LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAWPART I GENERAL PRINCIPLESA. Corporation 1. Definition An artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence 2. Classification Classification of corporations according to purpose: a. Public is a corporation that is created by the state, either by general or special act, for purposes of administration of local government or rendering of service in the public interest. b. Private formed for some private purpose, benefit, aim or end 3. Public and Private Corporations, distinguished Public organized for the government of a portion of the state Private formed for some private purpose, benefit, aim or end 4. Public Corporation, classified Classes of public corporations: i. Quasi-public corporation created by the state for a narrow or limited purpose; a private corporation created pursuant to the Corporation Code that renders public service or supplies public wants Examples: Public utility companies, electric companies, water districts, telecommunication companies ii. Real public corporation/Municipal corporation a body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants for the purpose of local government 5. Municipal corporation, defined Perception of local governments: A local government is not only a municipal corporation, meaning we dont look at it as an entity or a corporation that is clothed with a personality. Its also perceived as either political subdivision or a territorial subdivision. If we talk about political subdivision, then we look at local governments as agents of the national governments and therefore, tasked to perform certain government functions. If we talk about territorial subdivision, we look at it as a place. Basis: Sec. 1 Art. 10 Consti - The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. But not only that, we have to deal with local governments as something that has life, something that performs acts with legal effects. B. Municipal Corporations 1. Elements a. Legal creation or incorporation the law creating or authorizing the creation or incorporation of a municipal corporation; the law that established the lgu, either by statute or ordinance in the case of barangays. b. Corporate name the name by which the corporation shall be known Example: City of Cebu (Basis the charter) Sec. 13 The sangguniang panlalawigan may, in consultation with the Philippine Historical Institute, change the name of component cities and municipalities, upon the recommendation of the sanggunian concerned; provided that the same shall be effective only upon ratification in a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in the political unit directly affected. c. Inhabitants the people residing in the territory of the corporation d. Territory the land mass where the inhabitants reside, together with the internal and external waters, and the air space above the land and waters. 2. Dual Nature and Functions It has dual functions, namely: a. Public or governmental or political It acts as an agent of the state for the government of the territory and the inhabitants; this involves the administration of powers of the state and the promotion of public welfare; in this regard, we call a lgu as a political subdivision, thats why being a political subdivision, it is an agent of the national government and being an agent of the national government, the principal is giving the agent the task of administering its power, thats why we have local taxation, local police power and local eminent domain Examples: Local police power, local taxation, local eminent domain, public works b. Private or proprietary It acts as an agent of the community in the administration of local affairs. As such, it acts as a separate entity, for its own purposes, and not as a subdivision of the state. A kind of power that is exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community, thus, its not a necessary benefit, its something that the lgu can do without. Examples: Maintenance of parks, cemeteries, establishment of markets, fiestas and recreation Basis: Section 15. Political and Corporate Nature of Local Government Units. - Every local government unit created or recognized under this Code is a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it shall exercise powers as a political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. So, the framework therefore is accountability: If the lgu is exercising a governmental function, then it becomes accountable to the national government, but if the lgu is exercising corporation functions, then it is not accountable to the national government but it is accountable to the people. Bar Question: Johnny was employed as a driver by the Municipality of Calumpit. While driving recklessly a municipal dump truck with its load of sand for the repair of municipal streets, Johnny hit a jeepney and 2 passengers of the jeepney died. Is the municipality liable for the negligence of Johnny? YES, under Sec. 24: Section 24. Liability for Damages. - Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property. Whether the act is governmental or proprietary Alternative answer: NO. If it is governmental act, then, as a rule, there is no liability except only when it is performed by a special agent, such that conversely, if it is proprietary, then the agent of the state cannot enjoy that privilege because it is proprietary and therefore, not related to the national government, then it should be held liable. BARA LIDASAN VS COMELEC In a municipality in Mindanao, it was created by a statute. The problem was when such law was passed, it enumerated barangays or barrios belonging to a different province. Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to create the restricted area of nine barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the towns of Buldon and Parang, Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in the negative. Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State. Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory, and income. When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios not nine barrios was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to progressive community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent municipality, still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assume that the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into a municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities of an independent municipal corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with the income to be derived in their community? How about the peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obligations? This Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems, or to answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to impute to Congress an undeclared will. With the known premise that Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of progressive community, large aggregate population and sufficient income, we may not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine of the original twenty-one barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly stretches judicial interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditional separation of powers, we may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that congressional will. Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality. The idea that it must be self-sufficient therefore is relevant to the second function that it must be a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of the community. SURIGAO ELECTRIC CO. INC. VS MUNICIPALITY OF SURIGAO When Municipality of surigao wanted to operate an electric company of its own, it did so without a CPC, pursuant to the Public Service Act which says that government instrumentalities or entities are exempt from getting CPC if they decide to operate public utility companies. The private electric company argued that a lgu is not a government instrumentality or entity. There has been a recognition by this Court of the dual character of a municipal corporation, one as governmental, being a branch of the general administration of the state, and the other as quasi-private and corporate It would, therefore, be to erode the term "government entities" of its meaning if we are to reverse the Public Service Commission and to hold that a municipality is to be considered outside its scope. So, the SC said that as a lgu possessing the first function of being an agent of the state and that is being a political subdivision, it is a government instrumentality or entity, therefore, it is exempt from obtaining the CPC as provided for in the Public Service Act. 3. Sources of Powers 1987 consti Art. 10 RA 7160 LGC of 1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992 Statutes or acts that are not inconsistent with the Consti and the LGC Charter the law that creates the LGU Doctrine of the right of self-government, but applies only in states which adhere to the doctrine 4. Classification of Powers i. express, implied, inherent (powers necessary and proper for governance, e.g. to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals of inhabitants) ii. public or governmental, private or proprietary iii. intramural, extramural iv. mandatory, directory; ministerial, discretionary 5. Types of Municipal Corporations i. De jure created with all the elements of a municipal corporation being present ii. De facto where there is colorable compliance (not full or complete, but simply colorable, meaning almost or seems like) with the requisites of a de jure municipal corporation Example of colorable compliance: Theres a law creating the municipal corporation but it is defective Which municipal corporation acts with legal affects? BOTH Philosophy behind accepting de facto municipal corporation: Where there is authority in law for a municipal corporation, the organization of the people of a given territory as such a corporation under the color of delegated authority followed by a user in good faith of the governmental powers will be recognized by law as municipal corporation de facto Where through the failure to comply with constitutional or statutory requirements, the corporation cannot be considered de jure What are the bases or reasons for de facto municipal corporation? Security Prescription Meaning, lgus can exist via prescription. The basis for this doctrine is the very strong public policy supporting: i. Security of lgus; and ii. Conduct of their business against attack grounded upon collateral inquiry into the legality of their organization What is the operative fact doctrine? Certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. This is the modern view regarding the effects of declaration of unconstitutionality of a law, meaning if a law for example that creates a lgu will be declared as unconstitutional, the court is mindful that during the interim, that lgu must have already performed acts pursuant to its being a lgu. How do we treat these acts? Should we consider them as void acts, with no effects? The operative fact doctrine means that insofar as local government law is concerned, before a law creating a lgu is declared unconstitutional, the acts of the lgu concerned shall be respected and shall be given legal effects. The acts of such entity will be respected and will be recognized as valid and binding by the state as if it is a de jure municipal corporation. But long use of corporate powers does not silenced the state, thats why even if there is long use of corporate powers, the state is not in estoppel as it can never be in estoppel except in few special cases, but as a rule, it should not be considered in estoppel, so it can still question the existence of a lgu in a quo warranto proceeding. A defective incorporation may however be obviated and the de facto unit can actually become de jure by subsequent legislative recognition or subsequent validation. 6. De Facto Municipal Corporation Doctrine; Elements i. valid law authorizing incorporation ii. attempt in good faith to organize it iii. colorable compliance with law iv. assumption of corporate powers MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ VS BAS, JR. In this case, the Municipality of Sinacaban was created via EO 258 (this is an executive act, not a legislative act), and since then, it had been exercising the powers of a lgu. PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL The SC declared as unconstitutional Sec. 68 of the RAC which authorized the President to create municipalities through EO because the creation of municipalities is a legislative function and not an executive function. With this declaration, municipalities created by EO could not claim to be de facto municipal corporations, because there was not valid authorizing incorporation. However, later on, the case of Pelaez rendered invalid the creation of certain municipalities pursuant to an executive order, but under the petition of Pelaez, EO 258 creating Sinacaban was not included, so it continued to exist as such municipality until its existence was questioned. The SC said that Sinacaban attained a status of a de facto municipal corporation because its existence had not been questioned for more than 40 years. [long use of corporate powers; this is an example of prescription] MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO VS MENDEZ, SR. Sec. 442(d) of the LGC to the effect that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities converted municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders into regular municipalities. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with, are validly accepted in this jurisdiction. This involves the municipality of San Andres also created via executive act. Then came the Pelaez ruling. SC said that San Andres became de jure by subsequent recognition because it was included in the Ordinance to the 1987 consti apportioning the seats of the HR (as one of the 12 municipalities composing the 3rd district of Quezon). This is an example of subsequent recognition or validation, whether it was intentional or not. MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY VS CA Sec. 442 (d) of LGC: Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or EOs and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. [curative legislation] SULTAN OSOP CAMID VS OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC does not sanction recognition of just any municipality; Only those that can prove continued exercise of corporate powers can be covered; Incidentally, the SC, being not a trier of facts, cannot ascertain the truthfulness of petitioners allegation of continued exercise of corporate powers. (there should have been a trial court that ascertained it) 7. Method of challenging existence of municipal corporation Quo warranto proceeding (under what authority) this is a direct challenge. If you question or challenge a lgu, you need to institute a proceeding for that purpose. You cannot make it as a defense. It should be a direct attack and the method is quo warranto to be initiated by the state. MALABANG VS BENITO No collateral attack shall lie; an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipal corporation is reserved to the state in a proceeding for quo warranto which is a direct proceeding. But this rule applies only when the municipal corporation is, at least, a de facto municipal corporation. Proper party and nature of challenge: If the LGU is at least a de facto municipal corporation, only the STATE in a DIRECT ACTION. But if the LGU is not even de facto but a nullity, ANY PERSON in either DIRECT OR COLLATERAL ATTACK. Bar question: Suppose that 1 year after Masigla was constituted as a municipality, the law creating it is voided because of defects. Would that invalidate the acts of the municipality and/or its municipal officers? Answer: NO, Doctrine of Operative Fact

C. Overview of Philippines Local Government System 1. The Unitary vs. the Federal Forms of Government Ours is a unitary form of government, not federal. Generally, powers of government may be distributed either horizontally or vertically: It is horizontal if the distribution is among the 3 branches of the government in the national government. It is in this kind of distribution that we distinguish between presidential (separation of powers) and parliamentary (fusion of powers of the legislative and executive). It is vertical if the distribution is between the national government and the local government. It is in here that we distinguish unitary from federal. Distinction of unitary and federal: A unitary government is a single, centralized government, exercising powers over both the internal and external affairs of the state, the powers are shared by the national government and the local government; while a federal government consists of autonomous state (local) government units merged into a single state, with the national government exercising a limited degree of power over the domestic affairs but generally full direction of the external affairs of the state, the powers are divided by the national government and the local government. In a unitary government, we have national government creating local governments. Thus in our jurisdiction, our principle is that lgus derive both existence and powers from the national government. Which authority possesses residual powers or who is the repository of residual powers? In the horizontal distribution of powers, it is the President single executive doctrine. In the RAC, it says that all other powers not vested in the President, in the Congress or judiciary, shall be deemed a power that can be exercised by the President. To that extent, we call our form of government presidential. In the vertical distribution of powers, it is the national government through congress. Congress exercises plenary legislative power. ZOOMZAT INC. VS PEOPLE Petitioner assails the findings of Special Prosecutor Pascual that under Executive Order No. 205, it is the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), and not the local government unit, that has the power and authority to allow or disallow the operation of cable television. It argues that while the NTC has the authority to grant the franchise to operate a cable television, this power is not exclusive because under the Local Government Code, the city council also has the power to grant permits, licenses and franchises in aid of the local government units regulatory or revenue raising powers. Executive Order No. 205 clearly provides that only the NTC could grant certificates of authority to cable television operators and issue the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Likewise, Executive Order No. 436, vests with the NTC the regulation and supervision of cable television industry in the Philippines. It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises. Consequently, the protection of the constitutional provision as to impairment of the obligation of a contract does not extend to privileges, franchises and grants given by a municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra vires. But, lest we be misunderstood, nothing herein should be interpreted as to strip LGUs of their general power to prescribe regulations under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code. It must be emphasized that when E.O. No. 436 decrees that the "regulatory power" shall be vested "solely" in the NTC, it pertains to the "regulatory power" over those matters, which are peculiarly within the NTCs competence There is no dispute that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, like other local legislative bodies, has been empowered to enact ordinances and approve resolutions under the general welfare clause of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code of 1983. That it continues to possess such power is clear under the new law, R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991). Indeed, under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code, the local government unit can regulate the operation of cable television but only when it encroaches on public properties, such as the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions. Beyond these parameters, its acts, such as the grant of the franchise to Spacelink, would be ultra vires. 2. Philippines Local Government System and the concepts of Local Autonomy, Decentralization, Devolution, and Deconcentration Definition of terms: Local autonomy in the Philippines, it means that public administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. It refers to decentralization of administrative powers or functions. But in general, LIMBONA VS MANGELIN said that autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. The second is abdication by the national government of political power in favor of the local government (essence in a federal set-up); the first consists merely in the delegation of administrative powers to broaden the base of governmental power (essence in a unitary set-up). Against the first, there can be no valid constitutional challenge. Local autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by lgus vis--vis the central government. The system of achieving local autonomy is known as decentralization and this system is realized through the process called devolution. Decentralization is a system whereby lgus shall be given more powers, authority and responsibilities and resources and a direction by which this is done is from the national government to the local government Devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. This includes the transfer to local government units of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions, and responsibilities. Distinguish devolution from deconcentration: Deconcentration is different. If devolution involves the transfer of resources, powers from national government to lgus, deconcentration is from national office to a local office. Deconcentration is the transfer of authority and power to the appropriate regional offices or field offices of national agencies or offices whose major functions are not devolved to local government units. Kung i-devolve sa lgus, thats devolution. Kung i-devolve sa local offices or field offices, dili lgu, thats deconcentration. LINA VS PANO - Since Congress has allowed the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant to its legislative grant of authority, the provinces Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the exercise of said authority by preventing something already allowed by Congress. Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization". It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio". To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent mayor of San Pedro, cannot avail of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna as justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an expression of the local legislative unit concerned. The Board's enactment, like spring water, could not rise above its source of power, the national legislature. In sum, we find no reversible error in the RTC decision enjoining Mayor Cataquiz from enforcing or implementing the Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna. That resolution expresses merely a policy statement of the Laguna provincial board. It possesses no binding legal force nor requires any act of implementation. It provides no sufficient legal basis for respondent mayor's refusal to issue the permit sought by private respondent in connection with a legitimate business activity authorized by a law passed by Congress. SAN JUAN VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION All the assigned errors relate to the issue of whether or not the private respondent is lawfully entitled to discharge the functions of PBO (Provincial Budget Officer) of Rizal pursuant to the appointment made by public respondent DBM's Undersecretary upon the recommendation of then Director Abella of DBM Region IV. The petitioner-governors arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee should come only from his nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112. The issue before the Court is not limited to the validity of the appointment of one Provincial Budget Officer. The tug of war between the Secretary of Budget and Management and the Governor of the premier province of Rizal over a seemingly innocuous position involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. The exercise by local governments of meaningful power has been a national goal since the turn of the century. And yet, inspite of constitutional provisions and, as in this case, legislation mandating greater autonomy for local officials, national officers cannot seem to let go of centralized powers. They deny or water down what little grants of autonomy have so far been given to municipal corporations. When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back. The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM. More important, however, is the proper administration of fiscal affairs at the local level. Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion are forwarded to the national officials for review. They are prepared by the local officials who must work within the constraints of those budgets. They are not formulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally imposed on local governments whether or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is for this reason that there should be a genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals from both the local and national officials. It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment process involves a sharing of power between the two levels of government. Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based. Sec. 25 Art. 2 1987 consti The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. Sec. 2 Art. 10 1987 consti The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. Secs. 2-3 Section 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local government units. (b) It is also the policy of the State to ensure the accountability of local government units through the institution of effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum. (c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. Section 3. Operative Principles of Decentralization. - The formulation and implementation of policies and measures on local autonomy shall be guided by the following operative principles: (a) There shall be an effective allocation among the different local government units of their respective powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources; (b) There shall be established in every local government unit an accountable, efficient, and dynamic organizational structure and operating mechanism that will meet the priority needs and service requirements of its communities; (c) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, local officials and employees paid wholly or mainly from local funds shall be appointed or removed, according to merit and fitness, by the appropriate appointing authority; (d) The vesting of duty, responsibility, and accountability in local government units shall be accompanied with provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge their powers and effectively carry out their functions: hence, they shall have the power to create and broaden their own sources of revenue and the right to a just share in national taxes and an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas; (e) Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions; (f) Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources commonly beneficial to them; (g) The capabilities of local government units, especially the municipalities and barangays, shall be enhanced by providing them with opportunities to participate actively in the implementation of national programs and projects; (h) There shall be a continuing mechanism to enhance local autonomy not only by legislative enabling acts but also by administrative and organizational reforms; (i) Local government units shall share with the national government the responsibility in the management and maintenance of ecological balance within their territorial jurisdiction, subject to the provisions of this Code and national policies; (j) Effective mechanisms for ensuring the accountability of local government units to their respective constituents shall be strengthened in order to upgrade continually the quality of local leadership; (k) The realization of local autonomy shall be facilitated through improved coordination of national government policies and programs an extension of adequate technical and material assistance to less developed and deserving local government units; (l) The participation of the private sector in local governance, particularly in the delivery of basic services, shall be encouraged to ensure the viability of local autonomy as an alternative strategy for sustainable development; and (m) The national government shall ensure that decentralization contributes to the continuing improvement of the performance of local government units and the quality of community life. Section 17. Basic Services and Facilities. - (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein. (e) National agencies or offices concerned shall devolve to local government units the responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities enumerated in this Section within six (6) months after the effectivity of this Code. As used in this Code, the term "devolution" refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. (i) The devolution contemplated in this Code shall include the transfer to local government units of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions, and responsibilities. Section 528. Deconcentration of Requisite Authority and Power. - The national government shall, six (6) months after the effectivity of this Code, effect the deconcentration of requisite authority and power to the appropriate regional offices or field offices of national agencies or offices whose major functions are not devolved to local government units.

D. Local Governments in the Philippines 1. Territorial and Political Subdivisions: Provinces, Cities, Municipalities, Barangays Kinds of lgus: i. Regular lgus are provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. Note: Sitio is not a recognized lgu. ii. Autonomous regions ARMM and the Cordilleras iii. Special lgus special metropolitan political subdivisions Kinds of cities: i. Component cities Inhabitants can vote for provincial candidates and can run for provincial elective posts. Under the supervisory power of the province ii. Independent component city (ICC) Independent in the sense that the charter prohibits the voters from voting for provincial elective posts and this is outside the supervisory power of the province Inhabitants cannot vote for provincial elective posts neither can they run for provincial elective posts not because of income factor but simply because the charter prohibits the voters from voting or running for provincial posts. iii. Highly-urbanized city Independent from the province by reason of status Its outside the supervisory power of the province Reason: Status The voters cannot vote and run for provincial elective officials and offices. But what about Mandaue City why can they still vote for provincial elective officials? So the question is can there be a highly-urbanized city whose voters can still vote for provincial officials? YES. Basis: Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities. Qualified voters of cities who acquired the right to vote for elective provincial officials prior to the classification of said cities as highly-urbanized after the ratification of the Constitution and before the effectivity of this Code, shall continue to exercise such right. Vested-right theory Sec. 1 Art. X consti The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. Sec. 12 Art. X consti Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials. ABELLA VS COMELEC The main issue in these consolidated petitions centers on who is the rightful governor of the province of Leyte 1) petitioner Adelina Larrazabal (G.R. No. 100739) who obtained the highest number of votes in the local elections of February 1, 1988 and was proclaimed as the duly elected governor but who was later declared by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) "... to lack both residence and registration qualifications for the position of Governor of Leyte as provided by Art. X, Section 12, Philippine Constitution in relation to Title II, Chapter I, Sec. 42, B.P. Blg. 137 and Sec. 89, R.A. No. 179 and is hereby disqualified as such Governor" Failing in her contention that she is a resident and registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, the petitioner poses an alternative position that her being a registered voter in Ormoc City was no impediment to her candidacy for the position of governor of the province of Leyte. Section 12, Article X of the Constitution provides: Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials. Section 89 of Republic Act No. 179 creating the City of Ormoc provides: Election of provincial governor and members of the Provincial Board of the members of the Provincial Board of the Province of Leyte The qualified voters of Ormoc City shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte. Relating therefore, section 89 of R.A. 179 to section 12, Article X of the Constitution one comes up with the following conclusion: that Ormoc City when organized was not yet a highly-urbanized city but is, nevertheless, considered independent of the province of Leyte to which it is geographically attached because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for the provincial elective officials. The question now is whether or not the prohibition against the 'city's registered voters' electing the provincial officials necessarily mean, a prohibition of the registered voters to be elected as provincial officials. The petitioner citing section 4, Article X of the Constitution, to wit: Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. submits that "while a Component City whose charter prohibits its voters from participating in the elections for provincial office, is indeed independent of the province, such independence cannot be equated with a highly urbanized city; rather it is limited to the administrative supervision aspect, and nowhere should it lead to the conclusion that said voters are likewise prohibited from running for the provincial offices." (Petition, p. 29) The argument is untenable. Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly-urbanized cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are independent of the province. In the same provision, it provides for other component cities within a province whose charters do not provide a similar prohibition. Necessarily, component cities like Ormoc City whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are treated like highly urbanized cities which are outside the supervisory power of the province to which they are geographically attached. This independence from the province carries with it the prohibition or mandate directed to their registered voters not to vote and be voted for the provincial elective offices. The resolution in G.R. No. 80716 entitled Peralta v. The Commission on Elections, et al. dated December 10, 1987 applies to this case. While the cited case involves Olongapo City which is classified as a highly urbanized city, the same principle is applicable. Moreover, Section 89 of Republic Act 179, independent of the constitutional provision, prohibits registered voters of Ormoc City from voting and being voted for elective offices in the province of Leyte. We agree with the COMELEC en banc that "the phrase 'shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte' connotes two prohibitions one, from running for and the second, from voting for any provincial elective official." 2. Autonomous Regions Sec. 1 Art. X consti The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 3. Special Metropolitan Political Subdivisions Sec. 11 Art. 10 consti The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination. MMDA VS BEL-AIR VILLAGE The MMDA which has no police and legislative powers, has no power to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. It has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road in Makati City and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. MMDA is not even a special metropolitan political subdivision because there was no plebiscite when the law created it and the President exercises not just supervision but control over it. MMDA has purely administrative function. Because MMDA is not a political subdivision, it cannot exercise political power like police power.

E. Loose Federation of LGUs and Regional Development Councils Sec. 13 Art. 10 Consti Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them in accordance with law. Section 33. Cooperative Undertakings Among Local Government Units. - Local government units may, through appropriate ordinances, group themselves, consolidate, or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them. In support of such undertakings, the local government units involved may, upon approval by the sanggunian concerned after a public hearing conducted for the purpose, contribute funds, real estate, equipment, and other kinds of property and appoint or assign personnel under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the participating local units through Memoranda of Agreement. Take note: The resultant consolidation would not be a new corporate body. Why? Because the requirement that an lgu should be created by law is of constitutional origin. That requirement remains, so that it cannot be done either by MOA or ordinance. It has to be by law. It cannot be given a separate personality. Sec. 14 Art. 10 consti The President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the region.

PART II THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 1. Constitutional Mandate Sec. 3 Art. 10 consti The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. 2. Sources of the LGC of 1991 (Codified laws) 3. Scope of Application Section 4. Scope of Application. - This Code shall apply to all provinces, cities, municipalities, barangays, and other political subdivisions as may be created by law, and, to the extent herein provided, to officials, offices, or agencies of the national government. Section 526. Application of this Code to Local Government Units in the Autonomous Regions. - This Code shall apply to all provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays in the autonomous regions until such time as the regional government concerned shall have enacted its own local government code. Section 529. Tax Ordinances or Revenue Measures. - All existing tax ordinances or revenue measures of local government units shall continue to be in force and effect after the effectivity of this Code unless amended by the sanggunian concerned, or inconsistent with, or in violation of, the provisions of this Code. Section 534. Repealing Clause. (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS CA The provisions of the LGC do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, the Authority contends: The Honorable CA committed serious error when it ruled that the power to issue fishpen permits in Laguna de Bay has been devolved to concerned (lakeshore) lgus. Which agency of the Government the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned? We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission. It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991. The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and management. It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will render nugatory its avowed purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power would render useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the Local Government Code of 1991 had never intended to do. 4. Rules of Interpretation Section 5. Rules of Interpretation. - In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply: (a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned; (b) In case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be construed strictly against the local government unit enacting it, and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. Any tax exemption, incentive or relief granted by any local government unit pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming it. (c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community; (d) Rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of this Code and arising out of contracts or any other source of presentation involving a local government unit shall be governed by the original terms and conditions of said contracts or the law in force at the time such rights were vested; and (e) In the resolution of controversies arising under this Code where no legal provision or jurisprudence applies, resort may be had to the customs and traditions in the place where the controversies take place. Objective: To grant genuine local autonomy 5. Effectivity Section 536. Effectivity Clause. - This Code shall take effect on January first, nineteen hundred ninety-two, unless otherwise provided herein, after its complete publication in at least one (1) newspaper of general circulation.

PART III CREATION, CONVERSION, DIVISION, MERGER, SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF BOUNDARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS, AND ABOLITIONA. Regular Political Subdivisions (Provinces, Cities, Municipalities, and Barangays) 1. Creation and Conversion a. General Requirements: Law, Plebiscite, Compliance with Criteria on income, land & population Secs. 10-11 Art. 10 consti Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination. Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code. Section 7. Creation and Conversion. - As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit: (a) Income. - It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned; (b) Population. - It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and (c) Land Area. - It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. - No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date. Is it mandated that all these general requirements should be complied with? For example, the requirement on income, land and population, should we comply with such requirements? It depends on the lgu concerned. Its not required all the time that there should be compliance with income, population and land area, because it may happen that only 2 of the 3 factors should be complied with. TAN VS COMELEC A plebiscite for creating a new province should include the participation of the residents of the mother province in order to conform to the constitutional requirement. XXXXXX BP 885, creating the Province of Negros del Norte, is declared unconstitutional because it excluded the voters of the mother province from participating in the plebiscite (and it did not comply with the area of criterion prescribed in the LGC). XXXX Where the law authorizing the holding of a plebiscite is unconstitutional, the Court cannot authorize the holding of a new one. XXXX The fact that the plebiscite which the petition sought to stop had already been held and officials of the new province appointed does not make the petition moot and academic, as the petition raises an issue of constitutional dimension. PADILLA VS COMELEC Even under the 1987 consti, the plebiscite shall include all the voters of the mother province or the mother municipality. When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. LOPEZ VS COMELEC The creation of Metropolitan Manila is valid. The referendum of Feb. 27, 1975 authorized the President to restructure local governments in the 4 cities and 13 municipalities. XXXXX The President had authority to issue decrees in 1975. XXXX The 1984 amendment to the 1973 consti impliedly recognized the existence of Metro Manila by providing representation of Metro Manila in the Batasan Pambansa. SULTAN OSOP CAMID VS OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT From this survey of relevant jurisprudence, we can gather the applicable rules. Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local Government Code in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive order but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban was recognized by this Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored under. Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation? It is not. There are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact that the executive order creating Andong was expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If we were to affirm Andongs de facto status by reason of its alleged continued existence despite its nullification, we would in effect be condoning defiance of a valid order of this Court.Court decisions cannot obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved. It bears noting that based on Camids own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality created by executive order may receive recognition, they must "have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code." Camid admits that Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all. This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality. The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality in the last four decades are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town. The certifications relied upon by Camid, issued by the DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose of attesting to Andongs legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications qualify that they were issued upon the request of Camid, "to support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur," thus obviously conceding that the municipality is at present inoperative. We may likewise pay attention to the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, which had also been relied upon in Jimenez and San Narciso. This Ordinance, which apportioned the seats of the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities that are encompassed by the various legislative districts. Andong is not listed therein as among the municipalities of Lanao del Sur, or of any other province for that matter. On the other hand, the municipalities of San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban are mentioned in the Ordinance as part of Quezon, Bohol, and Misamis Occidental respectively. How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified in Pelaez but certified as existing in the DILG Certification presented by Camid? The petition fails to mention that subsequent to the ruling in Pelaez, legislation was enacted to reconstitute these municipalities. It is thus not surprising that the DILG certified the existence of these eighteen (18) municipalities, or that these towns are among the municipalities enumerated in the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Andong has not been similarly reestablished through statute. Clearly then, the fact that there are valid organic statutes passed by legislation recreating these eighteen (18) municipalities is sufficient legal basis to accord a different legal treatment to Andong as against these eighteen (18) other municipalities. We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of the Local Government Codethat it does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders. The provision affirms the legal personalities only of those municipalities such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent, unless recreated through specific legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG. Those municipalities derive their legal personality not from the presidential issuances or executive orders which originally created them or from Section 442(d), but from the respective legislative statutes which were enacted to revive them. And what now of Andong and its residents? Certainly, neither Pelaez or this decision has obliterated Andong into a hole on the ground. The legal effect of the nullification of Andong in Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios of the voided town back into their original municipalities, namely the municipalities of Lumbatan, Butig and Tubaran. These three municipalities subsist to this day as part of Lanao del Sur, and presumably continue to exercise corporate powers over the barrios which once belonged to Andong. If there is truly a strong impulse calling for the reconstitution of Andong, the solution is through the legislature and not judicial confirmation of void title. If indeed the residents of Andong have, all these years, been governed not by their proper municipal governments but by a ragtag "Interim Government," then an expedient political and legislative solution is perhaps necessary. Yet we can hardly sanction the retention of Andongs legal personality solely on the basis of collective amnesia that may have allowed Andong to somehow pretend itself into existence despite its judicial dissolution. Maybe those who insist Andong still exists prefer to remain unperturbed in their blissful ignorance, like the inhabitants of the cave in Platos famed allegory. But the time has come for the light to seep in, and for the petitioner and like-minded persons to awaken to legal reality. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILS. VS COMELEC The 16 Cityhood Bills do not violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution. Article X, Section 10 provides Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The tenor of the ponencias of the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution is that the exemption clauses in the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional because they are not written in the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), particularly Section 450 thereof, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9009, which took effect on June 30, 2001, viz. Section 450. Requisites for Creation. a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: x x x x (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied) Prior to the amendment, Section 450 of the LGC required only an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least P20,000,000.00 for the last two (2) consecutive years, based on 1991 constant prices. Before Senate Bill No. 2157, now R.A. No. 9009, was introduced by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, there were 57 bills filed for conversion of 57 municipalities into component cities. During the 11th Congress (June 1998-June 2001), 33 of these bills were enacted into law, while 24 remained as pending bills. Among these 24 were the 16 municipalities that were converted into component cities through the Cityhood Laws. While R.A. No. 9009 was being deliberated upon, Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws, desiring to become component cities which qualified under the P20 million income requirement of the old Section 450 of the LGC. The interpellation of Senate President Franklin Drilon of Senator Pimentel is revealing, Clearly, based on the above exchange, Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress would not be covered by the new and higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. When the LGC was amended by R.A. No. 9009, the amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent of the law, and such were incorporated in the LGC by which the compliance of the Cityhood Laws was gauged. Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the pending cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were enacted. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. Even if we were to ignore the above quoted exchange between then Senate President Drilon and Senator Pimentel, it cannot be denied that Congress saw the wisdom of exempting respondent municipalities from complying with the higher income requirement imposed by the amendatory R.A. No. 9009. Indeed, these municipalities have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. It is also acknowledged that they were centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In this regard, it is worthy to mention the distinctive traits of each respondent municipality, The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects, and extends to matters of general concern or common interest. Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government unitsincome, population, and land area. Congress deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with respect to the conversion of municipalities into component cities when it enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only from locally-generated sources. However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective provinces. Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption clauses, are not found in the LGC. OPPOSITION OF LEAGUE OF CITIES CASE Sec. 10, Art. 10 consti: No province, city, municipality or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the lgc and subject to approval by majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The consti is clear. The creation of lgus must follow the criteria established in the lgc and not in any other law. There is only one lgc. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood laws. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the consti is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the lgc. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the lgc violates Sec. 10, Art. 10. They were just pending bills at that time and thus have no force and effect of a law. PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GRP The RP entered into a MOA with the MILF. The MOA provided for the creation of Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) whereby there will be a some sort of government structure. There will also be the territory of this Bangsamoro juridical entity and it has also defined who are the supposed constituents of such juridical entity. Naay government, people, and territory. And insofar as it is allowed to relate itself to foreign states, the MOA provides that it can do so through the instrumentality of the national government. In fact, under the MOA, it mentioned of the so-called association kind of relationship. Such MOA is unconstitutional. If an associated state is legally a state then it cannot exist in the Phils. Remember, sovereignty is indivisible. You cannot divide sovereignty, there should only be one authority. Can an associated state be established in the Phils.? The concept of an associated state is not sanctioned by the Constitution. Under Art. X, the following are the only recognized political subdivisions in the Phils.: Provinces, Cities, Municipalities, Barangays and the ARMM and the Cordilleras. The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded. In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government. 4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in international law, and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term "associative" in the MOA-AD. Keitner and Reisman state that [a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence. x x x150 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,151 are associated states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free Association. The currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very close ties with the U.S., yet they issue their own travel documents, which is a mark of their statehood. Their international legal status as states was confirmed by the UN Security Council and by their admission to UN membership. According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity extending to matters such as the law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is obligated to consult with the governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S. government) regards as relating to or affecting either government. In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S. government has the authority and obligation to defend them as if they were part of U.S. territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the option of establishing and using military areas and facilities within these associated states and has the right to bar the military personnel of any third country from having access to these territories for military purposes. It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free association is understood as an international association between sovereigns. The Compact of Free Association is a treaty which is subordinate to the associated nation's national constitution, and each party may terminate the association consistent with the right of independence. It has been said that, with the admission of the U.S.-associated states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the American model of free association is actually based on an underlying status of independence.152 In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence. Examples of states that have passed through the status of associated states as a transitional phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since become independent states.153 Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an "associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X: SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention,154 namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association - runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." (Emphasis supplied) As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term "autonomous region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE. MARIANO VS COMELEC - Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati (without metes and bounds) will cause confusion as to its boundaries. Congress has refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other lgus with unsettled boundary disputes. Petitioners assail sec. 2 of RA 7854 as unconstitutional on the ground that it did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, in violation of Sec. 10 of the 1987 consti in relation to Secs. 7 and 450 of the LGC. The requirement that the territory of newly-created lgus be identified by metes and bounds is intended to provide the means by which the area of the lgu may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., as a tool in the establishment of the lgu. As long as the territorial jurisdiction of the newly created city may be reasonably ascertained by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities then, the legislative intent has been sufficiently served. [Note: RA 7854, which converted Makati into a city, did not define the boundaries of the new city by metes and bounds, because of a territorial dispute between Makati and Taguig, which was best left for the courts to decide.] SEN. BENIGNO AQUINO III VS COMELEC Requisites for Creation of a Province. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office. Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement. MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ VS BAZ The technical description, containing the metes and bounds of a municipalitys territory stated in EO 258 creating the Municipality of Sinacaban, Misamis Orinetal, is binding. The issue is whether it is the boundary provided in EO 258 or in Resolution 77 which should be used as basis for adjudicating Sinacabans claim. Jimenez argues that the RTC erred in ordering a reolocation survey of the boundary of Sinacaban, because the barangays which Sinacaban are claiming are not enumerated in EO 258 and that in any event, the parties entered into an agreement (Resolution 77) whereby the barangays in question were considered part of the territory of Jimenez. EO 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now called barangays) therein mentioned. What it says is that Sinacaban contains those barrios without saying they are the only ones comprising it. The reason for this is that technical description, containing the metes and bounds of its territory, is controlling. The trial court correctly ordered a relocation survey as the only means of determining the boundaries of the municipality and consequently the question to which municipality the barangays questioned belong. Therefore, if Resolution 77 is contrary to the technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as basis for opposing the claim. b. Specific Requirements: Income, Land and Population Requirements Barangay Section 385. Manner of Creation. - A barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, by law or by an ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan or panlungsod, subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC in the local government unit or units directly affected within such period of time as may be determined by the law or ordinance creating said barangay. In the case of the creation of barangays by the sangguniang panlalawigan, the recommendation of the sangguniang bayan concerned shall be necessary. Section 386. Requisites for Creation. (a) A barangay may be created out of a contiguous territory which has a population of at least two thousand (2,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office except in cities and municipalities within Metro Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions o