Macleod vs PFL

Facts:The Progressive Federation of Labor (PFL) a labor union whose members are in the

employ of Macleod & Company of the Philippines, Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) a petition stating, among other things, that on April 18, 1952 the union sent a letter to the company setting up certain grievances and demands to improve the labor conditions of its members; that the company, in reply, sent a letter to thirty-eight members of the union stating therein that they are to be dismissed from service unless they "should choose to remain in the employ of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company," and that as such dismissal would cause injustice and irrepairable injury to them, the union prayed that an injunction be issued to restrain the company from carrying out its plan of dismissal, which was opposed by the company on the ground that it did not entertain the demands because the status of the union as a legitimate labor organization has never been established as to justify its recognition as a collective bargaining agency. The company further alleged that the notice of termination of service of the thirty-eight laborers served by the company was legal.

After the efforts of the commission for amicable settlement which became futile, the case was set for hearing. The manager of the company referred to art 302 of the code of commerce that contractual employments may be cancelled at any time where no time is fixed. The employees made clear of their intention to strike.

Issue:Whether or not an employer, regardless of motives, terminate the services of his

employees upon 30 day's notification; and wether or not strikers be entitled to their wages during the strike?

Ruling:

This contention cannot be sustained for the simple reason that article 302 of the Code of Commerce has already been repealed by the new Civil Code. The cases invoked are likewise inapplicable for the reason that the doctrine therein laid down was merely an elaboration of the provisions of said article. It should be emphasized that, after the approval of the NCC, the relations between labor and capital have ceased to be merely contractual. They became impressed with public interest that for their determination, as well as the incidents arising therein, other considerations of moral and social character have to be reckoned with to promote industrial peace. This is in keeping with the spirit of social justice. The union, therefore, was justified in resorting to the only weapon it has under the law to protect its interest. It is for this reason that we say that the company was not justified in decreeing the separation of the thirty-eight employees because in so doing it resorted to ways other than what is sanctioned by law.

There is a rule that strikers may not collect their wages during the days they did not go to work because of the age-old rule governing the relation of labor and capital epitomized in a "fair day's wage for a fair day's labor" BUT does not apply in this case for the simple reason that the 38 laborers herein concerned did not voluntarily strike but were practically locked out. They were notified that on a certain date they would cease to work, and notwithstanding their efforts to

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reach a compromise, the company adopted a stern attitude which left no other alternative to them than to walk out.

Since it appears that the walkout of said employees is not of their own volition but in spite of it, it is only fair that they be reinstated with the payment of their backwages. However, as it appears that the thirty-eight laborers had been out of the services of the company for more than two years during which they may have found another employment or means of livelihood, it is the sense of the Court that whatever they may have earned during that period may be deducted from their backwages to mitigate somewhat the liability of the company. This is under the principle of unjust enrichment.

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Feati University vs Bautista

Facts: The private respondent wrote a letter to president of petitioner informing her of the

organization of the Faculty Club into a registered labor union. The Faculty club President sent another letter containing 26 demands that have connection with the employment of the members of the Faculty Club by the University, and requesting an answer within 10 days from receipt thereof. The University President answered the two letters, requesting that she be given at least 30 days to study thoroughly the different phases of the demands. Meanwhile counsel for the University, to whom the demands were referred, wrote a letter to the Faculty Club President demanding proof of its majority status and designation as a bargaining representative.  Thereafter the Faculty Club president filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor alleging as reason therefore the refusal of the University to bargain collectively. 

The parties were called to conferences but efforts to conciliate them failed. 

Members of the Faculty Club declared a strike and established picket lines in the premises of the University, resulting in the disruption of classes. President of the Philippines certified to the Court of Industrial Relations(CIR) the dispute between the management of the University and the Faculty Club pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875.

The Judge endeavored to reconcile the part and it was agreed upon that the striking faculty members would return to work and the University would readmit them under a status quo arrangement. On that very same day, however, the University, thru counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case upon the ground that the CIR has no jurisdiction over the case, because (1) the Industrial Peace Act is not applicable to the University, it being an educational institution, nor to the members of the Faculty Club, they being independent contractors; and (2) the presidential certification is violative of Section 10 of the Industrial Peace Act, as the University is not an industrial establishment and there was no industrial dispute which could be certified to the CIR.

The respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss. The University filed a motion for reconsideration by the CIR en banc, without the motion for reconsideration having been acted upon by the CIR en banc, respondent Judge set the case for hearing but the University moved the cancellation of the said hearing upon the ground that the court en banc should first hear the motion for reconsideration and resolve the issues raised therein before the case is heard on the merits but denied. Faculty Club filed with the CIR in Case 41-IPA a petition to declare in contempt of court certain parties, alleging that the University refused to accept back to work the returning strikers, in violation of the return-to-work order. The University filed its opposition to the petition for contempt by way of special defense that there was still the motion for reconsideration which had not yet been acted upon by the CIR en banc. Hence, this petition. 

Issue:

Whether or not FEATI is an employer within the purview of the Industrial Peace Act.  

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Ruling:

The SC denied the petition Based on RA 875 Section 2(c) The term employer include any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include any labor organization (otherwise than when acting as an employer) or any one acting in the capacity or agent of such labor organization. 

In the case at bar, the University is operated for profit hence included in the term of employer. Professors and instructors, who are under contract to teach particular courses and are paid for their services, are employees under the Industrial Peace Act, they are not independent contractors. The University controls the work of the members of its faculty; that it prescribes the courses or subjects that professors teach, and when and where to teach; that the professors’ work is characterized by regularity and continuity for a fixed duration; that professors are compensated for their services by wages and salaries, rather than by profits; that the professors and/or instructors cannot substitute others to do their work without the consent of the university; and that the professors can be laid off if their work is found not satisfactory.

All these indicate that the university has control over their work; and professors are, therefore, employees and NOT independent contractors.

Associated Labor Union vs Borromeo

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Facts:ALU is a duly registered labor organization, among the members thereof are employees

of Superior Gas and equipment company. In 1965 ALU and SUGECO entered into a CBA effective January 1966. There were on-going negotiations for renewal of contract late in February 1966 thereafter 12 SUGECO members resigned from ALU which stopped negotiations. ALU requested that 12 employees not be allowed to report to work, SUGECO rejected the request due to irreparable injury and that the contract lapsed. SUGECO stated that the 12 employees should rejoin ALU to resume the negotiations. ALU wrote to SUGECO of bargaining in bad faith. ALU struck and picketed in the SUGECO plant in Mandaue. SUGECO filed a case against ALU with CFI Cebu to restrain the same from picketing in the said plant and offices elsewhere in the Philippines. CFI Cebu issued a preliminary injunction prayed for by SUGECO. ALU filed charges of ULP against SUGECO with CIR, ALU filed a motion for reconsideration on the issuance of the injunction which the CFI. ALU filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against Judge Gomez and Borromeo, and SUGECO, prayed that CFI of Cebu has no jurisdiction over the case. SC annulled the preliminary injunction issued by CFI Cebu and directed to dismiss the case. The writ of injunction sought by ALU was granted. ALU resumed picketing and began to picket at the house of SUGECO's General Manager Mr. & Mrs. Lua and Cebu Home store. Mr. Lua filed a complaint with CFI Cebu to restrain ALU from picketing the store and residence and recover damages. Judge Borromeo issued an order requiring ALU to show cause order why the writ should not be issued. ALU filed a motion to dismiss assailed the jurisdiction of CFI Cebu to hear the case on the ground that it has grown out from a labor dispute. The judge denied the motion to dismiss and to reconsider his order and dissolve the writ of injunction. ALU commenced the present action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the writs and to restrain the lower court from hearing the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the strike held at the Cebu home is valid?

Held:

The SC ruled in the affirmative. Now then there is no dispute regarding the existence of a labor dispute between ALU and SUGECO-Cebu that SUGECO's Manager Mrs. Lua is the wife of the owner and manager of Cebu Home, Antonio Lua, and that Cebu home is engaged in the marketing of SUGECO products. Likewise, it is clear that as a managing member of conjugal partnership between him and his wife, Mr.Lua of the business of SUGECO and in the success o rfailure of her controversy in ALU, considering the results thereof may affect the condition of the said conjugal partnership. Similarly, as distributor of SUGECO products, the Cebu home has at least an indirect interest in the labor dispute between SUGECO and ALU. In other words, respondent herein has indirect interest in the said labor dispute, for which the reason, we find that sec. 9 of RA 875 squarely applies.

PAL vs PALEA

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Facts:4 private respondents who were members of PALEA (Philippine Air Lines Employees

Association) were dismissed on 4 May 1950. The On 31 October 1958, the Supreme Court affirmed the 13 July 1954 order, hereinafter known as Order# 1, of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), reinstating private respondents to status quo-ante without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges ,with backwages. Private respondents were reinstated on 14 January 1989 but contested the deduction taken from their backwages which was affirmed by CIR on 22 May 1960 but reversed by the Supreme Court on 26 July 1960. On 10 November 1960, private respondent moved for execution of the first order of CIR exemplifying other rights and privileges, Specifically

1. Christmas bonus from 1950 to 1958;2. Accumulated sick leave; 3. transportation allowance during lay-off period; and4. Accumulated free trip passes, both domestic and international. On 8 October 1962,

CIR granted the latest motion, hereinafter known as Order# 2, but denied (3) transportation allowances and sick leave credits to two other private respondents.

The sick leave credits are anchored on a maximum of 140 days and that retired employees cannot avail of sick leave credits – pursuant to the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA). PAL contends that the privileges were not specifically mentioned in Order #1, that Order#2 amended the first, and that the phrase without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges is to be construed after re-instatement and not during the lay-off period. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not a reinstated employee can enjoy status quo-ante as regards to rights and privileges it would have enjoyed during from the time he was dismissed to the time he was reinstated?

Ruling:

 The SC ruled in the affirmative.

If this is an absolute right and privilege enjoyed by employees, then YES; If the same is a reinstated employee enjoying a status as if he had been working during the lay-off period (from the time of his dismissal to time of his reinstatement), then NO. There is no doubt, therefore, that the private respondents enjoyed the rights and privileges enjoyed by other employees who were not laid off, subject, of course, to a CBA. Since the Christmas bonus and transportation allowances had been paid regularly to employees, it has formed part of their compensation therefore an absolute right, and thus the private respondents are entitled thereof. On the other hand, since the sick leave credits were subject to two conditions in the CBA, those conditions would govern, and in this case, the sick leave credits which the private-respondents

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are entitled to are subject to a 140 day maximum for the non-retired private-respondents and unavailability to the two other retired private-respondents. However, since the trip passes are not an absolute right of the employees, the same being subject to request and approval does not automatically operate, the same cannot be awarded to the private respondents.

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Allied workers union vs Maritima

Facts:

This is a consolidation of 3 cases involving both parties. Respondent Compania Maritima (MARITIMA), a local corp. engaged in shipping entered into a contract for lease of services with petitioner Allied Free Workers’ Union (AFWU), a duly registered legitimate labor union. In the contract, it was stipulated that AFWU will do and perform all the work of stevedoring and arrastre services of all vessels or boats of MARITIMA in Iligan City; that the contract is good and valid for 1 month starting Aug.12, 1952, but may be renewed by agreement of the parties with the reservation that MARITIMA has the right to revoke said contract even before the expiration of the term, if and when AFWU fails to render good service.

Towards the end of 1953, MARITIMA complained to AFWU of unsatisfactory and inefficient service. To remedy the situation, MARITIMA was forced to hire extra laborers from among “stand-by” workers not affiliated to any union.

On July 1954, AFWU sent a written proposal to MARITIMA for a CBA, but the latter did not reply. Thereafter, AFWU instituted an action in the CIR praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining unit composed of all the laborers doing arrastre and stevedoring work for MARITIMA, to which action MARITIMA answered, alleging lack of Employer-Employee relationship. On Aug.1954, MARITIMA informed AFWU of the termination of the contract because of the inefficient service rendered by the latter which had adversely affected its business. The termination was to take effect as of Sept.1, 1954. MARITIMA then contracted with the Iligan Stevedoring Union for the arrastre and stevedoring work. The latter agreed to perform the work subject to the same terms and conditions of the contract with AFWU. The new agreement was to be carried out on Sept.1, 1954.

On Aug.26, 1954, AFWU charged MARITIMA of unfair labor practices (ULPs) before the CIR. MARITIMA answered, again denying the Employer-Employee relationship between the parties. On Sept.9, 1954, MARITIMA filed an action to rescind the contract, enjoin AFWU members from doing arrastre and stevedoring work in connection with its vessels, and for recovery of damages against AFWU and its officers. The CFI ordered the rescission of the contract and permanently enjoined AFWU members from performing work in connection with MARITIMA’s vessels.nAFWU was later able to secure a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the maintenance of the status quo prior to Jan.6, 1961. Thus, after Jan.18, 1961, AFWU laborers were again back doing the same work as before.

On Nov.4, 1963, after almost 10 years, the CFI finally rendered its decision:

“In pursuance of the provisions of Sec.12 of R.A. 875 and the Rules of this court on certification election, the Honorable Secretary of Labor or any of his authorized representative is hereby requested to conduct certification election among all the workers and/or stevedores working in the wharf of Iligan City who are performing stevedoring and arrastre service aboard Compania Maritima vessels docking at Iligan City port in order to determine their representative for collective bargaining with the employer, whether these desire to be represented by the petitioner Allied Free Workers Union or neither; and upon termination of the said election, the result thereof shall forthwith be submitted to this court for further consideration. “

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From this ruling, both parties appealed, AFWU claiming that it should be declared outright as the majority union while MARITIMA contends that said court could not have correctly ordered a certification election considering that there was an absence of an employer-employee relationship between it and said laborers.

Issue:

Whether or not an Employer-Employee Relationship exists between the parties; If so, is the certification election issued by the CIR proper.

Ruling:

NO. Before a certification election can be held, there must exist that relationship between the parties. The duty to bargain collectively exists only between the “employer” and its “employees.” Where there is no duty to bargain collectively, it is not proper to hold certification elections in connection therewith. Reasoning In its findings, the CIR observed that after the rescission, the AFWU laborers continued working in accordance with the “CABO system,” which was the prevailing custom in the place. Under this system, the union was an independent contractor. The CIR also made a finding that prior to the contract between MARITIMA and AFWU, the former had an oral arrastre and stevedoring agreement with another union, the Iligan Laborers Union (ILU), which agreement was also based on the “CABO” system. After unsatisfactory service, MARITIMA cancelled this oral contract and entered into a new contract with AFWU, the terms and conditions of which were similar to the oral contract with ILU. The written contract between AFWU and MARITIMA was signed under the assurance by AFWU that the same arrangement previously had with the former union regarding performance and execution of arrastre and stevedoring contract be followed in accordance with the custom of such kind of work in Iligan. Thus, petitioner union operated as a labor contractor under the so-called “CABO” system.

From these findings, Insofar as the working agreement was concerned, there was no real difference between the contract and the prior oral agreement. Both were based on the “CABO” system. Hence, since the parties observed the “CABO” system after the rescission of the contract, and since the characteristics of said system show that the contracting union was an independent contractor, it is reasonable to assume that AFWU continued being an independent contractor of MARITIMA. Being an independent contractor, it could not qualify as an “employee”. With more reason would this be true with respect to the laborers. Moreover, there is no evidence at all regarding the characteristics of the working arrangement between AFWU and MARITIMA after the termination of the CONTRACT. All we have to go on is the court a quo’s finding that the “CABO” system was observed-a system that negatives employment relationship.

Since the only function of a certification election is to determine, with judicial sanction, which union shall be the official representative or spokesman of the “employees” will be, there being no relationship between the parties disputants, it follows that there is neither a duty to bargain collectively. Thus, the order for certification election in question cannot be sustained.

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Bautista vs Inciong

Facts:

This is an illegal dismissal case. The respondent Deputy Minister dismissed the complaint of herein petitioner principally on the ground that no employer-employee relationship existed between the petitioner and respondent Associated Labor Unions (ALU).

Petitioner was employed by ALU as 'Organizer' in 1972 with a starting salary of P250.00 a month. As such he paid his monthly SSS contributions, with the respondent as his employer. On March 15, 1979, He was left in the office of ALU while his other co-organizers were in Cainta, Rizal attending a certification election at Chrysler Philippines, as he was not the organizer assigned in said company. On March 16, 1979, he went on sick leave for ten (10) days. His SSS sickness benefit application form signed by ALU's physician was given to ALU for submission to the SSS. On March 16, 1979, complainant reported back for work upon expiration of his leave but was informed by ALU's Area Vice-President for Luzon of his termination effective March 15, 1979. Hence, this complaint filed on March 28, 1979. On April 18, 1979, however, ALU filed a clearance application to terminate complainant's services effective March 16, 1979 on the ground of abandonment of work.

Based on these findings, the Director ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered the respondent Union to reinstate the petitioner to his former position with full backwages and to pay him emergency allowance, 13th month pay and to refund his Mutual Aid Fund Deposit in the amount of P 370.00

Respondent ALU appealed to the Ministry of Labor. On October 23,1979, the respondent Deputy Minister set aside the order of the Director and dismissed the petitioner's complaint for lack of merit. In his order, the Deputy Minister found that the petitioner was merely accommodated by the respondent union after he was dismissed by his former employer sometime in 1972 and that his membership coverage with the SSS which shows that respondent ALU is the one paying the employer's share in the premiums is not conclusive proof that respondent is the petitioner's employer because such payments were performed by the respondent as a favor for all those who were performing full time union activities with it to entitle them to SSS benefits. The Deputy Minister further ruled that the non-existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties is bolstered by the fact that respondent ALU is not an entity for profit but a duly registered labor union whose sole purpose is the representation of its bona fide organization units where it is certified as such. Hence this petition contending that the respondent Deputy minister committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that there was no employer-employee relationship between him and the respondent union so much so that he is not entitled to the benefits that he is praying for.

Issue:

Whether or not there is exists an Employer-Employee Relationship.

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Ruling:

The SC agrees with the petitioner.

There is nothing in the records which support the Deputy Minister’s conclusion that the petitioner is not an employee of respondent ALU. The mere fact that the respondent is a labor union does not mean that it cannot be considered an employer of the persons who work for it. Much less should it be exempted from the very labor laws which it espouses as labor organization; In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are generally considered are the following:

(a) The selection and engagement of the employee; (b) The payment of wages; (c) The power of dismissal; and (d) The employer's power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. It is the so-called 'control test' that is the most important element

In the case at bar, the Regional director correctly found that the petitioner was an employee of the respondent union as reflected in the latter's individual payroll sheets and shown by the petitioner's membership with the Social Security System (SSS) and the respondent union's share of remittances in the petitioner's favor. Even more significant, is the respondent union's act of filing a clearance application with the MOL to terminate the petitioner's services. Bautista was selected and hired by the Union. He was paid wages by the Union. ALU had the power to dismiss him as indeed it dismissed him. And definitely, the Union tightly controlled the work of Bautista as one of its organizers. There is absolutely no factual or legal basis got Deputy Minister Inciong's decision. However, the records show that antipathy and antagonism between the petitioner and the respondent union militate against the former's reinstatement. ALU would not want to have a union organizer whom it does not trust and who could sabotage its efforts to unionize commercial and industrial establishments. Severance pay, therefore, is more proper in order.

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Reformist Union of RB liner vs NLRC

Facts:Reformist Union, a labor union staged a strike against R.B. Liner in 1989.   R.B. Liner

petitioned the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the dispute or certify it to the NLRC.   The Secretary certified the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.   The certified case was dismissed after the union and the company reached an agreement providing, among others, for the holding of a certification election.   Later, when the union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the company, i.e. illegal lockout that allegedly took place after the strike and the election, R.B. Liner countered with another case that sought to declare the 1989 strike illegal.  

Issue:Whether or not the company still contest the legality of the 1989 strike?

No, the company can no longer contest the legality of the strike.   The company itself sought compulsory arbitration in order to resolve that very issue.   The dispute or strike was settled when the company and the union entered into an agreement.   By acceding to the peaceful settlement brokered by the NLRC, the company waived the issue of the illegality of the strike.   The very nature of compulsory arbitration makes the settlement binding upon the company.  Compulsory arbitration has been defined both as “the process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which has the authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties,” and as a mode of arbitration where the parties are “compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party.”   Clearly, the legality of the strike can no longer be reviewed. 

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Mayor vs Macaraig

Facts:RA No. 6715 Declaring Vacant “all positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor

Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the present National Labor Relations Commissions”The old positions were declared vacant because of the “need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and functions, and upgrade their qualifications, ranks and salaries or emoluments.”

Issue: Whether or not the provisions of RA No. 6715 are constitutional.

Ruling:

The petitioners have the right to remain in office until the expiration of the terms for which they have been appointed, unless sooner removed “for cause provided by law.” A recognized cause for removal or termination is the abolition by law of his office as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of functions, or clear and explicit constitutional mandate for such termination of employment. Abolition of office is not the same as declaring that office is vacant. The latter would constitute an infringement of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.

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UFE vs NLRC

Facts: On June 22, 1988, the petitioner Union of the Filipro Employees, the sole and exclusive

bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of Nestle Philippines, (private respondent) filed a Notice of Strike at the DOLE raising the issues of CBA deadlock and unfair labor practice. Private respondent assailed the legal personality of the proponents of the said notice of strike to represent the Nestle employees, before the NCMB. This notwithstanding, the NCMB proceeded to invite the parties to attend the conciliation meetings and to which private respondent failed to attend contending that it will deal only with a negotiating panel duly constituted and mandated in accordance with the UFE Constitution and By-laws. Thereafter, Company terminated from employment all UFE Union officers, and all the members of the negotiating panel for instigating and knowingly participating in a strike staged at the Makati, Alabang, Cabuyao and Cagayan de Oro on September 11, 1987 without any notice of strike filed and a strike vote obtained for the purpose. The union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA upheld the validity of the dismissal; NLRC en banc affirmed. Subsequently, company concluded separate CBAs with the general membership of the union at Cebu/Davao and Cagayan de Oro units; Assailing the validity of these agreements, the union filed a case of ULP against the company with the NLRC-NCR Arbitration Branch Efforts to resolve the dispute amicably were taken by the NCMB but yielded negative result. Petitioner filed a motion asking the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the dispute of deadlock in collective bargaining between the parties. On October 28, 1988, Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon “certified” to the NLRC the said dispute between the UFE and Nestle, Philippines.. which reads as follows: xxx “The NLRC is further directed to call all the parties immediately and resolve the CBA deadlock within twenty (20) days from submission of the case for resolution.” Second Division of the NLRC promulgated a resolution granting wage increase and other benefits to Nestle’s employees, ruling on non-economic issues, as well as absolving the private respondent of the Unfair Labor Practice charge. Petitioner finds said resolution to be inadequate and accordingly, does not agree therewith. It filed a motion for reconsideration, denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the second division of the NLRC acted without jurisdiction in rendering

the assailed resolution, the same being rendered only by a division of the public respondent and not by en banc;

Ruling:

This case was certified on October 28, 1988 when existing rules prescribed that, it is incumbent upon the Commission en banc to decide or resolve a certified dispute. However, R.A. 6715 took effect during the pendency of this case. Aside from vesting upon each division the power to adjudicate cases filed before the Commission, said Act further provides that the divisions of the Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases within their respective territorial jurisdiction. Section 5 of RA 6715 provides as follows: xxxx The Commission may sit en banc or in five (5) divisions, each composed of three (3) members. The Commission shall sit en banc only for purposes of promulgating rules and regulations governing

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the hearing and disposition of cases before any of its divisions and regional branches and formulating policies affecting its administration and operations.

The Commission shall exercise its adjudicatory and all other powers, functions and duties through its divisions. Moreover, it is to be emphasized and it is a matter of judicial notice that since the effectivity of R.A. 6715, many cases have already been decided by the 5 divisions of the NLRC. We find no legal justification in entertaining petitioner’s claim considering that the clear intent of the amendatory provision is to expedite the disposition of labor cases filed before the Commission. To rule otherwise would not be congruous to the proper administration of justice. Accordingly, premises considered, the petition is dismissed. The resolutions of the NLRC, dated june 5, 1989 and august 8, 1989 are affirmed, except insofar as the ruling absolving the private respondent of unfair labor practice which is declared 

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Mina vs NLRC

Facts:

These cases of illegal dismissal were filed on December 11, 1981 by Anthony Farnican, Arthur Altatis and Ricardo Wangit in the first case, and Jovencio Mina and Peter Atuban in the second case. They have been consolidated since the complainants have the same causes of action against the same respondent, Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. The records do not show what their respective pay was when the complainants were all discharged on December 3, 1981.

Herein complainants were allegedly caught in the act of highgrading. According to the respondent's version, five mine patrols proceeded to 14 Vein, 23 Position, 1400 Level underground. On their way, the patrols met the respondent's mine engineer, leadman of the complainants, escorted by two security guards carrying two sacks of highgrade ore. With headlights off, the patrols went down the manway and when they reached the apprehension site, they saw the complainants breaking and pulverizing highgrade ores in the presence of the posted security guard. The mine patrols apprehended the complainants including a plastic containing the highgrade ores, including instruments aiding the crime. One of the complainants allegedly bribed the apprehending officers to let them go but the guards refused. Prior to the apprehension, the security guard on post, SG Freddie Bragado, allegedly warned the complainants to stop their illegal activity, but the complainants threatened him not to report them otherwise something would happen to him, he became a star witness in the case.

The complainants on the other hand say that they worked under the supervision of Engr. Melchor Estonilo and security guards. Allegedly, they were ordered to get out, and Engr. Estonilo padlocked their working place so they proceeded to take a crow's bath at the place where they were apprehended. They denied the allegations of the apprehending security guards and charged them to be more interested in the reward of P100.00 per apprehension plus 30% percent of the value of the allegedly recovered highgrade. That when they were apprehended, the guard on post told the patrols why they were effecting the arrest when complainants had not done anything illegal. That they were discharged illegally, without any just and valid cause. Hence the complaints filed where the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding that the complainants were illegally dismissed, which was appealed to the NRLC and also denied. But upon motion for reconsideration, Administrative Order No. 161 dated November 18, 1989 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment reorganized the NLRC and specified the place of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners.

In the motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent, the Third Division, as newly constituted, rendered its Decision and setting aside the Resolution declaring the dismissal from employment of complainants as valid. Which gave root to this petition. Petitioners claim that their motion for reconsideration should have been resolved by the same members of the Third Division who rendered the appealed decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the contention of the petitioner should be given credence.

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Ruling:

The SC ruled in the negative.

Since petitioners are from Baguio City, the Third Division of NLRC correctly took cognizance of the appealed case. As may be gleaned from the above-cited rules of NLRC, Baguio City is included in the Cordillera Administrative Region, which is assigned to the NLRC Third Division. Consequently, the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners must also be resolved by said Third Division.

The law is clear that the jurisdiction to decide cases appealed to NLRC is vested in the different divisions thereof, not in the individual commissioners assigned to each division. It is therefore of no significance as to who of the commissioners is functioning in the division at any given time. The only matter of concern is that the Commissioners voting on the motion for reconsideration were duly assigned to the division:

“. . . In ordinary parlance judges are spoken of as the courts and the courts are referred to, when the person speaking means the judge simply. It is common for persons, lawyers, and judges, as well as the law, to use these terms interchangeably. But, notwithstanding that fact, there is an important distinction between them which should be kept in mind. Courts may exist without a present judge. There may be a judge without a court. The judge may become disqualified, but such fact does not destroy the court. It simply means that there is no judge to act in the court. The courts of the Philippine Islands were created and the judges were appointed thereto later. In a few instances, the judges were appointed before the courts were established. A person may be appointed a judge and be assigned to a particular district or court subsequently. So it appears that there is an important distinction between the court, as an entity, and the person who occupies the position of judge”

As to the illegal termination aspect, the SC ruled that indeed the complainants were engaged in highgrading by substantial evidence which is a valid reason for their termination. It is well-established that factual findings of labor administrative officials, if supported by substantial evidence, are entitled not only to great respect but even to finality. The job of petitioners, as miners, although generally described as menial, is, nevertheless, of such nature as to require a substantial amount of trust and confidence on the part of respondent company. Since there is reasonable ground to believe that petitioners committed the crime of highgrading, respondent company is justified in terminating their services.

DOMINIC SARMEN

MSMG-UWP vs Ramos

Facts:In February 1990, M. Greenfield, Inc. (MGI), through its officers Saul Tawil, Carlos

Javelosa, and Renato Puangco began terminating employees. The corporation closed down one of their plants and so they said they have to retrench the number of employees. Consequently, the Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield (MSMG-UWP) filed an illegal dismissal case against MGI. The National Labor Relations Commission, chaired by Cresencio Ramos, ruled against the union. But on appeal, the decision of the NLRC was reversed and the corporation was ordered, among others, to pay the employees’ backwages. The union further appealed as they contend that the officers of the corporation should be held solidarily liable.

Issue: Whether or not the officers of the corporation should be held solidarily liable.

Held: No. A corporation is a juridical entity with legal personality separate and distinct from

those acting for and in its behalf and, in general from the people comprising it. The rule is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and employees are its sole liabilities. There is no question that MGI is guilty of illegal dismissal but the officers cannot be held solidarily liable.

It’s true that there’s a plethora of illegal dismissal cases where the SC made corporate officers personally liable but these cases usually involve corporate officers who acted in bad faith in illegally dismissing employees. Corporate directors and officers may be solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employment of corporate employees if the same is done with malice or in bad faith.

DOMINIC SARMEN

Calderon vs Carale

Facts: Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code

(PD 442) was approved. It provides in Section 13 thereof as follows: 

“The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor.” 

Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors. The appointments stated that the appointees may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office. After said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued Administrative Order No. 161, series of 1989, designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners. 

Petitioner questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and Members of the NLRC, without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to RA 6715 as amended. Petitioner insists on a mandatory compliance with RA 6715 which has in its favor the presumption of validity and which he contends that the law is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive as provided for in the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. 

Issue: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments of appointments extended by the president to government officers, in addition to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution. 

Ruling:

No. The provisions of first paragraph Art. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution is exclusive and cannot be expanded by mere act of legislation. Even the Solicitor-General stated that the provision of that law appertaining to the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments transgresses the Constitution and is therefore, without any legal basis. 

The Supreme Court held that the provisions of RA 6715, Sec. 13 is unconstitutional because it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President. 

DOMINIC SARMEN

The Court further stated that:

“the legislature cannot, upon passing law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition.” 

Thus, the Supreme Court said the appointment to NLRC positions do not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, as the provision in RA 6715 is declared unconstitutional. The NLRC Chairman and Commissioners are among those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.

DOMINIC SARMEN