JP 3-51, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare - BITS00).pdf · PREFACE i 1. Scope This publication establishes doctrinal guidance on the use of electronic warfare (EW) in joint operations

Joint Doctrine forElectronic Warfare

Joint Publication 3-51

7 April 2000

PREFACE

i

1. Scope

This publication establishes doctrinalguidance on the use of electronic warfare(EW) in joint operations. Specifically, thefollowing areas are within the scope of thispublication: the fundamentals of EW; the stafforganization and command relationships ofEW in joint operations; planning proceduresfor joint EW; coordination of joint EWduring operations; training and exerciseconsiderations for EW in joint operations; andallied and coalition considerations in planningand conducting joint EW.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations and provides the doctrinal basis forUS military involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other jointforce commanders and prescribes doctrine forjoint operations and training. It providesmilitary guidance for use by the Armed Forcesin preparing their appropriate plans. It is notthe intent of this publication to restrict theauthority of the joint force commander (JFC)from organizing the force and executing themission in a manner the JFC deems mostappropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of these commands. Theseprinciples and guidance also may apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attachedto forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine will befollowed except when, in the judgment of thecommander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

C. W. FULFORD, JR.Lieutenant General, US Marine CorpsDirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER IOVERVIEW OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE

• Introduction .............................................................................................................. I-1• Electromagnetic Environment ................................................................................... I-1• Military Operations and the Electromagnetic Environment ....................................... I-1• Role of Electronic Warfare in Military Operations ..................................................... I-1• EW as a Part of Other Military Concepts ................................................................... I-4• Directed Energy as a Part of EW ............................................................................... I-4• Principal EW Activities ............................................................................................. I-5• Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support .............................................................. I-8• Service Perspectives of EW....................................................................................... I-8

CHAPTER IIORGANIZING FOR JOINT ELECTRONIC WARFARE

• Introduction ............................................................................................................. II-1• Joint EW Organization ............................................................................................. II-1• Joint EW Staff Manning ........................................................................................... II-2• Joint Frequency Management Organization.............................................................. II-3• Organization of Intelligence Support to EW ............................................................. II-4• Service Organization for EW ................................................................................... II-5

CHAPTER IIIPLANNING JOINT ELECTRONIC WARFARE

• Introduction ........................................................................................................... III-1• EW Planning Considerations .................................................................................. III-1• Joint EW Planning Process ..................................................................................... III-6• EW Planning Guidance .......................................................................................... III-9• EW Planning Aids ................................................................................................ III-10

CHAPTER IVCOORDINATING JOINT ELECTRONIC WARFARE

• Introduction ........................................................................................................... IV-1• Joint Coordination and Control .............................................................................. IV-1• EW Frequency Deconfliction ................................................................................. IV-7• Component Coordination Procedures ................................................................... IV-10• EW and Intelligence Coordination ....................................................................... IV-12

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CHAPTER VELECTRONIC WARFARE IN JOINT EXERCISES

• Introduction ............................................................................................................ V-1• Planning Joint Exercises .......................................................................................... V-1• Planning EW in Joint Exercises ............................................................................... V-1• EW in Exercise Preparation, Execution, and Post-Exercise Evaluation .................... V-7

CHAPTER VIMULTINATIONAL ASPECTS OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE

• Introduction ........................................................................................................... VI-1• MNF EW Organization and Command and Control ............................................... VI-1• Multinational EWCC with NATO Forces .............................................................. VI-3• Multinational EW with ABCA and ASCC Member Nations ................................. VI-3• Multinational EWCC with Non-NATO or ABCA Allies or Coalition Partners ....... VI-3• EW Mutual Support ............................................................................................... VI-3• Releasability of EW Information to Allies and Multinational Forces ...................... VI-5

APPENDIX

A JOPES Electronic Warfare Guidance ................................................................ A-1B Electronic Warfare Frequency Deconfliction Procedures .................................... B-1C Joint Spectrum Center Support to Joint Electronic Warfare ................................ C-1D Electronic Warfare Reprogramming .................................................................. D-1E Electronic Warfare Modeling ............................................................................. E-1F Service Perspectives of Electronic Warfare ........................................................ F-1G References ........................................................................................................ G-1H Administrative Instructions ............................................................................... H-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions .............................................................................. GL-4

FIGURE

I-1 Portions of the Electromagnetic Spectrum ...................................................... I-2I-2 Concept of Electronic Warfare ........................................................................ I-3I-3 Information Operations: Capabilities and Related Activities .......................... I-5II-1 Duties Assigned to the Electronic Warfare Officer ......................................... II-2II-2 Organization of Intelligence Support to Electronic Warfare ........................... II-4III-1 Joint Frequency Management Office Spectrum Management Process .......... III-2III-2 Joint Task Force Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Planning Flow .... III-3III-3 Electronic Warfare Planning Related to Deliberate Planning........................ III-7III-4 Electronic Warfare Planning Related to Crisis Action Planning ................... III-8IV-1 Executing Wartime Frequency Use ............................................................. IV-2

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IV-2 Electronic Warfare Activities Coordinated With Information OperationsActivities .................................................................................................. IV-4

IV-3 Critical Elements in the Electronic Warfare Frequency DeconflictionProcess ..................................................................................................... IV-8

V-1 Electronic Warfare Exercise Planning Flow .................................................. V-2V-2 Tasks to Integrate Electronic Warfare Into Joint Exercises ............................ V-4V-3 Stages of a Joint Exercise ............................................................................. V-7

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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vii

Provides an Overview of Electronic Warfare

Covers Organizing for Joint Electronic Warfare

Discusses Planning and Coordination Requirements for JointElectronic Warfare

Identifies Electronic Warfare Requirements in Joint Exercises

Covers Multinational Aspects of Electronic Warfare

Military operations are executed in an increasingly complexelectromagnetic environment. Electromagnetic (EM) energyoccurs naturally or can be manmade. This energy, in the formof EM radiation, is made up of oscillating electric and magneticfields and is propagated at or near the speed of light. The EMenvironment is a combination of the power, frequency, andduration of the radiated or conducted EM emissions that maybe encountered by a military force. The term “electromagneticspectrum” refers to the range of frequencies of EM radiationfrom zero to infinity. In military operations, the term electronicwarfare (EW) refers to any military action involving the use ofelectromagnetic or directed energy to control the EM spectrumor to attack the enemy. EW includes three major subdivisions:electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfaresupport (ES). The need for control of the EM spectrum and thetype of EW actions that can be used to control that spectrumdepend on the operational environment in which a militaryoperation is carried out. In joint operations, EW is a militarycapability that must be integrated into a given joint operationas it supports all phases and aspects of a campaign. Theprincipal activities used in EW have been developed over timeto exploit the opportunities and vulnerabilities which areinherent in the physics of EM energy. The distinction betweenintelligence and ES is determined by who tasks or controls theintelligence assets, what they are tasked to provide, and forwhat purpose they are tasked. ES is achieved by intelligencecollection, processing, and exploitation assets tasked orcontrolled by an operational commander for immediate threat

Introduction

The three majorsubdivisions of electronicwarfare (EW) areelectronic attack,electronic protection, andelectronic warfare support.

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recognition and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance,targeting, and homing.

How joint forces are organized to plan and execute EW is aprerogative of the joint force commander (JFC). EW hasoperational implications for planning and supervision functionsthat are normally divided among several directorates of a jointstaff. Authority for long range planning is normally delegatedby the JFC to the Plans Directorate and supervising joint EWdelegated to the Operations Directorate (J-3). As one of thecapabilities of information operations (IO), EW is planned inclose coordination with other staff functions. Normally, theEW officer is the principal staff EW planner on a joint staff.The scope and nature of the EW officer’s responsibilities isdependent on the size of the staff, the operational area of theJFC which the staff supports, and the type of mission oroperation which the staff must plan. The requirement for staffpersonnel to support the EW officer varies among joint staffs.Accomplishment of this work requires that the core membersof a staff assisting the EW officer have a depth of technicalexpertise and knowledge of the capabilities of EW systemscurrently employed by components, allies, and coalitionpartners. Augmentation of joint staffs during times of crisis orimpending operations in order to accumulate additional EWexpertise is almost always necessary. It is important to notethat each Military Service has a different approach to organizingtheir forces to plan and execute EW.

EW is a complex aspect of modern military operations thatmust be fully integrated with other aspects of joint operationsin order to achieve its full potential for contributing to anoperation’s objectives. Such integration requires carefulplanning. EW is only one type of activity that occurs in anincreasingly crowded EM spectrum. As such, EW plannersmust be concerned with coordinating their planned activitieswith other aspects of military operations that use the EMspectrum as well as third party users of the spectrum that EWdoes not wish to disrupt. Like other aspects of joint operations,joint EW is centrally planned and decentrally executed. Sincethe Military Services provide most US EW assets available injoint operations, Service component EW planners should beintegrated into the joint planning process. Since EW activitytakes place in the EM spectrum, joint EW planners must closelycoordinate their efforts with those members of the joint staff

Organizing for Electronic Warfare

Planning

The joint forcecommander, PlansDirectorate, andOperations Directoratewill have primaryresponsibility for theplanning, coordination,and integration of jointforce EW operations.

Since EW must not conflictwith military operationsand others using theelectromagnetic (EM)spectrum, it is essentialthat EW plannerscoordinate their plannedactivities with them.

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Executive Summary

who are concerned with managing military use of the EMspectrum. Military operations dependence on EM energy anduse of the EM spectrum by the systems that sense, process,store, measure, analyze, and communicate information createIO opportunities and vulnerabilities that EW can address.The purpose of EW reprogramming is to maintain or enhancethe effectiveness of EW and target sensing system equipmentemployed by tri-Service units. EW reprogramming includeschanges to self-defense systems, offensive weapons systems,and intelligence collection systems. Effective electronicmasking of joint military operations involves the proactivemanagement of all friendly radiated electronic signatures ofequipment being used in or supporting the operation.Interoperability is essential to use EW effectively as anelement of joint military power. The major requirements ofinteroperability are to establish standards and practiceprocedures that allow for integrated planning and execution ofEW operations (including joint EW) as well as timely and routineexchange of EW information. Like other aspects of jointoperations, joint EW planning is conducted through the JointOperation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) process.In order to be fully integrated into other aspects of a plannedoperation, EW planning must start in the earliest stages of theJOPES process and be coordinated with other aspects of theplan every step of the way. Planning guidance for EW shouldbe included in an operation plan (OPLAN) as a tab to the IOguidance. There are a number of automated planning toolsavailable to help joint EW planners carry out theirresponsibilities.

Once a plan has been approved and an operation iscommenced, the preponderance of EW staff effort shifts to thecoordination necessary to ensure that EW actions are carriedout as planned or modified to respond to the dynamics of theoperation. EW staff personnel have a major role to perform inthe dynamic management of the EM spectrum duringoperations. Most of the elements and activities of IO dependon, use, or exploit the EM spectrum for at least some oftheir functions. The deconfliction and coordination of EWactivities in an operation is a continuous process for the IO celland EW staff personnel. Exploitation of adversary equipmentcan verify adversary electronic equipment capabilities, toinclude wartime reserve modes. There are several criticalelements in the EW frequency deconfliction process thatshould be performed on a continuing basis. Componentsrequiring EW support from another component should be

EW staff should focus oncoordination efforts thatensure EW actions arecarried out as planned,with emphasis on EWasset allocation, EMspectrum management,and emerging operationalissues.

Coordinating

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encouraged to directly coordinate that support when possible,informing joint EW planners of the results of such coordination.Detailed coordination is essential between the EW activitiesand the intelligence activities supporting an operation.

Joint exercises are a unique opportunity to exercise componentEW capabilities in mutually supportive operations. Exerciseplanning is a separate process from the JOPES planning that isused to develop OPLANs. The command or person designatedto plan the EW aspects of an exercise must be concerned with:(1) identifying EW exercise objectives that are consistent withthe overall exercise objectives in scope, purpose, and level ofeffort; (2) developing an EW concept of operations that isintegrated into the larger IO concept of operations; (3)coordinating EW personnel and assets to participate as both“Blue” and “Red” forces; (4) identifying personnel with EWexpertise to participate as joint exercise control group and“white cell” participants; (5) determining EW modeling andsimulation requirements and systems for the exercise andcoordinating their availability and funding; and (6) draftingthe EW sections of the exercise directive and supporting planssuch as the exercise control plan. The planning stage is onlythe first of four stages in the life cycle of each joint exercise.The other three stages, preparation, execution, and post-exercise and evaluation, also involve tasks and coordinationon the part of EW exercise staff personnel.

US planners must be prepared to integrate US and allied orcoalition EW capabilities into an overall EW plan; be able toprovide allied or coalition nations with information concerningUS EW capabilities within releasibility guidelines; and provideEW support to allied or coalition nations. In US-led operations,the doctrine within this publication should be used as thebasis for all EW activities within the Multinational Force (MNF).However, the planning of MNF EW is made more difficultbecause of ill-defined security issues, different cryptoequipment, differences in the level of training of involved forces,and language barriers. The MNF commander (MNFC)provides guidance for planning and conducting EW operationsto the MNF through the J-3 and the IO cell. The MNFCshould assign responsibilities for management of EWresources in multinational operations among the staff. NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO’s) EW doctrine,contained in Military Committee Document 64/8, “NATO

Joint Exercises

Multinational Aspects of EW

EW exercise activitiesmust be well-planned tobalance EW trainingobjectives with othertraining objectives.

US planners must provideEW support to allied orcoalition nations, as EW isan integral part ofmultinational operations.

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Executive Summary

Electronic Warfare Policy,” is largely based on US EWdoctrine.

The focus of this publication is to provide guidance on theuse of EW in joint operations. The material is focusedspecifically on the fundamentals of EW; the stafforganization and command relationships of EW in jointoperations; planning procedures for joint EW; coordinationof joint EW during operations; training and exerciseconsiderations for EW in joint operations; and allied andcoalition considerations in planning and conducting jointand/or combined EW.

CONCLUSION

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IOVERVIEW OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE

I-1

1. Introduction

Military operations are executed in anincreasingly complex electromagneticenvironment (EME). Today, electromagnetic(EM) devices are used by both civilian andmilitary organizations for communications,navigation, sensing, information storage,and processing, as well as a variety of otherpurposes. The increasing portability andaffordability of sophisticated EM equipmentguarantees that the EME in which militaryforces operate will become more complex inthe future. The recognized need for militaryforces to have unimpeded access to and useof the EME creates vulnerabilities andopportunities for electronic warfare (EW)in support of military operations. In jointoperations, EW is one of the integratedcapabilities used to conduct informationoperations (IO).

2. ElectromagneticEnvironment

EM energy occurs naturally or can bemanmade. This energy, in the form of EMradiation, is made up of oscillating electricand magnetic fields and is propagated at ornear the speed of light. EM radiation ismeasured by the frequency of its wavepattern’s repetition within a set unit of time.The standard term for the measurement of EMradiation is the hertz, the number ofrepetitions (cycles) per second. The term“electromagnetic spectrum” refers to therange of frequencies of EM radiation fromzero to infinity. The spectrum is divided intoalphabetically designated bands which range

“There is much more to electronic warfare than simply detecting enemytransmissions.”

Martin Van CreveldTechnology and War, 1989

from radio frequencies at the low end toinfrared and optical frequencies at the highend of the spectrum. Figure I-1 depicts thatportion of the EM spectrum used principallyin military applications. The operationalEME is a combination of the power,frequency, and duration of the EMemissions that may be encountered by amilitary force while performing its assignedmission.

3. Military Operations and theElectromagneticEnvironment

The impact of the EME upon theoperational capability of military forces,equipment, systems, and platforms is referredto as electromagnetic environmental effects(E3). E3 encompasses all EM disciplines,including EM compatibility and interference;electronic protection (EP), hazards of EMradiation to ordnance (HERO), and volatilematerials such as fuels; and the naturalphenomena effects of lightning andprecipitation static. Equipment and systemsthat operate on the principles ofelectromagnetism are characterized by EMvulnerability that causes them to suffer adefinite degradation (incapability to performthe designated mission) as a result of havingbeen subjected to a certain level of E3.

4. Role of Electronic Warfare inMilitary Operations

a. In military operations, the term EWrefers to any military action involving the useof EM or directed energy to control the EM

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spectrum or to attack the enemy. EWincludes three major subdivisions:electronic attack (EA), EP, and electronicwarfare support (ES). Figure I-2 gives aconceptual view of EW, the relationships ofthe three subdivisions, and the relationship ofthe subdivisions to principal EW activities.

• Electronic Attack. EA is thesubdivision of EW involving the use ofEM energy, directed energy, orantiradiation weapons to attackpersonnel, facilities, or equipment withthe intent of degrading, neutralizing, ordestroying enemy combat capability andis considered a form of fires (see JointPublication [JP] 3-09, “Doctrine for JointFire Support”). EA includes:

•• actions taken to prevent or reduce anenemy’s effective use of the EMspectrum, such as jamming and EMdeception; and

•• employment of weapons that useeither EM or directed energy as theirprimary destructive mechanism (lasers,radio frequency weapons, or particlebeams).

• Electronic Protection. EP is thesubdivision of EW involving passive andactive means taken to protect personnel,facilities, and equipment from anyeffects of friendly or enemy employmentof EW that degrade, neutralize, or destroyfriendly combat capability.

• Electronic Warfare Support. ES is thesubdivision of EW involving actionstasked by, or under direct control of, anoperational commander to search for,intercept, identify, and locate orlocalize sources of intentional andunintentional radiated EM energy forthe purpose of immediate threatrecognition, targeting, planning, and

Figure I-1. Portions of the Electromagnetic Spectrum

PORTIONS OF THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM

COMMUNICATIONSAND RADARFREQUENCYDESIGNATIONS

VHF UHF

L S

C X K MILLIMETER

ALPHABETICALFREQUENCYDESIGNATIONS

FREQUENCY(GIGAHERTZ)FREQUENCY(GIGAHERTZ)

A

0.1 0.15 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2 3 4 5 6 8.0 10 15 20 30 40 50 60 75 100

B C D E F G H I J K L M

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Overview of Electronic Warfare

conduct of future operations. ESprovides information required fordecisions involving EW operations andother tactical actions such as threatavoidance, targeting, and homing. ESdata can be used to produce signalsintelligence (SIGINT), provide targetingfor electronic or destructive attack, andproduce measurement and signatureintelligence (MASINT). SIGINT can

also provide battle damage assessmentand feedback on the effect of the overalloperational plan.

b. EW is waged throughout the EMspectrum in order to secure and maintaineffective control and use of the spectrumby friendly forces and to deny use by anadversary through damage, destruction,disruption, and deception. The need for

Figure I-2. Concept of Electronic Warfare

CONCEPT OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE

USE OF ELECTROMAGNETIC ENERGY,DIRECTED ENERGY, OR ANTIRADIATION

WEAPONS TO ATTACK PERSONNEL,FACILITIES, OR EQUIPMENT WITH THE

INTENT OF DEGRADING, NEUTRALIZING,OR DESTROYING ENEMY COMBAT

CAPABILITY AND IS A FORM OF FIRES

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

SUPPORT

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

SUPPORT

ThreatWarning

NonDestructive Destructive

CollectionSupporting

EW

DirectionFinding

Protect FromFriendly EW

Protect FromEnemy EW

FrequencyDeconfliction

EWReprogrammingElectronicMasking

ELECTRONIC ATTACK ELECTRONIC PROTECTION

ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW)

PASSIVE AND ACTIVE MEANS TAKEN TOPROTECT PERSONNEL, FACILITIES, AND

EQUIPMENT FROM ANY EFFECTS OFFRIENDLY OR ENEMY EMPLOYMENT OF EWTHAT DEGRADE, NEUTRALIZE, OR DESTROY

FRIENDLY COMBAT CAPABILITY

ACTIONS TASKED BY, OR UNDER DIRECTCONTROL OF, AN OPERATIONAL COMMANDER TOSEARCH FOR, INTERCEPT, IDENTIFY, AND LOCATE

OR LOCALIZE SOURCES OF RADIATEDELECTROMAGNETIC ENERGY FOR IMMEDIATE

THREAT RECOGNITION,TARGETING, PLANNING,AND CONDUCT OF FUTURE OPERATIONS IN

SUPPORT OF EW OPERATIONS ANDOTHER TACTICAL ACTIONS

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control of the EM spectrum and the type ofEW actions that can be used to control thatspectrum depend on the operationalenvironment in which a military operation iscarried out.

• In peacetime, intergovernmentalbodies, governmental bodies, and lawcontrol use of the EM spectrum.However, standing rules of engagementemphasize the joint force commanders’(JFCs’) responsibility at all times to takeappropriate and necessary action toprotect their forces. EW measures thatare normally not permitted in peacetimeshould be included in such action.

• In military operations that involve the useor threat of force, control of the EMspectrum will often be contested andthe full range of EW actions may beconsidered. The type and level of EWactions appropriate to a particularmilitary operation depend on the threatwhich adversary forces pose, the relianceof adversary forces on use of the EMspectrum, and the objectives of theoperation.

5. EW as a Part of OtherMilitary Concepts

In joint operations, EW is one of themilitary capabilities that are integrated toconduct IO. IO seek to affect adversaryinformation and information systems whiledefending friendly information andinformation systems. IO strategies supportmilitary missions and are in consonance withguidance provided in the United States’Unified Command Plan, Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan, and Defense PlanningGuidance documents. These strategiesrequire integrated and synchronizedoffensive, defensive, and exploitive actionsto counter, protect against, and learn of threatspresented at any given time. These actionscan be categorized by several supporting

activities such as operations security(OPSEC), military deception, psychologicaloperations (PSYOP), EW, physicaldestruction or physical protection, computernetwork attack (CNA), and computernetwork defense (CND). Since the collection,processing, storage, and transmission ofinformation often rely on EM energy, EW isan essential part of IO (see Figure I-3).Information warfare is IO conducted duringtime of crisis or conflict. EW also has animportant role to play in the suppression ofenemy air defenses (SEAD). EW’s role inthese concepts is discussed further in ChapterIII, “Planning Joint Electronic Warfare.”

For more information on joint IO doctrine,refer to JP 3-13, “Joint Doctrine forInformation Operations.” For moreinformation on joint tactics, techniques, andprocedures for conducting SEAD, refer toJP 3-01.4, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Joint Suppression of EnemyAir Defenses (J-SEAD).”

6. Directed Energy as a Part ofEW

Directed energy (DE) is an umbrella termcovering technologies that relate to theproduction of a beam of concentrated EMenergy or atomic or subatomic particles. ADE weapon is a system using DE primarilyas a direct means to damage or destroyadversary equipment, facilities, andpersonnel. Directed-energy warfare(DEW) is military action involving the useof DE weapons, devices, and countermeasuresto either cause direct damage or destructionof adversary equipment, facilities, andpersonnel, or to determine, exploit, reduce,or prevent hostile use of the EM spectrumthrough damage, destruction, and disruption.It also includes actions taken to protectfriendly equipment, facilities, andpersonnel and retain friendly use of the EMspectrum. Possible applications includelasers, radio frequency weapons, and particle

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beam weapons. As the development of DEWevolves, tactics, techniques, and proceduresmust also evolve to ensure their safe, effectiveemployment. Although some DE applicationswill easily fit into traditional EW roles, otherswill not. For example, a laser designed toblind or disrupt optical sensors is, in EWterms, EA. A laser warning receiver designedto detect and analyze a laser signal is, in EWterms, ES. A visor or goggle designed to filterout the harmful wavelength of laser light is,in EW terms, EP. The threat of an adversary’suse of destructive DE weapons and otherdestructive radio frequency weapons is alsogrowing. Intelligence assets must be taskedto collect information about this threat, andjoint planning must include the concerteddevelopment of operational procedures andcourses of action (COAs) to mitigate theeffects of adversaries’ use of these weaponsagainst friendly forces.

7. Principal EW Activities

The principal activities used in EW havebeen developed over time to exploit theopportunities and vulnerabilities that areinherent in the physics of EM energy.Although new equipment and new tacticscontinue to be developed, the physics of EMenergy remains constant. This physicalconstant is the reason that the basic activitiesof EW remain effective despite changes inhardware and tactics.

The principal activities used in EW includethe following.

a. Electromagnetic Compatibility.Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) isthe ability of systems, equipment, and devicesthat utilize the EM spectrum to operate intheir intended operational environments

Figure I-3. Information Operations: Capabilities and Related Activities

INFORMATION OPERATIONS: CAPABILITIESAND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Building information operations means...

merging traditionally separate capabilities and activities

Information S

ecurityPublic Affairs

Cou

nter

Dec

eptio

n

Deception

Physical Securit

y

Communications Security

Computer SecurityP

sych

olog

ical

Ope

ratio

ns

Physical Attack/D

estruction

Counterintellig

enceCou

nter

-pro

paga

nda

Other

Electronic Warfare

Operations Security

Computer Network Attack

Computer Network Defense

Civil Affairs

Networ

k M

anag

emen

t

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without suffering unacceptabledegradation or causing unintentionaldegradation because of EM radiation orresponse. EMC involves the application ofsound EM spectrum management: system,equipment, and device design configurationthat ensures interference-free operation; andclear concepts and doctrines that maximizeoperational effectiveness.

b. Electromagnetic Deception. EMdeception is the deliberate radiation,reradiation, alteration, suppression,absorption, denial, enhancement, or reflectionof EM energy in a manner intended to conveymisleading information to an enemy or toenemy EM-dependent weapons, therebydegrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combatcapability. Among the types of EM deceptionare the following.

• Manipulative EM Deception. This typeof deception involves actions to eliminaterevealing, or convey misleading, EMtelltale indicators that may be used byhostile forces.

• Simulative EM Deception. This typeof deception involves actions to simulatefriendly, notional, or actual capabilitiesto mislead hostile forces.

• Imitative EM Deception. This type ofdeception introduces EM energy intoenemy systems that imitates enemyemissions.

c. Electromagnetic Hardening. EMhardening consists of actions taken to protectpersonnel, facilities, and equipment byfiltering, attenuating, grounding, bonding,and shielding against undesirable effects ofEM energy.

d. Electromagnetic Interference. EMinterference (EMI) is any EM disturbancethat interrupts, obstructs, or otherwisedegrades or limits the effectiveperformance of electronics or electricalequipment. It can be induced intentionally,as in some forms of EW, or unintentionally,as a result of spurious emissions andresponses, and intermodulation products.

e. Electromagnetic Intrusion. EMintrusion is the intentional insertion of EMenergy into transmission paths in any manner,with the objective of deceiving operators orcausing confusion.

f. Electromagnetic Jamming. EMjamming is the deliberate radiation,reradiation, or reflection of EM energy for the

FIRST RECORDED INSTANCE OF DELIBERATE RADIO JAMMING

The first recorded instance of deliberate radio jamming took place in September1901, in the [United States]. Interestingly, it was aimed at securing commercialgain rather than military advantage. As now, there was considerable publicinterest in the America’s Cup yacht races, and the newspaper first to reachthe stands carrying each result stood to reap a large profit . . . A third company. . . failed to get a sponsor but . . . used a transmitter more powerful than itscompetitors, and one of its engineers, John Pickard, worked out a methodwhich allowed him to jam signals from the other companies while at thesame time reporting on the progress of the race from his boat.

SOURCE: Alfred PriceThe History of U.S. Electronic Warfare, Volume I, 1984

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purpose of preventing or reducing anenemy’s effective use of the EM spectrum,with the intent of degrading or neutralizingthe enemy’s combat capability.

g. Electromagnetic Pulse. EM pulse isa strong electronic pulse, most commonlycaused by a nuclear explosion that maycouple with electrical or electronic systemsto produce damaging current and voltagesurges.

h. Electronic Masking. Electronicmasking is the controlled radiation of EMenergy on friendly frequencies so as toprotect the emissions of friendlycommunications and electronic systemsagainst enemy ES measures or SIGINT,without significantly degrading the operationof friendly systems.

i. Electronic Probing. Electronic probingis the intentional radiation designed to beintroduced into the devices or systems ofpotential enemies for the purpose of learningthe functions and operational capabilities ofthe devices or systems.

j. Electronic Reconnaissance. Electronicreconnaissance is the detection, location,identification, and evaluation of EMradiations.

k. Electronic Intelligence. Electronicintelligence (ELINT) is the technical andgeolocational intelligence derived fromforeign non-communications EMradiations emanating from other than nucleardetonations or radioactive sources.

l. Electronics Security. Electronicssecurity is the protection resulting from allmeasures designed to deny unauthorizedpersons information of value that might bederived from their interception and study ofnoncommunications EM radiations, e.g.,radar.

m. Electronic WarfareReprogramming. EW reprogramming is thedeliberate alteration or modification of EWor target sensing systems (TSSs) in responseto validated changes in equipment, tactics,or the EME. These changes may be the resultof deliberate actions on the part of friendly,adversary, or third parties or may be broughtabout by EMI or other inadvertentphenomena. The purpose of EWreprogramming is to maintain or enhance theeffectiveness of EW and TSS equipment. EWreprogramming includes changes to self-defense systems, offensive weapons systems,and intelligence collection systems.

n. Emission Control. Emission control(EMCON) is the selective and controlled useof EM, acoustic, or other emitters to optimizecommand and control (C2) capabilitieswhile minimizing, for operations security:

• detection by enemy sensors;

• mutual interference among friendlysystems; and

• inhibitors to executing a militarydeception plan.

o. Spectrum Management. Spectrummanagement involves planning, coordinating,and managing use of the EM spectrumthrough operational, engineering, andadministrative procedures. The objectiveof spectrum management is to enableelectronic systems to perform their functionsin the intended environment without causingor suffering unacceptable interference.

p. Wartime Reserve Modes. Wartimereserve modes (WARM) are characteristicsand operating procedures of sensors,communications, navigation aids, threatrecognition, weapons, and countermeasuressystems that will contribute to militaryeffectiveness if unknown to or

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misunderstood by opposing commandersbefore they are used, but could be exploitedor neutralized if known in advance. WARMare deliberately held in reserve for wartimeor emergency use and seldom, if ever, appliedor intercepted prior to such use.

8. Intelligence and ElectronicWarfare Support

Electronic forms of intelligence gathering(SIGINT, MASINT, and other forms)comprise a significant portion of the day-to-day activities of the intelligence community.The distinction between intelligence and ESis determined by who tasks or controls theintelligence assets, what they are tasked toprovide, and for what purpose they are tasked.ES is achieved by intelligence collection,processing, and exploitation assets taskedor controlled by an operational commander.These assets are tasked to search for,intercept, identify, and locate or localizesources of intentional or unintentional radiatedEM energy. The purpose of ES tasking isimmediate threat recognition, targeting,planning and conduct of future operations,and other tactical actions such as threat

avoidance, targeting, and homing. ES isintended to respond to an immediateoperational requirement. However, thesame assets and resources that are tasked withES can simultaneously collect intelligence thatmeets other collection requirements.Intelligence collected for ES purposes isnormally also processed by the appropriateparts of the intelligence community for furtherexploitation after the operationalcommander’s ES requirements are met.

9. Service Perspectives of EW

Planning and execution of joint EW isaffected by the different viewpoints on EWheld by the Military Services. Althoughformal EW definitions are standardized in theDepartment of Defense (DOD), differentoperational environments and tacticalobjectives lead to variations in perspectiveamong the Services.

Appendix F, “Service Perspectives ofElectronic Warfare,” gives a brief overviewof the differences in EW perspective amongthe four Services.

FIRST US ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE SATELLITE

Following the loss of the U-2, President Eisenhower ordered that no furtheroverflights be made by these planes over the USSR. But as that door wasclosed to the intelligence collectors, another opened. Within a few weeks thefirst US ELINT [electronic intelligence] collection satellite was launched fromthe Cape Canaveral test site. The early ELINT satellites were fitted with asimple broad-band transponder covering the DE [directed energy] bands, whichpicked up radar signals and immediately rebroadcast them on a differentfrequency to be picked up by US ground stations around the world. It was thestart of a program that would continue, with increasing complexity andcapability, to the present day.

SOURCE: Alfred PriceThe History of U.S. Electronic Warfare, Volume II

CHAPTER IIORGANIZING FOR JOINT ELECTRONIC WARFARE

II-1

1. Introduction

How joint forces are organized to plan andexecute EW is a prerogative of the JFC. Thesize of the commander’s staff, the mission ormissions which the joint force is tasked toaccomplish, and the time allocated toaccomplish the mission or missions are justsome of the factors which affect theorganization of the staff. This chapterdiscusses the nominal organization of stafffunctions to plan and execute EW in jointoperations. It also summarizes EM spectrummanagement functions and the joint levelorganization of intelligence support to EW.A brief introduction to how each of the fourServices is organized to plan and executeEW is provided in order to give anunderstanding of how joint staff EW functionsinteract with Service components.

2. Joint EW Organization

EW has operational implications forplanning and supervision functions that arenormally divided among several directoratesof a joint staff. Long-range planning of EWnormally occurs under the Plans Directorate(J-5). More immediate planning and thesupervision of execution of EW normallyfalls within the purview of the OperationsDirectorate (J-3). The EA portions of jointEW normally must be coordinated closelywith joint force components anddeconflicted with the Command, Control,Communications, and Computer SystemsDirectorate (J-6) and the IntelligenceDirectorate (J-2). The joint restrictedfrequency list (JRFL) is promulgated by theJ-6 in coordination with the J-3. The EP

“Generally, management of the many is the same as management of thefew. It is a matter of organization.”

Sun Tzu

functions of joint EW affect and are affectedby planning and activities within the J-2 andJ-6. The ES and EA functions of EW requireclose cooperation between the J-2 and the J-3.

a. J-3. Authority for planning andsupervising joint EW is normally delegatedby the JFC to the J-3. When so authorized,the J-3 will have primary staff responsibilityfor planning, coordinating, integrating, andensuring execution of joint force EWoperations. The J-3 may delegate staffresponsibility for EW as appropriate for thesize of the staff and scope of J-3responsibilities.

b. IO Officer. The IO officer on a jointstaff is responsible for coordinating theconstituent parts of IO in the joint planningprocess. Leadership of the “IO cell” isnormally one of the functions of the IO officer.

JP 3-13, “Joint Doctrine for InformationOperations,” provides details about theorganization and procedures of the IO cell.

c. EW Officer. Normally, the EW officeris the principal staff EW planner on a jointstaff. The scope and nature of the EW officer’sresponsibilities are dependent on the size ofthe staff, the operational area of the JFC thatthe staff supports, and the type of mission oroperation that the staff must plan. The typesof duties that may be assigned to the EWofficer are shown in Figure II-1.

d. EW Staff. The requirement for staffpersonnel to support the EW officer variesamong joint staffs. The number of personnelrequired to carry out EW staff functions, their

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areas of expertise, and the division of laboramong them should be appropriate to thescope of the commander’s responsibilities.

3. Joint EW Staff Manning

The integration of the concepts of IO in jointdoctrine formalized the requirements for EW

coordination within the joint staff. On manyjoint staffs, the intra-staff coordinationpreviously accomplished through a “jointcommander’s electronic warfare staff” hasnow been replaced by the functions of an “IOcell” or similar organization. Despite thistrend, EW remains a sophisticated andtechnically complex aspect of military

Figure II-1. Duties Assigned to the Electronic Warfare Officer

DUTIES ASSIGNED TO THEELECTRONIC WARFARE OFFICER

SECONDARY:

Drafting and supervising the implementation of electronic warfare (EW) policies andinstructions within the commander's operational area.

as the command’s principal delegate to EW planning and coordinationmeetings within the operational area.

EW planning efforts and the preparation of EW appendices to operationplans.

the planning for and preparation of EW in joint exercises within thecommander’s operational area.

the number, type, and status of US EW assets within the operational area orinvolved in specific operations or exercises.

the augmentation of EW staff planners and EW assets for exercises andoperations within the operational area.

EW interests in the preparation of the joint restricted frequency list forspecific operations and exercises within the operational area.

the multinational aspects of EW in exercises and operations within theoperational area.

EW interests and requirements in the IO cell and other multifunctionalplanning organizations within the staff.

the execution of the EW plans in current operations and exercises within theoperational area and supervising the adaptation of those plans to meet operationalcontingencies.

EW reprogramming requirements within the operational area and makingrecommendations for reprogramming when appropriate.

and supervising the analysis of EW plans and activities during operationsand exercises within the operational area in order to derive lessons learned.

the preparation and submission of EW lessons learned in accordance withthe Joint After-Action Reporting System.

Serving

Supervising

Coordinating

Monitoring

Coordinating

Representing

Coordinating

Representing

Monitoring

Monitoring

Coordinating

Supervising

PRIMARY:

Coordinating with tactical operations and the other members of the informationoperations (IO) cells.

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Organizing for Joint Electronic Warfare

operations that requires detailed staff planningand coordination. Accomplishment of thiswork requires that the core members of a staffassisting the EW officer have a depth oftechnical expertise and knowledge of thecapabilities of EW systems currentlyemployed by components, allies, and coalitionpartners. Augmentation of joint staffsduring times of crisis or impending operationsto accumulate additional EW expertise isalmost always necessary. However,augmentees may have limited joint experienceand require time to be trained in joint staffprocedures. Innovative staffing solutions maybe necessary if the number of billets assignedspecifically to EW planners falls short of therequirements necessary to accomplish EWstaff work. During crisis action planning(CAP), permanent joint staffs, such ascombatant commander staffs, may considerrequesting that components provideaugmentees with the necessary technicalexpertise to be assigned to assist the permanentmembers of the joint staff on a temporarybasis. Assignment of allied exchangepersonnel that have a background in EW isalso a possible solution to EW staffingshortfalls on permanent joint staffs. Jointstaffs that are organized to carry out specificoperations should seek to identify specific EWstaff manning requirements early on in theprocess of standing up a joint task force (JTF)or other temporary joint staff. Where feasible,manning requests to fill EW billets oncontingency joint staffs should emphasize theneed to fill such billets with personnelexperienced in joint operation planning as wellas the requisite EW expertise.

4. Joint FrequencyManagement Organization

Each geographic combatant commander isspecifically tasked by joint EM spectrumuse policy (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff Instruction [CJCSI] 3220.01,“Electromagnetic Spectrum Use in Joint

Military Operations”) to establish a frequencymanagement structure that includes a jointfrequency management office (JFMO) andto establish procedures to support plannedand ongoing operations. The supportedcombatant commander authorizes andcontrols use of the spectrum resources by themilitary forces under his or her command.Each supported combatant commanderestablishes a command policy on how thespectrum is used in their operational area,obtains clearance (or approval) from hostnations for use of the spectrum (throughexisting coordination procedures), andensures that assigned military forces areauthorized sufficient use of the spectrum toexecute their designated missions. Toaccomplish these tasks, each supportedcombatant commander establishes a JFMO,typically under the cognizance of the J-6, tosupport joint planning, coordination, andcontrol of the spectrum for assigned forces.The JFMO may be assigned from thesupported combatant commander’s J-6 staff,from a component’s staff, or from an externalcommand such as the Joint Spectrum Center(see Appendix C, “Joint Spectrum CenterSupport to Joint Electronic Warfare”). In anyevent, the JFMO must be staffed with trainedspectrum managers, preferably withexperience in joint spectrum use andknowledge of the spectrum requirements ofthe combatant command component forces.Figure III-1 diagrams the spectrummanagement process followed by the JFMO.

The basic process the JFMO uses to carryout its primary responsibilities is discussedfurther in Chapter III, “Planning JointElectronic Warfare,” and Chapter IV,“Coordinating Joint Electronic Warfare.”Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual(CJCSM) 3220.01, “Joint Operations in theElectromagnetic Battlespace,” providesadditional information about the JFMO andits functions and processes.

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5. Organization of IntelligenceSupport to EW

The intelligence community is organizedinto three levels to provide intelligencesupport to joint military operations (seeFigure II-2). Each of these levels is closelyand continuously involved in providingsupport for EW.

a. National- L e v e l I n t e l l i g e n c eOrganizations. At the national level,organizations and agencies such as the CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA), National SecurityAgency (NSA) and Defense IntelligenceAgency (DIA) are constantly seeking to

identify, catalog, and update the electronicorder of battle (EOB) of identified orpotential adversaries. Other intelligenceagencies, such as the National Imagery andMapping Agency (NIMA), support themaintenance of the EOB. National-levelorganizations also analyze and provideintelligence on adversary EW doctrine andtactics. National-level collection efforts alsoprovide much of the intelligence that isgathered about adversary electronicinfrastructures. The DIA J-2 National MilitaryJoint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) is the focalpoint for tasking national assets to collect EWin response to intelligence requirements. EWintelligence requirements that cannot be met

Figure II-2. Organization of Intelligence Support to Electronic Warfare

ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCESUPPORTTO ELECTRONICWARFARE

NATIONAL-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

COMBATANT COMMAND

SUBORDINATE JOINT FORCE

At the national level, organizations and agencies such as theCentral Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, andDefense Intelligence Agency are constantly seeking to identify,catalog, and update the electronic order of battle of identified orpotential adversaries; analyzing and providing products onadversary electronic warfare (EW) doctrine and tactics; andproviding much of the intelligence that is gathered aboutadversary electronic infrastructure.

At the combatant command level, the Joint Intelligence Centerresponds to theater-level EW intelligence requirements andforwards requests that require national-level assets to theNational Military Joint Intelligence Center or other national-levelorganizations according to established procedures.

Within the context of a geographic combatant command,individual subordinate joint force J-2 organizational structureswill be situation- and mission-dependent. The J-2 normallyassigns one or more members of the staff to act as a liaisonbetween the J-2 section and the information operations (IO) cellwhere EW planners are normally assigned. This is to coordinatecollection requirements and analytical support forcompartmented and non-compartmented IO.

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by lower-level intelligence assets areforwarded to NMJIC for prioritization andtasking to national assets.

JP 2-02, “National Intelligence Support toJoint Operations,” provides more detaileddiscussion on the organization of national-level intelligence support.

b. Combatant Command. At thecombatant command level, intelligencesupport to military operations is focused inthe Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). The JICresponds to theater-level EW intelligencerequirements and forwards requests thatrequire national-level assets to the NMJIC orother national-level organization according toestablished procedures. EW planners at thecombatant command level work with thecommand J-2 staff to satisfy EW intelligencerequirements according to command-specific procedures established by eachcommander of a combatant command(CINC).

JP 2-0, “Doctrine for Intelligence Supportto Joint Operations,” provides additionaldiscussion of how theater-level intelligencesupport is accomplished.

c. Subordinate Joint Force. The J-2 isthe primary point of contact for providingintelligence support to joint EW. Within thecontext of a geographic combatant command,individual subordinate joint force J-2organizational structures will be situation- andmission-dependent, as determined by the JFC.The J-2 normally assigns one or moremembers of their staff to act as a liaisonbetween the J-2 section of the staff and the IOcell (or other IO staff structure) where EWplanners are normally assigned. At thediscretion of the JFC, a joint intelligencesupport element (JISE) is established eitherduring crisis or the preparation stage foroperations in order to augment the subordinatejoint force J-2 element. Under the directionof the joint force J-2, a JISE normally

manages the intelligence collection,production, and dissemination of a jointforce. The purpose of this liaison is tocoordinate collection requirements andanalytical support for compartmented andnon-compartmented IO. Because of the closeinterrelationship between EW (particularlyES) and activities such as SIGINT, EWplanners may find it necessary to work with awide variety of personnel in the intelligencesection of the staff.

JP 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support toMilitary Operations,” discusses how theintelligence community is organized tosupport joint military operations.

6. Service Organization for EW

Each Military Service has a differentapproach to organizing their forces in orderto plan and execute EW. Since the Servicesprovide most US EW assets, a basicunderstanding of each Service’s EWorganization greatly facilitates the planningand coordination of EW at the joint level.

a. Army. Army EW assets are organizedto ensure that EW operations are developedand integrated as part of the commander’soverall concept of operations. At each echelonof Army organization responsible for an EWmission, the IO cell officer in charge (OIC),under the direction of the componentoperations staff officer (G-3) or battalionor brigade operations staff officer (S-3) isresponsible for planning and coordinatingEW operations into the IO plan. Theelectronic warfare officer (EWO) isresponsible to the G-3 and coordinates withthe IO cell OIC and the component command,control, communications, and computersystems staff officer (G-6) for planning,synchronizing, coordinating, anddeconflicting EW actions. The EWOnormally works closely with the fire supportcoordinator to integrate EW efforts withother supporting fire missions. The EW

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coordination center (EWCC) is an ad hocstaff coordination element often formed tofacilitate the EW coordination function.

b. Marine Corps. Marine EW assets areintegral to the Marine air-ground taskforce (MAGTF). The G-3 or S-3 has staffresponsibility for planning and coordinatingMAGTF EW operations and activities.Ground-based EW is provided by the radiobattalion (RADBN), and airborne EW isprovided by Marine tactical EW squadrons(VMAQs). The RADBN is organized andequipped to conduct tactical SIGINT, ground-based ES, communications EA, andcommunications security (COMSEC)monitoring and analysis in support of theMAGTF. To accomplish this mission, theRADBN provides the MAGTF with task-organized detachments. VMAQs conductELINT operations as well as EA, ES, and EPtraining in support of aviation and groundunits. With the employment of both theRADBN and the EA-6B aircraft incombination with the Marine Corps’ TacticalElectronic Reconnaissance Processing andEvaluation System, the Marine Corpspossesses a unique capability to provide EWsupport and SIGINT to the MAGTFcommander and any subordinate elementswhile also providing invaluable support andinformation to the JFC. The MAGTFcommander will normally plan, synchronize,coordinate, and deconflict EW operationsthrough an EWCC.

For more information about EA-6Bemployment, see the Air Land SeaApplication Center publication“Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for EA-6B Employment in theJoint Environment.” This publication isreferenced Service-wide as Field Manual(FM) 90-39, Marine Corps ReferencePublication (MCRP) 3-22A, Naval WarfarePublication (NWP) 3-01.4, and Air ForceTactics, Techniques, and Procedures(Interservice) (AFTTP[I]) 3-2.4.

c. Navy. Naval forces are normallyorganized to support joint operationsaccording to the composite warfarecommander (CWC) concept. Within thisconcept, the information warfare commander(IWC) is responsible for the integration ofthe various elements and activities of IO,including EW, into naval and joint operations.An EWO is normally assigned to the IWC’sstaff to carry out specific staff coordinationand integration functions associated withEW’s role in the IO effort. EW is plannedand conducted by the EWO under thedirection of the IWC. The IWC watchoversees the execution of the coherent EWand IO plan and control of associated systems.Control of the ES and non-communicationsportion of the plan requires continualmonitoring by EW staff personnel and isdelegated to the EW control ship.

NOTE: The functions of the IWC areprimarily defensive in nature, coordinating IOfor the defense of the battle group. Embarkedairborne EA assets, such as the EA-6BProwler, are under the operational control ofthe strike warfare commander, who is also thecarrier battle group air wing commander(CVWC) or the more traditional “carrier airgroup” (CAG). When executing strikeoperations, air wing EA assets will remainunder the operational control of the CAG, andwill come under the tactical control of theairborne mission commander. When assignedto joint or coalition operations, the joint forceair component commander (JFACC) willcoordinate with CAG operations forscheduling air wing assets in the air taskingorder (ATO). When airborne assets areassigned ashore as part of an expeditionaryforce, they will be transferred to theoperational control of the JFACC. It shouldalso be noted that Navy airborne ES isprimarily provided by shore-based aircraftsuch as the EP-3E Aries II. These aircraftwill come under the operational control of thetheater maritime and reconnaissance taskforce commander, and will be assigned to the

II-7


tactical control of either the battle group IWCor the JFACC as scheduled by the ATO.

d. Air Force. Within the Air Forcecomponent, dedicated EW support assets areunder operational control of the Commander,Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR). Withinthe COMAFFOR headquarters, the office ofprimary responsibility for EW is theOperations Directorate (A-3) and PlansDirectorate (A-5). Functional planning,directing, and control of Air Force EWassets, however, are normally conducted bythe JFACC through the joint air operationscenter’s Director and its Information WarfareTeam, by means of the ATO. In response tothe ATO, wing and unit level staffs andindividual aircrews develop the detailedtactical planning for specific EW missions.

Due to the high demand for support from AirForce dedicated tactical systems, thesesystems are normally organized as separateEW wings and squadrons, whose employmentthe JFACC carefully rations through the ATOprocess. Air Force EP and ES systems,however, are normally assigned to orintegrated into Air Force wings or squadrons.Wing commanders are supported by a staffdefensive systems officer (DSO), EWO, orelectronic combat officer (ECO). Theseofficers work with the wing operationsintelligence staff to analyze and evaluate thethreat in the theater or operational area. TheDSO, EWO, and ECO also plan available EWequipment employment and oversee radarwarning receiver and EW systemsreprogramming.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIIPLANNING JOINT ELECTRONIC WARFARE

III-1

1. Introduction

a. EW is a complex aspect of modernmilitary operations that must be fullyintegrated with other aspects of jointoperations in order to achieve its full potentialfor contributing to an operation’s objectives.Such integration requires careful planning.EW planners must be concerned withcoordinating their planned activities withother aspects of military operations whichuse the EM spectrum as well as third partyusers of the spectrum that EW does not wishto disrupt. Coordination of military use ofthe spectrum is largely a matter ofcoordinating with other staff functions(primarily the J-2 and J-6 as well as the otherelements of IO, such as PSYOP planners) andcomponents (to include allies and coalitionpartners) which rely on the EM spectrum toaccomplish their mission. Coordination ofEW activities in the context of third party useof the EM spectrum is largely a matter of EMspectrum management and adherence toestablished frequency usage regimens andprotocols.

b. Like other aspects of joint operations,joint EW is centrally planned anddecentrally executed. Since the MilitaryServices provide most US EW assets availablein joint operations, Service component EWplanners must be integrated into the jointplanning process. The JFC may delegatecontrol of EW operations to a componentcommander or lower echelon. However, such

“...the most important single outcome of technological progress during thedecades since World War II has been that, on the modern battlefield, ablizzard of electromagnetic blips is increasingly being superimposed on, andto some extent substituted for, the storm of steel in which war used to takeplace.”


delegation does not eliminate the requirementfor joint and/or multinational coordination ofEW operations. This chapter providesguidance on the joint EW planning process,discusses some of the considerations that mustbe taken into account when planning EW insupport of military operations, providesguidance on preparation of the EW portionof the operation plan (OPLAN) and/oroperation order (OPORD), and brieflydiscusses some of the automated decision aidsthat may be used to assist with planning jointEW.

2. EW Planning Considerations

a. EM Spectrum Management. SinceEW activity takes place in the EM spectrum,joint EW planners must closely coordinatetheir efforts with those members of the jointstaff who are concerned with managingmilitary use of the EM spectrum. Figure III-1shows the steps involved in JFMO spectrummanagement responsibilities. Figure III-2shows a flow diagram of frequencymanagement planning. For operations withina CINC’s operational area, the subordinateJFCs follow this guidance as amplified by theCINC. The commander, JTF coordinates andnegotiates modifications necessary for aspecific JTF situation with the CINC’s staff.For operations outside a CINC’s operationalarea, JFCs assume the spectrum managementresponsibilities of the CINC. Joint EWplanners should establish and maintain a closeworking relationship with the frequency

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management personnel. The JRFL is acritical management tool in the effective useof the EM spectrum during militaryoperations. Normally the J-6 is responsiblefor promulgating the JRFL, but the J-3 isresponsible for coordination of the preparationof the JRFL during operation planning. The

EWO within the IO cell is normally delegatedthe responsibility for coordinating thepreparation of the JRFL. The Joint SpectrumCenter (JSC) can support this responsibility,including provision of automated frequencymanagement tools and augmentationpersonnel to assist with JRFL preparation and

Figure III-1. Joint Frequency Management Office Spectrum Management Process

JOINT FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT OFFICESPECTRUM MANAGEMENT PROCESS

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

10.

11.

12.

7.

8.

9.

Develops and distributes spectrum-use plans that include frequencyreuse and sharing schemes for specific frequency bands, as appropriate.This is particularly vital in support of command and control hand-oversthat are highly dependent on radio systems.

In conjunction with the J-2, J-3, and J-6, prepares a joint restrictedfrequency list (JRFL) for approval by the J-3 (through the informationoperations [IO] cell or equivalent).

Periodically updates and distributes the JRFL, as necessitated bychanges in the task organization, geography, and joint communications-electronics operation instructions and by transition through operationalphases.

Provides administrative and technical support for military spectrumuse.

Exercises frequency allotment and assignment authority. This may bedelegated to facilitate decentralization and to provide components withthe maximum latitude and flexibility in support of combat operations.

Establishes and maintains the common data base necessary forplanning, coordinating, and controlling spectrum use. This data baseshould contain spectrum-use information on all emitters and receivers(critical, friendly, military and civilian, available enemy, and neutral) asappropriate for the area of responsibility involved.

Serves as the focal point for inclusion of spectrum-use considerationsin the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.

Receives, reports on, analyzes, and attempts to resolve incidents ofunacceptable electromagnetic interference; refers incidents that cannotbe resolved to the next higher spectrum management authority.

Functions as a member of the IO cell by performing steps 2, 3, 4, 7, 8,and 11.

Analyzes and evaluates potential spectrum-use conflicts.

As a member of the IO cell (or equivalent), assists and coordinates theresolution of spectrum-use conflicts.

In accordance with J-5 guidance, coordinates military spectrum usewith the spectrum authorities of the United Nations or host nationsinvolved.

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Planning Joint Electronic W

arfareFigure III-2. Joint Task Force Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Planning Flow

JOINT TASK FORCE ELECTROMAGNETICSPECTRUM MANAGEMENT PLANNING FLOW

ASSESSSITUATION

INTELLIGENCE

WARNING ORDER LRSMP INTERNATIONAL HOST NATIONFREQUENCY ASSIGNMENTSPLANNING

GUIDANCECONOPS

ALERT ORDER

FORCE COMPOSITION

INFORMATION OPERATIONS CELL/EW STAFF & J-2 MUES

SITUATION CHANGES

EQUIPMENT DATA

FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENTS

COMMAND AND CONTROLREQUIREMENTS

J-3 REQUIREMENTS

SMASSUMPTIONS

SMCONOPS

SPECTRUMREQUIREMENTS

DETERMINESPECTRUM

REQUIREMENTS

DEVELOP SMCONCEPT

DEVELOPSPECTRUM USE

PLAN

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

SM POLICIES &PROCEDURES

CONOPSSM INPUT

JTF PLAN/ANNEX

FREQUENCY PROPOSALS

operation plan in conceptformatIntelligence DirectorateOperations Directoratejoint task forcelong range spectrummanagement proceduresManagement & Use of theEM Spectrumspectrum management

CONOP

J-2J-3JTFLRSMP

MUES

SM

JTF SpectrumUse PlanningJTF SpectrumUse Planning

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other frequency management tasks. EWplanners should coordinate with J-6 and J-2personnel and request assistance from the JSCearly in the planning process.

See Appendix B, “Electronic WarfareFrequency Deconfliction Procedures,” forfrequency deconfliction procedures andinformation on generating the JRFL.

For exercises conducted in the US orCanada, EW planners must consult CJCSM3212.02, “Performing Electronic Attack inthe United States and Canada,” for planningand guidance procedures.

CJCSM 3220.01, “Joint Operations in theElectromagnetic Battlespace,” provides moredetailed guidance in EM spectrummanagement. For more information on theJSC, see Appendix C, “Joint SpectrumCenter Support to Joint Electronic Warfare.”

b. EW as a Part of IO. EM energy is themeans by which modern informationsystems process and store information. EMenergy is also used for sensing, measuring,analyzing, and communicating information.This dependence on EM energy and use ofthe EM spectrum by the systems that sense,

process, store, measure, analyze, andcommunicate information create IOopportunities and vulnerabilities that EWcan address. EA tactics, techniques andprocedures from a variety of EW platformscan offer a range of lethal and nonlethaloptions to affect adversary information andinformation systems. EP tactics, techniques,and procedures are essential to protectingfriendly information and informationsystems. ES is a primary means for gatheringinformation during joint operations. All EWactivities conducted as part of or in supportof joint operations should be coordinatedthrough the IO cell of the joint staff in orderto realize the potential synergistic benefit ofsynchronizing the efforts of all the capabilitiesand related activities of IO in a coordinatedmanner.

c. EW Support of SEAD. SEAD is aspecific type of mission intended toneutralize, destroy, or temporarily degradesurface-based adversary air defenses withdestructive and/or disruptive means. JointSEAD is a broad term that includes all SEADactivities provided by one component of thejoint force in support of another. SEADmissions are of critical importance to thesuccess of any joint operation when control

SEAD missions are of critical importance to the success of any joint operationwhen control of the air is contested by an adversary.

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Planning Joint Electronic Warfare

of the air is contested by an adversary. SEADrelies on a variety of EW platforms to conductES, EP, and EA in support, and EW plannersshould coordinate closely with joint andcomponent air planners to ensure that EWsupport to SEAD missions is integrated intothe overall EW plan.

For more information about SEAD, see JP3-01.4, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Joint Suppression of EnemyAir Defenses (J-SEAD).”

d. EW Reprogramming. The purpose ofEW reprogramming is to maintain orenhance the effectiveness of EW and TSSequipment. EW reprogramming includeschanges to self-defense systems, offensiveweapons systems, and intelligencecollection systems. The reprogramming ofEW and TSS equipment is the responsibilityof each Service or organization through itsrespective EW reprogramming supportprograms. However, during joint operations,the swift identification and turnaround ofreprogramming efforts could become a matterof life and death in a rapidly evolving hostilesituation. Service reprogramming efforts mustinclude coordination with JFCs to ensure thatthose reprogramming requirements areidentified, processed, and implemented in atimely manner by all affected friendly forces.

See Appendix D, “Electronic WarfareReprogramming,” for more informationabout reprogramming.

e. Electronic Masking

• Electronic masking is the controlledradiation of EM energy on friendlyfrequencies in a manner to protect theemissions of friendly communicationsand electronic systems against adversaryES and SIGINT without significantlydegrading the operation of friendlysystems. Electronic masking is used todisguise, distort, or manipulate

friendly sensor-related data to concealmilitary operations information and/orpresent false perceptions to adversarycommanders. Electronic masking is animportant component to a variety ofmilitary functions (such as EW,camouflage, military deception, OPSEC,and signals security) that are conducted,wholly or in part, within the EMspectrum.

• Effective electronic masking of jointmilitary operations involves the proactivemanagement of all friendly radiatedelectronic signatures of equipment beingused in or supporting the operation. Thedegree of masking required in themanagement of these signatures is afunction of two variables:

•• the assessed adversary ES andSIGINT collection capability (or accessto third party collection); and

•• the degree to which the electronicsignature of joint forces must be maskedin order to accomplish the assignedmission.

• JFCs have two primary responsibilitieswith respect to electronic masking:

•• providing adequate electronicmasking guidance to componentcommands through OPLANs andOPORDs; and

•• planning a n d i m p l e m e n t i n gappropriate electronic masking measureswithin the joint force headquarters.

• To accomplish these responsibilities, thefollowing steps should be taken earlyin the planning process:

•• Assess the adversary ES and SIGINTcapabilities against friendly forces;

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•• Determine whether the missionassigned to joint forces may requireelectronic masking and, if so, to whatdegree;

•• Request staff augmentation ifnecessary to acquire expertise in planningand implementing electronic maskingtactics, techniques, and procedures; and

•• Alert component commands at theearliest opportunity of the need to beprepared to implement electronicmasking measures. This will afford thesecommands with the necessary lead timeto augment their own forces with thenecessary resources and expertise.

f. Interoperability. Interoperability isessential in order to use EW effectively as anelement of joint military power. The majorrequirements of interoperability are:

• to establish standards and practiceprocedures that allow for integratedplanning and execution of EW operations(including joint EW); and

• to exchange EW information in atimely and routine fashion.

This exchange may be conducted in eithernon real time or in near real time viacommon, secure, jam-resistant radios anddata links. The ability to exchange near realtime data (such as targeting information)enhances situational awareness andcombat coordination between various forceelements, including EW strike and/orexecution assets, command-control units, EScollection units, supported units, and others,is a critical combat requirement. Thisexchange of data relates to ES, EA, and EP,including friendly and adversary force data.Routine exchange of data among joint forcecomponents, the joint force and supportingcommands and organizations and, when

possible, with allies and coalition partnersgreatly facilitates all types of EW planning.

g. Rules of Engagement. EW activitiesfrequently involve a unique set of complexissues. There are federal laws, federal agencypublications and directives, laws of armedconflict (LOACs), and theater rules ofengagement (ROE) that may affect EWactivities. These guidelines become especiallycritical during sensitive peacetime operationswhen international and domestic laws, treatyprovisions, and political agreements mayaffect mission planning and execution.Commanders must seek legal review duringall levels of planning and execution of EWactivities, to include planning of the theaterROE. This can best be accomplished byhaving a legal advisor as a member of the IOcell.

3. Joint EW Planning Process

Like other aspects of joint operations, jointEW planning is conducted through theJoint Operation Planning and ExecutionSystem (JOPES) process. In order to be fullyintegrated into other aspects of a plannedoperation, EW planning must start in theearliest stages of the JOPES process and becoordinated with other aspects of the planevery step of the way. Figures III-3 and III-4show the integration of EW into both theJOPES deliberate and crisis action planningprocess, respectively. Once a plannedoperation has commenced, EW plannersmust monitor execution of the plan and beprepared to assist with coordination of theplan as well as make modifications to the planas the dynamics of the operation evolve. JointEW planners should take the followingactions during the planning process tointegrate EW into the joint plan.

a. Determine the type, expected length,geographic location, and level of hostilityexpected during the operation to be planned.

III-7


b. Review the scale of anticipatedoperations and the number and type of friendlyforces (to include allied and coalition partners)expected to participate.

c. Review current ROE on EW activitiesand recommend any necessary modifications

in accordance with current staff procedures.Coordinate with legal to ensure thatrequirements of the LOAC are met.

d. Review the contribution which EW canmake to the IO effort with other “elementlevel” planners (such as PSYOP and military

Figure III-3. Electronic Warfare Planning Related to Deliberate Planning

ELECTRONIC WARFARE PLANNINGRELATED TO DELIBERATE PLANNING

PLANNINGPHASE

JOPES EW PLANNING ACTION EW PLANNINGOUTCOME

Initiation

ConceptDevelopment

MissionAnalysis

PlanningGuidance

Staff Estimates

CINC's Estimate

CINC's Concept

CJCS ConceptReview

PlanDevelopment

Plan Review

SupportingPlans

PHASE V

PHASE IV

PHASE III

Step 6

Step 5

Step 4

Step 3

Step 2

Step 1

PHASE II

PHASE I

CINCCJCSEWIO

JOPESOPLANTPFDD

Combatant CommanderChairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffElectronic WarfareInformation Operations

Joint Operation Planning and Execution SystemOperation PlanTime-Phased Force and Deployment Data

EW planners identify informationrequirements needed for missionplanning.

Notify EW planners of planningrequirements. Request augmentationof EW planning staff as required.

EW planners assist in development ofCINC's planning guidance to supportoverall operational planning guidance.

EW planners support the developmentof intelligence, operations, andcommunications staff estimates.EW planners assist in transformingstaff estimates into the CINC’sEstimate.

EW planners assist in development ofCINC’s Concept as required.

EW planners assist in the CJCSConcept Review as required.

EW planners develop the EW portionof the IO plan and assist indevelopment of other sections asappropriate in coordination with otherstaff sections, operational units, andsupporting agencies.

EW planners modify or refine EWportions of plan as necessary.

Subordinate units and supportingagencies prepare their own EW plans.Joint EW planners coordinate orassist subordinate and supporting EWplans as necessary. Ensure thatTPFDD supports EW portions of plan.

EW planner augmentationif necessary.

Tasking to gather andobtain requiredinformation.

EW incorporated intoCINC’s planningguidance.

EW incorporated intostaff estimates.

EW incorporated intoCINC’s Estimate.

EW incorporated intoCINC’s Concept.

EW aspects ofoperational conceptapproved by Chairman.

Draft EW tab to IOappendix and integrationof EW considerations intoother sections of OPLANas appropriate.

Approved EW tab to IOappendix and integrationof EW considerations intoother appropriate sectionsof the OPLAN.Completed subordinatedand supporting agencies’supporting plans. EWportions of plansupported by TPFDD.

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ELECTRONIC WARFARE PLANNINGRELATED TO CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

PLANNINGPHASE

JOPES EW PLANNING ACTIONEW PLANNING

OUTCOMESituationDevelopment

Monitor situation. EW plannersidentify planning informationrequirements as situation develops.Review applicable CONPLAN.Request augmentation of EW planningstaff as required.

EW planners continue to identifyemerging information requirementsneeded for mission planning. Assistin development of CINC's planningguidance to support overalloperational planning guidance.

EW planners support the developmentof intelligence, operations, andcommunications staff estimates foreach COA.

EW planners transforming EW aspectsof staff estimates associated withselected COA into CINC’s Estimate.Assist with EW aspects of CINC'sConcept as required.

EW planners develop EW tab to IOplan and assist in development of EWaspects of other sections asappropriate in coordination with otherstaff sections, operational units, andsupporting agencies.

Joint EW planners monitor EWaspects of operations and coordinateadaptation of EW plans, procedures,and resources to support changingoperational directives.

Tasking to gather andobtain requiredinformation. EW planneraugmentation ifnecessary.

EW incorporated intoCINC's planning guidance.Initial liaison with unitsand agencies that mayparticipate in or supportEW during operation.

EW incorporated into staffestimates for each COA.

EW aspects of operationalconcept approvedthrough the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Approved EW tab to IOappendix and integrationof EW considerations intoother appropriatesections of the OPLAN.Completed subordinateand supporting agencies’supporting plans. EWportions of plansupported by TPFDD.

EW plans, procedures,and resources adapted tochanging operationalrequirements.

CrisisAssessment

COADevelopment

COA Selection

ExecutionPlanning

ExecutionPHASE VI

PHASE V

PHASE IV

PHASE III

PHASE II

PHASE I

CINCCJCSCOACONPLANEW

IOJOPESOPLANTPFDD

Combatant CommanderChairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCourse of ActionOperation Plan in Concept FormatElectronic Warfare

Information OperationsJoint Operation Planning and Execution SystemOperation PlanTime-Phased Force and Deployment Data

deception planners) and determine what levelof EW platform support they expect to needduring the operation.

e. Review with intelligence planners thetype of ES platforms and products availableto support the operation.

f. Consult with Service and functionalcomponents as well as multinational EWplanners, wherever the most current expertisein the capabilities and employment of EWplatforms resides, in order to understand thefull range of capabilities that EW cancontribute to IO.

Figure III-4. Electronic Warfare Planning Related to Crisis Action Planning

III-9


g. Determine the number and type of EWplatforms that could reasonably be expectedto be tasked to support the joint operationbeing planned. Consult automated force statusreports (such as those provided through theStatus of Readiness and Training System forUS forces) for this information. Service andfunctional components and multinationalplanners should be consulted to augmentautomated information.

h. Review with component air planners therequirement for EW support to the SEADeffort.

i. Recommend to the IO officer (or otherdesignated member of the J-3 or J-5 staff) thetype and number of EW assets to be requestedfrom component or supporting commands forthe operation being planned.

j. Estimate the size and expertise of the EWstaff required to plan and coordinate executionof the EW portion of the plan. Consult Serviceand functional component and multinationalEW planners to refine these estimates.

k. Recommend staff augmentation inaccordance with staff procedures fromcomponent, supporting, and multinationalforces as necessary to assemble the necessarystaff to conduct EW planning.

l. Request assistance and augmentation asnecessary from the JSC to assist withpreparation of the JRFL and other EMspectrum management tasks.

m. During CAP, evaluate each COAconsidered with respect to EW resourcesrequired and the EW opportunities andvulnerabilities inherent in the COA.

4. EW Planning Guidance

Planning guidance for EW should beincluded in an OPLAN as a tab to the IO

guidance. IO guidance is normally appendedto Annex C of the OPLAN.

Appendix A, “JOPES Electronic WarfareGuidance,” shows the format of JOPES EWguidance as a tab to the IO guidance.CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planningand Execution System Vol II: (PlanningFormats and Guidance)” and its classifiedsupplement, CJCSM 3122.04, “JointOperation Planning and Execution SystemVol II: (Supplemental Planning andExecution Formats and Guidance)” are thesource documents that should be consultedfor detailed information about OPLANdevelopment.

a. Planning Factors. Development ofthe EW portion of the OPLAN requiresconsideration of a number of diverse factorsabout the proposed operations. Some ofthese planning factors include thefollowing.

• R e q u i r e m e n t s f o r f r i e n d l ycommunications nets, EM navigationsystems, and radar. These requirementsshould be considered with respect to theanticipated operations, tactical threatexpected, and EM interferenceconsiderations. Once identified, theserequirements should be entered into theJRFL under appropriate categories (e.g.,TABOO).

• Identification of COMSEC andelectronic security measures necessary todeny OPSEC indicators to enemypassive-EM sensors.

• Determination of what prior coordinationand precautions will be necessary whenconducting EA in order to ensurecontinued effective ES. Development ofthe JRFL is a critical preliminary step toensuring deconfliction of EA and ESactivities.

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• Coordination and identification ofspecific resources required forinterference deconfliction.

• Identification of commander’s criticalinformation requirements (CCIR) thatsupport commanders and EW operations.These CCIR must be included in theintelligence annex (normally Annex B)of the OPLAN to facilitate generation ofES.

• Coordination and establishment ofprocedures to ensure timely fulfillment,including tactical real-time dissemination.

• Review of ROE to determine whatrestrictions (if any) apply to EWoperations.

b. EW plans should:

• Identify the desired EM profile selectedby the commander for the basic conceptof operations and provide EMCONguidance to commanders so that desiredEM and acoustic profiles are realized;

• Identify EW resources required tosupport IO, SEAD, and other activities;and

• Evaluate enemy threats to criticalfriendly C2 communications, weaponscontrol systems, target acquisitionsystems, surveillance systems, andcomputer networks. Specify EPmeasures necessary to ensure effectiveoperations during combat.

5. EW Planning Aids

There are a number of automatedplanning tools available to help joint EWplanners carry out their responsibilities. Thesetools can be divided into three broadcategories; databases, planning processaids, and graphics analysis tools.

a. Databases. Automated databases canassist EW planners by providing easy accessto a wide variety of platform-specifictechnical data used in assessing the EWthreat and planning appropriate friendlyresponses to that threat. However, plannersshould keep several considerations in mindwhen relying on automated data.

• There are a large number of databasesavailable to military planners. Some ofthese databases are maintained by theServices, others by various intelligencecommunity agencies or other DODorganizations, others by alliedorganizations. Still other databases maybe maintained by academic or private(profit or non-profit) organizations. Ingeneral, friendly data is maintained byService, government contractor andallied organizations. “Threat” data iscompiled by intelligence organizations.Compilation of accurate technical datainto one place is a lucrative target forhostile intelligence collection. For thisreason, access to friendly force datamay be highly restricted and harder forplanners to obtain than threat data whichcan be accessed through normalintelligence channels.

• The level of detail, specific fields, andfrequency of update may vary widelyacross different databases dealing withthe same data. The way that data isorganized into fields in a database andthe level of detail (such as number ofdecimal places certain technical data iscarried out) are functions of what the datais used for and the cost associated withcompiling and maintaining eachdatabase.

• The sources of data being used forplanning should be a topic ofcoordination among EW planners. Ifnecessary, joint planners should provideguidance about what sources of

III-11


automated data should be used forspecific EW planning purposes.Planners should request thatorganizations that maintain importantsources of EW data update theirdatabases (or specific parts of them) morefrequently than normal when planningspecific operations. Planners should becautioned about using unofficial sourcesof data, particularly those available throughthe Internet that may be subject tomanipulation by organizations hostile toUS policies and objectives. However, open-source intelligence remains a viable andimportant source of valuable information.

b. Planning Process Aids. There areseveral automated aids available that assistin the planning process and others underdevelopment. These include aids thatautomate the JOPES planning process orOPLAN development, automatedfrequency management tools, and othersthat assist with the integration of differentelements and activities of IO. The type ofautomated software used in the JOPESplanning process or OPLAN developmentwill probably be directed by some othersection of the staff. Use of automated tools tointegrate different elements of IO willnormally be determined by the IO officer. EWplanners should ensure that any EW planninginput developed separately from such systemsare created in a format that is compatible

(electronically transferable) to designatedplanning tools. EW planning input solicitedfrom subordinate and supporting commandsshould specify the format of such input.

c. Graphics Analysis Tools. The variablesthat affect the propagation of EM energy areknown and subject to mathematicalpredictability. The use of automated analysistools that graphically display transmissionpaths of such energy have becomewidespread in EW planning. However, theaccuracy, speed, and flexibility of these toolsgreatly depend on the accuracy of the dataprovided to the tool and the sophistication ofthe software and hardware used to manipulatethe data. Reliance on the output of such toolscan ultimately be a matter of life and death incombat if the tools are used to plan the locationof EW assets or avoid hostile emitters.These tools are essentially models forEM propagation. The accuracy andsophistication of the software and hardwarebeing used may not be determined from thegraphics display alone. EW planners shouldhave an understanding of how suchmodeling systems are computing thegraphics being displayed. Such anunderstanding, combined with operationalexperience, is the basis on which plannersmust rely to judge the strengths andweaknesses of different modeling tools anddetermine what is and is not an appropriateuse of such systems.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IVCOORDINATING JOINT ELECTRONIC WARFARE

IV-1

1. Introduction

A certain amount of coordination is part ofthe planning process. However, once a planhas been approved and an operation iscommenced, the preponderance of EW staffeffort shifts to the coordination necessary toensure that EW actions are carried out asplanned or modified to respond to thedynamics of the operation. Areas of concernthat normally require continual monitoring onthe part of EW staff personnel include: EWasset allocation, EM spectrummanagement, and emerging operationalissues that require modification to plans orprocedures. Normally, such monitoring takesthe form of personnel on watch in the JointOperations Center (JOC). Such watchpersonnel, stationed at an IO (or separate EW)watch station, normally are tasked to alertother EW or staff personnel to carry outspecific coordinating actions in response toemerging requirements. This chapterdiscusses the actions and concerns on whichEW staff personnel should focus toaccomplish such coordination.

2. Joint Coordination andControl

a. Management of the EM Spectrum.The JFMO assessment of the operational areaEME — conducted during the planning phase— constitutes a best guess based oninformation available at the time. Followingdeployment and buildup, overlaying jointforce EM emissions on the existingoperational area EME — during employmentof the joint force — will create a new, and

“In the case of electronic warfare, as in any other kind of warfare, no weaponand no method is sufficient on its own.”


somewhat different, actual environment.Further, this environment will constantlychange as forces redeploy and as C2,surveillance, weapons systems, and otherspectrum-use applications realign. Since EWis concerned with disruption (EA),protection (EP), and monitoring (ES) of theEM spectrum, EW staff personnel have amajor role to perform in the dynamicmanagement of the spectrum duringoperations. Figure IV-1 shows the executionof frequency use deconfliction during anoperation. A comprehensive and wellthought out JRFL and EMCON plan arenormally the two tools that permit flexibilityof EW actions during an operation withoutcompromising friendly use of the EMspectrum. Some of the coordination actionsrelated to EM spectrum that EW staffpersonnel should consider include:

• monitoring compliance with the JRFLand EMCON plan by friendly EW assets;

• recommending changes to EWoperations based on emerging frequencydeconfliction requirements;

• establishing ROE for EA employment,and ensuring that the EA plan is incompliance with the CINC’s ROE;

• establishing a chattermark plan to ensurecommunications net availability in thepresence of jamming, intrusion, orinterference; and

• establishing and designating a jammingcontrol authority (JCA) to conduct on-

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JP 3-51

station coordination, employment,targeting, and deconfliction of EA andES assets.

Paragraph 3 of this Chapter andAppendix B, “Electronic WarfareFrequency Deconfliction Procedures,”provide additional detail about EWfrequency deconfliction.

b. Coordination Between theSubdivisions of EW. There are a number ofcoordinating actions that must occuramong the respective divisions of EW (EA,EP, and ES) during an operation. Theseactions include:

• monitoring the employment and effectiveintegration of ES assets and the timelyflow of ES information relevant to EAand EP, to units responsible for thosemissions and coordinating correctivemeasures as required; and

• monitoring input to the reprogrammingprocess submitted by components andcoordinating urgent reprogrammingactions on the basis of recommendationsfrom Service reprogramming centers.

c. Coordination with the OtherElements and Activities of IO. One of theprimary functions of the IO cell is to

Figure IV-1. Executing Wartime Frequency Use

EXECUTING WARTIME FREQUENCY USE

SPECTRUM USE PLAN

DEGRADATION REPORTSASSESS

FREQUENCYPLAN

EFFECTIVENESS

UPDATEASSIGNMENTS

UPDATE JOINTRESTRICTIONFREQUENCYLIST (JRFL)

RESOLVEINTERFERENCE

SITUATION CHANGES

COMM STATUS REPORT

FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENTS

Management and Use of theEM Spectrum/IS

MEACONING, INTRUSION,JAMMING, ANDINTERFERENCE REPORT

PROBLEMS REPORTED

JRFL UPDATE

ENGINEERING REQUEST

MONITORING OF RESULTS

COMPLIANCE DIRECTION

EXECUTEORDER

JFMC, INFORMATION OPERATIONS CELL/ELECTRONIC WARFARE STAFF & J-2

ASSIGNMENT UPDATE

IV-3

Coordinating Joint Electronic Warfare

deconflict and coordinate the variouselements and activities of IO. Most of theelements and activities of IO depend on, use,or exploit the EM spectrum for at least someof their functions. The deconfliction andcoordination of EW activities in an operationis a continuous process for the IO cell andEW staff personnel. Specific activities andconcerns that must be coordinated across IOelements and activities are shown in FigureIV-2 and include the following.

• PSYOP. PSYOP are planned operationsto convey selected information andindicators to foreign audiences toinfluence their emotions, motives,objective reasoning and, ultimately,the behavior of foreign governments,organizations, groups, and individuals.PSYOP activities often use the EMspectrum to broadcast their message totarget audiences using platforms such asCOMMANDO SOLO. EW activitiessupport PSYOP and also have thepotential to interfere with PSYOP effortsto convey information to adversaries orforeign target audiences. PSYOPplatforms and units depend oninformation gathered through ES to warn

them of potential threats and providefeedback about reaction to PSYOPbroadcasts and other activities. Jammingand other EA activities can potentiallydisrupt PSYOP broadcasts. PSYOP unitsrely on effective EP efforts to preventadversary EA activities or other inadvertentEMI from disrupting their efforts.Coordination of PSYOP and EW plannedfrequency use when developing the JRFLis the first step in deconflicting these twoactivities. During the execution phase ofan operation, PSYOP and EW staffpersonnel should deconflict their operationsand frequency use on a regular basis.

JP 3-53, “Doctrine for JointPsychological Operations,” providesadditional detail.

• OPSEC. OPSEC is a process ofidentifying critical information andsubsequently analyzing friendly actionsattendant to military operations and otheractivities to:

•• identify those actions that can beobserved by adversary intelligencesystems;

PSYOP platforms and units depend on information gathered throughES to warn them of potential threats.

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Figure IV-2. Electronic Warfare Activities Coordinated WithInformation Operations Activities

ELECTRONIC WARFARE ACTIVITIES COORDINATEDWITH INFORMATION OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES

Psychological Operations (PSYOP): PSYOP are plannedoperations to convey selected information and indicators toforeign audiences.

Operations Security (OPSEC): OPSEC is a process ofidentifying critical information and subsequently analyzingfriendly actions attendant to military operations and otheractivities.

Military Deception: Military deception efforts can misleadadversary decision makers and slow or introduce error into theirdecisions. Knowledge of military deception plans and actions isnormally very restricted. Forces assigned to the deceptioneffort are often electronically "enhanced" to project a larger ordifferent force structure to adversary sensors.

Physical Destruction: "Precision strike" is an increasinglyimportant aspect of physical destruction actions in jointoperations. Electronic warfare (EW) is an important part ofprecision strike. Factors require that joint EW staff personnelactively work with air planners, fire support personnel, andother staff personnel involved in coordinating the physicaldestruction actions during combat operations.

Computer Network Warfare: Computer Network Attack (CNA)and Computer Network Defense (CND). CNA and CNDoperations target and defend computer networks and systems.As many computer networks are linked electronically,incorporating the results of EW planning is crucial to bothoffensive and defensive computer network warfare campaigns.While physical access to a particular computer network may belimited, electronic access may prove the key to successfulcomputer system penetrations.

•• determine what indicators adversaryintelligence systems might obtain thatcould be interpreted or pieced together

to derive critical information in time tobe useful to adversaries; and

IV-5


•• select and execute measures thateliminate or reduce to an acceptable levelthe vulnerabilities of friendly actions toadversary exploitation.

• ES can support the OPSEC effort byproviding information about adversarycapabilities and intent to collectintelligence about essential elements offriendly information (EEFI) throughthe EM spectrum. ES can also be usedto evaluate the effectiveness of friendlyforce EMCON measures and recommendmodifications or improvements. Aneffective and disciplined EMCON planand other appropriate EP measuresare important aspects of good OPSEC.During operations, OPSEC planners andEW staff personnel should frequentlyreview EEFI in light of the dynamics ofthe operation. Adjustments should berecommended to ES collection efforts,EMCON posture, and other EP measuresas necessary to maintain effectiveOPSEC.

JP 3-54, “Joint Doctrine for OperationsSecurity,” provides additional details.

• Military Deception. Military deceptionis defined as being those actions executedto deliberately mislead adversarymilitary decision makers as to friendlymilitary capabilities, intentions, andoperations, thereby causing the adversaryto take specific actions (or inactions) thatwill contribute to the accomplishment ofthe friendly mission. Knowledge ofmilitary deception plans and actions isnormally very restricted. Designated EWstaff personnel work through the IO cellto support and deconflict militarydeception with their own activities.Military deception frequently relies onthe EM spectrum to convey thedeception to adversary intelligence ortactical sensors. Forces assigned to the

deception effort are often electronically“enhanced” to project a larger ordifferent force structure to adversarysensors. Friendly EA assets may be anintegral part of the deception effort byselectively jamming, interfering, ormasking the EM profile of the mainoperational effort. At the same time,coordination within the JTF staff mustoccur so that EA activities do notinterfere with frequencies being used toconvey the EM aspects of the deceptionto adversary sensors. DisciplinedEMCON and other appropriate EPefforts, by both deception assets and thoseof the main effort, are essential topreventing the adversary fromdistinguishing deception activities fromthe main effort. ES assets can provideimmediate warning to deception forcesabout adversary forces reacting to theirpresence or actions. ES assets are alsoan important means to determine that theadversary is capable of receiving the EMaspects of a deception. Since deceptionforces are often positioned “off axis”from the main effort, ES platformspositioned with the deception effort mayassist in location of adversary forces byassisting with “triangulation” in directionfinding activities. Designated EW staffpersonnel should have the securityclearances and access necessary to workwith military deception planners duringthe planning and execution phases of anoperation which involves deception. EWplanners should ensure that EMfrequencies necessary in order to supportdeception plans are accounted for inspectrum management databases and onthe JRFL without disclosing that specificfrequencies are related to deception.During the execution of an operation,EW staff personnel should monitor EWsupport to the deception effort andcoordinate any changes or conflicts in atimely manner.

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JP 3-58, “Joint Doctrine for MilitaryDeception,” provides additional details.

• Physical Destruction. “Precisionstrike” is an increasingly importantaspect of physical destruction actions injoint operations. EW is an important partof precision strike. Frequencymanagement and deconfliction mustaccount for frequencies used by varioustypes of precision strike weapons. ESassets are an important part of efforts todynamically map the EME of theoperational area for targeting and threatavoidance planning. Stand-off munitionsand anti-radiation ordnance are majorassets in any operation and may, forexample, be used to selectively destroyadversary emitters in support of militarydeception, SEAD, OPSEC, and PSYOPefforts. The employment of anti-radiationweapons must be de-conflicted with

friendly and neutral emitters to ensurethat engagements between friendly forcesare prevented. Destructive DE weaponsare becoming an increasingly importantpart of the physical destruction actionsof joint operations. EA assets performvital screening functions (including theuse of standoff weapons) for friendly airstrikes and other combat units on theground and at sea. EA also plays animportant role in defeating hostile airstrikes and countering precision strikeweapons. Disciplined EMCON andother EP measures are also an importantpart of protecting friendly air strikes andfront line tactical units on the ground andat sea. EMCON and other EP measuresalso protect friendly forces handling oroperating around live ordnance duringcombat operations by preventinginadvertent detonations due to HERO.ES assets provide timely warning of

INTEGRATION OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE, DECEPTION, AND PHYSICALDESTRUCTION IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION OVERLORD

By the evening of June 5, when the vanguard of the invasion fleet set out fromEngland, all but sixteen of the original ninety-two radar sites along the northerncoasts of France and Belgium had been attacked from the air. Most of theirsets were now out of action, including all of the long range early warningWassermann and Mammut radars. Now that the “softening up” phase ofOVERLORD was complete, the jamming and spoofing phases could go ahead.

On the night of June 5, the two ghost invasion armadas “set sail.” The larger,with Rope dropped from eight Lancaster bombers of No. 617 Squadron of theRAF (the Dam Busters), made for Le Havre - this was Operation TAXABLE.The smaller, flown by six Stirlings of No. 218 Squadron, made for the Dunkirk,Calais and Boulogne area - this was Operation GLIMMER. Orbiting to thenorth of the real and ghost invasion fleets were four B-17s of the US 803rdBombardment Squadron (on their first operational mission) and sixteenStirlings of the RAF No. 199 Squadron. These aircraft put up a Mandrel screento cover the various operations with the jamming deliberately thin to the eastto allow the German operators to observe the TAXABLE and GLIMMER spoofs.

Beneath the orbiting aircraft and their falling clouds of Rope, the small flotillaof launches headed south into the choppy sea with their ungainly “Filbert”balloons trailing low over the water downwind.

SOURCE: Alfred PriceThe History of U.S. Electronic Warfare. Volume I, 1989

IV-7


adversary reaction to friendly air strikeand other physical destruction actionsthat take friendly forces into hostileterritory or contact with adversarycombat forces. ES also performs animportant combat assessment role byproviding feedback about the results offriendly physical destruction actionsthat can be obtained through SIGINT orchanges in the EME. ES can also be usedto evaluate the effectiveness of friendlyforce EMCON measures and recommendmodifications or improvements. All ofthese factors require that joint EW staffpersonnel actively work with airplanners, fire support personnel, andother staff personnel involved incoordinating the physical destructionactions during combat operations.

JP 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint FireSupport,” provides further details.

• Computer Network Attack andComputer Network Defense. CNA andCND operations target and defendcomputer networks and systems. Asmany computer networks are linkedelectronically, incorporating the resultsof EW planning is crucial to bothoffensive and defensive computernetwork warfare operations. Whilephysical access to a particular computernetwork may be limited, electronic accessmay prove the key to successful computersystem penetrations.

• Legal. Legal review is required to ensureLOAC compliance.

See JP 1-04, “Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Legal Support toMilitary Operations,” for furtherdetails.

d. Exploitation of Captured Equipmentand Personnel. Exploitation of adversary

equipment can verify adversary electronicequipment capabilities, to include WARM.This information can lead to the testing orverification of friendly EW equipment orbegin the process of EW reprogramming tocounter new adversary capabilities.Exploitation of captured adversary personnelcan lead to discoveries of adversarycapabilities, tactics, and procedures againstfriendly EW capabilities. Interrogation ofcaptured personnel may help EW plannersevaluate the effectiveness of friendly EWactions. This information can also aid inafter-action report reconstruction of EW.The joint captured materiel exploitation centerand joint interrogation and debriefing centerconduct theater exploitation of capturedmaterial and interrogation of capturedpersonnel respectively. The EW staff shouldestablish EW exploitation and interrogationrequirements through the J-2 representativeof the IO cell (or via other establishedprocedures) to take advantage of theopportunities that may be realized through theexploitation of captured equipment and theinterrogation of captured personnel.

3. EW Frequency Deconfliction

The following items are critical elementsin the EW frequency deconfliction processand should be performed on a continuing basis(see Figure IV-3).

a. Conflict. EW planners should be preparedto examine cases where EA missions conflictwith the JRFL or where JRFL changes mightaffect planned EA operations. The extent ofconflict analysis depends on the tools and timeavailable to the EW staff. Joint EW personnelshould attempt to resolve or diffuse the conflictby working within the staff and subordinate EWunits. If the deconfliction effort is successful,the operation is conducted as planned ormodified. For unresolved conflicts, J-3 remainsthe ultimate authority on EW frequencydeconfliction.

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b. Jamming. In joint operations,jamming is a form of nonlethal fires asdiscussed in JP 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint FireSupport.” As nonlethal fire, the determinationto conduct jamming is made in accordancewith the principles set forth in Chapter III ofJP 3-09. Joint EW planners should be familiarwith the process and principles of joint firesupport and provide appropriate guidance andcoordination necessary to deconflict jammingwith other friendly uses of the EM spectrum.Close, continuous coordination withcomponent planners and with allied andcoalition planners (during both the planningand execution phase of joint operations) isnecessary to ensure that the jamming missionsare conducted as planned and necessarywhile minimizing unintended disruption of

the EM spectrum. OPLANs should includeprovisions for an on-station JCA who willprovide real-time coordination anddeconfliction of jamming efforts. The JCAdoes not need to be an EA asset, but shouldbe capable of monitoring the ES spectrum,assessing effects on both friendly andunfriendly forces, and be in contact with EAassets to provide direction and coordinationof EA efforts.

c. Disruption. When the operation issuccessful and the friendly EA missions donot disrupt friendly communications networksor non-communications equipmentoperations, no frequency conflict occurs.However, when any disruption on a friendlyfrequency occurs, two actions should take

Figure IV-3. Critical Elements in the Electronic Warfare Frequency Deconfliction Process

CRITICAL ELEMENTS IN THE ELECTRONIC WARFAREFREQUENCY DECONFLICTION PROCESS

CONFLICT: Electronic warfare planners should be prepared toexamine cases where electronic attack (EA) missions conflictwith the joint restricted frequency list (JRFL) or where JRFLchanges might affect planned EA operations.

JAMMING: The J-3 decides whether the jamming mission isnecessary for success of the operations. If the overall joint forceoperation can be executed without the jamming mission, the J-3should probably cancel the jamming mission.

DISRUPTION: When the operation is successful and the friendlyEA missions do not disrupt friendly communications networksor non-communications equipment operations, no frequencyconflict occurs. However, when any disruption on a friendlyfrequency occurs, two actions should take place: a report of thedisruption should be made as soon as possible to the J-6spectrum manager and, if critical functions are interfered with,a notification should be issued.CEASE BUZZER

RESOLVING INTERFERENCE: If the spectrum manager candetermine that the disruption was caused by friendly EA, thenthe report should be given to the information operations cell forresolution and possible modification of the JRFL.

IV-9


place: a report of the disruption should bemade as soon as possible to the J-6 spectrummanager and, if critical functions are interferedwith, the controlling authority for CEASEBUZZER (an unclassified term used toterminate EA activities, including the use ofEW expendables) should be contacted toevaluate the need to issue a CEASE BUZZERnotification.

• Report of Interference. Reportinterference using Joint SpectrumInterference Resolution (JSIR) formattedmessages in accordance with CJCSI3320.02, “Joint Spectrum InterferenceResolution.” Operators should reportinterference through the chain ofcommand to the J-6 spectrum managerby the fastest means available. As theinterference reports are passed throughthe chain of command, each componentwith the capability should attempt toresolve the interference under itspurview. Each component may not havethe capability or control over that portionof the spectrum to resolve the conflict,so the report should be forwarded asquickly as possible to a level of commandwith the capability. Ultimately, allunresolved interference reports reach theJ-6, at which time the spectrum manager

should attempt to determine the cause ofthe interference and resolve the conflict.

• CEASE BUZZER Notification. Forcritical functions (generally those on theTABOO list of the JRFL), an immediateCEASE BUZZER notification shouldbe promulgated by the JCA if theinterference can be positively identifiedas friendly EA. The CEASE BUZZERnotification is issued for the specificfrequency or range only on the EWcontrol net of the offending jammer. Noacknowledgment of interference is madeon the signal being jammed.

For more information on the JRFLTABOO list, see Appendix B,“Electronic Warfare FrequencyDeconfliction Procedures.”

d. Resolving Interference. If the spectrummanager can determine that the disruption wascaused by a source other than friendly EA,the J-6 has the option of modifying thecurrent signal operating instructions orcommunications plans. If the spectrummanager determines that the interference wascaused by friendly EA, then the report shouldbe given to the IO cell for resolution andpossible modification of the JRFL. In either

ELECTRONIC DECEPTION IN WORLD WAR II

During May 1944, Cockburn ran a ghost “fleet” toward captured GermanSeetakt, Freya, and Wuerzburg radars set up on cliffs overlooking the Firth ofForth in Scotland. The spoof worked effectively against all of them. The Alliedradar operators, however, had all known they were seeing a simulated invasionfleet. The next stage was to test the spoof against operators who had notbeen told what to expect. Eight bombers flew a ghost “fleet” against a BritishType 11 radar, the nearest equivalent to the Giant Wuerzburg, situated atFlamborough Head on the Yorkshire coast. The unsuspecting operatorsreported the echoes on their screens as coming from a very large convoyindeed - far larger than any they had seen before. Now Cockburn and his teamcould be reasonably confident that the spoof would also work against Germanoperators.

SOURCE: Alfred PriceThe History of U.S. Electronic Warfare, Volume I, 1989

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case, both staffs can report (or have theoriginating unit report) the suspectedinterference or jamming to the joint staffthrough the JSIR program for detailedanalysis.

4. Component CoordinationProcedures

Components requiring EW support fromanother component should be encouraged todirectly coordinate that support whenpossible, informing joint EW planners of theresults of such coordination as appropriate.However, at the joint force level, EW plannersshould be familiar with how this coordinationoccurs across Service and functionalcomponent lines in order to be prepared toassist and facilitate coordination whennecessary or when requested. An overviewof component EW coordination factors andprocedures are provided in this section. Whenthe JFC has chosen to conduct operationsthrough functional components, the functionalcomponent commanders will determine howtheir components are organized and whatprocedures are used. EW planners shouldcoordinate with the functional components todetermine how they are organized and whatprocedures are being used by functionalcomponent forces.

a. Army Coordination Procedures. TheArmy component headquarters supporting thejoint force is responsible for Armycoordination of joint EW support. Withinthis headquarters (which may be a theaterarmy, Army group, field army, or corps),requirements for other component EWsupport are established by the EW officerin coordination with the G-3 and, if at corpslevel, in coordination with both the G-3, thefire support coordination center or fire supportelement (FSE), and the G-6. Theserequirements are translated into EW supportrequests and, where possible, are coordinateddirectly with the appropriate staff elements

having EW staff responsibility within othercomponent headquarters. Conversely, othercomponents requiring Army EW supportin i t ia l ly coordinate those suppor trequirements with the EW officer at the Armyforces headquarters or tactical operationscenter. This coordination is normally done inperson or through operational channels inplanning joint EW operations. However, theGlobal Command and Control System(GCCS) or Army Global Command andControl System (AGCCS) may be used tocoordinate immediate requests for ArmyEW support. In this case, other componentswill communicate their EW support requestsvia the GCCS or AGCCS to the FSE and EWofficer or to the EW section at corps ordivision level. Air Force and Armycoordination will normally flow through thebattlefield coordination detachment at theAir Force Air Operations Center. EW staffsat higher echelons monitor the EW requestsand resolve conflicts when necessary. Also,the G-3:

• Provides an assessment of EWcapabilities to other component operationcenters;

• Coordinates preplanned EW operationswith other Service components; and

• Updates preplanned EW operations incoordination with other components asrequired.

b. Marine Corps CoordinationProcedures. The MAGTF headquartersEWCC, if established, or the MAGTF EWO,if there is no EWCC, is responsible forcoordination of the joint aspects ofMAGTF EW requirements. Requirementsfor other component EW support areestablished by the operations staff, incoordination with the aviation combatelement, the ground combat element, and thecombat service support element of the

IV-11


MAGTF. These requirements are translatedby the EWCC or EWO into tasks andcoordinated with the other component EWstaffs. In addition, the EWCC or EWO:

• Provides an assessment of Marine Corpsforces’ EW capabilities to othercomponent operation centers to be usedin planning MAGTF EW support to air,ground, and naval operations;

• Coordinates preplanned EW operationswith appropriate component operationcenters;

• Updates EW operations based oncoordination with other component EWagencies; and

• Coordinates with the intelligence staffofficer to ensure that an intelligence gainand loss analysis is conducted forpotential EW targets.

c. Navy Coordination Procedures. Innaval task forces, the IWC is normallycollocated with the CWC and is directlyresponsible for all aspects of EW, includingnecessary joint coordination. When naval taskforces are operating as a component of a jointforce, the IWC:

• Provides an assessment of Navy EWcapabilities to the other componentoperation centers; and

• Coordinates preplanned EW operationswith appropriate component EWagencies.

NOTE: Airborne EA and ES assets, such asthe EA-6B Prowler, when employed in a strikesupport role will be the responsibility of thestrike warfare commander. The strike warfarecommander is the CVWC or the moretraditional CAG. The CAG is responsible for

coordinating integration of air wing assets intothe ATO with the JFACC.

d. Air Force Coordination Procedures.Air Force requirements for other componentEW support are established by theCOMAFFOR’s A-3 or A-5, in coordinationwith the Director for Intelligence. The A-3or A-5 staff translates requirements for othercomponent EW support into tasks andcoordinates those tasks with the componentEW agency. In addition, the A-3 or A-5 staffofficer:

• Provides an assessment of Air Forcecapabilities to other component operationcenters; and

• Updates EW operations based oncoordination with the other componentagencies.

e. Special Operations ForcesCoordination Procedures. The joint forcespecial operations component command(JFSOCC) will establish a JOC to serve asthe task integration and planning center forjoint force special operations (SO).Requirements from SO units for EW supportwill be transmitted to the JFSOCC JOC forcoordination with the JFSOCC IO cell.

See JP 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint SpecialOperations,” for further details.

f. United States Coast Guard (USCG).In peacetime the USCG operates as part ofthe Department of Transportation. In wartimethe USCG will operate as part of theDepartment of Defense. During bothpeacetime and war, joint operations mayinclude USCG assets that may possess EWcapabilities. Coordination with USCG assetsshould be through assigned USCG liaisonpersonnel or operational procedures specifiedin the OPLAN or OPORD.

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5. EW and IntelligenceCoordination

Detailed coordination is essentialbetween the EW activities and theintelligence activities supporting anoperation. A major portion of theintelligence effort, prior to and during anoperation, relies on collection activities thatare targeted against EM energy in variousparts of the EM spectrum. ES depends onthe timely collection, processing, andreporting of various intelligence to alertEW operators and other military activitiesabout important intelligence collected inthe EM spectrum. It is vital that all prudent

measures are taken to ensure that EAactivities and other friendly EWactivities are closely and continuouslydeconflicted with ES and otherintelligence collection activities. The J-2must ensure that EW collection prioritiesand ES sensors are integrated into acomplete intelligence collection plan.This plan ensures that scarce intelligenceand ES collection assets are maximized inorder to support all aspects of the JFCobjectives.

JP 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support toMilitary Operations,” and its classifiedsupplement provide additional details.

CHAPTER VELECTRONIC WARFARE IN JOINT EXERCISES

V-1

1. Introduction

Effective employment of EW in jointoperations depends on the ability of US forcesto train as they intend to fight. Joint exercisesare a unique opportunity to exercisecomponent EW capabilities in mutuallysupportive operations. Because of thecomplexity of good EW planning and theimpact that EW has on many other areas ofjoint operations, EW should be included inmost joint exercises. The potential for EW(particularly EA actions) to disrupt the use ofthe EM spectrum and thereby disrupt othertraining objectives of an exercise require thatEW exercise activities be well planned inorder to balance EW training objectiveswith other training objectives.

2. Planning Joint Exercises

Exercise planning is a separate process fromthe JOPES planning, which is used to developOPLANs. While the development of anOPLAN using the JOPES planning processis usually part of the training that takes placeduring joint exercises, exercise planninginvolves all the necessary preparations tostructure the exercise and facilitatetraining. Most joint exercises are scheduledat an annual exercise planning conference.The results of this conference are promulgatedin Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(CJCS) Notices. CJCS Notice 3501, “CJCSJoint Training Master Schedule,” is a long-range planning document that providesnominal exercise schedules for 5 fiscal years.More detailed scheduling guidance isprovided in CJCS Notice 3502, “QuarterlySchedule of Significant Military Exercises.”

“We must remember that one man is much the same as another, and that heis best who is trained in the severest school.”

Thucydides

These two documents identify the schedulingcommand, sponsoring command, and thename, dates, location, and purpose of theexercise as well as joint tasks (from CJCSM3500.04B, “Universal Joint Task List”) to betrained during the exercise. More informationabout the joint training program can beobtained from CJCSM 3500.03, “JointTraining Manual for the Armed Forces of theUnited States.” Planning for joint exercisesnormally occurs several months prior to startof the exercise (STARTEX). The planningprocess is anchored by three planningconferences hosted by the sponsoringcommand: the initial planning conference(IPC), the mid-planning conference (MPC),and the final planning conference (FPC).The tasks that must be accomplished by EWplanners during this planning period areaddressed in the following section.

3. Planning EW in JointExercises

a. The exercise-sponsoring commandnormally designates those commands or staffpersonnel responsible for planning the specificaspects of the exercise. The command orperson designated to plan the EW aspects ofan exercise must be concerned with:

• Identifying EW exercise objectives thatare consistent with the overall exerciseobjectives in scope, purpose, and levelof effort;

• Developing an EW concept ofoperations (for “Blue” and “Red” forces)that is integrated into the larger conceptof operations;

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JP 3-51

• Coordinating EW personnel andassets to participate as both “Blue” and“Red” forces (if specific forceparticipation has not already beendesignated by higher authority);

• Identifying personnel with EWexpertise to participate as joint exercisecontrol group (JECG) and “White cell”participants;

• Determining EW modeling andsimulation requirements and systemsfor the exercise and coordinating theiravailability and funding; and

• Drafting the EW sections of theexercise directive and supporting planssuch as the exercise control plan. FigureV-1 gives a general idea of the planningflow involved in planning EW inexercises.

Figure V-1. Electronic Warfare Exercise Planning Flow

ELECTRONIC WARFAREEXERCISE PLANNING FLOW

COMBATANT COMMANDER'SGUIDANCE

EW PLANNING FLOW

TASKS ANDRESPONSIBILITIES

EW OBJECTIVES

OBJECTIVES

Integrate With Maneuver

Overall ExerciseParticipating Forces

Exercise PlanningElements

Planning Factors & Assets

EW Capable Systems

Integral EW Operations

CONOPSEWIO

IPCOPLAN

Concept of OperationsElectronic WarfareInformation Operations

Initial Planning ConferenceOperation Plan

EW Support

Coordination &Documentation

Publish

EW Events &Simulators

Scheme of Maneuver

EXERCISECONOPS

TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

EW TAB TO IO APPENDIX TO EXERCISEDIRECTIVE AND/OR OPLAN

GOALS

IPC EW SUMMARYAND/OR CONCEPT

V-3

Electronic Warfare in Joint Exercises

b. Planning Considerations. Whenemploying EW in exercises, fundamentalplanning considerations include the following.

• The exercise objectives and how theyrelate to EW. Planning EW exerciseobjectives should include a review of theuniversal joint task list, the Joint MissionEssential Task List, and the Chairman’sCommended Training Issues forapplicable objectives.

• The type of exercise, the location and sizeof the exercise area, and the duration ofthe exercise.

• Lessons learned from previous, similarjoint exercises and operations. Thereview of lessons learned is an importantand cost effective way to avoid thedocumented mistakes of previousexercises and operations.

• The number and type of EW assets andpersonnel that will be appropriate for thetype of exercise and its objectives.

• The type of control (free play, semi-controlled, controlled, or scripted) forEW activities that will be necessary tomost effectively accomplish the trainingobjectives.

• The type of modeling or simulationsystem that will be used as part of theexercise.

• The number of EW experiencedevaluators that will be necessary toadequately monitor the exercise andassist in developing lessons learnedthrough the after-action report (AAR)process.

• Evaluate the potential for interferencebetween EW and EM activity (civilianand military) outside the scope of theexercise. Avoiding exercise conflicts

with third party EM spectrum useinvolves adherence to guidance providedin training area standing operatingprocedures (SOPs) as well as applicablelocal regulations, laws, treaties, andconventions. For exercises conducted inthe United States or Canada, EW exerciseplanners must consult CJCSM 3212.02,“Performing Electronic Attack in theUnited States and Canada,” for planningguidance and procedures. The JSC canassist in accomplishing this task.However, EW planners shouldcoordinate with J-6 and request assistancefrom the JSC early in the planningprocess.

• Evaluate the possible adverse effect ofcompromising friendly operations,intelligence capabilities, and methods.“Real-world” OPSEC and other securityconsiderations must be taken into accountwhen planning EW activities. Foreignintelligence organizations often monitorjoint exercises to gather informationabout US capabilities, tactics, andprocedures.

c. Planning Tasks. The following tasks(shown in Figure V-2) should be undertakento ensure that EW is properly integrated intojoint exercises when appropriate.

• Development of specific, attainableEW exercise objectives. EW exerciseobjectives are statements of anticipatedeffects that result from specific EWactions. The identification andaccomplishment of these objectives willincrease the capability of effectivelyemploying the EW resources and providethe vehicle to evaluate the training of EWpersonnel. Objectives must bemeasurable and compatible withoverall exercise constraints. EWobjectives should provide specificdirection and should be correlated, whenpossible, to lessons learned or the

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development of new tactics, techniques,and procedures. General statements ofpolicy and rephrased definitions shouldbe avoided in the development ofobjectives.

• Provision of the opportunity forsufficient EW activity to accomplishexercise objectives and satisfy trainingrequirements. The quantity and type ofEW activity appropriate to each jointexercise are related to the type ofexercise, the overall exercise trainingobjectives, and the type and quantityof EW assets and personnel involved.

EW exercise planners should considerthese factors when proposing EW eventsand drafting the EW portion of theexercise directive. EW activities withinan exercise can be stimulated throughscenario design and asset participationor through scripting of specific eventsin the master scenario events list (MSEL).In addition to the training value ofcoordinating and employing multipleService EW platforms in a jointenvironment, joint exercises offer theopportunity for EW personnel to exercisestaff EW functions such as the EWreprogramming process.

Figure V-2. Tasks to Integrate Electronic Warfare Into Joint Exercises

TASKS TO INTEGRATE ELECTRONICWARFARE INTO JOINT EXERCISES

Develop

Provide

Create

Encourage

Ensure

Ensure

Coordinate

specific, attainable electronic warfare (EW)exercise objectives.

the opportunity for sufficient EW activity toaccomplish exercise objectives and satisfy trainingrequirements.

as realistic an exercise environment as possible.

commanders to practice EW frequencydeconfliction procedures during exercises.

adequate manning for EW staff functions and EWevaluations.

that "real-world" operations security is consideredin the exercise planning effort.

the use of simulations to fulfill trainingobjectives.

V-5


EW exercise planners should review theprincipal EW techniques discussed inChapter I, “Overview of ElectronicWarfare,” for ideas about the type of EWexercise activities that may be scheduledto achieve training objectives.

• Creation of as realistic an exerciseenvironment as possible. For trainingpurposes the EW environment in anexercise should be as realistic as possible.However, the need for realism to supporttraining must be weighed against theconcern for safety and avoidingdisruption of the EM spectrum usedby third parties. As past exerciseexperience has shown, even seeminglyharmless activities such as releasing chaffin offshore operations areas can haveunintended consequences if the chaff isblown ashore and shorts out high powerlines. Realism can be achieved by usingfriendly EW assets or by employingEW models and simulations. To achieveexercise objectives, it is often necessaryto employ available EW assets alternatelyin “Blue” and “Red” roles.

• Practice of EW frequencydeconfliction procedures as discussedin Chapter IV, “Coordinating JointElectronic Warfare,” and Appendix B,“Electronic Warfare FrequencyDeconfliction Procedures,” duringexercises. Frequency deconfliction is animportant part of joint operations, andpracticing these procedures routinelyduring exercises should be an importanttraining goal for commanders in order toprepare for most real-worldoperations.

• Provision for adequate manning forEW staff functions and EWevaluations. EW planners shouldnominate EW manning billets throughthe process being used to create the

exercise billet documents. In addition tothe appropriate number of EW billets inthe exercise joint staff, EW observer andtraining billets and EW “white cell”billets may be appropriate, depending onthe scale and purpose of the exercise. IfEW-related technology or tacticsevaluations are to be accomplishedduring the exercise, additional EWevaluation billets may be necessary.

For more information on EW billets inthe exercise joint staff, see the EWmanning section of Chapter II,“Organizing for Joint ElectronicWarfare.”

• Provision to ensure that “real-world”OPSEC is considered in the exerciseplanning effort. Coordinate withappropriate authorities to ensure thatadequate protection is applied for bothsimulators and real-world systems.These systems should be used at locationsand in ways that minimize the success ofcollection efforts of hostile intelligencesystems.

• Coordination of the use of simulationsto fulfill training objectives. Force-on-force simulations provide a capability totrain battle staffs in the planning,execution, and evaluation of EWemployment for any range of scenarios,from a small single-Service counterdrugexercise to a multinational theatercampaign. A current EW model used bythe Warrior Preparation Center and theBattle Training School is the JointElectronic Combat Electronic WarfareSimulation, which is linked to the AirForce Air Warfare Simulation Systemmodel.

Appendix E, “Electronic WarfareModeling,” provides additional detailsabout EW modeling and simulation.

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d. EW Exercise Planning Flow. Theplanning tasks discussed in the previousparagraph must be accomplished within theframework of the three phases of exerciseplanning, culminating in the IPC, MPC, andFPC, respectively. Normally, the IPC occursapproximately 8 months prior to thecommencement of the exercise. The MPCfollows the IPC by about 4 months. The FPCnormally occurs about 2 months before theexercise. EW exercise planning tasksnormally should be accomplished within thisframework as discussed below.

• Initial Planning Tasks. The initialplanning phase of each exercise normallybegins with the issuance of thesponsoring command’s guidanceconcerning the exercise. Thedevelopment of an outlined EW conceptof operation and the drafting of specificEW training objectives are primaryplanning functions that should beaccomplished during this phase. KeyService, support agency, andmultinational participants should becontacted to determine their proposedlevel of participation and any objectivesor constraints that they may recommendfor planning consideration. Earlycoordination with exercise IO plannersis also important to ensure that the EWconcept of operations and EW trainingobjectives support and are supported bythe broader IO concept and objectives.An initial assessment should be madeof possible conflicting demands on EWassets within the exercise, between theexercise being planned and other joint orService exercises, and between exerciseand real-world operations. EMspectrum management procedures,constraints, and regulations specific tothe exercise area should be identifiedduring this phase of planning. Service,supporting agencies, and appropriatemultinational participants should be

invited to participate in the IPC. TheEW focus at the IPC should be onmeeting key participants, reviewing thebasic EW concept of operations and EWtraining objectives, and proposing howto work through any asset schedulingconflicts or issues of concern. Anyspecial maintenance or supportrequirements unique to EW assets to beused in the exercise, along with themovement of EW assets and personnelto and from the exercise area, are topicswhich may prove useful for discussionamong participants during the IPC.

• Mid-Planning Tasks. The periodbetween the end of the IPC and the MPCis the time when the EW concept ofoperation, training objectives, andother planning tasks should befinalized. After finalization, all changesand updates concluded during the MPCwill have a due date of the FPC. An EAon-off control plan should be developedduring this phase to ensure the priorityof safety for any active jamming or othermeasures anticipated during the exercise.Frequency assignments are made duringthis phase and frequency plans arepromulgated. EW exercise plannersshould coordinate with IO exerciseplanners and J-6 exercise planners tocoordinate the assignment of frequencies(for “Blue,” “Red” and JECG) necessaryto accomplish EW training objectives.The exercise directive is normallyfinalized during this phase, and EWplanners should accomplish planningtasks to complete the EW portion of theexercise directive in order to conform tothe timeline for promulgation of thisand supporting documents. Timelydistribution of the exercise directive andsupport documentation is necessary in orderto give exercise participants time tocomplete preparations and conduct any pre-exercise training that may be necessary.

V-7


• Final Planning Tasks. The final aspectsof EW planning for an exercise, as wellas the FPC, are actually accomplishedin the preparation stage of the exerciseand are discussed in paragraph 4.a.below.

4. EW in Exercise Preparation,Execution, and Post-ExerciseEvaluation

The planning stage is only the first of fourstages in the life cycle of each joint exercise(see Figure V-3). The other three stages,preparation, execution, and post-exerciseand evaluation, also involve tasks andcoordination on the part of EW exercise staffpersonnel.

a. Preparation Stage. During thepreparation stage, the approved exercise

directive and supporting plans aredistributed; pre-exercise training isdeveloped and conducted; any exercisespecific databases are finalized and tested;and the exercise time-phased force anddeployment data is validated. During thisstage, milestones receive a final review andupdate, operation plans and orders arefinalized, simulation gamer augmentees andAAR observer manning is completed, and theAAR collection management plan isapproved. The FPC is conducted in orderto finalize actions required prior toSTARTEX. Key action of the FPC includestime-phased force and deployment listrefinement as well as the concept ofoperations and MSEL review as applicable.EW preparations during this period includeobtaining necessary clearances andnotifications for EW activity (particularlyEA), coordinating implementation of the

Figure V-3. Stages of a Joint Exercise

STAGES OF A JOINT EXERCISE

1

23

4

PREPARATIONSTAGE

PLANNINGSTAGE

EXECUTIONSTAGE

POST-EXERCISEand EVALUATION

STAGE

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JP 3-51

exercise directive, and accommodatingchanges in personnel and assets.

b. Execution Stage. During the actualconduct of the exercise, personnelresponsible for the EW aspects of theexercise should focus their efforts onensuring that the EW events in the MSELoccur as planned, that actual EW exerciseactivities remain focused on the trainingobjectives, and that data and observationsthat support the AAR process are properlycollected and processed. Prior to theactual STARTEX, it may be necessary oruseful to provide structured training onsome aspect of EW as a means to achieveone or more of the training objectives. The

specifics of such training (who willinstruct, who will attend, where, and otherspecifics) should be worked out during theplanning and preparation stages of the exercise.

c. Post-Exercise and Evaluation Stage.This period actually begins prior to theconclusion of the exercise. EW activityassociated with this stage includes capturingand documenting lessons learned,participating in “hot wash” meetings, andcoordinating the redeployment of participantsand assets to parent commands.

The form and format for documenting lessonslearned is in CJCSI 3150.25, “Joint After-Action Reporting System.”

CHAPTER VIMULTINATIONAL ASPECTS OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE

VI-1

1. Introduction

Operations DESERT STORM andALLIED FORCE demonstrated therequirement for US forces to be able tointegrate operations with other allied andcoalition nations. US planners must beprepared to integrate US and allied or coalitionEW capabilities into an overall EW plan, beable to provide allied or coalition nations withinformation concerning US EW capabilities,and provide EW support to allied or coalitionnations. As in joint operations, EW is anintegral part of multinational operations.In US-led operations, the doctrine within thispublication should be used as the basis for allEW activities within the Multinational Force(MNF). However, the planning of MNF EWis made more difficult because of ill-definedsecurity issues, different crypto equipment,differences in the level of training ofinvolved forces, and language barriers.These problems are well understoodthroughout North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) commands and arenormally resolved by adherence to agreed-upon procedures. Therefore, it makes sensefor US forces, as participants in NATO, toadopt these procedures when working withNATO or other MNFs such as may be drawnfrom members of the American, British,Canadian, Australian Armies StandardizationProgram (ABCA) and the Air StandardizationCoordinating Committee (ASCC) made up ofthe members of ABCA plus New Zealand.NATO and the ABCA have developeddocuments to deal with MNF EW missionsupport, and are currently developing a

“Durable relationships with allies and friendly nations are vital to our security.A central thrust of our strategy is to strengthen and adapt the securityrelationships we have with key nations around the world and create newrelationships and structures when necessary.”

National Security Strategy for a New Century

doctrine for multinational operations. ASCCis developing a document to cover MNF EWsupport and operations that will draw fromthis publication. As a result of thesepublications, most allied and coalition EWofficers can be expected to understand thesubject. However, with the exception ofAustralia, Britain, and Canada (who are onthe official distribution list of this publication),allied and coalition EW officers may notunderstand the terminology or proceduresbeing used. A fundamental task for the EWOof a US-led MNF is to recognize and resolveterminology and procedural issues at theoutset. This can be achieved by comparingmultinational doctrine to this publication.Current NATO EW doctrine is largelybased on US EW doctrine. Geographiccombatant commanders should provideguidance to the MNF commander (MNFC)(if the MNFC is a US Service member) withintheir joint OPLANs on the release of classifiedmaterial to allied and/or coalition forces.However, the MNFC must determine the needto know and release information essential toaccomplishing the mission at the earlieststages of planning. To do this, US EWplanners must be intimately aware of bothsides of the issue — national security as wellas mission accomplishment — in order toadvise the MNFC.

2. MNF EW Organization andCommand and Control

a. MNFC. The MNFC providesguidance for planning and conducting EWoperations to the MNF through the J-3 and

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the IO cell. It should be recognized that theIO cell (or EW planning cell if implemented),for all intents and purposes assumesresponsibilities set forth in Chapter II,“Organizing for Joint Electronic Warfare.”

b. Multinational Staff. The MNFCshould assign responsibilities for managementof EW resources in multinational operationsamong the staff as follows.

• Operations Officer. The multinationalstaff J-3 has primary responsibility forthe planning and integration of EWoperations with other combat disciplines.

• Staff EW Officer. The staff EWO’sprimary responsibility should be toensure that the MNFC is provided thesame EW support that a US JFC wouldexpect. In addition to the duties outlinedin Chapter II, “Organizing for JointElectronic Warfare,” the EW officershould be responsible as follows.

•• Ensure that all componentcommanders of the MNF provideadequately trained EW officers to bemembers of the MNFC EW staff. Thechain of command should be establishedby the J-3. The rationale for augmenteestatus is that the allied and/or coalitionofficers must be full members of themultinational EW planning cell andresponsible to the chain of command.They must not be subjected to thepossibility of split loyalties to a lowercommand within the force, as could bethe case if they adopted the traditionalliaison role.

•• Determine the need for placing USEW liaison officers with allied and/orcoalition commands to ensure that theMNFC’s EW plans and procedures arecorrectly interpreted.

•• Integrate allied and/or coalition EWofficer augmentees at the planning stage,delegating to them duties andresponsibilities similar to those given toequivalent US officers.

•• Coordinate the necessary EWcommunications connectivity forassigned forces. Particular emphasisshould be given to equipment,encryption devices and keying material,and procedural compatibility whenintegrating allied and/or coalition forces.

•• Integrate allied and/or coalition C2requirements into the multinational andjoint restricted frequency list.

•• At the earliest possible stage, provideallied and/or coalition forces with currentUS EW doctrine and planning guidelines.

• Allied and/or Coalition EW Officers.Allied and/or coalition commandersshould assign adequately trained EWofficers to the MNF EW planning cell.These officers should:

•• Have an in-depth knowledge of theirown forces’ operational requirements andcapabilities, organize SIGINT and EWcapabilities, national support facilities,and C2 structure; and

•• Possess national clearances equivalentwith the level of classified US militaryinformation they are eligible to receivein accordance with US nationaldisclosure policy. These requirementsmay mean the individuals concerned willbe a senior O-3 or O-4 paygrade level orequivalent. As a result, they may beaugmentees drawn from national sourcesother than the unit involved in the MNF.

VI-3

Multinational Aspects of Electronic Warfare

3. Multinational EWCC withNATO Forces

Although NATO’s EW doctrine, containedin Military Committee (MC) document 64,“NATO Electronic Warfare Policy,” is largelybased on US EW doctrine, the perspectiveand procedures of an MNF EWCC will benew to most. At best, participants may haveworked joint issues and served in adjacentforces who have exchanged EW liaisonofficers. However, precedent exists; maritimeforces have for many years workedmultinational issues with little difficulty.Allied Tactical Pub (ATP) 8A, “Doctrine forAmphibious Operations,” now contains asupplement on EW. This includes proceduresnecessary to exchange SIGINT information.In addition, NATO is developing Allied JointPub (AJP)-01(A), “Allied Joint OperationsDoctrine,” which will include a chapter onEW and the EWCC. ATP-44, “ElectronicWarfare in Air Operations,” and ATP-51,“Electronic Warfare in the Land Battle,” areadditional NATO EW publications availableto multinational forces. NATO membersinvariably base their national EW doctrine onthat agreed within NATO MC 64. However,there is a need to ensure that the most recent,releasable, US EW publications are providedto supporting allied and/or coalition forces.NATO has also established a NATO emitterdatabase to exchange information aboutmember countries’ electronic emissions andfacilitate the coordination of EW.

4. Multinational EW withABCA and ASCC MemberNations

Strong ties are maintained with thesetraditional allied forces. This is particularlytrue within the field of EW and SIGINT.Much information is exchanged at thenational level and this publication has beenreleased to these nations. An example of theclose ties is the Quadripartite Working Group

on EW, which is the ABCA EW forum.Although Australia is not a party to NATOagreements, they are aware of the currentstatus of NATO’s EW doctrine contained inMC 64. Quadripartite StandardizationAgreement (QSTAG) 593, “Doctrine onMutual Support Between EW Units,” reflectscurrent NATO doctrine and meets Australia’sneeds. This document contains SOP for anEWCC. ASCC Working Parties (WPs) 45(Air Operations) and 70 (Mission Avionics)both deal with EW issues. WP 45 looks atthe operational employment of the MNF’s EWassets, while WP 70 investigates thepossibility of standardizing EW systems.

5. Multinational EWCC withNon-NATO or ABCA Alliesor Coalition Partners

The principles expressed above are equallyapplicable to other allies and/or coalitions. TheMNFC should include EW officers fromsupporting allied and/or coalition forces withinthe EWCC. Should this not be practical forsecurity reasons or availability, the MNFCshould, based on the mission, be prepared toprovide EW support and the appropriate liaisonofficers to the allied and/or coalition units.

6. EW Mutual Support

a. Exchange of SIGINT information insupport of EW operations should beconducted in accordance with standardNATO, ABCA, and ASCC procedures, asappropriate. The information data elements,identified at TABs 1 and 2 and Annex C, alsoare contained in appropriate alliedpublications — notably, NATO’s confidentialsupplement to ATP-8(A), “EW inAmphibious Operations,” ATP-51, “EW inthe Land Battle,” and ABCA’s QSTAG 593,“Doctrine on Mutual Support Between EWUnits.” Care should be taken not to violateSIGINT security rules when exercising EWmutual-support procedures.

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b. Exchange of Electronic Order ofBattle. In peacetime, this type of exchangeis normally achieved under bilateralagreement. NATO has in place procedureswithin the Major NATO commanders’precautionary system that can be put intoeffect during time of tension. They includethe requirement to exchange information onWARM. The procedures also determine atwhat stage allied forces change to the use ofWARM; however, in low-level conflict, theyare unlikely to be activated. Therefore, theEWCC officer, through the EW intelligencesupport organization and the theater JointAnalysis Center (JAC) or theater JIC, shouldensure maintenance of an up-to-date EOB.Allied and/or coalition staff officers shouldbe included in turn, and should ensure thattheir national commands provide appropriateupdates to theater joint analysis in discussionson theater EOB. They, in turn, should ensurethat their national commands provideappropriate updates to theater JACs and JICs.

c. Reprogramming. Reprogramming ofEW equipment is a national responsibility.However, the EWCC officer should be awareof reprogramming efforts being conductedwithin the multinational force. The EWCCofficer should keep the MNFC aware oflimitations that could result in fratricide and,when necessary, seek the MNFC’s assistancein attaining a solution. To do this, nationaland allied and/or coalition commands shouldprovide the EWCC officer with informationon the following on request.

• Capabilities and limitations of MNFallied and/or coalition EW equipment.

• EW reprogramming support availablewithin MNF allied and/or coalition units.

• Bilateral agreements on reprogrammingsupport for allied and/or coalition unitsemploying US EW equipment, to includeany agreement on flagging support.

• Bilateral agreements on exchange of EWreprogramming information with thosenations not employing US EWequipment.

• Reports from friendly units experiencingreprogramming difficulties, to includeinformation on efforts being made torectify the problem.

• Immediate reports on incidents that couldhave resulted in fratricide.

• Operational change requests sent to USforeign military sales reprogrammingorganizations, that identify deficienciesin the allied and/or coalition country’sEW equipment and their request forreprogramming support.

In turn, the EWCC officer should ensurethat allied and/or coalition units in the MNFreceive the most recent data held within thetheater tactical EOB database and, asappropriate, the associated parametricinformation. This should allow allied and/orcoalition units within the MNF to judge thereliability of their current reprogrammingdata and, if necessary, identify problems tothe MNF EWCC and national supportagencies. Without this level of EW mutualsupport, fratricide may occur.

d. US EW Planning Aids. Significantimprovements have been made within theUnited States in the automation of EWplanning aids. These improvements allow USEW planners to extract information, almostat will, from theater and national databasesand depict it in graphic format for planningand briefing purposes. Supporting allied and/or coalition forces are unlikely to have anequal level of automation. Working with theallied and/or coalition officers, the EWCCofficer should determine what EWinformation would assist the MNF at theplanning and unit level and ensure that they

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Multinational Aspects of Electronic Warfare

get it. To do this, the EWCC officer shouldunderstand security issues that preclude therelease of some of the data and its source butdo not necessarily preclude the release of EWmission planning tools.

7. Releasability of EWInformation to Allies andMultinational Forces

The integration of allied and/ormultinational EW officers into US-led

MNF activities is often perceived by USstaff officers as too difficult due to thecomplexity of national disclosure policy. Aclear, easily understood policy on thedisclosure of EW information requested byallied and multinational partners must bedeveloped by the commander’s IO cellofficer. Likewise, in peacetime exercises,the chief IO officer should develop a clear,easily understood policy on the disclosureof EW information.

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX AJOPES ELECTRONIC WARFARE GUIDANCE

A-1

The guidance in this annex relates to thedevelopment of Tab B (Electronic Warfare)of Appendix 3 (Information Operations) toAnnex C (Operations) of the format found inCJCSM 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planningand Execution System Vol II: (PlanningFormats and Guidance),” for OPLANs,operation plans in concept format, OPORDs,campaign plans, and functional plans.

1. Situation

a. Enemy Forces

• What are the capabilities, limitations,a n d v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s o f e n e m ycommunications, non-emitting, and EWsystems?

• What is the enemy capability to interferewith accomplishment of the EWmission?

b. Friendly Forces

• What friendly EW facilities, resources,and organizations may affect EWplanning by subordinate commanders?

• Who are the friendly foreign forces withwhich subordinate commanders mayoperate?

c. Civilian and/or Neutral Facilities

• What civilian and/or neutral facilities,resources, and organizations may affectEW planning by subordinates?

• What potential collateral effects could beexpected?

d. Assumptions. What are theassumptions concerning friendly or enemy

capabilities and COAs that significantlyinfluence the planning of EW operations?

2. Mission

What is the EW mission (who, what, where,why)?

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations

• What is the role of EW in thecommander’s strategy?

• What is the scope of EW operations?

• What methods and resources will beemployed? Include organic and non-organic capabilities.

• How will EW support the other elementsof IO and SEAD?

b. Tasks. What are the individual EWtasks and responsibilities for each componentor subdivision of the force? Include allinstructions unique to that component orsubdivision.

c. Coordinating Instructions

• What instructions, if any, are applicableto two or more components orsubdivisions?

• What are the requirements, if any, for thecoordination of EW actions betweensubordinate elements?

• What is the guidance on the employmentof each activity, special measure, orprocedure that is to be used but is notcovered elsewhere in this tab?

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• What is the emissions control guidance?Place detailed or lengthy guidance in anexhibit to this tab.

• What coordination with the J-6 isrequired to accomplish the JRFL?

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Administration

• What, if any, administrative guidance isrequired?

• What, if any, reports are required?Included example(s).

b. Logistics. What, if any, are the specialinstructions on logistic support for EWoperations?

5. Command and Control

a. Feedback

• What is the concept for monitoring theeffectiveness of EW operations duringexecution?

• What are the specific intelligencerequirements for feedback?

b. After-Action Reports. What are therequirements for after-action reporting?

c. Signal. What, if any, are the special orunusual EW-related communicationsrequirements (e.g., PACER WARE andSERENE BYTE)?

APPENDIX BELECTRONIC WARFARE FREQUENCY DECONFLICTION

PROCEDURES

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Annex A Standardized JRFL Format

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1. General

Friendly, adversary, and third partyoperations that use or affect the EM spectrum(communications, non-communications,jamming) have the potential to interfere withjoint force communications and otherelectronic systems. To counter this, the USmilitary has established spectrummanagement and EW frequency deconflictionprocedures. Spectrum management iscomposed of an entire range of technical andnon-technical processes designed to quantify,plan, coordinate, and control the EM spectrumto satisfy spectrum use requirements whileminimizing unacceptable interference. EWfrequency deconfliction can be considered asubset of spectrum management and is definedas a systematic management procedure tocoordinate the use of the EM spectrum foroperations, communications, and intelligencefunctions. This appendix provides guidancefor developing joint EW frequencydeconfliction procedures. To facilitate thedevelopment process, procedures and specificstaff responsibilities are discussed inparagraph 5 below. To the extent possible,these procedures should be followed duringjoint, multinational, and single-Serviceoperations and exercises.

2. EW Deconfliction Procedures

The steps involved in the EW frequencydeconfliction process are as follows.

a. Defining the Operations Concept andCritical Functions. The J-3 defines theconcept of operations to include each discretephase of the operation. For each phase, theJ-3 defines the critical mission functions thatrequire uninterrupted communicationsconnectivity or non-communicationsoperations. For example, communications

ELECTRONIC WARFARE FREQUENCY DECONFLICTIONPROCEDURES

with long-range reconnaissance elements orclose air support assets could be crucial topreparing for transition from defense tooffense. Non-communications equipmentsuch as identification, friend or foe systemsand fire-control radars might also needprotection. The J-3 provides this guidance tothe joint force staff and subordinatecommanders for planning.

b. Developing the IntelligenceAssessment. Based on the J-3 concept ofoperations, the J-2 determines intelligencesupport requirements and identifies adversaryelectronic system targets for each phase of theoperation (including the critical adversaryfunctions) and associated electronic systemnodes that need to be guarded. For example,during the friendly attack, adversarycommunication and non-communicationsassociated with C2 of the counterattack forcescould be crucial to friendly forces indetermining the timing of the counterattackand the exact area where the attack will takeplace. Therefore, those critical nodes shouldbe protected from EA.

c. Managing the ElectromagneticSpectrum. The J-6 is responsible for theadministrative and technical management ofthe EM spectrum. This includes maintaining,in conjunction with the J-2, the necessarydatabase that contains information on allfriendly, available adversary, and selectedneutral or civil spectrum emitters or receivers.With the aid of the database, the J-6 assignsfrequencies, analyzes and evaluates potentialconflicts, resolves internal conflicts,recommends alternatives, and participates inspectrum-use conflict resolution. Theassignment of frequencies is based on the J-3concept of operations, frequency availability,unit geographic dispersion, radio wavepropagation, equipment technical parameters,

B-3

Electronic Warfare Frequency Deconfliction Procedures

criticality of unit functions. When assigningfrequencies, the J-6 should advise users (usingtheir frequency database) of possibleinterference from mobile systems in theoperational area. Operating on assignedfrequencies could spell the difference betweensuccess and failure of the operations.

d. Defining and Prioritizing CandidateNodes and Nets. The joint force staff andsubordinate commanders should definefunctions and identify specific nodes,communications and non-communicationsnetworks, and equipment that are critical tofriendly and adversary operations. Candidatenodes and nets are submitted for EAprotection to the EWO in J-3 and/or the IOcell. (The submission should follow thestandard JRFL format listed in Annex A,“Standardized JRFL Format.”) In times oftension and war, certain adversary force dataderived from compartmented SIGINTinformation should be provided by the J-2 andmay be exchanged at the appropriate level ofclassification. Real-world EW data elementsshould not be exchanged in exercises exceptwhen specifically authorized.

e. Generating the JRFL. The JRFL is atime- and geographically-oriented listing ofTABOO, PROTECTED, and GUARDEDfunctions, nets, and frequencies. The JRFLshould be limited to the minimum number offrequencies necessary for friendly forces toaccomplish objectives. Thus, the JRFLfacilitates friendly EW actions by placing theminimum number of restrictions on systemssuch as EC-130H/COMPASS CALL, EA-6B/PROWLER, EH-60/QUICK FIX, and AN/TLQ-17A(V3)/TRAFFICJAM. The J-6should compile the JRFL based on thecoordinated inputs from the operations,intelligence, and communications staffs withinthe command and affected subordinatecommands. The J-6 should ensure that thefrequency assignments of unit nets designatedfor inclusion as PROTECTED or TABOO onthe JRFL are submitted to the J-3 for final

approval prior to dissemination. Therestrictions imposed by the JRFL may onlybe removed at the direction of the J-3 if theJ-3 determines that the benefit of jamming arestricted frequency surpasses the immediatecriticality to friendly forces. Operations andintelligence functions must be consultedbefore this decision. However, the self-protection of combat aircraft and ships haspriority over all controls. GUARDED,PROTECTED, and TABOO frequencies aredefined as follows.

• GUARDED. GUARDED frequenciesare adversary frequencies that arecurrently being exploited for combatinformation and intelligence. AGUARDED frequency is time-orientedin that the list changes as the adversaryassumes different combat postures.These frequencies may be jammed afterthe commander has weighed the potentialoperational gain against the loss of thetechnical information.

• PROTECTED. PROTECTED frequenciesare those friendly frequencies used for aparticular operation, identified, andprotected to prevent them from beinginadvertently jammed by friendly forceswhile active EW operations are directedagainst hostile forces. These frequenciesare of such critical importance thatjamming should be restricted unlessabsolutely necessary or until coordinationwith the using unit is made. They aregenerally time-oriented, may change withthe tactical situation, and should beupdated periodically.

• TABOO. TABOO frequencies are anyfriendly frequency of such importancethat it must never be deliberately jammedor interfered with by friendly forces.Normally these include internationaldistress, CEASE BUZZER, safety, andcontroller frequencies. These aregenerally long-standing frequencies.

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However, they may be time-oriented inthat, as the combat or exercise situationchanges, the restrictions may be removedto allow self protection by friendly forces.Specifically, during crisis or hostilities,short duration jamming may beauthorized on TABOO frequencies forself protection to provide coverage fromunknown threats, threats operatingoutside their known frequency ranges, orfor other reasons.

f. Disseminating the JRFL. The JRFL ismaintained and disseminated by the J-6.

g. Updating the JRFL. The JRFL isreviewed by all joint force staff sections andsubordinate commands. The J-2 might needadditions or deletions or qualified frequenciesbased on possible SIGINT and ES targets.The J-3 and IO cell monitor the JRFL withrespect to changes in the operations, timing,dates, and TABOO frequencies. The J-6ensures that PROTECTED frequencies arecongruent with assigned frequencies. The J-6also amends the JRFL based on input fromJ-2 and J-3. Supporting EW units check theJRFL because this list is the primary sourceof “no jam” frequencies.

3. JSIR Program

This program, coordinated and managed bythe JSC, addresses those interference incidentsthat cannot be resolved at the unified,subordinate unified, JTF, and componentlevels. The JSIR program also satisfies therequirements of the Joint Staff and the statedneeds of the CINCs for a joint-level agencyto coordinate resolution of EMI incidents.

a. JSC has a 24-hour capability forreceiving interference reports.

• Message address: JSC ANNAPOLISMD//J3//

• Telephone: Defense Switched Network(DSN) (312) 281-9857, Commercial(410) 293-9857

• Sensitive compartmented informationtraffic is serviced directly through securefacsimile (FAX) and Intelink in the JSCsensitive compartmented informationfacility.

b. The following is the minimuminformation required for beginning a JSIRinvestigation.

• Information contained in componentinterference report.

• System affected by interference(nomenclature, J-12 number).

• Frequency of the victim receiver.

• The area or location where theinterference incident occurred.

• Description of the interference.

• The time(s) and date(s) the interferenceoccurred.

• A point of contact with DSN orcommercial phone number and dutyhours available to discuss the interferenceincident.

c. Upon receipt of a JSIR service request,the JSC JSIR team performs an analysis usingJSC models and databases to determine thesource and works with the appropriate fieldactivity and frequency manager to resolveinterference problems. Resources forgeolocation and direction-finding support, aswell as access to databases not resident at JSC,should be coordinated with appropriateagencies as necessary. The JSC JSIR teamdeploys to the location of the victim

B-5


organization, if necessary, in order to resolveinterference problems. The organizationrequesting JSIR services is provided a reportof the results of the JSIR analysis andappropriate information is incorporated intothe JSIR database. This database supportstrend analysis and future interference analysis.Space system interference reporting andresolution is similar to the terrestrial reportingand resolution process except that theinterference report is sent directly to the SpaceControl Center (SCC) at United States SpaceCommand, Cheyenne Mountain Air Station,Colorado (DSN 268-4405 or Commercial(719) 474-4405) from the space-systemmanager affected. The space system isconsidered to include both the space-basedand earth segments. SCC forwards theincident report to the JSC for analysis.

4. Responsibilities

The responsibilities of the respective staffsections and commands in EW frequencydeconfliction are noted below.

a. J-3 Responsibilities

• Determine and define critical friendlyfunctions (TABOO and PROTECTED)to be protected from jamming andelectronic deception based on the jointforce concept of operations and incoordination with components.

• Approve the initial JRFL and subsequentchanges.

• Provide guidance in OPLANs as to whenjamming takes precedence overintelligence collection and vice versa.

• Resolve problems with the use ofjamming and electronic deception intactical operations when conflicts arise.

• Continually weigh the operationaladvantages of employing EW against theadvantages of intelligence collection.

• Develop and promulgate specific ROEfor jamming and electronic deceptionin support of combat operations.Coordinate ROE with Staff JudgeAdvocate.

b. J-2 Responsibilities

• In coordination with the nationalSIGINT authority, NSA, determine anddefine critical adversary functions andfrequencies (GUARDED) and intelligencesystem processing and disseminationfrequencies (PROTECTED) to beprotected from friendly EA and providethem to the J-3 (through the IO cell) forapproval.

• Assist in prioritizing the JRFL before J-3approval.

• Develop and maintain map of nonmilitaryentities operations on or near the areabeing jammed. Evaluate probablecollateral effect on nonmilitary users.

• Nominate changes to the JRFL.

• Assist JSC in resolving reporteddisruption resulting from EMI.

c. J-6 Responsibilities

• Attempt to resolve all reported non-EA-related interference.

• Manage all frequency assignments forcommunications or non-communicationsequipment associated with the joint force.

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• Maintain frequency databases of all jointforce emitters (communications, non-communications equipment, radars, andjammers) to manage frequencyassignments and assist the IO cell withresolving reports of interference throughfriendly EA.

• Compile, consolidate, coordinate, anddisseminate the JRFL and provide the IOcell with the frequency assignments forthose PROTECTED or TABOO unit netsthat are designated for inclusion in theJRFL.

• Nominate changes to the JRFL based onthe changing of assigned operationalfrequencies among friendly force units.

• Assist in minimizing adverse impact offriendly EA on critical networks byproviding alternative communications.

d. EWO Responsibilities

• Attempt to resolve all reported EA-related interference.

• Coordinate and provide input to theJFRL.

• Recommend a joint force EW target listthrough the IO cell.

• Identify and resolve, if possible, conflictsthat might occur between planned EAoperations and the JRFL.

• Coordinate with J-6 and J-2 on reportedinterference to determine if friendly EAactions could be responsible.

e. Joint force subordinate commands andcomponents should, where applicable,establish a unit staff element to perform thefrequency deconfliction process. This staffelement should be patterned after the IO celland should be the focal point for frequency

deconfliction for the subordinate commandand component forces it represents. Theresponsibilities of this frequency deconflictionstaff element are as follows.

• Submits to the J-6, candidate nodes andnets (both friendly and adversary) withassociated frequencies (if known), forinclusion in the JRFL using the formatin Annex A, “Standardized JRFLFormat.” Units should specificallydesignate only those functions critical tocurrent operations for inclusion in theJRFL. Over-protection of nonessentialassets complicates the EA supportprocess and significantly lengthens thetime required to evaluate mission impactresulting from spectrum protection.Normally, candidate nodes and netsshould be submitted either throughintelligence channels and consolidated byJ-2 or through operations channels andconsolidated by J-3.

• Identifies conflicts between JRFL andfriendly EA operations and requestschanges, as necessary, to resolve theconflicts.

• Reports unresolved spectrum disruptionincidents as they occur in accordancewith this publication and currentinterference reporting instructions.

• Keeps the IO cell apprised of EWplanning and operational activities.

f. JSC Responsibilities. The JSC managesthe DOD JSIR program as described inparagraph 3 above.

5. Frequency DeconflictionAnalysis

Personnel analyzing frequency conflictsmust consider frequency, location geometry,and time.

B-7


a. Frequency. The potential forinterference exists whenever emitters(communications, non-communicationsequipment, radars, and jammers) operate ator close to the same frequency or range asunintended receivers. Interference can alsooccur through frequency harmonicsthroughout the EM spectrum with jammingoperations. The JRFL limits the frequenciesthat require immediate review by the IO cell.Where possible, automated decision aidsshould be used to conduct this comparison.

b. Location Geometry. Because of thefluid nature of the battlefield (mobility), thelocations of friendly emitters constantlychange. The locations of friendly emittersshould be analyzed by J-6 in order to predictpossible interference. The results of theanalyses depend highly on the accuracy, forexample, of data and the analytical techniqueused.

c. Time. Time analysis attempts to protectcritical communications network or non-communications equipment from friendlyinterference during friendly jammingmissions. This subjective judgment is one thatshould be made by the J-3 or JTF commander,who must weigh the trade-off between criticaljamming operations and protection of vital C2resources.

6. Automated SpectrumManagement Tools

a. Commands are also encouraged to useautomated spectrum management tools that

will assist in developing and managing aconstantly changing JRFL. To support a timeand geographically oriented JRFL, automatedsystems must possess an engineering modulethat considers such factors as broadcast power,reception sensitivity, terrain, locations,distances, and time. The capability for directcomputer data exchange between echelons forJRFL nominations and approval isrecommended.

b. Joint Spectrum Management System(JSMS) and SPECTRUM XXI. JSMS andSPECTRUM XXI are computer-basedsystems that support the joint spectrummanager. JSMS and SPECTRUM XXIsupport operational planning as well as real-time management of the radio frequencyspectrum, with emphasis on assigningcompatible frequencies, deconflictingoperations, and performing spectrumengineering tasks. During peacetime, JSMSand SPECTRUM XXI are used by a joint staffat its permanent headquarters to facilitate thecomplex task of managing the spectrumduring the planning and execution phases ofexercises, as well as performing routinespectrum management functions. In thecombat environment, JSMS and SPECTRUMXXI are used by joint staffs to perform jointspectrum management. It is capable ofimplementing any variations betweenpeacetime and wartime operations, such asoperational area, frequency assignments,terrain data, equipment characteristics, andtactical constraints.

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Intentionally Blank

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX BSTANDARDIZED JRFL FORMAT

B-A-1

The following JRFL format is an attemptto give the planner a standardized listing ofinformation for developing a JRFL. Thisformat is used by the JSMS. This sample

JRFL is unclassified but, when actuallyaccomplished, should show the properclassification of each paragraph.

1. CLASSIFICATION: One character (U=Unclassified, C=Confidential,S=Secret).

2. UNIT: Sixteen characters (net name as identified incommunications-electronics operating instructions[CEOI]). Disregard for GUARDED nominations.

3. FREQUENCY: Twenty-four characters (K=kilohertz, M=megahertz,G=gigahertz, T=terahertz), identifies a frequency orband (e.g., M13.250-15.700).

4. STATUS: Four characters (T=TABOO /P=PROTECTED/G=GUARDED, and a slash followed by priority A-Zand 1-9 (e.g., T/A1).

5. PERIOD: Two characters (represents CEOI time period 01-10),if known.

6. START DATE: Eight characters (MM/DD/YY) indicates start datewhen protection is required, if known.

7. END DATE: Eight characters (MM/DD/YY) indicates end datewhen protection is no longer required, if known.

8. TRANSMITTERCOORDINATES:

Fifteen characters (latitude (dd[N r S] mmss)/longitude(ddd[E or W] mmss) provide the location to thetransmitter or system, if known.

9. RECEIVERCOORDINATES:

Fifteen characters (latitude [dd(N or S)mmss] andlongitude [ddd(E or W)mmss]) provides the locationof the receiver or system to be protected, if known.

10. AGENCY SERIALNUMBER:

Ten characters (the agency serial number is a uniqueidentifier for each frequency assignment), if known.

11. POWER: Nine characters (W=watts, K=kilowatts,M=megawatts, G=gigawatts) and a maximum of fivedecimal places, (e.g., W10.01234), if known.

12. EMISSION: Eleven characters (the emission designator containsthe necessary bandwidth and the emissionclassification symbols [e.g., 3KOOJ3E]), if known.

13. EQUIPMENTNOMENCLATURE:

Eighteen characters (e.g., AN/GRC-103), if known.

14. COMMENTS: Forty characters (provided for user remarks), optionalentry.

15. CEOI NAME: Ten characters (a short title provided by the user tohelp identify the entry could use the actual titleidentified on the CEOI), optional entry.

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Annex A to Appendix B

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX CJOINT SPECTRUM CENTER SUPPORT TO JOINT

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

C-1

1. General

The DOD JSC was activated on 28September 1994. The JSC has assumed allthe missions and responsibilities previouslyperformed by the ElectromagneticCompatibility Center, as well as additionalfunctions. The JSC is a field activity of theDefense Information Systems Agency.

2. Mission

The mission of the JSC is to ensure theDepartment of Defense’s effective use of theEM spectrum in support of national securityand military objectives. The JSC serves asthe DOD center of excellence for EMspectrum management matters in support ofthe combatant commands, MilitaryDepartments, and Defense agencies inplanning, acquisition, training, and operations.The JSC serves as the DOD focal point forsupporting the spectrum supremacy aspectsof IO. Since EW is a principal use of thespectrum within the IO effort, JSC supportextends to the EW aspects of joint militaryoperations.

3. The JSC Support to EW

a. The JSC provides data about friendlyforce C2 system locational and technicalcharacteristics for use in planning electronicprotect measures. Databases maintained bythe JSC provide EW planners withinformation covering communications, radar,navigation aids, broadcast, identification, andEW systems operated by the Department ofDefense, other United States Governmentdepartments and agencies, and privatebusinesses or organizations. Information fromthese databases is available on a quick reactionbasis in a variety of formats and media to

support EW planners and EM spectrummanagers.

b. The JSC assists spectrum managers, EWplanners, or the IO cell in the development ofthe JRFL. The JSC provides automated tools,JSMS and SPECTRUM XXI, to assist in thedevelopment and management of the JRFLand has designated CINC support teams thatcan be deployed to combatant commands,subordinate unified commands, JTFs, or theircomponents when requested. These teams aretrained to prepare JRFLs or provide trainingand assistance in how to prepare a JRFL. Theteams can also serve as on-site advisors andassistants in EM spectrum managementmatters as required.

c. The JSC assists in the resolution ofoperational interference and jammingincidents through the auspices of the JSIRprogram. The objective of the JSIR programis to resolve problems at the lowest possiblelevel in the chain of command. The JSCmaintains rapid deployment teams that areable to quickly locate and identify interferencesources. These teams recommend technicaland operational fixes to resolve identifiedinterference sources. The JSC also maintainsa historical database of interference andjamming incident reports and solutions toassist in trend analysis and correction ofrecurring problems. Combatant commands,subordinate unified commands, JTFs, or theircomponents should contact the JSC in orderto request assistance in resolving suspectedspectrum interference problems.

d. The JSC provides data about foreigncommand, control, and communications (C3)frequency and location data. Databasescontaining this data are developed primarilyfrom open sources.

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e. The JSC also provides unclassified C3area studies about the C3 infrastructure of over100 countries. These area studies aredeveloped entirely from open source material.Information provided in these studiesincludes: physical and cultural characteristics(geography, climate, and population);overview of telecommunications systems; andEM frequencies registered for use within thegeographic boundaries of each country. Datain these studies includes civilian, military, andradio and TV broadcast frequencies.Frequency data is provided in automated formto facilitate direct input into automatedspectrum management tools such as thewidely-used JSMS.

4. Mailing Address:

JSC/J32004 Turbot LandingAnnapolis, MD 21402-5064

5. Message Address:

JSC ANNAPOLIS MD//J3//

6. Telephone Numbers:

DSN: (312) 281-9815 (UNCLASSIFIED)COMMERCIAL: (410) 293-9815FAX: DSN (312) 281-3763 (UNCLASSIFIED)FAX: DSN (312) 281-3684 (CLASSIFIED)Duty Officer: DSN (312) 281-9857,Commercial (410) 293-9857

APPENDIX DELECTRONIC WARFARE REPROGRAMMING

D-1

1. EW Reprogramming

a. Purpose. The purpose of EWreprogramming is to maintain or enhance theeffectiveness of EW and TSS equipmentmaintained by field and fleet units. EWreprogramming includes changes to self-defense systems, offensive weapons systems,and intelligence collection systems. Thereprogramming of EW and TSS equipmentis the responsibility of each Service throughits respective EW reprogramming supportprograms.

b. Types of Changes. Several types ofchanges constitute EW reprogramming.These fall into three major categories: tactics,software, and hardware changes.

• Tactics. A tactics change includeschanges in tactics, equipment settings, orEW systems mission-planning data.These changes are usually created andimplemented at the unit level usingorganic equipment and personnel.

• Software. Software changes includeactual changes to the software ofprogrammable EW and TSS equipment.This type of change requires the supportof a software support activity to alterprogrammed look-up tables, threatlibraries, or signal-sorting routines.These changes are not normally createdorganically, although newer systems maybe reprogrammed rapidly at the unit levelusing electronic transmission means.

• Hardware. Hardware changes and/orlong-term system development isnecessary when tactics or softwarechanges cannot correct equipmentdeficiencies. These changes usuallyoccur when the complex nature of a

change leads to a system modification.Hardware changes normally requiredepot-level support.

c. EW Reprogramming Actions. Duringcrisis planning or actual hostilities, EWreprogramming provides operationalcommanders with a timely capability tocorrect EW and/or TSS equipmentdeficiencies, tailor equipment to meet uniquetheater or mission requirements, or to respondto changes in adversary threat systems.

• Threat Changes. Service EWreprogramming support programs areprimarily designed to respond toadversary threat changes affecting thecombat effectiveness of EW and TSSequipment. A threat change may be anychange in the operation or EM signatureof an adversary threat system.

• Geographic Tailoring. Geographictailoring is the reprogramming of EWand TSS equipment for operations in aspecific area or region of the world.Geographic tailoring usually reduces thenumber of threats in system memory,resulting in decreased processing timeand a reduction in system displayambiguities.

• Mission Tailoring. Mission tailoring isthe reprogramming of EW and TSSequipment for the mission of the hostplatform. Mission tailoring may bedesirable to improve system response tothe priority threat(s) to the host platform.

d. General Reprogramming Process.The reprogramming process for EW and TSSequipment can be divided into four phases.Although the last three phases of thereprogramming process are unique by Service,

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each Service follows the general processdescribed below.

• Determine Threat. The first phase ofreprogramming is to develop andmaintain an accurate description of theequipment’s operational environment,specifically enemy threat systems andtactics. Since EW and TSS equipmentis programmed to identify and respondto particular threat or target signaturedata, intelligence requirements must beidentified to ensure that an accuratedescription of the EM environment ismaintained at all times. Maintaining anaccurate description of the environmentrequires fusion of known EM data withthe collection, analysis, and validation ofenemy “threat” signature changes. Thisfirst phase of the reprogramming processcan be divided into the following threesteps.

•• Collect Data. Threat signature datacollection (e.g., collection of threatsystem parametric information) is theresponsibility of the combatant andcomponent command collectionmanagers. Signature data may becollected as a matter of routineintelligence collection against targetedsystems, while other data collection mayoccur as the result of urgent intelligenceproduction requests. Regardless of themeans of collection, signature data isdisseminated to appropriate intelligenceproduction centers, and Serviceequipment support and flagging activitiesfor analysis.

•• Identify Changes. At Servicesupport and flagging activities,collected signature data is analyzed forEW and TSS equipment compatibility.Incompatible data is “flagged” for furtheranalysis and system impact assessment.At the intelligence production centers,collected data is processed and analyzed

to identify threat signature changes in theEM environment. Identified changes arefurther analyzed to ensure collector bias(i.e., collector contamination ormanipulation of signature data attributedto the collector or its reportingarchitecture) was addressed during theanalysis process.

•• Validate Changes. The mostimportant step of this initial phase ofreprogramming is to validate threatsignature changes. Therefore, once anidentified signature change is correlatedto a threat system and analyzed to ensurethe reported parameters are correct andnot a collector anomaly, it is furtheranalyzed to “validate” it as an actualsystem capability change or identify itas a probable malfunction. Informationon threat system engineering and tacticalemployment is critical to this validationprocess. Technical analysis andvalidation of threat changes is normallyprovided by one of three Servicescientific and technical intelligenceproduction centers or by the DIA. Duringtimes of crisis, the combatant commandmust ensure this phase of thereprogramming process provides for theexpeditious identification, technicalanalysis, and dissemination of threatchange validation messages tocomponent commands and Servicereprogramming centers.

• Determine Response. During thissecond phase of reprogramming,validated threat change information isused to assess its impact upon friendlyEW and TSS equipment and a decisionto initiate a reprogramming change isdetermined. If the equipment fails toprovide appropriate indications andwarning or countermeasures in responseto a threat change, a decision must bemade to change tactics, software, orhardware to correct the deficiency. To

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support this decision making process, theService reprogramming analysis orflagging activities normally generates asystem impact message (SIM) to informcombatant and component commandstaffs of the operational impact of thethreat change to EW and TSS equipmentperformance. The SIM often recommendsappropriate responses for each identifiedthreat change. The Service componentemploying the affected equipment isultimately responsible for determiningthe appropriate response to validatedthreat changes.

• Create Change. The third phase of thereprogramming process is to developtactics, software, or hardware changesto regain or improve equipmentperformance and combat effectiveness.A change in tactics (e.g., avoiding thethreat) is usually the first optionconsidered, because software andhardware changes take time. Often, acombination of changes (e.g., tactics andsoftware changes) is prescribed toprovide an immediate and long-term fixto equipment deficiencies. Regardlessof the type of change created,reprogramming support activities willverify equipment combat effectivenessthrough modeling and simulation, benchtests, or test range employmentssimulating operational conditions.Following the verification ofeffectiveness, the reprogramming changeand implementation instructions aremade available to appropriate field andfleet units worldwide.

• Implement the Change. The final phaseof the reprogramming process is toactually implement the change to ensurethat unit combat effectiveness is regainedor enhanced by the tactic, software, orhardware change. To accomplish thistask, component commands ensure that

tactics changes are incorporated intomission pre-briefs, and software andhardware changes are electronically ormechanically installed in host platformEW and TSS equipment.

2. Joint Coordination of EWReprogramming

a. General. Coordination of EWreprogramming is critical because threatsignature changes and equipmentreprogramming changes will affect the EMenvironment and all three subdivisions of jointEW operations. Combatant commands mustensure that joint coordination of EWreprogramming (JCEWR) policy andprocedures are developed and exercisedduring all major training events and real-worldoperations.

b. Policy. The joint staff is responsible forJCEWR policy. Each Service is responsiblefor its individual EW reprogramming policiesand procedures. The establishment andexecution of JCEWR procedures is theresponsibility of the combatant commands,component commands, and subordinate jointforce commands in accordance with thefollowing joint policy.

CJCSI 3210.04, “Joint EW ReprogrammingPolicy,” outlines the responsibilities of theJoint Staff, Military Services, combatantcommands, Service components, NSA, andthe DIA regarding the JCEWR process. Theinstruction also sets forth joint procedures,guidelines, and criteria governing jointintelligence support to EW reprogramming.This instruction describes the purpose of threatchange validation and directs combatantcommands to develop and exercise a timelythreat change validation process to supportthe needs of component commands andService reprogramming support activitiesduring times of crisis.

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX EELECTRONIC WARFARE MODELING

E-1

1. General

Digital models and simulations havebecome essential tools in the evaluation of EWand related systems. Simulations are criticalbecause of the high cost of systemdevelopment, field testing, and trainingexercises. Additionally, it is often impossibleto replicate the multitude of variables and theinteractions that occur in actual combat in afield test or training exercise.

2. Application

a. Operational Test Support. Testagencies use simulations to assist in planningand setting up field tests and in extrapolating,expanding, and verifying test results.

b. Analysis Support. Combat developersand other analysis activities use simulationsto conduct cost and operational effectivenessstudies, assist in defining requirements,perform force mix and tradeoff analyses, anddevelop tactics, doctrine, and procedures.

c. Operational Support. Operationalcommands use simulations to provide trainingfrom the individual to theater staff levels,perform as tactical decision aids, assist indeveloping and evaluating OPLANs, andconduct detailed mission planning.

d. Weapon System Development.Materiel developers use simulations to supportengineering development and design,vulnerability and survivability analyses, anddevelopmental testing.

e. Intelligence Support. Intelligenceagencies use simulations to evaluate rawintelligence, develop threat projections,analyze threat design options, and evaluatethreat tactics and employment options.

3. Modeling Agencies

There are numerous government agenciesand contractors involved in EW modeling.The Joint Staff Director for Force Structure,Resource, and Assessment periodicallypublishes the “Catalog of Wargaming andMilitary Simulation Models.” This is the mostcomprehensive catalog of models availableand identifies most agencies involved in EWmodeling. Listed below are some of the jointand Service organizations involved with EWmodeling and simulation.

a. Joint. Joint Command and ControlWarfare Center, Joint Warfighting AnalysisCenter, Joint Spectrum Center, WarriorPreparation Center, and Joint WarfightingCenter.

b. Army. Aviation and Missile Command,National Ground Intelligence Center, AirDefense Center and School, IntelligenceCenter and School, US Army Training andDoctrine Command Analysis Center,Electronic Proving Ground, CommunicationsElectronics Command, Army MaterialSystems Analysis Agency, Test andEvaluation Command, Signal Center andSchool, and National Simulation Center.

c. Navy. Naval Command and Control andOcean Surveillance Center, Naval Air WarfareCenter, Naval Research Laboratory, NavalStrike Air Warfare Center, NavalOceanographic Office, Center for NavalAnalysis, Naval Space Command, and NavalSurface Warfare Center.

d. Air Force. Air Force Electronic CombatOffice, Air Force Research Laboratory,National Air Intelligence Center, Air ForceInformation Warfare Center (AFIWC), AirForce Operational Test and Evaluation Center,

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Air Force Studies and Analysis Agency,Aeronautical Systems Center, Survivabilityand Vulnerability Information AnalysisCenter, Air Armaments Center, Air and SpaceC2 Agency, C2 Battle Lab, and Air ForceWargaming Centers.

e. Marine Corps. Commandant’sWarfighting Lab, Wargaming and CombatSimulated Division of Marine Corps CombatDevelopment Command, and MAGTF StaffTraining Program, Modeling and SimulationBranch.

4. Fidelity Requirements

Fidelity is the degree of accuracy and detailto which the environment, physical entities,and their interactions are represented. Fidelityrequirements vary widely depending on theparticular application. Considerations indetermining the proper fidelity should bebased on scope (e.g., individual versus corpsstaff), consequences of inaccurate results (e.g.,air strike against sophisticated air defense),time available, computer resources available,accuracy of available data, and allowabletolerance of results. Regardless of the fidelityrequired, a consistent analytic approachshould be used. As an example, table look-up values for a low resolution model couldbe obtained from a high resolution model. Anaudit trail should be available in an analystmanual or other documentation to determinesimplifying assumptions, limitations, andaggregation techniques. In general, the modelsetup time, run time, and user expertiserequired increase as model scope, fidelity, andflexibility increase.

5. Model Design

a. User Interface, Preprocessors, andPostprocessors. These requirements willvary widely depending on the particularapplication. For example, a radar designengineer will need much more flexibility anddetail for input data than a targeting analyst

would need in a tactical decision aid. Otherthan purpose, setup, and analysis, timerequirements and user expertise are keyconsiderations in designing preprocessors andpostprocessors and the user interface. Ingeneral, maximum use should be made ofstandard graphic user interfaces.

b. Electronic Warfare Functions. Formission planning or force level analysis, allEW functions need to be represented to someextent. For other applications, the specificpurpose will drive what functions should berepresented. EW model functions includesuch areas as propagation, radio line of sight,self-protect jamming, standoff jamming(communications and non-communications),ES vulnerability and effectiveness,expendables effectiveness (chaff and flares),decoy effectiveness (active and passive),SEAD, acquisition and tracking (radar,electro-optical and infrared), clutter effects,satellite coverage and link analysis, missileflyout (effects of countermeasures), effects ofevasive maneuvers, C3 processes, EP, andeffects of lethal attack on critical C3 nodes.

c. Software Architecture. The design ofan EW model or system of models should bemodular and object oriented. Existingstandards and commonly used commercialsoftware packages should be used whereappropriate. Standards include those from theInstitute of Electrical and ElectronicsEngineers (IEEE), American NationalStandards Institute, Federal InformationProcessing Standards, Military Standard2167A, Open Software Foundation, andNational Security Agency and CentralSecurity Service. 2167A standards should betailored to meet the user requirements fordocumentation. Standards are particularlyimportant with regard to interfaces. Theprimary objective of standardization is tomake the simulation as machine independentas possible. To this end, the operating systemenvironment should conform to IEEEPortable Operating System Interface for

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Electronic Warfare Modeling

Computer Environments standards.Additionally, communications protocols andinterfaces should conform to the GovernmentOpen Systems Interconnection Profile, whichis the DOD implementation of internationalOpen Systems Interconnect standards.

6. Verification and Validation

a. Verification. Model verification isrelated to the logic and mathematical accuracyof a model. Verification is accomplishedthrough such processes as design reviews,structured walk-throughs, and numerous testruns of the model. Test runs are conducted todebug the model as well as determine thesensitivity of output to the full range on inputvariables. Included in verification is a reviewof input data for consistency, accuracy, andsource. Ultimately, verification determinesif the model functions as designed andadvertised. Verification is rather straight-forward but time consuming.

b. Validation

• Model validation relates to the correlationof the model with reality. In general asthe scope of a simulation increases,validation becomes more difficult. At theengineering level for a limited scopeproblem, it is often possible to design alaboratory experiment or field test toreplicate reality. At the force level, it isnot possible to replicate all the variableson the battlefield and their interaction.It may be possible to validate individualfunctional modules by comparison withtest data or previously validatedengineering-level or high to mediumresolution models. No model totallyrepresents reality, and this disparityincreases as the model scope increases.At the force level, models can providerelative answers, insights, and trends sothat alternatives may be rank ordered.Any model user should always keep

model limitations and assumptions inmind and use the model in conjunctionwith off-line methods to compensate forthese shortfalls.

• Although the above methods may beused for the validation of individualmodules in a force level model, threetechniques are used for validating thebottom line output of force-on-forcesimulations: benchmarking with anaccepted simulation, comparing withhistorical data, and using militaryjudgment. As technological advances arerapidly being incorporated in modernforces, historical data is becoming lessuseful for predicting outcomes in a futuremid- to high-intensity conflict. Militaryjudgment is still a viable method but isbiased by the unique experience of theperson or persons making the judgment.Benchmarking with an acceptedsimulation provides the moststraightforward and least biased methodof validation. The primary problem hereis caused by differing data structuresbetween the models. However, bycareful review and manipulation of inputdata, this problem can be minimized topreclude “comparing apples to oranges.”

7. Databases

Numerous databases are available tosupport EW modeling. Data include doctrinal,order of battle, parametric, signature, antennapattern, C3 networks, and topographic. Oneof the most comprehensive database catalogsavailable is the directory of DOD-SponsoredResearch and Development databasesproduced by the Defense TechnicalInformation Center. Some sources of data forEW modeling include the following.

a. Doctrinal or Scenario Order of Battleand C3 Networks. DIA, Combined ArmsCenter, National Ground Intelligence Center

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(NGIC), National Air Intelligence Center,AFIWC, Naval Weapons Center, and AirForce Air Warfare Center.

b. Parametric Signature AntennaPattern. NSA, NGIC, Missile and SpaceIntelligence Center, JSC, AFIWC, and DIA.

c. Topographic. NIMA, US GeologicalSurvey, Army Engineer TopographicLaboratories, CIA, and WaterwaysExperiment Station.

APPENDIX FSERVICE PERSPECTIVES OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE

F-1

1. Army

The focus of Army EW operations is basedon the need to synchronize lethal and nonlethalattacks against adversary C3 targets. ArmyEW disrupts, delays, diverts, and denies theadversary while protecting friendly use ofcommunications and non-communicationssystems. The perspective of Army forces isdirectly associated with the combined armsstructure of adversary forces and the mannerin which both friendly and adversarycombatants conduct combat operations. Thehigh mobility of opposing combat forces andthe speed, range, precision accuracy, andlethality of their weapons systems placestringent demands on the C2 systems of bothfriendly and adversary ground forcecommanders. Synchronization is achieved byintegrating EW into both the IO plan and firesupport operations in support of the groundscheme of maneuver, using centralized controland decentralized execution functionsperformed by parallel C3 systems andprocedures at all echelons. Organic EWresources available to support Armyoperations are limited. Mission requirementsusually exceed operational capability. Cross-Service EW support, synchronized with Armycombat operations, is essential to the successof joint military operations. Joint planningand continuous, effective coordination arecritical to synchronizing joint EW capabilitiesand generating joint combat power at thecritical time and place in battle. The Armyprovides and requires cross-Service EWsupport when and where needed to achievethe combat objectives and operational goalsof the JFC.

2. Marine Corps

The Marine Corps employs EW within theconcept of maneuver warfare with the intent

to disrupt the adversary’s ability to commandand control forces, thereby influencing theenemy’s decision cycle. This ability enhancesfriendly capabilities while shattering themoral, mental, and physical cohesion of theadversary, rendering the adversary incapableof effectively resisting. Marine EW units,found within both the command and aviationcombat elements of a MAGTF, are task-organized to meet the needs of the MAGTFcommander, subordinate commanders, andultimately the operational goals of the JFC.EW units are integrated into the commander’sconcept of operations and scheme ofmaneuver in order to enhance the MAGTF’sinherent combined arms capabilities. Throughthis integration of aviation and ground EWcapabilities, the MAGTF is able to exploitboth the long- and the short-term effects ofEW, conducting active operations of EA, ES,and EP in order to support the operationalrequirements of the MAGTF commander aswell as those of the JFC with provision ofcross-Service support in the joint arena.

3. Navy

Naval task forces use all aspects of spaceand EW in performing their naval warfaretasks. Emphasis is given to surveillance, theneutralization or destruction of adversarytargets, and the enhancement of friendly forcebattle management through the integratedemployment and exploitation of the EMspectrum and the medium of space. Navalbattle groups employ a variety of organicshipboard EW systems, primarily for selfprotection. Naval aviation forces are theprimary means by which naval forces take theEW fight to the adversary at extended ranges.Carrier and land-based EA-6B Prowlers usea variety of onboard systems to conduct EA(including both standoff and close-injamming), ES, and EP in support of SEAD

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and IO tasking. Naval task force use of theEM spectrum and space encompassesmeasures that are employed to:

• Coordinate, correlate, fuse, and employaggregate communication, surveillance,reconnaissance, data correlation,c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , t a rg e t i n g , a n delectromagnetic attack capabilities;

• Deny, deceive, disrupt, destroy, orexploit the adversary’s capability tocommunicate, monitor, reconnoiter,classify, target, and attack;

• Facilitate anti-ship missile defense; and

• Direct and control employment offriendly forces.

4. Air Force

The COMAFFOR conducts a variety ofEW operations, including EA, EP, and ES.In addition, EW supports SEAD and IO.The object of these operations is to increaseaircraft survivability, enhance theeffectiveness of military operations, andincrease the probability of mission success.Air Force EW system development and

employment focus on this task. The AirForce uses an integrated mix of disruptiveand destructive EW systems to defeathostile integrated air defenses. DisruptiveEW systems, (e.g., self-protectionjamming) provide an immediate buttemporary solution. The EC-130HCompass Call is the Air Force’s primarynonlethal SEAD asset. It performs C3countermeasures throughout the C2spectrum, supporting air, land, sea, andspecial operations across the range ofmilitary operations. Destructive systemsprovide a more permanent solution, butmay take longer to fully achieve the desiredresults. The integrated use of destructiveand disruptive systems offsets theirindividual disadvantages and results in asynergistic effect. Successful EWoperations emphasize risk reduction whilestill maintaining mission effectiveness.The military significance of EW is directlyrelated to the increase in missioneffectiveness and to the reduction of riskassociated with attaining air superiority.Aggressive employment of EW can have aprofound impact on the JFC’s IO. The AirForce employs a variety of ground-, air-,and space-based assets to accomplish thesetasks.

APPENDIX GREFERENCES

G-1

The development of JP 3-51 is based upon the following primary references.

1. DOD Directive 3222.3, “DOD Electromagnetic Compatibility Program.”

2. DOD Directive 3222.4, “Electronic Warfare (EW) and Command and Control WarfareCountermeasures.”

3. CJCSI 3121.01, “Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces.”

4. CJCSI 3150.25, “Joint After-Action Reporting System.”

5. CJCSI 3210.01, “Joint Information Operations Policy.”

6. CJCSI 3210.03, “Joint Electronic Warfare Policy.”

7. CJCSI 3210.04, “Joint EW Reprogramming Policy.”

8. CJCSI 3220.01, “Electromagnetic Spectrum Use in Joint Military Operations.”

9. CJCSI 3221.01, “Near Real-Time Analysis of Electromagnetic Interference and Jammingof US Space Systems.”

10. CJCSI 6510.01, “Defensive Information Warfare Implementation.”

11. CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (PlanningFormats and Guidance).”

12. CJCSM 3212.02, “Performing Electronic Attack in the United States and Canada.”

13. CJCSM 3220.01, “Joint Operations in the Electromagnetic Battlespace.”

14. CJCSM 3500.03, “Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States.”

15. CJCSM 3500.04B, “Universal Joint Task List.”

16. JP 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”

17. JP 1-04, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Legal Support to MilitaryOperations.”

18. JP 2-0, “Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”

19. JP 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.”

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20. JP 2-02, “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”

21. JP 3-01.4, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Suppression of EnemyAir Defenses (J-SEAD).”

22. JP 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.”

23. JP 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.”

24. JP 3-13, “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.”

25. JP 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”

26. JP 3-54, “Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.”

27. JP 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”

28. JP 3-58, “Joint Doctrine for Military Deception.”

29. JP 3-61, “Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.”

30. Air Land Sea Application Center publication “Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for EA-6B Employment in the Joint Environment.” (Referenced by individualServices as FM 90-39, MCRP 3-22A, NWP 3-01.4, and AFTTP(I) 3-2.4.)

31. MC 64/7, NATO “Electronic Warfare Policy.”

32. AJP-01(A), “Allied Joint Operations Doctrine.”

33. ATP-8A, “Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.”

34. ATP-44, “Electronic Warfare in Air Operations.”

35. ATP-51, “Electronic Warfare in the Land Battle.”

36. QSTAG 593, “Doctrine on Mutual Support Between EW Units.”

37. QSTAG 1022, “Electronic Warfare in the Land Battle.”

APPENDIX HADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

H-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100,116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should addresscontent (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director forOperations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-51, 30 June 1991, “Electronic Warfare in Joint MilitaryOperations.”

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J39/STOD//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (DefenseAttaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications)814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321Albany, GA 31704-0321

Coast Guard: Commandant (G-OPD), US Coast Guard2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, DC 20593-0001

CommanderUSJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution)116 Lake View ParkwaySuffolk, VA 23435-2697

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

A-3 Operations Directorate (COMAFFOR)A-5 Plans Directorate (COMAFFOR)AAR after-action reportABCA American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies

Standardization ProgramAFIWC Air Force Information Warfare CenterAGCCS Army Global Command and Control SystemAJP Allied Joint PubASCC Air Standardization Coordinating CommitteeATO air tasking orderATP Allied Tactical Pub

C2 command and controlC3 command, control, and communicationsCAG carrier air groupCAP crisis action planningCCIR commander’s critical information requirementsCIA Central Intelligence AgencyCINC commander of a combatant commandCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff InstructionCJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ManualCNA computer network attackCND computer network defenseCNE computer network exploitationCOA course of actionCOMAFFOR Commander, Air Force ForcesCOMSEC communications securityCVWC carrier battle group air wing commanderCWC composite warfare commander

DE directed energyDEW directed-energy warfareDIA Defense Intelligence AgencyDOD Department of DefenseDSN Defense Switched NetworkDSO defensive systems officer

E3 electromagnetic environmental effectsEA electronic attackECO electronic combat officerEEFI essential elements of friendly informationELINT electronic intelligenceEM electromagneticEMC electromagnetic compatibility

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JP 3-51

EMCON emission controlEME electromagnetic environmentEMI electromagnetic interferenceEOB electronic order of battleEP electronic protectionES electronic warfare supportEW electronic warfareEWCC electronic warfare coordination centerEWO electronic warfare officer

FAX facsimileFPC final planning conferenceFSE fire support element

G-3 Army or Marine Corps component operations staff officerG-6 Army or Marine Corps component command, control,

communications, and computer systems staff officerGCCS Global Command and Control System

HERO hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics EngineersIO information operationsIPC initial planning conferenceIWC information warfare commander

J-2 Intelligence Directorate of a joint staffJ-3 Operations Directorate of a joint staffJ-5 Plans Directorate of a joint staffJ-6 Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems

Directorate of a joint staffJAC Joint Analysis CenterJCA jamming control authorityJCEWR joint coordination of electronic warfare reprogrammingJECG joint exercise control groupJFACC joint force air component commanderJFC joint force commanderJFMO joint frequency management officeJFSOCC joint force special operations component commandJIC Joint Intelligence CenterJISE joint intelligence support elementJOC Joint Operations CenterJOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution SystemJP joint publicationJRFL joint restricted frequency listJSC Joint Spectrum CenterJSIR Joint Spectrum Interference ResolutionJSMS Joint Spectrum Management System

GL-3

Glossary

JTF joint task force

LOAC law of armed conflict

MAGTF Marine air-ground task forceMASINT measurement and signature intelligenceMC Military Committee (NATO)MNFC multinational force commanderMNF Multinational ForceMPC mid-planning conferenceMSEL master scenario events list

NATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNGIC National Ground Intelligence CenterNIMA National Imagery and Mapping AgencyNMJIC National Military Joint Intelligence CenterNSA National Security Agency

OIC officer in chargeOPLAN operation planOPORD operation orderOPSEC operations security

PSYOP psychological operations

QSTAG Quadripartite Standardization Agreement (NATO)

RADBN radio battalionROE rules of engagement

S-3 battalion or brigade operations staff officer (Army; MarineCorps battalion or regiment)

SCC Space Control CenterSEAD suppression of enemy air defensesSIGINT signals intelligenceSIM system impact messageSO special operationsSOP standard operating procedureSTARTEX start of the exercise

TSS target sensing system

USCG United States Coast Guard

VMAQ Marine tactical electronic warfare squadron

WARM wartime reserve modesWP Working Party (NATO)

CEASE BUZZER. An unclassified term toterminate electronic attack activities,including the use of electronic warfareexpendables. (Upon approval of thisrevision, this term and its definition willbe included in JP 1-02.)

civil affairs. The activities of a commanderthat establish, maintain, influence, or exploitrelations between military forces and civilauthorities, both governmental andnongovernmental, and the civilian populacein a friendly, neutral, or hostile area ofoperations in order to facilitate militaryoperations and consolidate operationalobjectives. Civil affairs may includeperformance by military forces of activitiesand functions normally the responsibilityof local government. These activities mayoccur prior to, during, or subsequent to othermilitary actions. They may also occur, ifdirected, in the absence of other militaryoperations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specifiedcommand with a broad continuing missionunder a single commander established andso designated by the President, through theSecretary of Defense and with the adviceand assistance of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. Combatant commandstypically have geographic or functionalresponsibilities. (JP 1-02)

command and control. The exercise ofauthority and direction by a properlydesignated commander over assigned andattached forces in the accomplishment ofthe mission. Command and controlfunctions are performed through anarrangement of personnel, equipment,communications, facilities, and proceduresemployed by a commander in planning,directing, coordinating, and controllingforces and operations in the

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-4

accomplishment of the mission. Alsocalled C2. (JP 1-02)

communications intelligence. Technical andintelligence information derived fromforeign communications by other than theintended recipients. Also called COMINT.(JP 1-02)

communications security. The protectionresulting from all measures designed todeny unauthorized persons information ofvalue which might be derived from thepossession and study oftelecommunications, or to misleadunauthorized persons in their interpretationof the results of such possession and study.Also called COMSEC. Communicationssecurity includes cryptosecurity,transmission security, emission security,and physical security of communicationssecurity materials and information. a. —cryptosecurity. The component ofcommunications security that results fromthe provision of technically soundcryptosystems and their proper use. b. —transmission security. The component ofcommunications security that results fromall measures designed to protecttransmissions from interception andexploitation by means other thancryptanalysis. c. — emission security. Thecomponent of communications security thatresults from all measures taken to denyunauthorized persons information of valuethat might be derived from intercept andanalysis of compromising emanations fromcrypto-equipment and telecommunicationssystems. d. — physical security. Thecomponent of communications security thatresults from all physical measures necessaryto safeguard classified equipment, material,and documents from access thereto orobservation thereof by unauthorizedpersons. (JP 1-02)

JP 3-51

computer network attack. Operations todisrupt, deny, degrade, or destroyinformation resident in computers andcomputer networks, or the computers andnetworks themselves. Electronic attack(EA) can be used against a computer, but itis not computer network attack (CNA).CNA relies on the data stream to executethe attack while EA relies on theelectromagnetic spectrum. An example ofthe two operations is the following: sendinga code or instruction to a central processingunit that causes the computer to short outthe power supply is CNA. Using anelectromagnetic pulse device to destroy acomputer’s electronics and causing thesame result is EA. Also called CNA. (Uponapproval of this revision, this term and itsdefinition will modify the existing term andits definition and will be included in JP1-02.)

computer network defense. Defensivemeasures to protect and defend information,computers, and networks from disruption,denial, degradation, or destruction. Alsocalled CND. (Upon approval of thisrevision, this term and its definition will beincluded in JP 1-02.)

directed energy. An umbrella term coveringtechnologies that relate to the productionof a beam of concentrated electromagneticenergy or atomic or subatomic particles.Also called DE. (JP 1-02)

directed-energy device. A system usingdirected energy primarily for a purposeother than as a weapon. Directed-energydevices may produce effects that couldallow the device to be used as a weaponagainst certain threats, for example, laserrangefinders and designators used againstsensors that are sensitive to light. (JP 1-02)

directed-energy warfare. Military actioninvolving the use of directed-energyweapons, devices, and countermeasures to

either cause direct damage or destructionof enemy equipment, facilities, andpersonnel, or to determine, exploit, reduce,or prevent hostile use of the electromagneticspectrum through damage, destruction, anddisruption. It also includes actions takento protect friendly equipment, facilities, andpersonnel and retain friendly use of theelectromagnetic spectrum. Also calledDEW. (JP 1-02)

directed-energy weapon. A system usingdirected energy primarily as a direct meansto damage or destroy enemy equipment,facilities, and personnel. (JP 1-02)

electromagnetic compatibility. The abilityof systems, equipment, and devices thatutilize the electromagnetic spectrum tooperate in their intended operationalenvironments without sufferingunacceptable degradation or causingunintentional degradation because ofelectromagnetic radiation or response. Itinvolves the application of soundelectromagnetic spectrum management;system, equipment, and device designconfiguration that ensures interference-freeoperation; and clear concepts and doctrinesthat maximize operational effectiveness.Also called EMC. (JP 1-02)

electromagnetic deception. The deliberateradiation, reradiation, alteration,suppression, absorption, denial,enhancement, or reflection ofelectromagnetic energy in a mannerintended to convey misleading informationto an enemy or to enemy electromagnetic-dependent weapons, thereby degrading orneutralizing the enemy’s combat capability.Among the types of electromagneticdeception are: a. manipulativeelectromagnetic deception. Actions toeliminate revealing, or convey misleading,electromagnetic telltale indicators that maybe used by hostile forces. b. simulativeelectromagnetic deception. Actions to

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simulate friendly, notional, or actualcapabilities to mislead hostile forces. c.imitative electromagnetic deception. Theintroduction of electromagnetic energy intoenemy systems that imitates enemyemissions. (JP 1-02)

electromagnetic environmental effects. Theimpact of the electromagnetic environmentupon the operational capability of militaryforces, equipment, systems, and platforms.It encompasses all electromagneticdisciplines, including electromagneticcompatibility/ electromagnetic interference;electromagnetic vulnerability;electromagnetic pulse; electronicprotection, hazards of electromagneticradiation to personnel, ordnance, andvolatile materials; and natural phenomenaeffects of lightning and p-static. Also callE3. (JP 1-02)

electromagnetic interference. Anyelectromagnetic disturbance that interrupts,obstructs, or otherwise degrades or limitsthe effective performance of electronics/electrical equipment. It can be inducedintentionally, as in some forms of electronicwarfare, or unintentionally, as a result ofspurious emissions and responses,intermodulation products, and the like.Also called EMI. (JP 1-02)

electromagnetic intrusion. The intentionalinsertion of electromagnetic energy intotransmission paths in any manner, with theobjective of deceiving operations or ofcausing confusion. (JP 1-02)

electromagnetic jamming. The deliberateradiation, reradiation, or reflection ofelectromagnetic energy for the purpose ofpreventing or reducing an enemy’s effectiveuse of the electromagnetic spectrum, andwith the intent of degrading or neutralizingthe enemy’s combat capability. (JP 1-02)

electromagnetic pulse. The electromagneticradiation from a strong electronic pulse,most commonly caused by a nuclearexplosion that may couple with electricalor electronic systems to produce damagingcurrent and voltage surges. Also calledEMP. (Upon approval of this revision, thisterm and its definition will modify theexisting term and its definition and will beincluded in JP 1-02.)

electromagnetic spectrum. The range offrequencies of electromagnetic radiationfrom zero to infinity. It is divided into 26alphabetically designated bands. (JP 1-02)

electronic intelligence. Technical andgeolocation intelligence derived fromf o r e i g n n o n - c o m m u n i c a t i o n selectromagnetic radiations emanating fromother than nuclear detonations orradioactive sources. Also called ELINT.(JP 1-02)

electronic masking. The controlled radiationof electromagnetic energy on friendlyfrequencies in a manner to protect theemissions of friendly communications andelectronic systems against enemy electronicwarfare support measures/signalsintelligence, without significantlydegrading the operation of friendly systems.(JP 1-02)

electronic probing. Intentional radiationdesigned to be introduced into the devicesor systems of potential enemies for thepurpose of learning the functions andoperational capabilities of the devices orsystems. (JP 1-02)

electronic reconnaissance. The detection,location, identification, and evaluation offoreign electromagnetic radiations. (Uponapproval of this revision, this term and itsdefinition will modify the existing term and

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its definition and will be included in JP1-02.)

electronics security. The protection resultingfrom all measures designed to denyunauthorized persons information of valuethat might be derived from their interceptionand study of noncommunicationselectromagnetic radiations, e.g., radar. (JP1-02)

electronic warfare. Any military actioninvolving the use of electromagnetic anddirected energy to control theelectromagnetic spectrum or to attack theenemy. Also called EW. The three majorsubdivisions within electronic warfare are:electronic attack, electronic protection, andelectronic warfare support. a. electronicattack. That division of electronic warfareinvolving the use of electromagnetic energy,directed energy, or antiradiation weaponsto attack personnel, facilities, or equipmentwith the intent of degrading, neutralizing,or destroying enemy combat capability andis considered a form of fires. Also calledEA. EA includes: 1) actions taken toprevent or reduce an enemy’s effective useof the electromagnetic spectrum, such asjamming and electromagnetic deception,and 2) employment of weapons that useeither electromagnetic or directed energyas their primary destructive mechanism(lasers, radio frequency weapons, particlebeams). b. electronic protection. Thatdivision of electronic warfare involvingpassive and active means taken to protectpersonnel, facilities, and equipment fromany effects of friendly or enemyemployment of electronic warfare thatdegrade, neutralize, or destroy friendlycombat capability. Also called EP. c.electronic warfare support. That divisionof electronic warfare involving actionstasked by, or under direct control of, anoperational commander to search for,intercept, identify, and locate or localize

sources of intentional and unintentionalradiated electromagnetic energy for thepurpose of immediate threat recognition,targeting, planning and conduct of futureoperations. Thus, electronic warfaresupport provides information required fordecisions involving electronic warfareoperations and other tactical actions suchas threat avoidance, targeting, and homing.Also called ES. Electronic warfare supportdata can be used to produce signalsintelligence, provide targeting for electronicor destructive attack, and producemeasurement and signature intelligence.(Upon approval of this revision, this termand its definition will modify the existingterm and its definition and will be includedin JP 1-02.)

electronic warfare frequency deconfliction.Actions taken to integrate those frequenciesused by electronic warfare systems into theoverall frequency deconfliction process.(Upon approval of this revision, this termand its definition will be included in JP1-02.)

electronic warfare reprogramming. Thedeliberate alteration or modification ofelectronic warfare (EW) or target sensingsystems (TSS), or the tactics and proceduresthat employ them, in response to validatedchanges in equipment, tactics, or theelectromagnetic environment. Thesechanges may be the result of deliberateactions on the part of friendly, adversary orthird parties; or may be brought about byelectromagnetic interference or otherinadvertent phenomena. The purpose ofEW reprogramming is to maintain orenhance the effectiveness of EW and TSSequipment. EW reprogramming includeschanges to self-defense systems, offensiveweapons systems, and intelligencecollection systems. (Upon approval of thisrevision, this term and its definition will beincluded in JP 1-02.)

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emission control. The selective andcontrolled use of electromagnetic, acoustic,or other emitters to optimize command andcontrol capabilities while minimizing, foroperations security: a. detection by enemysensors; b. minimize mutual interferenceamong friendly systems; and/or c. executea military deception plan. Also calledEMCON. (JP 1-02)

frequency deconfliction. A systematicmanagement procedure to coordinate theuse of the electromagnetic spectrum foroperations, communications, andintelligence functions. Frequencydeconfliction is one element ofelectromagnetic spectrum management.(JP 1-02)

guarded frequencies. Enemy frequenciesthat are currently being exploited forcombat information and intelligence. Aguarded frequency is time-oriented in thatthe guarded frequency list changes as theenemy assumes different combat postures.These frequencies may be jammed after thecommander has weighed the potentialoperational gain against the loss of thetechnical information. (Upon approval ofthis revision, this term and its definition willbe included in JP 1-02.)

imitative communications deception. Thatdivision of deception involving theintroduction of false or misleading butplausible communications into targetsystems that mimics or imitates the targetedcommunications. (Upon approval of thisrevision, this term and its definition will beincluded in JP 1-02.)

information operations. Actions taken toaffect adversary information andinformation systems while defending one’sown information and information systems.Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

joint restricted frequency list. A time andgeographically-oriented listing of TABOO,PROTECTED, and GUARDED functions,nets, and frequencies. It should be limitedto the minimum number of frequenciesnecessary for friendly forces to accomplishobjectives. Also called JRFL. (Uponapproval of this revision, this term and itsdefinition will be included in JP 1-02.)

joint suppression of enemy air defenses. Abroad term that includes all suppression ofenemy air defenses activities provided byone component of a joint force in supportof another. Also called J-SEAD. (JP 1-02)

meaconing. A system of receiving radiobeacon signals and rebroadcasting them onthe same frequency to confuse navigation.The meaconing stations cause inaccuratebearings to be obtained by aircraft or groundstations. (JP 1-02)

measurement and signature intelligence.Intelligence obtained by quantitative andqualitative analysis of data (metric, angle,spatial, wavelength, time dependence,modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic)derived from specific technical sensors forthe purpose of identifying any distinctivefeatures associated with the emitter orsender, and to facilitate subsequentidentification and/or measurement of thesame. The detected feature may be eitherreflected or emitted. Also called MASINT.(JP 1-02)

military deception. Actions executed todeliberately mislead adversary militarydecisionmakers as to friendly militarycapabilities, intentions, and operations,thereby causing the adversary to takespecific actions (or inactions) that willcontribute to the accomplishment of thefriendly mission. The five categories ofmilitary deception are: a. strategic military

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deception—Military deception plannedand executed by and in support of seniormilitary commanders to result in adversarymilitary policies and actions that supportthe originator’s strategic military objectives,policies, and operations. b. operationalmilitary deception—Military deceptionplanned and executed by and in support ofoperational-level commanders to result inadversary actions that are favorable to theoriginator’s objectives and operations.Operational military deception is plannedand conducted in a theater of war to supportcampaigns and major operations. c. tacticalmilitary deception—Military deceptionplanned and executed by and in support oftactical commanders to result in adversaryactions that are favorable to the originator’sobjectives and operations. Tactical militarydeception is planned and conducted tosupport battles and engagements. d. Servicemilitary deception—Military deceptionplanned and executed by the Services thatpertain to Service support to jointoperations. Service military deception isdesigned to protect and enhance the combatcapabilities of Service forces and systems.e. military deception in support ofoperations security (OPSEC)—Militarydeception planned and executed by and insupport of all levels of command to supportthe prevention of the inadvertentcompromise of sensitive or classifiedactivities, capabilities, or intentions.Deceptive OPSEC measures are designedto distract foreign intelligence away from,or provide cover for, military operations andactivities. (JP 1-02)

Modernized Integrated Database. Thenational level repository for the generalmilitary intelligence available to the entireDepartment of Defense IntelligenceInformation System community and,through Global Command and ControlSystem integrated imagery andintelligence, to tactical units. This data ismaintained and updated by the Defense

Intelligence Agency. Commands andServices are delegated responsibility tomaintain their portion of the database.Also called MIDB. (Upon approval of thisrevision, this term and its definition will beincluded in JP 1-02.)

nondestructive electronic warfare. Thoseelectronic warfare actions, not includingemployment of wartime reserve modes, thatdeny, disrupt, or deceive rather than damageor destroy. (Upon approval of this revision,this term and its definition will be includedin JP 1-02.)

operations security. A process of identifyingcritical information and subsequentlyanalyzing friendly actions attendant tomilitary operations and other activities to:a. Identify those actions that can beobserved by adversary intelligence systems.b. Determine indicators hostile intelligencesystems might obtain that could beinterpreted or pieced together to derivecritical information in time to be useful toadversaries. c. Select and execute measuresthat eliminate or reduce to an acceptablelevel the vulnerabilities of friendly actionsto adversary exploitation. Also calledOPSEC. (JP 1-02)

precipitation static. Charged precipitationparticles that strike antennas and graduallycharge the antenna, which ultimatelydischarges across the insulator, causing aburst of static. Also called P-STATIC.(Upon approval of this revision, this termand its definition will be included in JP1-02.)

protected frequencies. Those friendlyfrequencies used for a particular operation,identified and protected to prevent themfrom being inadvertently jammed byfriendly forces while active electronicwarfare operations are directed againsthostile forces. These frequencies are ofsuch critical importance that jamming

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should be restricted unless absolutelynecessary or until coordination with theusing unit is made. They are generallytime-oriented, may change with the tacticalsituation, and must be updated periodically.(Upon approval of this revision, this termand its definition will be included in JP1-02.)

psychological operations. Plannedoperations to convey selected informationand indicators to foreign audiences toinfluence their emotions, motives, objectivereasoning, and ultimately the behavior offoreign governments, organizations,groups, and individuals. The purpose ofpsychological operations is to induce orreinforce foreign attitudes and behaviorfavorable to the originator’s objectives.Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

public affairs. Those public information,command information, and communityrelations activities directed toward both theexternal and internal publics with interestin the Department of Defense. Also calledPA. (JP 1-02)

signal security. A generic term that includesboth communications security andelectronics security. (JP 1-02)

signals intelligence. 1. A category ofintelligence comprising either individuallyor in combination all communicationsintelligence, electronic intelligence, andforeign instrumentation signals intelligence,however transmitted. 2. Intelligencederived from communications, electronics,and foreign instrumentation signals. Alsocalled SIGINT. (JP 1-02)

spectrum management. Planning,coordinating, and managing joint use

of the electromagnetic spectrum througho p e r a t i o n a l , e n g i n e e r i n g , a n dadministrative procedures. The objectiveof spectrum management is to enableelectronic systems to perform theirfunctions in the intended environmentwithout causing or suffering unacceptableinterference. (JP 1-02)

suppression of enemy air defenses. Thatactivity which neutralizes, destroys, ortemporarily degrades surface-based enemyair defenses by destructive and/or disruptivemeans. Also called SEAD. (JP 1-02)

TABOO frequencies. Any friendlyfrequency of such importance that it mustnever be deliberately jammed or interferedwith by friendly forces. Normally, thesefrequencies include international distress,CEASE BUZZER, safety, and controllerfrequencies. These frequencies aregenerally long standing. However, theymay be time-oriented in that, as the combator exercise situation changes, therestrictions may be removed. (Uponapproval of this revision, this term and itsdefinition will be included in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

wartime reserve modes. Characteristics andoperating procedures of sensor,communications, navigation aids, threatrecognition, weapons, and countermeasuressystems that will contribute to militaryeffectiveness if unknown to ormisunderstood by opposing commandersbefore they are used, but could be exploitedor neutralized if known in advance.Wartime reserve modes are deliberatelyheld in reserve for wartime or emergencyuse and seldom, if ever, applied orintercepted prior to such use. Also calledWARM. (JP 1-02)

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCs

Includes scope ofproject, references,milestones, and who willdevelop drafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

The CINCs receive the JP andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7,will solicit a written report fromthe combatant commands andServices on the utility andquality of each JP and theneed for any urgent changes orearlier-than-scheduledrevisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each JP isrevised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCs, or JointStaff to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy asshown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrinepublications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 3-51 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to JointStaff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub,makes required changes and prepares pubfor coordination with Services and CINCs

Joint Staff conducts formal staffing forapproval as a JP

STEP #4CJCS Approval

Lead Agent selects Primary ReviewAuthority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCs,Services, and Joint Staff

STEP #3Two Drafts

JP 1

JOINTWARFARE

JP 0-2

UNAAF

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Documents

JP 3-51, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare - BITS00).pdf · PREFACE i 1. Scope This publication establishes doctrinal guidance on the use of electronic warfare (EW) in joint operations