Upload
samuel-rines
View
216
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
7/31/2019 Let Them Steal It
1/2
The US and other developed nations tend to
have a tremendous advantage inventing and
innovating. Less-developed nations struggle
to eep up technologically and occasionally
resort to unscrupulous methods to maintain pace
with their industrial counterparts. One of thepreferred tactics is imitation, and the imitation is
not always flattering. Such imitations are usually
of a lower quality than the original, and usually
remain so for an extended period. Imitation of
intellectual property is, simply, stealing, and the
industrialized world does not tae this well. The
condemnation of imitation, and the defense of
intellectual property, has become a crusade of
corporations and politicians. It is a simple and
seemingly non-debatable argument: developed
economies suffer from the imitation and de facto
theft of intellectual property.
It is not quite so simple. Intellectual propertyrightsIPin the less developed world can be
more relaxed than in the developed world, and
this may benefit the developed nations in the
long run. Granted, theft is theft, and the typical
corporation may not feel so conflicted, or be
interested in the long term effects of imitation and
wea IP r ights. But maybe they should be.
What is Innovation?
Innovation can be thought of as the process of
applying creative and differentiating properties
to an existing technology at a high level of qua
and design. Imitation is the creation of a lower
quality product with many of the same qualita
aspects as the innovation.
Stealing is Good
How could imitation be a good thing for the
developed world? How could the blatant copyi
of innovative products be a posit ive? The notio
that lower protections of IP in less-developed
countries is important, or at least not devastati
to the developed world is at best counter-intuit
Nonetheless, there is a case for the long-termbenefits of lower IP protections and allowing
ignoringimitations. As less-developed count
strive to eep up with the developed world, the
temptation to short cut the necessity to innova
is overwhelming. The short cutting leads to
imitation of products, software, services, and
everything in between.
Economically, this engenders the necessity t
innovate continuously on one side of the equat
and the lac of incentive to innovate on the oth
Countries that have a tendency to imitate and
do not need to have a culture of innovation. Th
can simply create a lower quality reproductionbring it to maret.
There are some problems with the imitate-
to-profit transition, however. The most glaring
is that it is unliely the imitation products will
be allowed into the marets of the innovating
country, and many of the other countries with
significant IP protections in place. The imitato
restricted to its own domestic maret, whereas
innovator can still sell its product or service in
less developed country. The quality of imitatio
is typically lower. And, as imitation leads to
Let Them Steal ItSamuel Rines
A PUBLICATION OF CHILTON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
WWW.CHILTONCAPITAL.COM
August 2
7/31/2019 Let Them Steal It
2/2
the lower rates of innovation in the imitating
countries, a larger gap in innovation emerges
between the two.
The loss to the innovator is the sale of a few
marginal units to the imitator. The benefit is the
necessity to innovate continuously. Why? Because
at some point the imitations begin to reach aquality level similar to the original, and evolve
enough from the original innovation that they are
liely to be allowed into the developed marets.
Essentially, there is a cycle of innovation to
imitation and bac again. The lac of protections
accelerates this cycle, and forces the innovators to
chase, ceaselessly, the next innovation.
Lower IP protections and high levels of
imitation create disincentives for the imitators to
innovate, and create incentives for innovators to
continue innovating. In the long-run, economies
with an emphasis on innovation have the
advantage in quality and in industry creation.
Stealing is Bad
While wea IP and the existence of unpunished
imitators do have the effect of creating a larger
innovation gap between the countries, stronger IP
also creates a better climate for innovators. Since
developing nations do not start from a tabula rasa,
countries are liely to begin with wea IP and
later move slowly and only incrementally towards
a stronger regime. This movement is never
seamless, because it requires an entirely different
set of economic drivers. Weaer IP countr ies
tend to have a high level of imitation driving
their economies, and find it difficult to adapt as
stronger IP begins to tae hold.
Moving from a lower to a higher IP stance
is a boon for innovators. The incentives for the
innovators to accelerate innovation are high:
they have a monopoly in selling in the previouslyimitating countries, and therefore higher
expected profits. This energizes the innovators
to turn out innovations more quicly in an
attempt to capture profits from larger, more
protected marets.
Imitators will find themselves unable to
continue their previous imitation cycle. They
are forced, instead, to attempt to innovate on
their own. But it is not a fast shift to this different
mindset. It taes time to create a culture of
innovation.
More than aligning incentives to benefit the
innovators, there is an awaening to the necess
of innovation in the long run. Since most
countries with low IP protections cannot typic
sell their imitations in the developed world, the
incumbent innovators are unliely to have face
competition from these imitators. This createscompetition in innovation in the long run, and
drives a higher rate of innovation in the short
run as incumbent innovators attempt to maint
their lead.
Does It Really Matter?
Whether or not IP is enforced, innovators from
the IP protected economies have an advantage
In the case of the persistently low IP regimes, t
innovators are forced to innovate continuously
to avoid the quality of the initial product being
imitated. It also reduces the incentives of the
imitator to innovate and create new industriesand products. This is a competitive advantage,
and it eeps competition from entering the
innovative, higher IP marets. However, there
are also benefits to the innovator if an imitatin
country begins to switch from low to high IP
protection. It creates a larger maret for their
innovations, increases the expected profits for
innovations, and therefore incentivizes innovat
The downside is the eventual competition from
the previous imitators after they have adjusted
the higher IP protection climate.
Developed countries may find that enforcing
higher IP is simply not worth the headache, an
that imitators are not true competitors in thebroad maret. Imitators do not easily become
innovators. In many ways, it maes sense to let
them steal it.
Sources: Marchetti, Society as a Learning System:
Discovery, Invention, and Innovation Cycles Revisited;
Edwin Lai, International Intellectual Property Rights
Protection and the Rate of P roduct Innovation; Amy
Jocely n Glass, Product Cycles and Maret Penetration
SAMUEL RINESisan analystand Economistat
chilton capital managEmEntin houston, tExas.dirEctquEstionsorcommEntsto:
ZACH BECkisthE Editorof chilton currEntsand
opErations spEcialistat chilton capital managEmEn
houston, tExas.
forfurthErinformationon chilton capital
managEmEntstratEgiEsandsErvicEs, plEasEcontact
christophEr l. Knapp, [email protected]
ww w.chiltoncapital.com/currEnts
The notion that lower protections of IP inless-developed countries is important, or atleast not devastating, to the developed world
is at best counter-intuitive.