LEE&RAADSCHELDERS_ Political-Administrative Relations_Impact of and Puzzles in Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981.pdf

Political-Administrative Relations: Impact of andPuzzles in Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981

KWANG-HOON LEE* and JOS C.N. RAADSCHELDERS*

Political-administrative relations became an issue once politicians andadministrators came to be considered as distinct actors in the public realm.This happened in the late eighteenth century, and several authors since thenexplored the nature of this relationship in normative and/or juridical terms.But it took almost two centuries before it became an object of systematicempirical study in a comparative perspective: Aberbach, Putnam, andRockman (APR 1981). The APR study was the first to use survey methodsand to advance empirically based theory. In this article we discuss theintellectual attention for this topic since the early nineteenth century,APR’s findings and impact and—given APR’s influence upon methods—some intriguing problems with the framework that they developed. Finallywe list some potential new avenues of research.

Introduction

The interest in political-administrative relations and concern about bureau-cratization dates back to the nineteenth century, but until the 1940s studieswere either normative by nature, advocating some degree of separationbetween politics and administration (in the United States, e.g., Goodnow1900; Wilson [1887] 2005) or discussed the growing influence of civilservants on policymaking (Appleby 1949; Leys 1943; Weber 1985). Afterthe 1940s scholars increasingly argued that the politics-administrationdichotomy did not reflect the emerging reality of increasing civil servicediscretion and influence (e.g., Mosher [1968] 1982; Svara 1985, 1998, 2001)and that empirical research was needed to illuminate the dynamics of therelation between politicians and bureaucrats.

Surprisingly, systematic data collection and analysis of the developmentand status of political-administrative relations was not done until the1970s. The research presented by Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (here-after APR, 1981) is the first comparative book-length manuscript.1 Sincethe publication of Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies, thestudy of political-administrative relations has blossomed and expanded.This article demonstrates how the APR study fits in the intellectual devel-opment of attention for this topic.

*University of Oklahoma

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 21, No. 3,July 2008 (pp. 419–438).© 2008 The AuthorsJournal compilation © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main St., Malden, MA 02148, USA,and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK. ISSN 0952-1895

We will first briefly trace the study of political-administrative relationsto the intellectual tradition of Hegel’s political theory and to Weber’scomparative-historical observations (first section). Next we discuss thecontent and main theses of APR’s book and subsequent studies (secondsection). Then we address APR’s impact on the substantive study ofpolitical-administrative relations (third section) and examine someintriguing problems in their theory and methodology (fourth section). Thelatter is important because their approach has been quite influential andoften replicated. We will conclude with some observations about emerginglines of research (fifth section).

The Intellectual Attention for Political-Administrative Relations

In light of history, the distinction between politicians and administrators isvery recent. For most of history, government offices were held by individu-als belonging to the social-economic elite, while the population at large hadlittle to no influence. The distinction made between political and nonpo-litical, that is, administrative, officeholders rests basically upon the needfor a less corrupt and more expert civil service that was separate from thedirect and personal influence of politics so that knowledgeable and meri-torious candidates rather than friends or relatives would be appointed.Such a nonpoliticized bureaucracy emerged in Europe between 1780–1830(Church 1981, 129; Hattenhauer 1978, 182; Parris 1969, 33). Since the 1780sthe number of nonpolitical, civil service career positions started to becomesignificantly larger than that of political (elected or politically appointed)positions in public organizations (Chester 1981, 286). For instance, thepercentage of civil servants (i.e., white collar, desk workers) in four Dutchmunicipalities amounted from 5.4% in 1800 to 31.1% in 1980, while that ofpolitical officeholders declined from a little more than 11% in 1800 to about2.5% in 1980 (Raadschelders 1994, 417).

Hegel is the first scholar to consider the role and position of civilservants in relation to the executive as part of a more encompassingphilosophy of right (Gale and Hummel 2003; Shaw 1992). He holds thatexecutive power depends upon civil servants (Hegel [1821] 1942, 189–190)given their impartiality and their “knowledge and proof of ability” (190–192). To Hegel a civil servant is more than a mere mechanical executor ofpolitical will and brings moral consciousness to an otherwise technicaladministrative activity. Civil servants are supposed to be recruited fromamong a politically conscious and educated middle class that is the pillarof the state (193, 291). He argues that contemporary civil servants are thenew Platonic guardians of the universal (i.e., state) will.2 In this sense,Hegel’s perspective is normative and juridical.

It was Weber who developed a sociological perspective on political-administrative relations without disregarding the normative and juridicalangles. He believed that civil servants should “remain outside the realm ofthe [political] struggle of power” (Weber 1968, 1404).3 They were respon-

420 KWANG-HOON LEE AND JOS C.N. RAADSCHELDERS

sible for sincerely executing orders of their political leaders. At the sametime, though, Weber found that no action or problem is so technical that itis without political content, foreshadowing Waldo’s point of view somedecades later. In addition, Weber emphasized a legal, rational, and expertbureaucracy as necessary, arguing that a “less competent administrativestaff might prove a more pliable instrument . . . in a political system basedon strongly-held beliefs” (Diamant 1962, 85). He also acknowledged theemerging power of bureaucracy when observing that “[i]n a modern statethe actual ruler is necessarily and unavoidably the bureaucracy. . . . It is[civil servants] who decide on all our everyday needs and problems”(Weber 1968, 1393).

The distinction between Hegel and Weber is also visible in the works ofGoodnow and Wilson. Goodnow is closer to Hegel than to Weber foradvocating a (nonspecified) degree of administrative independence, thatis, that administration should mostly be separate from politics in order toavoid corruption (Goodnow 1900, 45, 82). Wilson appears to separate thepolitics and administration on a basis more comparable to Weber, regard-ing administration as the application of technical principles. In practice asin theory, the distinction between civil servants and politicians solidifiedin Europe from the early nineteenth century. In the United States and at theend of that century, advocates of scientific management focused on effi-ciency while social reformers clamored for anticorruption measures. Bothgroups asserted that efficiency and reform would be best served if admin-istration were largely separated from politics. The role of administratorscontinued to increase and even overshadowed that of political officehold-ers (Leys 1943). In response to growing bureaucratic influence throughoutthe twentieth century, increased political control over bureaucraticpower was advocated (Weber 1968, 1408, 1417). In the late nineteenth andearly twentieth century new political offices were created (Lee andRaadschelders 2005; Light 1995) and (new) top civil service positions werepoliticized (see Raadschelders and Van der Meer 1998, 28–33). Throughoutthe twentieth century politicians have created agencies outside directbureaucratic (i.e., departmental) control, and in the latter part of the twen-tieth century performance measures and benchmarking represent effortsto make bureaucratic activity even more transparent.

Findings in APR and Changes since Then

The APR study was initiated by the University of Michigan’s ComparativeElites Project, which aimed to collect data about attitudes and beliefs of toppolitical and administrative officeholders.4 The data for the study weregathered mainly between 1970 and 1974 on the basis of “open-ended, yetlargely structured” interviews with top officials (APR 1981, 33).5 Bureau-crats and Politicians in Western Democracies (1981) included material onBritain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UnitedStates, and was the capstone to a project that had led to 17 articles and

POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONS 421

several books up to 1981.6 The behavioral and attitudinal data was system-atically presented throughout the book and interpreted in terms of aframework of four images of political-administrative relations. Both thedata as well as the fourth of their images have attracted much attention.7

The four images of interaction between political and bureaucraticofficeholders (Table 1) have been subject to much discussion and misun-derstanding and even confusion. The authors assumed Image I and II asmore descriptive of bureaucrats at lower levels, while considering ImageIII and IV as more illustrative of the higher levels (APR 1981, 20). Inter-preting their findings in light of the four images, APR concluded that thecivil servants’ role had evolved from Image I to II and even III. Theycarefully voiced the potential for advancing toward Image IV (238–239).

APR presented the social, economic, educational, and political charac-teristics of civil servants. Generally, civil servants came from more privi-leged social origins than political officeholders and were not veryrepresentative of the population, especially so in France and Italy (APR1981, 51, 56, 61–64). They enjoyed a higher educational background withan emphasis on law in France and Germany, on the humanities in Britain,and on the hard sciences in the United States (50–51). In regard to politicalideology, politicians were more inclined to sympathize both with pluralistpolitics and egalitarian or participatory populism (176–190), while bureau-crats appeared to be low on populism (206–207). In regard to nationalcharacteristics, the British were highest on pluralism, while the Italianswere lowest; egalitarianism was strongest in Sweden; and populismsurprisingly strong among German civil servants (180–181, 188).

Next, APR turned to the role of civil servants in policymaking andexpressed surprise when finding that bureaucrats were heavily involvedin mediating and reconciling interests (89–91). At the same time, politicalofficeholders were clearly more partisan and served more particularisticpurposes, while civil servants fulfilled more the roles of bureau technicianand broker, serving a collective purpose (109–111). In terms of the inter-

TABLE 1Four Images of Interaction between Political Officeholders and Civil Servants(APR 1981, 4–16)

Separation Pure Hybrid

Image I Image II Image III Image IV

Politicians Policy Interests (politicalsensitivity)

Energy (passion,idealism)

Civilservants

Administration Facts (neutralexpertise)

Equilibrium(pragmatism,caution)

Authors Wilson,Goodnow

Simon Rose


actions between politicians and bureaucrats, they distinguished threetypes: cabinet bureaucrats insulated from politics (the United Kingdom,the Netherlands, and Sweden), relatively frequent contacts (Germany andItaly), and interdependency (the United States) (233–235).8 More interest-ingly, the authors noticed clear differences between the United States andEurope on the degree of intertwinement between political and adminis-trative elites. U.S. civil servants played more political roles as advocates,policy entrepreneurs, and even partisans than their European colleagues,while American political officeholders were more active techniciansthan their European counterparts (APR 1981, 94–98). APR argued thatAmerican elites overlapped more than in Europe because of U.S. institu-tional history (243). European civil servants were more situated at theideological center and slightly more conservative than Members of Parlia-ment, while American bureaucrats were as scattered across the politicalspectrum as members of Congress but lightly skewed to the left (119–125).

Has anything changed in political-administrative relations since thepublication of APR’s book? Generally, little change has been reported insocial-cultural background. For instance, despite intense struggles aboutthe role of the public sector through the three decades (1970s–1990s), theAmerican higher civil servants still remain a well-educated, experienced,and highly motivated group, as they were in 1970 (Aberbach 2003b). In theUnited Kingdom, the civil service is still ideologically located in the centerand appears to have moved away somewhat from Image III into thedirection of Image I (Wilson and Barker 2003). German civil servants arestill left of center (Derlien 2003). For Belgium, the civil service is ideologi-cally moderate and right of center (Dierickx 2003).9 Bigger change hasbeen reported with regard to educational background. By and large, lawhas become less and the social sciences more important as a preparationfor the civil service career.10 The same phenomenon has been observedin other European countries (Page and Wright 1999, 2007) and in theEuropean Union (Page 1997).

With regard to politicization APR (1981) hypothesized that it would notencroach much upon professionalism of bureaucracy, and this was indeedconfirmed. At the same time they assumed that partisan appointmentwould influence administrative activities (260–261), but this was found tobe the case only to a limited extent. For instance, despite their partisanshipfor career development, German civil servants are often critical of theconsequences of politicization (Mayntz and Derlien 1989, 399–400). Thedegree of politicization depends more upon institutional factors as coun-tries in the Westminster tradition show. For example, the ideological close-ness between parties and the low number of political transitions keepCanadian deputy ministers from being politicized (Bourgault and Dion1989, 139–140). The Belgian bureaucracy is an interesting case. Belgiansenior civil servants are marginalized, since ministerial staffers assist min-isters and act like a hub of contacts among parliamentarians, ministers,and civil servants (Dierickx 2003, 328–329).


Neutrality and politicization of bureaucrats are also influenced by thehistorical development of the political system. For instance, in Europe,bureaucracy historically preceded democracy, whereas democracy inthe United States was followed by bureaucratization (Derlien 1996, 150;Nelson 1982, 774–775). Consequently, U.S. political parties used theemerging bureaucracy for their interests and spoils, while their Europeancounterparts, as more programmatic and disciplined, endeavored tocontrol the growing bureaucracy through, for example, enhanced controlsover top career appointments (Nelson 1982, 774–775). APR noted thatdissimilar attitudes between European and the U.S. elites were attributedto differences in constitutional development, electoral and party systems,and political institutions (21–23). In terms of recruitment for top bureau-cratic positions, national differences have been found. The United Statesappears to emphasize loyalty and political responsiveness to the govern-ment in power; the British model stresses expertise of top-ranking civilservants, while the German model combines loyalty and expertise (Derlien1996, 156–157). In terms of party affiliation, while the United States andBritain ban civil servant membership of political parties, Germany and theNetherlands allow it (Derlien 1996, 153).

Perhaps the most noticeable difference between APR’s initial con-clusions and research results since then regards the degree to whichImage IV became less rather than more the direction to which political-administrative relations evolved. Initially, several examples of movementtoward Image IV were noticed. For instance, Image IV was consideredmore possible in the United States than in any other country (Aberbachand Rockman 1988, 23), and a higher civil service as “political careerists”was in fact rising in the United States (Heclo 1984, 18–20, also cited inCampbell and Peters 1988, 93; Light 1995). The blending of expert knowl-edge and political commitment through intertwinement of the SpecialAdvisers to the Prime Minister and the politically partisan think tanks inBritain during the 1970s and 1980s also suggested a movement towardImage IV (Bulmer 1988, 30–40). Another example was that Swedish under-secretaries mostly viewed themselves as hybrids between civil servantsand politicians in 1990, while they mainly saw themselves as civil servantsin 1971 (Ehn et al. 2003, 440). Notwithstanding this perceived increasingintertwinement, political control was observed to have intensified sincethe early 1980s (Aberbach 2003a; Aberbach and Rockman 1997; Bulmer1988; Campbell and Wilson 1995; Derlien 2003; Ehn et al. 2003; Mayntzand Derlien 1989). The intensification of political control over bureaucracymay well be due to the influence of New Public Management (NPM).While the impact of NPM in general varied from country to country, itsinfluence upon political-administrative relations seems to be quite uni-form.11 These findings suggest that the development toward Image IV isnot fully formed in some political systems or vary over countries. Theo-retical discussion of Image IV (next section) helps to explain the nationalvariances in the development.


Impact of APR on the Study of Political-Administrative Relations

Until the late 1970s political-administrative relations were often studiedas part of a more general analysis of political-administrative systems(Suleiman 1974, 1978, on France; Mayntz 1978, on Germany). The APRstudy certainly helped in defining this as a research topic in its own rightand has had a large impact in terms of substantive focus and methodology.First, the APR study initiated the investigation of the characteristics oftop-elected and administrative officeholders and the relations betweenthem on the basis of interviews rather than the hitherto customary inves-tigation of departments and agencies in the United States. In addition, itstarted to move comparative study of this phenomenon beyond theUnited Kingdom and the United States. Second, the study is considered asan example of the empirical inquiry fueled by the behavioral revolutionduring which theory development was less important than a solid, data-based account of various aspects of bureaucracy (Pierre 1995, 5–6). Muchof this empirical work involves national country studies (Derlien 1992,295). Finally, and most importantly, judged by the number of replicationsand further inquiry into national circumstances, APR’s work must beregarded as a landmark, having enlarged and enriched the topic. In thewords of Campbell (1988) it represented “the most direct challenge to thepolicy/administration dichotomy” (246), Derlien (1992) called it an out-standing comparative study (295), and Peters and Pierre (2001, 1) wrotethat “the standard corpus of literature on the role perceptions and actionsof civil servants and politicians comes out of the work of [APR].”

It is not until the late 1980s that attention for this topic picks up steam.Considering the year of publication and the years scholars needed to collectand report data, this time lag is not surprising. Aberbach and Rockmancontinued in this area of research, fueling interest through the symposiumdedicated to this topic in the inaugural issue of Governance (1988) thatcontained, next to an introductory article by Aberbach and Rockman(1988), country-specific pieces on the United Kingdom (Bulmer 1988)and Germany (Derlien 1988) and a piece on the politics-administrationdichotomy (Campbell and Peters 1988). Aberbach and Rockman (1997,2000) continued to publish and in 2003 another symposium appeared inGovernance (with Aberbach, Derlien, Dierickx, Ehn et al., and Wilson andBarker). Authors in these two special issues, though, did not all focus on thesame categories of officials and focused on career civil servants’ relationswith political appointees at the top of departments rather than on relationswith members of parliament.12 Next to these two special issues, severalarticles have been published since 1988 that explicitly revisit elements of theAPR study (Aberbach et al. 1990, comparing United States and Germany;Bourgault and Dion 1989, 1993, on Canada; Campbell 1988, on Image IV invarious countries; Genieys 2005, on France; Gregory 1991, on Australia andNew Zealand; Hacek 2006, on Slovenia; Hart and Wille 2006, on theNetherlands; Mayntz and Derlien 1989, on Germany).13


Scholars also expanded and/or refined the four images, specificallyImage IV. Campbell (1988), and Campbell and Peters (1988) elaboratedImage IV by distinguishing three subtypes: Image IV.1 represents thereactive career bureaucrats; Image IV.2a the pro-active, permanent civilservants who operate as policy professional and who exercise cross-cuttinggamesmanship; and, Image IV.2b the pro-active, party-political bureaucratwith corner-fighting gamesmanship. Campbell (1988) presented examplesof each in various Western countries (including Japan) (250). Gregory (1991)studied the degree to which civil servants were programmatically commit-ted and tolerant of politics, while reminding us of APR’s typology ofbureaucrats and politicians in terms of populism and pluralism. He mergedCampbell’s three Image IV subtypes with APR’s four images (Table 2).These theoretical elaborations reflect that the political-administrative rela-tions in Image IV are not always the same across countries and acrossgovernmental departments or agencies.

The literature referenced so far concerns political-administrative rela-tions at the level of federal or national government, but APR has alsoreinvigorated research into the relations between elected officials andadministrators at the local level both in America and Europe.14 As far asthe local level in the United States is concerned, the study on the council-manager model indeed looked at the political-administrative relations inAmerican cities before APR but focused on suitable functions and divi-sions between elected officials and administrators, that is, a juridical per-spective. Many studies since the 1950s found that the roles and powers ofcity managers had increased (Adrian 1958; Morgan and Kirkpatrick 1972;Reynolds 1965; Saltzstein 1974; Stillman 1974).

In the middle of 1980s, Svara (1985) mapped four models of the council-manager system (i.e., political-administrative relations) at the locallevel on the basis of extensive literature review: a policy-administrationdichotomy, mixture in policy, mixture in administration, and co-equals inpolicy. He observed, though, that none of these captured reality entirely.

TABLE 2Roles of Administrators in Terms of Political Tolerance and ProgrammaticCommitment (Gregory 1991, 326)

ProgrammaticCommitment

Tolerance of Politics

High Low

High (Pro-active) Political bureaucrats(IV2a, IV.2b)

Technocrats (II, IV2a)

Low (Reactive) Traditional bureaucrats(IV.1, III)

Classical bureaucrats(I, II, III)

Note: Close comparison of the original table in Gregory (1991, 326) and the accompanyingtext (326–327) shows that the text is more nuanced than the table. We have adapted the tablein the spirit of the text.


Later Svara (1998) observed that a strict separation of the two spheres wasunproductive and that elected officials and administrators complementedeach other. Politicians should show respect for the administrator’s com-petence and trust their commitment to accountability and responsiveness(Svara 2001, 179). APR was not referenced in these articles. But, in anextensive empirical and comparative study of political-administrativerelations at the top in local government, APR is referenced several timesbut then to point to similarities and differences in characteristics of andinteractions between federal or national and local government electedofficeholders and civil servants (Mouritzen and Svara 2002).

Mouritzen and Svara (2002) distinguish four types of administratorroles (Table 3). They insist that the case of separate roles is closest to APR’sImage II and that the case of overlapping roles is closest to Image III. Theyacknowledge the possibility of closer interdependency at the local levelbut refer to APR and others to argue that “complementarity in relation-ships is a general phenomenon at the apex of all governments” (287). Sincethen several articles concerning local government elites have been pub-lished (Dunn and Legge 2002; French and Folz 2004, on the United States;Hansen and Ejersbo 2002, on Denmark; Jacobsen 2005, 2006a, 2006b, onNorway). More study of local civil service systems at large is necessary (cf.Kuhlmann and Bogumil 2007).

Even though it is found that the “gap” between politicians and bureau-crats has been widening since the early 1980s, in particular in the UnitedStates (Aberbach and Rockman 1997, 347–348), Image IV is nonetheless apowerful image since it forces people to consider the desired nature ofinteraction between the two groups of public sector actors. We will discussthe features of Image IV in more detail next.

Intriguing Problems of the APR Study

While APR has greatly advanced and inspired empirical research intopolitical-administrative relations, the theoretical meaning of their work

TABLE 3Models of Political-Administrative Relations Concerning HierarchicalRelations and Relative Distinctness of Officeholders (Mouritzen and Svara2002, 26–42)

Separationof Roles

Supremacy of Political Norms

High Low

High Separation from politicalinvolvement but not administrativeinvolvement in policy

Autonomous administrator

Low Responsive administrators Overlapping roles


has much less been scrutinized. In this section we will focus on threeintriguing problems of the APR study.15 The first problem concerns themoment that the theoretical model of four images was constructed. Thecontent of the images is the second problem. The third is by far the mostintriguing: the coherence and consistency of the four images’ framework.

The first problem concerns the question when, exactly, the authorsdeveloped their four images and their content. APR observed that theWeberian distinction between the world of political officeholders and topbureaucrats was supported by their data and fitting well with their ImageII (APR 1981, 84, 89). But they also observed the likelihood that bothgroups of actors were involved in policymaking and thus in politicalactivity (85). They wrote: “Bureaucrats are more likely to focus on broker-ing than legislators . . . because they are more deeply involved with theconcrete details of policy decisions than are the legislative politicians”(90). And then they expressed that such a finding was “one of [their] moststriking and unexpected findings” (91, emphasis added; but see Aberbachand Rockman 1977). If unexpected, the question is legitimate to askwhether the framework of four images was developed prior to the inter-views or an outcome of them. The language throughout APR suggests thelatter. If that is the case, one could argue that it should not have beenpresented as a theory framing the interpretation of the study’s findingsbut as an important theoretical contribution coming out of empiricalwork. Subsequent authors seem to treat the images as a result (rather thana start) that can be tested in other times and contexts (especially Images II,III, and IV).

As far as the content of the four images is concerned, they include botha normative and juridical and an empirical and sociological perspective.In fact, APR’s images conflate a juridical interpretation of the politics-administration interaction with a more sociological understanding(Raadschelders and Van der Meer 1998, 32). The normative-juridical per-spective is represented in Image I, while Images II, III, and IV concerndescriptive-empirical dimensions. The same mixture of perspectives isnoticeable in Peters’ (1985) five types of interaction between officeholdersat the summit. Peters’ formal-legal model compares well to APR’s ImageI, while the middle three models (i.e., village life, functional village life,and adversarial) are based on a more sociological perspective (cf. ImagesII, III, and IV). Peters’ last type, the administrative state, assumes almostcomplete dominance of administrators (and implies absence of politicalofficeholders) and thus falls entirely outside APR’s four images. In their1988 article in Governance, Aberbach and Rockman observed that the purehybrid of Image IV is a “marriage between technical skill and proximity topolitical power” (10). Hence, Image IV is about overlapping roles of poli-ticians and (we assume) political appointees on the one hand and topbureaucrats on the other. If that is so, then there must be an Image V wherepoliticians are negligible or even absent, something that Peters’ type of the“administrative state” considers at least theoretically possible.


The second problem is what the content of Image IV represents. Theimage can be defined as either a complete intertwinement of electedofficeholders and civil servants at one moment in time or, as various pas-sages seem to suggest, a reference to top officials who move in their careerfrom administrative or private sector positions to political positions (andsometimes back again).16 For instance, APR mention the phenomenon ofpantouflage in France and Japan as well as the advance of “technocraticallytrained” individuals into political office. They mention Giscard d’Estaingand Raymond Barre in France, Helmut Schmidt in Germany, and JimmyCarter in the United States as examples (APR 1981, 17, 85). Next to indi-vidual career patterns, Image IV can also be seen as a new type of eliteconvergence and this seems to be the most often used interpretation ofImage IV. Aberbach and Rockman clarified Image IV as an executivecreature based on “motivational construct,” which combines the controlover bureaucracy by the political leadership with the bureaucratic sympa-thetic attitudes toward political decision (1988, 9–10).

Could it be that modeling of reality is very much dependent uponZeitgeist? As we mentioned above, after the Second World War, authorsnoted that the dichotomy was no reflection of reality and even an aberra-tion. Indeed, empirical research showed more shades of gray than could beconceived of through the juridical lens of the prewar decades. Could it bethat the lens through which we look at political-administrative relations haschanged while reality has not? The dominant perspective before the SecondWorld War, that of a dichotomy, is today the submerged perspective simplybecause there is so much empirical research testifying to degrees of overlap.

We suggest that the framework of four images is inconsistent, becauseit lumps two rather different (normative and juridical as well as sociologi-cal) perspectives together. First, the images represent a development overtime. APR suggested that political-administrative relations evolved overtime from Image I to II and even III. Most recent developments, they held,appeared to point toward an Image IV (APR 1981, 238–239). Page pouncedthat such an observation could not be made on the basis of “single-pointdata” and that historical analysis was needed (Page 1985, 134; 1995, 136).Indeed, the dispersed historical analyses show that administrators andpoliticians have been pretty much intertwined at the top in the course ofthe nineteenth and twentieth centuries because they belonged to the samesocial-economic-cultural elite (Raadschelders and Van der Meer 1998).What is more, there are clear cases where administrators have had sub-stantial, even decisive, influence over policy (Carpenter 2001; Van derMeer and Raadschelders 2008). But how often this occurred and whetherthere was variation between countries in this regard is unclear for lack ofdocumentation (see next section). There is another reason why APR’ssuggestion of an evolutionary model is puzzling. They indicate thatImages I and II are more characteristic of the lower levels in the hierarchy,while Images III and IV are more representative of the top. If that is so,however, two questions emerge:


1. Do the images represent an evolutionary framework that only per-tains to the higher-level officials?

2. Do the images adequately capture different levels of responsibility ingovernment?

The third problem with the four images is that the framework containselements of both a typology and a taxonomy: Two images are elements ofa typology, while two others are elements of taxonomy. A typologydefines theoretical concepts with dimensions based on a notion of idealtype. It serves as a useful heuristic for comparison (chapeau Weber). At thesame time, though, boundaries between identified categories are often notvery clear. A taxonomy, instead, classifies and measures characteristics onthe basis of empirical observations. Taxonomies are mostly associated withthe natural sciences, while typologies thrive in political science and publicadministration (Smith 2002). We suggest that APR’s Images I and IV areelements of a typology. Image I has been part of the literature since at leastBonnin’s 1812 study,17 while Image IV originated with APR. We state thatImages I and IV are ideal types. Images II and III are more elements of ataxonomy, since they are based on carefully documented interviews andsurveys about characteristics and behaviors of top-level public officials.

One can quibble over the shortcomings in theory and methodology ofthe APR study, but the authors were very clear about their intention: theimages were not to be regarded as theory but as “searchlights” (i.e., quitelike the hermeneutic function of an ideal type), and their methodologywas not a quantitative-statistical and rigorous test of variables (APR 1981,20). The lack of clarity about the survey instrument is an issue not men-tioned by APR. However, the critiques do not diminish the most impor-tant fact about the APR study: there is little doubt that it prompted avigorous study about characteristics and behaviors of elected officials andtop civil servants and interactions between the two groups. More specifi-cally, they pulled the research done hitherto in individual countries (e.g.,Van Braam 1957, on the Netherlands) into a comparative perspective. Wesuspect that APR’s impact will continue both directly, in the replication,updating, and even collection of data (as in the case of local government),and indirectly, in studies probing day-to-day activities of top-, middle- andlower-level administrators.

Emerging Avenues of Research

We conclude this article with suggestions for four avenues of furtherresearch. First, much more work also needs to be done on the role andinfluence of junior, mid-level civil servants at both the federal or nationaland subnational levels. To be sure, APR did mention that officials of lowerrank (but, still quite senior) had extensive contact with members of Par-liament, citizens, clientele group representatives, and departmental peers


(APR 1981, 226). Indeed, one of the reviewers noticed that this observationwas very intriguing but had been left unexplored (Lehman 1984, 1450).The studies by Page and Jenkins (2005) and Page (2007) may become asimportant a start to this line of inquiry as APR was to comparative char-acteristics of politicians and bureaucrats and political-administrative rela-tions. We expect that in-depth mapping of the role of junior, mid-levelcivil servants will significantly increase the understanding of the role ofspecialists in policymaking.

A second line of profitable research is the administrator biography, a“method” only recently coming in vogue and—as far as we can tell—especially in the United Kingdom (e.g., Denman 2002; Fry 2000; Roper 2001;Theakston 1997), Canada (e.g., Granatstein 1981), and the United States(e.g., Riccucci 1995; Stillman 1998). While there are plenty biographies ofpolitical officeholders, the dearth of biographies of top civil service isperhaps less striking than it seems. After all, according to the formal-legaljuridical model, they play a service role and thus de-emphasize theirleadership. Civil servants may not be inclined to trumpet their own impor-tance and involvement in policymaking. Yet, as limited administrativebiographies are in numbers, those that are available clearly show howimportant civil servants have become to the functioning of government andits services at large. Riccucci (1995, 4–12) believes that the biographicalprofile allows scholars to see how senior civil servants can exercise entre-preneurialism without alienating the elected officeholders and their politi-cal environment, while Rhodes and Weller (2001, 7–8) observe that“biography enables us to explore how an institution is created, sustained,and modified through the beliefs and actions of individuals.”

The third promising line of emerging research, related to biography, isan ethnographic (also interpretative and narrative) account based uponthe study of writings, lectures, interview transcripts, and actions of civilservants and elected officeholders (Rhodes 2005, 5–6). Both a biographicand an ethnographic approach register and generate qualitative data aboutthe daily activities of officeholders, exploring the beliefs and desiresthat—at least partially—influence policy and decision making (Bevir,Rhodes, and Weller 2003, 3–4). We do not think that these emergingavenues of research take us farther away from the intent of the APR study.Combined, quantitative, and qualitative approaches provide a much richerunderstanding of the interplay between social, economic, and educationalcharacteristics of officeholders and their role fulfillment in the interactionwith one another. Perhaps the biographic and ethnographic approachesprovide a better understanding of the beliefs of individual acts that arepartly influenced by institutional history.

Finally, on an altogether different note, it is important that any researchinto theories about the politics-administration dichotomy and investiga-tions of political-administrative relations is embedded in the intellectualdebate about this since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.Our attempt in the first section is admittedly brief, befitting a review


article. We believe that the historical perspective is necessary to compre-hend the development of political-administrative relations over time andexplicitly include analysis of the changes of lenses or perspectives throughwhich contemporaries judged their own environment. A good theory of(organizational) political-administrative relations in reality requires suchhistorical analysis.

APR was instrumental in developing an empirical approach to thistopic and this continues to inspire scholars. They also strengthened asociological perspective, but we should not forget the normative and thejuridical or legalist perspectives that, in practice, are as relevant at the topas actual organizational behavior.

Notes

1. Dogan’s (1975) study contains contributions from various authors (includ-ing a reprinted article by Putnam and a chapter by Eldersveld, Hubée-Boonzaaijer, and Kooiman, both on the APR project) and is thus not consid-ered a (co-)authored book-length manuscript.

2. Hegel used the term, “universal,” in a broad way using terms like subject,object, abstract, individual, particular, etc. For a reference, see Knapp (1986).

3. In this article we cited from Weber’s (1968) essay “Parliament and Govern-ment in a Reconstructed Germany: A Contribution of the Political Critiqueof Officialdom and Party Politics,” originally published in 1918, reprinted inRoth and Wittich (1968, Appendix II in Volume 2). This piece addresses thesame concerns as Weber’s more often quoted “Politics as a Vocation,” whichwas originally published in 1919. See a reprint of the latter in Hans H. Gerthand C. Wright Mills, eds., 1946. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. NewYork: Oxford University Press, 77–128.

4. For a reference of the sample and data collection, see chapter 2 of APR’sbook.

5. The interviews with French officials in fact took place in the fall of 1969 (APR1981, 39).

6. For a reference, see APR (1981, viii–xi, 299–300).7. Reviewers on the APR study generally appreciated the richness of the data

on beliefs and attitudes of top officeholders and were somewhat critical ofthe lack of attention for the link between national characteristics of office-holders (as dependent variable) and their institutional environment (theindependent variable) and the poor information about the data collection(Edinger 1982; Hodgetts 1983; Issac 1983; Legg 1983; Lehman 1984; Rains1983; Sloan 1983). Hodgetts 1983 and Lehman 1984 specifically discussed thepossible shift toward Image IV, mentioning trends in that direction inCanada and Germany as reported in APR.

8. APR did not have data on the interaction among elites in France.9. Belgium was not surveyed in APR’s (1981) research.

10. In Germany, law as the best career preparation was not as prevalent as before,whereas social sciences like economics were emerging (Derlien 1988, 72;2003). Similarly in Sweden, law for civil service training gradually decreased(from 61% in 1917 to 29 % in 1971 and 21% in 1990); instead, social science(15%), economics (15%), and engineering (21%) increased in 1990 (Ehn et al.2003, 437). In Belgium, in 1989–1990, law is not as dominant a background(32%). Civil servants are also reported to have degrees in engineering (21%),social science (21%), and economics (14%) (Dierickx 2003, 345, fn. 9).


11. For the details of the impact of NPM on the political-administrative rela-tions, see Aberbach (2003) on the United States, Gregory (1991) on Australiaand New Zealand, Bulmer (1988) and Wilson and Barker (2003) on theUnited Kingdom, Ehn et al. (2003) on Sweden, Rouban (2007) on Europeanstates, and Campbell (2007) and Halligan (2007) on Anglo-American states.

12. Dierickx (2003) and Ehn et al. (2003) interviewed top bureaucrats andmembers of Parliament; Aberbach (2003) and Derlien (1988) compared civilservants with political appointees including (in the German case) parliamen-tary secretaries; Bulmer (1988) and Wilson and Barker (2003) focused onWhitehall; Bourgault and Dion (1989) studied Canada’s deputy ministers,the country’s top bureaucrats; and Gregory (1991) compared top bureaucratsof Australia and New Zealand.

13. Hacek’s article presents not only a comparison between Slovenia and thecountries in the APR study but also the differences in social and educationalbackgrounds of administrative and political elites between national andlocal levels.

14. As far as the supranational level is concerned, Page (1997, 138) found that thesocial, economic, and educational characteristics of senior-level officials inthe European Union were comparable to what APR had collected more thantwo decades earlier. For instance, the average age of top EU officials in theearly 1990s was close to APR’s average age for the senior civil servant in theearly 1970s, which was 53 (Page 1997, 70–73).

15. Beside the three intriguing problems, Weber’s (1981, 5) ideal type of bureau-cracy is somewhat ambiguously used in APR’s book. They write: “Weberhimself thought that what we have termed Image I was the ideal relationshipbetween politicians and administrators, but he recognized that it was animprobable one” (emphasis added). This is a puzzling observation sinceWeber was very clear about the use of ideal types as an analytical instrumentfor studying reality (Weber 1985, 146–214). It is never an ideal to strive for.Various authors had observed this misunderstanding of the nature of anideal type in the 1960s (Diamant 1962, 62–65; Lipset 1963, 58–59; Mayntz1965; Mouzelis 1967, 43–46), and what is puzzling is that APR could haveknown this since they referenced Diamant in their first chapter. In fact, APRconsciously chose to speak of “images” rather than models. The concept of“model” implies a hypothetical and theoretical frame, while “image” mayinclude both normative and empirical conceptions. To them the images are“searchlights for illuminating empirical patterns in [the] data” (20). Also,they used the Gerth and Mills translation of Weber’s “Politics as a Vocation,”which is hardly sufficient considering that Weber wrote so much more aboutbureaucracy and politics in his monumental Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Seethe full translation by Roth and Wittich (1968). How Weber is treated in theliterature is representative of a shortcoming in various individual studies.Ultimately, though, the stereotypical treatment of Weber and the misunder-standing of his methodology start with the cursory treatment of his schol-arship in textbooks.

16. For a reference, see Bezes and Lodge (2007).17. Thus is quite a bit earlier than Vivien’s (1844) study of which Mouritzen and

Svara (2002, 3) claim that it introduced the dichotomy. Also see Rutgers(2004, 66–67, 152).

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