Logic, Thought, and Action 7

Chapter 7

TRUTH AND REFERENCE∗

Henri Lauener†University of Bern

To current naturalistic views on philosophy I oppose a pragmaticallyrelativized version of transcendental philosophy. Quine’s system, as aparadigmatic case, forms a subtle and solidly woven fabric of theseswhich seem difficult to attack from within in spite of certain apparenttensions. As I am not prepared to concede all the semantic indetermina-cies it involves I object to its founding principles and reject naturalismas a general approach. Shunning any notion of absolute (external) truth,I replace the doctrine of physical realism by a distinctive kind of rela-tivism which is not to be confused with so-called cultural or subjectiverelativism. On the basis of an entirely different conception of language,I consider Quine’s claim that truth precedes reference as an error dueto his particular brand of holism and to his one-sidedly behavioristicmethod. Questions concerning truth are so central in philosophy that itshould not be introduced, at the outset, as a pretheoretic notion relyingon such a vague criterion as that of assenting to sentences. I doubt thathe can be right when he asserts that what objects there are accordingto a theory is indifferent to the truth of observation sentences, for themeaning, i.e. the intension and the extension of the terms occurringin sentences used for testing that theory, depends on it insofar as theirtruth, in accord with Tarski’s definition, requires the existence of em-pirically discoverable objects satisfying the respective open sentences.Therefore, holophrastically conceived observation sentences, held truemerely on account of their stimulus meaning, cannot do the job since

∗This article appeared in the issue of the Revue internationale de philosophie devoted to“Quine with his replies” 1997, vol. 51, pp. 557–566. We thank both the editor of the Revueinternationale de philosophie, Prof. Michel Meyer, and Herr Michael Frauchiger acting onbehalf of the Lauener Stiftung, for granting us permission to re-publish this paper to whichQuine replied in the issue mentioned (Ibid. pp. 581–582)

D. Vanderveken (ed.), Logic, Thought & Action, 153–161.©c 1997 Revue Internationale de Philosophie. Printed by Springer, The Netherlands.

154 LOGIC, THOUGHT AND ACTION

they do not properly belong to the language in which the theory hasbeen couched.

Jaakko Hintikka has distinguished two radically contrasting appr-oaches to language which he labels the universalistic view and the viewof language as a calculus.1 According to the first, language is a universalmedium which we cannot contemplate from an external vantage point inorder to examine its relation to the world. As a partisan of the secondapproach I do not consider language an amorphous, constantly evolvingwhole; I rather hold that we create a great number of distinct linguisticsystems which we use as instruments for various purposes. Facing thefact that there are different uses of expressions, I lay much weight onthe possibility of interpreting or reinterpreting token systems in the waythis is done in model theory.

According to my method of systematic relativization to contexts (ofaction), we create reality sectors by employing specific conceptual sch-emes through which we describe the world. Since a new domain ofvalues for the variables is presupposed for each context I advocate apluralistic conception of ontology in contrast to Quine who postulatesa unique universe by requiring us to quantify uniformly over everythingthat exists. The divergence comes from the different forms of holism wecountenance. In “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, he favors an extremesort of holism claiming that our global theory of the world is confrontedwith the tribunal of experience as a whole and affirming later that onlysentences at the periphery have an empirical content of their own. Thisis so because their (stimulus) meaning — as in the case of all occasionsentences — is constituted by the fact that assent to them is directlyprompted in presence of adequate sensory stimuli. Doubts have beenraised whether the Duhem-thesis is really compatible with the claimthat the meaning of observation sentences does not depend on the the-ory. With my contextual holism no such difficulty occurs. Rejecting theview of a constantly evolving, unified language-theory, I claim that theintension of all the terms is determined by the axioms of the specific the-ory with which we operate in a given context, and that consequently themeaning of the observation sentences must depend on that theory, too.Whereas the naturalist aims at theories which are supposed to explainthe causal relation between semantic facts and utterances as physicaltokens, I stress the normative aspect of semantics. Equating talk aboutmeaning with talk about rules, I consider that intensions and extensions

1Cf. “Is Truth Ineffable?”, in Les formes actuelles du vrai , Palermo, 1988, and “Quine asa Member of the Tradition of the Universality of Language”, in R. Barrett and R. Gibson(eds.), Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1990.

Truth and Reference 155

are fixed by the totality of the rules which prescribe the correct use ofthe expressions. My method has the advantage that it permits us todistinguish language from theory and to separate the distinctive contri-butions to the truth conditions made by the language and by mattersof fact. If linguistic rules alone are involved we have analytically truestatements. Contrary to what Quine affirms, it is not the semantic dis-tinction between analytic and synthetic which is a matter of degree, butthe psychological faculty of an individual to comprehend a language. Inorder to understand exactly the theoretical terms of quantum mechan-ics, for instance, one must thoroughly master the whole theory includingits integral parts of logic and mathematics. Philosophers tend to overes-timate the capacities of a layman when they suggest that he can graspthe precise meaning of terms like ’electron’, ’nucleus’, ’spin’ etc. Thefact that they are able to utter some true sentences about particles isnot sufficient, since full understanding requires potential knowledge ofall the truths on the matter — an ideal which can be approximatelyrealized only by professionals.

Thus, considered from my transcendental point of view, the very pos-sibility of expressions having meaning depends on conventions, i.e. ona community of users agreeing on a set of rules which determine theiruse in a context. Insofar as the intensions of the theoretical terms areimplicitly defined by the system of empirical laws and their extensionsfixed by the intended model, their meaning cannot remain the same inthe event of (even a slight) theory change. For, when we give up a the-ory, replacing it by a new one, the conditions under which sentences canbe rightly asserted have been altered altogether so that the two theoriesmust be considered, strictly speaking, as semantically incommensurable.Of course, it is possible, by means of ascent to a meta-language, to speakabout the words and to ascertain that they have a similar meaning dueto some similarities of the axioms in which they appear, but this doesnot amount to making them synonymous, since synonymy, according tothe present view, must be an intralinguistic property (if it occurs at all).Moreover, we have no obvious guarantee that terms like ’electron’ havethe same extension in successive physical theories, contrary to what Hi-lary Putnam has suggested, because we must secure that equal methodsof empirical identification have been applied, before we can assert theextensional identity of two terms used in different contexts. In viewof the fact that linguistic individuals cannot be taken to be (identical


with) physical tokens, as I have argued elsewhere,2 I insist on the dif-ferent nature of scientific theories dealing with empirical objects andmeta-theories talking about abstract linguistic entities. I wonder howQuine with his vision of a unique language-theory manages to keep to-gether such a mixed bag of disorderly things which is fatally threatened— it would seem — by paradox. Therefore, I prefer to resort to mynotion of a limited context which allows us to avoid the dismissal ofuseful semantic distinctions as merely gradual. The resulting concept ofmeaning diverges radically from any concept developed along natural-istic lines. One important consequence touches on the sentences whichare to serve for testing theories. Since a language used in daily mattersis subjected to semantic rules differing from those of a language used inscience, a sentence taken from the first cannot have a proper functionwithin a scientific test procedure. For this reason the so-called proto-col sentences of early logical positivism or Quine’s observation sentencesare of no avail when we are confronted with the problem of testing sci-entific theories. The fact that we may describe, on a meta-level, thewords ’water’ and ’H2O’ as denoting roughly the same substance doesnot entitle us to declare them synonymous, for they do not belong tothe same linguistic systems; as ’water’ is not an appropriate chemicalterm it should be banished from the language used in the context ofchemistry. This explains why I reject sentences like ’Water is H2O’ assemantically incoherent while I maintain that metalinguistic statementssuch as, “’Water’ in ordinary language denotes roughly the same sub-stance as ’H2O’ in chemical terminology”, do make sense.

Every philosopher must assume the consequences of his fundamen-tal options. In my case the price to pay is a relativized conception oftruth and ontology. Quine, for his part, has become more and moreinsistent in defending his position of physicalist realism. Yet, somehowsurprisingly, he favors, at the same time, an extreme form of ontologicalrelativity, originating in the fact that we cannot determine a speaker’sreferential intentions from his linguistic behavior and that, therefore, ref-erence remains empirically inscrutable. But then how is it possible thatindeterminacy of reference does not undermine physicalism, the doctrinewhich assumes the posits of our overall world theory?

Quine argues that alternative theories obtained by means of proxyfunctions are structurally identical with our physical theory down tothe observation sentences, through which it gains its empirical content,

2Cf. “Speaking about Language: On the Nature of Linguistic Individuals” in A. P. Martinichand M. White (eds.), Certainty and Surface, New York, Edwin Mellen Press, 1992, pp. 117-134.


and that, therefore, they must have the same cognitive import: “Thestructure of our theory of the world will remain undisturbed, for theobservation sentences are conditioned holophrastically to stimulation,irrespective of any reshuffling of objective reference. Nothing detectablehas happened. Save the structure and you save all.” The position isclearly stated in the quotation: Since the observation sentences whichestablish the contact with sensory stimuli are our only access to the oneand absolute reality and since they are accepted as true without any re-gard to referential matters, there can be no objective, i.e. physical, factsabout reference. As Quine, on the other hand, concedes that we mustascribe denotations to the terms in order to understand a language headmits a derivative kind of semantic facts in the form of referents whichare assumed relative to a background language taken “at face value”.But as such ascriptions are posterior to our attributions of a truth valueto sentences we must eventually grant the precedence of truth over ref-erence. It seems very questionable to me whether ontological relativityso conceived is compatible with Quine’s professed realism according towhich our physical theory must count as true (pending further informa-tion). For if no empirical evidence in favor of the objects posited by thephysical theory — inclusively those of physiology, as nerve endings andstimuli etc. — can be adduced, how is it possible to affirm absolutely its(external) truth to the detriment of empirically equivalent3 rivals withplatonistic, pythagorean or other ontologies?

As I consider any attempt to establish an absolute correspondencerelation between theory and reality (neutrally given through sense ex-perience) as hopeless, I am not prepared to accord to physicalism thestatus of a true theory about the world. It is at best a recommenda-tion to adopt a physicalist ontology on the ground of practical reasonspartaking of scientific methodology.

Renouncing realism with its dubious notion of external truth andopting for a form of relativism which turns truth into a strictly inter-nal matter, akin to model theoretic treatment, does not prevent mefrom clinging to an empiricist attitude appropriate to scientific method.Relativity after all is a concept familiar to physicists. Quine’s mostimplausible theses — especially the ones concerning semantic indeter-minacy — have their origin in his deep-rooted conviction that scientificlanguage must be purged of intensionality. Flight from intensions is oneof his well-known slogans. As it is impossible to treat intentionality by

3Two theories are empirically equivalent if they have corresponding predicates interrelatedin the same way and if their corresponding observation sentences are identically conditionedto sensory stimulations, irrespective of the differing kinds of objects they are talking about.


purely extensional means he adopts a strategy according to which inten-tions along with propositional attitudes have to be reduced to a strictlydescriptive treatment in line with the methods of natural science, partic-ularly of behavioristic psychology which is the seemingly best candidatefor being incorporated into our global physical theory. Yet, I doubt thatthis will do because we cannot be content with simply describing pastintentional acts. Ordinary life as well as science requires innovation, i.e.decisions of all sorts in order to achieve tasks which are not predictableby means of a physical theory. My main objection to a naturalisticview on semantics resides in the fact that interpretation presupposes in-tentional acts to the effect that the members of a community speakinga specific language will agree on a set of rules prescribing the use ofthe expressions and that it cannot, therefore, be considered as a merelydescriptive matter to be handled exclusively with extensional tools. Ac-cepting (conventionally fixed) rules, choosing, conforming, asserting etc.are typical kinds of actions without which language would not exist. Ifthey were absent we could not speak but only produce noises. Conse-quently there can be no hope for integrating semantics into a physicalistdoctrine with its corresponding semantic facts, as long as nobody hassucceeded in reducing talk about intensions to talk about extensions.

The realist, being committed to the posits of his overall theory, mustassume the existence of physical objects and cannot, consequently, jus-tify his claim that it is (externally) true by taking recourse to the prethe-oretical truth of some unanalyzed sentences. As we need determinatecategories of objects, i.e. definite domains of values for the variables, inorder to fix the truth conditions, reference has to play a primordial role.This is the reason why I propose to relativize the concept of truth tocontexts in which we operate with specific linguistic systems and the-ories. According to my normative viewpoint, semantic questions aresettled by the fact that we have accepted the rules which determine theintension and the denotation of the terms for a particular language. Byrelativizing ontology to a given theory we gain the advantage that refer-ential relations become determinate. Thus the analogy with relativity inphysics, where position and velocity are determinable relative to an iner-tial frame, works well while it fails for Quine since relativized reference inhis sense cannot be behavioristically determined. The weakness of thenaturalist’s position resides in his ignoring the trivial fact that positspresuppose positing and that intentional acts cannot be accounted forin an austerely extensional language as he wants to have it. I concludethen that, notwithstanding his claims to the contrary, reference doesmatter and that a scientific theory cannot be properly identified with-out assuming an intended domain whose individuals must satisfy certain


open sentences in order to make corresponding closed sentences true. Atany rate, a philosopher should not resort to the notion of a posit if hisvery doctrine renders intentional acts of positing unintelligible.

According to my special brand of transcendental philosophy, con-cerned with the optimal conditions for the elaboration of reliable sci-ence, we employ specific linguistic systems in order to structure theworld about which we acquire knowledge by describing and explainingit with help of various sorts of theories. We create what I call realitysectors by imposing different conceptual schemes on the raw materialprovided by sensory experience. The imposition of linguistic forms isa precondition for the possibility of individuating objects and for spec-ifying the ontology to which a given theory is committed. Electronsqua electrons do not exist absolutely but only relative to a context inwhich we use quantum mechanics. Through the selection of a languageappropriate to the intended purpose we create a relative a priori suchthat the truth of certain sentences will be determined by the semanticrules alone. Thus we exclude the very possibility for analytic statementsto be refuted by empirical facts (internal to the operating theory) aslong as we stick to the same conceptual framework. Such a relativizedconcept of analyticity depending on linguistic rules explicitly stated ina context has nothing to do with the old absolutistic notion inspiredby Kant and rightly dismissed in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. It isperfectly compatible with the conviction that no statement is immuneto revision. If a conceptual scheme proves to be inadequate for somepractical reason we give it up and replace it by a new one. Two token-wise identical sentences may occur in both contexts, but with differentmeanings since the connections within the semantic network have beenaltered, and it can even happen that the one is analytic while the otheris synthetic according to the respective sets of accepted rules. As I donot believe that we can do with the continually moving mass of a totallanguage-theory, I insist on the necessity of introducing stability pointsin our conceptual apparatus by stipulating that certain statements mustbe held true without regard to empirical matters in the reality sectorcreated by the context. By recommending such a procedure I do jus-tice to the widespread intuition that there are statements whose truthis elucidated without recourse to empirical considerations. Contrary toQuine, I do not rate classical logic as objectively true because we haveintegrated it into our overall scientific theory. I rather estimate that,being free to make alternative choices, we can use any system that fitsbest our practical needs. One may prefer, for philosophical reasons, in-tuitionistic to classical logic and consequently deny the truth of ’p ν -p’.In doing so he does not, however, enter into an objectively decidable


conflict with his rival who claims the truth of the same (token) sentence.No logical contradiction can arise between the competing positions sincethe rules fixing the correct use of the connective, i.e. the axioms de-termining its intension, are not the same. For this reason the meaningof ’ν’ must be different and it should not, therefore, be affirmed thatthe systems have a common stock of truths. Insofar as no statement ofthe one can be expressed in the language of the other, they have to beconsidered incommensurable.

My transcendental method requires a uniform treatment of truth bymeans of modeltheoretic procedures. The difference between mathemat-ics and empirical theories resides in the distinct nature of the denizenswho populate their respective ontologies. The domain of the former con-sists of abstract entities created by the fact that we use a mathematicaltheory through which they are precisely definable, whereas in the do-mains of the latter we have physical objects whose existence must beascertained by way of experimental procedures. Accordingly existentialclaims like ’(∃x)(x is a pentagon)’ are analytically true in the context ofEuclidean geometry since it follows logically from the axioms that theremust be at least one individual which satisfies the predicate ’pentagon’.4

On the other hand, synthetic statements like ’(∃x)(x is an electron)’ aretrue in the context of quantum mechanics because physicists have beenable to fix traces of such particles on photographic plates placed in cloudchambers in order to confirm the theory. It may be finally remarked thatthe theses of a system of logic (whose axioms and rules of deduction de-termine the intension of the logical constants) remain true under anyinterpretation of the descriptive terms and that they are, therefore, ex-tensionally indistinguishable.

I hope that the reasons I have invoked in the present paper will con-vince the reader that truth without reference does not make sense. Inaccord with my transcendental method, I propose to apply the semanticpredicate ’true’ only to sentences seen from within a theory, completewith its posited ontology, which we use in a specific context. It seemsto me that, in view of the unsurmountable difficulties with which (scien-tific) realism is confronted, we have no other choice than to banish anynotion of external truth. Superseded theories cannot be deemed false inan absolute sense; they only have a more or less extensive range of more

4For a platonist believing in the absolute existence of mathematical objects who endeavoursto render clear the informal notion of ’arithmetically true’ by resorting to a formal system,there is a problem: as such systems are incomplete according to Godel’s theorem there will¨always be truths not captured by them. For me the problem does not arise because, from thestart, I limit domains to objects specifiable within an (axiomatized) theory itself specified byan explicit set of rules.


or less precise applications. Newtonian mechanics, for instance, stillworks satisfactorily for a limited class of phenomena which we may callclassical phenomena. Since it fails in cases where great distances andhigh velocities are involved, we must use for such domains Einstein’smore efficient theory which, in turn, is not to be termed (externally orabsolutely) ’true’ any more than its predecessors.

In way of conclusion I remark that ’truth’ is ultimately to be consid-ered as an evaluative term designed to assess sentences with regard totheir practical reliability. We can decide objectively whether a sentenceused in a given context is true or not only after having accepted ruleswhich fix convenient standards. Thus everything will finally rest on cer-tain agreements about norms which I call conventions and which cannotbe captured within a purely descriptive scientific theory, but must ratherbe discussed and settled by deliberation on a metalevel.

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Logic, Thought, and Action 7