legal-ethics-cases1. 1. 1 1. )G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974 2. Get Homework/Assignment Done 3. Homeworkping.com 4. 5. Homework Help 6. https://www.homeworkping.com/ 7. 8. Research Paper help 9. https://www.homeworkping.com/ 10. 11. Online Tutoring 12. https://www.homeworkping.com/ 13. 14. click here for freelancing tutoring sites ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent. Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf. FERNANDO, J.:p What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. 1 One of the grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case." 2 It was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category being precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be very much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.2. 2.2 According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counselde oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding. 3 As noted at the outset, the petition must fail. 1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw as counsel de oficio speaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case without the express authority of the Commission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964." 4 Reference was then made to another order of February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala." 5 After which, it was noted in such order that there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the court and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends of justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case." 6 2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban: 7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either3. 3.3 to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled." 8 So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa, 9 where respondent was de oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases ...." 10 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia 11 reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12 The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident. 3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own." 13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The present Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel," 15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16 Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.4. 4.4 LEDESMA VS CLIMACO DIGEST Facts: Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge not only denied the motion but also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. On November 6, Judge denied the motion. Hence, Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding. Issue: Whether or not a member of the bar may withdraw as counsel de oficio due to appointment as Election Registrar. Held: The ends of justice would be served by requiring Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio because: the case has been postponed at least 8 times at the defense's instance; there was no incompatibility between duty of petitioner to defend the accused, and his task as an election registrar. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty required of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal. In People v. Holgado: In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not5. 5.5 include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. The present Constitution provides not only that the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel but further provides that Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. This made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of the accused. Thus, Ledesma should exert himself sufficiently, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest. 2.) [A.C. No. 5161. April 14, 2004] ISIDRA TING-DUMALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES, respondent. R E S O L U T I O N PER CURIAM: In a Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed on 22 October 1999 with this Court, complainant Isidra Ting- Dumali charges respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres with presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainants signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial ethics.6. 6.6 The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting. Her siblings are Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam T. Saria; Felicisima T. Torres, who is married to herein respondent; Vicente Ting, Jr.; and Eliseo Ting. Their parents died intestate and left several parcels of land, to wit: a) One half of Lot 1586 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 43,908 square meters more or less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6203) RT-19151 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite; b) Lot 1603 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 16,073 square meters, more or less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6425) RT-7688 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite; c) Lot 1605 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 22,131 square meters, more or less and covered at that time by TCT No. T- 1869 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite. According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and her brothers and used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due them even if it involved the commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to the respondent the following acts or omissions: 1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the perjury committed by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986, wherein the two made it appear that they were the sole heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully well that the same was false. He presented that document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the transfer of the title over Lot No. 1586 in the names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was later sold to Antel Holdings Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and received by, Felicisima and Miriam. 2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the forgery of complainants signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in Italy at that time working as an overseas contract worker. He even presented the falsified document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the property in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in-law Marcelina. The forgery or falsification was made to enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was received and misappropriated by Felicisima and Marcelina. 3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re:Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Original Copy and Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot No. 1605 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, filed by complainants sisters Marcelina and Felicisima on 24 October 1995, the respondent made gross misrepresentation and offered false testimony to the effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs of the late spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante for the purpose of obtaining a new title in their names. With the reconstituted title, and with the express conformity of the respondent, Felicisima and Marcelina were able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 and profited from the sale to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial payment was even received pending the reconstitution proceedings. 4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false misrepresentations for the purpose of profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense that the order of reconstitution would be released within a month when he knew that it would be impossible because he presented evidence in the reconstitution case only on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even used the stationery of the Philippine National Bank, of which he was an employee.7. 7.7 In his Comment,[2] the respondent denies the allegations of the complaint and asserts that he did not take advantage of his profession to deprive any of the co-heirs of his wife of the estate left by his parents-in-law. Insofar as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms that Felicisima and Miriam were not motivated by any desire to solely profit from the sale. Neither can he be faulted by the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 because he had no part in the execution of the document. All the while he believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had already agreed on how to dispose of the said lot. If ever complainants signature was affixed on that document, it was done in good faith. The respondent admits that he was the counsel of Marcelina Ting Rivera, et. al., in LRC Case No. 5964 for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-1869. The false testimony of Marcelina in that case that she and Felicisima were the only children of spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante could not be faulted on him because such was a clear oversight. Moreover, the sale of Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., was the decision of Marcelina and his wife. His conformity through his signature was pro-forma because the property was a paraphernal property of Marcelina and his wife. Anent his alleged gross and false misrepresentation that the order of reconstitution would be released by the end of November 1996, suffice it to say that the assurance was made by the Clerk of Court, Mr. Rosauro Morabe. Besides, petitions for reconstitution are usually uncontested and granted by courts. Finally, the respondent believes that complainant intended to harass him in bombarding him with numerous lawsuits, i.e., this administrative case; Civil Case No. TM-855 for Annulment of Documents, Titles, and Reconveyance plus Damages; and a criminal case for Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents. In her reply, the complainant denies the presence of toka or verbal will allegedly made by her mother and allegedly implemented by their eldest brother Eliseo in view of the following circumstances: (1) her mother met a sudden death in 1967; and partition of the properties in total disregard of their father was morally reprehensible, since the latter was still alive; (2) when their mother died, four of the siblings were still minors including respondents wife herself; (3) on 5 February 2000, Eliseo wrote his siblings, in response to the previous letter of Felicisima, Marcelina, and Miriam, denying the existence of a toka. She further states that the respondent was not merely a passive onlooker but, as he admitted, the administrator of the properties of the Ting spouses. On 14 June 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation or decision.[3] On 9 January 2003, after due hearing and consideration of the issues presented by both parties, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP found the actuations of the respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus she recommended that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law.[4] In its Resolution No. XV-2003-333[5] of 21 June 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted Commissioner San Juans report, but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for six years. We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in her findings of facts and conclusion of culpability. The respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession. In his long years as a lawyer, he must have forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus: LAWYER'S OATH8. 8.8 I, , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. SO HELP ME GOD. This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. By swearing the lawyers oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of justice.[6] This oath is firmly echoed and reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes. Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. . . . CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. . . . CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. When the respondent took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. In this covenant, respondent miserably failed. The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986 that they are the children of Julita Reynante and thus adjudicated only between them Lot No. 1586 to the exclusion of their other siblings.[7] There was concealment of the fact that there were other compulsory heirs to the estate of the deceased. Significantly, the respondent is the brother-in-law of complainant. Being married to complainants sister, he knew of his wifes siblings. In fact, he declared that the complainant stayed with them while she was in the Philippines.[8] Yet, the respondent presented that document to the Register of Deeds of General9. 9.9 Trias, Cavite, to effect the transfer of the title of the lot in question in the name of his wife and his sister-in-law Miriam. It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted[9] regarding the falsification of complainants signature in the Extrajudicial Settlement[10] dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603, which contains a purported waiver by the complainant of her right over the property. Marcelina admitted that she signed complainants name in that document.[11] Such act of counterfeiting the complainants signature to make it appear that the complainant had participated in the execution of that document is tantamount to falsification of a public document.[12] Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of attorney and against committing falsification, he presented[13] such document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a new title for the lot in favor of Marcelina and his wife.[14] He himself, therefore, may also be held liable for knowingly using a falsified document to the damage of the complainant and her other co- heirs.[15]Notably, he also admitted in an affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that he prepared the legal documents for the transfer of Lot 1603.[16] Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which are contrary to law. He must have kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a lawyer, which is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and obey the laws of the land. The Code of Professional Responsibility underscores the primacy of such duty by providing as its canon that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes.[17] For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.[18] As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate.[19] He should not, therefore, engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.[20] He makes himself unfit to remain in the profession who commits any such unbecoming act or conduct.[21] Respondents argument that the non-declaration by his wife and his sister- in-law Marcelina of the other siblings in LRC Rec. No. 5964 for the reconstitution of title involving Lot 1605 was a mere oversight does not deserve credence in view of the following circumstances: First, the petition clearly names only Felicisima and Marcelina as the petitioners when there were six siblings who were heirs of the unpartitioned lot.[22] Second, during the hearing of said case when the respondent asked Marcelina whether she has brothers and sisters other than Felicisima, the latter said none. The transcript of that hearing reads: ATTY. TORRES: Q Madame Witness, are you the only child or daughter of the deceased Sps. Vicente Ting, Jr. and Julita Reynante? WITNESS: A No, sir. We are two, Felicisima Torres and I. Q Do you have other brothers and sisters? A None, sir.[23] The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony[24] in court, and he never corrected the same despite full knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the case.[25] Moreover, in knowingly offering in evidence such false testimony, he himself may be punished as guilty of false testimony.[26] Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.[27] This Rule was clearly and openly violated by the respondent when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no siblings aside from Felicisima and when he offered such testimony in the petition for reconstitution of the title involving Lot 1605.10. 10.10 The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. For this reason, any act on his part that obstructs and impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him.[28] It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the reconstitution, he offered in evidence an Affidavit of Loss, which was executed by Marcelina and notarized by him. During the hearing of this administrative case, Marcelina admitted that her statement in that affidavit that the title was in her possession was false, as she was never in possession of the title[29] and would not, therefore, know that the same was lost. Moreover, in a letter dated 20 November 1996 addressed to a certain Mrs. Ong, the respondent requested the release of 50% of the remaining balance for the sale of Lot 1605, relaying to Antel Holdings, Inc., through Mrs. Ong that he was assured by the Clerk of Court that the order directing the reconstitution of title for Lot 1605 would be released within the month.[30] Respondents information was misleading because he presented evidence only on 12 August 1997, or almost a year after he sent the letter.[31] Such act, therefore, shows lack of candor and honesty on the part of the respondent. Respondents acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be disbarred or suspended pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. -- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, we take into account the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.[32] While the assessment of what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to our sound discretion, the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar.[33] Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. We will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it.[34] Verily, given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, we find that respondents gross misconduct calls for the severance of his privilege to practice law for life, and we therefore adopt the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the personal files of the respondent; all the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar11. 11.11 of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines. SO ORDERED. A. 2 ISIDRA TING-DUMALI VS TORRES DIGEST The parents of Isidra Ting-Dumali died intestate and they left several properties including two parcels of land Lot 1586 and Lot 1603 both in Malabon. Isidra has 5 other siblings. In 1986 however, two of her siblings, Felicisima Ting-Torres and Miriam Ting-Saria, executed two Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement. They were assisted by Felicisimas husband, Atty. Rolando Torres who was also the administrator of the Ting Estate. In the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement covering Lot 1586, they made it appear that Felicisima and Miriam were the only heirs of the Tings. Atty. In the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement covering Lot 1603, the signature of Isidra was forged to make it appear that she was a party to the Deed. Torres then presented the Deeds to the Registry of Deeds of Cavite for the purpose of transferring the titles into the name of Miriam and Felicisima. Thereafter, Felicisima and Miriam sold the lands to a corporation. Consequently, Isidra filed several complaints. One of the complaints is this disbarment case against Atty. Torres. Torres, in his defense, averred that he acted in good faith in allowing his wife and Miriam to execute the Deeds; that he thought that the Deeds were agreed to by the other siblings pursuant to a toka or verbal will left by Isidras mother and as implemented by their eldest brother, Eliseo Ting; that the exclusion of the other heirs was merely an oversight. Isidra denied the existence of the toka. Eliseo also said there was no such toka. ISSUE: Whether or not Torres should be disbarred for allowing the exclusion of the other heirs from the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement despite his knowledge of their presence. HELD: Yes. He violated his oath as he engaged in deceitful conduct. He has committed falsehood. By letting his wife and Miriam declare in a public document that they are the only heirs to the estate when in fact there are other compulsory heirs and then later presenting these Deeds to the Registry of Deeds, Atty. Torres failed to advise that the two were doing acts contrary to law. He participated in the making of these Deeds as well as to the subsequent transactions involving the sale of the properties covered by the Deeds. His acts facilitated a wrong against the other heirs. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila12. 12.12 EN BANC 3.) A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995 WELLINGTON REYES, complainant, vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent. PER CURIAM: This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former Assistant City Fiscal of manila, with malpractice and willful violation of his oath as an attorney. I On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant's business rival. According to complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other occasions. He said that another "payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in respondent's office at the City Hall. An entrapment was set up by the NBI. Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling P150.00 for marking. The paper bills were sent to the Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to complainant for the use in the entrapment. When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the latter would not return until around 2:30 P.M. So complainant and the NBI agents went back at around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business with respondent, complainant had to wait for thirty minutes. When finally complainant was able to see respondent, the latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba ang sa iyo?" Complainant answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang umaga." To which respondent replied "Oo, kanina pa kita hinihintay." Complainant then handed to respondent the marked money which he placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent and brought him to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. Respondent's hands were found positive of the yellow florescent powder applied earlier to the marked money. Respondent was thereafter taken to the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI where he was photographed, fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent declined to give a sworn statement to explain his side of the case, invoking his right against self-incrimination. On the same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the filing of administrative charges and the institution of disbarment proceedings against him. On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from office pending investigation and disposition of his administrative case (Case No. 74).13. 13.13 Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two other cases were earlier filed against respondent: namely, Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave Misconduct filed by one Angel Alora on October 13, 1969, wherein respondent was found guilty as charged and was recommended for suspension; and Administrative Case No. 10-A. for partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26, 1970, which was pending resolution. In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that complainant surreptitiously planted the marked money in his pocket without his knowledge and consent. He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed against him by the NBI at the instance of complainant was still pending preliminary investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila. In connection with the incident of March 30, 1971, he said that he had filed a criminal complaint for incriminatory machination, perjury and attempted corruption of a public official against complainant with the City Fiscal of Manila. In reply to the answer, complainant denied that the several cases against respondent were motivated by revenge, malice or personal ill will. He said that the investigating fiscal had recommended the dismissal of the charges filed by respondent against him. In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the disbarment case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. However, upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court., the case was transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and disposition. On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that respondent be disbarred. Said recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution dated March 26, 1994. II We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of receiving the marked money from complainant during the entrapment conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in his arrest and the subsequent filing of administrative and criminal cases against him. In his defense, respondent merely denied the charge of extortion and retorted that the marked money was planted by complainant. It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]). When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics 93 [1949]). He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him (Bayasen v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 197 [1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]). Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 [1989]). The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation14. 14.14 is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67 [1983]). WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent. SO ORDERED. 4.) SECOND DIVISION EPIFANIA Q. BANTOLO, Adm. Case No. 6589 Complainant, Present: PUNO, J., Chairman, - versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. ATTY. EGMEDIO B. CASTILLON, JR., Respondent. Promulgated: December 19, 2005 D E C I S I O N TINGA, J.: In a letter-complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dated 02 October 1997,[1] Epifania Q. Bantolo charged Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. of violating the lawyers oath and Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for having (i) wittingly or willingly performed, promoted, or sued any groundless, false or unlawful suit, and or giving aid or consent to the same; (ii) delayed the just execution of the suit without legal or justifiable cause and employing illegal means and unlawful force to do so; (iii) blatantly showed disrespect to the Regional Trial Court by disobeying its lawful orders; and (iv) for employing unlawful and illegal means to attain his ends. According to complainant, respondent is the lawyer and one of the defendants in a case involving a parcel of land in Valderrama, Antique.[2] The case was decided in favor of the complainant and her co-plaintiffs, and thereafter, a writ of execution was issued, by virtue of which, defendants were ejected from the property. However, respondents, with his co-defendants subsequently entered the disputed property and harvested the palay planted therein.[3] Plaintiffs15. 15.15 were prompted to move for defendants to be declared in contempt of court because of their open defiance and willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the court, which were abetted by the acts of Atty. Egmedio Castillon who is an officer of the court.[4] On 25 January 1991, the trial court declared Atty. Castillon and his co-defendants guilty of indirect contempt of court, with the penalty of one month imprisonment and fine.[5] Subsequently, on 26 July 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, with the modification that instead of imprisonment, defendants were ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each.[6] In his Answer to Complaint dated 02 March 1998, respondent denied complainants allegations and claimed that said complaint was a form of harassment.[7] Hearings were thereafter scheduled but were cancelled and reset due to the unavailability of the complainant. Finally, on 09 December 1998, a hearing for the reception of complainants evidence was conducted.[8] While notices were subsequently sent to respondent setting the case for reception of his evidence, no such hearing pushed through due to respondents failure to inform the IBP of his new office address. Thus, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to present evidence.[9] In the Report and Recommendation (Report) dated 17 March 2004, the investigating commissioner, Atty. Rafael Antonio M. Santos, found that complainant failed to prove that respondents actions, with respect to his unsuccessful defense of the case were not within the bounds of the law. Moreover, that respondent lost his case in the trial court does not necessarily support the charge of willingly promoting or ruing any groundless, false or unlawful suit or giving aid, or consenting to the same, [10] he added. Thus, according to the IBP, the only remaining issue to be resolved is respondents liability, if any, for his contumacious acts, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.[11] Recognizing that the findings of the trial court and the appellate court with respect to respondents contumacious acts as final and conclusive, it was found that respondent committed an act which constitutes a breach of his sworn promise to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities. Furthermore, the Report noted respondents attempts to thwart the instant disbarment proceedings, to wit: i) attempt to mislead the Commission on Bar Discipline by representing that the proceedings relative to the contempt charges against him are still pending when in fact they had already been terminated; ii) placing too much emphasis on the alleged lack of personality of the complainant to file the disbarment complaint; and iii) failure to notify the Commission of his change of address.[12] Finding however, that the penalty of disbarment would be reasonable under the circumstances, the Commission recommended instead the penalty of suspension for one month.[13] As explained in the Report: A close examination of the facts of this case reveals that the basis of the act for which the court found to be contumacious is a claim of ownership over the subject property, and thus arose from an emotional attachment to the property which they had possessed prior to their dispossession as a consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. 1345. Respondents subsequent acts, however, including those which were found to be contumacious, as well as his actuations in the instant case, merit disciplinary sanctions, for which is recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) month.[14] On 30 July 2004, the IBP passed a resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation, to wit: RESOLUTION NO, XVI-2004-376 CBD Case No. 510 Epifania Q. Bantolo vs.16. 16.16 Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent has been found by both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals guilty of indirect contempt for disobeying the writ of execution and for attempting to mislead the Commission into believing that the contempt charge is still pending by submitting an Order of the trial court which pertains to a second contempt charge, Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month. The findings and recommendation of the IBP are well-taken. Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes, and this deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof may subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well.[15] Such is the situation in the instant case. We need not delve into the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the contempt case against respondents. Suffice it to say that respondent lawyers commission of the contumacious acts have been shown and proven, and eventually punished by the lower courts. A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. Thus, while he owes his entire devotion to the interest and causes of his client he must ensure that he acts within the bounds of reason and common sense, always aware that he is an instrument of truth and justice. More importantly, as an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts[16] and to show respect to its processes. Thus, any act on his part which tends visibly to obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him.[17] Respondents defiance of the writ of execution is a brazen display of disrespect of the very system which he has sworn to support. Likewise, his various attempts to delay and address issues inconsequential to the disbarment proceedings had necessarily caused delay, and even threatened to obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nevertheless, the supreme penalty of disbarment is not proper in the instant case. The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring lawyer from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers when the evidence calls for it, it will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.[18] In the case of respondent, the Court finds that a months suspension from the practice of law will provide him with enough time to purge himself of his misconduct and will give him the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondents suspension is effective upon notice of this decision. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondents record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned. SO ORDERED.17. 17.17 EN BANC 5.) [B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003] DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent. D E C I S I O N CARPIO, J.: The Case Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations. The Facts Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now. Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).18. 18.18 On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body. On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate. On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him. In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading. On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys. On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government. Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta. On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation. OBCs Report and Recommendation The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar. On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee.19. 19.19 Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC. The Courts Ruling We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar. Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies. On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar. In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that: The practice of lawis not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]20. 20.20 The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.[5] The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.[7] True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.[9] On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan. Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan. On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law. WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar. SO ORDERED. EN BANC AGUIRRE DIGEST Aguirre v Rana Facts: Rana passed the 2000 bar examinations. The following year, one day before the oath taking, Aguirre filed a petition for denial of admission to the bar against Rana, charging Rama with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law and grave misrepresentation. Rama was alleged to have appeared as counsel for a certain Bunan in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of canvassers in Masbate, and filed a pleading as counsel. His clients were running for Mayor and Vice-Mayor. He was still allowed to take his oath as a member of the bar but ruled that he could not sign the roll of attorneys pending the resolution of the charge.21. 21.21 Incidentally he is also a government employee (Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon Masbate): By law, he is not allowed to act as counsel in any court/admin body because of his government position Issue: W/n he is allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body? Held: Respondent is guilty of unauthorized practice of law. Rana had been appearing in proceedings even before he took his oath. This misconduct casts serious doubt on his moral fitness as a member of the bar. Practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces preparation of pleadings and papers incident to actions and other proceedings, the management of such actions on behalf of clients before judges and courts. Giving advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. Basically activity in and out of court which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. Although he passed the bar examinations it is the signing in the roll of attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. In fine, he engaged in the practice of law by filing pleadings and signing as counsel and giving advice to his clients thereby creating a atty-client relationship even before signing the roll of attorneys. He shouldve waited a little longer. (Rule 9 violated; Unauthorized practice of law) He is DENIED ADMISSION to the Bar 6.) [A.C. No. 6486. September 22, 2004] EMMA T. DANTES, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent. D E C I S I O N PER CURIAM: Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one requirement remains constant in all the jurisdictions where the practice of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has good moral character, and once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in accordance with the standard. In this jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a condition precedent[1] to the practice of law, but an unending requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.[2] In an Affidavit-Complaint[3] dated June 6, 2001, filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Emma T. Dantes, sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of immorality, abandonment, and violation of professional ethics and law. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 01-851. Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent purportedly engaged in illicit relationships with two women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the time respondents illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular support to complainant and their children, thus forcing complainant to work abroad to provide for their childrens needs. Complainant pointed out that these acts of respondent constitute a violation of his lawyers oath and his moral and legal obligation to be a role model to the community.22. 22.22 On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order[4] requiring respondent to submit his answer to the Affidavit-Complaint. Respondent submitted his Answer[5] on November 19, 2001. Though admitting the fact of marriage with the complainant and the birth of their children, respondent alleged that they have mutually agreed to separate eighteen (18) years before after complainant had abandoned him in their Balintawak residence and fled to San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent claimed that when complainant returned after eighteen years, she insisted that she be accommodated in the place where he and their children were residing. Thus, he was forced to live alone in a rented apartment. Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best school he could afford and provided for their needs. He even bought two lots in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and gave complainant adequate financial support even after she had abandoned him in 1983. Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to force him to remit seventy percent (70%) of his monthly salary to her. Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the complaint. Complainant presented her evidence, both oral and documentary,[6] to support the allegations in herAffidavit-Complaint. From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established that on January 19, 1979, complainant and respondent were married[7] and lived with the latters mother in Balintawak. At that time, respondent was just a fourth year law student. To make ends meet, complainant engaged in the buy and sell business and relied on dole-outs from the respondents mother. Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and Daisy, who were born on February 20, 1980,[8] October 14, 1981[9] and August 11, 1983,[10] respectively. Complainant narrated that their relationship was marred by frequent quarrels because of respondents extra- marital affairs.[11] Sometime in 1983, she brought their children to her mother in Pampanga to enable her to work because respondent had failed to provide adequate support. From 1986 to 2001, complainant worked abroad as a domestic helper. Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and respondent to live separately, complainant asseverated that she was just compelled to work abroad to support their children. When she returned to the Philippines, she learned that respondent was living with another woman. Respondent, then bluntly told her, that he did not want to live with her anymore and that he preferred his mistresses. Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling, and Christian Dave,[12] all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his paramour[13] to prove the fact that respondent sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with two different women. Letters of complainants legitimate children likewise support the allegation that respondent is a womanizer.[14] In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to cross- examine complainant, after he failed to appear during the scheduled hearings despite due notice. He, however, submitted his Comment/Opposition to the Complainants Formal Offer of Evidence with Motion to Exclude the Evidence from the Records of the Proceedings[15] onAugust 1, 2002. Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion to Adopt Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Respondents motion was denied because it was filed after the complainant had already presented her evidence.[16] Respondent was given a final chance to present his evidence on July 11, 2003. Instead of presenting evidence, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss, which was likewise denied for being a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent submitted his Position Paper on August 4, 2003.23. 23.23 In respondents Position Paper,[17] he reiterated the allegations in his Answer except that this time, he argued that in view of the resolution of the complaint for support with alimony pendente lite[18] filed against him by the complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,[19] the instant administrative case should be dismissed for lack of merit. On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the Bar Confidant its Report[20] and Resolution No. XVI-2004-230 involving CBD Case No. 01-851.[21] The IBP recommended that the respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-taken. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.[22] To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyers conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree[23] or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.[24] In Barrientos vs. Daarol,[25] we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves.[26] Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.[27] They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.[28] Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established respondents commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently, respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.[29]24. 24.24 In Toledo vs. Toledo,[30] we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,[31] we ruled that abandoning ones wife and resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,[32] that moral delinquency which affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community as exemplified by behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.[33] Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed.[34] However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED. 7.) Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 2361 February 9, 1989 LEONILA J. LICUANAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. MANUEL L. MELO, respondent. R E S O L U T I O N PER CURIAM: An affidavit-complaint, dated November 11, 1981, was filed by Leonila J. Licuanan with the Office of the Court Administrator on 5 February 1982 against respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, for breach of professional ethics, alleging that respondent, who was her counsel in an ejectment case filed against her tenant, failed to remit to her the rentals collected by respondent on different dates over a twelve-month period, much less did he report to her the receipt of said amounts. It was only after approximately a year from actual receipt that respondent turned over his collections to complainant after the latter, through another counsel, acquired knowledge of the payment and had demanded the same.25. 25.25 In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted having received the payment of rentals from complainant's tenant, Aida Pineda, as alleged in the complaint, but explained that he kept this matter from the complainant for the purpose of surprising her with his success in collecting the rentals. We forwarded the case to the Office of the Solicitor General, for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were conducted and the parties presented their respective evidence. After investigation, the Solicitor General submitted the following Findings and Recommendation: Findings: The issue to be resolved is whether there was unreasonable delay on the part of the respondent in accounting for the funds collected by him for his former client, the complainant herein, for which unprofessional conduct respondent should be disciplined. A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. Under paragraph 11 of the Canons of Legal Ethics, he is obligated to report promptly the money of client that has come to his possession and should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal purpose without his client's consent viz: Money of the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported promptly, and except with the client's know and consent should not be commingled with his private or be used by him. And paragraph 32 of the Canons of Legal Ethics further requires a lawyer to maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust: ... But above all, a lawyer will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen. In the instant case, respondent failed to observe his oath of office. It is undisputed that the relation of attorney and client existed between Licuanan and Melo at the time the incident in question took place. The records disclose that on August 8, 1979, respondent, as Licuanan's attorney, obtained judgment in Licuanan's favor against Aida Pineda whereby the latter was directed by the City Court of Manila to pay Licuanan all her monthly rentals from October, 1978 and succeeding months thereafter. When several months had elapsed without them hearing a word from Pineda, respondent decided to send her a letter on February 4, 1980, demanding that she pay the monthly rental of her apartment otherwise he will be constrained to take the necessary legal action against her to protect the interest of his client (Exhibit "A", p. 8, record). On February 11, 1980, Pineda yielded to the demand of Melo. She went to respondent's office and paid him P3,060.00 for which respondent gave her a receipt for the said amount representing her rental payments for October, 1978 to February, 1980 at the rate of P180.00 per month (Exh. "B", p. 9, Ibid.) At the end of March 31,1980, Pineda again went back to respondent and paid the rentals of her apartment for the months of March and April, 1980 in the sum of P360.00 (Exh. "C" p. 10, Ibid.). Not only that, respondent again received from Pineda on June 30, 1980 rental payments covering the months of May, June and July, 1980 in the total sum of26. 26.26 P540.00 (Exh. "D" p. 11, Ibid.). And, on September 29, 1980, he received and issued Pineda a receipt for P540.00 covering rental payments for the months of August, September and October, 1980. (Exh. "E", Ibid.). After four months had elapsed, or on January 23, 1981, he collected again from Pineda the total sum of P720.00 covering the months of October, November, December, 1980 and January 1981 (Exh. "F", p. 12, Ibid.). During the entire twelve-month period that respondent had been receiving the said rental payments of Pineda, he did not bother to inform or report to complainant about the said payments and instead unnecessarily retained the money. He allowed the money to accumulate for a year and kept complainant in the dark as to the progress of the case. He did not even attempt to tell her about the money that had come into his possession notwithstanding the fact that complainant used to call him and inquire regarding the case (pp. 14-15, tsn., Sept. 10, 1985). It was only when Atty. Ponciano B. Jacinto, the new counsel retained by complainant, wrote respondent a letter on May 4, 1981, advising him to surrender the money to complainant that he accounted for it (Exh. "H", p. 15, Ibid.). But this was rather late because as early as April 27, 1981, complainant, not knowing that respondent had been receiving the rental payments of Pineda, instituted an administrative case against her (Aida Pineda) before the Chief of the Philippine Tuberculosis Society accusing her of "moral turpitude" arising from her alleged failure to pay the rent of her apartment as ordered by the City Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 037276 and claiming that she has ignored and refused to pay her just obligation (Exh. "G", p. 14, Ibid.). This led therefore Pineda to bring an action against her (Licuanan) for damages before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, for she allegedly suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation arising from the unfounded administrative case Licuanan filed against her (Aida Pineda), since as borne out by the records, she had been paying her obligation religiously to the lawyer of Licuanan, herein respondent (pp. 48-52, record). Clearly, this unfortunate incident would not have happened had respondent been only true to his oath as a lawyer, i.e., to be honest and candid towards his client. Thus, we find it hard to believe respondent's defense that he kept the money of complainant for a year merely because he wanted to surprise her with his success in collecting the rental payments from Pineda. On the contrary, it is very much discernible that he did not surrender immediately the money to complainant because he was using it for his own benefit. Common sense dictates that by unnecessarily withholding the money of complainant for such length of time, respondent deprived her of the use of the same. It is therefore too credulous to believe his explanation, which is flimsy and incredible Respondent's actuation casts doubt on his honesty and integrity. He must know that the "highly fiduciary" and "confidential relation" of attorney and client requires that the attorney should promptly account for all funds and property received or held by him for the client's benefit, and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct, as succinctly held by the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Fermina Legaspi Daroy, et al., vs. Atty. Ramon Chaves Legaspi, Adm. Case No. 936, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 304, to wit: A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his clients that has come into his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal purposes without his client's27. 27.27 consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust (Pars. 11 and 32, Canons of Legal Ethics). Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his clients is held in trust and must be immediately turned over to them (Aya vs. Bigonia, 57 Phil. 8, 11). xxx xxx xxx A lawyer may be disbarred for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in his office as attorney or for any violation of the lawyer's oath (Ibid, sec. 27). The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting and confidential in character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith (7 Am. Jur. 2d 105). In view of that special relationship, 'lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on money in his hands collected for his clients does not relieve him from the duty of promptly accounting for the funds received. (Emphasis supplied). In fine, we are convinced that respondent is guilty of breach of trust reposed in him by his client. Not only has he degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession (In re Paraiso, 41 Phil. 24, 25; In re David, 84 Phil. 627; Manaloto vs. Reyes, Adm. Case No. 503, October 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 131). By his deceitful conduct, he placed his client in jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a damage suit; thus, instead of being a help to his client, he became the cause of her misery. He, therefore, deserves a severe punishment for it. (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8, 11; In re Bamberger, April 17, 1924, 49 Phil. 962; Daroy, et al., vs. Atty. Ramon Chaves Legaspi, supra.) Clearly, respondent is guilty of professional misconduct in the discharge of his duty as a lawyer. RECOMMENDATION WHEREFORE, we respectfully recommend that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of not less than one (1) year, and that he be strongly admonished to strictly and faithfully observe his