Art. 280. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph:Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.

Art. 281. Probationary employment. Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.G.R. No. 148492 May 9, 2003BUENAVENTURA C. MAGSALIN & COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., petitioners, vs.NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF WORKING MEN (N.O.W.M.), RODOLFO MELGAR, ARNEL DELOS SANTOS, SILVERIO MINDAJAO, RUBEN NAVALES, BOBBY AUSTERO, RAYMUNDO GAUDICOS, CHRISTOPHER PERALTA, GIOVANI DELA CRUZ, JOSELITO OCCIDENTAL, AMADO BODASAN, FREDERIK MAGALINO, CHITO OCCIDENTAL, ALEXANDER DELOS SANTOS, DEONIL MESA, OLIVER VILLAFLOR, ROBERTO TUMONBA, RODRIGO ANGELES, ROMMEL ABAD, FELIX AVENIDO, ARMANDO AMOR, FREDERICK DE GUZMAN, CEA CARMELO, MARIANO CAETE, ALBERTO ANTONES, ROMEO BASQUINAS, ROGELIO MALINIS, EDMUNDO BAYOS, RAMIL REVADO, JOEL PIATA, OSCAR MALINAY, ROBERT REYES, JIMMY REYES, RETCHEL HAUTEA, VICTORINO TORRALBA, NOEL RUBAI, RENATO DE OCAMPO, JESUS NOZON, JOEL MALINIS, REYNALDO GREGORY, MICHAEL RUBIA, JOSELITO VILLANUEVA, LEONARDO MONDINA, EDUARDO BELLA, WILFREDO BELLA, ALBERTO MAGTIBAY, MIGUEL CUESTA, JOSE MARCOS RODRIGUEZ III, HERMINIO ROFLO, ERNIE CHAVEZ, NELSON LOGRONIO, LEONILO GALAPIN, REY PANGILINAN, LARRY JAVIER, MATIAS ARBUES, RONILO AUSTERO, ADEMAR ESTUITA, EDWIN DE LEON, RANDY DE CHAVEZ, respondents.VITUG, J.:Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., herein petitioner, engaged the services of respondent workers as "sales route helpers" for a limited period of five months. After five months, respondent workers were employed by petitioner company on a day-to-day basis. According to petitioner company, respondent workers were hired to substitute for regular sales route helpers whenever the latter would be unavailable or when there would be an unexpected shortage of manpower in any of its work places or an unusually high volume of work. The practice was for the workers to wait every morning outside the gates of the sales office of petitioner company. If thus hired, the workers would then be paid their wages at the end of the day.Ultimately, respondent workers asked petitioner company to extend to them regular appointments. Petitioner company refused. On 07 November 1997, twenty-three (23) of the "temporary" workers (herein respondents) filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for the regularization of their employment with petitioner company. The complaint was amended a number of times to include other complainants that ultimately totaled fifty-eight (58) workers. Claiming that petitioner company meanwhile terminated their services, respondent workers filed a notice of strike and a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice with the NLRC.On 01 April 1998, the parties agreed to submit the controversy, including the issue raised in the complaint for regularization of employment, for voluntary arbitration. On 18 May 1998, the voluntary arbitrator rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the thesis that respondents (then complainants) were not regular employees of petitioner company.Respondent workers filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the decision of the voluntary arbitrator, therein contending that -"1. The Voluntary Arbitrator committed errors in finding that petitioners voluntarily and knowingly agreed to be employed on a day-to-day basis; and"2. The Voluntary Arbitrator committed errors in finding that petitioners' dismissal was valid."1In its decision of 11 August 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the voluntary arbitrator, it concluded -"WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and anew one is entered:"1. Declaring petitioners as regular employees of Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. and their dismissal from employment as illegal;"2. Ordering respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. to reinstate petitioners to their former positions with full backwages, inclusive of allowances that petitioners had been receiving during their employment and 13th month pay, computed from the date of their termination up to the time of their actual reinstatement (Paramount Vinyl Product Corp. vs. NLRC, 190 SCRA 526)."2Petitioner company's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution, dated 21 May 2001, of the appellate court.The focal issues revolve around the matter of whether or not the nature of work of respondents in the company is of such nature as to be deemed necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of petitioner that could qualify them to be regular employees.The basic law on the case is Article 280 of the Labor Code. Its pertinent provisions read:"Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season."An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists."Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., is one of the leading and largest manufacturers of softdrinks in the country. Respondent workers have long been in the service of petitioner company. Respondent workers, when hired, would go with route salesmen on board delivery trucks and undertake the laborious task of loading and unloading softdrink products of petitioner company to its various delivery points.Even while the language of law might have been more definitive, the clarity of its spirit and intent, i.e., to ensure a "regular" worker's security of tenure, however, can hardly be doubted. In determining whether an employment should be considered regular or non-regular, the applicable test is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. The standard, supplied by the law itself, is whether the work undertaken is necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, a fact that can be assessed by looking into the nature of the services rendered and its relation to the general scheme under which the business or trade is pursued in the usual course. It is distinguished from a specific undertaking that is divorced from the normal activities required in carrying on the particular business or trade. But, although the work to be performed is only for a specific project or seasonal, where a person thus engaged has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or is merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as being sufficient to indicate the necessity or desirability of that activity to the business or trade of the employer. The employment of such person is also then deemed to be regular with respect to such activity and while such activity exists.3The argument of petitioner that its usual business or trade is softdrink manufacturing and that the work assigned to respondent workers as sales route helpers so involves merely "postproduction activities," one which is not indispensable in the manufacture of its products, scarcely can be persuasive. If, as so argued by petitioner company, only those whose work are directly involved in the production of softdrinks may be held performing functions necessary and desirable in its usual business or trade, there would have then been no need for it to even maintain regular truck sales route helpers. The nature of the work performed must be viewed from a perspective of the business or trade in its entirety4 and not on a confined scope.The repeated rehiring of respondent workers and the continuing need for their services clearly attest to the necessity or desirability of their services in the regular conduct of the business or trade of petitioner company. The Court of Appeals has found each of respondents to have worked for at least one year with petitioner company. While this Court, in Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora,5 has upheld the legality of a fixed-term employment, it has done so, however, with a stern admonition that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the period has been imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, then it should be struck down as being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy. The pernicious practice of having employees, workers and laborers, engaged for a fixed period of few months, short of the normal six-month probationary period of employment, and, thereafter, to be hired on a day-to-day basis, mocks the law. Any obvious circumvention of the law cannot be countenanced. The fact that respondent workers have agreed to be employed on such basis and to forego the protection given to them on their security of tenure, demonstrate nothing more than the serious problem of impoverishment of so many of our people and the resulting unevenness between labor and capital. A contract of employment is impressed with public interest. The provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and "the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other."6With respect to the "Release, Waiver and Quitclaim" executed by thirty-six (36) of the original complainants, namely, Rommel Abad, Armando Amor, Bobby Austero, Felix Avenido, Amado Badasan, Edmundo Bayos, Eduardo Bella, Jr., Mariano Caete, Carmelo Cea, Ernie Chavez, Randy Dechaves, Frederick De Guzman, Renato De Ocampo, Ademar Estuita, Leonilo Galapin, Raymund Gaudicos, Retchel Hautea, Larry Javier, Nelson Logrinio, Alberto Magtibay, Frederick Magallano, Rogelio Malinis, Rodolfo Melgar, Silverio Mindajao, Leonardo Mondina, Ruben Navales, Rey Pangilinan, Christopher Peralta, Jimmy Reyes, Herminio Roflo, Michael Rubia, Noel Rubia, Roberto Tumomba, Oliver Villaflor, and Joselito Villanueva, this Court finds the execution of the same to be in order. During the pendency of the appeal with the Court of Appeals, these thirty-six (36) complainants individually executed voluntarily a release, waiver and quitclaim and received from petitioner company the amount of fifteen thousand (P15,000.00) pesos each. The amount accords with the disposition of the case by the voluntary arbitrator thusly:"WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the herein complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit."However, we cannot completely negate the fact that complainants did and do actually render services to the Company. It is with this in mind and considering the difficulty the complainants may face in looking for another job in case they are no longer re-engaged that we direct the company to pay complainants Fifteen Thousand Pesos each (P15,000.00) as financial assistance. It is however understood that the financial assistance previously extended by the Company to some of the complainants shall be deducted from the financial assistance herein awarded."7The receipt of the amount awarded by the voluntary arbitrator, as well as the execution of a release, waiver and quitclaim, is, in effect, an acceptance of said decision. There is nothing on record which could indicate that the execution thereof by thirty-six (36) of the respondent workers has been attended by fraud or deceit. While quitclaims executed by employees are commonly frowned upon as being contrary to public policy and are ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of their legal rights, there are, however, legitimate waivers that represent a voluntary and reasonable settlement of laborers' claims which should be so respected by the Court as the law between the parties.8 Where the person making the waiver has done so voluntarily, with a full understanding thereof, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as being a valid and binding undertaking. "Dire necessity" is not an acceptable ground for annulling the release, when it is not shown that the employee has been forced to execute it.9WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 47872 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the "Release, Waiver and Quitclaim" executed by the thirty-six (36) individual respondents are hereby declared VALID and LEGAL.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 70705 August 21, 1989MOISES DE LEON, petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and LA TONDE;A INC., respondents. FERNAN, C.J.:This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside: (1) the majority decision dated January 28, 1985 of the National Labor Relations Commission First Division in Case No. NCR- 83566-83, which reversed the Order dated April 6,1984 of Labor Arbiter Bienvenido S. Hernandez directing the reinstatement of petitioner Moises de Leon by private respondent La Tonde;a Inc. with payment of backwages and other benefits due a regular employee; and, (2) the Resolution dated March 21, 1985 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. It appears that petitioner was employed by private respondent La Tonde;a Inc. on December 11, 1981, at the Maintenance Section of its Engineering Department in Tondo, Manila. 1 His work consisted mainly of painting company building and equipment, and other odd jobs relating to maintenance. He was paid on a daily basis through petty cash vouchers.In the early part of January, 1983, after a service of more than one (1) year, petitioner requested from respondent company that lie be included in the payroll of regular workers, instead of being paid through petty cash vouchers. Private respondent's response to this request was to dismiss petitioner from his employment on January 16, 1983. Having been refused reinstatement despite repeated demands, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, reinstatement and payment of backwages before the Office of the Labor Arbiter of the then Ministry now Department of Labor and Employment. Petitioner alleged that he was dismissed following his request to be treated as a regular employee; that his work consisted of painting company buildings and maintenance chores like cleaning and operating company equipment, assisting Emiliano Tanque Jr., a regular maintenance man; and that weeks after his dismissal, he was re-hired by the respondent company indirectly through the Vitas-Magsaysay Village Livelihood Council, a labor agency of respondent company, and was made to perform the tasks which he used to do. Emiliano Tanque Jr. corroborated these averments of petitioner in his affidavit. 2 On the other hand, private respondent claimed that petitioner was not a regular employee but only a casual worker hired allegedly only to paint a certain building in the company premises, and that his work as a painter terminated upon the completion of the painting job. On April 6, 1984, Labor Arbiter Bienvenido S. Hernandez rendered a decision 3 finding the complaint meritorious and the dismissal illegal; and ordering the respondent company to reinstate petitioner with full backwages and other benefits. Labor Arbiter Hernandez ruled that petitioner was not a mere casual employee as asserted by private respondent but a regular employee. He concluded that the dismissal of petitioner from the service was prompted by his request to be included in the list of regular employees and to be paid through the payroll and is, therefore, an attempt to circumvent the legal obligations of an employer towards a regular employee. Labor Arbiter Hernandez found as follows: After a thorough examination of the records of the case and evaluation of the evidence and versions of the parties, this Office finds and so holds that the dismissal of complainant is illegal. Despite the impressive attempt of respondents to show that the complainant was hired as casual and for the work on particular project, that is the repainting of Mama Rosa Building, which particular work of painting and repainting is not pursuant to the regular business of the company, according to its theory, we find differently. Complainant's being hired on casual basis did not dissuade from the cold fact that such painting of the building and the painting and repainting of the equipment and tools and other things belonging to the company and the odd jobs assigned to him to be performed when he had no painting and repainting works related to maintenance as a maintenance man are necessary and desirable to the better operation of the business company. Respondent did not even attempt to deny and refute the corroborating statements of Emiliano Tanque Jr., who was regularly employed by it as a maintenance man doing same jobs not only of painting and repainting of building, equipment and tools and machineries or machines if the company but also other odd jobs in the Engineering and Maintenance Department that complainant Moises de Leon did perform the same odd jobs and assignments as were assigned to him during the period de Leon was employed for more than one year continuously by Id respondent company. We find no reason not to give credit and weight to the affidavit and statement made therein by Emiliano Tanque Jr. This strongly confirms that complainant did the work pertaining to the regular business in which the company had been organized. Respondent cannot be permitted to circumvent the law on security of tenure by considering complainant as a casual worker on daily rate basis and after working for a period that has entitled him to be regularized that he would be automatically terminated. ... . 4 On appeal, however, the above decision of the Labor Arbiter was reversed by the First Division of the National Labor Relations Commission by virtue of the votes of two members 5 which constituted a majority. Commissioner Geronimo Q. Quadra dissented, voting "for the affirmation of the well-reasoned decision of the Labor Arbiter below." 6 The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this recourse. Petitioner asserts that the respondent Commission erred and gravely abuse its discretion in reversing the Order of the Labor Arbiter in view of the uncontroverted fact that the tasks he performed included not only painting but also other maintenance work which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of private respondent: hence, the reversal violates the Constitutional and statutory provisions for the protection of labor. The private respondent, as expected, maintains the opposite view and argues that petitioner was hired only as a painter to repaint specifically the Mama Rosa building at its Tondo compound, which painting work is not part of their main business; that at the time of his engagement, it was made clear to him that he would be so engaged on a casual basis, so much so that he was not required to accomplish an application form or to comply with the usual requisites for employment; and that, in fact, petitioner was never paid his salary through the regular payroll but always through petty cash vouchers. 7The Solicitor General, in his Comment, recommends that the petition be given due course in view of the evidence on record supporting petitioner's contention that his work was regular in nature. In his view, the dismissal of petitioner after he demanded to be regularized was a subterfuge to circumvent the law on regular employment. He further recommends that the questioned decision and resolution of respondent Commission be annulled and the Order of the Labor Arbiter directing the reinstatement of petitioner with payment of backwages and other benefits be upheld. 8 After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court finds merit in the petition as We sustain the position of the Solicitor General that the reversal of the decision of the Labor Arbiter by the respondent Commission was erroneous. The law on the matter is Article 281 of the Labor Code which defines regular and casual employment as follows: Art. 281. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of a written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists.This provision reinforces the Constitutional mandate to protect the interest of labor. Its language evidently manifests the intent to safeguard the tenurial interest of the worker who may be denied the rights and benefits due a regular employee by virtue of lopsided agreements with the economically powerful employer who can maneuver to keep an employee on a casual status for as long as convenient. Thus, contrary agreements notwithstanding, an employment is deemed regular when the activities performed by the employee are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. Not considered regular are the so-called "project employment" the completion or termination of which is more or less determinable at the time of employment, such as those employed in connection with a particular construction project 9 and seasonal employment which by its nature is only desirable for a limited period of time. However, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or intermittent, is deemed regular with respect to the activity he performed and while such activity actually exists. The primary standard, therefore, of determining a regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also, if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is also considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists. In the case at bar, the respondent company, which is engaged in the business of manufacture and distillery of wines and liquors, claims that petitioner was contracted on a casual basis specifically to paint a certain company building and that its completion rendered petitioner's employment terminated. This may have been true at the beginning, and had it been shown that petitioner's activity was exclusively limited to painting that certain building, respondent company's theory of casual employment would have been worthy of consideration.However, during petitioner's period of employment, the records reveal that the tasks assigned to him included not only painting of company buildings, equipment and tools but also cleaning and oiling machines, even operating a drilling machine, and other odd jobs assigned to him when he had no painting job. A regular employee of respondent company, Emiliano Tanque Jr., attested in his affidavit that petitioner worked with him as a maintenance man when there was no painting job. It is noteworthy that, as wisely observed by the Labor Arbiter, the respondent company did not even attempt to negate the above averments of petitioner and his co- employee. Indeed, the respondent company did not only fail to dispute this vital point, it even went further and confirmed its veracity when it expressly admitted in its comment that, "The main bulk of work and/or activities assigned to petitioner was painting and other related activities. Occasionally, he was instructed to do other odd things in connection with maintenance while he was waiting for materials he would need in his job or when he had finished early one assigned to him. 10 The respondent Commission, in reversing the findings of the Labor Arbiter reasoned that petitioner's job cannot be considered as necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer because, "Painting the business or factory building is not a part of the respondent's manufacturing or distilling process of wines and liquors. 11The fallacy of the reasoning is readily apparent in view of the admitted fact that petitioner's activities included not only painting but other maintenance work as well, a fact which even the respondent Commission, like the private respondent, also expressly recognized when it stated in its decision that, 'Although complainant's (petitioner) work was mainly painting, he was occasionally asked to do other odd jobs in connection with maintenance work. 12 It misleadingly assumed that all the petitioner did during his more than one year of employment was to paint a certain building of the respondent company, whereas it is admitted that he was given other assignments relating to maintenance work besides painting company building and equipment. It is self-serving, to say the least, to isolate petitioner's painting job to justify the proposition of casual employment and conveniently disregard the other maintenance activities of petitioner which were assigned by the respondent company when he was not painting. The law demands that the nature and entirety of the activities performed by the employee be considered. In the case of petitioner, the painting and maintenance work given him manifest a treatment consistent with a maintenance man and not just a painter, for if his job was truly only to paint a building there would have been no basis for giving him other work assignments In between painting activities. It is not tenable to argue that the painting and maintenance work of petitioner are not necessary in respondent's business of manufacturing liquors and wines, just as it cannot be said that only those who are directly involved in the process of producing wines and liquors may be considered as necessary employees. Otherwise, there would have been no need for the regular Maintenance Section of respondent company's Engineering Department, manned by regular employees like Emiliano Tanque Jr., whom petitioner often worked with.Furthermore, the petitioner performed his work of painting and maintenance activities during his employment in respondent's business which lasted for more than one year, until early January, 1983 when he demanded to be regularized and was subsequently dismissed. Certainly, by this fact alone he is entitled by law to be considered a regular employee. And considering further that weeks after his dismissal, petitioner was rehired by the company through a labor agency and was returned to his post in the Maintenance Section and made to perform the same activities that he used to do, it cannot be denied that as activities as a regular painter and maintenance man still exist. It is of no moment that petitioner was told when he was hired that his employment would only be casual, that he was paid through cash vouchers, and that he did not comply with regular employment procedure. Precisely, the law overrides such conditions which are prejudicial to the interest of the worker whose weak bargaining position needs the support of the State. That determines whether a certain employment is regular or casual is not the will and word of the employer, to which the desperate worker often accedes, much less the procedure of hiring the employee or the manner of paying his salary. It is the nature of the activities performed in relation to the particular business or trade considering all circumstances, and in some cases the length of time of its performance and its continued existence. Finally, considering its task to give life and spirit to the Constitutional mandate for the protection of labor, to enforce and uphold our labor laws which must be interpreted liberally in favor of the worker in case of doubt, the Court cannot understand the failure of the respondent Commission to perceive the obvious attempt on the part of the respondent company to evade its obligations to petitioner by dismissing the latter days after he asked to be treated as a regular worker on the flimsy pretext that his painting work was suddenly finished only to rehire him indirectly weeks after his dismissal and assign him to perform the same tasks he used to perform. The devious dismissal is too obvious to escape notice. The inexplicable disregard of established and decisive facts which the Commission itself admitted to be so, in justifying a conclusion adverse to the aggrieved laborer clearly spells a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission are hereby annulled and set aside. The Order of Labor arbiter Bienvenido S. Hernandez dated April 6, 1984 is reinstated. Private respondent is ordered to reinstate petitioner as a regular maintenance man and to pay petitioner 1) backwages equivalent to three years from January 16,1983, in accordance with the Aluminum Wage Orders in effect for the period covered, 2) ECOLA 3) 13th Month Pay, 4) and other benefits under pertinent Collective Bargaining Agreements, if any. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 176627 August 24, 2007GLORY PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, vs.BUENAVENTURA B. VERGARA and ROSELYN T. TUMASIS, Respondents.YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:This petition1 for review on certiorari assails the September 18, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73377 which set aside the December 20, 2001 Decision and July 22, 2002 Order of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 022914-00 and declared that respondents Buenaventura B. Vergara and Roselyn T. Tumasis were illegally dismissed; and the February 6, 2007 Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration.Petitioner Glory Philippines, Inc. manufactures money-counting machines. In June 1998, it created a Parts Inspection Section (PIS) tasked to inspect the machine parts for exportation to its exclusive buyer, Glory Limited Japan (Glory Japan).Petitioner hired respondents on July 6, 1998, allegedly as members of the PIS. However, the employment contracts4 which they signed only on August 18, 1998, indicated them as Production Operators in the Production Section with a daily wage of Php188.00. The contracts covered the period from July 31 to August 30, 1998.Thereafter, respondents employment contracts were extended on a monthly basis. For the periods from August 31 to October 20, 1998, and October 21 to November 30, 1998, respondents signed their respective employment contracts designating them as members of the PIS. From December 1, 1998 to April 27, 1999, respondents performed the same duties and responsibilities despite the absence of employment contracts. On April 27, 1999, however, they were each made to sign employment contracts5 covering the period from February 28 to April 30, 1999.On April 26, 1999,6 petitioners President, Mr. Takeo Oshima, informed the Assistant Manager that the contractual employees in the PIS would no longer be needed by the company as Glory Japan had cancelled its orders.Nevertheless, despite the alleged lack of need for respondents services, petitioner claimed that it reluctantly agreed to extend respondents employment due to their insistent pleas. Thus, for the period from May 1 to May 15, 1999, respondents signed employment contracts with a higher wage of Php200.00 a day.Respondents claimed that they continued to work until May 25, 1999 when, at the close of working hours, petitioners security guard advised them that their employment had been terminated and that they would no longer be allowed to enter the premises. Consequently, on May 27, 1999, they filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal with the Department of Labor and Employment, Region IV. The cases were subsequently referred to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for resolution.On October 29, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision7 finding that respondents were regular employees because they performed activities desirable to the usual business or trade of petitioner for almost eleven (11) months; and that they were illegally dismissed for lack of just cause and non-observance of due process. Thus:Hence, in accordance with Art. 280, we believe as we ought to believe that complainants [herein respondents] were regular employees since their engagement was not fixed for a specific project or undertaking for a particular season. As regular employees, complainants had all the rights to security of tenure.x x x xAfter a careful perusal of the record of this case, we could not find any glimpse of just cause and the observance of due process before and during the termination of complainants services. In this case, only general allegations were asserted by respondent such as "declining order from Glory Japan coupled with poor work performance of complainants" to justify the dismissal of the latter. This afterthought averment, in the absence of any substantial evidence to prove respondents defense, should be considered as empty allegation and must miserably fail.Thus, we declare as we ought to declare that the dismissal of complainants Vergara and Tumasis were (sic) illegal in the absence of any just cause as enunciated in Art. 282 and the non-observance of due process in the termination of complainants services.8On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter. However, upon motion for reconsideration, the NLRC reversed and set aside its earlier decision9 and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC ruled that respondents were project employees and that their employment was terminated upon expiration of their employment contracts. Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied hence, they filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. On September 18, 2006, the appellate court granted the petition, as follows:WHEREFORE, the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS GRANTED.The DECISION dated December 20, 2001 and the ORDER dated July 22, 2002 are SET ASIDE and the DECISION of Labor Arbiter Dominador B. Medroso, Jr. dated October 29, 1999 is REINSTATED subject to the following MODIFICATIONS:1. Should the reinstatement of the petitioners [herein respondents] be no longer feasible because the section/division to which they used to be assigned no longer exists, separation pay equivalent to 1 month salary for every year of service from the time of dismissal until finality of this DECISION shall be paid;2. Full backwages to be paid to the petitioners shall be from the time of dismissal until actual reinstatement or, in case separation pay is proper, until finality of this DECISION; and3. Other monetary awards granted in the DECISION dated October 29, 1999 shall be paid reckoned from the start of their employment until their actual reinstatement or, in case separation pay is proper, until finality of this DECISION.The case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the prompt computation of the benefits in favor of the petitioners as hereby determined.The private respondent shall pay costs of suit.SO ORDERED.10Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied hence, this petition raising the following issues:11A.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND MANIFEST ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE LABOR ARBITERS DECISION FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE REGULAR EMPLOYEES OF THE PETITIONERB.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND MANIFEST ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE LABOR ARBITERS DECISION FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS WERE ILLEGALLY DISMISSEDC.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND MANIFEST ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE LABOR ARBITERS DECISION FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO BACKWAGES, SEPARATION PAY, 13TH MONTH PAY AND SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE PAYPetitioner claims that respondents were contractual and/or project employees because their employment was dependent on the transaction with Glory Japan. Respondents, on the other hand, claim that they were regular employees and that they were dismissed without just or authorized cause and due process of law.The issues for resolution are: 1) whether respondents were regular employees; and 2) whether respondents were illegally dismissed.The petition lacks merit.In Perpetual Help Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Faburada,12 we explained that there are three kinds of employees as provided under Article 280 of the Labor Code, thus:Article 280 of the Labor Code provides for three kinds of employees: (1) regular employees or those who have been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; (2) project employees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season; and (3) casual employees or those who are neither regular nor project employees x x x.13There is no merit in petitioners claim that respondents were project employees whose employment was coterminous with the transaction with Glory Japan.In Grandspan Development Corporation v. Bernardo,14 the Court held that the principal test for determining whether particular employees are properly characterized as project employees, as distinguished from regular employees, is whether or not the project employees were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration and scope of which were specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project. As defined, project employees are those workers hired (1) for a specific project or undertaking, and (2) the completion or termination of such project or undertaking has been determined at the time of engagement of the employee.15In the instant case, respondents employment contracts failed to state the specific project or undertaking for which they were allegedly engaged. While petitioner claims that respondents were hired for the transaction with Glory Japan, the same was not indicated in the contracts. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, nothing therein suggested or even hinted that their employment was dependent on the continuous patronage of Glory Japan.16Further, the employment contracts did not indicate the duration and scope of the project or undertaking as required by law. It is not enough that an employee is hired for a specific project or phase of work to qualify as a project employee. There must also be a determination of, or a clear agreement on, the completion or termination of the project at the time the employee was engaged,17 which is absent in this case.Respondents were given pro forma employment contracts which were repeatedly renewed upon petitioners behest. Respondents were hired on July 6, 1998 but signed their initial employment contracts only on August 18, 1998. The contracts covered the period from July 31 to August 30, 1998 and respondents were designated therein as Production Operators. Thereafter, respondents were hired as members of the PIS and their employment contracts were extended several times, to wit: from August 31 to October 20, 1998; from October 21 to November 30, 1998; from February 28 to April 30, 1999; and, from May 1 to May 15, 1999.It bears stressing that from December 1, 1998 to April 27, 1999, respondents reported for work despite the absence of employment contracts. On April 27, 1999, however, they were belatedly made to sign employment contracts for the period from February 28 to April 30, 1999. Although petitioners transaction with Glory Japan was terminated sometime in April 1999, yet respondents were allowed to work without interruption until May 25, 1999. In fact, petitioner even paid them higher salaries of Php200.00 a day.To our mind, the foregoing factual circumstances negate petitioners claim that respondents were project employees. We quote with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals, as follows:The manner by which the private respondent [herein petitioner] dealt with the petitioners [herein respondents] was obviously plagued with basic irregularities. Although they were supposedly hired as PSI staff and started working on July 6, 1998, they were still made to sign individual pro forma employment contracts only much later i.e., on August 18, 1999, with their employment position being stated therein as production operators in the Production Section being purportedly extended from July 31, 1998 to August 30, 1998. From then until October 20, 1998, they were made to sign employment contracts on more or less month-to-month terms for the position of PSI staff. Thereafter, they continued working for the private respondent from December 1, 1998 until April 27, 1999 even if they had [not] signed any written contract for such employment period. We are baffled why they were once again made to signify on April 27, 1999 their conformity to an employment contract for the period from February 28, 1999 to April 30, 1999 and later to another contract for the period from May 1, 1999 to May 15, 1999.To us, the private respondents illegal intention became clearer from such acts. Its making the petitioners sign written employment contracts a few days before the purported end of their employment periods (as stated in such contracts) was a diaphanous ploy to set periods with a view for their possible severance from employment should the private respondent so willed it. If the term of the employment was truly determined at the beginning of the employment, why was there delay in the signing of the ready-made contracts that were entirely prepared by the employer? Also, the changes in the positions supposedly held by the petitioners in the company belied the private respondents adamant contention that the petitioners were hired solely for the purpose of manning PIS during its alleged dry run period that ended on October 20, 1998. We view such situation as a very obvious ploy of the private respondent to evade the petitioners eventual regularization.18Likewise, we cannot give credence to petitioners claim that respondents were fixed term employees. Petitioners reliance on our ruling in Philippine Village Hotel v. National Labor Relations Commission19 is misplaced because the facts in the said case are not in all fours with the case at bar. In said case, the employees were hired only for a one-month period and their employment contracts were never renewed. In the instant case, respondents original employment contracts were renewed four times. In the last instance, their contracts were extended despite the cessation of petitioners alleged transaction with Glory Japan. Thus, respondents were continuously under the employ of petitioner, performing the same duties and responsibilities, from July 6, 1998 to May 25, 1999.In Philips Semiconductors (Phils.), Inc. v. Fadriquela,20 we held that such a continuing need for respondents services is sufficient evidence of the necessity and indispensability of their services to petitioners business.21 Consequently, we find that respondents were regular employees defined under Article 280 of the Labor Code as those who have been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of petitioner.Respondents are entitled to security of tenure notwithstanding the contrary provisions of their employment contracts. Under the Labor Code, the requirements for the lawful dismissal of an employee are two-fold, the substantive and the procedural aspects. Not only must the dismissal be for a valid or authorized cause, the rudimentary requirements of due process - notice and hearing must, likewise, be observed before an employee may be dismissed. Without the concurrence of the two, the termination would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal.22As an employer, petitioner has the burden of proving that respondents dismissal was for a cause allowed under the law and that they were afforded due process. However, it failed to discharge this burden. While it claims that the dismissal was due to the expiration of respondents employment contracts and the termination of the transaction with Glory Japan, the facts and evidence show otherwise. Indeed, the periods of employment were imposed in circumvention of respondents right to security of tenure. Time and again, we held that the practice of imposing a limited period in an employment contract to circumvent the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy or morals.23 So it is in this case.1avvphi1In sum, we find no reason to deviate from the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were regular employees and that they were illegally dismissed by petitioner.Under Article 27924 of the Labor Code, an employee who was illegally dismissed from work is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer feasible, separation pay shall be granted in lieu of reinstatement.25It appears that respondents were paid the amount of Php91,015.15 corresponding to their payroll reinstatement from March 29, 1999 up to November 30, 2000.26 The said amount should thus be deducted from the computation for respondents backwages.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 18, 2006 Decision and the February 6, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 73377 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Respondents are entitled to: a) reinstatement, and if reinstatement is no longer feasible, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service; b) full backwages from the time the compensation was withheld until actual reinstatement or, in case separation pay is proper, until finality of this Decision less the amount of Php90,015.15; and c) 13th Month Pay and Service Incentive Leave Pay reckoned from the start of their employment until actual reinstatement or, in case separation pay is proper, until finality of this Decision.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 125606 October 7, 1998SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, THIRD DIVISION, and FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, JR., respondents.QUISUMBING, J.:Before us is the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking on set aside the April 18, 1996 Decision 1 and the May 30, 1996 Resolution 2 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission 3 in NLRC CA No. 009490-95. Said decision reversed the JUne 30, 1995 judgment 4 of the labor Artiber 5 in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-05954-94, and oredered the reinstatement of private respondent as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assiled decision is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby entered ordering herein respondent San Miguel Corporation to reinstate complainant to his former position with full backwages from the time he was dismissed from work until he is actually reinstated without loss of seniority rights and ther benefits, less earning elsewhere, if any. 6The facts on record show that in November 1990, private respondent was hired by petitioner as helper/bricklayer for a specific project, the repair and upgrading of furnace C at its Manila Glass Plant. His contract of employment provided that said temporary employment was for a specific period of approximately four (4) months.On April 30, 1991, private respondent was able to complete the repair and upgrading fo furnace C. Thus, his services were terminated on that same day as there was no more work to be done. His employment contract also ended that day.On May 10, 1991, private respondent was again hired for a specific job or undertaking, which involved the draining/cooling down of fuenace F and the emergency repair of furnace E. This project was for a specific period of approximately three (3) months.After the complesion of this task, namely the draining/cooling down of furnace F and the emergency repair of furnace E, at the end of July 1991, private respondent's services were terminated.On August 1, 1991, complainant saw his name in a Memorandum posted at the Company's Bulletin Board as among those who were considered dismissed.On August 12, 1994, or after the lapse of more than three (3) years from the completion of the last undertaking for which private respondent wa hired, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 08-05954-94. 7Both parties submitted their respective position papers, reply and rejoinder to labor Arbiter Felipe Garduque II. On JUne 30, 1995, he rendered the decision dismissing said complaint for lack of merit. In his ruling Labor Arbiter Garduque sustained petitioner's argument that private respondent was a project employee. The position of a helper does not fall within the classification of regular employees. Hence, complainant never attained regular employment status. Moreover, his silence for more than three (3) years without any reasonable explanation tended to weken his claim. 8Not satisfied with the decision, private respondent interposed his appeal with public respondent NLRC on August 8, 1995 Petitioner filed its opposition thereto on August 29, 1995.On April 18, 1996, public respondent NLRC, promulgated its assailed decision, reversing Labor Arbiter Garduque's decision. In its ruling, public respondent made the following findings:Respondent scheme of subsequently re-hiring complainant after only ten (10) days from the last day of the expiration of his contract of employment for a specific period, and giving him again another contract of employment for another specific period cannot be countenanced. This is one way of doing violence to the employee's constitutional right to security of tenure under which even employees under probationary status are amply protected.Under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case we find that herein complainant was indeed illegally dismissed. Respondent failed to adduce substantial evidence to prove that Francisco de Guzman, Jr. was dismissed for a just or authorized cause and after due process. The only reason they advance is that his contract of employment which is for a specific period had already expired. We, however, find this scheme, as discussed earlier, no in accordance with law. 9Petitioner then moved for the reconsideration of said decision. This was however denied by public respondent on May 30, 1996 as it found no cogent reason, or patent or palpable error, that would warrant the disturbance of the decision sought to be reconsidered.Hence, this petition, based on the following grounds:1. RESPONDENT NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO RULE THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS A PROJECT OR A FIXED PERIOD EMPLOYEE.2. RESPONDENT NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT PETITIONER VIOLATED PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE AND THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED.3. RESPONDENT NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT LACHES OR SILENCE OR INACTION FOR AN UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME DID NOT BAR PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CLAIM.Given these ground, this petition may be resolved once the following issues are clarified: (a) What is tile nature of the employment of private respondent, that of a project employee or a regular employee? and (b) Was he terminated legally or dismissed illegally?As a general rule the factual findings and conclusions drawn by the National Labor Relations Commission are accorded not only great weight and respect, but even clothed with finality and deemed binding on the Court, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. However, when such findings and those of the Labor Arbiter are in conflict, it behooves this Court to scrutinize the records of the case, particularly the evidence presented, to arrive at a correct decision. 10Art. 280 of the Labor Code defines regular, project and casual employment as follows:Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of one parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists.The above mentioned provision reinforces the Constitutional mandate to protect the interest of labor as it sets the legal framework for ascertaining one's nature of employment, and distinguishing different kinds of employees. Its language manifests the intent to safeguard the tenurial interes of worker who may be denied the enjoyment of the rights and benefits due to an employee, regardless of the nature of his employment, by virtue of lopsided agreements which the economically powerful employer who can maneuver to keep an employee on a casual or contractual status for as long as it is convenient to the employer.Thus, under Article 280 of the Labor Code, an employment is deemed regular when the activities performed by the employee are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer even if the parties enter into an agreement tating otherwise. But considered not regular under said Article (1) the so-called "project employment" the termination of which is more or less determinable at the time of employment, such as those connected, which by its nature is only for one season of the year and the employment is limited for the duration of that season, such as the Christmas holiday season. Nevertheless, an exception to this exception is made: any employee who has rendered at least one (1) year of service, whether continuous or intermitent, with respect to the activity he performed and while such activity actually exists, must be deemed regular.Following Article 280, whether one is employed as a project employee or not would depend on whether he was hired to carry out a "specific project or undertaking", the duration and scope of which were specified at the time his services were engaged for that particular project. 11 Another factor that may be undertaken by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer, if without specifying the duration and scope, the work to be undertaken is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, then it is regular employment and not just "project" must less "casual" employment.Thus, the nature of one's employment does not depend on the will or word of the employer. Nor on the procedure of hiring and the manner of designating the employee, but on the nature of the activities to be performed by the employee, considering the employer's nature of business 12 and the duration and scope of the work to be done.In ALU-TUCP vs NLRC, 13 this Court discussed two types of projects:In the realm of business and industry, we note that project could refer to one or the other of at least two (2) distinguishable types of activities. Firstly, a project could refer to a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of the employer company, but which is distinct at separate, and identifiable as such, from the other undertakings of the company. Such job or undertaking begins and ends at determined or determinable times. . . . The term project could also refer to, secondly, a particular job or undertaking that is not within the regular business of the corporation. Such a job or undertaking must also be identifiably separate and distinct from the ordinary or regular business operations of the employer. The job or undertaking also begins and ends at determined or determinable times . . . (Underscoring supplied)Public respondent NLRC's findings that herein private respondent is a regular employee is erraneous as the latter's employment clearly falls within the definition of "project employees" under paragraph 1 of Article 280 of the Labor Code and such is a typical example of the second kind of project employment in the ALU TUCP case discussed aboveNote that the plant where private respondent was employed for only even months is engaged in the manufacturer of glass, an integral component of the packaging and manufacturing business of petitioner. The process of manufacturing glass requires a furnace, which has a limited operating life. Petitioner resorted to hiring project or fixed term employees in having said furnaces repaired since said activity is not regularly performed. Said furnaces are to be repaired or overhauled only in case of need and after being used continuously for a varying period of five (5) to ten (10) years.In 1990, one of the furnaces of petitioner required repair and upgrading. This was a undertaking distinct and separate from petitioner's business of manufacturing glass. For this purpose, petitioner must hire workers to undertake the said repair and upgrading. Private respondent was, thus, hired by petitioner on November 28, 1990 on a "temporary status for a specific job" for a determined period of approximately four monthsUpon completion of the undertaking, or on April 30, 1991, private respondent's services were terminated. A few days, thereafter, two of petitioner's furnaces required "draining/coolong down" and "emergency repair". Private respondent was again hired on May 10, 1991 to help in the new undertaking, which would take approximately three (3) months to accomplish. Upon completion of the second undertaking, private respondent's services were likewise terminated. 14 He was not hired a third time, and his two engagements taken together did not total one full year in order to qualify him as an exception to the exception falling under the cited proviso in the second paragraph of Art. 280 of the Labor Code.Clearly, private respondent was hired for a specific project that was not within the regular business of the corporation. For petitioner is not engaged in the business of repairing furnaces. Although the activity was necessary to enable petitioner to continue manufacturing glass, the necessity therefor arose only when a particular furnace reached the end of its life or operating cycle. Or, as on the second undertaking, when a particular furnace required an emergency repair. In other words, the undertakings where private respondent was hired primarily as helper/bricklayer have specified goals and purpose which are fulfilled once the designated work was completed. Moreover, such undertakings were also identifiably separate and distinct from the usual, ordinary or regular business operations of petitioner, which is glass manufacturing. Thses undertakings, the duration and scope of which had been determined and made known to private respondent at the time of his employment clearly indicated the nature of his employment as a project employee. Thus, his services were terminated legally after the completion of the project. 15Public respondent NLRC's decision, if upheld, would amount to negating the distinction made in Article 280 of the Labor Code. It would shunt aside the rule that since a project employee's work defends on the availability of a project, necessarily, the duration of his employment is coterminous with the project to which he is assigned. 16 It would become a burden for an employer to retain an employee and pay him his corresponding wages it there was no project for him to work on. Well to remember is the language of the Court in the case of Mamansag vs. NLRC: 17 While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management has also rights, which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play. Although the Supreme Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and has upheld has cause in his conflicts with the employer, such favoritism has no blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in avery case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.Considering that private respondent was a project employee whose employment, the nature of which he was fully informed, related to a specific project, work or undertaking, we find that the Labor Arbiter correctly ruled that said employment legally ended upon completion of said project. Hence the tremination of his employment was not tantamount to an illegal dismissal; and it was a grave abuse of discretion on public respondent's part to order his reinstatement by petitioner.WHEREFORE the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of respondent NLRC is hereby REVERSED, and the judgment of the Labor Arbiter REINSTATED.NO COSTS.SO ORDERED.G.R. NO. 158132 July 4, 2007RAYCOR AIRCONTROL SYSTEMS, INC., Petitioner, vs.MARIO SAN PEDRO and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Respondents.D E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:Assailed in the Petition for Review1 before this Court are the August 24, 2001 Decision2 and April 30, 2003 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 63403.4The facts are as stated by the CA.Raycor Aircontrol Systems, Inc. (petitioner) hired Mario San Pedro (respondent) as tinsmith operator subject to the condition that his employment shall commence "on August 24, 1995 and shall be effective only for the duration of the contract at Uniwide Las Pias after completion of which on November 18, 1995, it automatically terminates without necessity of further notice."5 As the Uniwide Las Pias project (first project) lasted for one year, petitioner extended respondent's contract beyond November 18, 1995. When this first project was finally completed, petitioner again extended respondent's employment by assigning him to its Olivarez Plaza, Bian, Laguna project (second project) until December 1996. Subsequently, petitioner rehired respondent as ducting man and assigned him to its Cabuyao, Laguna project (third project) until April 1997. Thereafter, petitioner transferred respondent to its Llanas, Alabang project (fourth project) and later, to its Uniwide Coastal project in Baclaran, Paranaque (fifth project).6 Petitioner did not anymore issue new contracts to respondent each time his employment was extended.In a Memorandum7 dated October 30, 1997, petitioner declared that the contract of employment of respondent was set to expire on November 1, 1997, the same to take effect on November 3, 1997. Thus, when respondent reported for work on November 3, 1997, he was informed by the company timekeeper that he had been terminated.Respondent filed a Complaint8 for illegal dismissal with damages. The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999 in favor of respondent, thus:WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds and so rule that the complainant was illegally dismissed by the respondent without just cuase and without due process of law on November 3, 1997. As such he is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other benefits; and payment of full backwages from the time of his dismissal up to the time of his actual reinstatement which up to this date is in the amount of P105,534.00 (P198.00/day x 26 days x 20.5 mos.).Other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.9On appeal by petitioner, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) issued a Resolution10 dated September 18, 2000, affirming the July 15, 1999 LA Decision, and a Resolution11 dated December 15, 2000, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari which the CA denied in the August 24, 2001 Decision impugned herein. Its Motion for Reconsideration was also denied by the CA in a Resolution dated April 30, 2003.Hence, the present recourse of petitioner on the sole issue:Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave error in ruling that private respondent was illegally dismissed.12The Court denies the petition for lack of merit.The CA, as well as the NLRC and LA, considered respondent a regular employee of petitioner because of the existence of a reasonable connection between the former's regular activity in relation to the latter's business. They based this finding on the uncontroverted fact that petitioner repeatedly rehired respondent in five successive projects for 23 continuous months - nine months in the first project, four months in the second, four months in the third, four months in the fourth, and two months in the fifth - which repeated rehiring is indicative of the desirability and indispensability of the activity performed by respondent to the usual business or trade of petitioner. They held that, being a regular employee entitled to security of tenure, respondent's dismissal was illegal for lack of a just or authorized cause and due process. 13Petitioner denies that it dismissed respondent, insisting that the latters services were terminated for he was a mere project employee whose employment contract expired when the fifth project to which he was assigned was scrapped due to non-payment by the project owner, Uniwide Holdings, Inc. (Uniwide).14 It argues that the rehiring of respondent for 23 months did not make him a regular employee, given the following nature of its business:Petitioner is engaged in the installation of air conditioning units in high and low rise building[s]. Petitioner gets business from architects/engineers who invite petitioner to participate in a public bidding on a certain project. If the project is awarded to it, that will only be the time when it mobilizes and engages the services of workers to install the air conditioning units in the building. Petititioner is not a manufacturing or trading company. Workers are hired according to their skills. It is for this reason that private respondent was hired as tinsmith operator.15The concurrent findings of the CA and the labor tribunals on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties in the present case are factual in nature and are accorded due deference16 for being well-founded.The issue of regularization of employees had already beset petitioner, as early as the year 1996, in Raycor Aircontrol Systems, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission.17 In said case, the Court resolved the issue whether several individuals it hired and rehired to work as tinsmith, leadman, aircon mechanic, installer, welder, and painter in its various projects became regular employees after rendering service for more than one year, with some of them serving for two to six years. The Court recognized that petitioner was engaged in a peculiar business which constrained it not to maintain a regular work force. The Court observed:It is not so much that this Court cannot appreciate petitioner's contentions about the nature of its business and its inability to maintain a large workforce on its permanent payroll. Private respondents have admitted that petitioner is engaged only in the installation (not manufacture) of aircon systems or units in buildings, and since such a line of business would obviously be highly (if not wholly) dependent on the availability of buildings or projects requiring such installation services, which factor no businessman, no matter how savvy, can accurately forecast from year to year, it can be easily surmised that petitioner, aware that its revenues and income would be unpredictable, would always try to keep its overhead costs to a minimum, and would naturally want to engage workers on a per-project or per-building basis only, retaining very few employees (if any) on its permanent payroll. It would also have been more than glad if its employees found other employment elsewhere, in between projects. To our mind, it appears rather unlikely that petitioner would keep private respondents -- all fifteen of them -- continuously on its permanent payroll for, say, ten or twelve years, knowing fully well that there would be periods (of uncertain duration) when no project can be had. To illustrate, let us assume that private respondents (who were each making about P118.00 to P119.50 per day in 1991) were paid only P100.00 per day. If the fifteen were, as they claimed, regular employees entitled to their wages regardless of whether or not they were assigned to work on any project, the overhead for their salaries alone -- computed at P100.00/day for 30 days in a month -- would come to no less than P45,000.00 a month, or P540,000.00 a year, not counting 13th month pay, Christmas bonus, SSS/Medicare premium payments, sick leaves and service incentives leaves, and so forth. Even if petitioner may have been able to afford such overhead costs, it certainly does not make business sense for it or anyone else to do so, and is in every sense contrary to human nature, not to mention common business practice. On this score alone, we believe that petitioner could have made out a strong case. x x x (Emphasis ours)18Nonetheless, the Court ruled against petitioner because the latter failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that the projects to which its workers were assigned were of limited scope and duration and that, at the time of hiring, said workers knowingly accepted the restrictions on their employment, thus:For that matter, it seems self-evident to this Court that, even if the contracts presented by petitioner had been signed by the employees concerned, still, they would not constitute conclusive proof of petitioner's claim. After all, in the usual scheme of things, contract terms are normally dictated by the employer and simply acceded to and accepted by the employee, who may be desperate for work and therefore in no position to bargain freely or negotiate terms to his liking.In any event, petitioner in this case undoubtedly could have presented additional evidence to buttress its claim. For instance, petitioner could have presented copies of its contracts with its clients, to show the time, duration and scope of past installation projects. The data from these contracts could then have been correlated to the data which could be found in petitioner's payroll records for, let us say, the past three years or so, to show that private respondents had been working intermittently as and when they were assigned to said projects, and that their compensation had been computed on the basis of such work. But petitioner did not produce such additional evidence, and we find that it failed to discharge its burden of proof.19 (Emphasis ours)The same fate befalls petitioner once again.Other than the 1995 employment contract it issued to respondent, which contract we have held to be insufficient evidence of project employment,20 petitioner utterly failed to adduce additional evidence which would have convinced us that: 1) each time it hired and rehired respondent, it intended for him to accomplish specific tasks in the particular project to which he was assigned; 2) it intended for respondent to carry out these specific tasks in accordance with the project plan it had drawn out and within the limited time it had to complete the same; and 3) it made such restrictions on each engagement known to respondent, and the same were freely accepted by him. Petitioner's failure to present such evidence is inexcusable, given its access to such documents as project contracts, payment remittances, employment records and payslips.21 Such lapse is dismaying, considering that in Raycor v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court had signalled to petitioner that, given the peculiar nature of its business, it had a strong case against the regularization of some of its workers. The Court even enumerated the kind of evidence petitioner should present to establish the project employment of its workers.Evidently, petitioner did not heed the Courts observations in Raycor v. National Labor Relations Commission, leaving us no option but to declare that it failed, yet again, to discharge its burden of proving that respondent was a project employee.Consequently, the Court affirms the finding of the CA and the labor tribunals that respondent became a regular employee after 23 months of rehiring.The next question then is whether respondent was validly dismissed on November 3, 1997.Petitioner claims that respondent was laid off due to adverse business conditions it suffered at that time, attributing these to the Asian currency crisis, in general, and to the rehabilitation of Uniwide, in particular.22The CA rejected such pretext and held:In the instant case, Raycor merely alleged that its business was affected by the Asian currency. It could not also rely on the financial reverses suffered by its client, Uniwide Holdings, Inc. without adducing sufficient and convincing proof that by reason of such economic reverses, it suffered imminent substantial losses and retrenchment was the most reasonable and effective recourse to prevent the expected losses. In short, Raycor could not establish exculpation from liability in the illegal dismissal of San Pedro by invoking another company's economic reverses.23The CA is correct.To justify termination of employment under Article 28324 of the Labor Code, the employer must prove compliance with the following requirements: (a) a written notice must be served on the employees, and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at least one month before the intended cessation of business;25 and (b) the cessation of business must be bona fide in character.26It is readily apparent that petitioner did not comply with any of the foregoing requirements. There is no evidence that it complied with the one-month notice requirement. While petitioner claims that it issued to respondent an October 30, 1997 Memorandum of termination of employment, it failed to prove that such document was ever served upon respondent and the DOLE. Moreover, the notice is less than one month, for the memorandum states that respondents contract of employment is to expire on November 3, 1997, or only three days later from the date of the Memorandum.Worse, there is no evidence at all that petitioner dismissed respondent because it actually ceased or suspended business operations, or it resorted to the dismissal of respondent and other employees to stave off cessation or suspension of its business. The best evidence of reversal of fortune is audited financial and income statements which detail the extent and pattern of business losses suffered by the employer.27 Petitioner did not present any such document where it could have demonstrated how the 1997 Asian financial currency crisis or the rehabilitation of Uniwide adversely and significantly affected the viability of its business.1avvphi1Again, for failure of petitioner to discharge its burden of proving business reverses as a ground for the lay-off of respondent, we uphold the CA in ruling that the latter's dismissal was illegal.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990BRENT SCHOOL, INC., and REV. GABRIEL DIMACHE, petitioners, vs.RONALDO ZAMORA, the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, Office of the President, and DOROTEO R. ALEGRE, respondents.NARVASA, J.:The question presented by the proceedings at bar 1 is whether or not the provisions of the Labor Code, 2 as amended, 3 have anathematized "fixed period employment" or employment for a term.The root of the controversy at bar is an employment contract in virtue of which Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic director by Brent School, Inc. at a yearly compensation of P20,000.00. 4 The contract fixed a specific term for its existence, five (5) years, i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of execution of the agreement, to July 17, 1976. Subsequent subsidiary agreements dated March 15, 1973, August 28, 1973, and September 14, 1974 reiterated the same terms and conditions, including the expiry date, as those contained in the original contract of July 18, 1971. 5Some three months before the expiration of the stipulated period, or more precisely on April 20,1976, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent School with the Department of Labor advising of the termination of his services effective on July 16, 1976. The stated ground for the termination was "completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of employment." And a month or so later, on May 26, 1976, Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed a receipt therefor containing the phrase, "in full payment of services for the period May 16, to July 17, 1976 as full payment of contract."However, at the investigation conducted by a Labor Conciliator of said report of termination of his services, Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976, since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment had lasted for five years, he had acquired the status of a regular employee and could not be removed except for valid cause. 6 The Regional Director considered Brent School's report as an application for clearance to terminate employment (not a report of termination), and accepting the recommendation of the Labor Conciliator, refused to give such clearance and instead required the reinstatement of Alegre, as a "permanent employee," to his former position without loss of seniority rights and with full back wages. The Director pronounced "the ground relied upon by the respondent (Brent) in terminating the services of the complainant (Alegre) . . . (as) not sanctioned by P.D. 442," and, quite oddly, as prohibited by Circular No. 8, series of 1969, of the Bureau of Private Schools. 7Brent School filed a motion for reconsideration. The Regional Director denied the motion and forwarded the case to the Secretary of Labor for review. 8 The latter sustained the Regional Director. 9 Brent appealed to the Office of the President. Again it was rebuffed. That Office dismissed its appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the Labor Secretary's decision, ruling that Alegre was a permanent employee who could not be dismissed except for just cause, and expiration of the employment contract was not one of the just causes provided in the Labor Code for termination of services. 10The School is now before this Court in a last attempt at vindication. That it will get here.The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed on July 18, 1971, at a time when the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet been promulgated. Indeed, the Code did not come into effect until November 1, 1974, some three years after the perfection of the employment contract, and rights and obligations thereunder had arisen and been mutually observed and enforced.At that time, i.e., before the advent of the Labor Code, there was no doubt whatever about the validity of term employment. It was impliedly but nonetheless clearly recognized by the Termination Pay Law, R.A. 1052, 11 as amended by R.A. 1787. 12 Basically, this statute provided thatIn cases of employment, without a definite period, in a commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishment or enterprise, the employer or the employee may terminate at any time the employment with just cause; or without just cause in the case of an employee by serving written notice on the employer at least one month in advance, or in the case of an employer, by serving such notice to the employee at least one month in advance or one-half month for every year of service of the employee, whichever is longer, a fraction of at least six months being considered as one whole year.The employer, upon whom no such notice was served in case of termination of employment without just cause, may hold the employee liable for damages.The employee, upon whom no such notice was served in case of termination of employment without just cause, shall be entitled to compensation from the date of termination of his employment in an amount equivalent to his salaries or wages corresponding to the required period of notice.There was, to repeat, clear albeit implied recognition of the licitness of term employment. RA 1787 also enumerated what it considered to be just causes for terminating an employment without a definite period, either by the employer or by the employee without incurring any liability therefor.Prior, thereto, it was the Code of Commerce which governed employment without a fixed period, and also implicitly acknowledged the propriety of employment with a fixed period. Its Article 302 provided that In cases in which the contract of employment does not have a fixed period, any of the parties may terminate it, notifying the other thereof one month in advance.The factor or shop clerk shall have a right, in this case, to the salary corresponding to said month.The salary for the month directed to be given by the said Article 302 of the Code of Commerce to the factor or shop clerk, was known as the mesada (from mes, Spanish for "month"). When Article 302 (together with many other provisions of the Code of Commerce) was repealed by the Civil Code of the Philippines, Republic Act No. 1052 was enacted avowedly for the precise purpose of reinstating the mesada.Now, the Civil Code of the Philippines, which was approved on June 18, 1949 and became effective on August 30,1950, itself deals with obligations with a period in section 2, Chapter 3, Title I, Book IV; and with contracts of labor and for a piece of work, in Sections 2 and 3, Chapter 3, Title VIII, respectively, of Book IV. No prohibition against term-or fixed-period employment is contained in any of its articles or is otherwise deducible therefrom.It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed between Brent School and Alegre on July 18, 1971, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the duration thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as valid by this Court, for instance, in Biboso v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc., promulgated on March 31, 1977, 13 and J. Walter Thompson Co. (Phil.) v. NLRC, promulgated on December 29, 1983. 14 The Thompson case involved an executive who had been engaged for a fixed period of three (3) years. Biboso involved teachers in a private school as regards whom, the following pronouncement was made:What is decisive is that petitioners (teachers) were well aware an the time that their tenure was for a limited duration. Upon its termination, both parties to the employment relationship were free to renew it or to let it lapse. (p. 254)Under American law 15 the principle is the same. "Where a contract specifies the period of its duration, it terminates on the expiration of such period." 16 "A contract of employment for a definite period terminates by its own terms at the end of such period." 17The status of legitimacy continued to be enjoyed by fixed-period employment contracts under the Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442), which went into effect on November 1, 1974. The Code contained explicit references to fixed period employment, or employment with a fixed or definite period. Nevertheless, obscuration of the principle of licitness of term employment began to take place at about this timeArticle 320, entitled "Probationary and fixed period employment," originally stated that the "termination of employment of probationary employees and those employed WITH A FIXED PERIOD shall be subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe." The asserted objective to was "prevent the circumvention of the right of the employee to be secured in their employment as provided . . . (in the Code)."Article 321 prescribed the just causes for which an employer could terminate "an employment without a definite period."And Article 319 undertook to define "employment without a fixed period" in the following manner: 18An employment shall be deemed to be without a definite period for purposes of this Chapter where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.The question immediately provoked by a reading of Article 319 is whether or not a voluntary agreement on a fixed term or period would be valid where the employee "has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer." The definition seems a non sequitur. From the premise that the duties of an employee entail "activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer the" conclusion does not necessarily follow that the employer and employee should be forbidden to stipulate any period of time for the performance of those activities. There is nothing essentially contradictory between a definite period of an employment contract and the nature of the employee's duties set down in that contract as being "usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer." The concept of the employee's duties as being "usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer" is not synonymous with or identical to employment with a fixed term. Logically, the decisive determinant in term employment should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to perform, but the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship, a day certain being understood to be "that which must necessarily come, although it may not be known when." 19 Seasonal employmen