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LANGUAGE-GAMES AND FORMS OF LIFE UNCONFUSED
JOHN H. WHITPAKER
Wit tgens te in f e a r e d t h a t h e would sow only j a r g o n i n the f i e l d of philosophy, and to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t h i s f e a r s have come t r u e , H e d i d sow some ja rgon , which aiei.g w i t h t h e r e l a t e d e x p r e s s i o n "form o f l i f e , " h a s passed i n t o common p h i l o s o p h i c a l usage t r a i l i n g confusion and misunderstanding. No one seems t o know j u s t what a language-game o r a form of l i f e is, o r how they are r e l a t e d . t h e s e ques t ions , since m t t g e n s t e i n ' s own usage appears t o b e inexac t .
Perhaps t h e b e s t example of t h i s is t h e term "language-game,"
And t h e r e seems t o b e no s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d way t o pursue
Y e t i n contex t one can see why W i t t g e n s t e i n invented t h e language-game analogy and why he a p p r o p r i a t e d the n o t i o n of a form of l i f e . It is o n l y o u t of c o n t e x t , as ja rgon , t h a t t h e s e terms begin t o look so i l l - d e f i n e d . For once w e lose s i g h t o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r uses t o which W i t t g e n s t e i n p u t them, t h e s e tenns take on a t h e o r e t i c a l a s p e c t which they never o r i g i n a l l y possessed , Wft tgens te in must have had an o v e r r i d i n g theory of language, w e t h i n k ; and so we p r e s s h i s terminology i n t o t h a t service. This has gone on f o r so long now t h a t one can add terms l i k e "language-gane" or "form of l i f e " t o h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l vocabulary simply by a s s o c i a t i r g them w i t h a crude b u t popular theory of language-a theory which Wit tgens te in never h e l d , And t h i s i n t u r n makes i t easy t o c r i t i c i z e W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s "philosophy" by apply ing t h i s popular ized view of language t o problem c o n t e x t s which c l e a r l y reveal its inadequacy, To see what I mean, l e t us sl'art w i t h t h e theory i t s e l f .,
I
Kai Nielsen h a s a p t l y des r i b e d t h i s s i m p l i f i e d view of language as a lltxnmpartmentalized*l conception,' Every term i n our language,, on t h i s view, g e t s i t s meaning from a surrounding compartment of human a c t i v i t y i n which i t a c q u i r e s i t s r o l e as an ins t rument of communication. S ince Wit tgens te in in t roduced t h e term "language-came" t o remind us t h a t " the speaking of lan- guage is p a r t of an a c t i v i t y " (PI 2 3 > , 2 and s i n c e he used t h i s term t o d f f f e r e n t i a t e t h e r o l e s of words i n v a r i o u s d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t s of a c t i v i t y , i t seems reasonable t o suppose t h a t he had some such view of language i n mind, Apparently h e thought of language as a composite of many independent u n i t s o f speech-ac t fvf ty , and he e v i d e n t l y used t h e term "language-game" t o r e f e r t o t h e s e compartments,
Presumably, w e can say t h e same of forms of l i f e , They t o o s e e m t o
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JOHN H, WHITTAKER
b e compartments i n which t h e u s e of language is condi t ioned by underlying p a t t e r n s of common a c t i v i t y . e s p e c i a l l y t h e way i n which he a p p l i e s h i s language i n judgments--we m u s t s h a r e some common f o o t i n g i n our own thought and p r a c t i c e . Without t h i s under ly ing agreement i n o u r p r a c t i c e , norms of good judgment could never b e e s t a b l i s h e d , arguments could never be grounded, and r a t i o n a l appea ls could never r e g i s t e r as such. Thus, j u s t as t h e meaning of o u r words depends on t h e i r convent iona l r o l e s i n language-games, t h e f o r c e f u l n e s s of our judgments depends on an underlying agreement i n t h e way we t h i n k and live--a kind of agreement which W i t t g e n s t e i n descr ibed as an agreement i n form of l i f e ,
For t o understand another p e r s o n q s discourse--
(PI 240-42)
This , a t least , seems t o b e t h e commonly accepted view, It can be summed up i n t h e i d e a t h a t t h e r e can be no uncondi t ioned--foe, , no non- compartmental ized--cr i ter ia of sense , Every such c r i t e r i o n , whether it governs good judgment or proper usage, h o l d s sway only i n its own d i s t i n c t compartment of d i scourse . Thus, when disagreement arises between speakers whose n o t i o n s of s e n s e are drawn from d i f f e r e n t compartments, t h e s e d is - p u t a n t s can o n l y r e h e a r s e t h e i r own s t a n d a r d s of meaning and r a t i o n a l i t y , S ince n e i t h e r s h a r e s t h e o t h e r ’ s language-games or form of l i f e , they are bound t o t a l k p a s t one a n o t h e r wi thout any mutual understanding. And s i n c e n e i t h e r can appea l t o any independent , uncondi t ioned, c r i t e r i o n of s e n s e p such disagreement must remain o b j e c t i v e l y i n s o l u b l e ,
I f , f o r example, religious language and p r a c t i c e makes up a series of language-games o r a form of l i f e , then t h o s e who abandon t h e i r s e c u l a r ways f o r a l i f e o f f a i t h cannot p o s s i b l y hope t o j u s t i f y t h e i r new b e l i e f s on any independent grounds. r a t i o n a l i z e d from w i t h i n a r e l i g i o u s form of l i f e , where t h e r e l e v a n t p a t t e r n of r e l i g i o u s judgment is t i e d t o t h e common p r a c t i c e of b e l i e v e r s i n normalizing t h e i r own canons of sense , From a t h e o l o g i c a l p o i n t of view t h i s k ind of l o g i c a l autonomy may seem appeal ing , and from a phi losophfca l p o i n t of view i t might n o t b e so hard t o accept , were it not f o r a f u r t h e r consequence of t h i s compartmental view, The t r o u b l e is t h a t c r i t e r i a of meaning as w e l l as r a t f o n a l f t y belong t o forms of l i f e , o r t o t h e language- games a s s o c i a t e d w i t h them; and t h e r e f o r e , the p r o s p e c t i v e convert cannot even understand what he is expected t o b e l i e v e , n o t u n t i l he is a f a m i l i a r p a r t i c i p a n t i n t h e very As long as h e s t a n d s o u t s i d e t h e circle of f a i t h , a l l t h o s e p e c u l i a r l y r e l i g i o u s e x p r e s s i o n s which are condi t ioned by t h e surrounding r e l i g i o u s l i f e w i l l remain opaque t o him, of r e l i g i o u s p r a c t i c e and b e l i e f , hoping t o land i n something t h a t makes s e n s e from t h e o t h e r s i d e .
For t h e c r u c i a l b e l i e f s h e r e can only be
ac t iv i t ies which t y p i f y t h e f a i t h f u l ,
A l l h e can do is t o l e a p i n t o t h e myster ious darkness
I n s h o r t , any d i v i s i o n of language i n t o wholly s e p a r a t e and l o g i c a l l y autonomous compartments of d i s c o u r s e l e a d s n o t only t o r e l a t i v i s m but t o f lde ism, And i f Wit tgensteinOs use of t h e language-game analogy and t h e concept of a form of l i f e r e p r e s e n t s such a d i v i s i o n , then t h e s e drawbacks
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LANGUAGE-GAMES AND FORMS OF LIFE UNCONFUSED
must b e l a i d a g a i n s t h i s account. t h e deba tes over Wi t tgens te in ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o philosophy, p a r t i c u l a r l y t o t h e philosophy of r e l i g i o n , have lodged on t h f s p o i n t , t o q u i e t t h e s e susp ic ions , of coursec But 87 t of t h e s e a t tempts have involved only v a r i a t i o n s on t h e theme of compartmenta t a t i o n , whereas t h e b e t t e r course i s t o avoid i t a l t o g e t h e r .
Ever s i n c e Nielsen r a i s e d t h e s e s u s p i c i o n s ,
There have been a t tempts
Perhaps t h e s i m p l e s t v a r i a t i o n on t h e compar r1ent.i' theme is t o c o n s t r w language-games as s u b u n i t s w i t h i n overarching form; c' I L ~ J , $ 3 tri?t tL= cr i te r ia which apply throughout formla of l i f e mig'o- I J ~ se? L O reso lve v3. t I
p a r o c h i a l d i s p u t e s involv ing language-gamzs. One -i igi , t ic izntifv 3 form or l i f e , i n o t h e r words, wi th a c u l t u r e , a v a s t a r r a y of h-aa: a c t i v i t y per ; 2 L - '
by c e r t a i n themat ic p a t t e r n s of thought. One would then c h a r a c t e r i z e forms of l i f e j u s t as w e do cul tures--as s c i e n t i f i c o r p r e - s c i e n t i f i c , western or as ia t ic , medieval o r modern, and so on, ThiF i n f a c t , seems t o have been t h e view popular ized (perhaps u n i n t e n t i o n a l 1 by P e t e r Winch. "Criteria of l o g i c , " h e says , "are only i n t e l l i g i b l e i r t h e contex t of ways of l i v i n g o r modes [forms?] of s o c i a l l i f e as S U C ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i n our s c f e n t i f f c c u l t u r e we use empir ica l observa t ion and evidence t o test our judgments and i n c r e a s e our knowledge. t h e i r judgments t o e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t cri teria; they consul t o r a c l e s and conducr r i t u a l s , Thus, i f an Azande is asked t o j u s t i f y h i s b e l i e f s o r behavior , he w i l l appea l t o t h e overarching system of b e l i e f s (e ,g , , t h e p r i n c i p l e s of w i t c h p r a f t ) which govern a l l important Azande d e l i b e r a t i o n s . To us, of course, t h e s e appea ls seem completely i r r a t i o n a l ; bu t f o r t h e Azande o u r manner of judgment seems e q u a l l y s t r a n g e and u n i n t e l l i g i b l e ,
But I n Azande c u l t u r e , t o t a k e Winch's example, people submit
So on t h i s account of t h e matter, we w( I d n o t come t o the l i m i t s of p o s s i b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n u n t i l we came t o fund; e n t a l l y divisivce c u l t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s . Rut w e would s t i l l a r r i v e a t t h e s e l i m i t s ; t h e zompartrnents would simply be much l a r g e r than anything which Wft tgenstein envis ioned as a language-game. Thus, t h e t r o u b l e wi th t h f s refinement of t i e compartmental theory is t h a t i t merely pushes t h e t h r e a t of r e l a t i v i s m back t o the l e v e l of la rge-sca le cultiiral disagreements , For as long as t h e s t a n d a r d s by which w e d i s t i n g u i s h t h e r a t i o n a l from t h e i r r a t i o n a l , t h e r e a l from t h e unrea l , and t h e t r u e from t h e f a l s e are confined t o compartments of human d iscourse , i t doesn ' t seem t o matter The consequences s t i l l seem r e l a t i v i s t i c ,
ow l a r g e t h e compartments areo r: P a t r i c k Sherry, t h e r e f o r e , e x p l i c i t l y j e c t s such la rge-sca le
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of forms of l i f e , Rather thE encompassing anything so complex as a c u l t u r e , he t h i n k s t h a t t h e tern1 denotes something on a smaller scale; namely, a s i n g l e type of human behavior such a13 hoping, o r measuring, o r p i t y i n g O 6 being found i n every c u l t u r e ; and u n l i k e t h e v a r i a b l e , i d i o s y n c r a t i c , a c t i v i t i e s which make up p a r t i c u l a r language-games, t h e s e activities l i e beyond being j u s t i f i e d o r u n j u s t i f i e d (OC 358-59), They l i e beyond j u s t i f i c a t i o n because they are so n a t u r a l , so elementary, and so i n v a r i a n t .
Such a c t i v i t i e s as t h e s e are human c o n s t a n t s ,
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JOHN H, IJHITTAKER
They need no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r no one q u e s t i o n s them, w i t h human l i f e i t s e l f .
They are simply g iven
The complex series of language-games i n t o which t h e s e common t h r e a d s of human l i f e are woven, however, do vary , Hence, even though i t would b e in- a p p r o p r i a t e t o demand j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r something l i k e hoping i n g e n e r a l , Sherry claims t h a t we can demand j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r p a r t i c u l a r hopes, such as t h e C h r i s t i a n ' s hope i n a f u t u r e r e s u r r e c t i o n . According t o him, t h e common phenomenon of human hope g i v e s us t h e means of " loca t ing" a p a r t i c u l a r language-game (e.g, , praying f o r t h e r e s u r r e c t i o n , d e s c r i b i n g i t , e t c , ) a g a i n s t t h e background of u n i v e r s a l human behavior , This kind of u n i v e r s a l behavior is a f a c t of o u r n a t u r a l h i s t o r y , and such f a c t s c o n d i t i o n every language-game (PI p. 230), They g i v e us a p o i n t of comparison by which w e can approach d i v e r s e language-games, thereby h e l p i n g us t o understand and a p p r e c i a t e t h e s e a l i e n p r a c t i c e s by r e l a t i n g them t o something f a m i l i a r and i r r e p r o a c h a b l e , n o t completely autonomous b u t are governed by t h e c o n s t a n t themes of human l i f e which g i v e rise t o them, then w e can banish a l l r e l a t i v i s t i c s u s p i c i o n s , We w i l l have found something t h a t c u t s a c r o s s l i n g u i s t i c compartments i n a way which e n a b l e s us t o e l i m i n a t e t h e s e n s e of u l t i m a t e a r b i t r a r i n e s s t h a t has t h u s f a r hovered over language-games and forms of l i f e ,
When w e see t h a t t h e s e language-games are n e i t h e r a r b i t r a r y
A l l t h i s is f i n e i f one is worr ied only about s o f t e n i n g v a r i o u s claims about c u l t u r a l d i v e r s i t y and promoting mutual understanding. But i f one is worried about t r u t h claims and t h e i r j u s t i f i c a t i o n , then t h i s s o f t e n e d vers ion of t h e compartmental theory o f f e r s no h e l p a t a l l , For t h e n a t u r a l f a c t s , o r forms of l i f e , which c o n d i t i o n our l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e s do n o t provide any logical grounds f o r our b e l i e f s , They f u r n i s h no c r i te r ia f o r a d j u d i c a t i n g t h e s e b e l i e f s as a s s e r t i o n s ; and t h e r e f o r e , they o f f e r no j u s t i f f c a t i o n for t h e c o g n i t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o r c o n s t i t u i t i v e b e l i e f s of a language-game, No common p a t t e r n s of hoping o r worshipping o r anyth ing of t h e s o r t prove t h a t God e x i s t s , f o r example, Admittedly, v a r i o u s f a c t s about t h e n a t u r a l h i s t o r y of human be ings might j u s t i f y c e r t a i n behavior, and i n t h i s sense they mfght make some a l i e n language-games more understandable , They mlght even excuse people f o r main ta in ing c e r t a i n b e l i e f s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a language-game, much as psychologfca l f a c t s are sometimes given as excuses f o r r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f , But t h e g e n e r a l f a c t s of o u r n a t u r a l h i s t o r y and t h e common p a t t e r n s i n our forms of l i f e w i l l s t f l l n o t j u s t i f y t h e b e l i e f s which a r e condi t ioned by t h i s background as truth c l a i m s , So I don ' t t h i n k t h a t Sherry 's account of language- games and forms of l i f e w i l l s a t i s f y t h e c r i t i c s , Universa l l o g i c a l s tandards are s t f l l wanting i n h i s v e r s i o n of t h e compartmental theory ,
I1
This whole d i s p u t e , however, is l a r g e l y a manufactured problem, Both cr i t ics and advocates h e r e assume t h a t Wi t tgens te in h e l d some v e r s i o n of t h e compartmental theory , and both have t r i e d t o f e r r e t t h i s theory o u t by de te r - mfning t h e i l l - d e f i n e d scope of language-games and forms of l i f e , Y e t i n f a c t
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LANGUAGE-GAMES AND FORMS OF LIFE UNCONFUSED
Wit tgens te in had no such theory, and t h e e f f o r t t o a s s i g n clea.cer boundaries t o language-games and f o m of l i f e is a waste of tfme, embraced anything l i k e a compartmental theory of language w a s .Ln t h e T r a c t a t u s , when he argued t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n a l language as a whole w a s bounded by d e f i n i t e l i m i t s of sense , f a c t u a l a s s e r t i o n and t h e domain of every th ing "higher" than matters of f a c t . Later, when he abandoned t h i s sweeping d i s t i n c t i o n , he d i d n q t simply mul t ip ly t h e number and v a r f e t y of s e p a r a t e compartments; he abandoned compartmentalized concept ions a l t o g e t h e r , might be t h e o r e t f c a l f y d i v i d e d i n t o mutua l l y e x c l u s i v e compartnents of d i s - c o u r s e ,
The only time he
But t h e r e he upheld only two compartments, t h e domain of
That is, h e s i m p l y gave up t h e i d e a t h a t language
Therefore , once we see t h a t t h e tenns OP "language-game" and "form of l i f e " have l i t t l e t o do with any r i g i d d i v i s i o n of language i n t o u n i t s , and noth ing whatever t o do wi th t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a compartmental theory, , we can see t h e s p e c t r e of r e l a t i v i s m which now hangs over V i t t g e n s t e i n ' s :.ater work f o r what i t is--a phantom, I won't s a y t h a t every phf losophica l problem about j u s t f f i c a t i o n and c r o s s - c u l t u r a l disagreements can be reso lved by shedding t h i s pseudo=Wfttgensteinian view of language, But t h e problem of g e t t i n g people back out of t h e conceptual compartments t o which they have been unduly con- f i n e d can s u r e l y b e so lved , For t h e only t h i n g t h a t p u t s them t h e r e i s confusion,
The source of t h i s confusion is t h e assumption t h a t t h e 1.ogical s t r u c t u r e of language--or what Wft tgens te in c a l l e d its "depth grammar"--can b e captured by a s y s t e m a t i c a n a l y s i s , This is one of t h e assunpt ions which Wit tgens te fn abandoned when h e gave up c o n s t r u c t f n g t h e o r i e s of language and of i t s hidden s t r u c t u r e (PI 90-92), Thus, he never s t a t e d o r followed any s i n g l e p r f n c i p l e of d i v i s i o n i n us ing t h e language-game analogy o r t h e not fon of a form of l i f e t o h i g h l i g h t d i f f e r e n c e s i n depth grarimar of o u r d iscourse , The d i s t i n c t i o n s which h e drew were always ad hoc , words, h e used t h e terms "language-game" and "form of l f f e " much as w e might use t h e terms " d i s t 2 i c t " and "region" t o d i s c u s s d i f f e r e n c e s t n American customs. J u s t as we might d i s t i n g u i s h urban from suburban d is - t r ic ts i n dea l ing with teenage d a t i n g , o r n o r t h e r n regfons frori southern reg ions i n d i s c u s s i n g e a t i n g h a b i t s , one might c o n t r a s t one language-game w i t h another to b r i n g o u t d i f f e r e n c e s f n use of c e r t a i n terms, and then might d i v i d e one form of l i f e from another t o h i g h l i g h t d i f f e r e n c e s i n v a r i o u s p a t t e r n s of judgment. a very unsystematic way, w i t h no s i n g l e p r i n c i p l e of d i v i s i o n he ing a p p l i e d and no clear connect ion made between t h e scope of o u r c a t e g o r i e s .
I n o t h e r
And i n both cases, a l l t h i s might go on i n
America, a f te r a l l , might b e subdivided i n innumerable d i f f e r e n t ways according t o innumerable p o i n t s of comparison, have t o make a l l t h e s e d i s t i n c t i o n s i n o r d e r to use words l i k e " d i s t r i c t " and "region" i n h e l p f u l ways, t h e re levant p o i n t s of c o n t r a s t are clear, C e r t a i n l y w e don ' t compart- menta l ize Amerkca i n any s t r o n g s e n s e when w e do t h i s , f o r w e k.now t h a t
But we obvfous1.y do not
Rather , w e can use them ad hoc EIS long as
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JOHN H, WHITTMER
other distinctions and other groupings will apply in other circumstances, The same holds true, I think, of language-games and forms of life: as long as we are clear about the point our distinctions are to serve; we can use these terms wfthout dividing our language into hard and fast compartments, That is, we can use them as Wittgenstein himself did--in a strictly ad hoc mannera
This is not to deny that Wittgenstein used the terms "language-game" and "form of life" to distinguish between one context of linguistic activity and another, He did, But in each case his distinctions represented only some of many possible comparisons and contrasts, Wittgenstein's point in comparing speaking to playing a game was simply to provide a more perspicuous view of our word-use, so that we might avoid conceptually confusing similarities in the surface grammar, or syntax, of our language, The point at which one might mark off one language-game from another depends on the confusions at hand and the subtlety of the distinctions needed to clear them up. In the face of a gross confusion between, say, naming things and counting them, one might portray the kind of activity involved in naming and the kind of activity involved in counting as different language-games, But then as the con- fusions at hand become more refined--when, for example, various types of referring terms are confused--one will have to came out finer language-games accordfng t5 another pattern of division,
So the question of whether or not one segment of our speech activity is to be included in the same language-game with another segment is not a question which one can answer out of detached reflection for the purpose of theorizing, How one parcels the language into different regions depends on the various respects in which similarities and differences need to be noted, and this in turn depends on the conceptual difficulties at hand, That is why Wittgenstein spoke of language-games as having a countless multiplicity (PI 231, not because he knew just what to count as a single language-game but because he had no systematic way of counting them in the first place,8
Moreover, the same could be said of "forms of life" (which Wittgenstein uses interchangeably with "language-game" in PI 23), Admittedly, his use of the term "farm of life" is less frequent and more obscure; but the compartments which he isolates by means of this term are no less artificial, Thus, there is no p5fnt in trying to clear up the notion of a form of life by assigning it a definite scope, One need no more relate the boundaries of forms of life ta those of language-games than one need construct a comparable theory for all regions and districts, Rather, one needs to see the reasons that led Wittgenstein to reach for such a term in the first place, Sometfmes he used the term t5 characterize the kind of ungrounded agreement which makes verbal communication possible by underwriting the governing conventions of a common language, As a condition for the possibility of verbal communication, such agreement has to come naturally, wfthout prior ratiocination--as something "given," so to speak, So he borrowed the term "form of life" from the con- text of natural history to describe this kind of unpremeditated agreement- (PI Q - 226; OC 475, 5 5 9 ) , On other occasions he used the term more specifically
45
LANGUAGE-GAMES AND FORMS OF LIFE UNCDNFUSED
t o d e s c r i b e t h a t agreement i n which o u r s t a n d a r d s of r e l i a b l e judgment are f i x e d by common p r a c t i c e (PI 240-42; OC 358-59), And on s t i l l o t h e r occas ions he used i t t o s a y t h a t language i n g e n e r a l , bu t p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e language of something l i k e hope o r r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f , assumes i t s p l a c e i n a l i f e which i s formed, o r formable, i n c e r t a i n p e c u l i a r l y human ways (P I 19, p. 174; LC p. 51-58), A t every one of t h e s e p o i n t s , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g one form of l i f e from another is provided f o r ; b u t t h e breadth of such d is - t i n c t i o n s w i l l s t i l l depend on ad hoc c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,
For example, i f one should f a l l i n t o d i f f i c u l t y by t r y i n g t o cons t rue t h e r e l i g i o u s d o c t r i n e of d i v i n e c r e a t i o n as a s c i e n t i f i c hypothes is , w e might s a y t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e of d i v i n e c r e a t i o n belongs t o a d i f f e r e n t form of l i f e , a form of l i f e in which i t p l a y s a r o l e q u i t e u n l i k e t h a t of a s c i e n t i f i c hypothesis . Such a b e l i e f comes much c l o s e r t o an a x i o m a t i c convic t ion about t h e purposiveness of a l l t h a t is; and t h i s might b e much easier t o see once w e recognize t h e p e c u l i a r way i n which t h i s d o c t r i n e informs, o r r e g u l a t e s , t h e thought - l i fe of t h o s e who b e l i e v e i n it, So one might b r i n g i n t o prominence t h e d i s t i n c t i v e l o g i c a l s t a t u s of t h i s b e l i e f by d e s c r i b i n g i ts s e t t i n g i n a c e r t a i n form of l i f e , Ilere, however, one might use f a i r l y broad s t r o k e s , so t o speak, t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e p a t t e r n of a c t i v i t y which revolves around judgments of f a c t from t h a t which revolves around judgments of cosmic purpose, whereas i n o t h e r cases one would have t o draw much f i n e r d i s t i n c t i o n s . I f , f o r example, one were concerned t o avoid c o n f l a t i n g t h e d o c t r i n e of p r e d e s t i n a t i o n and t h e d o c t r i n e of u n i v e r s a l s a l v a t i o n , one might t r a c e more exac t ing d i f f e r e n c e s between fxms of l i f e , a l l of which are t h e same i n being r e l i g i o u s but d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e i n o t h e r r e s p e c t s , O r , t o go t o t h e o t h e r extreme, one might use t h e term "form of l i f e " t o make r e a l l y broad d i s t i n c t i o n s , such as t h a t between t h e form of l i f e of W i t t g e n s t e i n v s ( h y p o t h e t i c a l ) t a l k i n g l i o n and t h a t of human be ings , who are so f a r removed from t h e l i o n i n t h e i r speech a c t i v i t y as t o be unable t o understand him (PI p . 223) , I n any case, t h e sco3e of what w e call "forms of l i f e " w i l l vary according t o t h e d i s c o u r s e i.1 ques t ion and t h e needs a t hand,
I n sump Wit tgens te in ' s i n t e r p r e t e r s go wrong from t h e very start i n th inking t h a t he intended t o compartmentalize language according t o a s i n g l e p r i n c i p l e of d i v i s i o n , For b e f o r e one language-game o r one fo.em of l i f e can b e compared with another , w e have t o know i n what r e s p e c t s t h e s e com- p a r i s o n s are t o be made, Di f fe rences of one k ind another in the use of our language can always be poin ted out ; bu t t o g i v e t h e s e d is t : lnc t ions any s i g n i f i c a n c e , we have t o t i e our i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s and c o n t r a s t s t o some governing p o i n t s of comparison, And t h e s e can vary, The terms "same" and " d i f f e r e n t , " a f t e r a l l , are r e l a t i v e terms, I n t h i s r e s p e c t they are l i k e t h e terms "simple" and "complex," which as Wft tgens te in himself confessed, had once l e d him down a garden p a t h of theory , a complex phenomenon, h e thought t h a t i t must be capable of analysis-- indeed, t h a t i t muse b e cons t ruc ted o u t of a b s o l u t e l y s imple u n i t s o r s i g n s T r a c t a t u s 3,23, 3,25, 3,261, But by t h e t i m e he wrote t h e P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s
Since language i s obviously
46
JOHN H, WHITTAKER
he r ea l f zed t h a t t h e attempt t o analyze composite th fngs such a s language i n t o abso lu te sfmples was impossible, f o r t ha t . X," where "x" r ep resen t s t h e need f o r some unspecified poin t of re ference , t h i s po in t of re ference needn't be invariant t o g ive such d i s t i n c t i o n s t h e i r senseo language ou t o f abso lu t e simples. by t r y i n g t o r econs t ruc t language as a whole out of abso lu t e ly sfmple language- games o r f o T s of l i f e , i l l umina te t h e grammar of troublesome concepts, never expectfng t o have them o s s f f f e d i n a theory of l i n g u i s t i c compartments.
The simple/complex d i s t i n c t i o n was too v a r i a b l e "Sfmple," as one might say , always means "simple with respec t t o
But
So Wittgenstefn gave up h i s earlier hope of recons t ruc t ing p ropos i t i ona l And having done t h a t , he d i d n q t begin anew
He simply kept these terms f n readiness t o he lp
And where t h e r e is no compartmentalizing, t h e r e is no t h r e a t of con- ceptua l relativism, from the impos i t ion of premature r e s t r a i n t s on t h e demand f o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n , J u s t i f i c a t i o n obviously has its l i m f t s , f o r we cannot go on ad fnffnftum i n adducfng s t e a d f l y more s o l i d grounds f o r our convic t ions , Nor can we take a given r a t i o n a l s tandard , such as a p r i n c i p l e of moral judgment, and use i t t o frame j u s t i f f c a t o r y appeals wherever reasons are needed f o r b e l f e f , e , g , , by demanding moral grounds f o r holding a s c i e n t i f i c theory o r f o r making a h i s t o r i c a l p red ic t ion , But a l l want t o avoid c u t t i n g c r f t f c i s m and r a t i o c i n a t i o n s h o r t where i t is s t i l l possfb le and appropr ia te . And Wit teens te in ' s c r i t i cs - - those who a t t r i b u t e t o hfm a compartmentalized conception of language--have suggested t h a t t h i s i s j u s t what t he dfvfs ion of language i n t o language-games and forms of l i f e leads to . It g ives var ious p a r t s of our d iscourse a f a l s e autonomy. But su re ly one can poin t out ad hoc d i f f e rences i n t h e use, of terma o r i n t h e l o g i c a l s t a t u s of b e l i e f s without confer r ing any genera l ized autonomy on the contex ts of speech-activfty which one i s o l a t e s t o these ends, The f a c t t h a t s c i e n t i f f c grounds ought not always t o be expected f o r r e l fg fous claims does not mean t h a t be l i eve r s a r e immune from consfstency demands o r moral c r i t f c f sms , With respec t t o these consfdera t ions , be l i eve r s and nonbelfevers may be sa id t o belong t o t h e same form of l i f e , however much they may vary i n o the r respec ts , So as our p o f t ~ t s of comparison s h i f t , t he wa l l s which we seemfngly erect between one domain of d i scourse and another simply co l l apse and o the r d f s t f n c t f o n s take t h e f r p l ace , thereby d f spe l l i ng any absolu te d ivfs fons and allowfng approprfa te c r f t f c f sm t o proceed,
The objec t ionable f e a t u r e of conceptual r e l a t iv i sm comes
Few i f any philosophers would deny t h i s ,
The t r f c k , t he re fo re , is t o l o c a t e t h e l fmf t s of f n t e l l f g f b f l f t y and j u s t i f f c a t i o n where they belong, not by forc ing our thfnkfng i n t o any pre- arranged compartments bu t by p lac ing a few boundary markers wherever they a r e needed t o prevent confusion, A s philosophers anxious t o g r i p such ques t ions i n a genera l theory, o r t o a t t a c k another philosopher 's remarks, we o f t en t r y t o make th ings simpler than they are, His use of t h e language-game analogy and t h e concept of a form of l f f e was too un- systematfc t o be reduced t o any s impl i f i ed p i c t u r e of language, Since he never pressed any abso lu te d f s t fnc t fons between language-games or forms of l i f e , he never compartmentalfzed or r e l a t f v f z e d our d iscourse and i t s log ic , Rather,
Wfttgenstefn d idn ' t do t h a t ,
LANGUAGE-GAMES AND FORMS OF LIFE UNCONFIJSEJ
he l e f t i t t o us t o decide i n s p e c i f i c ins tances where t h e liiaits of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y and j u s t i f i c a t i o n lie. pra ised ,
For t h i s he shouldn't be un fa i r ly c r f t i c l z e d o r unduly
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
NOTES
'Kai Nielsen, "Wittgensteinian Fideism;' Philosophy, vol. XLII, No. 161, pp. 191-209.
'References t o Wittgenstein 's works are by paragraph number unless noted by page. P I s tands f o r t h e Philosophical I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , OC lor On C e r t a i n t y , LC f o r t h e Lectures and Conversat ions on A e s t h e t i c s , P s y c h o l o q y , and R e l i g f o u s Belief, and Tracta tus f o r t h e Tracta tus Logico-Philosophicus.
3See P e t e r Winch, The Idea of a Socia l Science (Oxford: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958); a l s o h i s w e l l known essay "Understanding a P r imi t ive Society,"American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. I, 1964, pp. 307-24.
4Winch, The Idea o f a Socia l Sc ience , p. 100.
5For an extended d iscuss ion along these l i n e s see Roger Trigg, Reason
6Pat r ick Sherry, R e l i g i o n , Truth and Language-Games (New York: Barnes
'Sherry, pp. 59-61.
'Consider:
and Commitment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 1973). pp. 22-26, 86-92.
and Noble, 1977), pp. 22-23.
when Wittgenstein e labora tes t h e p r imi t ive language-game of t h e bu i lde r s by adding counting terms i n P I 8, does he thereby c r e a t e a new game o r extend the same game? Here the re is no s i n g l e answer: f o r c e r t a i n purposes w e might want t o count a l l these terms as p a r t of that same game, f o r o the r purposes w e might want t o say t h a t counting is a d i f f e r e n t language-game than t h a t of simply c a l l i n g f o r "slabs," e t c .
F a i l u r e t o see t h i s po in t has l ed some philosophers--noirably John Searle-- t o take i s sue with Wittgenstein 's remark t h a t t h e r e are a count less number of language-games. Sea r l e equates language-games wi th speech aci:s; and s i n c e he has a sys temat ic way of i den t i fy ing speech acts, he th inks thiat t h e i r number can be to ld . Y e t i f one reads t h e l i s t of examples which Wittgenstein g ives
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JOHN A, IJHITTAKER
i n P I 23, he w i l l see t h a t some of t h e s e language-games are too complex t o be speech ac ts - -e ,go9 "forming and t e s t i n g a hypothes is , " o r " t r a n s l a t i n g from one language i n t o another." And if one adds t o t h i s l i s t every th ing else t h a t Wft tgens te fn descr ibed as a language-game, i t becomes i n c r e a s i n g l y obvious t h a t Wi t tgens te in had no s y s t e m a t i c means of i d e n t i f y i n g s i n g l e language-games. So t h e number of language-games is c o u n t l e s s because t h e r e i s v i r t u a l l y no end t o t h e ways i n which one game might be d iv ided from another , h e r e are r e p o r t e d from a l e c t u r e , )
( S e a r l e ' s views
