Basco vs PAGCORMunicipal Corporation Local Autonomy imperium in imperioOn July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Basco and four others (all lawyers) assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR on constitutional grounds among others particularly citing that the PAGCORs charter is against the constitutional provision on local autonomy.Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local is violative of the local autonomy principle.ISSUE:Whether or not PAGCORs charter is violative of the principle of local autonomy.HELD:NO. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other chargessubject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide.Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local governments.MMDA v Bel-Air Village Association,Inc.GR 135962March 27, 2000FACTS:On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.ISSUE:WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of the state endowed with police power.HELD:A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. It is a body politic and corporate one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs inSec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality] and its inhabitantspursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the [LGU's corporate powers] provided under the Code.There isno syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alonelegislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.TheMMDA is merely a development authorityandnot a political unit of governmentsince it is neither an LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. TheMMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.In sum,the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils,that possess legislative power and police power.The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.Province of Batangas vs.RomuloGR 152774May 27, 2004FACTS:In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them through the LGC.The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the corresponding funds.Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release thereof.ISSUE:Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.HELD:Yes.The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a withholding of a portion of the IRA they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down.According toArt. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution,the State shall ensure the local autonomy of local governments. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, theConstitution confines the Presidents power over the LGUs to one ofgeneral supervision, which has been interpreted toexclude thepower of control.Drilon v. Limdistinguishes supervision from control:controllays down the rules in the doing of an act the officer has thediscretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it himself;supervisionmerelysees to it that the rules are followedbut hasno authority to set down the rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national taxes.Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitutionmandates that the just shareshall beautomatically released to the LGUs. Since the release isautomatic, theLGUs arent required to perform any act to receive the just share it shall bereleasedto them without need of further action. To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate.The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply in this case.The Oversight Committees authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC of 1991 nottosupplant or subvertthe same, and neither can itexercise control over the IRAof the LGUs.Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGCbutonly through a separate lawand not through appropriations laws or GAAs.Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.Ageneral appropriations billis a special type of legislation, whosecontentislimited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unitany provisiontherein which isintended to amend another law is considered an inappropriate provision. Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of general & substantive law. To permit the Congress to undertake these amendments through the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.Sultan Osop Camid vs. The Office of thePresidentPosted onSeptember 11, 2012Sultan Osop Camid vs. The office of the PresidentG.R. No. 161414 January 14, 2005Facts:The municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur, is a town that is not supposed to exist yet is actually insisted by some as alive and thriving. The creation of the putative municipality was declared void ab initio by the Supreme Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists that Andong thrives on and, hence, its legal personality should be given judicial affirmation.xxxThe factual antecedents derive from the ruling inPelaez vs.Auditor Generalin 1965. Then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders creating 33 municipalities in Mindanao.President Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing his powers under Sec.68 of the Revised Admin. Code. Then VP Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of prohibition alleging that the EOs were null and void, Sec. 68 having been repealed by RA 2370, and said orders constituting an undue delegation of legislative power.After due deliberation, the SC ruled that the challenged EOs were null and void since Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch.Among the EOs annulled was EO 107 which created the Municipality of Andong.Petitioner represents himself as a current resident of Andong and alleged that Andong has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its constituents, despite the fact that no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of the local government offices of Andong since 1968.Camid imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of DILG in not classifying [Andong] as a regular existing municipality and in not including said municipality in its records and official database as [an] existing regular municipality. He argues thatPelaezhas already been modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence, particularly citing Municipality ofSan Narciso v. Hon. Mendezwherein the court affirmed the unique status of the Municipality of San Andres as a de factomunicipal corporation. Camid also cites Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 as basis for the recognition of the impugned municipality.Issue:Whether the judicial annulment of the Municipality of Andong continues despite the petitioners allegation that Andong has thrived into a full-blown municipalityHeld:Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription. What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by instrumentalities of the state. Camids plaint should have undergone the usual administrative gauntlet and, once that was done, should have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least would have had the power to make the necessary factual determinations.Petitioners seeming ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant prematurity of the present petition, cannot be countenanced.The question as to whether a municipality previously annulled by the Supreme Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative/reimplementing statute has never been decided before. The effect of Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as Andong warrants explanation.EO 107 which established Andong was declared null and voidab initioin 1965 by the Supreme Court inPelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965), along with 33 other EOs. The phrase ab initio means from the beginning.Pelaezwas never reversed by the SC but was rather expressly affirmed in the cases ofMunicipality of San Joaquin v. Siva,Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, andMunicipality of Kapalong v. Moya. No subsequent ruling declaredPelaezas overturned/inoperative. No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating the Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted municipality.Pelaezand its offspring cases ruled thatthe President has no power to create municipalitiesyet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. With the promulgation of the LGC in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive order but not judicially annulled Sec. 442(b) of the LGC deemed curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored under.There are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact thatthe EO creating Andong was expressly annulled by the SC in 1965.Court decisions cannot lose their efficacy due to sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved.Sec. 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to affirm/reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities which had been previously created by presidential issuances/EOs.The provision only affirms the legal personalities of those municipalities which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved remain inexistent unless recreated through specific legislative enactments.Thelegal effect of the nullification of a municipality in Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios of the voided town back to their original municipalities.If there is only a strong impulse for the reconstitution of the municipality nullified inPelaez, thesolution is through the legislature and not judicial confirmation of void title.The time has come for the light to seep in and for the petitioner and like-minded persons to awaken to legal reality.

League of Cities v. ComelecAction:These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.Fact:During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents signature.The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.Issue:The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.Held:We grant the petitions.The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.TAN vs. COMELECG.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local Government CodeFacts:This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because: The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite. The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.Issue:WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which states that Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected? NO.Held:Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger.The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.Padilla vs. COMELECFACTS:Pursuant to RA 7155, creating the Municipality of Tulay na Lupa in the province of Camarines Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-naLupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Bayan-bayn, Mataulang, Pag-asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in the Municipalty of Labo, some province, COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite was conducted throughout the municipality of Labo and majority voted against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa. Petitioner prayed that the plebiscite conducted to set aside with the contention that such plebiscite was a complete failure.ISSUE:Whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay na Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is valid.RULING:COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion and the result of the plebiscite rejecting the creation of the new municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa is valid.It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted in the political units directly affected, it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phrase political units directly affected is the plurality of the political units which would participate in the plebiscite.Grio vs. COMELECG.R. No. 105120September 2, 1992FACTS:Grio and his LDP political party filed a certiorari case against COMELEC in relation to the May 11, 1992 election. Grio is a candidate for Governor of Iloilo where thesub-provinceofGuimarasis located. LGC of 1991 took effect requiring the conversion of existing sub-provinces into regular provinces, and Guimaras is one such sub-provinces, upon approval by majority of votes cast in a plebiscite. The plebiscite favored the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province but petitionerquestioned the COMELEC that ballots should have contained spaces to allow voting for Gov, Vice Gov and members of the Sanggunian of Iloilo.ISSUE:Whether or not there was a complete failure of election in Guimaras.HELD:The court held that COMELEC was under mistaken presumption that under the LGC of 1991, whether or not the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province is ratified by the people in plebiscite, the President will appoint provincial officials. However, the voters favored for the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province so there was need to undo what COMELEC has done in plebiscite. There ballots in Guimaras should have contained spaces for Gov and Vice Gov. etc. but SC has now considered the case moot and academic since majority voted in the affirmative for the conversion of Guimaras. Malabang vs BenitoFACTS:Municipality of Balabagan was once part of the Municipality ofMalabang before it was created into a separate municipality thruan executive order.The Municipality Malabang filed a suit against the Municipality ofBalabagan for having been created under an invalid EO 386 andto restrain the respondent municipal officials from performing thefunctions of their respective offices.Petitioner relied on the ruling of the Pelaez case that Sec. 68 ofthe Administrative Code is unconstitutional (a) because itconstitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (b)because it offends against Section 10 (1) of Article VII of theConstitution, which limits the President's power over localgovernments to mere supervision.Section 68 of the Revised AdministrativeCode, approved onMarch 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by thesubsequentadoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterlyincompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.The Respondents on the other hand argue that the Mun. ofBalabagan isat leasta defacto corporation forhaving beenorganized under color of a statute before this was declaredunconstitutional, its officers having been either elected orappointed, and the municipality itself havingdischarged itscorporate functions for the past five years preceding theinstitution of this action. It is contended that as a de factocorporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked,although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quowarranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual likethe petitioner Balindong.The method of challenging the existence of a municipalcorporation is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quowarranto or other direct proceeding. But the rule disallowingcollateral attacks applies only where the municipal corporation isat least a de facto corporation. For where it is neither acorporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is that itsexistence may be questioned collaterally or directly in any actionor proceeding by any one whose rights or interests are affectedthereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unlessthey are estopped by their conduct from doing so.ISSUE:W/O the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation.RULING:No, because there is no other valid statute to give color ofauthority to its creation when EO 386 was subsequently declaredas unconstitutional.The color of authority requisite to the organization of a de factomunicipal corporation may be:1. A valid law enacted by the legislature.2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a)been upheld for a time by the courts or (b) not yet been declaredvoid; provided that a warrant for its creation can be found insome other valid law or in the recognition of its potentialexistence by the general laws or constitution of the state.In the case at bar, there is no other law that could give color ofauthority to the validity of the existence of the municpality ofBalabagan when EO 386 was later on invalidated. Hence, suchmunicipality is not a de factor corporation.

Pelaez vs Auditor GeneralPolitical Law Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness TestFrom Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovincesThe VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated. Pelaez argues, accordingly: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities? The Auditor General countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of Pelaez argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.ISSUE:Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC.HELD:Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.`In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not administrative.

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,vs.PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,

FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

HELD: NoLocal Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

Facts

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princessa enactedordinanceno. 15-92 banning the shipment of live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princessa City for a period of 5 years. In the same light, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan also enacted a resolution that prohibits the catching, gathering, buying, selling and possessing and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of 5 years within the Palawan waters. The petitiones Airline Shippers Association of Palawan together with marinemerchantswere charged for violating the aboveordinanceand resolution by the city and provincial governments. The petitioners now allege that they have the preferential rights as marginal fishermen granted with privileges provided in Section 149 of the Local Government Code, invoking the invalidity of the above-stated enactments as violative of their preferential rights.

Issue

Whether or not the enacted resolutions andordinancesby the local government units violative of the preferential rights of the marginal fishermen?

Held

No, the enacted resolution andordinanceof the LGU were not violative of their preferential rights. The enactment of these laws was a valid exercise of the police power of the LGU to protect public interests and the public right to a balanced and healthier ecology. The rights and privileges invoked by the petitioners are not absolute. The general welfare clause of the local government code mandates for the liberal interpretation in giving the LGUs more power to accelerate economic development and to upgrade the life of the people in the community. The LGUs are endowed with the power to enact fishery laws in its municipal waters which necessarily includes the enactment ofordinancesin order to effectively carry out the enforcement of fishery laws in their local community.

TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC [207 SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar 1992]

Facts:Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac.Complaintswere received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailingmachineinside petitioners warehouse. A committee was then appointed by themunicipalcouncil, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by theMunicipalcouncildeclaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview ofArticle694 of the New Civil Code. According to respondentmunicipalofficials, petitioners warehouse was constructed in violation ofOrdinanceNo. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting theconstructionofwarehousesnear a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends thatOrdinanceNo. 13 is unconstitutional.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioners warehouse is a nuisance within themeaningArticle694 of the Civil Code

(2) Whether or notOrdinanceNo. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.

Held:The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions ofArticle694 of the Civil Code. At the same time,OrdinanceNo. 13 was passed by theMunicipalCouncilof Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a validmunicipalordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of the saidordinanceis to avoid the loss of property and lifein case of firewhich is one of the primordial obligation ofgovernment. The lower court did not err in its decision.

Solicitor General v MetroManila AuthorityCruz, 1991FACTS:InMetropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the SC ruled that (1) theconfiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that couldbe imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605; and, that (2) even the confiscation of driver'slicenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to beimposed by the Commission.Several complaints were filed in the SC against the confiscation by police authorities of driver's licenses andremoval of license plates for alleged traffic violations. These sanctions were not among those that may beimposed under PD 1605.The Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach thelicense plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked orobstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."oThe Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adoptedpursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. There was no conflict between the decision andthe ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter.oThe Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it representedan invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. It violated PD 1605 which does not permit, and soimpliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for trafficviolations in Metropolitan Manila.

ISSUE & HELD:WON Ordinance No. 11 is valid (NO)

RATIO:The problem before the Court is not the validity of the delegationof legislative power. The question the SC mustresolve is the validity of the exerciseof such delegated power.oA municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must notbe unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulatetrade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for trafficviolations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the Metropolitan ManilaCommission, now the Metropolitan Manila Authority, to impose such sanctions.

Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from thenational legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes isconferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinatelegislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all timesthe will of their principal. Here, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevailagainst the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions thedecree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits.There is no statutory authority forand indeed there is a statutory prohibition againstthe imposition ofsuch penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed by thechallenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.NOTE:SC emphasized that the ruling in theGonongcase that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It isan exception to the general authority conferred by RA 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punishviolations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned.

Binay vs. Domingo; Power of LGUG.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991

Facts: Petitioner passed a resolution to confirm and/or ratify the ongoing burial assistance program initiated by the office of the mayor, of extending financial assistance of five hundred pesos (500.00) to a bereaved family, funds to be taken out of unappropriated available funds existing in the municipal treasury. This resolution was re-enacted again by a subsequent resolution.

The dispute arose when respondent issued an order disapproving the disbursement of the City's funds pursuance to the said resolution.

The COA argued thatthere is "no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under the assailed Resolutions, and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of Makati."

Also COA alleged that the resolution violate the prohibition that government funds must be disbursed for public purpose.

Moreover, COA alleged that there was violation of the equal protection clause, since classifying pauper residentswould be an invalid classification since there is not substantial distinctions form the other residents of Makati.Issue:Whether or not the resolutions are within the power of the Sanguniang Panglungsod of Makati.HELD: The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights.xxx Ordinance is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons.xxx The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of the police power in the promotion of the common good.

Plaza II vsCassionPosted onNovember 18, 2012GR 136809July 27, 2004FACTSThe City of Butuan, through its Sanggunian, passed SP Resolution 427-92 authorizing the City Mayor to sign the Memorandum of Agreement for the Devolution of the DSWD to the City of Butuan. Pursuant to the MoA, Mayor Plaza issued EO No. 06-92 reconstituting the City Social Services Development Office (CSSDO), devolving or adding thereto 19 additional DSWD employees headed by Virginia Tuazon as Officer-in-charge. Its office was transferred from the original CSSDO building to the DSWD building.Aggrieved by the development, Respondents refused to recognize Tuazon as their new head & to report at the DSWD building contending that the issuance of EO No. 06-92 & Tuazons designation as the CSSDOs Officer-in-charge are illegal. Respondents failed to report for work despite Mayor Plazas series of orders directing them to do so. Thereafter, they were administratively charged for grave misconduct & insubordination and were preventively suspended for 60 days.Upon expiration of their suspension, the respondents informed the Mayor that they are willing to return to work but only to their old office, not the DSWD building. They also failed to report to Tuazon at the DSWD building despite the Mayors instructions to do so.Mayor Plaza then dropped the respondents from the rolls pursuant to theCSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, Series of 1993which provides that officers & employees who are absent for at least 30 days without approved leavemay be dropped from the service without prior notice.ISSUE1. Whether EO No. 06-92 directing the devolution of 19 national DSWD employees to the city DSWD to be headed by petitioner Tuazon should be upheld as valid.2. Whether private respondents were denied due process when they were dropped from the rolls.HELD1.Sec.17 of the LGCauthorizes thedevolution of personnel, assets & liabilities, records basic services, and facilities of a national government agency to LGUs.Under this Code, the term devolution refers to theact by which the government confers power and authority upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions & responsibilities.Mayor Plaza is empowered to issue EO No. 06-92 in order to give effect to the devolution decreed by the LGC. As the local chief executive of Butuan City,Mayor Plaza has the authority to reappoint devolved personnel&may designate an employee to take charge of a department until the appointment of a regular head.EO No. 06-92 did not violate respondents security of tenure as they were not transferred to another office without their consent.Transferis amovement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service & may be imposed as an administrative penalty.The change of respondents place of work from the CSSDO to the DSWD building is not a transfer.It wasonly a physical transfer of their office to a new onedone in the interest of public service.2.Dropping from the rolls is not an administrative sanction. Thus,private respondents need not be notified or heard. Their assertion that they were denied due process is, therefore, untenable.

LTO vs. City of Butuan; Power of LGUG. R. No. 131512. January 20, 2000

Facts: Relying on the fiscal autonomy granted to LGU's by the Constittuion and the provisons of the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Butuan enacted an ordinance "Regulating the Operation of Tricycles-for-Hire, providing mechanism for the issuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit, and Imposing Penalties for Violations thereof and for other Purposes." The ordinance provided for, among other things, the payment of franchise fees for the grant of the franchise of tricycles-for-hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance of a permit for the driving thereof.

Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions of the national government that, indeed, has been transferred to local government units is the franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board ("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, the authority of LTO to register all motor vehicles and to issue to qualified persons of licenses to drive such vehicles.

The RTC and CA ruled that the power to give registration and license for driving tricycles has been devolved to LGU's.Issue:Whether or not, the registration of tricycles was given to LGU's, hence the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.

Ruling: No, based on the-"Guidelines to Implement the DevolutionofLTFRBs Franchising Authority over Tricycles-For-Hire to Local Government units pursuant to the Local Government Code"-the newly delegated powers to LGU's pertain to the franchising and regulatory powers exercised by the LTFRB and not to the functions of the LTO relative to the registration of motor vehicles and issuance of licenses for the driving thereof. Corollarily, the exercised of a police power must be through a valid delegation. In this case the police power of registering tricycles was not delegated to the LGUs, but remained in the LTO.

Clearly unaffected by the Local Government Code are the powers of LTO under R.A. No.4136 requiring the registration of all kinds of motor vehicles "used or operated on or upon any public highway" in the country.

The Commissioner of Land Transportation and his deputies are empowered at anytime to examine and inspect such motor vehicles to determine whether said vehicles are registered, or are unsightly, unsafe, improperly marked or equipped, or otherwise unfit to be operated on because of possible excessive damage to highways, bridges and other infrastructures. The LTO is additionally charged with being the central repository and custodian of all records of all motor vehicles. Adds the Court, the reliance made by respondents on the broad taxing power of local government units, specifically under Section 133 of the Local Government Code, is tangential.

Police power and taxation, along with eminent domain, are inherent powers of sovereignty which the State might share with local government units by delegation given under a constitutional or a statutory fiat. All these inherent powers are for a public purpose and legislative in nature but the similarities just about end there. The basic aim of police power is public good and welfare. Taxation, in its case, focuses on the power of government to raise revenue in order to support its existence and carry out its legitimate objectives. Although correlative to each other in many respects, the grant of one does not necessarily carry with it the grant of the other. The two powers are, by tradition and jurisprudence, separate and distinct powers, varying in their respective concepts, character, scopes and limitations.

To construe the tax provisions of Section 133 (1) of the LGC indistinctively would result in the repeal to that extent of LTO's regulatory power which evidently has not been intended. If it were otherwise, the law could have just said so in Section 447 and 458 of Book III of the Local Government Code in the same manner that the specific devolution of LTFRB's power on franchising of tricycles has been provided. Repeal by implication is not favored.

The power over tricycles granted under Section 458(a)(3)(VI) of the Local Government Code to LGUs is the power to regulate their operation and to grant franchises for the operation thereof. The exclusionary clause contained in the tax provisions of Section 133 (1) of the Local Government Code must not be held to have had the effect of withdrawing the express power of LTO to cause the registration of all motor vehicles and the issuance of licenses for the driving thereof. These functions of the LTO are essentially regulatory in nature, exercised pursuant to the police power of the State, whose basic objectives are to achieve road safety by insuring the road worthiness of these motor vehicles and the competence of drivers prescribed by R. A. 4136. Not insignificant is the rule that a statute must not be construed in isolation but must be taken in harmony with the extant body of laws.

LGUs indubitably now have the power to regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire and to grant franchises for the operation thereof, and not to issue registration.

Ergo, the ordinance being repugnant to a statute is void andultra vires.

[ G.R. NO. 193677, SEPTEMBER 06, 2011 ]LUCIANO VELOSO, ABRAHAM CABOCHAN, JOCELYN DAWIS-ASUNCION AND MARLON M. LACSON, PETITIONERS, VS.COMMISSIONONAUDIT, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

On December 7, 2000, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040 entitledAn Ordinance Authorizing the Conferment of Exemplary Public Service Award to Elective Local Officials of Manila Who Have Been Elected for Three (3) ConsecutiveTerms in the Same Position.Section 2 thereof provides:SEC. 2. The EPSA shall consist of a Plaque of Appreciation,retirement and gratuity pay remuneration equivalent to the actual time served in the position for three (3) consecutive terms, subject to the availability of funds as certified by the City Treasurer..xxx..Pursuant to the ordinance, the City made partial paymentsto some former city councilors including herein petitioners the total amount ofP9,923,257.00.The Director, Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO)-Local of the COA issued ND No. 06-010-100-05dated May 24, 2006.The COA sustained the Notice of Disallowance

ISSUE:

(1) Whether the COA has the authority to disallow the disbursement of local government funds

(2) Whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of P9,923,257.00 covering the EPSA of former three-term councilors of the City of Manila authorized by Ordinance No. 8040.

RULING:

Under the 1987 Constitution, however, the COA is vested with the authority to determine whether government entities, including LGUs, comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of these funds.Thus, LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within theauditjurisdiction of the COA.However, in line with existing jurisprudence,we need not require the refund of the disallowed amount because all the parties acted in good faith.

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY VS. AMBANLOC- LOCAL BUSINESS TAXATION

FACTS:Lepanto Consolidated Mining had a mining lease contract for a mining claim in Benguet. They used the sand and gravel mined to construct and maintain concrete structures needed in its mining operations such as a tailings dam, access roads, and offices. The provincial treasurer of Benguet then asked Lepanto Consolidated Mining to pay sand and gravel tax for the quarry materials extracted from the mining site. The counterargument was that the said tax applied only to commercial extractions and since Lepanto did not supply other users for some profit, the tax should not apply.ISSUE:Is Lepanto liable for the tax imposed by Benguet on the sand and gravel that it extracted from within the area of its mining claim used exclusively in its mining operations?HELD:YES. The CTA erred in applying the provision of the Local Government Code (Section 138) since the basis of Benguet province emanates from the Revised Benguet Revenue Code itself. This notwithstanding, the provincial revenue measure still did not distinguish between commercial and non-commercial extractions.

In addition, the Petitioners argument that when a company is taxed on its main business it can no longer be taxable for engaging in an activity that is but part of, incidental to, and necessary to such main business, was held to be inapplicable. The Court said that the cases where the above principle has been applied involved business taxes and thus the incidental activities could not be treated as separate and distinct from the main business. Here the tax being imposed was an excise tax levied on the privilege of extracting gravel and sand.

Province of Cam Sur v CA, 222 SCRA 137, GR 103125 (1993)

Facts:On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed a Resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial Capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employeesPursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, at the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur.The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper.

The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February 26, 1990.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order denying the motion to dismiss and allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.

Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.

Issue:WON the Province of Cam Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.

HELD:To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Ratio:WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.SO ORDERED.

MODAY VS. CAMunicipal Corporation Eminent Domain Disapproval by SP of SB ResolutionModay is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Modays land. Purpose of which is to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the expropriation nonetheless.ISSUE:Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.HELD:Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is governments right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same. This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.