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All cases ending in “1” and “0” general tips:

1. Just press ctrl + click on the case title (not the number) to navigate.2. Texts enclosed in [] should be paraphrased as they are not copied verbatim3. Read the notes, if any, at the top of every case digest.

Contents

01

Lolita A. Lopez, et. al., vs. Quezon City Sports Club, Inc..............................................................................3

10 Herminigildo Inguillo and Zenaida Bergante vs. First Philippine Scales, Inc. (FPSI) and/or Amparo Policarpio, manager.....................................................................................................................................5

11 HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (HEPI), owner of Hyatt Regency Manila, vs. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT-NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN)......................................................................................8

20 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS (UST) vs SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG UST (SM-UST)...................10

21 ANDREW JAMES MCBURNIE, vs EULALIO GANZON, EGI-MANAGERS, INC. and E. GANZON, INC.,.......12

30 RONILO SORREDA vs. CAMBRIDGE ELECTRONICS CORPORATION........................................................14

31 PNCC SKYWAY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY DIVISION WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PSTMSDWO), represented by its President, RENE SORIANO vs. PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION..............15

40 NESTLÉ vs. UFE-DFA-KMU.....................................................................................................................17

41 FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THEPHILIPPINES (FASAP), PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), PATRIA CHIONG & CA............................................................................19

50 FLAVIO S. SUAREZ, JR., et. al. vs. NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION......................................................22

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Lolita A. Lopez, et. al., vs. Quezon City Sports Club, Inc.Facts: Kasapiang Manggagawa sa Quezon City Sports Club (union) filed a complaint for unfair

labor practice against QCSC, alleging that the latter committed the following unfair labor practices:

1. Interference with, restraining and/or coercing employees, particularly members of the incumbent union in their exercise of their rights to self-organization;

2. Discrimination in regards to payment of wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in order to discourage continued membership to the incumbent union;

3. Violation of several economic provisions of the CBA such as, across the board implementation of any legislated wage increases, non-payment of salaries and wages for [the] period already worked, and non-payment of overtime pay to some employees and other related economic benefits which will be specifically enunciated by the petitioner in the succeeding pleadings to be filed

The Union averred that it was ordered to submit a new information sheet. It immediately wrote a letter addressed to the general manager, Angel Sadang, to inquire about the information sheet, only to be insulted by the latter. The members of the union were not paid their salaries on 30 June 1997. A board member, Antonio Chua allegedly harassed one of the employees and told him not to join the strike and even promised a promotion. On 4 July 1997, the union wrote a letter to the management for the release of the members’ salaries for the period 16-30 June 1997, implementation of Wage Order No. 5, and granting of wage increases mandated by the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). When its letter went unanswered, the union filed a notice of strike on 10 July 1997 for violation of Article 248 (a)(c)(e) of the Labor Code, nonpayment of overtime pay, refusal to hear its grievances, and malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of the CBA. After conducting a strike vote, it staged a strike on 12 August 1997. On 16 August 1997, the QCSC placed some of its employees under temporary lay-off status due to redundancy. It appears that on 22 December 1997, QCSC also filed a petition for cancellation of registration against the union.

QCSC, for its part, contended that the union was not a legitimate labor union as it

had a pending complaint for cancellation of certificate of registration; that there was no valid CBA; that it had not committed any unfair labor practice; and that the union had staged an illegal strike.

Labor Arbiter promulgated a decision finding QCSC guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering it to pay the affected employees their separation pay, backwages, and salary increase, totaling P27,504,864.46. QCSC appealed from the labor arbiter’s decision. In turn, the union filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for non-perfection due to failure to post the appeal bond. QCSC filed a motion for reduction of the appeal bond to FOUR MILLION PESOS (P4,000,000.00)

Issue: Do the simultaneous filing of the motion to reduce the appeal bond and posting of the reduced amount of bond within the reglementary period for appeal constitute substantial compliance with Article 223 of the Labor Code?

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Held: 1. Yes. The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. The party who seeks to avail himself of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.

Article 223 of the Labor Code partly provides that: Art. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:

a. If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter;

b. If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and corruption;

c. If made purely on questions of law; andd. If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would

cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

Under Sections 4(a) and 6 of Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, appeals involving monetary awards are perfected only upon compliance with the following mandatory requisites, namely: (1) payment of the appeal fees; (2) filing of the memorandum of appeal; and (3) payment of the required cash or surety bond. While the bond requirement on appeals involving a monetary award has been relaxed in certain cases, this can only be done where there was substantial compliance with the Rules; or where the appellants, at the very least, exhibited willingness to pay by posting a partial bond. Applying these jurisprudential guidelines, we find and hold that the NLRC did not err in reducing the amount of the appeal bond and considering the appeal as having been filed within the reglementary period. Moreover, the posting of the amount of P4,000,000.00 simultaneously with the filing of the motion to reduce the bond to that amount, as well as the filing of the memorandum of appeal, all within the reglementary period, altogether constitute substantial compliance with the Rules.

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Texts enclosed in a [] are supplied by me. Therefore, please paraphrase if you are to copy.There are 2 issues in this digest (kaya mahaba) – one will suffice.

Herminigildo Inguillo and Zenaida Bergante vs. First Philippine Scales, Inc. (FPSI) and/or Amparo Policarpio, manager

G.R. No. 165407 (June 5, 2009)Facts: In 1991, FPSI and First Philippine Scales Industries Labor Union (FPSILU) entered into a

Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) for a period of five (5) years in a document entitled RATIPIKASYON NG KASUNDUAN. Bergante and Inguillo, who were members of FPSILU, signed the said document.

Bergante, Inguillo and several FPSI employees joined another union, the Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM). [The latter] filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) an intra-union dispute against FPSILU and FPSI. Meanwhile, on March 29, 1996, the executive board and members of the FPSILU addressed a document dated March 18, 1996 denominated as “Petisyon” to FPSI's general manager, Amparo Policarpio (Policarpio), seeking the termination of the services of [several employees, including herein petitioners. This was granted upon by FPSI, which terminated, among others, herein petitioners.]

In their Petition, Bergante and Inguillo assail the legality of their termination based on the Union Security Clause in the CBA between FPSI and FPSILU.

Issue: [(1) Was there a valid ground for termination?(2) Was there compliance with the procedural due process to the termination?]

Held: (1) Yes. The Labor Code of the Philippines has several provisions under which an employee may be validly terminated, namely: (1) just causes under Article 282; (2) authorized causes under Article 283; (3) termination due to disease under Article 284; and (4) termination by the employee or resignation under Article 285. While the said provisions did not mention as ground the enforcement of the Union Security Clause in the CBA, the dismissal from employment based on the same is recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction.

“Union security” is a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends “closed shop,” “union shop,” “maintenance of membership” or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment. There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union within a certain period as a condition for their continued employment. There is maintenance of membership shop when employees, who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated.[40] A closed-shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and his employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part.[

Bergante and Inguillo assail the legality of their termination based on the Union Security

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Clause in the CBA between FPSI and FPSILU. Article II[42] of the CBA pertains to Union Security and Representatives, which provides:

“The Company hereby agrees to a UNION SECURITY [CLAUSE] with the following terms:

1. All bonafide union members x x x x shall, as a condition to their continued

employment, maintain their membership with the UNION;x x x

5. Any employee/union member who fails to retain union membership in good standing may be recommended for suspension or dismissal by the Union Directorate and/or FPSILU Executive Council x x x”

Verily, the aforesaid provision requires all members to maintain their membership with FPSILU during the lifetime of the CBA. Failing so, and for any of the causes enumerated therein, the Union Directorate and/or FPSILU Executive Council may recommend to FPSI an employee/union member's suspension or dismissal. Records show that Bergante and Inguillo were former members of FPSILU based on their signatures in the document which ratified the CBA. It can also be inferred that they disaffiliated from FPSILU when the CBA was still in force and subsisting, as can be gleaned from the documents relative to the intra-union dispute between FPSILU and NLM-KATIPUNAN. In view of their disaffiliation, as well as other acts allegedly detrimental to the interest of both FPSILU and FPSI, a “Petisyon” was submitted to Policarpio, asking for the termination of the services of employees who failed to maintain their Union membership.

In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the Union Security Clause, the employer needs only to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the union's decision to expel the employee from the union or company. All the requisites have been sufficiently met and FPSI was justified in enforcing the Union Security Clause.

The stipulations in the CBA authorizing the dismissal of employees are of equal import as the statutory provisions on dismissal under the Labor Code, since a CBA is the law between the company and the Union, and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy to give protection to labor. In Caltex Refinery Employees Association (CREA) v. Brillantes, the Court expounded on the effectiveness of union security clause when it held that it is one intended to strengthen the contracting union and to protect it from the fickleness or perfidy of its own members. For without such safeguards, group solidarity becomes uncertain; the union becomes gradually weakened and increasingly vulnerable to company machinations. In this security clause lies the strength of the union during the enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement. It is this clause that provides labor with substantial power in collective bargaining.

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(2) No. Nonetheless, while We uphold dismissal pursuant to a union security clause, the same is not without a condition or restriction. The enforcement of union security clauses is authorized by law, provided such enforcement is not characterized by arbitrariness, and always with due process. There are two (2) aspects which characterize the concept of due process under the Labor Code: one is substantive––whether the termination of employment was based on the provisions of the Labor Code or in accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence; the other is procedural - the manner in which the dismissal was effected.

Procedural due process in the dismissal of employees requires notice and hearing. The employer must furnish the employee two written notices before termination may be effected. The first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, while the second notice informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. The requirement of a hearing, on the other hand, is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted.

In the present case, the required two notices that must be given to herein petitioners Bergante and Inguillo were lacking. Respondents, however, aver that they had furnished the employees concerned, including petitioners, with a copy of FPSILU's “Petisyon.” While the “Petisyon” enumerated the several grounds that would justify the termination of the employees mentioned therein, yet such document is only a recommendation by the Union upon which the employer may base its decision. It cannot be considered a notice of termination. A perusal of each of [the grounds stated therein] leads Us to conclude that what was stated were general descriptions, which in no way would enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses.

Policarpio's allegations are self-serving. Except for her claim as stated in the respondent's Position Paper, nowhere from the records can We find that Bergante and Inguillo were accorded the opportunity to present evidence in support of their defenses. Policarpio relied heavily on the “Petisyon” of FPSILU. She failed to convince Us that during the dialogue, she was able to ascertain the validity of the charges mentioned in the “Petisyon.” In her futile attempt to prove compliance with the procedural requirement, she reiterated that the objective of the dialogue was to provide the employees “the opportunity to receive the act of grace of FPSI by giving them an amount equivalent to one-half (½) month of their salary for every year of service.” We are not convinced. We cannot even consider the demand and counter-offer for the payment of the employees as an amicable settlement between the parties because what took place was merely a discussion only of the amount which the employees are willing to accept and the amount which the respondents are willing to give. Such non-compliance is also corroborated by Bergante and Inguillo in their pleadings denouncing their unjustified dismissal. In fine, We hold that the dialogue is not tantamount to the hearing or conference prescribed by law.

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2.5 issues. Paraphrase texts enclosed in []. More facts can be deduced from the ruling. HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (HEPI), owner of Hyatt Regency Manila, vs. SAMAHAN

NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT-NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN)

G.R. No. 165756 June 5, 2009Facts: In 2001, HEPI’s hotel business suffered a slump due to the local and international economic

slowdown, aggravated by the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States. According to petitioner, the management initially decided to cost-cut by implementing energy-saving schemes: prioritizing acquisitions/purchases; reducing work weeks in some of the hotel’s departments; directing the employees to avail of their vacation leaves; and imposing a moratorium on hiring employees for the year 2001 whenever practicable. [It thereafter decided to retrench several employees, including some of the union members.]

[Respondent Union, believing that this constituted an unfair labor practice, staged a strike]. A strike notice filed on April 12, 2002; a strike vote reached on April 25, 2002; notification of the strike vote filed also on April 25, 2002; conciliation proceedings conducted on May 8, 20002; and the actual strike on May 10, 2002.

Issue: [(1) Was the retrenchment valid? (corollary-) Does the implementation of the downsizing scheme preclude petitioner from availing the services of contractual and agency-hired employees?(2) Was the strike valid?]

Held: (1) Yes. For a valid retrenchment, the following requisites must be complied with: (1) the retrenchment is necessary to prevent losses and such losses are proven; (2) written notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; and (3) payment of separation pay equivalent to one-month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.

In case of redundancy, the employer must prove that: (1) a written notice was

served on both the employees and the DOLE at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; (2) separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher, has been paid; (3) good faith in abolishing the redundant positions; and (4) adoption of fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining which positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished.

It is the employer who bears the onus of proving compliance with these requirements, retrenchment and redundancy being in the nature of affirmative defenses. Otherwise, the dismissal is not justified.

This Court will not hesitate to strike down a company’s redundancy program structured to downsize its personnel, solely for the purpose of weakening the union leadership. Our labor laws only allow retrenchment or downsizing as a valid exercise of management prerogative if all other else fail. But in this case, petitioner did implement various cost-saving measures and even transferred some of its employees to other viable positions just to avoid the premature termination of employment of its affected workers. It was when the same proved insufficient and the amount of loss became certain that petitioner had to resort to drastic measures to stave offP9,981,267.00 in losses, and be able to survive.[Corollary issue:] No. “In any event, we have held that an employer’s good faith in implementing a redundancy program is not

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necessarily destroyed by availment of the services of an independent contractor to replace the services of the terminated employees. We have previously ruled that the reduction of the number of workers in a company made necessary by the introduction of the services of an independent contractor is justified when the latter is undertaken in order to effectuate more economic and efficient methods of production. In the case at bar, private respondent failed to proffer any proof that the management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner in engaging the services of an independent contractor to operate the Laura wells. Absent such proof, the Court has no basis to interfere with the bona fide decision of management to effect more economic and efficient methods of production.”

(2) No, but... [read below][T]he requisites for a valid strike are: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30

days before the intended date thereof or 15 days in case of ULP; (b) a strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (c) a notice to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike. The requirements are mandatory and failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal.

A valid and legal strike must be based on “strikeable” grounds, because if it is based on a “non-strikeable” ground, it is generally deemed an illegal strike. Corollarily, a strike grounded on ULP is illegal if no acts constituting ULP actually exist. As an exception, even if no such acts are committed by the employer, if the employees believe in good faith that ULP actually exists, then the strike held pursuant to such belief may be legal. As a general rule, therefore, where a union believes that an employer committed ULP and the surrounding circumstances warranted such belief in good faith, the resulting strike may be considered legal although, subsequently, such allegations of unfair labor practices were found to be groundless.

Here, respondent Union went on strike in the honest belief that petitioner was committing ULP after the latter decided to downsize its workforce contrary to the staffing/manning standards adopted by both parties under a CBA forged only four (4) short months earlier. The belief was bolstered when the management hired 100 contractual workers to replace the 48 terminated regular rank-and-file employees who were all Union members.[65] Indeed, those circumstances showed prima faciethat the hotel committed ULP. Thus, even if technically there was no legal ground to stage a strike based on ULP, since the attendant circumstances support the belief in good faith that petitioner’s retrenchment scheme was structured to weaken the bargaining power of the Union, the strike, by exception, may be considered legal.

Because of this, we view the NLRC’s decision to suspend all the Union officers for

six (6) months without pay to be too harsh a punishment. A suspension of two (2) months without pay should have been more reasonable and just.

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The underlines are supplied by me.UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS (UST) vs SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG UST (SM-UST)

G.R. No. 169940 (September 14, 2009)Facts: Respondent Samahang Manggagawa ng U.S.T. (SM-UST) was the authorized bargaining

agent of the non-academic/non-teaching rank-and-file daily- and monthly-paid employees (numbering about 619) of petitioner, the Pontifical and Royal University of Santo Tomas, The Catholic University of the Philippines (or UST), a private university in the City of Manila run by the Order of Preachers. [The two parties had attempted to have a CBA formulated, containing salary increases, signing and Christmas bonuses. They were not able to come to an agreement, and the respondent union voted to stage a strike. This was promptly acted upon by DOLE, which rendered a decision granting, among others, reasonable increases and signing bonus. This was questioned by the respondents on appeal, which partially granted the petition].

On appeal to SC, UST alleged that:1. It began paying the wage adjustment and other benefits pursuant to the May 31, 2002 Order of the DOLE Secretary; and that to date, 572 out of the 619 members of respondent have been paid. It argued that by their acceptance of the award and the resulting payments made to them, the said union members have ratified its offer and thus rendered moot the case before the Court of Appeals.

2. The appellate court’s award of additional signing bonus (from P10,000.00 to P18,000.00) is contrary to the nature and principle behind the grant of such benefit, which is one given as a matter of discretion and cannot be demanded by right,[12] a consideration paid for the goodwill that existed in the negotiations, which culminate in the signing of a CBA.[13] Petitioner claims that since this condition is absent in the parties’ case, it was erroneous to have rewarded respondent with an increased signing bonus.

Issue: [1. Whether or not the members of private respondent voluntarily and knowingly accepted the arbitral award of the secretary of dole, amounting to ratification or waiver..2. Whether or not the increase of the signing bonus was correct.]

Held: The question of whether respondent’s members’ individual acceptance of the award and the resulting payments made by petitioner operate as a ratification of the DOLE Secretary’s award which renders CA decision moot, we find that such do not operate as a ratification of the DOLE Secretary’s award; nor a waiver of their right to receive further benefits, or what they may be entitled to under the law. The appellate court correctly ruled that the respondent’s members were merely constrained to accept payment at the time. Christmas was then just around the corner, and the union members were in no position to resist the temptation to accept much-needed cash for use during the most auspicious occasion of the year. Time and again, we have held that necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men; but to answer a present emergency, will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them.

Besides, as individual components of a union possessed of a distinct and separate corporate personality, respondent’s members should realize that in joining the organization, they have surrendered a portion of their individual freedom for the benefit of all the other members; they submit to the will of the majority of the members in order that they may derive the advantages to be gained from the concerted action of all. Since the

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will of the members is personified by its board of directors or trustees, the decisions it makes should accordingly bind them. Precisely, a labor union exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment. What the individual employee may not do alone, as for example obtain more favorable terms and conditions of work, the labor organization, through persuasive and coercive power gained as a group, can accomplish better.

A signing bonus is a grant motivated by the goodwill generated when a CBA is successfully negotiated and signed between the employer and the union. In the instant case, no CBA was successfully negotiated by the parties. It is only because petitioner prays for this Court to affirm in toto the DOLE Secretary’s May 31, 2002 Order that we shall allow an award of signing bonus. There would have been no other basis to grant it if petitioner had not so prayed. We shall take it as a manifestation of petitioner’s liberality, which we cannot now allow it to withdraw. A bonus is a gratuity or act of liberality of the giver; when petitioner filed the instant petition seeking the affirmance of the DOLE Secretary’s Order in its entirety, assailing only the increased amount of the signing bonus awarded, it is considered to have unqualifiedly agreed to grant the original award to the respondent union’s members.

[FYI.]WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The signing bonus of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P18,000.00) per member of respondent Samahang Manggagawa ng U.S.T. as awarded by the Court of Appeals is REDUCED to TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00). All other findings and dispositions made by the Court of Appeals in its January 31, 2005 Decision and September 23, 2005 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 72965 are AFFIRMED.

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[Similar to Lolita A. Lopez, et. al., vs. Quezon City Sports Club, Inc.] bold and italicized texts were supplied in the decision. Texts enclosed in [] are supplied by me.

ANDREW JAMES MCBURNIE, vs EULALIO GANZON, EGI-MANAGERS, INC. and E. GANZON, INC.,G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117; G.R. Nos. 186984-85 (September 18, 2009)

Facts: McBurnie filed a case against EGI for illegal termination. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the former.

On November 5, 2004, or 10 days after receipt of the Labor Arbiter’s decision, respondents filed before the NLRC a Memorandum of Appeal and Motion to Reduce Bond, and posted as bond the amount of P100,000.00. They argued that the awards of the Labor Arbiter were null and excessive, with the premeditated intention to render the employer incapable of posting an appeal bond and consequently deprive him of the right to appeal.

In an Order dated March 31, 2005, the NLRC denied the motion to reduce bond

and ordered respondents to post an additional bond of P54,083,910.00 together with the other requirements under Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure within a non-extendible period of 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise the appeal shall be dismissed. Respondents moved for reconsideration but it was denied in an Order dated July 15, 2005; respondents were again ordered to post the additional appeal bond within another non-extendible period of 10 days from receipt thereof. [NLRC thereafter dismissed the appeal for failure to post the additional bond. This was reversed by the CA].

Issue: [Whether or not the failure to post the imposed bond warrant the dismissal of the appeal.]Held: Yes. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides:

Article 223. Appeal.— Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final

and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. x x x

x x x x In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the

employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. (Emphasis supplied)

The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The lawmakers clearly intended to make the bond a mandatory requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer as inferred from the provision that an appeal by the employer may be perfected “only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond.” The word “only” makes it clear that the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer is the essential and exclusive means by which an employer’s appeal may be perfected. On the other hand, the word “may” refers to the perfection of an appeal as optional on the part of the defeated party, but not to the compulsory posting of an appeal bond, if he desires to appeal. The meaning and the intention of the legislature in enacting a statute must be determined from the language employed; and where there is no ambiguity in the words used, then there is no room for construction.

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Moreover, the filing of the bond is not only mandatory but a jurisdictional requirement as well, that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the NLRC. Non-compliance therewith renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory. This requirement is intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer’s appeal. It is intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay or evade their obligation to satisfy their employees' just and lawful claims.

Thus, it behooves the Court to give utmost regard to the legislative and administrative intent to strictly require the employer to post a cash or surety bond securing the full amount of the monetary award within the 10 day reglementary period. Nothing in the Labor Code or the NLRC Rules of Procedure authorizes the posting of a bond that is less than the monetary award in the judgment, or would deem such insufficient posting as sufficient to perfect the appeal.

While the bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer, this is subject to the conditions that (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. The qualification effectively requires that unless the NLRC grants the reduction of the cash bond within the 10 day reglementary period, the employer is still expected to post the cash or surety bond securing the full amount within the said 10-day period. If the NLRC does eventually grant the motion for reduction after the reglementary period has elapsed, the correct relief would be to reduce the cash or surety bond already posted by the employer within the 10-day period.

Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Hence, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. To reiterate, perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirements for perfecting an appeal must, as a rule, be strictly followed. Such requirements are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and are necessary for the orderly discharge of the judicial business. Failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision. Thus, the propriety of the monetary awards of the Labor Arbiter is already binding upon this Court, much more with the Court of Appeals.

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RONILO SORREDA vs. CAMBRIDGE ELECTRONICS CORPORATIONG.R. No. 172927 (February 11, 2010)

Facts: On May 8, 1999, petitioner was hired by respondent as a technician for a period of 5 months at minimum wage. Five weeks into the job (on June 15, 1999), petitioner met an accident in which his left arm was crushed by a machine and had to be amputated. In September 1999, after he recovered from his injury, petitioner reported for work. Instead of giving him employment, they made him sign a memorandum of resignation to formalize his separation from the company in the light of the expiration of his five-month contract.

[Petitioner filed a case for illegal dismissal. Defendant averred that there was no employer-employee relationship. CA ruled that the] petitioner Ronilo Sorreda was not a regular employee of respondent Cambridge Electronics Corporation.

Issue: Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship.Held: NO. In this instance, petitioner, from the period May 8, 1999 to October 8, 1999, was

clearly a per-project employee of private respondent, resulting in an employer-employee relationship. Consequently, questions or disputes arising out of this relationship fell under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.

However, based on petitioner’s allegations in his position paper, his cause of action was based on an alleged second contract of employment separate and distinct from the per-project employment contract. Thus, petitioner insisted that there was a perfected contract of perpetual employment and that respondent was liable to pay him damages.

We note, however, that petitioner filed the case only when respondent refused to rehire him. While there was an employer-employee relationship between the parties under their five-month per-project contract of employment, the present dispute is neither rooted in the aforestated contract nor is it one inherently linked to it.

While the Constitution recognizes the primacy of labor, it also recognizes the critical role of private enterprise in nation-building and the prerogatives of management. A contract of perpetual employment deprives management of its prerogative to decide whom to hire, fire and promote, and renders inutile the basic precepts of labor relations. While management may validly waive it prerogatives, such waiver should not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs.[24] An absolute and unqualified employment for life in the mold of petitioner’s concept of perpetual employment is contrary to public policy and good customs, as it unjustly forbids the employer from terminating the services of an employee despite the existence of a just or valid cause. It likewise compels the employer to retain an employee despite the attainment of the statutory retirement age, even if the employee has became a “non-performing asset” or, worse, a liability to the employer.

Moreover, aside from the self-serving claim of petitioner, there was no concrete proof to establish the existence of such agreement. Petitioner cannot validly force respondent to enter into a permanent employment contract with him. Such stance is contrary to the consensuality principle of contracts as well as to the management prerogative of respondent company to choose its employees.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

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PNCC SKYWAY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY DIVISION WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PSTMSDWO), represented by its President, RENE SORIANO vs. PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION

G.R. No. 171231 (February 17, 2010)Facts: Petitioner PNCC Skyway Corporation Traffic Management and Security Division Workers'

Organization (PSTMSDWO) is a labor union duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Respondent PNCC Skyway Corporation is a corporation duly organized and operating under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines. [They entered into CBA. Pertinent provisions are as follows:]

ARTICLE VIIIVACATION LEAVE AND SICK LEAVE

Section 1. Vacation Leave.

[b] The company shall schedule the vacation leave of employees during the   year   taking   into   consideration   the   request   of   preference   of   the  employees. (emphasis supplied)

[PNCC then created a schedule of leaves for their employees.] Petitioner objected to the implementation of the said memorandum. It insisted that the individual members of the union have the right to schedule their vacation leave. It opined that the unilateral scheduling of the employees' vacation leave was done to avoid the monetization of their vacation leave in December 2004.

Issue: WON the PNCC has the sole discretion to schedule the vacation leaves of its employees.Held: YES. Petitioner insisted that their union members have the preference in scheduling

their vacation leave. On the other hand, respondent argued that Article VIII, Section 1 (b) gives the management the final say regarding the vacation leave schedule of its employees. Respondent may take into consideration the employees' preferred schedule, but the same is not controlling.

The rule is that where the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, its meaning should be determined without reference to extrinsic facts or aids. The intention of the parties must be gathered from that language, and from that language alone. Stated differently, where the language of a written contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract must be taken to mean that which, on its face, it purports to mean, unless some good reason can be assigned to show that the words used should be understood in a different sense.

In the case at bar, the contested provision of the CBA is clear and unequivocal . Article VIII, Section 1 (b) of the CBA categorically provides that the scheduling of vacation leave shall be under the option of the employer.

Thus, if the terms of a CBA are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall prevail. In fine, the CBA must be strictly adhered to and respected if its ends have to be achieved, being the law between the parties. In Faculty Association of Mapua Institute of Technology (FAMIT) v. Court of

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Appeals, this Court held that the CBA during its lifetime binds all the parties. The provisions of the CBA must be respected since its terms and conditions constitute the law between the parties. The parties cannot be allowed to change the terms they agreed upon on the ground that the same are not favorable to them.

[T]he purpose of a vacation leave is to afford a laborer a chance to get a much-needed rest to replenish his worn-out energy and acquire a new vitality to enable him to efficiently perform his duties, and not merely to give him additional salary and bounty. Accordingly, the vacation leave privilege was not intended to serve as additional salary, but as a non-monetary benefit. To give the employees the option not to consume it with the aim of converting it to cash at the end of the year would defeat the very purpose of vacation leave.

Indeed, the multitude or scarcity of personnel manning the tollways should not rest upon the option of the employees, as the public using the skyway system should be assured of its safety, security and convenience. Petitioner's contention that labor contracts should be construed in favor of the laborer is without basis and, therefore, inapplicable to the present case. This rule of construction does not benefit petitioners because, as stated, there is here no room for interpretation. Since the CBA is clear and unambiguous, its terms should be implemented as they are written.

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2 rulings. You can just choose one of the two, or a little of both. Paraphrase text in []. UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES - DRUG, FOOD AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES UNIONS - KILUSANG MAYO

UNO (UFE-DFA-KMU) vs. NESTLÉ PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED (NESTLÉ)G.R. Nos. 158930-31

NESTLÉ vs. UFE-DFA-KMUG.R. Nos. 158944-45 (March 3, 2008)

Facts: UFE-DFA-KMU was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Nestlé belonging to the latter’s Alabang and Cabuyao plants. Despite fifteen (15) meetings between them, the parties failed to reach any agreement on the proposed CBA. The union then filed a case for unfair labor practice against Nestlé

Issue: Was Nestlé guilty of unfair labor practice?Held: NO. [citing Arts. 252 and 253 of the Labor Code]

[T]he purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement resulting in a contract binding on the parties; but the failure to reach an agreement after negotiations have continued for a reasonable period does not establish a lack of good faith. The statutes invite and contemplate a collective bargaining contract, but they do not compel one. The duty to bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement.

The crucial question, therefore, of whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of the individual case. As we have said, there is no per se test of good faith in bargaining. Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. To some degree, the question of good faith may be a question of credibility. The effect of an employer’s or a union’s individual actions is not the test of good-faith bargaining, but the impact of all such occasions or actions, considered as a whole, and the inferences fairly drawn therefrom collectively may offer a basis for the finding of the NLRC.

For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that Nestlé was motivated by ill will, “bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, or grave anxiety resulted x x x” in disclaiming unilateral grants as proper subjects in their collective bargaining negotiations. While the law makes it an obligation for the employer and the employees to bargain collectively with each other, such compulsion does not include the commitment to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. All it contemplates is that both parties should approach the negotiation with an open mind and make reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement.

[in citing Art. 247 and 248 (g)]

In the case at bar, except for the assertion put forth by UFE-DFA-KMU, neither the second Notice of Strike nor the records of these cases substantiate a finding of unfair labor practice. It is not enough that the union believed that the employer committed acts of unfair labor practice when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie showing to warrant such a belief. (Tiu v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 123276, 18

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August 1997, 277 SCRA 681, 688.)

Employers are accorded rights and privileges to assure their self-determination and independence and reasonable return of capital. (Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Meris, G.R. No. 155098, 16 September 2005, 470 SCRA 125, 136.) This mass of privileges comprises the so-called management prerogatives. (Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Meris, G.R. No. 155098, 16 September 2005, 470 SCRA 125, 136.) In this connection, the rule is that good faith is always presumed. As long as the company’s exercise of the same is in good faith to advance its interest and not for purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the law or a valid agreement, such exercise will be upheld. (Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Meris, G.R. No. 155098, 16 September 2005, 470 SCRA 125, 136.)

There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining. (Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 125038, 6 November 1997, 281 SCRA 509, 518.) Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. (Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 125038, 6 November 1997, 281 SCRA 509, 518.) Herein, no proof was presented to exemplify bad faith on the part of Nestlé apart from mere allegation. Construing arguendo that the content of the aforequoted letter of 29 May 2001 laid down a pre-condition to its agreement to bargain with UFE-DFA-KMU, Nestlé’s inclusion in its Position Paper of its proposals affecting other matters covered by the CBA negates the claim of refusal to bargain or bargaining in bad faith. Accordingly, since UFE-DFA-KMU failed to proffer substantial evidence that would overcome the legal presumption of good faith on the part of Nestlé, the award of moral and exemplary damages is unavailing.

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You can choose from either #1, 4 or 5 or a combination of any of those mentioned in the ruling...FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THEPHILIPPINES (FASAP), PETITIONER, VS.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), PATRIA CHIONG & CAG.R. No. 178083, July 23, 2008

Facts: Petitioner FASAP is the duly certified collective bargaining representative of PAL flight attendants and stewards, or collectively known as PAL cabin crew personnel. Respondent PAL is a domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, operating as a common carrier transporting passengers and cargo through aircraft.

On June 15, 1998, PAL retrenched 5,000 of its employees, including more than 1,400 of its cabin crew personnel, to take effect on July 15, 1998. PAL adopted the retrenchment scheme allegedly to cut costs and mitigate huge financial losses as a result of a downturn in the airline industry brought about by the Asian financial crisis. During said period, PAL claims to have incurred P90 billion in liabilities, while its assets stood at P85 billion.

[facts for #5] The NLRC made a detailed listing of the retrenchment scheme based on the ICCD Masterank and Seniority 1997 Ratings. It found the following:

1. Number of employees retrenched due to inverse seniority rule and other reasons -- 454

2. Number of employees retrenched due to excess sick leaves -- 2993. Number of employees who were retrenched due to excess sick leave and other

reasons -- 614. Number of employees who were retrenched due to other reasons -- 1075. Number of employees who were demoted -- 552

Total -- 1,473.

PAL determined the cabin crew personnel efficiency ratings through an evaluation of the individual cabin crew member's overall performance for the year 1997alone. Their respective performance during previous years, i.e., the whole duration of service with PAL of each cabin crew personnel, was not considered.

[facts for #4]PAL then subsequently rehired the 140 probationary cabin attendants whose services it had previously terminated, and yet proceeded to terminate the services of its permanent cabin crew personnel.

Issue: Whether or not PAL's retrenchment scheme was justified.Held: Under the Labor Code, retrenchment or reduction of employees is authorized as follows:

ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel.- The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker

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affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.

The law recognizes the right of every business entity to reduce its work force if the same is made necessary by compelling economic factors which would endanger its existence or stability. Where appropriate and where conditions are in accord with law and jurisprudence, the Court has authorized valid reductions in the work force to forestall business losses, the hemorrhaging of capital, or even to recognize an obvious reduction in the volume of business which has rendered certain employees redundant. Retrenchment is only a measure of last resort, when other less drastic means have been tried and found to be inadequate.The burden clearly falls upon the employer to prove economic or business losses with sufficient supporting evidence. Its failure to prove these reverses or losses necessarily means that the employee's dismissal was not justified.] Any claim of actual or potential business losses must satisfy certain established standards, all of which must concur, before any reduction of personnel becomes legal. These are:(1) That retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer;

(2) That the employer served written notice both to the employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment;

(3) That the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (½) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher;

(4) That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees' right to security of tenure; and,

(5) That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such as status, efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain workers.

[application of the law...on #1 above]In the instant case, PAL failed to substantiate its claim of actual and imminent substantial losses which would justify the retrenchment of more than 1,400 of its cabin crew personnel. Although the Philippine economy was gravely affected by the Asian financial crisis, however, it cannot be assumed that it has likewise brought PAL to the brink of bankruptcy. Likewise, the fact that PAL underwent corporate rehabilitation does not automatically justify the retrenchment of its cabin crew personnel.

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The foregoing principle holds true with respect to PAL's claim in its Comment that the only issue is the manner by which its retrenchment scheme was carried out because the validity of the scheme has been settled in its favor. Respondents might have confused the right to retrench with its actual retrenchment program, treating them as one and the same. The first, no doubt, is a valid prerogative of management; it is a right that exists for all employers. As to the second, it is always subject to scrutiny in regard to faithful compliance with substantive and procedural requirements which the law and jurisprudence have laid down. The right of an employer to dismiss an employee differs from and should not be confused with the manner in which such right is exercised.

[on #4 above]It is almost an inflexible rule that employers who contemplate terminating the services of their workers cannot be so arbitrary and ruthless as to find flimsy excuses for their decisions. This must be so considering that the dismissal of an employee from work involves not only the loss of his position but more important, his means of livelihood. Applying this caveat, it is therefore incumbent for the employer, before putting into effect any retrenchment process on its work force, to show by convincing evidence that it was being wrecked by serious financial problems. Simply declaring its state of insolvency or its impending doom will not be sufficient. To do so would render the security of tenure of workers and employees illusory. Any employer desirous of ridding itself of its employees could then easily do so without need to adduce proof in support of its action. We can not countenance this. Security of tenure is a right guaranteed to employees and workers by the Constitution and should not be denied on the basis of mere speculation.

On the requirement that the prerogative to retrench must be exercised in good faith, we have ruled that the hiring of new employees and subsequent rehiring of "retrenched" employees constitute bad faith; that the failure of the employer to resort to other less drastic measures than retrenchment seriously belies its claim that retrenchment was done in good faith to avoid losses; and that the demonstrated arbitrariness in the selection of which of its employees to retrench is further proof of the illegality of the employer's retrenchment program, not to mention its bad faith.

[on #5 above]Prominent from the above data ( in facts) is the retrenchment of cabin crew personnel due to "other reasons" which, however, are not specifically stated and shown to be for a valid cause. This is not allowed because it has no basis in fact and in law.

Moreover, in assessing the overall performance of each cabin crew personnel, PAL only considered the year 1997. This makes the evaluation of each cabin attendant's efficiency rating capricious and prejudicial to PAL employees covered by it. By discarding the cabin crew personnel's previous years of service and taking into consideration only one year's worth of job performance for evaluation, PAL virtually did away with the concept of seniority, loyalty and past efficiency, and treated all cabin attendants as if they were on equal footing, with no one more senior than the other.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. x x x FINDING respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. GUILTY of illegal dismissal [buti nga! ]

3 rulings, marked with numbers enclosed in (). Just choose 1.

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FLAVIO S. SUAREZ, JR., et. al. vs. NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATIONG.R. No. 150180 (October 17, 2008)

Facts: Respondent National Steel Corporation was engaged in the business of manufacturing steel products needed for pipe making, ship building, can-making and production of appliances. Sometime in 1994, respondent suffered substantial financial losses due to an increase in the volume of steel products manufactured by foreign countries. With this development, respondent adopted an organizational streamlining program that resulted in the retrenchment of seven hundred (700) employees in its main plant in Iligan City, among whom were herein petitioners. [The retrenched employees received a notice and a separation package including, among others, 2 months salary for every year of service, 13th month pay, and leave balance credits.] After having been paid their separation benefits, the employees, including herein petitioners, each executed and signed a release and quitclaim, written in English and containing a translation in the Visayan dialect in the same document. The release and quitclaims were acknowledged before a notary public.

Nothing was heard from the retrenched employees, until February 1997 or about two and half years after their separation from the company, when herein petitioners wrote respondent demanding payment of retirement benefits under the CBA. They claimed that they were qualified for optional retirement after having rendered services for at least ten (10) years when they were retrenched on August 18, 1994.

[Labor arbiter dismissed their claims. NLRC reversed.] CA declared that petitioners were no longer entitled to retirement benefits after having received the separation pay, and were precluded from claiming such benefits because of their quitclaims.

Issue: Whether these retrenched employees that had already received their separation pay can still recover retirement benefits.

Held: NO. (1) The retirement plan of respondent company reveals that an employee who was terminated for cause is not entitled to retirement benefits and thus explicitly prohibits the recovery of retirement benefits in cases of terminations for cause. Here, there is no dispute that petitioners were separated from the service for cause, as it was due to a valid retrenchment undertaken by respondent company. Unarguably, retrenchment is recognized as one of the authorized causes for termination of employment under Article 283 of the Labor Code, which states:

 The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to

the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operations of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof.  In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.  In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.  A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.

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Having been separated from employment due to an authorized cause, petitioners are barred from receiving retirement benefits pursuant to Article X(E) of respondent’s retirement plan. With the inclusion of such provision in the retirement plan, respondent categorically disallows payment of retirement benefits to retrenched employees. They are only entitled to payment of separation pay in accordance with Article 283 of the Labor Code.

In their Reply, petitioners argue that the term “terminations for cause” under Article X(E) of the retirement plan should be read to only include terminations for “just cause” under Article 282 of the Labor Code, or to situations wherein it is the employee that is at fault. This Court is not persuaded by this argument. Petitioners concede that the Labor Code allows terminations by the employer for “just causes” under Article 282 or “authorized causes” under Articles 283 and 284. Terminations covered by Articles 282 to 284 are all terminations by the employer for a lawful cause. In the past, this Court has had occasion to use the term “dismissal for cause” to refer to dismissals for just and/or authorized cause. Respondent’s retirement plan in referring to “terminations for cause” plainly does not distinguish between just cause and authorized causes for termination. Moreover, there is nothing in the said retirement plan which limits the term “terminations for cause” to terminations under Article 282.

(2) Apart from the abovementioned provision in the retirement plan, provisions of the CBA between the company and its employees further militate against petitioners’ contention that they are entitled to both separation pay and retirement benefits. [It] readily shows that retirement benefits shall be granted only to those employees who, after rendering at least ten (10) years of continuous services, would retire upon reaching the mandatory retirement age, or would avail of optional voluntary retirement.

A CBA is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. It covers the whole employment relationship and prescribes the rights and duties of the parties. If the terms of the CBA are clear and have no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall prevail. However, if the CBA imports ambiguity, then the parties’ intention as shown by their conduct, words, actions and deeds -- prior to, during, and after executing the agreement, must be ascertained. That there is an apparent ambiguity or a failure to express the true intention of the parties, especially with regard to the retirement provisions of the 1994-1996 CBA, is evident in the opposing interpretations of the same by the Labor Arbiter and the CA on one hand and the NLRC on the other. It is settled that the parole evidence rule admits of exceptions. A party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he raises as an issue, among others, an intrinsic ambiguity in the written agreement or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto.

In this instance to resolve all doubts as to the proper interpretation of the relevant CBA provisions, it was imperative for the CA to determine the true intent of the parties to the agreement. This juristic principle is supported by the following provision of law found in the New Civil Code:

Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties,

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their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.

Thus, while the CBA, on its face, does not contain an express prohibition of payment of retirement benefits to retrenched employees, the parties may still prove it by means of contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties to the agreement, such as the execution of the affidavits by the NASLU-FFW officers and respondent’s managers.

(3) We likewise uphold the CA’s finding that petitioners voluntarily executed and signed a release and quitclaim after receiving their separation package, acknowledging full and final payment of all benefits that they may be entitled to in relation to their employment. The validity of quitclaims executed by laborers has long been recognized in this jurisdiction. In Periquet v. National Labor Relations Commission, this Court ruled that not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement of the claims of the employee, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. Such legitimate waivers resulting from voluntary settlements of laborer’s claims should be treated and upheld as the law between the parties.

In the instant case, there is no showing that petitioners were forced or duped by respondent into signing the release and quitclaim. In their sworn quitclaim, they freely declared that they received full separation pay as well as all other amounts due them by reason of their employment. Each quitclaim was written in English and in the Visayan dialect which petitioners very well understand. Besides, the quitclaim represents a reasonable and fair settlement of petitioners’ claims as the separation package consisted of two (2) months salary for every year of service, leave balance credits, 13th month pay, uniform plus rice subsidy differential, salary differential and signing bonus. Indeed, nothing on the face of their quitclaim has been shown as unconscionable. In the absence of evidence showing coercion or intimidation in its execution, we are constrained to uphold the appellate court’s conclusion that the execution of the release and quitclaim was valid.