talel~ted journalisr and lobbyist, and a war-time courier hcnveen the Polish goverti- ~nenr in Londo~i atid tlic Uridcrgronnd in Nazi-occupicd Poland. R~tdk) 'Free Europc' was heanictl from Munich for ninetccn hours ?very day and, rfeqpite extensive conlmunist jamming, was widcly lisrclied to across Poland. The war in the ether becamc n malor hattleground of the Cold War. Ever vi~ilatit for foreign spies and do~i~estic countcr-revolutionaries, the communist authorities re- mained on high alert against the activities o i the tmigr6s and rheir organization\, and i~npcdcd contact between Poles living in Poland dnd their fellow countrymen abroad. Yet one thing, paradoxically, united thc ideological and political foes: for while insisting on Poland's rights m irs pre-war eastern border. the exiles called also for tlle international recognition of rhe Oder-Neisse Line as

Cotnnrrritism urrd tlte Cold War. lyqj-rgSg 7-95

Pola~ld's western border aod campaigned energetically against West German revanchism.

Needless to say. the world of exile politics was wroughr with deep fissures. Augusr Zaleski, a former foreign ininisrer, succeeded Kaczkiewicz as president-in-exile after the latter's death in 194,, hut alienated the exiled socialists and the nationalist SN; he then refused ro step down after rhe expiry of his term oi office in 1 9 . i ~ . A rival presidenrial body was created, the 50-called 'Council of Three', consisting of General Anders. Tomasz Arciszewski (re- placed after his death in l g j j by General R6r-Komorowski, the former commander of the Home Army), and Count Edward Raczyhski, a highly distinguished diplomat and former Polish ambassador to the Cotlrt of St. James. The 'Council of Three' sained wide support among the exiles, while the posirion of the increasingly isolated Zaleski was further undermined when two of his 'prinle iliinistcrs' dcclded to rerrrrn to comnlunist Poland. Launching a propaganda campaign among the Polish diaspora in 19 j j, the Polish communist authorities also set out to undermine the exiles' political role.

Despite its totalit;~rian features, Stalinist rule in Poland never became a clrlne of irs Soviet model and avoided solne of tlie excesses witnessed in other satellite starcs, such as the purge trials of co~nmunisr leaders ir i Czcchr)slovakia and Hungary between 1949 atid iq5r . But the post-Sralinisr political thaw was a slow process, limired at first t o the PLPK. It started wirli discreet purges in 19 j 3 within the I'olish security apparatus. The defection to tlic West in December 19x3 of 1hzef ~wiar lo , a high-ranking officer in the security police (the [IB), and his revelations on the airwaves of Radio Free Europe in autumn 1954 ahour the iniquities of the UR, aroused widespread ferment within the Parry. Scapegoats were sought for tlie now admitted illegalities of the security police. In December 1954 thc Ministry of I'ublic Security was restructured and its notorioos chief Radkiewicz transferred, in a mild post- Stalinist inanrler !,f demotion, ro tlie minisrry for state farms. Gomulka, who had heel1 under arrest since August 1951, was quietly released from jail. In January 195s the central committee of the PZPR publicly condemned thc repression of the Stalinist period. Ir proved increasingly difficult for the Party leadership to

contain its internal critics, many o t them young comrnunists ,qssociared with the weekly Po prostu (Straighr Talk) and a host of cliscrlssion clubs that appeared all over the country. An attack on ~ocialist realism in literarure was launched by. hlarek Hlasko, a young rebellious exponent of black realism, whilc tlie poet Adam \Vaiyk qoesrioned the price paid for 'the great building of social- ism' in his published 'Pocm for adults'. Khrilslichev's denonciation ~ r f Stalinism at the twentieth Congress of tlie Soviet Communist ['arty on z5 February 1956 was a clear message that the old style of repression had to go; in Poland and Hungary it provided a powerful boost for change.

Thr death of Bierur in Moscow on r z March ~ 9 5 6 increased the pressure on the beleaguered Stalinists. It also provided the dispirited PZPR, now led by Edward Ochab, with a timely oppor- runity to brcak wirli the euphemistically labelled period of 'errors a1111 distortions', tor which Rierur could be blamed. But an amnesty f

296 Poli7nd, after 179 y

5 . i l h c cnd of Scalinisni. Wlsdyslaru Goinulk~. .lr the Ihcigllr of his pr,pulariry, addressing liundrcds of rli(,i~s.inds of \J.~rsoi,i;ln~ on 1 4 Ocroht r 9 j 6 He appealed for an end to dcmonsrrnring and for a rerurn ro work. 'Unircd wirh rhe working class and wirh rhe narion', hc concltldcd, 'rlie Parry will lcad Poland alonaa ncw parh ro socinlisni.' (;omulka's populariry in Ocmhcr r y s h probably equallrd rhar of Pilsudski in >lvl;~y 1 gzo and of I.ech U?dqsa in I 980- I . I )~s~~~chanr~nenr ~ v s s so011 ro follow.

inrellecruals, and in making common ground with Gomulka. The I'arry boss. Ochab, also wisely showed willingness to step down. But Moscow was not consulted. And so when on ry Octoher 1956 the central committee of thc PZPR mct nt its Vlllth plena? session to rcsolve tllc internal crisis, Soviet forccs stationed in Poland started converging on LVarsaa. The scent of a national revolution was in rhe air and preparations were made for resistance. At that ioncture a furious Khrushchev, accompanied by most of rlie Soviet leadership, made an unexpected appearance in the Polish capital. Bur in a dramatic nocturnal ralk, Gornulka succecdcd in persuading thc Soviet leader thar the undertaking of repairs \vould not under- mine the principles of the system or deflect Poland from the road to socialism. Mao Tse-T~ing's support tor Gomulka also carried weiglir in Moscow. 111 a innior specch on zo Octohcc, Gomutka

Contmunrsm and the Cold War, r 945- 1987 297

attacked the Stalinist illegalities, the misconceived methods used in collectivization, and the excessive dependence on rhc USSR. On r r October a tiew Polithuio, with Gon~ulka as first secretary. was clected. While anxious to allay Soviet fears, Gomulka a t the sanic time had to moderate the cnthusiasric expectations of a poptilation that saw in him a national leader against Soviet domination. Tlie soberil~g effect of the brutal Soviet suppression of the Hungarian I

298 Polund, after 179 j

of daily lift, ant1 rhc concern to preserve the l'olish language and culture among their childrcn were taking prioriry over politics. Tlierc !rere also consolations and even attractions of life in the west. Co~nmirtcd to the overthrow of communism, the Omigre leaders found it difficult ro adjusr ro the new realities in Poland. More itnagin:itivc proved to be the message coming from the Literary Institute outside Paris, founded by Jerry Giedrnyt, a political thinker of vision and something of an enfont terrible among rlre exiles. The monthly jol~rnal Kr~ltura, which Giedroyt edited with his .lssr~ciatc Juliusz iMieroszcwski, pro\:ed to be the mosr )nfluenti,ll Polish emigre publication of the entire Cold War period. Kathcr than call for the overthrow of communism, they thought in tcrnls oi its euolution, and set out to influence that process in Poland h y an open-door approach. On the pages of h'irlturo appeal-cd some of rhe hesr exiled wrirers, including indi- viduals who had worked for the rcgintc in Warsaw suc11 as Milosz, as well as \+!riteis (undcr assumed names) living in Poland, and Iiussian writers banncd in the USSR. Kult~rrii also cmbarkcd on diffusing histori~il animosities benveen rlte Poles and their irn- mediate eastern nciglthours; tt called on the Poles ro acccpt the loss of Wilno (Vilnius) and of Lwbw (Uviv), srill regarded by [nost exiles as an inalicnahle historical and territorial legacy, in the name of reconciliation with rhe 1.ithuanians and the Ukminians. I

i: (.':~rtlt~nal \Y,ysxyiisLi .IT t l~r l .~st~ ' t Ci,)c.> mioti:~s~cr~ I I I C>~qsr,>~~l~land (tlrc baptis~ri of Micszko 1 in y6h) confirmed thc loyalty of rI1v faithful t o thc Clinrch. T h e authorities' attempt t o hold rivnl aclchrations of the millentriltm of Polish sratehood inrn1duccd an clcment i ~ f thcarrical i;ircc arid o i i l ~ wcakened rlieir standing +niorrg rile popirlat~ori. Hruiscd, the communist party \r.itlidrei\. frorn any f~trrlier direct confronration with the (:horsli, whose rcrsirion it1 thc counrry was yr;idually hut 1-e~norselcsslv strcngrh- cncd by the implncablr Cardinal Wysz~bski . In tlie lore 1960s rhe Pulish Church was e\.cn iiblc a) spare Koo ~xics t s , monks and nuns ior missionary w11rk around tlic worlcl; a T'olish cleric, 31-chhisliop K ~ ~ z l o w i c c l i ~ , hec:ime tlie metropolitan of Lusaka in Z a ~ n h i a .

\Vitliin a pear the country lurchcd into anorher phase of mrrnoil. For wliilc C;urnulL:i w:is ;il>le, fill- tlic momcnt , ro silcnce rhe rcvisio~lists, 3 tar s r r -~nger illid more sinisrcr rhrc.it \ V ~ S emerging w~thlr i tlic I'arry apparatus in the f~lrrii of all anti-i~ltellecrual coni ir~i~nisr grouping which was to [make a bid fnr power hy riding the nilrioriel~sr r i ~ c r . Led hy Micays law hloczar. rlie deputy minister of thc ~nrcric,r and a shady wartime communisr guerrilla tighrcr; thc so-cilled 'Partisans' esp(iused a crude narioiinlism rhat was a i t i e r n i n anti-Ukr;iinian and anti-Semitic; they cvrn offere~l a partial relrahilirntion to former AK soldiers whose war- rirnc record had been vilified by- the communists since tlie war. lTlic 'P;trtisans3 rargctcti lihcraliting pro-reforlners within the I'arty, a s =:ell :is 'ct,smopolitan' writers and film-makers. Tlic tensions \r,ith~n rhc ['arty between bloczar's I'artisans o n tlie one hand, a n d the r e r n a i n i ~ ~ g reformer-s on the ~ltlier, caiiie t o a dramatic head in I 967-8. ' l h c cr,ndcninarion oiTslnel :and Zi~ in i sm by tllc USSR and mosr of its e;iar Europe:+ii satellites during tlie Arablsi-acl i w a r of June 1967 w.1 nor shared by Poland's small number of Je\vs o r indeed by i n : ~ i ~ y youlig 1)iiIcs. Gomulkn persoiinlly had no record of anti-Semitism (and 111s \\.ife was of Jewish origin), hut his p~ th l ic contleriitiation rrf Polish 'Ziolrists' who had rejoiced in Israel's victiiry as a ' i ifrli colurun' a n excellent oppo1,-

t t l~ i i ty for hiloczar and his followers to exploit anti-Semitism in their hill for power. In a climate o f political hysteria. tantamount to a wi rc l i - I i~~ i t , old Pnrty members a t Jewish origin wcrc cxpclled f r i ~ n l rheir posts. AII attiick was also launched on thc y o u ~ i g radical rcvisionists ( K ~ ~ r o h , Modzclewski and the student activist Adam Michnik) whose support for Dubi-ck's reform movement ill lish or Czeihosloi~ak variety, and a desire t(1 rnainrniti his credit in hfoscow led hini to support ~i i i l i tar i ly (w i th z6,ooo Pnlish troops) the Soviet-led invasion o f Czechoslovakia i n August 1968.

For the momenr t l i c Party apparatus \\'as triumph;int, but i t lind alicnatcd an entire gencrarlnn o f vnun:: cduc:~ted people Ihy its brut31 police methods and liicnilacious propaganda. Convinced that the ct~mmunir t sycrem could not he reformed from w i t l i i ~ ~ , the rcvisionists began to turn thcir hacks on Marxis111 and to scek c ~ ~ l l a b o ~ x t i o n wi th non-blularuist student ncrivisrs, (Gicdroyi's

i \ ir /ru~n in T'aris, ;and tlie liheral Cnrlii>lic intclligenrsia. The dctcri- i,~.:iting economic siruotion and continrling fnod shortages brought (;umulkn no credit citlier. Nor did his apparent foreign policy >llccess, in thc sh:ipc o f a treaty \vith tlie W ~ s t C;erni;in government oi Wil l i Bralidt ol i 7 Deceliil~cr I 970, which recljgnized de firrto I'oland's post-war western border, e~iliance his domestic position.

LYlIiatcvcr sclf-satisf>iction (;nnililka's tc;irn may hiive felt at thc signing o f thc trciity with Bonn evaporated a uxcck later with the ourhrcnk of strikes in the sli~pyards o f Gilafisk ;ind Gdyiiia. K lxugramnir o f niodest econ(!ttiic reform, i l~tendcd to give some ;~i~rt inomv to facrories 2nd to introduce a system of wage incen- tives, went hadly wmng when irs first ph;ase, a large increase in fnr~d prices, was intr

c;lse the situation. Rut it took a further strike hy tlie textile workers of thdi., a city moch neglected by the ~urhnrities since t l~e hcforr the price rises were wirhdrawn on I 5 February.

Althnugh Gicrek's tear11 cmcrgcd fl-0111 the crisis with sol: degree ot puhlic co~ifidcncc, :In end was p l ~ t to :ill attempts endow trade unions with greater autonomy. Tlic workers remainlu c:iotiou.; even if very mucl~ aware of their strength. The narinnalisr. communist Moczar. who htid challcn~ed Gomulka in 1968, was cased out of the interior ~ninisrry in the spring of 1971, after which Gierck skilfully kept a~nhirious colleagilrs away from the levers powcn Relations with tllc Churcll, now respected by the state as a key basrio~i of social prncr in the country, imp]-nscd. In June ~ 9 7 1 Pope I'aul VI finall!. rcc(~gn~zed the post-w;ir ecclesiastical administration in the ex-Gcrmcin tcrritorics. Thcrc was 3 nlarked liheralizatinn in cultural polis); especiall\- e\.ideut in the reai~n of cxpcrimcnr:iI thcatl-c and in film-making. Repressinn was eased and government propaganda iiuw cmp1i;isized tlhe 'moral-political unity of the Polish nation'. The decision NJ rchuild the Royal Castle in Viiarsa\v, which had been destroyed hy rlir Kazis, was welcomed hy I'oles a t home and ahroad; Gierek's go\,crnrrient was even ahle to attract some emigri-s to co-opcr.lte in the tieids of husiness and culture. O n the other hand, the continiling tmigration to West Germany of many Mazuri;ins, Upper Silcsians, and even Kashub- ians, who had bcen alicnatcd froit1 Polishrlcss ~iver tlie years by an insensiti\,c administration, was a sh;lmeiul indicrrr~cnt of the com- munist I-cgime.

As for the 1.ondon imigres, it was only in iy;~, atrcr Zalcski's dcath, that their main groupings achieved a belatcd reconciliation. The successio~l of Edward Raczyfisl;i nl the presidential office in 1979 restored snnie prestige ro the exilccl presidency. Outside this new ho~id nf krnigri: unity renaincd rlic National Party (the n:~tionnlist heirs of Dmowski) who sought a more 're:ilistic' apprnncli to Gicrek's Poland and who continued ro warn of C;crnlan :ind lewish intripucs i n destabilizing the counrrs. A great boost to thr n111r:ile of the Poles in tlie llnired States was the appointment in Novemher 1 ~ 7 6 oi the Polish-;\rnerica~~ scholar Professor Zhigniew blzeziliski, an expert on Soviet affairs, as President Carter's national security adviser, as ivell as the prnmi-

Cutn?~rrlttistrr C I I ~ the Cold War, r94j - r9Sg 305

l>c.ot role played in US political life lhy Ser~ator Edtnund hluskie, a 1)rrnocrat pres~dcntial hopef~il, ;lnd Klerncnt Zalilocki, chairman , i r l 1977) of the Foreign Ilelations Committee of the Mouse of Jlcl~reseilratives.

f h c key to the carly buoyancy of Gierek's regime was the rapid gy with a vim to increasing I'oland's role in international trade. Gon~ulka's p,,licy of econoinic autarky was abandoned. There was n marked iniivovc~ncnt in the general standard of living. Emphas~s was put on reversing the chronic housing shortage, and motor-car pro- duction under licence increased, notably of the Fiat r r x p ; herweell 1970 and 1980 car ownership grew from 4jo,ooo to over two ~i~illion. Tlir casing of fol-eign currerlc? resrrictions gave many l'olc access to otherwise rare western consumer goods. At the 7;irnc time the sr;tre coiitinued its heavy subsidy of housing, icinsport, holidays and of the health service. and it cvcn hrought iilrlependenr peasant farmers within rhc social security system. (:ornpulsory requisitioning of agricultural produce iron1 the p~,;ls.ints, in forcc s i ~ ~ c c 1945, findly ended in 1971. 111 the new climate o t eect-wcsr detente, Gicrek paid official visits to several \veste~-n countries, irrcluding the USA, and in return was Iiosr in W-:~rsaw ro the French president Gisc:ird d'Estaing, and tlic Amcri- call presiderlts lu'ison, Ford and Carter; rhc latter came in 1777, ~?ccompanied by I'rofessor Hrzr~ihski.

811t G~crek's 'economic miracle' restcd on flawed fou~tdatinns. I'lic centralized economy, run irieflicienrly hy a privileged and vcnal I'arty leadership, still revolved round heavy industry which riilderwent no srrucn~ral reform. ]Many of the i~tvcsrmcnts were misdirected and indced wasted. Many new 1)olish protlucrs ill- tcndcd for cxport provcd to be of shoddy quality and failed tn \\-in foreig~i markets. External factors, such as the 1774 oil pricr rise (following the 1973 Arah-Israeli war) and rising western interest rates. compounded the economic d~f fc~~ l t i e s . Hy 1974 tlie economy was overheating, inflation was growing, and there was a return of fc~od short.tges; in 1976 sugar was rationed. Gierek's honeymoon ivitlt the nntion, rvhose consumer appetites had bcen whetted, was cuniing to a n end. There were also serious squalls (117 the political

job Pola1i11, after J 79 7

5 ; C : o ~ l l ~ . ~ i l r i < l \ v . ~ r d ( , i ~ ~ c L I , ilv, c: i-. IU:LCC< ihc T I ~ I I ~ C ~ \ 01 Rydulttlw) IC I llpl,x1 S~lcsia. \cprc~iilrcr ,974. L>csp~re tl~cdia~srruos failure (ri G i ~ u c k ' ~ rionumic policirs. sn opii~iun poll of Ocrohcr iqgg found 11i:lr >nost I'ules who had rr.iched inarurir? in rhc early r9;as as ivcll as r h r m lcarr well c l f f in rhcThird lleptrhlic rcrainrd o fnvour:thle image of thr ' ~ w d rimes' under Cierek. Ovcr ro.ooo mourners attended his fonci;il m S

308 Poland, iiftrr I 7 9 1 G~rnr~rrorknr l l~rd the Cold \Var. 1945-1989 09

Emigre publications and Polish-laligi~agc mdio srations abroad. especislly Radio Free Europe in Munich and the Polish section of the IMC. also contrib~itcd ro this effer\~cscencc of ideas. At tIlc same time the relaxation on foreign travel and the spread of television ( 4 ~ per cent of Polish homes j~ossccsed a ttlevision ser in 1970) increased popular awareness of rhe cvcr-widening gulf between Polish and western living conditions. Dependent on western loans and bcing a signarory to the Helsinki Final Act o i 1975 with its emphasis on human rights, thc Polish governmcnr W ~ S onable to root out the vigorous and pluralist \vorld of dissent \vhich now flourished behilid rhe increasingly sterile official poli- tical ordcn

The Catholic Church conrrihutcd significantly ro the creation of a broad-based movement in defcncc of honlan rights, which embraced Catholic and secular intcllccruals acrlve in rhe oppo- sirion. The Church had already her11 stl-engtliened by Cardinal Wyszyhski's deft, yet rclcntlcss, exrcnsion of its influence os a Inass orsanization firmly rooted in the national tradition. Its prestige soared to unexpected heights wllcrl Karrrl Wbjtylo, the archbishop of Krakhw, was elected pope oil 1 6 Octohcr I 978, assu~ning thc namc of John Paul 11. For the authorities, who lhad strongly clisapproved of \%jr).fa's I-obust support i

I"" Conin11171rs11r a id the Cold W L I ~ , r q q j - 19x9 3 1 1

1 . . nP . ' " . \ ' ( fl 1 . ~ ~ 1 1 \Y. I I c s . I 0, ,111 I I X ~IAIII ~ L , I I I at tlie tn~omr!br o ; s ( g r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 117,. agrcenler1r n.hiih lh~oucht Zolid.ir~t! inra rxi?rr~~ce, in rhc 1.enin shipyard in Cdahsk on 3 r Augrbct rqXo. On his icnmcdiarr righr is Mieczyslnw lagiclski, a dcpury prsme tiiiriisrcr and member oirhr communisr Politburo. h r x c thc sraruc of Lenin. lorig since zone, in the rigl~t~hantl come,:

\4azou,iccki, a lcadiiig Catholic juurnalist, and Bronistaw Geremek, a distinguished mcdiclaal historia11 and doughry ilego- tiator, joined Walpsa's tcnni.

Yer again a la>-ge sectior~ oi the Polish working clasc, crearrd by the comniunist-led prngr;immc of post-war i~idustrializarion, turncd against its bureaucratic masters. When o n z6 Augt~sr rhe srrikes spread t o the coal-mines of Silesia, Poland's industrial liearr- land, the governmcrlr had littlc choice hut to negoriate with the ~ t r i k c co~ii~nir tces . T(I his credit, Gicrck rejcctcd Soviet advice t o use force against tlic srrikcrs. O n j o and j r August, in S7,czecin and Gdansk respectively> rlic tloundering authorities capirlrlarcd over tlie ccntral demand for indepclident trade unions. TO con- solidntc rlicir position against any future government intrigues, the tratlc union leader5 vorcd on 17 Septcmbcr t o create H single llational trade i ~ i i i o ~ i called 'Solidarity'. Llndcr the leadership of

~Yjalqsa, \rho displaved a slire\vrl political insrinzr, combined with ,Iynarnis~n and a scnse of mission, Solidarity built up its inrernal democratic srrucrures and hcca~nc a magnetic focus for a widc r,ingc of protest groups. By mid-November it had Y ~iiillion memhers, roughly a third of Poland's adult p o p ~ ~ l a r i o n ; a year later its membership exceeded r o million. T h e discrcditcd Gierek was removed fronr office on 6 Septemher and replaced by Stailistaw Kania, an experienced apparatchik.

'Flie developments in Poland niade tlic headlines around the xrrorld, while Alilosz's Nohel I'rizr for Literature in Dccembcr 1980 also focused international attention on Polish affairs. In the wesr thrre was considerable sympathy fnr Solidarity which also enjoyed tile support of the Polish pope. 111 'loscow a n d East Berlin rliere was horror and alarm. President Carrcr \ m s briefed o n rhe Polish situatiori hy Rrzezihski, and his thrcat of sanctions a ~ a i n s r the USSR, niadc to the Kremlin via the 'hot line' ar midnight of 3-4 December 1980, nray have dissi~adcd t h r Soviet leadership from ordering an imminent invasion of Poland. l 'hr likclihood of I'olish resistance was prohahly another deterrent t o a Soviet invasion which would have creared a ~ i ia jo r intcl-nar~onal crisis. In any casc, >~losc~~\ r ; remained unyielding in irs hosrility, and leant heavily o n the Polish aurhorities to crack down on Solidarity. For Solidarity was not an ordinary tvade union; it was evolving into a niass social movement commitred t o the democratization of political lifc, the disnianrling of the command econoni): and the introduction of autolionlous production units. Although 11s lcadcrs were realistic enough t o hold back from seizing political power (Kuroir described it as 'a self-limiting revolution'), an effective sratc i ~ f 'dual power' was cmcrging. Ry its very csistence, Solidarity represented a challenge t o tlic communisrs' ~nnnopoly of political control within Poland, and ultimately t o the Soviet empire in eastern Europe.

Under 1Vatqsa's leadership Solidarity not only w~ithstood the government's arrempts to infiltrate its regional branches a n d ro promore a split wirhin its ranks hut also grcw in strength, most vividly demonstrarcd by theall-national four-hour general srrikp on z j hlarch I ~ X I . In May Rural Solidarity of peasant farliiers --as legalized. The Polish authr~rities were not yet ready for a decisive confrontation. Indeed, u~?der the impact of the euphoric expecta-

tions of greatcr freedom gripping rhe country, rhe Parry itsclf was in turmoil and in 3 verifahle state of decline. Of its j million mc~nbers , ahour :I third ab.indoncd rlie Party nltogcther, while a further 700,ooo mernbcrs actually joined Solidarity. A reformist wing called for more dc~nocrat ic 'horizonrel s t rui t~ires ' within the Parry, while the hardliners, encouragerl by Mosco~vq urged decisive action against the 'counter-revolution'.

The (:hurch's effective mcdinmry role in diiiusing repcated crises hetween the auth(~ri t ics and Solidarity was temporarily blunted in May 1981 by the attempted assassination of the pope, probably instigarcd by the KGB, and hy tlic dear11 of Cardinal Wyszyhski. Thc new primate Cardinal Jbzef Glcmp did iiot have his pre- deccssur's dominating prestige and had a hard act t o follow. In an!, case, rile day of reckoning was fast approaching: tol- the ahnormal situation in Poland could nor conrinne indcfinitclp. [ h e appoinr- rnelir o i the defence in in is re^- Genrral \trojciech J;truzelski as prime rninisrcr in February was at1 early indication rliat the I'arty leader- ship rons hmcing itsclf for action. Althou,~h o t gentry origin and a soung victim of Sralink deport;irions, the a loot Jaruzelski was a loyal communist senera1 with a long, nrjcccssful military career behind him. At frequent meetings throughout tlic spring and summer of 1981, the I'olish comrnur~ist lcadcl-s nssurrd thc irnpaticnr Soviets of their rcsolvc t o end the crtsi.\ by their orrrn means. At rlie extraordinary 9th l'arry congl-css in July, the first t o b r attcndcd by deniocratically elccrcd delcgatec, Knnin succeeded in r c s t o r i n ~ some order within rlie I'arty. Wirh rlie appointment iii August of Gcncral Kiszczal,, the head of military countcr- inrclligence, as interior minister. the authorities accelerated plans devised earlier for the i~irrnduction of ]martial law.

The drastic dctcrioration of food supplies rriggercd oif further wage demands and deeperred thc \krcariness of thc pupularion. The hardening of rhe authorities' atrirudes raclicalii-cd lnatiy Solidarity ;~crivists. At irs nalional congress, hcld in Gdiiirsk in Scprernher, Solirlarity overwhelmingly endorsed an ~ p p c a l of fraternity t o rhe 3vorLrrs of eastcrn Oirope arid o i the USSR; i r was a romantic gesture that onlv serrsed as a red rag to the Sovirr bull. 'The gravity (if thc situation and the h ~ g h srakcs involved werc rcflcctcd when, on 18 Octoher, rhc central commitrce of the h r t v replaced Kania

wiih JaruzcIsL~ es firsr secretary. Conrr

cumpounded by the vast h~rc ign debts (Sqobn ill 1988) and the \\,csr's onwillir~gncss to advance f i~rrhcr creriirs, ntlr t o ~iicl~tiorl US c c o ~ ~ o n ~ i c sancr inn~ , s o n r i l ~ ~ l e d t n gnaw ar the very sinews of nntional life. Industrial p ~ - ~ ~ d u c r i o n and living standards continued ro f>~ll; prices I-osc; slinps cmpricd; the statc budget faced a draniaricall? growing deficit. Alarming effects of industrial pollu. r i m were observed i i i m;in!. areas of the country. Poland\ prospects sermed lhoprless and some half a rnillior~ I'ules. mostly young and enrerprising, left rhr country 11r chose t o reu~a in a h r o ; ~ d in t l i s period. In 1y86 the :nrer!nnent rclcased all remaining ~lolitical prisoncl-s but rlie Snlidarits leadership. altht~ugll n o longer pre- rwnted from actlng o l ~ r n l ~ , refusc~l t o parricipare in a govenlment- sponsored consul tar~vc 'issen~l~ly. Treare~l by visiring h~re ign poli- ticians as the efiectivc IcaJci- of rhe opp

Gorhacbcv's rnvoy made the mnmcnrous announcement that Polantl w,as free ro determine the shape of its ourn governn~cnr, ln anothcr conipromise arrangement, Jaruzclski was clecred president

8 on l y July; ten days later he resigned from the Parry ~ccrc taryshi~ . On the other hand, \Valcsa skiltullv ~voord the United Peasant

~~...

Party (ZSL) and the Democratic par^ (SD). hirherto communisr- ~(~nrro l jed parliamentary grouping.< but iiow eager to assert rheir independence, to prevent the crearion of a cr)nlirion government led by General Kiszczak. On I y August President Jaruzelski invited the respected Catholic i~~rellectual Tildeurz i\.[;izowiecki to form a coalition governmcnr. With the almost unanimous support of the Seim, b1.iazowiecki became rlie first non-communist prime rninisar in what was still formallv communist castern Europe - and received a congratularory telegram from Mnsco\r.. U'alrsa himself eschewed all public office for the tinic being. Although the PU'R rerained the kry ministries of the interior and o f defence_ in accordance witli the 'mund rahle' agreement and ro reasstlre bloscow, its days as a '.Clarsisr-I~cninisr' parry were over.

The for(?-five-year pcriod of communist rule in I'oland cannot he simply dismissed as one in wliicb nothing constr~~ctive or beneficial was achicved. And l'ola~ld's snrellite status mas cerrainly preferable to the late of the Baltic States. \vhich were incorporated in the USSR. Rut the forcible imposition of an ideology alien ro most of its inhabita~ns, the cynical travesty of the concept of democracy, rlie decades of me~idacity, the humiliating suhserviencc to the USSR, and the shccr rvasrefulness of much econc)mic activiry all weigh bcavilv in any objectivr asscssn~e~it of the communist legacv in I'nland. In terms of livins srandards, co~nrnunist Poland not only did not catch up wirh the west, bur fell furrher behind. Impressirc statistics of coal or sreel prodt~rrion were no suhsrirure for chronic shortages of hasic goods. It now remained ro be seen how I'olish socien; so long in a conimunist srrairiacker, would rcrpond m the sudden challcrlgcs o f freed0111 and indcpendencc.

A new republic, 1989-

.Although ~T,III!: hardline Solidari? soppt~rterr resented the lack of a clean break \I-irh thr communist past and no settling of scores with the cnmmunisrs. the constitutional chattges and rhe t.lecrions of ry8q are now generally accepted as marking the birth of thc Pol~sli 'Third Republic'. On rg 1)ecemher 1989 Poland formally ccaied 10 bc a nu-callrd 'People's Republic' and rccovcrcd the crowned white earlr ns irs emblem; rcfcrcnccs ro the 'Icading role' nf thc PZPR, to the S n v ~ e ~ :alliance, and to socialis111 were expungcd frmn the constirllrioti. \.YJhar made possible Poland's pcaceful rranstormarion in iy8y-yo was rhc 'self-organization' of Polish society that had evolved since the 1970s and the self-restraint and 5ense of responrihilit). of the counrry's political leaders, whether conimuntsrs or menlhers of the former opposition. As a result a dangerous political vacuum was avoided and social peace was ni:~inrained. Indeed, the much greater political realism of the Poles in rhe second halt of the twentieth century, as witnessed in r y 56, in rgXo-I, and now, marked a powel.fi~l contrast wit11 the disastrous Ronianric insurrrctions of rhc previous century and with rhe \Varsa\\r uprising of 1944.

.IlazowieckiS 'great coalition' showed exceptional energy in draaging I'oland out of its economic mnrasmus. J a n u a ~ ~ s q o saw the introduction oi a widc-ra~lging prosranline of economic reform, the mosr radical in thc wholc of ex-communist Europe and prepared hy the new tinnncc minisrrr Professor Leszek Balcerowicz. The resulting 'shock rrearment' halted the galloping ir~flatiun and