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EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605. December 18, 2008.]

SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M. MANOTOK III, MA.

MAMERTA M. MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL

III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V. MANOTOK, MARY ANN MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE V.

MANOTOK, IGNACIO MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V. MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK

III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA

E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L.

MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE MANOTOK,

JR., and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, represented by their Attorney-in-fact, Rosa R.

Manotok, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, Represented by TERESITA

BARQUE HERNANDEZ, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

TINGA, J p:

The perceived advantages of the Torrens system of registration of land titles have

helped stabilize land ownership in the Philippines. Its underlying principle is security

with facility in dealing with land. 1 Its fundamental purpose is to quiet title to land,

to perpetually enjoin any question in the legality of the title, 2 hence, the titles

issued under the system are indefeasible. Yet the Torrens system is imperfect in

that it remains susceptible to fraud, either in the original registration proceedings or

in subsequent transactions. 3 ADCEaH

These petitions feature apparently fraudulent practices relating to the attempts at

registration of the subject property. Necessarily, they call for the correct applicationof entrenched principles in land registration. At the same time, they afford this

Court the opportunity to again defend the Torrens system against unscrupulous

elements who use its formalities to actualize the theft of property, and to exert

judicial might in ensuring that fraud does not prevail in the end.

These petitions were referred to the Court en banc by the Special First Division

which had initially ruled on them, most comprehensively in a Decision dated 12

December 2005. 4 They were accepted by the Court en banc in a Resolution dated

26 July 2006. Subsequently, the parties presented their various contentions before

the Court in an oral argument held on 24 July 2007, followed by the submission of

their respective memoranda. While the cases were under consideration of the Court

en banc, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General was required, 5 and a

set of new parties was allowed leave to intervene. 6

The antecedent facts are stated in full in our 2005 Decision, but are summarized

herein for convenience. DCcIaE


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On 11 June 1988, a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall, immolating, among

others, records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. That

fire has attained notoriety due to the numerous certificates of title on file with that

office, which were destroyed as a consequence. The resulting effects of that blaze

on specific property registration controversies have been dealt with by the Court in

a number of cases since then. 7 These petitions are perhaps the most heated, if notthe most contentious of those cases thus far.

Respondents Heirs of Homer Barque (the Barques) filed a petition 8 with the Land

Registration Authority (LRA) for administrative reconstitution of the original of

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 210177 (the Barque title) issued in the name

of Homer Barque. They alleged that the Barque title was among the records

destroyed by the 1988 fire. In support of their petition, the Barques submitted

copies of the alleged owner's duplicate of the Barque title, real estate tax receipts,

tax declarations and a Plan FLS 3168-D covering the property.

Learning of the Barques' petition, Severino M. Manotok IV, et al. (the Manotoks) filedtheir opposition thereto. The Manotoks claimed that the lot covered by the Barque

title formed part of the land covered by their reconstituted title TCT No. RT-22481

[372302] (the Manotok title) in the name of Severino Manotok, et al. They further

alleged that the Barque title was spurious. TcHDIA

A brief description of the property involved is in order. Both the Barques' and the

Manotoks' titles advert to land belonging to Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate

situated in the then Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal. The Barque title

actually involves two parcels of land as part of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate,

with an aggregate area of 342,945 square meters, while the Manotok title concerns

only one parcel of land, but with a similar area of 342,945 square meters.

On 30 June 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer of the LRA,

denied 9 the petition for reconstitution of the Barque title, declaring that:

xxx xxx xxx

1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and

171,472 Sq. Mtrs., respectively, covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot

823 Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No.

372302 registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et al., reconstituted under

Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated February 01, 1991;

2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as categorically stated

by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management

Bureau, in his letter dated February 19, 1997. CAaDSI

xxx xxx xxx


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The Barques' motion for reconsideration was denied by Atty. Bustos in an Order 10

dated 10 February 1998; hence, the Barques appealed to the LRA.

The LRA reversed Atty. Bustos on appeal. It ruled that the reconstituting officer

should not have required the submission of documents other than the owner's

duplicate certificate of title as basis for denying the petition and should haveconfined himself to the owner's duplicate certificate of title. The LRA further found

anomalies in the Manotoks' title. It observed that:

Based on the documents presented, petitioners have established by clear and

convincing evidence that TCT No. 210177 was, at the time of the destruction

thereof, valid, genuine, authentic and effective. Petitioners duly presented the

original of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177 . . . . The logbook of the

Register of Deeds of Quezon City lists TCT No. 210177 as among the titles lost . . . .

The Register of Deeds of Quezon City himself acknowledged the existence and

authenticity of TCT No. 210177 when he issued a certification to the effect that TCT

No. 210177 was one of the titles destroyed and not salvaged from the fire thatgutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988 . . . . aCASEH

It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and boundaries of the lot

reflected in TCT No. 210177 absolutely conform to the technical description and

boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate . . . as indicated in the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R

dated 11-8-94 and B. L. Form No. 31-10 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands . . . .

It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity and effectivity

of TCT No. 210177 was established indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners.

Under such circumstances, the reconstitution thereof should be given due course

and the same is mandatory . . . . CacEIS

It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy of Plan FLS 3168 D was

duly issued by the office of Engr. Ernesto Erive, Chief, Surveys Division LMS-DENR-

NCR whose office is the lawful repository of survey plans for lots situated within the

National Capital Region including the property in question. Said plan was duly

signed by the custodian thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical Records and

Statistics Section, DENR-NCR. Said plan is likewise duly supported by Republic of

the Philippines Official Receipt No. 2513818 Q dated 9-23-96 . . . . Engr. Erive in his

letter dated 28 November 1996 addressed to Atty. Bustos . . . confirmed that a

microfilm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is on file in the Technical Records and Statistics

Section of his office. Engr. Dalire, in his letter dated 2 January 1997 addressed toAtty. Bustos even confirmed the existence and authenticity of said plan. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that his office has no

records or information about Plan FLS 3168-D is belied by the certified copy of the

computer print-out duly issued by the Bureau of Lands indicating therein that FLS


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3168D is duly entered into the microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and has

been assigned Accession Number 410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report

No. 1, List of Locator Cards and Box Number 0400 and said computer print-out is

duly supported by an Official Receipt . . . . aDSHIC

The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as it does from thelegal repository and duly signed by the custodian thereof. The documentary

evidence presented is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed aside and be

defeated by the fabricated statements and concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his

19 February 1997 letter. . . .

Notwithstanding its conclusion that the Manotok title was fraudulently reconstituted,

the LRA noted that only the Regional Trial Court (RTC) could cancel the Manotok

title as a Torrens title. It thus ruled, 11 that:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of

TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course aftercancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of Manotoks upon order of a

court of competent jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED. aIEDAC

The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the Barques

with a prayer that the reconstitution be ordered immediately. The LRA denied 12

the Manotoks' motion for reconsideration and the Barques' prayer for immediate

reconstitution.

Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the Court of

Appeals (CA). The Barques' petition for review 13 was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.66700, while the Manotoks' petition for review 14 was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.

66642. The Barques prayed that the LRA be directed to immediately reconstitute

the Barque title without being subjected to the condition that the Manotok title

should first be cancelled by a court of competent jurisdiction. On the other hand,

the Manotoks argued in their own petition that the LRA erred in imputing that the

Manotok title was spurious and fake.

Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion for leave to

intervene. 15 She sought the dismissal of the cases in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and

CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 and claimed ownership over the subject property. CTacSE

On 13 September 2002, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a

Decision 16 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, denying the Barques' petition and affirming

the LRA Resolution. The Barques filed a motion for reconsideration. 17

Subsequently, the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division rendered

an Amended Decision 18 dated 7 November 2003 wherein it held that:


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WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered.

Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT

No. RT-22481 of private respondents and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute

forthwith petitioners' valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.

19

The Manotoks filed a motion for the reconsideration of the amended decision in CA-

G.R. SP No. 66700, but this was denied. 20

On the other hand, as to the Manotoks' petition, CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Third

Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 21 on 29 October 2003 which

affirmed the resolution of the LRA. 22 The appellate court held that the LRA

correctly deferred in giving due course to the Barques' petition for reconstitution,

since there was as yet no final judgment upholding or annulling the Barque title.

The Barques filed a motion for reconsideration of this ruling. 23 As had occurred

with the Barques' petition, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals granted the

Barques' motion for reconsideration and on 24 February 2004, promulgated itsAmended Decision 24 wherein it held that:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of

this Court dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered

ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-

22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents' TCT No. T-

210177. THaDAE

Aggrieved with the twin decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700

and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, both ordering the cancellation of the Manotok title, the

Manotoks filed separate petitions for review before this Court docketed as G.R. No.162605 and G.R. No. 162335, respectively. On 2 August 2004, the Court ordered

the consolidation of G.R. No. 162605 with G.R. No. 162335. 25

On 12 December 2005, the Court's First Division rendered its Decision 26 affirming

the two decisions of the Court of Appeals. 27 The Manotoks filed a motion for

reconsideration, which the Court's First Division denied in a Resolution dated 19

April 2006. 28 Thereafter, the Manotoks filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second

Motion for Reconsideration, with their Motion for Reconsideration attached. The

Court denied the same in a Resolution dated 19 June 2006, and the Court further

ordered that entry of judgment be made. 29 Thus on 2 May 2006, entry of judgment

was made in the Book of Entries of Judgment. 30

The Barques filed multiple motions with the Court's First Division concerning the

execution of the judgment, including a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession or

For Execution. 31 In response, the Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion

for Possession to the Supreme Court En Banc (with prayer to set motion for oral

argument). In a Resolution dated 19 July 2006, the Special First Division referred


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these cases to the Court en banc, and on 26 July 2006, the Court en banc

promulgated a Resolution accepting the cases. 32

On 7 September 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion to

intervene, to which was attached their petition in intervention. 33 Movants alleged

that the property subject of the petition in G.R. No. 162335 and G.R. No. 162605was owned by them. They claimed that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente

Manahan, was issued Sales Certificate No. 511 which covered lot 823 of the Piedad

Estate. Moreover, they attached to their petition the findings of the National Bureau

of Investigation (NBI) that the documents of the Manotoks were not as old as they

were purported to be. 34 The Director of the Legal Division of the Land Management

Bureau (LMB) recommended to the Director of the LMB that:

. . . steps be taken in the proper court for the cancellation of TCT No. RT-

22481(372302) and all its derivative titles so that the land covered may be reverted

to the State. 35

Ultimately, the Court found it necessary to involve the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG) in these cases, directing the OSG to file its Comment. The OSG filed its

Comment on 04 April 2007. Oral arguments were eventually held on 24 July 2007.

TDSICH

After the oral arguments, the Court required the parties, the intervenors, and the

Solicitor General to submit their respective memoranda.

I

As can be gleaned from the foregoing statement of facts, these petitions are

attended by a few procedural unorthodoxies, such as, for example, the Court enbanc's move on the Special First Division's referral for re-evaluation of these

petitions when an entry of judgment had already been made in favor of the

Barques. Yet the prevailing consensus within the Court en banc was to proceed with

the re-evaluation of these cases on a pro hac vice basis. There are good reasons for

the Court to act in such rare manner in these cases. Most urgently, the Court had

felt that the previous rulings by the First Division and the Special First Division

warranted either affirmation or modification by the Court acting en banc.

It is a constitutional principle that "no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the

[C]ourt in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed

except by the court sitting en banc". It has been argued that the 2005 Decision of

the First Division is inconsistent with precedents of the Court, and leaving that

decision alone without the imprimatur of the Court en banc would lead to undue

confusion within the bar and bench, with lawyers, academics and judges quibbling

over whether the earlier ruling of the Division constitutes the current standard with

respect to administrative reconstitution of titles. Our land registration system is too


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vital to be stymied by such esoteric wrangling, and the administrators and courts

which implement that system do not deserve needless hassle.

The Office of the Solicitor General correctly pointed out that this Court before had

sanctioned the recall entries of judgment. 36 The power to suspend or even

disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter eventhat which this Court itself has already declared to be final. 37 The militating

concern for the Court en banc in accepting these cases is not so much the particular

fate of the parties, but the stability of the Torrens system of registration by ensuring

clarity of jurisprudence on the field.

It is beyond contention, even by the parties, that since the Court en banc resolved

to accept these petitions in 2006, we have effectively been reviewing the 12

December 2005 Decision of the Court's First Division, as well as the Resolutions

dated 19 April and 19 June 2006 of that same Division. This Resolution is the result

of that review. As earlier stated, we have opted to do so on a pro hac vice basis to

lend much needed jurisprudential clarity as only the Court en banc canconstitutionally provide. TASCDI

II

In the context of an administrative reconstitution proceeding before the LRA, the

Barques have sought that the LRA exercise the power to cancel the Manotok title

and forthwith cause the reconstitution of their own title. The LRA refused to do so,

although it did rule that the Manotok title was spurious and thus subject to

cancellation through the proper judicial proceeding. Upon appellate review of that

LRA decision, the Court of Appeals initially upheld the LRA's position, but ultimately,

upon motion for reconsideration, directed the cancellation of the Manotok title andthe reconstitution of the Barque title.

Our succeeding discussion centers on the ordered mechanism for the cancellation

of Torrens titles in the Philippines.

To recall, both assailed Amended Decisions of the Court of Appeals notably directed

the cancellation of the Manotok title even as it mandated the reconstitution of the

Barque title. The obvious question is whether the Court of Appeals was empowered

to direct the annulment of the Manotok title through the petitions raised before it by

the Barques and the Manotoks. It could not.

Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as the Property Registration

Decree, provides that "[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack

[. . . and] cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in

accordance with law". 38 Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise

incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque title

even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor


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could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA's

administrative proceeding.

There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to

annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of

property. Its exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law, particularly byBatas Pambansa (B.P. 129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original

jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for

annulment of judgments of the regional trial court. 39 Still, the Court of Appeals did

acquire jurisdiction over the Barques' and the Manotoks' petitions, albeit in the

exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction 40 over the ruling of the LRA, also

pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the appellate court to

be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a

decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens

title in the first place.

Note that the Office of the Solicitor General, which acts as counsel for thegovernment and its agencies including the LRA, refutes the contention that the LRA

has jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title, much less jurisdiction to rule on the

validity of a certificate of title. It invokes the exclusive original jurisdiction of the

RTC under Paragraph 2, Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129, conferring jurisdiction on the

RTC over "all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or

any interest therein . . . ." That the RTC has "exclusive original jurisdiction" over

actions seeking the cancellation of title to real property is so cardinal in our

remedial law that it is reflected in hundreds if not thousands of examples in

jurisprudence. HDATCc

Nonetheless, we may inquire whether, notwithstanding the statutory delineation of"exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC", there is statutory basis for the LRA to

exercise jurisdiction over the cancellation of Torrens titles. If there is, we can

perhaps assess such law separately from B.P. Blg. 129.

Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates the general functions of the Land

Registration Commissioner, as follows:

SEC. 6. General Functions.

(1) The Commissioner of Land Registration shall have the following functions:

(a) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in land

registration proceedings and cause the issuance by the Registers of Deeds of the

corresponding certificates of title;

(b) Exercise supervision and control over all Registers of Deeds and other

personnel of the Commission;


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(c) Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from decision of,

Registers of Deeds;

(d) Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and personnel of the

Court of First Instance throughout the Philippines with respect to the discharge of

their duties and functions in relation to the registration of lands;

(e) Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated relative to the

registration of lands and issue, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, all

needful rules and regulations therefor;

(f) Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and consolidation-subdivision

survey plans of properties titled under Act No. 496 except those covered by P.D. No.

957.

Nowhere in the aforecited provision is it stated that the LRA has the power to cancel

titles. Indeed, the Barques are unable to point to any basis in law that confirms the

power of the LRA to effect such cancellation, even under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, which authorizes the administrative

reconstitution of titles in limited cases. In fact, as we shall see shortly such laws

take great care to ensure that a petition for administrative reconstitution of title will

not disturb existing Torrens titles.

It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to

cancel the Manotok title. The next matter of inquiry is whether the LRA had acted

correctly in ordering, conditional as it may have been, the administrative

reconstitution of the Barque title.

Under Rep. Act No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, administrativereconstitution of titles is permitted where the certificates of titles have been lost

due to "flood, fire and other force majeure". The petitioner in such a case is required

to execute an affidavit, containing the following averments: AEIHaS

(1) That no deed or other instrument affecting the property had been presented

for registration, or, if there be any, the nature thereof, the date of its presentation,

as well as the names of the parties, and whether the registration of such deed or

instrument is still pending accomplishment;

(2) That the owner's duplicate certificate or co-owner's duplicate is in due form

without any apparent intentional alterations or erasures;

(3) That the certificate of title is not the subject of litigation or investigation,

administrative or judicial, regarding its genuineness or due execution or issuance;

(4) That the certificate of title was in full force and effect at the time it was lost

or destroyed;


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(5) That the certificate of title is covered by a tax declaration regularly issued by

the Assessor's Office; and

(6) That real estate taxes have been fully paid up to at least two (2) years prior

to the filing of the petition for reconstitution. 41

Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 26, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, further provides:

Sec. 19. If the certificate of title considered lost or destroyed, and subsequently

found or recovered, is not in the name of the same person in whose favor the

reconstituted certificate of title has been issued, the Register of Deeds or the party

concerned should bring the matter to the attention of the proper regional trial court,

which, after due notice and hearing, shall order the cancellation of the reconstituted

certificate of title and render, with respect to the memoranda of new liens and

encumbrances, if any, made in the reconstituted certificate of title, after its

reconstitution, such judgment as justice and equity may require: Provided, however,

That if the reconstituted certificate of title has been cancelled by virtue of any deedor instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary, or by an order of the court, and a

new certificate of title has been issued, the procedure prescribed above, with

respect to the memorandum of new liens and encumbrances made on the

reconstituted certificate of title, after its reconstitution, shall be followed with

respect to the new certificate of title, and to such new liens and encumbrances, if

any, as may have been on the latter, after the issuance thereof. 42

Rep. Act No. 6732 itself also states: IDAaCc

Section 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud, deceit or other

machination is void ab initio as against the party obtaining the same and all persons

having knowledge thereof.

Section 12. Any person who by means of fraud, deceit or other machination

obtains or attempts to obtain a reconstituted title shall be subject to criminal

prosecution and, upon conviction, shall be liable for imprisonment for a period of

not less than two years but not exceeding five years or the payment of a fine of not

less than Twenty thousand pesos but not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos

or both at the discretion of the court.

Any public officer or employee who knowingly approves or assists in securing a

decision allowing reconstitution in favor of any person not entitled thereto shall be

subject to criminal prosecution and, upon conviction, shall be liable for

imprisonment of not less than five years but not exceeding ten years or payment of

a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos but not exceeding One hundred

thousand pesos or both at the discretion of the court and perpetual disqualification

from holding public office. 43


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These provisions indubitably establish that the administrative reconstitution of

Torrens titles is intended for non-controversial cases, or especially where the

subject property is not covered by an existing title in favor of a person other than

the applicant. Such an implication is consonant with the rule that the reconstitution

proceedings are not the venue for confirmation or adjudication of title, but merely a

means by which a previously adjudicated title whose original has been lost ordestroyed may be reissued to its owner. 44

The Solicitor General pertinently cites the rule in Alabang Development Corporation

v. Valenzuela, 45 which we held that "[t]he courts simply have no jurisdiction over

petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles

over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of

their duly registered owners". 46 That such doctrine was established for cases of

judicial reconstitution does not bar its application to cases of administrative

reconstitution. None of the provisions pertaining to administrative reconstitution in

Rep. Act No. 26 or 6732 extraordinarily empowers the LRA to exercise jurisdiction

over a petition for reconstitution, where the property is already covered by aTorrens title. After all, the LRA in such case is powerless to void the previous title or

to diminish its legal effect. Even assuming that the previously issued title is

obviously fraudulent or attended by flaws and as such cannot be countenanced by

the legal system, the corrective recourse lies with the courts, and not with the LRA.

If a petition for administrative reconstitution is filed with the LRA, and it appears

from the official records that the subject property is already covered by an existing

Torrens title in the name of another person, there is nothing further the LRA can do

but to dismiss the petition. The dismissal of such petition is subject to judicial

review, but the only relevant inquiry in such appellate proceeding is on whether or

not there is a previously existing title covering that property. Neither the LRA nor

the Court of Appeals at that point may inquire into the validity of the title or the

competing claims over the property. The only remedy is an action before the RTC

for the cancellation of the existing title, whether by the competing claimant or by

the OSG on behalf of the Republic. cSTDIC

III

The 2005 Decision placed heavy reliance on Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership

v. Velasco, 47 where in the course of reviewing an action for judicial reconstitution

of title, the Court opted not to remand the reconstitution case filed by Molina to the

court of origin in order to permit the appeals of Ortigas and the Solicitor General,

which had been improvidently disallowed by the trial court. Instead, owing to the

"fatal infirmities" of Molina's cause of action, the Court itself nullified the

reconstituted titles issued by the trial court. Ortigas had been cited by the Court of

Appeals and also by the 2005 Decision, in ruling on the Barques' petition. EDSAac


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The unusual "shortcut" that occurred in Ortigas had become necessary because in

that case the trial court had denied or stricken out the notices of appeal

respectively filed by Ortigas and the Solicitor General from the order for

reconstitution of Molina's titles. Had these notices of appeal been allowed, the Court

of Appeals would have then reviewed the trial court's decision on appeal, with the

ultimately correct resolution which was the annulment of Molina's titles. Ortigas wasforced to institute a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus with this Court,

praying for either of these alternative results the more prudent recourse of

directing the trial court to act on the notices of appeal and to forward the case

records to the Court of Appeals, or the more immediate remedy of bypassing the

appellate process and the Court itself by directly annulling Molina's titles.

The Court of Appeals herein could not have equated its annulment of the Manotok

title with that undertaken by the Court in Ortigas since, unlike in Ortigas, the Court

of Appeals was not endowed with the proper appellate jurisdiction to annul the

Manotok title. As earlier pointed out, since the LRA had no original jurisdiction to

cancel the Manotok title, it follows that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdictionalcompetence to extend the same relief, even while reviewing the LRA's ruling.

Clearly, Ortigas cannot be applied as a binding precedent to these cases. The

fundamental jurisdictional defects that attended the actions of both Divisions of the

Court of Appeals have effectively diminished Ortigas as a persuasive authority.

IV

The 2005 Decision accepted the findings of the LRA and the Court of Appeals that

the Manotok title was spurious and accordingly sanctioned its cancellation, even

though no direct attack on the title had been initiated before a trial court. That the

2005 Decision erred in that regard is a necessary consequence following our earlierexplanation of why the mere existence of the Manotok title necessarily barred the

LRA from inquiring into the validity of that title. ASIDTa

Moreover, it would have been pointless for the LRA or the Court of Appeals to have

ruled definitively on the validity of the Barques' claim to title. After all, since neither

the LRA nor the Court of Appeals could cause the cancellation of the Manotok title,

any declaration that the Barque claim was valid would be inutile and inoperable.

Still, in order to effectively review and reverse the assailed rulings, it would be best

for this Court to test the premises under which the LRA and the Court of Appeals

had concluded that the Barques had a valid claim to title. The available record

before the Court is comprehensive enough to allow us to engage in that task.

The Barque title, or TCT No. 210177, under which the Barques assert title to Lot 823

of the Piedad Estate, states that it was transferred from TCT No. 13900. 48 The

Barques assert that they bought the subject property from a certain Setosta. Thus,

it could be deduced that TCT No. 13900 should have been registered under the

name of Setosta. However, it was not. TCT No. 13900 was registered under the


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name of Manotok Realty, Inc. 49 This detracts from the Barques' claim that the

Manotoks do not have title to the property, as in fact the Barque title was a transfer

from a title registered under the name of the Manotoks. The Barques have failed to

explain the anomaly. CDaSAE

The Barques hinge their claim on a purported subdivision plan, FLS-3168-D, made infavor of Setosta. However, based on the records, it appears that there is a conflict

as to its actual existence in the files of the government. Revelatory is the exchange

of correspondence between the LMB and the LRA. The LMB did not have any copy of

FLS-3168-D in the EDP listing, 50 nor did the LMB have a record of the plan. 51

However, a microfilm copy of FLS-3168-D was on file in the Technical Records and

Statistical Section of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Capital

Region (DENR-NCR). 52 The copy with the Technical Records and Statistical Section,

which bore the stamp of the LMB, was denied by the LMB as having emanated from

its office. 53

Further, the letter dated 2 January 1997 from the LMB stated that the copy of FLS-3168-D as verified from its microfilm file was the same as the copy sent by the

Technical Records and Statistics Section of the National Capital Region Lands

Management Sector. 54 The LMB, however, denied issuing such letter and stated

that it was a forged document. 55 To amplify the forged nature of the document,

the LMB sent a detailed explanation to prove that it did not come from its office. 56

In a letter to the administrator of the LRA, the hearing officer concluded that "it is

evident that there is an attempt to mislead us into favorable action by submitting

forged documents, hence it is recommended that this case [be] referred to the

PARAC for investigation and filing of charges against perpetrators as envisioned by

this office under your administration". 57 IEaCDH

There are significant differences between the technical description of Lot 823 of the

Piedad Estate as stated in FLS-3168-D, the subdivision plan relied on by the

Barques, and the technical description provided by the DENR. 58 The DENR-

confirmed technical description reads:

Bounded on the E., along line-2 by Payatas Estate; on the SE., by Tuazon Estate;

along line 3-4 by Lot 824; along line 4-5 by Lot 818; and on the N., along line 5-1 by

Lot 822, all of Piedad Estate. 59

However, if we examine the subdivision plan, there are critical changes with respect

to the boundaries named therein. In effect, the boundaries as described in thesubdivision plan would read:

Bounded on the E., along line-2 by Diez Francisco; on the SE., by Diez Francisco;

along line 3-4 by Lot 824; along line 4-5 by Lot 826; and on the N., along line 5-1 by

Lot 822, all of Piedad Estate. 60


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The Barques offered no credible explanation for the discrepancy between the

subdivision plan it relies on and the DENR record. They also do not contradict the

finding of the National Archives that there is no copy in its files of the deed of sale

allegedly executed between Setosta and Barque. 61

Lastly, in the 1st indorsement issued by the Land Projection Section of the LRAdated 23 August 2006, that Section stated that upon examination it was found out

that the land as described in the Barque title "when plotted thru its tie line falls

outside Quezon City". This is material, since Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is within

the boundaries of Quezon City. 62 A similar finding was made by the Land

Management Bureau (LMB). It attested that the line or directional azimuth of Lot No.

823 per the Barque title locates it at 5,889 meters away from point 1 of Lot No. 823

of the Piedad Estate. 63 SADECI

These discrepancies highlight the error of the LRA and the Court of Appeals in

acknowledging the right of the Barques to seek reconstitution of their purported

Barque title. Even assuming that the petition for reconstitution should not havebeen dismissed due to the Manotok title, it is apparent that the Barques' claim of

ownership is exceedingly weak.

V

In the course of fully reevaluating these cases, the Court could not turn a blind eye

on the evidence and points raised against the Manotok title. The apparent flaws in

the Manotoks claim are considerable and disturbing enough. The Court, as the

ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy, is a guardian of the integrity of the land

registration system of the Philippines. We will be derelict in our duty if we remain

silent on the apparent defects of the Manotok title, reflective as they are of ascourge this Court is dedicated to eliminate.

Many of these flaws have especially emerged through the petition-for-intervention

of Felicitas and Rosendo Manahan, whom we have allowed to intervene in these

cases. The Manahans had filed a petition with the OSG seeking that it initiate

cancellation/reversion proceedings against the Manotok title. That petition was

referred by the OSG to the LMB of the DENR, which duly investigated the claim of

the Manahans. The Chief of the Legal Division of the LMB recommended that the

appropriate proceedings be taken in the proper court for the cancellation of the

Manotok title, through a Memorandum dated 17 April 2000. 64

Around the same time, the LMB referred to the DENR Undersecretary for Legal

Affairs Roseller S. dela Pea a query on whether a deed of conveyance could be

issued to Felicitas Manahan. The DENR Undersecretary, in answering that query

through a Memorandum dated 6 July 2000, pointed out that the titles of the

Manotoks could not have been derived from OCT No. 614, the mother title of Lot

823 of the Piedad Estate. 65 The chain of transfers leading from OCT No. 614 to the

Manotok title was a TCT No. 22813, purportedly issued by the Office of the Register


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of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. The copy of said TCT No. 22813 submitted to the

Court is truncated in the upper half, to the point that it is not visually discernible

what year the same was issued. More crucially, a certification was issued by the

Register of Deeds of Rizal dated 7 January 2000 stating thus:

After a thorough verification from the files of this Office, it appears that thedocuments leading to the issuance of TCT No. 22813, Blk. T-92 cannot be found

from the files of this Office. 66

These findings were twice verified with due diligence and reconfirmed by the DENR,

according to Undersecretary dela Pea. 67 TIADCc

The DENR also requested the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation

(NBI) in conducting the said investigation. The NBI examined various sales

certificates and assignment of sales certificates in the names of the purported

predecessors-in-interest of the Manotoks Regina Geronimo, Modesto Zacarias, and

Felicisimo Villanueva certificates that were all dated prior to 1930. In itsChemistry Report No. C-99-152 dated 10 June 1999, the Forensic Chemistry Division

of the NBI concluded that the said documents "could not be as old as it (sic)

purports to be". 68

According to the Manahans, the LMB did eventually forward to the Office of the

Register of Deeds of Quezon City a Deed of Conveyance for registration and

mandatory issuance of title to Felicitas Manahan as grantee, pursuant to Section

122 of the Land Registration Act. The registration of said Deed of Conveyance was

referred to the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority en consulta in 2001.

Also on record 69 is an Investigation Report on Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate

dated 5 July 1989, authored by Evelyn C. dela Rosa, Land Investigator of the

Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), NCR-North Sector

and addressed to the CENRO Officer, North CENRO. It was narrated therein that Lot

No. 823 had actually been in the possession of a Valentin Manahan beginning in

1908. In 1939, Valentin Manahan applied for the purchase of the land, and he was

issued Sales Certificate No. 511. The Investigation Report stated: TIHCcA

Records show that the Sale Certificate No. 511 covering Lot 823, Piedad Estate, was

issued to Valentin Manahan as purchaser and transferred to Hilaria de Guzman

Manahan as (Assignee) and sold to Felicitas Manahan by way of Deed of Absolute

Sale dated August 23, 1974. Based on my research at the Land ManagementBureau (LMB), Central Office, it appears that original claimant of lot 823 was

Valentin Manahan. 70

All told, these apparent problems with the Manotoks' claim dissuade us from being

simply content in reflexively dismissing the administrative petition for reconstitution

filed by the Barques. Indeed, we have to take further action.


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VI

The most formidable impediment to the Court reacting to the problems apparent in

the Manotok title is the fact that we are not engaged in the review of an original

action for the cancellation of such title. If, as in Ortigas, the validity of the

questionable title were now properly at issue, the Court would without hesitancyrule on such question. Because it is not, the matter of how next to proceed warrants

more deliberation.

The conservative approach would be to still affirm the continuing validity of the

Manotok title until the proper case for its cancellation is filed with the regional trial

court. Within that context, it would also be a plausible recourse for us is to direct

the Solicitor General to duly investigate the circumstances behind the transmission

of Lot No. 823, formerly a Friar Land, to private persons. Thereafter, the Solicitor

General can file the appropriate proceedings for cancellation if warranted. However,

it is already apparent, following the evaluation of these cases, that there is evidence

unrefuted thus far indicating that the Manotoks' claim to title is just as flawedas that of the Barques. HAIaEc

Can the Court declare the Manotok title void? In the 2002 decision in Alonso v. Cebu

Country Club, 71 the subject property therein had originally formed part of the

Banilad Friar Lands. Cebu Country Club had undertaken the administrative

reconstitution of the title to the property, leading Alonso to file a complaint for

nullification of such title in order to vindicate his own claims to the property.

Alonso's complaint was dismissed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. While

the case was pending with this Court, the Solicitor General was required to

comment on the validity of Cebu Country Club's administratively reconstituted title.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that Cebu Country Club had not been able toestablish a clear title over the contested estate, and in the dispositive portion of its

decision declared "that Lot No. 727 D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate covered by

Original Certificate of Title Nos. 251, 232, and 253 legally belongs to the

Government of the Philippines".

The following year, the Court, acting on the motions for reconsideration in Alonso,

72 extensively discussed why it had taken that extraordinary step even though the

Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, had not participated or

intervened in that case before the lower courts.

It must be borne in mind that the disputed property is part of the "Friar Lands" overwhich the Government holds title and are not public lands but private or patrimonial

property of the Government and can be alienated only upon proper compliance with

the requirements of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act.

xxx xxx xxx


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It was thus primordial for the respondent to prove its acquisition of its title by clear

and convincing evidence in view of the nature of the land. In fact, it is essential for

both respondent and petitioners to establish that it had become private property.

Both parties failed to do so. As we have held earlier, petitioners have not succeeded

to prove their claim of ownership over the subject property.

xxx xxx xxx

Neither may the rewards of prescription be successfully invoked by respondent, as

it is an iron-clad dictum that prescription can never lie against the Government.

Since respondent failed to present the paper trail of the property's conversion to

private property, the lengthy possession and occupation of the disputed land by

respondent cannot be counted in its favor, as the subject property being a friar

land, remained part of the patrimonial property of the Government. Possession of

patrimonial property of the Government, whether spanning decades or centuries,

can not ipso facto ripen into ownership. Moreover, the rule that statutes of limitation

do not run against the State, unless therein expressly provided, is founded on "thegreat principle of public policy, applicable to all governments alike, which forbids

that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or

agents to whose care they are confided." DEAaIS

xxx xxx xxx

Finally, our declaration that Lot 727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate legally

belongs to the Government does not amount to reversion without due process of

law insofar as both parties are concerned. The disputed property is a Friar Land and

both parties failed to show that it had ceased to belong to the patrimonial property

of the State or that it had become private property. 73

The Alonso approach especially appeals to us because, as in this case, the subject

property therein was a Friar Land which under the Friar Lands Law (Act No. 1120)

may be disposed of by the Government only under that law. Thus, there is greater

concern on the part of this Court to secure its proper transmission to private hands,

if at all.

At the same time, the Court recognizes that there is not yet any sufficient evidence

for us to warrant the annulment of the Manotok title. All that the record indicates

thus far is evidence not yet refuted by clear and convincing proof that the

Manotoks' claim to title is flawed. To arrive at an ultimate determination, the formalreception of evidence is in order. This Court is not a trier of fact or otherwise

structurally capacitated to receive and evaluate evidence de novo. However, the

Court of Appeals is sufficiently able to undertake such function.

The remand of cases pending with this Court to the Court of Appeals for reception of

further evidence is not a novel idea. It has been undertaken before in Republic v.


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Court of Appeals 74 and more recently in our 2007 Resolution in Manotok v. Court

of Appeals. 75 Our following explanation in Manotok equally applies to this case:

Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for certiorari, the

Court may, whenever necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of

the evidence on such issues to any of its members or to an appropriate court,agency or office. 80 The delegate need not be the body that rendered the assailed

decision.

The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review findings of fact. Its

conclusions as to findings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court.

It is a body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating

factual matters, including documentary evidence.

In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pending before

it to the Court of Appeals. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court commissioned

the former Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals to hear and receive evidenceon the controversy, more particularly to determine "the actual area reclaimed by

the Republic Real Estate Corporation, and the areas of the Cultural Center Complex

which are 'open spaces' and/or 'areas reserved for certain purposes,' determining in

the process the validity of such postulates and the respective measurements of the

areas referred to." The Court of Appeals therein received the evidence of the parties

and rendered a "Commissioner's Report" shortly thereafter. Thus, resort to the

Court of Appeals is not a deviant procedure. TCDHaE

The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of

authority to the Court of Appeals to receive evidence in the present case. Under

Section 2, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct areference to a commissioner when a question of fact, other than upon the

pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a

judgment or order into effect. The order of reference can be limited exclusively to

receive and report evidence only, and the commissioner may likewise rule upon the

admissibility of evidence. The commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a report

in writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference.

In Republic, the commissioner's report formed the basis of the final adjudication by

the Court on the matter. The same result can obtain herein. 76

The primary focus for the Court of Appeals, as an agent of this Court, in receiving

and evaluating evidence should be whether the Manotoks can trace their claim oftitle to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate,

which was a Friar Land. On that evidence, this Court may ultimately decide whether

annulment of the Manotok title is warranted, similar to the annulment of the Cebu

Country Club title in Alonso. At the same time, the Court recognizes that the

respective claims to title by other parties such as the Barques and the Manahans,

and the evidence they may submit on their behalf, may have an impact on the


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correct determination of the status of the Manotok title. It would thus be prudent, in

assuring the accurate evaluation of the question, to allow said parties, along with

the OSG, to participate in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals. If the final

evidence on record definitively reveals the proper claimant to the subject property,

the Court would take such fact into consideration as it adjudicates final relief.

For the purposes above-stated, the Court of Appeals is tasked to hear and receive

evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings

and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from notice of this

Resolution.

To assist the Court of Appeals in its evaluation of the factual record, the Office of

the Solicitor General is directed to secure all the pertinent relevant records from the

Land Management Bureau and the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources and submit the same to the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 12 June 2005, and the Resolutions dated 19 Apriland 19 June 2006 of the Court's First Division are hereby SET ASIDE, and the Entry

of Judgment recorded on 2 May 2006 is RECALLED. The Amended Decision dated 24

February 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Amended Decision dated 7 November

2003 and the Resolution dated 12 March 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, and the

Resolutions of the Land Registration Authority dated 24 June 1998 and 14 June 1998

in Admin. Recons. No. Q-547-A[97] are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE. TcSICH

The instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further

proceedings in accordance with this Resolution. The Court of Appeals is directed to

raffle these remanded cases immediately upon receipt of this Resolution.

This Resolution is immediately executory.

Puno, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Velasco, Jr. and Brion, JJ., concur.

Quisumbing, J., joins in the dissent of J. Santiago.

Ynares-Santiago, J., please see Dissenting Opinion.

Carpio, J., see separate concurring opinion.

Corona, J., please see Separate Opinion.

Carpio-Morales, J., also concurs with J. Carpio's Separate Opinion.

Azcuna, J., joins the dissent of Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.

Chico-Nazario, J., joins the dissent of Justice Consuelo Santiago in addition to her

dissenting opinion.

Nachura, J., related to one of the counsel. Took no part.


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Reyes, J., joins the dissent of J. Santiago.

Leonardo-de Castro, J., joins the dissent of Justice Santiago.

Separate Opinions

CARPIO, J., concurring:

The Antecedents

On 22 October 1996, Homer L. Barque, Sr. (Barque, Sr.) represented by Teresita

Barque-Hernandez filed a petition for administrative reconstitution of the original

copy of TCT No. 210177 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. TCT No. 210177

was allegedly destroyed when a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988. In

support of the petition, Barque, Sr. submitted the owner's duplicate certificate of

title, Real Estate Tax Receipts and Tax Declaration. ICaDHT

Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos (Atty. Bustos), Reconstituting Officer and Chief of theReconstitution Division, Land Registration Authority (LRA) wrote a letter dated 29

October 1996, 1 addressed to Engineer Privadi J. Dalire (Engineer Dalire), Chief of

the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau, Binondo, Manila.

Atty. Bustos requested Engineer Dalire to furnish him with a certified copy of

Subdivision Plan Fls-3168-D (Fls-3168-D). Atty. Bustos wrote a similar but undated

letter addressed to the Chief of the Surveys Division of the Lands Management

Services, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, National Capital

Region (LMS-DENR-NCR). 2

In his reply dated 7 November 1996, 3 Engineer Dalire informed Atty. Bustos that

the Lands Management Bureau has no record of Fls-3168-D. In a letter dated 28November 1996, 4 Engineer Ernesto S. Erive (Engineer Erive), Chief of the Surveys

Division of the LMS-DENR-NCR, informed Atty. Bustos that a microfilm copy of Fls-

3168-D is on file in the Technical Records and Statistical Section of their office.

The letter of Engineer Erive confirming the existence of a microfilm copy of Fls-

3168-D conflicted with the letter of Engineer Dalire that his office has no record of

Fls-3168-D. Thus, Atty. Bustos sent another letter dated 2 December 1996 5 to

Engineer Dalire requesting for clarification. In a letter dated 5 December 1996, 6

Engineer Dalire requested the Regional Technical Director of LMS-DENR-NCR for a

copy of Fls-3168-D for evaluation. Engineer Dalire wrote:

In connection with the letter of clarification dated December 2, 1996 of the

Reconstituting Officer and Chief Reconstitution Division of LRA relative to the

certified reproduction plan FLS-3168-D (microfilm) issued by the Chief, Technical

Records & Statistical Section on September 23, 1996 and our letter dated November

7, 1996 that we have no record of Fls-3168-D. In this regards (sic), please forward to

us the copy on file in that office (DENR-NCR) from where the Chief of Technical

Records and Statistical Section reproduced a copy he issued to LRA for our


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evaluation. In the machine copy of Fls-3168-D (furnished to us by LRA) from the

copy of that office issued to LRA, the said copy on file in your office did not emanate

from this Office. The stamp, particularly, bearing the name of this office and the

Chief of Geodetic Surveys is not the same stamp we are using.

Please forward to us the said plan for evaluation and comment.

A letter dated 2 January 1997, 7 purportedly from Engineer Dalire, addressed to the

LRA Administrator, was handcarried to, and received by the LRA General Records

Section on 7 January 1997. The letter states: TcDAHS

SUBJECT: Copy of Plan FLS-3168-D

Caloocan, M.M.

02 January 1997

The Administrator

Attn: The Reconstituting Officer &

Chief, Reconstitution Division

Land Registration Authority

East Avenue, Quezon City

Sir:

In reply to your letter dated December 2, 1996, please be informed that the copy of

the subject plan was forwarded to this office by the Chief, Technical Records and

Statistical Section of the National Capital Region Lands Management Sector for our

evaluation. As per verification and comparison made in our microfilm records, it was

found out that they are identical and bore the same stamps and initials used in this

office.

In view hereof, it is further informed that in our reply letter dated Nov. 7, 1996 we

indicated the status thereof because we failed to verify from our index cards then

for our last result, hence, this case be given due course for Administrative

reconstitution (sic).

Very truly yours,

For the Director,

Lands Management Bureau

(SGD.)


22/118


23/118

2. Reply letter of Engineer Ernesto S. Erive, dated Nov. 28, 1996;

3. Our reply letter dated November 7, 1996 to your letter dated October 29,

1996

In this connection, please be informed that we wrote on December 5, 1996 the

DENR-NCR about your letter dated December 2, 1996 informing them that the plan

Fls-3168-D filed in that Office from where the reproduced copy furnished to LRA did

not emanate from our office. We requested them to forward to us the said plan for

our evaluation and comment. Likewise, on January 5, 1997, we made a follow-up,

reiterating that we have no records (sic) of Fls-3168-D and requesting them to

forward the plan for our evaluation and comment. It is regretted, they did not

respond.

Upon examination of the copy of Fls-3168-D allegedly issued by DENR-NCR, it is

certain that the source of the copy is a spurious plan which may have been inserted

in the file. We requested for the copy in their file last 05 December 1996 and 05January 1997 but until this writing, NCR has not sent us the copy for authentication

as required by DENR Administrative Order. We are sure that the copy did not come

from this Office. The reasons are:

a. Our inventory of approved plans enrolled in our file, our Microfilm Computer

list of plans available for decentralization all show that we do not have this plan Fls-

3168-D, logically we cannot issue any copy.

b. The copy of the plan Fls-3168-D shows visible signs that it is a spurious copy.

1) The certification (rubber stamp) serves a two piece stamp. The certification

and the signing official are separate. Ours is one-piece. ADCTac

2) The alignment of: Lands, GEODETIC, this, Privadi, and Chief in the syndicates

(sic) stamp differ from our stamp. Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division is our stamp,

their (sic) is Survey without the s plural.

3) We do not stamp the plan twice as the syndicate did on the copy.

4) The size of the lettering in the rubber stamp "Not for Registration/Titling For

Reference Only" is smaller than our stamp. It is also incomplete as an (sic) Stamp,

in addition to [the] above is "of _________".

5) The copy bears forged initials of my action officer and myself. I sign

completely certification.

6) The name of the claimant is very visible to have been tampered in the master

copy.

7) Again, it is certified that this Bureau does not have copy of Fls-3168-D.


24/118

In view of the foregoing, the copy of Fls-3168-D furnished your Office as well as the

alleged letter authenticating it should be disregarded or rejected as they come from

spurious sources. This involves the reconstitution of title allegedly lot 823-A of Fls-

3168-D with an area of 171,473 Sq. M. Surely, the use of the spurious copy of Fls-

3168-D for the reconstitution of title will create land problem involving prime lots in

that area.

Meanwhile, we requested our Records Division to find out to whom lot 823 (or

portion thereof) Piedad Estate was conveyed.

Very truly yours,

For the Director,

Lands Management Bureau:

(SGD.)

PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE

Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division

In a letter dated 13 February 1997 10 to the LRA Administrator, Engineer Dalire

explained that the 2 January 1997 letter was forged. Thus:

13 February 1997

The Administrator


East Avenue, NIA Road

Quezon City

ATTN: Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos

Reconstituting Officer

Sir:

In reply to your letter dated January 28, 1997 which we received today, please be

informed that as per the inventory of approved surveys which are officially enrolled

in our file, the locator cards, the microfilm, list of plans on file which were

decentralized to our regions, that are on file in this Bureau show that plan Fls-3168-

D is not among the plans in our file. The non-existence of plan Fls-3168-D in our file,

hence there is none to decentralize to our National Capital Region, is the subject of

our reply to you dated 07 November 1996 (copy attached). EADCHS


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With respect to the letter dated 02 January 1997, xerox copy attached to your

letter, this letter definitely did not come from this office; it is a forged document.

The statement that the subject plan was forwarded to us by the Chief, Technical

Records Statistics Section of the NCR-LMS is not true. Until now the NCR has not

turned over the plan they reproduced in compliance with our urgent requests dated

03 January 1996 and followed up by our letters 03 January 1997 and 06 February1997 (copies attached).

With respect to the questioned plan of Fls-3168-D, xerox copy attached to your

letter of December 2, 1996, our detailed findings tending to prove it is a spurious

copy have been discussed in our letter-reply dated 31 January 1997.

Meanwhile, we are retrieving the plan allegedly in the file of NCR for investigation

and/or validation under DENR Administrative Order No. 40, s. 1991. HCISED

Very truly yours,

(SGD.)

PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE


Finally, in a letter dated 19 February 1997, 11 Engineer Dalire requested Atty.

Bustos to disregard Fls-3168-D for being spurious, thus:

19 February 1997

Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos

Reconstituting Officer


East Avenue, Quezon City

Dear Atty. Bustos:

In reply to your query whether or not

a) the copy of plan Fls-3168-D submitted to you involving lot 823, Piedad Estate

as surveyed for Emiliano Setosta;

b) the letter dated 07 November 1996, and

c) the letter dated 02 January 1997

are authentic and really coming from this office.


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The letter dated 07 November 1996 (copy attached) stating that this Bureau has no

records of Fls-3168-D is authentic. Our Inventory Record of Approved Surveys, our

computerized list of plans officially filed in this Bureau, the Locator Cards, and the

microfilm all show that we have no records or information about Plan Fls-3168-D.

The copy of Fls-3168-D attached to your letter dated December 2, 1996 is notissued by this Office. There are many markings on the copy to prove it did not come

from LMB. Reasons, among others, are:

1) We have no copy of Fls-3168-D on file so how can we issue a copy of plan

that is non-existing?

2) The copy of plan bears two "Certifications" at the top and at lower half. This is

not our practice;

3) The rubber-stamp shows there are two pieces; one for the certification and

another for the signing official. We use one piece rubber stamp. The alignment of

the letters/words of one rubber stamp is different from this marking on this spuriousplan; ACIDSc

4) The plan shows only initial. I sign in full copies of plans with the initials of my

action officers and their codings below my signature. These are not present in the

spurious copy of plan;

5) The letter size of the rubber stamp NOT FOR REGISTRATION/TITLING, FOR

REFERENCE ONLY is smaller than our rubber stamp;

6) The spurious copy of plan you furnished us does not carry our rubber stamp

"GOVERNMENT PROPERTY NOT TO BE SOLD: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OF___________________ "This is stamped on all microfilm copies we issue because all

microfilm copies are for official use only of our LMS. We have shown you our rubber

stamps to prove that the copy of Fls-3168-D in your possession is a spurious plan.

I firmly deny having prepared and issued the letter dated 02 January 1997 stating

that copy of subject plan (Fls-3168-D) was forwarded to us by the Chief Technical

Records and Statistics Section of the NCR and that as per verification, the plan is

identical to the microfilm and that the case be given due course for administrative

reconstitution. Certainly this is not true. This is the handiwork of forgers. How can

this be when NCR has never given us the alleged copy in their file for validation. The

forwarding of the copy to us is mandatory under DAO No. 49 for our validation. Thisis the subject of our letters to NCR dated 05 December 1996, 03 January 1997 and

06 February 1997 (copies attached). Definitely this letter was never prepared and

issued by this Office. Our record books and file attest to this. We do not use

letterheads for letters involving this topic.

Apparently our letter of 31 January 1997 (copy attached) was intercepted and did

not reach you. HcISTE


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For all intent and purposes, please disregard the plan Fls-3168-D and the letter

dated 02 January 1997 as they are proven to be spurious documents.

Very truly yours,

For the Director of Lands:

(SGD.)

PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE


The Ruling of the Reconstituting Officer

In an Order dated 30 June 1997, 12 Atty. Bustos denied the petition for

administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 on the following grounds:

1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and171,472, respectively, covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823

Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302

registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et al., reconstituted under Adm.

Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated February 01, 1991; IDScTE

2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as categorically stated

by Engineer Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Lands Management

Bureau, in his letter dated February 19, 1997. 13 (Boldfacing and underscoring

supplied)

Barque, Sr. moved for reconsideration of the Order. In an Order dated 10 February1998, 14 Atty. Bustos denied the motion for lack of merit.

The Heirs of Barque (Barques) filed an appeal with the LRA, docketed as Admin.

Recons. No. Q-547-A [97].

The Ruling of the Land Registration Authority

In a Resolution dated 24 June 1998, 15 the LRA gave due course to the appeal. The

LRA ruled that under LRA Circular No. 13, 16 only the owner's or co-owner's

duplicate of an original or transfer certificate of title may be used as a source of

administrative reconstitution. Hence, Atty. Bustos erred in requiring the submissionof documents other than the owner's duplicate TCT. The LRA further ruled that

Engineer Dalire failed to deny or question the genuineness of his signature in the

letter of 2 January 1997. The LRA held that the 2 January 1997 letter is an official

communication from Engineer Dalire. The LRA Administrator personally opined that

the Manotoks' TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] is sham and spurious. Thus:


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It is undisputed that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, the property in question, is

located at Barrio Matandang Balara, Quezon City. Several documents submitted by

oppositors particularly the several Deeds of Sale and Unilateral Deed of Conveyance

including the real estate tax receipts would show that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate

is located at Barrio Payong, and/or Barrio Culiat [Annexes "2" to "77" inclusive "79",

"84" and "85" of Opposition] which is grossly inaccurate. The map of Quezon City[Annex "N" of Petitioners' Position Paper] would show that there is no such barrio as

Payong. It must likewise be noted that there is a Barrio Culiat but the same is

separate and distinct from Barrio Matandang Balara and they do not adjoin each

other. Quite perplexing though is the fact that the real estate tax receipts for

payments made after the Quezon City Hall was gutted by fire on 11 June 1988

would show that the property covered thereby is already situated at Barrio

Matandang Balara [Annexes "91" to "104" inclusive of Opposition], while in other

tax payment receipts [Annexes "103" to "114" inclusive of Opposition], Barrio

Capitol is indicated as the location of the property in question. This is highly

questionable and likewise highly irregular. The said real estate tax receipts also

reflect the tax declaration of the property covered thereby. It is highly irregular that

the tax declaration numbers indicated therein would vary and those tax

declarations which appear to have been canceled would again be revived. STHAaD

The claim of the oppositors that the property in question per TCT No. RT-22481

[372302] covers only one [1] lot is also inaccurate and without any basis. Plan FLS

3168D shows that the property in question indeed consists of two [2] lots, Lot 823-A

and Lot 823-B. The same is being buttressed and corroborated by the certified copy

of the tax map over the property in question issued by the Quezon City Assessor's

Office [annex "H" of Petitioners Position Paper]. Said tax map shows that similar to

TCT No. 210177 and Plan FLS 3168D, the property in question covers two [2] lots,Lot 823-A and Lot 823-B. Granting arguendo that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate has

not yet been subdivided into two [2] lots from the date of original survey in 1907, it

is highly irregular that TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] would have Lot 822-A Psd 2498,

Lot 818-A and Lot 818-C Psd 2507 as boundaries when at the time of the original

survey, there were no such Psd's yet.

Examination of the technical description and boundaries appearing in TCT No. RT-

22481 [372302] would show that the same do not, in all respects, conform to the

certified technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate

[property in question] which are the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R and B. L. Form No. 31-

10 issued by the Bureau of Lands [Annexes "I" and "J" of Petitioners' Position Paper].There was never any mention of Payatas Estate nor Tuazon Estate as the

boundaries of the lot in question. The lot in question does not at all adjoin the

Payatas Estate which was surveyed only on January 12, 1923 as per certification

issued by the LMS-DENR-NCR [Annex "L" Petitioners' Position Paper]. As correctly

pointed out by petitioners, Lot 822 was mentioned as one of the boundaries of TCT


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No. RT-22481 [372302]. It was not, however, indicated whether or not it was Lot

822 of the Piedad Estate. 17

However, the LRA ruled that TCT No. 210177 may only be reconstituted after a

court of competent jurisdiction cancelled TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of

the Manotoks. The dispositive portion of the LRA Resolution reads: EacHSA

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of

TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after

cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of the Manotoks upon order

of a court of competent jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED. 18 (Emphasis supplied)

The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration. In an Order dated 14 June 2001, 19

the LRA denied the motion.

The Manotoks filed a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 beforethe Court of Appeals challenging the 24 June 1998 Resolution and 14 June 2001

Order of the LRA.

The Barques filed a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 praying

for the modification of 24 June 1998 Resolution and 14 June 2001 Order of the LRA.

The Barques prayed for the immediate reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 without

prior cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) by a court of competent

jurisdiction. aHTcDA

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

CA-G.R. No. 66642

CA-G.R. No. 66642 was initially dismissed in the Resolution of 23 October 2001 20

for failure to show that Rosa Manotok was authorized to sign the verification and

certification against forum shopping in behalf of the other petitioners. Upon motion

for reconsideration filed by the Manotoks, the petition was reinstated in the

Resolution of 27 November 2001. 21

In its Decision of 29 October 2003, 22 the Court of Appeals denied the Manotoks'

petition and affirmed the LRA Resolution of 24 June 1998. However, upon motion for

reconsideration of the Barques, the Court of Appeals promulgated an Amended

Decision on 24 February 2004, 23 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of

this Court dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered

ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-

22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents TCT No. T-

210177.


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SO ORDERED. 24

The Manotoks came to this Court for relief. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No.

162335.

CA-G.R. SP No. 66700

In a Decision promulgated on 13 September 2002, 25 the Court of Appeals

dismissed the Barques' petition and affirmed the LRA Resolution of 24 June 1998.

The Barques moved for reconsideration of the Decision.

In an Amended Decision promulgated on 7 November 2003, 26 the Court of Appeals

reconsidered its 13 September 2002 Decision, as follows:

WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered.

Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT

No. RT-22481 of private respondents and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute

forthwith petitioners valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.

No pronouncement as to costs. THCSAE

SO ORDERED. 27

The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration of the Amended Decision. In its

Resolution of 12 March 2004, 28 the Court of Appeals denied the motion.

The Manotoks filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed as G.R. No.

162605.

The cases were consolidated in the Court's Resolution of 2 August 2004.

In a Decision dated 12 December 2005, 29 the First Division of this Court denied the

petitions and affirmed the Amended Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP

No. 66642 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66700. In its 19 April 2006 Resolution, 30 the Special

First Division of this Court denied the Manotoks' motion for reconsideration. No

proceeding of any kind took place before any trial court assailing the validity of the

Torrens title of the Manotoks. Yet, as the final resolution of the Barques' simple

petition for administrative reconstitution, the First Division of this Court cancelled

the Torrens title of the Manotoks and declared the title of the Barques not only

reconstituted, but also valid.

In a Resolution dated 12 September 2006, this Court, among others, granted the

Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Felicitas B. Manahan and Rosendo Manahan

(Manahans).

In a Resolution dated 19 July 2006, the Special First Division of this Court referred

the cases to the Court en banc. In its 26 July 2006 Resolution, the Court en banc


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accepted the cases. In the Oral Argument on 24 July 2007, the Court en banc

considered the following issues:

1. Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-

22481 without a trial before the proper regional trial court in a proceeding directly

assailing the validity of petitioners' title?

2. Does the LRA have jurisdiction to administratively reconstitute the allegedly

lost TCT No. 210177 in the name of respondents despite the previously

reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481 of the petitioners over the same property?

3. Does the LRA have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the validity of petitioners' TCT

No. RT-22481 in the administrative reconstitution case filed by respondents with the

LRA?

4. Does the Court of Appeals or the LRA have jurisdiction to decide the

ownership of the disputed property in the administrative reconstitution of title filed

by respondents?

The Ruling of This Court

We set aside the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division of this Court.

cDTSHE

First, the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division of this Court overturns

well-entrenched doctrines of this Court, such as the decision in Sps. Antonio and

Genoveva Balanon-Anicete, et al. v. Pedro Balanon. 31 Second, the LRA has no

jurisdiction to reconstitute the Barques' title because of the pre-existing Torrens

title of the Manotoks. Third, a Torrens title can only be cancelled if a directproceeding assailing its validity is filed before the proper Regional Trial Court.

Fourth, the Barques submitted patently forged documents in the administrative

reconstitution of their title, and even in the attachments to their Memorandum of 23

August 2007.

FOUR FIRSTS IN PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE

The 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division made four "firsts". First, it is

the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence where an administrative reconstitution

of title resulted in the cancellation of the Torrens title of another person without a

direct attack of the cancelled title in any trial court. Second, it is the first decision inPhilippine jurisprudence authorizing the LRA to reconstitute administratively a

Torrens title despite the existence of a previously issued Torrens title over the same

property in the name of another person. Third, it is the first decision in Philippine

jurisprudence where the issue of ownership of land is decided with finality in a

petition for administrative reconstitution of title. And fourth, it is the first decision in

Philippine jurisprudence where the petitioner in an administrative petition praying

for a simple reconstitution of title received an unexpected and undeserved windfall


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the declaration of validity of his reconstituted title and the cancellation of a

previously issued Torrens title in the name of another person over the same

property.

LANDMARK DOCTRINES OVERTURNED

The Decision of the First Division overturns three doctrines firmly established in

numerous decisions of this Court, both en banc and in division, many of them

landmark rulings. To name a few of these decisions starting in the year 1915:

Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 32 Magay, etc. v. Estiandan, 33 Republic v. Court of

Appeals, 34 Alabang Development Corporation, et al. v. Valenzuela, etc., et al., 35

MWSS v. Hon. Sison, etc., et al., 36 Liwag v. Court of Appeals, 37 Ybaez v.

Intermediate Appellate Court, 38 Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, 39 Ortigas &

Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, 40 Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago,

41 and Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc. 42

The three well-established doctrines that the Decision of the First Division hasoverturned are: IDSEAH

1. A Torrens title can be cancelled only in a proceeding directly attacking the

title's validity before the proper regional trial court. 43 This is the bedrock principle

that provides enduring stability to Torrens titles.

2. A reconstitution of Torrens title, whether judicial or administrative, cannot

proceed once it is shown that another Torrens title has already been issued to

another person over the same property. The reconstituting body or court has no

jurisdiction to issue another Torrens title over the same property to the petitioner.

44 The existence of a prior title ipso facto nullifies the reconstitution proceedings.

45 The proper recourse is to assail directly in a proceeding before the regional trial

court the validity of the Torrens title already issued to the other person.

3. The reconstituting officer or court has no jurisdiction to decide the issue of

ownership over the property or the validity of the title. 46 The purpose of

reconstitution is solely to replace a certificate of title that was lost or destroyed in

the same legal status it existed at the time of the loss or destruction. The validity of

a Torrens title, reconstituted or not, is a separate issue from the reconstitution of

title.

DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY NOT APPLICABLE

The dissenting opinion asserts that the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First

Division has already become final and executory, and thus has become immutable

and unalterable. The dissenting opinion states that there is no compelling reason to

depart from the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions.

On the contrary, the 12 December 2005 Decision never became final and

executory. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions necessarily


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applies only to final and executory decisions. If the decision never became final and

executory, the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions has no

application. Before finality of a decision, a court has "plenary power to alter, modify

or even set aside, its own decisions, and even order a new trial, at any time before

the decision becomes final." 47

There are two compelling jurisdictional reasons why the 12 December 2005

Decision of the First Division never became final and executory. First, the First

Division has no jurisdiction to overturn a doctrine laid down by the Court en banc or

in division. The Court en banc has ruled in Group Commander, Intelligence and

Security Group, Philippine Army v. Dr. Malvar 48 that a decision of a division is void

if it overturns a doctrine established by the en banc or another division. There, t

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