University of California, Berkeley

An Intellectual History of Republicanism in Germany 1787-1849The 1848/49 March Revolutions made applicable to contemporary revolutions

Jason Michael FaussSenior Honors Thesis

Dr. Jeroen DewulfApril 15, 2016

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Outline

I. Historical Introduction

II. Topic Relevance and Thesis

III. Description of Research and Methodology

IV. Literature Review

A. Domestic Fragmentation

B. International Politics

C. Strength of Monarchy

V. Background on Republicanism

VI. Intellectual History

A. 1787-1803—Rejected Jacobinism

B. 1803-1815—Napoleonic Era

C. 1815-1830—Budding Political Culture in a Rigidly Monarchistic Environment

D. 1830-1840—Height of Republican Favoritism

E. 1840-1849—The Shift to an Illiberal Republicanism and Moderate Revolution

VII. Concluding Remarks With an Extended Analysis and Application

VIII. Bibliography

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I. Historical Introduction

With the storming of the Bastille and beheading of King Louis XVI and his wife Marie

Antoinette, the long-standing monarchy in France was violently overturned. Europe gazed in awe

at this momentous revolution that would eventually be considered one of the most important

events in history. When the French monarchy was dissolved, Jacobinism and pro-democratic

fervor permeated the borders of the German confederation. For half a century, this fervor

compounded itself and eventually lead to the first large-scale revolt in Vienna on March 13,

1848. The 39 Confederate German states seemed posed to have their democratic moment. Eric

Brose describes this unique moment in his historiography Germany History 1789-1871 (1997)

writing that “not since the Peasant Wars of the early 1500s had such a wave of violence swept

across rural Germany.”1 The fires and revolts that spread across 1848 Germany were a molten

discharge that escalated to a fusillade, a salvo, a torrential downpour of acrimony that only

centuries of feudalistic oppression could explain. After just three months, the revolutionaries

selected 812 delegates to convene The Frankfurter Parliament whose primary goal was to unify

Germany and establish a republic.

An amalgamation of professionals such as lawyers, artisans, and public servants spent

months hammering out their grievances and plans for a unified republic. On March 28, 1849 the

national assembly passed their first draft of the constitution—which was to unite Germany as a

constitutional monarchy—and submitted it to King William IV of Prussia whom the delegates

designated as their monarch. King William IV, however, dismissed the constitution saying that

he would never “accept a crown from the gutter.”2 A few days after the King’s rejection, the 1 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich.

Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Page 24. Print.2 Clark, Christopher (2006). Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947. Cambridge,

Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 490.

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Parliament was dismissed and the entire democratic movement died. How could this revolution

with so much potential and power dissolve so quickly?

I. Topic Relevance and Thesis

Republicanism is a topic that was catapulted to the forefront of historical and political

scholarship after the widespread revolutions in 19th century Europe. Most republican scholarship

bases its research and conclusions on the American or French revolutions which were successful

in overthrowing their aristocratic oppressors. The German March Revolutions have not

contributed very much to the republican field because The Forty-Eighters (revolutionaries) were

unable to dismantle the aristocracy and unify the German confederation. In fact, the 1848/49

March Revolutions are often referred to as failed.

When analyzing democratic revolutions that failed to overthrow an autocratic or

dictatorial regime it is easy to conclude that the revolutionaries failed due to a lack of resources

or strength. Allied countries can be blamed for not joining in or funding revolutionary wartime

capabilities, the government could be qualified as too powerful to fall, and the general population

can be faulted for feebly hiding behind their doors. Though these are all valid claims pertaining

to the might and means of the revolutionary group, they fail to encompass another equally

significant aspect: motive. Revolutions ought to be analyzed on a deeper, more personal level to

determine the degree of motive present amongst revolutionaries.

In this paper, I will argue that by 1849 the two most significant factors impacting the

outcome of the 1848/49 March Revolutions were 1. The revolution’s moderate approach and 2.

The German population’s desire to preserve the hereditary monarch. I will make this argument

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by recounting Germany’s past by with republicanism at the center. It is for this reason that I have

entitled the sections following the literature review and background on republicanism an

intellectual history. Though it is not an intellectual history in the traditional sense, it is a history

of Germany’s developing political culture with regard to republicanism. Both republicanism and

19th century German history are rich fields of research with vast amounts of historiographies and

essays published. My research does not seek to reject historical narratives or challenge

republican theories. Rather, my project’s aim is to illuminate an example of a current major

world player that rejected traditional republicanism when many of its neighbors were adopting it.

The 19th century German case study is not the most popular amongst republican scholarship nor

is it a model applicable to contemporary states and revolutions.

Instead of simply listing the grievances of different revolutionary actors (peasant, artisan,

scholar, autocrat), I am seeking to discover crucial elements that are necessary to sustain a

revolution. Why was the initial motive of The Forty-Eighters not strong enough to edit the

Paulskirche Constitution or launch a second wave of revolution after King William IV dismissed

them? Did the French have something the Germans lacked? If deeper research on the 1848/49

March Revolutions can begin to answer what motivates people to take the risks required to

destroy existing monarchical structures of social and political authority, it can be used as an

applicable model to contemporary revolutions.

II. Description of Research and Methodology

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My project’s primary approach is historical. After a careful analysis of the most prolific

historiographies I have written a narrative that presents a new perspective on Germany’s past by

putting republicanism at the center. I have deliberately chosen to recount Germany’s past with

regard to republicanism chronologically. This method allows us to see the ideology’s interplay

with art, scholarship, music, economics, literature, and political transitions. This essay does not

seek to be the most successful account of Germany’s art history or economic development.

Rather, I have taken bits and pieces of those who have in fact written the most successful

accounts of Germany’s artistic, economic, etc. development and woven them into my own

narrative of Germany’s past with regard to republicanism. Given the chronological structure of

my project, I have partitioned the intellectual history into 5 categories that encapsulate the

general political culture of the time. For each category, I offer a title that best summarizes the

most prominent event or trend at the time that impacted changing attitudes towards

republicanism. The five categories are:

A. 1787-1803—Rejected Jacobinism

B. 1803-1815—Napoleonic Era

C. 1815-1830—Budding Political Culture in a Rigidly Monarchistic Environment

D. 1830-1840—Height of Republican Favoritism

E. 1840-1849—The Shift to an Illiberal Republicanism and Moderate Revolution

III. Literature Review

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The 1848/49 March Revolutions in the 39 German states is by far the most widely

discussed and disputed topic among 19th century German scholars and historians. The revolutions

were the manifestation of a long-time shift in German institutions, politics and ideology as well

as a piece of a larger, European republican portrait. Before beginning on a crystallization of the

secondary literature regarding this scholarship, it is important to note that the 1848/49 March

Revolutions cannot be simplified into categories of success and failure. A general consensus

among scholars is that the main actors—peasants, artisans, scholars, the aristocracy, and the

international community—interacted to produce a revolution but failed to accomplish two major

goals: 1. Dismantle the aristocratic government and 2. Unify the 39 confederate German states.

Most scholars, however, agree that the revolutions ultimately did more good than harm. Though

unable to dismantle the aristocracy and unify Germany, the demonstrations worked to mobilize a

large sector of the population, promote democratic discussion, and implement minimal legal

revisions. In order to understand why the 1848/49 March Revolutions failed to achieve what The

United States and France accomplished, a crystallization of the most prolific scholarship on this

topic is necessary.

Among the prodigious literature surrounding this topic, three explanations of the March

Revolutions’ inability to dismantle the aristocracy or unify Germany have emerged: 1. Domestic

Fragmentation 2. International politics and 3. Strength of the monarchy. As is the case with most

historical research, none of the aforementioned schools of thought exist in a vacuum; the three

arguments undoubtedly contain areas of overlap and cannot be considered mutually exclusive.

Though there is no general consensus about any one explanation impacting the outcome of the

March Revolutions, the domestic fragmentation argument is the most endorsed.

A. Domestic Fragmentation

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The most prominent explanation for the revolution’s outcome pits domestic

fragmentation as the primary cause. Scholars in this camp argue that there was an irreconcilable

divide among all levels of the socioeconomic demography. John Breully writes in Austria,

Prussia and the Making of Germany: 1806-1871 (2011) that “even amongst those who wanted a

national state, there were insuperable divisions between Catholics and Protestants, democrats and

liberals, Austrians, Prussians and those from the ‘third Germany’, guildsmen and mobile

businessmen, landowners and small peasants”.3 The first fragmentation was between radical

scholars (progressives) and more moderate artisans (reactionaries). In The German Public Mind

in the Nineteenth Century (1975), Frederick Hertz writes that “the war was barely over when the

progressives and reactionaries clashed….their [progressives] plans for German unity did not

accord with the spirit of the German people.” 4 The scholars are referred to as the progressives

because they had a very liberal, and to some degree radical notion of how a unified German

government ought to function. Though the reactionaries (artisans) initially responded in revolt,

they did not share the more liberal views the progressives held. Thus, the revolution went awry

because the two demographics had very different goals for a post-revolutionary Germany.

Alvin Gouldner expands on this ideological divide in his essay Artisans and Intellectuals

in the German Revolution of 1848 (1983). Gouldner argues that artisans and scholars were “two

occupations alike in other ways that made both resentful of threats to their traditional status,”5

and were thus unified in their initial revolutionary spirit, however, after the dust settled, the

ideological divide manifested such that “the artisans saw the educated class as enemies and as

3 Breuilly, John. Austria, Prussia, and the Making of Germany, 1806-1871. Harlow, England: Longman/Pearson, 2011. 54. Print.

4 Hertz, Friedrich Otto, and Frank Eyck. The German Public Mind in the Nineteenth Century; a Social History of German Political Sentiments, Aspirations and Ideas. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1975. Page 89. Print.

5 Gouldner, Alvin. "Artisans and Intellectuals in the German Revolution of 1848." Theory and Society 12.4 (1983): Page 522. Springer. Web.

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hired ideologues for the free trade movement that, together with the factory system, was ruining

them. ‘Handicraftsmen regarded higher education with the same suspicion which they felt

toward great wealth,’ reports Hamerow.”6 Gouldner assertion is solidly voiced: artisans found

their livelihoods threatened by the radical scholars. Artisans were coming from a much more

practical perspective. If the revolution was fought and won in order to emancipate themselves

from autocratic rule and structural violence, it would only make sense to implement policies

directly benefitting their livelihoods such as greater freedoms in the marketplace. The European

Subsistence Crisis of 1845-507 also worked to moderate the artisans because heavy debt and job

loss due to depreciated potato output meant that the artisans had more to lose by revolting. The

potato blight affected all levels of society but left the lower and lower-middle classes the most

destitute; artisans living hand to mouth didn’t have time for lofty, republican ideals.

Edward Shorter details specific ideological misalignments when he states in his essay,

Middle Class Anxiety in the German Revolution of 1848 (1969) that “liberals advocated craft

freedom, a prospect which the local artisans dreaded; the liberals talked of “human rights” and

the “end of repressive government,” while at home their unhappy constituents could think only

of more severe administrative restrictions upon the migration and the immorality of the lower

classes.”8 [1969] The Artisan demographic had qualms with vague, theoretical discussions of

liberty and self-governance and increasingly viewed themselves as alienated by the scholarly

class. In fact, Breuilly takes the argument further writing that “the reaction against radical

movements turned the Confederation into an instrument of repression.”9 Breuilly argues that

6 IBID.7 Vanhaute, E., Richard Paping, and Cormac O Grada. The European Subsistence Crisis of 1845-1850: A

Comparative Perspective. Vol. IEHC 2006 Helsinki Session 123. Dublin: U College Dublin, Department of Economics, 2006. Web. <http://www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers3/Vanhaute.pdf>.

8 Shorter, Edward. "Middle Class Anxiety in the German Revolution of 1848." Oxford Journals (1969): 26-28. Web. <http://jsh.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/3/189.full.pdf>.

9 Breuilly, John. "Pages 24, 28, 36, 49, 57." Austria, Prussia and the Making of Germany: 1806 - 1871. Harlow: Longman/Pearson, 2011. N. pag. Print.

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after the initial violence, the radical scholars posed such a threat to artisans that they began to

view the scholars, not the aristocracy, as the repressive actors. James J. Sheehan further details

the degree of mistrust between the liberals and working class in his historiography German

History, 1770-1866 (1989). He writes that lower class and artisan mistrust of liberals was only

exacerbated by the fact that “liberals were never entirely sure about the boundaries of their own

movement, never confident that they knew who belonged and who did not”.10 Thus, not only

were the political and socioeconomic goals of the liberals different than those of the working

class—the liberals were ambivalent in goal-setting. This ambivalence is risky in a revolutionary

period and certainly a factor hindering the two groups from working together.

Without the muscle of the working class, the revolutions were an empty threat and

nothing more. Johannes Willms promotes this interpretation in Nationalismus ohne Nation:

Deutsche Geschichte 1789-1914 (1983) when he notes that “nur die Macht der Revolution

konnte die politische Reform vorwärtstreiben und zum Steig führen,”11 [1983] ‘Die Macht der

Revolution’ in 1848/49 were the peasants and artisans—those truly going into the streets and

violently revolting. The fire and fuel of political reform are burned from the ground up; ideas and

strategy alone do not suffice in achieving progressive change. Christopher Clark recalls in his

historiography Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947 (2006) that after the

Frankfurter Assembly submitted its newly drafted constitution, King Frederick Wilhelm IV of

Prussia rejected it on April 3, 1849 saying that he would not accept a, “crown from the gutter.”12

Quickly thereafter, however, the assembly splintered. Where was the fire that burned the

Hünsruck Forests in the Rhineland-Palatinate? Where was the muscle of the working class that

10 Sheehan, James J. German History 1770-1866. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. 598. Print.11 Willms, Johannes. "Der Scheitern Der Politischen Klasse." Nationalismus ohne Nation: Deutsche

Geschichte von 1789 Bis 1914. Düsseldorf: Claassen, 1983. Page 244. Print.12 Clark, Christopher (2006). Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947. Cambridge,

Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 490.

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turned over carts and broke feudal fences? To make matters even more complicated, ideological

fragmentation among domestic actors also occurred within the scholarly community, further

crippling the movement. Michael Sorensen argues in Young Hegelians Before and After 1848:

When Theory Meets Reality (2011) that students seeking to promote Hegel’s ideas such as Karl

Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Bruno Bauer were poorly received by the wider, more moderate

scholarly community. Bauer, for example, was dismissed from his post at Bonn University in

1842 for promulgating radical ideology. Young Hegelians and other more radical student

scholars were encouraged not to submit their dissertations to the university community knowing

that they would be poorly received.13 When the time came for the Frankfurter Assembly to meet

for its first session on May 18, 1848, the fragmentation was already so thick that little to no

artisans were represented and the scholars themselves were sharply divided on the ideological

trajectory of the movement. Fragmentation based on misaligned ideology significantly impacted

the outcome of the 1848/49 German March Revolutions.

An additional, more Marxist facet of the domestic fragmentation argument asserts that

class conflict was a significant driving force for the German peoples’ failure to establish a

republic post-1849. Shorter writes that “questions more social than political in nature agitated the

common people, especially the middle classes.”14 Shorter agrees that there was political

fragmentation as outlined in the previous paragraph, but also adds a social splintering akin to

class warfare. In The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848 (1962) Eric Hobsbawm details this

misalignment when he writes that “the revolution which broke out in the first months of 1848

was not a social revolution merely in the sense that it involved and mobilized all social classes. It

13 Sørensen, Michael Kuur. Young Hegelians before and after 1848: When Theory Meets Reality. Frankfurt Am Main U.a.: Lang, 2011. Chapter 2. Print.

14 Shorter, Edward. "Middle Class Anxiety in the German Revolution of 1848." Oxford Journals (1969): Page 25. Web. <http://jsh.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/3/189.full.pdf>.

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was in the literal sense the rising of the laboring poor in the cities…when the dust settled on their

ruins, workers were seen to be standing on them, demanding not merely bread and employment,

but a new state and society.”15 Herein lies the fragmentation: the lowest classes started the

revolution, but after the dust settled the higher classes took over focused on the promotion of

their class’ welfare, threatening the livelihood of the artisans and poor.

Helge Berger and Mark Spoerer crystallize this aspect of the domestic fragmentation in

their essay Economic Crises and the European Revolutions of 1848 (2001). They argue that

“while ideas and institutions undoubtedly contributed to our understanding of the general

preconditions for the upheaval of 1848, they fail to explain the timing, simultaneity, or regional

distribution of the events.”16 Instead, a stronger emphasis on economic and class factors

“reflected in one strand of the Anglo-Saxon literature, ranging from W. W. Rostow, Eric

Hobsbawm, and George Rude…is supported by a number of empirical studies of social disorder

in the 1840s.”17 Berger and Spoerer go on to investigate the “grain-price shock that hit most

European countries in the second half of the 1840s” that significantly crippled the proletariat

class. They argue that this economic crisis triggered revolts by “the peasants and artisans of the

1840s, suffering a severe deterioration in their socioeconomic status.” 18 However, when the

scholars and bourgeois class took the reins of the revolution led by “professors and students but

little to no artisans,”19 they began advocating for reforms that would benefit their class such as

less censorship (increasing scholarly freedom) instead of social welfare programs, universal

15 Hobsbawm, E. J. "Conclusion: Towards 1848." The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789-1848. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962. 305. Print.

16 Berger, Helge, and Mark Spoerer. "Economic Crises and the European Revolutions of 1848." The Journal of Economic History 61.02 (2001): Page 294. Cambridge Journals. Web. <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=81890&jid=JEH&volumeId=61&issueId=02&aid=81889&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=>.

17 IBID. Pages 294-295.18 IBID.19 Hill, Claude. Zweihundert Jahre Deutscher Kultur. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. 121. Print.

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suffrage, or agricultural subsidies which would have aided the proletariat class. If the concerns of

the artisans and working class were being ignored, why should they continue to revolt? If they

continued, the stable system run by old autocratic families such as the Austrian Habsburgers and

east-Prussian Junkers that had existed for so many years would be compromised. Compromising

this system meant putting the already fragile occupations and livelihoods of the working class

and artisans on the line.

Breuilly’s previously discussed observation, which noted that the scholarly community

threatened the proletariat more oppressively than the aristocracy is yet again applicable. Given

this newly formed threat, the proletariat had no choice but to refrain from further revolutionary

support. This divide is exemplified by Gouldner much more explicitly when he writes, “the

Artisan Congress urged the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848 to support a progressive income tax, a

property tax, and to substitute deportation for capital punishment - demands that the Parliament

found too ‘radical.’”20 Further indication of artisan-working class marginalization is evident in

the demographic make-up of The Frankfurter Parliament. Gouldner notes that “the 586 members

of the Frankfurt Parliament of 1848 included 124 bureaucrats, 104 professors, 100 judicial

officials, 95 lawyers, and only 34 landowners and 13 businessmen.”21 One of the first democratic

institutions in German history that sought to reform the autocracy and unify the confederacy was

egregiously unrepresented. It’s no surprise since the federal election of 1848 was highly selective

in choosing who to grant suffrage. The individual states set their qualifications. In Baden and

Saxony, farm hands were barred; Bavaria only allowed those paying direct taxes to vote and

Wutternberg excluded domestic servants and lower class workers. One class started the

20 Gouldner, Alvin. "Artisans and Intellectuals in the German Revolution of 1848." Theory and Society 12.4 (1983): Page 524. Springer. Web. <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00187755?LI=true#page-1>.

21 IBID. Page 526.

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revolutions and another class ended the revolutions. Shorter, Hobsbawm, Berger, Spoerer, Hill,

and Gouldner agree that domestic fragmentation caused the splintering of the 1848/49 March

Revolutions arguing that it was additionally related to class warfare.

B. International Politics

A second school of thought argues that it was international politics that impacted the

outcomes of the 1848/49 March Revolutions. Scholars promoting this narrative argue that the

revolution was unsuccessful because it lacked international endorsement. Otto Pflanze details

Germany’s weak international presence in The Unification of Germany: 1848-1871 (1968)

asking, “where under such new conditions stood ‘our poor, tired, much divided Germany’? It

was not a European power, let alone a world power.”22 When a fledgling Germany announced its

desire to unify and break autocratic bonds, it greatly relied on the support of neighboring

democratic movements and governments—namely England and France. Peter Krüger explains

this phenomenon in The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848 (2003). He notes that

there was at the time an “ideological block [that] corresponded to an east-west division of

Europe into spheres of influence which each side generally respected.”23 So when the time came

for international support and endorsement, Austria received support from the eastern bloc—

headed mostly by Russia—while the western bloc—England and France—did nothing for the

German revolutionaries. The western bloc was more than likely too preoccupied erecting

“constitutional monarchies in Beligum, Spain, and Portugal, while Russia could get away with

crushing the Polish revolt of 1830/31”24 and ultimately the German revolt as well. So many

revolutions and proxy wars were at play at this unique time in European history and Germany

22 Pflanze, Otto. "State and Nation in Germany, Page 123. "The Unification of Germany, 1848-1871.” N.p.: Huntington, N.Y. : R. E. Krieger Pub., 1968. N. pag. Print.

23 Krüger, Peter, and Paul Schroeder. Page 202. The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848. N.p.: n.p., 2003. N. pag. Print.

24 IBID.

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simply did not receive priority from the western bloc. In The German Revolution of 1849 (1903)

Charles Dahlinger highlights the German National Assembly’s lack of external support. He

writes that “when it became apparent that there was no possibility of inducing the other large

powers of Germany to ratify the instrument, the National Assembly began to decline, and in a

few short weeks became a farce and laughing stock.”25 The language used by the aforementioned

scholars such as ‘endorse’, ‘ratify’, and ‘support’ are not particularly clear.

However, taken in the context of international relations, these varied forms of support are

linked to softpower. The revolutionaries can be powerful individually, but to successfully

overthrow such a powerful and long-standing aristocracy, they need to have the potential backing

of other strong countries. If we think back to 1776 and American Revolution it becomes clear

that without the French, there would have never been a successful parting of the colonies from

the British Empire. In The History of Germany Since 1789 (1968) Golo Mann further unpacks

this argument when he writes that “the emergence of a new national state in the heart of Europe

was an international question of concern to all the European powers…popular sovereignty versus

historic or monarchical law, social democracy versus liberalism, dynastic states versus the

Confederation, national state versus foreign nationalities, great powers versus the new Great

Power—none of these problems was really thought through or fought through to the end in 1848

and 1849. In chaotic interplay they dominated, confused and wrecked the great attempt”.26 Thus,

scholars arguing that the revolution was unwanted and lacked international endorsement—

including Mann, Mommsen, Pflanze, Krüger, Sheehan, Fand Dahlinger—argue that international

political factors played the largest role in the outcome of the 1848 German March Revolutions.

25 Dahlinger, Charles William. Page 125. The German Revolution of 1849; Being an Account of the Final Struggle, in Baden, for the Maintenance of Germany's First National Representative Government. New York: Putman's, 1903. N. pag. Print.

26 Mann, Golo, and Marian Jackson. The History of Germany since 1789. New York: Praeger, 1968. 97. Print.

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C. Strength of the Monarchy

A third common argument among 19th century historians is that the splintering of the

Frankfurter Parliament was due to the strength of the Prussian and Austrian monarchies. From

the Middle Ages to 1806 contemporary German was organized and ruled by The Holy Roman

Empire. The German prince electors were the highest ranking nobles of the empire and The

Kingdoms of Prussia and Austria were the most powerful. The Kingdom of Prussia was founded

in 1701 following the alliance written after the War of the Spanish Succession. Frederick III was

Prussia’s first leader followed by the long-term reign of the Hohenzollerns. Through The Great

Northern War (1700-1721), The Silesian Wars (1740-1760), conflicts with The Polish-

Lithuanian Commonwealth (1772-1795), and The Napoleonic Wars (1801-1815), The Kingdom

of Prussia established itself as a major player in Europe. Frederick William III (November 1797-

June 1840) and Federick William IV (June 1840-January 1861) ruled Prussia with an iron fist,

similar to that of their closest neighbor. The Kingdom of Austria was led by the infamous

Habsburg Monarchy whose most powerful rulers were Francis II (1792-1806) and the foreign

minister and chancellor of the state Klemens von Metternich (1815-1848).

I give this detailed history of leadership to indicate the length of leadership for each of

the leaders. Both kingdoms had hereditary monarchs who on the whole led for their entire lives.

The longevity of their rule was not coincidental, it was consciously structured. By 1848, Hertz

writes that “the main obstacle to national unity lay in the existence of two German great powers

and four German kingdoms of medium size, all of which were resolved to acknowledge no other

ruler than their own monarch”.27 The length of their leadership reflects the strength of the

conservative, monarchical kingdoms. Otto Pflanze highlights this phenomenon in his novel The

27 Hertz, Friedrich Otto, and Frank Eyck. The German Public Mind in the Nineteenth Century; a Social History of German Political Sentiments, Aspirations and Ideas. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1975. Page 277. Print.

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Unification of Germany, 1848-1871 (1968) when he writes that military strength “[was]

increasing everywhere. The men of the Paulskirche had not recognized either the strength of

these sentiments or the strength of the individual states and dynasties…the forces opposed to the

founding of the Reich were already gigantic. Certainly the opportune moment, if there had ever

been one, no longer existed”.28 In fact, scholars that make this argument such as Wolfgang

Mommsen don’t just note that the dynasties and individual states were strong, they write that

“Die Armeen der europäischen Staaten waren von den revolutionären Strömungen und ebenso

von den nationalistischen Zeittendenzen nahezu unberührt geblieben”.29 In other words, the

existing monarchical structures and allied militaries were so robust that the revolutions barely

even phased them.

With regard to the Frankfurter Parliament, scholars and historians generally concur that

Friedrick William IV and Metternich believed it prudent to let the parliament temporarily exist

only to crush it in the end. Indeed, when the Prussian and Austrian monarchs had had enough

“Carl Alben von Piemont-Sardinien sah seine unter dem Druck einer mehrheitlich

republikanischen Mehrheit im parlament stehende Regierung dem Sog der nationalen

Strömungen so stark ausgesetzt, daß er im März 1849 den so populären Krieg gegen Österreich

wieder aufnahm, freilich mit katastrophalen Folgen; am 23. März 1849 wurde die piemontische

Armee bei Novara von Radetzky vernichten geschlagen”.30 From this excerpt it is clear that the

autocracy more or less pushed the parliament to their preferred expiration date and when they

decided to take military action the defeat was swift and decisive. This is only logical given that

every day the parliament spent hammering out a constitution was a day spent rebuilding military

28 Pflanze, Otto. The Unification of Germany, 1848-1871. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968. 23-24. Print.

29 Mommsen, Wolfgang J. 1848, Die Ungewollte Revolution: Die Revolutionaren Bewegungen in Europa 1830-1849. Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1998. 238. Print.

30 IBID. Page 287.

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capabilities by Prussia and Austria. The Frankfurter Parliament made a grave mistake focusing

all their efforts on constitution-building and none on strategic military competence.

Given the aforementioned review of the most widely read and respected literature

surrounding the 1848/49 German March Revolutions, we can conclude that there is no universal

consensus on dominant narratives explaining the outcome of the March Revolutions. A more

nuanced, psychological narrative that analysis the motive of the revolutionaries would be most

helpful in explaining the revolution’s outcome. The intellectual history of republicanism in

Germany 1787-1849 is necessary in order to follow the psychology of The Forty-Eighters.

IV. Background on Republicanism

Before I begin on an intellectual history of republicanism in Germany, I find it prudent to

clarify what I mean when I use the term republicanism. Most helpful in this clarification is

Quentin Skinner’s essay Liberty Before Liberalism (1998). In the essay, Skinner recovers the

neo-Roman scholarship regarding liberty and republicanism. The neo-Roman thinkers believed

that liberty could best be preserved through its constituents. It is only through the active

participation in governmental affairs and promotion of civil liberties that one can avoid

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enslavement. The neo-Romans believed that one was considered a slave if one was subject to an

arbitrary power’s interference. This foundational tenet, the belief that one must actively promote

their civil liberty within a state in order to remain free, clarifies the first portion of Skinner’s

definition of freedom as being “a member of a civil association…unimpeded from exercising

your capacities in pursuit of your desired ends”.31 The very first premise the neo-Romans make

in this definition is that one must be a “member of a civil association”. By redefining ‘civil

association’ as the state we find that paramount to freedom and its preservation is the

requirement that a person operate in a state. Furthermore, this definition maintains that any

impediment to one’s capacity to act freely decreases one’s civil liberty. We can define

“unimpeded” as the ability to choose freely—not controlled or dependent on any outside power.

Another critical aspect of this claim is the word “capacity”. In this regard, Skinner is referring to

the ability to freely pursue individual desires. It is not necessary that one actually reach their

desired ends, but the option to do so must always be available in order to preserve civil liberty.

Decreasing the possibility to do so inherently decreases one’s freedom.

One of the most controversial beliefs held by the neo-Romans is the belief that it is

impossible to enjoy individual liberty without living in a self-governing state. This association is

objected to most by Thomas Hobbes in his Leviathon32 (1651) and defended by Skinner

throughout the book. In order to fully comprehend this claim, it is necessary to discuss

governmental institutions that achieve the greatest degree of civil liberty. The neo-Romans

believed that a body politic could foster the vivere libero—freedom of the commonwealth—via

governmental institutions. Skinner does not claim that a state is illegitimate or immoral if it is not

a republic. Rather, he recovers the literature surrounding this scholarship and notes that were one

31 Skinner, Quentin. Liberty Before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. Page 5. Print.32 Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathon. Originally Published 1651. Tokyo: Kawade Shobo, 1967. Print.

19

to think as a neo-Roman, one would promote democratic governmental institutions such as

elections, separations of power, etc. In a modern republic, self-governance is characterized by

the extension of vote and voice to representatives. This extension of vote and voice are achieved

through elections which are a foundational aspect of a neo-Roman republic.

Central to the discussion of liberty is the question: how can a state function effectively and

preserve public liberty simultaneously? Titus Livius Patavinus first asked this question in his

work History of Rome (Ab Urbe Condita) (27 B.C.). Livy was foundational to the evolution of

our contemporary understanding of liberty given that he was one of the first authors to write

about the civitas libera33 or civil liberty, mentioning major tenets of liberty such as slavery,

elections, and rule of law. Following this critical question lies a popular debate amongst political

philosophers such as Livy, Hall, Osborne, Skinner, Milton, and Neville. The aforementioned

authors find a monarchy incompatible with public liberty. However, Machiavelli and a small

minority argue that it is indeed possible to maintain public liberty within the rule of a prince or

monarch.

It was not until Machiavelli’s death and subsequent publishing of his Discorsi in 1531 that

civil liberty was critically analyzed and catapulted to the forefront of the discussion of

republicanism. Most fundamental is his extended analysis on Livy’s discussion of slavery.

Slavery is fundamental because it provides a black and white model through which states can

differentiate the maintenance, or lack thereof, of the body politic’s civil liberty. Situationally, an

individual or a body politic are either slave or free. The two cannot co-exist. Largely believed to

be the element separating a state from slavery and freedom is the notion of self-governance.34

33 Livy (i. E. Titus Livius Patavinus). The History of Rome (Ab Urbe Condita). Vol. Originally Written: 27 B.C. Place of Publication Not Identified: Dent, 1912. Print.

34 Machiavelli, Niccolo. Discorsi. Milano: n.p., Originally Published 1531. Print.

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The concept of de statu hominis—perspective of slavery—offers the distinction between

a free individual and an enslaved individual as “someone who, contrary to nature, is made into

the property of someone else”.35 Machiavelli’s initial assumption is that freedom is a natural

state, slavery being the converse. Machiavelli makes two large claims in this sentence, the first

being that slavery is socially constructed and the second being that humans can only be enslaved

to one another. If one must be “made into” something else, the only driving force behind this

action is another individual or group of individuals. A deviation from one’s natural state of

freedom—as Machiavelli believes it to be—must therefore be done by another person or persons.

Second, Machiavelli claims that humans can only be enslaved to one another. Using the terms

“someone” and “someone else,” Machiavelli clarifies that slavery exists from human to human

and through no other model. Of course, the plurality of the individual is irrelevant; it can be one

person enslaving a body politic or a periphery body politic enslaving another body politic.

Slaves exist in potestate—within the power and jurisdiction of someone else. The neo-

Romans believed that even if a master granted his slave incredible amounts of freedom as the

slave Tranio was given in Plautus’s play Mostellaria,36 it ought to still be regarded as a state of

slavery because one exists in a consistent state of imminent foreign jurisdiction. In other words,

even if one is only coerced for one hour a day or one hour a week, one is still a slave because one

is “obnoxious, perpetually subject or liable to harm or punishment”.37 This claim is highly

disputed because “imminent foreign jurisdiction” or the possibility thereof is 1. Difficult to prove

and 2. Difficult to prevent in its entirety. Putting pragmatic and operative complaints aside,

however, this definition at the very least widens the spectrum of slavery and freedom.

35 Skinner, Quentin. Liberty Before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. Print. Page 39.36 Plautus, Titus Maccius., and Frank R. Merrill. Mostellaria. Original Publication Date Unknown. London:

Macmillan, 1972. Print.37 Skinner, Quentin. Liberty Before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. Print. Page 42.

21

However, more directly, a slave can be one who exists in potestate domini—continually

remaining within the power and jurisdiction of a master. Existing in potestate domini carries with

it the condition of “obnoxious, perpetually subject or liable to harm or punishment”.38 The

concept of slavery is then applicable to foundational tenets of a republic aiming to maintain

public liberty such as self-governance, elections, the right to deliberate, civic participation, and

political representation. Of the aforementioned, self-governance is perhaps most all-

encompassing and crucial to the maintenance of public liberty.

The neo-Romans believe that any forms of government enslaving their citizens or

subjecting them to a state of obnoxious ought to be abolished and replaced with institutions

promoting self-governance. They argue that the most common form of government incompatible

with the maintenance of public liberty is a monarchical government. Characteristics within a

monarchical government antithetical to civil liberty are the power of the veto, an inability for the

commonwealth to deliberate, the use of force without right, and a deprivation of constitutional

rights among other things. Skinner recovers the texts of scholars that opposed monarchical

governments in the style of the neo-Romans. For example, Milton argues in Eikonoklastes

(1652) that it is fundamentally impossible for a state to be a free merely given the “very

existence of the royal veto”.39 Milton’s scholarship on liberty does not follow popular

scholarship which argues that liberty is freedom of action. Instead, he argues more that liberty is

freedom from another entity’s arbitrary power—the royal veto being such an example. A famous

quote by Milton in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1652) reads, “…surely they that shall

boast, as we do, to be a free nation, and not have in themselves the power to remove or to abolish

any governor supreme, or subordinate, with the government itself upon urgent causes, may

38 IBID.39 Skinner, Quentin. Liberty Before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. Print. Page 52.

22

please their fancy with a ridiculous and painted freedom, fit to cozen babies”.40 His syllogism

with regard to “freedom from an arbitrary power”, however, mostly lies within The Digest41—a

compilation of Roman Law. CONTINEU HERE The Digest discusses slavery “under the rubric

of de statu hominis, where we are told that the most fundamental distinction within the law of

persons is between those who are free and those who are slaves”.42 Thus, the study of slavery is

crucial not just to the discussion of liberty and republicanism, but to larger questions of human

identity as well, given that liberty links to “fundamental distinctions within the law of persons”.

Crucial to the maintenance of civil liberty is self-governance. If the will of the whole is

not represented in law and governance, the commonwealth has been reduced to a collection of

slaves. Skinner draws on scholars such as Marchamont Nedham who wrote that individuals are,

“keepers of their own liberties”.43 The preservation of liberty rests with the person in focus

because all people are keepers of their own liberty. A tangible manifestation of this self-

governance is evident in the institution of an elected assembly. The neo-Romans were not foolish

enough to assume that every individual can voice his/her opinion within politics and policy as

the Grecians notoriously attempted. However, they argued that electing a representative to serve

as an extension of political will is the valid alternative. Thus, a representative body of elected

officials is the body that enacts laws by popular choice, continuing to preserve liberty.44 There is

a second body, however, that the neo-Romans believed to be necessary for successful

governance—an additional body that deliberates with elevated wisdom. The neo-romans would

40 Milton, John. Complete Prose Works of John Milton, Vol III. Ed. Merritt Hughes. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.Originally Published: 1652. Print. Page 241.

41 Mommsen, Theodor, Paul Krueger, and Alan Watson. The Digest of Justinian. Originally published 530 A.D. Philadelphia, PA: U of

Pennsylvania, 1985. Print.42 Skinner, Quentin. Liberty Before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. Print. Page 39.43 Nedham, Marchamont. The Excellencie of a Free-State. London: Printed for Thomas Brewster. 1656. Pp, ix-x.

Print.44 IBID. Page 34.

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therefore be strongly in favor of a senate and house of representatives model meritocratically

formed.

If the ability to self-govern allows the body politic to define its own fate and thus be free,

the converse also holds true. If the body politic were not able to determine its own fate, another

party would instead hold that power and the body politic would hitherto be enslaved to the

jurisdiction of another. This, the neo-Romans assert, is why it is impossible for a body politic to

be free within a monarchy. When the king or leading monarch submits the state to his/her

jurisdiction, he/she enslaves the body politic. In the presence of slavery, liberty cannot exist. This

then is the definition of a republic: a system of governance in which the affairs of the state are a

public matter—the literal translation of res publica—and its constituents are not enslaved,

maintaining significant liberty.

Through the lens of self-governance, we can see several other facets of liberty such as

deliberation and participation. The right to deliberate Milton asserts in Eikonoklastes is a

“fundamental duty”45 of the commonwealth. If we accept Nedham’s claim that citizens are

“keepers of their own liberties,”46 a parliament or a house of commons would be necessary.

Though this view has support from esteemed political philosophers such as Milton, Osborne, and

Nedham, other thinkers and writers such as Harrington, Neville, and Sidney disagree. The latter

three purport bicameral forms of legislation. Harrington’s The Commonwealth of Oceana 47 —

though somewhat antediluvian with regard to contemporary political theory—promotes a model

in which one body, the senate, is comprised of the nobility and an executive council; the second

body encompasses the popularly elected representatives. Harrington follows, “adding that the

45 Skinner, Quentin. Liberty Before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. Print. Page 48.46 IBID. Page 26.47 Harrington, James. The Commonwealth of Oceana. Originally Published 1656. London: George Routledge and

Sons, 1887. Print.

24

senate should be elected by parliament as a whole”48 and Sidney speaks of a need for rational

individuals capable of “temper[ing] the absolutism of monarch and the excesses of the

multitude”.49 Following these literary publications is the debate on the validity of a unicameral vs

bicameral legislature, a judiciary with the power to make annul laws, the extension of

governance to a president, etc.

The neo-Romans also believed that the concept of self-governance required the

participation of its constituents. If governance is rooted in elections, the electorate holds the

power. The ability to lobby, speak publically, write to your representative, or any other form of

communication between constituent and elected leader is a form of self-governance. If a

constituent believes a law to be unjust, he/she has the power to voice his/her opposition or

through protest, petition, or otherwise. This extension of self-governance is important to note

because 1. It is a characteristic of a republic and 2. A requirement for the preservation of liberty.

However, the preservation of liberty within a “commonwealth,” “joint voice,” or “body politic”

can be misconstrued based on the time’s laws regarding citizenship and voting rights. A

discussion, therefore, of the contemporary composition of a body politic and its evolution is

important. We must ask ourselves what a body politic truly is and what role it plays in the

promotion of liberty. The simple definition of a body politic would be a conglomerate of voting

citizens or simply, “we the people” as is forever enshrined in the U.S. Constitution. But who are

“we the people?” It would be behoove us to note that at the time of the neo-Romans, a body

politic would not have included women, slaves, those without property, or first-nation

immigrants. This exclusion of more than half the population is a significantly limited definition

of the body politic. Come Hobbes’s Leviathon the body politic is neither inclusive nor free. On

48 Skinner, Quentin. Liberty Before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. Print. Page 35.49 IBID. Page 35.

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the contrary, though the body is comprised of many parts, Hobbes still maintained that the head

is the king, with many minority groups ignored. We will see this voter marginalization in the as

well as the struggle to establish the right kind of republic for Germany in the following chapters.

V. Intellectual History

A. 1787-1803—Rejected Jacobinism

From 1787-1803 the first version of republicanism that was considered in the German

confederacy was Jacobinism. In the follow I will argue that the Jacobin ideology was rejected

by the vast majority of the German population because there was 1. Considerable opposition

by the intellectual community 2. General satisfaction with the current system and 3.

Francophobia induced by French militarization.

Jacobinism refers to the values and ideologies of the Jacobin Club which was the most

influential political club in the French Revolution up until the death of their leader—

Maximilien de Robespierre—in 1794. The Jacobin ideology that was developing in France at

the time was considerably left wing and radical which resulted in the famous Reign of Terror.

French Jacobinism mirrored many aspects of American republicanism such as its promotion

of a “centralized republican state and strong central government powers”.50 Jacobinism held

the common man in high esteem, arguing that “any institution which does not suppose the

people good, and the magistrate corruptible, is evil” – Robespierre.51 Along with the social

50 Rey, Alain. Dictionnaire historique de la langue française, Le Robert, 1992.51 Lejeune, Anthony. The Concise Dictionary of Foreign Quotations. Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2001. Print. 117.

26

contract and the freedom of all men, a move from monarchistic feudalism to a democratic

republic was what the Jacobin ideology encouraged. Following great success in Paris, many

German intellectuals, politicians, and other members of the upper middle class responded

sympathetically to Jacobinism by trying to set up ‘Jacobin Clubs’ at home. 1789 was a

critical year because this year saw the start of the French Revolution and robust Jacobin

promotion. 1794 is also a crucial year because it was the year in which both the Mainz

Republic of Germany failed and Robespierre died which severely diminished a hopeful

spread of Jacobinism throughout Germany en masse. I end this chronological category with

the year 1803 because that was the start of the Napoleonic Years which pressed Jacobinism

far into the background.

From 1789 to 1803 Germany’s intellectual community was highly influential in framing

Jacobinism as wild and barbaric. Eric Dorn Brose explains the intellectual and artistic

community’s role in interpreting the French Revolution when he writes that “like all great

artists, obviously, Goethe and Schiller were unusually sensitive to the currents and

undercurrents of the era. This sensitivity enabled them to render valuable assistance to

contemporaries struggling to perceive the rhythm of the times. By interpreting and defining

reality with their imagery, however, artists enter a political dimension, especially during

anxious and frightening periods of rapid change or when oppressive regimes stifle other

means of expression”.52 Thus, an analysis of the impactful works at the time would give us a

window into how the German culture was being molded with regard to the French

Revolution. For Schiller and Goethe, many:

Heroes and heroines end tragically: Wallenstein is betrayed; Mary Stuart beheaded; and Joan of Arc burned at the stake. Preoccupied with Greek dramas, Schiller allows a cruel

52 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich. Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Page 37. Print.

27

fate to undermine the revolts, struggles, and intrigues of his characters—a destiny which individual action cannot avoid or alter. ‘In the end,’ observes Martin Malia, ‘rebellion is invariably punished by failure’. To Schiller, in fact, the times were not ripe for revolt because the people were imperfect. The deterioration of the French Revolution—ending, as he predicted in 1794, with the advent of ‘a strong man’ (like Napoleon) who would restore order and become ‘the unlimited lord’ of France and ‘much of the rest of Europe’–had demonstrated that freedom was not attained through reason alone.53

These authors taught their German audiences that if one was rational, one certainly could not

concur with the Jacobins. Johann Gottfried Herder—one of the most prolific and respected

philosophers at the time—wrote in a letter that “we can watch the French Revolution as we

watch a shipwreck at sea from the safety of the shore.”54 This opinion was by many in the

German intellectual community. Konrad Engelbert Oelsner, for example, criticized the

Jacobins when he wrote, “‘überhaupt streben diese Leute [the Jacobins] nach einer wilden

Demokratie, das allergefährlichste Ungeheuer, so gedacht werden kann. Sie wäre ein

untrügliches Mittel, die civilisirteste Nation in die tiefste Barbarey zu stürzen.’”55 A ‘wild

democracy’ founded by barbaric revolutionaries framed the Jacobins as uncivilized and

irrational which were received very poorly by observing Germans.

J.B. Metzler expands on this when he writes in the preface of Walter Grab's novel, Leben

Und Werke Norddeutscher Jakobiner that “die Merzahl der deutschen Intelligenz neigte den

staatstheoretischen und politischen Prinzipien Immanuel Kants zu, die in dessen

moralphilosophischen Abhandlungen niedergelegt waren. Für den Königsberger Philosophen

und seine meisten Anhänger und Schüler bedeutete die Revolution nichts anderes als eine

Umwälzung im bloßen Denken.”56 Kantian ethics—which view rationality as the ultimate

good—would have rebuked supporters of the fledgling, untested Jacobin ideology. For a 53 IBID. Page 39.54 Gooch, George Peabody. Germany and the French Revolution. New York: Russell & Russell, 1966. Page 167.

Print.55 Saine, Thomas P. Black Bread--White Bread: German Intellectuals and the French Revolution. Columbia, SC,

USA: Camden House, 1988. Print. 292.56 Metzler, J.B.. Leben Und Werke Norddeutscher Jakobiner. Stuttgart, 1973. Print. XII-XIII.

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society educated by the philosophies of Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte, anything irrational was not

only foolish but dangerous as well. Thomas P. Saine writes in his book Black Bread--White

Bread: German Intellectuals and the French Revolution that “…according to the political

theory most of them had learned, ‘democracy’ was the degenerative hypostasis of the

‘republican’ form of government, just as ‘despotism’ or ‘tyranny’ was the degenerative form

of ‘monarchy’”.57 This means that if Germans of all socioeconomic status were to accept

Jacobinism, they would be endorsing something ‘degenerative’. The aspersions from the

intellectual community continued as “...the French Revolution had not found any admirers

among German statesmen or philosophers, only among poets, ‘Romanschreiber,’ and

‘philanthropische Kosmopoliten’ such as Campe…but poets are not obligated to be real

people in touch with the real world.”58 The Jacobin ideology promoted lofty, shining values

that sounded nice in a poem or song but were wholly unrealistic.

To insult the Jacobin Club for being out of touch with the real world is a harsh criticism.

The crowd the Jacobins needed to appeal to most were the peasants and artisans because only

they were capable of fueling ideology into action. The German peasantry was fully aware

that their government was not perfect, but did it need to be burned to the ground and subject

to the guillotine in order to be improved? Saine answers this question when he writes

“liberals and intellectuals hoped all along that the French example would encourage German

rulers to introduce reforms and improve conditions in their states voluntarily, obviating the

necessity of revolution or dramatic change in the form of German governments, for which, as

we have seen, even politically advanced German writers such as Forster and Rebmann

57 Saine, Thomas P. Black Bread--White Bread: German Intellectuals and the French Revolution. Columbia, SC, USA: Camden House, 1988. Print. 280.

58 IBID. Pages 285-286

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considered the Germans to be as yet unready”.59 With such a criticisms, the intellectual

community was cutting off the Jacobins’ most powerful and necessary tool. Though German

peasants were sympathetic to Jacobinism, they were not prepared to dramatically launch feet

first into a revolution and without the muscle of the working class, the ideology was dead in

the water.

Though the intellectual community’s criticisms were highly influential we must

remember our time period. Unlike The Netherlands in 1581 or France in 1806, the German

confederation that existed had not broken away from The Holy Roman Empire. Instead it

“survived in altered form [even after]…the ravages of the Reformation, the Thirty Years

War, and Austro-Prussian rivalry”.60 This is a truly fascinating way to view late 18th, early

19th century Germany. A slightly altered version of the Holy Roman Empire suggests that the

empire had not died and been forgotten. Rather, the culture, structure, and traditions lived on

through the Kingdoms of Prussia and Austria. Sheehan highlights this phenomenon when he

writes that “these people were much too deeply embedded in the existing order to lead a

revolution”.61 Brose builds on Sheehan writing that “traditional social institutions and time-

honored means of production still predominated in the countryside amidst much discussion

of ways to improve output. By creating paid work, moreover, the putting-out system

provided a buffer against greater misery on the land.”62 In 1789 Germany, there was a respect

for hierarchy and social placement. Guilds and freemasonry were part of Germany’s

“organizational web”63 and abrupt challenges to this fully functional system were not looked

at favorably. This is description is radically different than late 18th, early 19th century France. 59 IBID. Page 278.60 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich.

Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Page 22. Print.61 Sheehan, James J. German History, 1770-1866. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. Print. 217.62 IBID. Page 22.63 IBID. Page 20.

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Therefore, The French Revolution and Jacobin promulgation were possible, in great part,

because the French were not as dedicated to their monarchy and Holy Roman Empire styled

structure.

When The French Revolution questioned the socially constructed organizational web, it

radically altered the roles of individuals within their society, especially women. However, in

his historiography Brose writes that “the majority of enlightened upper class thinkers were

less concerned about social and gender issues. They greeted French events with the smug

assurance that the Revolution was something good for humanity and for France, but was

generally unnecessary for the Germanies”.64 Saine expands on this notion by writing that

“what mattered most, in their opinion, was not the form of government, but the extent to

which the policy of the ruler was progressive and enlightened—even if that ruler was an

autocrat”.65 Middle and lower class Germans, though strongly suppressed, were pleased

enough with an autocrat as long as he was doing an adequate job within the region.

This reflects more Machiavellian or enlightened absolutist values because the notion of

democracy is unimportant as long as the state or region is stable and effectively governed. If

we return to my background on republicanism, we find that this perspective holds many of

the same values Machiavelli held 300 years earlier. Saine explains this further when he

writes that “the Germans who sympathized with the French Revolution were, however,

generally well enough pleased with the solution of constitutional monarchy at which the

French had arrived in September, 1791, that they had no desire to see the Revolution carried

any farther”.66 From this we can see that the average citizen’s disposition towards a

64 Sheehan, James J. German History, 1770-1866. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. Print. Page 24.65 Saine, Thomas P. Black Bread--White Bread: German Intellectuals and the French Revolution.

Columbia, SC, USA: Camden House, 1988. Print. 276.66 IBID. Page 275.

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government reflecting Jacobin ideology was not favorable. Instead, the long-held structure of

absolutism was still favored by the majority of the German population.

Lastly, the distancing of this ideology only grew when the French tried to aid German-

Jacobins in establishing The Republic of Mainz. French militarization of Germany in 1792-

93 ended up being the straw that broke the camel’s back. On October 21, 1792 the French

military led by General Custine took over Mainz after a brief period of weakness on part of

the Prussians and Austrians.67 The Jacobins saw this as an opportunity to strong arm their

ideology into Germany society. With minimal support domestically, German-Jacobins turned

to their only other hope: the French military. On March 18, 1793 independence from the

monarchy was declared and The Mainz Society of the Friends of Liberty and Equality (or

just The Republic of Mainz) was established by the German Jacobin Club. From this point

on, the German Jacobins were no longer a grassroots movement; they were a puppet

program. Grab clarifies this when he writes, “daher blieb die deutsche jakobinische

Bewegung währen der ganzen Epoche der fanzösischen Republik nicht nur ideologisch,

sondern auch militärisch auf den Beistand Frankreichs angewiesen”.68 With the French now

being both the ideological and military motor, Jacobinism was perceived as something

foreign and outsourced resulting in significant backlash and hatred for anything French.

In The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History, Helmut Walser Smith goes into

detail about this occupation writing, "whether through newly-instituted taxes, formal

requisitions, or simple confiscation, the revolutionary troops took everything that was not

67 Soboul, Albert. The French Revolution, 1787-1799; from the Storming of the Bastille to Napoleon. New York: Vintage, 1975. Print.

68 Grab, Walter. Jakobinismus Und Demokratie in Geschichte Und Literatur: 14 Abhandlungen. Frankfurt Am Main: Lang, 1998. Print. 23.

32

nailed down".69 To the locals suffering under this new occupation, Jacobinism didn’t look

anything like freedom, democracy, and sovereignty. Their livelihoods had been disturbed and

their privacy forcibly taken. It should have come as no surprise to the Jacobins when the

locals refused to support and defend their newfound republic against Prussian and Austrian

troops. Without public support, the already weak republic didn’t stand a chance against the

Prussian and Austrian troops who swiftly crushed the French occupation on July 22, 1793.

Reidar Maliks writes about the end of German Jacobinism in his book Kant’s Politics in

Context noting that "just as French radicalism abated after 1794, it also diminished in

Germany, and in hindsight it is clear that the German Jacobins were never a serious threat to

the governments of Prussia or the other German states".70 Thus, with only 5 months to their

name, The Mainz Republic soon perished and with it the transfer of French Jacobinism to

Germany.

The intellectual community’s resistance combined with the average citizen’s relative

contentment with the existing order led Germans to reject Jacobinism styled republicanism.

B. 1803-1815—Napoleonic Era

On December 4, 1805 the great Austrian and Russian powers were defeated by France in The

Battle of Austerlitz. Soon after the kingdoms collapsed entirely with The War of the Fourth

Coalition. In the following decade, a French occupied Germany saw 1. Significant

socioeconomic change 2. Heightened nationalism and patriotism and 3. A bolstering of domestic

69 Smith, Helmut Walser. The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011. Print. 151.

70 Maliks, Reidar. Kant's Politics in Context. Corby: Oxford UP, 2014. Print. 89-90.

33

defenses which made political change a low priority though I will mention some fledgling

republican developments.

Though Germany was occupied, scholars agree that The Napoleonic Years were a time of

great renewal and liberalization in the kingdoms of Austria and Prussia. The 1811 Edict of

Regulation “granted to 161,000 peasant households—about 10 percent of all farming families—

the right to land title in return for a compensatory payment to the lord of a third or a half of the

peasant’s land”.71 This edict was remarkable because the altered Holy Roman Empire built upon

generations of feudal serfdom and hereditary monarchical rule was written off and eliminated

with the stroke of a pen. The edict severely tarnished the guild system that had dominated middle

and lower class workers. Monopolies were abolished and rural factories were granted tax

preferences that incentivized better wages and conditions for workers. The kingdoms were also

patrons of sweeping secular and anti-clerical policies such as the Reichsdeputationshauptschluss

(Final Recess) which secularized multiple territorial possessions of the Catholic Church.

What impact did this renewal and liberalization have on the German commoner? For starters,

Napoleon’s audacious claim as emperor in 1804 offended royal sensitivities such that “Austria

and Russia agreed to join Europe’s Third Coalition against France”.72 In my study of German

political culture preceding The Napoleonic Years, I argued Germans were strongly committed to

the monarchy and their stable, feudal lifestyle. When the French Revolution and Jacobins

threatened that lifestyle, the intellectual community, aristocracy, and average German citizen

rebuked them.

Second, the abolition of serfdom, guild dominance, manufacturing monopoly, and anti-

clerical policies would seem liberating for the lower class. However, as Brose explains,

71 Maliks, Reidar. Kant's Politics in Context. Corby: Oxford UP, 2014. Print. Page 64.72 IBID. Page 47.

34

“initially, some peasants saw promise in the new regime’s abolition of serfdom, but the

excruciating tax burden of the French, combined with the terror of war, quickly dispelled

favorable thoughts. The new secularization policies and extreme anti-clerical attacks against the

church, moreover, proved highly unpopular with fundamentally devout Rhenish Catholics”.73

The ruination of the guilds was received very poorly because they were tight organizations of

artisans and merchants that created a system to efficiently carry out a particular craft. Guild

masters hired young apprentices who they trained and would eventually take over the business. It

was a highly functional and insulated organizational web that provided communities stability and

direction. When Napoleon came in and wiped out this stable structure, the result was anarchy not

freedom.

A second effect of the French annexation was heightened patriotism and nationalism. Easily

confused with each other, they are distinctly separated by their end goals. Patriotic Germans

sought to bolster their military and defense capabilities with the hope of ejecting France and

returning to the Holy Roman Empire. Nationalist Germans also wished to strengthen military and

defense capabilities with the hope of ousting France but they were not nostalgic for the Holy

Roman Empire. Instead, German nationalists sought a new order—one in which the confederacy

could be united and strengthened by their fraternal, Germanic bonds. Many of these patriotic or

nationalistic overtones could be found in the music and art of the time. Brose writes that:

Ludwig van Beethoven’s sentiments were anti-Napoleonic after the Eroica Symphony, and occasionally this feeling worked its way into the great composer’s music…Friedrich Schiller, too, adopted patriotic motifs in later plays like Wilhelm Tell. Indeed the goal of freeing Central Europe from French tyranny was shared by those Germans who did not support the Rhenish Confederation. This patriotic yearning to defeat France should not be confused, however, with more overtly nationalistic efforts to found a modern, unified German state. While both impulses can be found in Friedrich’s work, far more frequently,

73 Maliks, Reidar. Kant's Politics in Context. Corby: Oxford UP, 2014. Print. Pages 36-37.

35

patriotic Germans longed for a return to the Holy Roman Empire—a goal that admittedly had nationalistic overtones even though it was backward-looking…74

Though Johann Gottfried Herder is the father of the concept of the Volksgeist, it was Johann

Gottlieb Fichte who popularized and developed this concept in his Addresses to the German

Nation. In his address, he argued that there was a unique spirit of the Volk, or nation such that no

two nations could be the same. This concept was adopted by many philosophers including

Friedrich Carl von Savigny. In 1808, Fichte wrote in his eighth speech that:

Ihnen verdanken wir, die nächsten Erben ihres Bodens, ihrer Sprache und ihrer Gesinnung, daß wir noch Deutsche sind, daß der Strom ursprünglichen und selbstständigen Lebens uns noch trägt; ihnen verdanken wir alles, was wir seitdem als Nation gewesen sind, ihnen, falls es nicht etwa jetzt mit uns zu Ende ist, und der letzte von ihnen abgestammte Blutstropfen in unsern Adern versiegt ist, ihnen werden wir verdanken alles, was wir noch ferner sein werden. Ihnen verdanken selbst die übrigen, uns jetzt zum Ausland gewordenen Stämme, in ihnen unsere Brüder, ihr Dasein; als jene die ewige Roma besiegten, war noch keins aller dieser Völker vorhanden; damals wurde zugleich auch ihnen die Möglichkeit ihrer künftigen Entstehung mit erkämpft.75

The promulgation of a uniquely German Volksgeist was very influential in the minds and hearts

of many Germans. This ideology, along with other nationalistic and patriotic elements promoted

by anti-Napoleonic writers and artists such as Goethe, Schiller, Herder, Hegel, and Beethoven,

worked to cement Francophobic perspectives in early 19th century Germany. A result of this pro-

German, anti-French sentiment was that “the country’s energies were devoted far more to

defense than to reform”.76 It is for this reason that political culture in Germany with regards to

republicanism was stalled. The aristocracy was busy fighting the French, the upper class and

intellectuals were busy demonizing Napoleon and the French Revolution and “from Jena to

Eylau [everything] was ravaged: and the peasants remained indifferent to everything but French 74 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich.

Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 67-68.75 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. Reden an Die Deutsche Nation, Achte Rede, 1808. Web.

<http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/buch/reden-an-die-deutsche-nation-411/1>.76 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich.

Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 60.

36

foraging parties at harvest time”.77 Primary concern and energies were dedicated to war-time

efforts, not to republican development.

However, a few interesting republican attempts were made and I find them important to

mention because they laid the groundwork for the strong spirited movements that took place in

the years following the Napoleonic Era. The Assembly of Notables and the Provincial National

Assembly are examples of an attempted but failed republican institutions. The former was

established in 1811 by the Chancellor of Prussia in order to “make a ‘democratic’ beginning in

Prussia, but the birthing effort miscarried when the aristocratic majority launched an assault upon

proposals to tax noble estates and eliminate the nobility’s local police powers”.78 As a result,

Hardenberg established the Provincial National Assembly in Berlin that was comprised of 18

noblemen, nine peasants, and 12 burghers. The assembly criticized Napoleon’s anti-guild

policies and discussed other avenues they could take in order to rid themselves of French rule.

However, “the country’s leaders and its people were distracted long before this time by the final

act of Europe’s struggle to unseat Napoleon”.79

Another interesting republican development was the work of Gerhard Johann David

Waitz von Scharnhorst who sought to end aristocratic privileges in Prussia. He argued that “the

officer corps should be opened to all social classes with admission based on education and

competitive examination. Promotion should be based on merit. Alongside the regular army,

moreover, would arise a national guard to lend popular fervor to a war of liberation against

Napoleon”.80 Scharnhorst’s egalitarian and meritocratic reforms in the military are widely

77 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich. Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 62.

78 IBID. Page 65.79 IBID.80 IBID. Page 63.

37

recognized as positive improvements. His work in this regard combined with his military

prowess are honored today with a statue of him in Unter den Linden, Berlin.

A third interesting republican attempt was a document drafted in Bavaria in May of 1808

that “called for indirect male election of deputies who met property and education qualifications.

The Diet could not initiate legislation, but could advise the king on laws which he presented to

them for review”.81 This proposal would certainly reflect the illiberal republican varietal that I

am seeking to highlight in this paper. Only educated males with property were allowed office

and even at that, the election was indirect. Though this illiberal republican proposal was not

passed, it is an example of changing political culture in French occupied Germany.

The Napoleonic Era of 1803-1815 saw a French occupied Germany which experienced

significant socioeconomic change, heightened nationalism and patriotism, and a bolstering of

domestic defenses which resulted in minimal political change not including three marginal

republican developments.

C. 1815-1830—Budding Political Culture in a Rigidly Monarchistic Environment

1815-1830 was time in which most Germans lived in agrarian poverty and the political

system was under tight, autocratic control. It was in this austere time, however, that several

political organizations and intellectual communities developed that began laying the ground

work for the republican developments to come in the 1830s. First, I will briefly address the

socioeconomic conditions and then discuss the interplay of the changing intellectual and political

culture with increasing government rigidity.

81 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich. Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 54.

38

As I previously mentioned, The Napoleonic Era brought about sweeping socioeconomic

changes such as the abolition of serfdom, guilds, and freer enterprise. For the most part,

however, these changes did not work in the German commoner’s favor. Brose writes that

“marriage to a baker, butcher, cobbler, or weaver was more of an economic partnership than a

love match”.82 This indicates a strong necessary to prioritize security and survival over anything

else. 80% of Germans lived in “the ploughlands and the orchards”83 whose villages had less than

2,000 people. The agrarian life was a hard one. Long hours in filthy conditions with steep taxes

would be a common picture of the lower and working class.

In Prussia the situation was marginally better than in Austria because King Frederick III

allowed the passage of more liberal legislation that advocated for the lower and working class.

But even Prussia’s environment was on the whole quite grim. Brose writes that “Prussia and

Austria had withstood the challenge of revolutionary France. Prussia faced this challenge,

however, by embarking upon social, economic, and political reforms similar to those undertaken

in the Rhenish Confederation, whereas Austria persevered with most of its traditional

institutions”.84 The Prussian peasants—especially those in the Rhineland and Bavarian-Palatinate

—were on the whole the most stable in Germany. The Stein-Hardenberg Reforms led by Karl

Freiherr vom Stein and Karl August Fürst von Hardenberg were a series of reforms that sought to

pay reparations to France, stabilize the German economy, and benefit the various socioeconomic

classes. The 1816 Edicts of Regulation (Regulierungsedikten) and 1821 Ablöseordnung

82 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich. Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 123.

83 Clapham, J. H. The Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815-1914. Cambridge: U, 1936. 82. Print.84 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich.

Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 76.

39

(Redemption Decree) are examples of the Stein-Hardenberg Reforms.8586 Though unsuccessful in

rescuing cobblers, tailors, and artisans from their impecunious condition, the Stein-Hardenberg

Reforms indicate an effort on the Prussian Junkers’ behalf to mobilize the lower class.

Austria’s situation was somewhat different. Austrian peasants tended to be the least

supported in the Confederation.87 This is due to Metternich’s strict and draconian grip on the

Austrian economy couple with a weak parliament. The Austrian Kingdom’s refusal to

industrialize and embrace progressive reforms severely diminished the lower class’ standard of

living. In Austria, “dependence on supplemental incomes left most country families vulnerable to

cyclic and structural economic changes. Recessions undermined cottage industry as merchant

manufacturers cut back on the materials they put out”.88 Amidst one of the most

socioeconomically indigent times for the Prussian and Austrian lower class, however, several

political organizations and intellectual communities developed that began laying the ground

work for the greater republican developments to come in the 1830s.

By 1830, The Holy Roman Empire was certainly gone along with its surfeit of

ecclesiastical states. Sheehan notes in his German History Situation that “a time-traveler,

suddenly transported from the sixteenth century would have been amazed at German politics and

culture, but would have found the social and economic order quite familiar” (Sheehan, 470).

Post-Napoleonic Germany saw “hundreds of new associations which disseminated information

and recruited members from all classes…[promoting] the freer exchange of ideas”.89 The

85 Fehrenbach, Elisabeth (1986). Vom Ancien Régime zur Wiener Kongress [From the Ancien Régime to the Vienna Congress]. Oldenbourg Grundriss der Geschichte (in German) 7. Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag. ISBN 978-3-486-49754-0.

86 Nipperdey, Thomas (1998). Deutsche Geschichte 1800–1866. Bürgerwelt und starker Staat [German History 1800–1866: Civil Society and a Strong State] (in German). Munich: C. H. Beck. ISBN 3-406-44038-X.

87 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich. Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 113.

88 IBID. Page 116.89 IBID. Page 117.

40

German confederacy was burgeoning with developments in the humanities—particularly in art,

literature, theology, and history. Brose reveals that “these trends from the world of academic

philosophy—as well as music, painting, and architecture—reflected a new historical

consciousness in Germany…historical thinking became an even more prominent part of the

German mentality after 1815 as social and economic change increased appreciation for values

and institutions that threatened to pass from the scene”.90 Caspar David Friedrich’s Romantic

landscape paintings worked to instill nationalism and critical thinking of Germany’s political

system. Old Heroes' Graves and Fir Forest with the French Dragoon and the Raven are some of

Friedrich’s most famous paintings that inspired other German Romantics and are indicative of

the time’s developing humanities. Brose writes that “in both paintings [Wanderer above a Foggy

Moor and Two Men Looking at the Moon] the viewer is invited to turn his back on an

unacceptable present, step into the faceless figure, and hope, perhaps struggle, for change”.91

There was also significant patriotic literature critiquing the French Revolution and antiquated

German monarchy such as Ernst Moritz Arndt’s Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland? In the ninth

stanza, Arendt writes:

Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein!O Gott vom Himmel, sieh darein

Und gib uns rechten deutschen Mut,Dass wir es lieben treu und gut!

Das soll es sein! Das soll es sein!Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein!92

An emphasis on “deutschen Mut” is critical in the link between German patriotism and

republicanism. A desire for a unified Germany not tied down by the aristocracy are fundamental

90 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich. Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Pages 146-147.91 IBID. Pages 138-139.92 Arndt, Ernst Moritz. Des Deutschen Vaterland. 1813. Musical Piece.

41

republican values that glorify the people above the system. Even in Hegel’s theology, we find a

quest for unity and political reformation. Brose writes that “Hegel believed that the wars of the

French Revolution had resulted in the restored unity of the divine spirit and that it was lodged—

or actualized—in Prussia, a state destined to become the agent of progress”.93 A divinely

endorsed political reform was something very impactful on religiously affiliated Germans (the

majority being Catholics and Protestants) as well as an entire school of thought that manifested

itself in The Young Hegelians. Perhaps the most prominent social science developments of this

time are those of the historians. The Grimm Brothers—especially Jacob Grimm—worked to

recover German culture through folklore and their famous Grimms' Fairy Tales. Murray Peppard

reveals that “their motive in discovering the old language and reediting old manuscripts was not

primarily academic but rather patriotic: it was a means of discovering the spirit of the past.”94

Furthermore, Jacob Grimm’s Deutsche Grammatik was a groundbreaking, historical and

linguistic piece published in 1822 that is indicative of the flourishing humanities of this time.

Grimm’s recovery of German history and culture was paralleled by prolific scholars such as

Barthold Georg Niebuhr, Karl Friedrich Eichhorn, August Boeckh, and Friedrich Karl von

Savigny.

Halle, Marburg, Berlin, and Giessen were teeming with gymnastics clubs, fraternities,

and petition movements. All three were significant movements that “were insistent that the

princes introduce freedom of press, speech, assembly, and religion; guarantee the sanctity of

property; establish equality before the law; and a constitution for one, united Germany. It was

this lofty purpose which drew over 450 demonstrators to Eisenach in October 1817”.95 It is

93 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich. Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 146.

94 Murray B. Peppard, Paths Through the Forest: A Biography of the Brothers Grimm (New York, 1971). Page. 29. Print.

95 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich.

42

critical to dig into the nuanced connection between patriotism and republicanism in this regard.

Though freedom of press, speech assembly, etc. are all foundational elements of a republic, we

most note that they are all linked to an illiberal foundation: the fulcrum of the government still

lying with princes and kings. I will expand on this illiberalism at the latter portion of this

intellectual history, but here we see the very first groundwork being laid for a unique, illiberal

republican varietal.

Meanwhile in Württemberg, the parliament was passionately seeking to pass a new

constitution. After much deliberation and a move to put the constitution to a vote “Metternich

attempted to intimidate the constitutional convention by announcing that ‘the outcome of the

Württembergian Assembly will perhaps determine the fate of Germany.’ In a demonstration of

courageous defiance, however, the delegation unanimously approved Germany’s next modern

constitution”.96 The constitution had no chance of coming to fruition under Metternich’s

draconian rule but it did send a message. The parliament who represented the people were not

powerful but they were also growing less and less afraid of the monarchy.

Though there were significant contributions with regards to the humanities and politics,

there was little to no reciprocation from the Austrian and Prussian kingdoms. Metternich and

Frederick III had a will to maintain strict hierarchy and firmly rooted operations in Berlin and

Vienna. Brose writes that “history has rarely produced a politician as skillful and deceptive as

Clemens von Metternich”.97 The two did not take their positions for granted and viciously fought

to maintain order. In retrospect, however, “these powerful, prestigious aristocrats [Habsburgs,

Hohenzollerns, Wittelsbachs, Liechtensteins] were so solidly entrenched that they were

Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Pages 86-87.96 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich.

Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 90-91.97 IBID. Page 92.

43

invulnerable to property values, price trends, and market cycles. Only wars and revolutions could

threaten to topple these dominant clans”.98 Neither the Austrian Kingdom nor the Prussian

Kingdom were anywhere close to revolution or war. All of the previously mentioned political

and intellectual activity must be taken with a grain of salt “for this was indeed an authoritarian

era accompanied by much of the ugliness which we know from our own imperfect world…the

Burschenschaften and gymnastics clubs were everywhere disbanded”.99

Perhaps the most oppressive move on behalf of the monarchy were the Carlsbad Decrees

which were passed and enforced on September 20, 1819. The press and the scholarly community

were heavily censored, parliaments were weakened to almost nothing, the intellectual

community was strongly restricted, and the military frequently invaded without a moment’s

notice. The decrees were organized into three sections: 1. Universitätsgesetz (Student

Organizations) 2. Preßgesetz (Press Law) and 3. Untersuchungsgesetz (Investigating

Committee). The first legally disbanded all fraternities, gymnastics, and singing groups. This

section also contained restrictions on the academic community, giving the government the power

to spontaneously terminate the positions of university professors. Prussian King Frederick

William III was quoted saying “it is an urgent duty to counteract vigorously the highly dangerous

and criminal state of mind which has gained ascendancy among the inexperience youth of

German universities”.100 The monarchy was feeling the threat of the forming social movements’

discontent with the current political order. Though nothing significant would grow out of this

‘criminal mindset’ in this decade, the following decade would rally the masses to march on

provincial strongholds like Saarbrücken, Bavaria, and Wiesbaden.

98 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich. Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 108.

99 IBID. Page 93.100 Simon, Walter Michael. The Failure of the Prussian Reform Movement, 1807-1819. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP,

1955. 134-35. Print.

44

The section on censorship was perhaps the most austere and historically infamous. All

manners of communication including operas, books, plays, newspapers, and brochures were put

under a microscope. Brose writes that:

Julius Schneller’s history of Austria was condemned as Jacobin, for instance, because it did not sufficiently praise the monarchy or the church, while Schiller’s William Tell was so drastically reworked by the censors that audiences could not recognize it as the piece which had excited Berlin in 1804. Similarly, Franz Grillparzer’s play, King Ottokar’s Happiness and End was held up for two years because police worried that Ottokar’s divorce from Margarette might somehow remind Austrians of Napoleon and Josephine.101

In the third section, the parliaments were brought to their knees. A unanimous vote was required

to make important decisions and the bodies were not allowed to debate or discuss anything; their

only power was with a vote and even that power was only symbolic. In fact, all princes were

prohibited from accepting any constitution “that would limit or hinder them in the fulfilment of

their duties to the Confederation”.102 Thus, the voice of the people was feebly heard and only in

yeas or nays. General Gneisenau, after whom the Berliner Gneisenaustraße Strasse is named was

general perceived as free-thinking and progressive but had this to say of the parliamentarians:

“the demand for a constitution is getting dangerously out of hand, and some Jacobin yeast is

mixing in with it”.103 Brose writes that “the Carlsbad Decrees represented a sword of Damocles

which could fall at any time on the Grand Duchy”104 and were not abrogated until after 1848.

101 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich. Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 94-95.

102 Sheehan, James J. German History, 1770-1866. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. Page 408. Print.103 Walter M. Simon, The Failure of the Prussian Reform Movement 1807-1819 (New York, 1971). Print. Pages

134-135.104 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich.

Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 95.

45

Thus, even with the developments in the intellectual and political spheres,

socioeconomically the confederation was limited and with the Carlsbad Decrees, all other

activity was barred from coming to fruition.

D. 1830-1840—Height of Republican Favoritism

Following the changing political culture of the post-Napoleonic Era, 1830-1840 was a

time in which saloons were abuzz with discussion and town squares were hosts of democratic

demonstrations. If traditional republicanism and radical revolutionary action were ever valued,

this was the time. I will give a brief background on the socioeconomic and political conditions of

the time and then discuss the various arenas in which Germans were politically engaged.

Similar to Italy, Germany was one of the last western European countries to industrialize.

They were not ignorant; they were cautious. Brose writes that “the industrial revolution did not

occur automatically or inevitably—it was a hotly debated political question that divided

cultivated bourgeois and aristocratic fellow-travelers even more than it had the propertied

bourgeoisie”.105 Austria’s Metternich was particularly skeptical of the movement and heavily

resisted the industrial tides that were coming in from England. The opening of the Bayerische

Ludwigseisenbahn (Bavarian Ludwig Railway connecting Nuremberg and Fürth) on December

7, 1835 is generally marked as the first steam-hauled railway in German history.106 Its use and

popularity, however, would have to wait. The nobility and Austro-Prussian monarchs were far

too enamored with the economically inefficient canal projects. For example, The Ludwig Canal

105 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich. Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 216-217.

106 David J. S. King, "The Ideology Behind a Business Activity: The Case of the Nuremberg-Fürth Railway," . Business and Economic History, 1991, Vol. 20, pp 162-170

46

(named after King Ludwig I of Bavaria) connecting Bamberg and Kelheim took priority over

other major railroad projects. This was greatly due to the fact that railroad industrialization was a

liberal value not shared by the conservative leadership. Constant clash between liberal

economists such as Friedrich List and staunch conservatives such as the Metternich

Administration delayed railroad industrialization, for the most part, until the decades to follow.

A second aspect of the time was the heightened migration from the land to the cities.

With this also came steady economic restructuring whose investments began to favor

manufacturing over agricultural production. In the years following this decade, the agricultural

share of investment decreased from 58% to 29%.107 As people and production moved from the

land and into the cities so did the discourse. As I will highlight in the following paragraphs, the

majority of middle class Germans became more connected to the political environment of the

time and as a result critically engaged in discussion and demonstration.

Though the Carlsbad Decrees significantly hampered the existence of singing groups,

gymnastics clubs, and fraternities, they were not dead. They simply moved into more private and

secretive spheres. The singing clubs would gather in forest clearings “away from the threatening

rumblings of early industrialization, choirs of fifty to one hundred small-town burghers raised

their male voices in four-part harmonious songs like Die Wacht am Rhein, Schleswig-Holstein

meerumschlungen, and Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles”.108 These poems and songs sought

to envision a future, unified Germany. Would it be with or without their hereditary monarchs?

Similar discussion of republicanism and its manifestation in reality took place in saloons or

private estates. The saloon culture, growing since the 1820s, was now a popular scene for like-

107 Pierenkemper, Toni, and Richard H. Tilly. The German Economy During the Nineteenth Century. New York: Berghahn, 2004. Print. Pages 134-135.

108 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich. Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 210-211.

47

minded and relaxed discussion. When Francis died in 1835, his intellectually and mentally

disabled (due to Down Syndrome-Trisomy 21) son Ferdinand took the throne (as the hereditary,

monarchical tradition dictated). Though a regency was established in order to keep Ferdinand

from the public as much as possible, the administration struggled to establish aristocratic

legitimacy and it was by no means ignored. Germans sat around a dimly lit table in a pub and

discussed the recent news. On the whole, the death of Francis and his less than fortunate

succession resulted in a declining “dignity of [the] monarch” and greater discussion of the

legitimacy of a hereditary king.109 Political discussion also took place in the private estates of

different coteries. After the Hambach Festival (which I will highlight in the following paragraph)

individuals such as Johann von Itzstein continued political discussion in his home at Hallgarten

where politically interested men spoke openly and freely about the merits of republicanism.110

Most prominently republican were the demonstrations at this time. The Hambach Fest is

perhaps the most famous demonstration preceding the 1848/49 March Revolutions. On May 22,

1832, 25,000 nationalists paraded to the Hambach Castle which stood in ruins. Speeches were

made, songs were sung, and general protest demonstrations were held in support of German

unity and freedom. The result of the Hambach Fest, unfortunately, were tighter restrictions from

the Metternich Administration. Fearing more radicalism following the Hambach Fest, ten acts

were passed to quell the revolutionaries and tighten the Carlsbad Decrees. Ten days after the

Hambach Fest, “the so-called Ten Acts [were passed and] reinforced many provisions of the

Carlsbad Decrees such as university surveillance, strict censorship, and mutually military

assistance to quell disturbances. The acts also banned all political clubs and assemblies, forbade

the display of illegal insignia and flags, and obligated states to exchange police information on

109 C.A. Macartney, The Habsburg Empire 1790-1918 (New York, 1969). Print. Page 304.110 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich.

Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 208-209.

48

subversive activities”.111 The already stringent monarchy was tightening its authoritarian hold

even more.

Other demonstrations took form as protests and strikes. From Leipzig to Hesse-Kassel to

Aachen, peasants were destroying manorial records and shaking the cities with their bread riots.

In Brunswick, an irate mob torched the Ducal Palace after an officer keeping watch over the

palace spoke condescendingly to the crowd. Interesting, however, is the motive behind these

demonstrations. When the guard asked “now children, what do you want anyway?” the reply

was, “bread and jobs!”112 This indicates that the motive was less republican and more

socioeconomic in nature. They were not revolting to replace the monarchy with a republic; they

were revolting for socioeconomic stability. This is a significant facet of what I am arguing in this

paper: the republican varietal that was developing in Germany at this time was illiberal. Several

other demonstrations occurred throughout Cologne, Elberfeld, Chemnitz and Göttingen. In all of

these cases, the Prussian and Austrian military were dispatched in order to crush the

demonstrations resulting in significant loss of peasant life.

A third manifestation of republicanism and radicalism took shape in the parliaments.

Though Metternich and Francis suppressed any and all parliamentary action in Austria, Frederick

William III was less draconian. Prussian liberalism began to flourish as the parliament sought to

extend the “humanitarian concepts of the enlightenment”.113 Liberal parties and factions began to

grow in the Prussian parliament and there was a sense that Frederick William III was more

“interested in balancing the parties, not championing one over the other”.114 The 1831 elections

111 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich. Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 162.

112 Treitschke, Heinrich Von. Deutsche Geschichte Im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1879. 4:101. Print.

113 Brose, Eric Dorn. The Politics of Technological Change in Prussia: Out of the Shadow of Antiquity, 1809-1848. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1993. 264: N. 51. Print.

114 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich. Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 158.

49

gave a significant plurality to liberals which, combined with the flexibility on the king’s part,

resulted in greater discussion and critical analysis of the possibility of a republican state led by a

monarch but checked and balanced by a constitution. The Saxon diet, contained within the

Prussian kingdom, was relentless and persistent, demanding progressive policies without taking

no for an answer. As a result, the Prussian parliament began implementing liberal reforms such

as “social parity with the nobility, representative bodies and constitutionalism, German economic

integration, and a more genuine form of political unification than the moribund

Confederation”.115 We must note, however, that these reforms were a result of structured and

moderated action. Brose writes that “liberals possessed no enthusiasm for revolution. Violence

would only disrupt the social order and threaten their own accomplishments”.116 This

phenomenon will become very important in the last segment of this intellectual history and my

following explanation as to why the Frankfurter Parliament splintered so easily.

While Austria became more and more repressive, republican demonstrations, discussions,

and parliamentarianism flourished in Prussia.

E. 1840-1849—The Shift to an Illiberal Republicanism and Moderate Revolution

1840-1848 witnessed the continued discussion and demonstration prevalent in the previous

decade. However, republican attitudes began shifting to a more illiberal variety. This is evident

in 1. A prioritization of economic progress over republican ideals 2. A growing fear of

parliamentary tyranny instead of monarchical tyranny and 3. Significant backlash against radical

revolutionary activity.

115 IBID. Page 195.116 IBID. Page 195.

50

The socioeconomic conditions in the kingdoms of Austria and Prussia were satisfactory for

the middle class and dismal for the lower class. Peasants struggled under heavy tax burdens and

an exploitive cottage-manufacturing industry in “which noblemen and wealthy bourgeois

received the lion’s share of the spoils”.117 A growing number began moving to the cities as their

farms and family businesses crumbled. The population was exponentially growing more than the

agriculture and manufacturing industry could provide and as a result, many “slipped into a

desperate life of begging, prostitution, traffic in children, poaching, wood stealing, crop robbing,

or more violent crime. One contemporary estimated that a quarter of Berlin’s population in the

mid-1840s existed in this underworld of hunger, shame, and brutality. Another study of Hesse in

1846/47 found that one-third of the depressed farmers and town craftsmen could no longer

support themselves”.118

The Economic Recession of 1844 only made things worse. The recession was partially a

result of recessions in The United States and Britain that led to a chained, market shock and

domestic potato and grain crop failure in 1846. As a result, potato and grain exports dramatically

fell and the Austro-Prussian economies severely contracted. This was a major cause of the 1844

Silesian Weaver Revolt. Jurg K Siegenthaler cinematically highlights this demonstration in his

film The Weavers. Siegenthaler recounts the “crowds of weavers [that] attacked homes and

warehouses, destroyed machinery, and demanded money from local merchants”.119 Soon

thereafter, the military was called to quell the disturbance which resulted in the deaths of 11

demonstrators and the flogging or imprisonment of several others. After the 1844 Silesian

Weaver Revolt, workers—mostly journeymen, cigar workers, and other artisanal toilers who had

tasted and rejected the new industrial style of work—began to form small, secret associations to 117Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich.

Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 220.118 IBID. Page 221.119 Siegenthaler, Jurg. K. The Weavers. Play/Film. 1892.

51

fight back”.120 Stephan Born’s founding of “Der Allgemeinen Deutschen Arbeiterverbrüderung”

(The Brotherhood of the Workers) is one such example.121 Loosely formed in the early 1840s, the

organization grew to over 15,000 and was the largest unified workers union of the decade. The

Brotherhood of the Workers along with other more Marxist organizations, however, are an

indication of a prioritization of economic wellbeing over political freedom. This more illiberal

perspective is evident in one of the first rebellions on March 2, 1848. A crowd of 30,000

vehement peasants marched on Wiesbaden, demanding that Duke Adolf of Nassau accept their

constitution that had the main goal of abolishing serfdom.122 It seems the peasants of Wiesbaden

were behind on the reforms that took place in the previous decades, but more interesting is their

rebellious intent. They were not clamoring at the Duke’s gates demanding a parliament or voting

rights; they were demanding economic liberation. I find it important to note Marx and Engels’s

Communist Manifesto at this juncture. Originally published in London in late February, the

manifesto did not make its way to the German confederation until April at which time it was not

publicized because it was being corrected for printing and punctuation mistakes.123 As a result,

the manifesto was not officially released in Germany until May of 1848 at which point Brose

writes that it had “appeared too late in the 1840s to turn the continent upside down”.124

A second significant shift in republican attitudes towards a more illiberal variety was the

growing fear of parliamentary tyranny instead of monarchical tyranny. Traditional, western

styled republicanism—as I highlighted in my Chapter V. Background on Republicanism—grew

120 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich. Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 214.

121 Stephan Born: Erinnerungen eines Achtundvierzigers. Georg Heinrich Meyer, Leipzig 1893. Print. Page 65.122 Wiesbaden, Chronologie Der Stadtsgeschichte 1848. 1848: Die Forderungen Der Nassauer. Wiesbaden.de,

2016. Web. <http://www.wiesbaden.de/kultur/stadtgeschichte/chronologie/1848.php>.123 Laski, Harold (1948). "Introduction". Communist Manifesto: Socialist Landmark. George Allen and Unwin. Page

22. Print.124 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich.

Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 219.

52

out of both a fear and a bitterness of unwieldy monarchs. The American Revolution was in great

part founded on domestic animosity for an unchecked King George III. The French Revolution

was enflamed by the ignorance of Louis XVI and his wife, Marie Antoinette. But the average

German at this time did not feel that way about their monarch. Instead, we see quite the opposite

attitude. When considering the merits of a republic, most Germans were more afraid of what it

wouldn’t be able to control: the chaos of the masses. Sheehan unpacks this phenomenon when he

writes that “even [Karl von] Rotteck, who professed to believe that a republic was the best

governmental form, maintained that, if the executive did not retain ‘a certain independence’ from

the legislature, republican institutions would remain ‘dangerous and unstable’. Most liberals

were more insistent that the ultimate authority should not reside the people or their elected

representatives”.125

This fear of the legislature and general masses is mirrored in an anonymous essay entitled

“Verfassungsfrage” published in 1846 and immediately popularized. The author wrote that it

would be best if the parliament was incapable of making political decisions because there was a

good chance it would “make mistakes and earn the enmity of the crowd”. 126 This fear of the

parliament making mistakes is what led most Germans at the time to put their faith in the

monarchy. Sheehan writes that “deeply rooted fears about the implications of popular rule and a

pervasive unwillingness to challenge the ultimate authority of the state”127 led most Germans to

favor the status quo. Unwillingness to challenge the authority of the state did not grow out of fear

or intimidation. Quite the contrary. Both moderate and liberal Germans believed that the state

was the safest bulwark against the barbarism of the French Revolution. A prominent lawyer and

professor, Karl Salomo Zachariä von Lingenthal wrote that “the hereditary rule [erbliche

125 Sheehan, James J. German History, 1770-1866. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. 600. Print.126 Anon., Verfassungsfrage,” DV (1846), pp. 309 ff.127 Sheehan, James J. German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1978. Page 48. Print.

53

Einherrschaft] relates to the representative institutions as stability to change, rest to movement,

nature to art, unity to diversity, public power to public freedom”.128 Zachariä saw the concept of

the state and hereditary monarch not just as stable, but as beautiful. This more personal, aesthetic

view of monarchism is evident in many intellectuals’ comparison of the state to the church.

Writer and industrial developer Friedrich Harkort wrote that “the state has to replace the church

in matters of education in order for its independence to be assured”;129 theologian Friedrich

Schleiermacher wrote that it is “the state [which] joins the individual to the universal good and

the divine order”.130 Since the church was so dominant and central to both Protestants and

Catholics, these claims must be taken with a great degree of gravity. The state was being

compared to a divine institution that was the epicenter of European civilization for centuries.

Respect and admiration for the state and centralized monarchy was only heightened as

Germans looked at France’s history and the contemporary demonstrations of their time. Pflanze

writes that “the reaction to all this frothiness was the worship of positive power, the ‘saving

deed,’ everything authoritative which should effectually balance one’s own weakness and

indecision”.131 In times of chaos and confusion, many revert back to what they know and take

refuge in the status quo. With the strong revolutionary tides coming in, however, both moderates

and liberals needed a productive avenue to channel the lower class’ fervor. Both moderates and

liberals found that the safest way to channel the compounding revolutionary fervor was to

establish a national parliament but one that was severely restricted and only comprised of the

educated: a wholly illiberal republican institution. Bideleux and Jeffries highlight this excellently

in their historiography A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change. They write:

128 Fritz Fischer, Der Deutsche Protestantismus und die Politik im 19. Jahrhundert HZ 171, no. 3 (May 1951): 477.129 Harkort, Schriften. Paderborn, F. Schöningh.Germany. (1969), p. 17.130 Fritz Fischer, Der Deutsche Protestantismus und die Politik im 19. Jahrhundert HZ 171, no. 3 (May 1951): 477.131 Pflanze, Otto. State and Nation in Germany: The Unification of German, 1848-1871. N.p.: Huntington, N.Y. : R.

E. Krieger Pub., 1979. N. Print. Page 12.

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“In 1848, like their counterparts elsewhere in Europe, Austrian 'liberals' wanted neither

popular sovereignty nor universal rights of political participation. On the contrary, they desired a

constitution which would enhance the rights and privileges of the 'respectable' propertied classes

by guaranteeing them the prerogative of co-operating with the monarch in making laws and

approving taxes and by prohibiting royal violations of their rights as property-owning, taxpaying

and law-abiding subjects. Thus 'the moderate liberals of the March revolution...merely wanted a

parliament of property-holders to check the Emperor's absolute powers and advise him on

legislation".132

Third, and lastly, a significant factor preventing the establishment of a republic was the

growing preference for a moderate revolution instead of a radical one. This preference began to

grow because of two factors: 1. Respected voices in Germany were speaking out against

radicalism and 2. There was not a strong enough motive among revolutionaries.

The 1840s were a truly unique time in the evolution of German republicanism because it was

in this decade that the political philosophy experienced the most debate and critical thinking. On

the whole, however, the philosophy became dependent on the method of implementation. If the

confederation were to unify and democratize its government, how would they go about it? The

over-arching opinion was that they could go about it in a civilized manner. Georg Hegel was a

trusted and well esteemed voice at the time who did not believe that unrest or rebellion was

necessary. Though many scholars argue that Hegel’s voice was dying out as Marx and Engels

began turning his ideas on its head, Marx and Engels really did not enter the picture until after

1848 as previously mentioned. Paul Achatius Pfizer was a strong voice alongside Hegel who

argued that the monarch should have the strength to “grasp or pull in the reigns every time the

132 Bideleux, Robert, and Ian Jeffries. A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change. N.p.: Psychology, 1998. N. pag. Print. Page 321.

55

Volk lacks the decisive will, or because of factionalism or flaccidity, approaches the dangers of

dissolution”.133 Sheehan analyzes Pfizer as well as Carl Welcker when he writes that “liberals

rarely believed in the right of rebellion; most distrusted democracy; almost all condemned the

mob, which Welcker regarded as ‘a more savage enemy of the common good than any other’”.134

Even liberals could not fathom the notion of destruction without renewal. To them, violence and

mob mentality were merely demolition with nothing to replace the flames and ash. Heinrich von

Gagern—president of the Frankfurter Parliament—was one of these liberals. Brose writes that

“moderates around Heinrich von Gagern agreed on the need for electoral legitimacy for German

institutions, but vehemently opposed the idea of accelerating a revolution which had already

generated frightening scenes of social violence and destruction of property. The Germans, he

said, were not ripe for a republic. It was time to work with kings who were making changes, not

to abolish institutions that had stood the test of time”.135 Working with kings assumes that the

government will remain the same but the approach among reformers different. This, however,

sounds very different from an American or French-styled revolution. As Pflanze puts it, “the

German democratic movement of 1848 wished to achieve a gentle victory”.136

A radical revolution carries with it a desperate motive. But if Pflanze was correct, and I do

believe he is, the Germans were not quite desperate enough. The argument that the Germans

were relatively appeased by political and economic conditions is not a new one. Golo Mann

notes in his book The History of Germany Since 1789 that the “conditions in Germany in 1848

differed fundamentally from those in France in the late eighteenth century. There was no

bankrupt administration on the verge of collapse; the Austrians were not badly governed and the

133 Pfizer, Paul Achatius. Gedanken Uber Recht, Staat Und Kirche. Stuttgart: Hallberger, 1842. Page 340. Print.134 Sheehan, James J. German History, 1770-1866. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. 601-602. Print.135 Brose, Eric Dorn. German History, 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich.

Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997. Print. Page 250.136 Pflanze, Otto. State and Nation in Germany: The Unification of German, 1848-1871. N.p.: Huntington, N.Y. : R.

E. Krieger Pub., 1979. N. Print. Page 14.

56

Prussians were well governed…On the contrary, the Germans rebelled against the effective,

often all too effective bureaucratic state.” This would follow Pflanze’s claim that Germans only

wanted a moderate revolution. But if at the beginning of this section I wrote that socioeconomic

conditions were so poor that a significant portion of Germans were living in an underworld of

hunger and prostitution, how could struggling Germans not be desperate enough? Herein lies the

illiberal republican varietal that I am seeking to illuminate: both lower and middle class Germans

revolted in order to socioeconomically elevate themselves, not to replace their government with a

republic. The moderate revolution was organized in order to amendment to the political order,

not eliminate it. If this argument holds water, then we ought to see very little revolution

following the Frankfurter Parliament because the recession was receding and industries were

flourishing. Sheehan writes that “between 1850 and 1869, the production of coal grew from 5.1

to 26.7 million metric tons, pig iron from .2 to 1.4; steam power capacities increased from

260,000 to 2,480,000 horse power”137 reflecting heightened industrial output which would have

offered greater jobs following significant worker protection rights. Indeed we see very little

revolutionary activity follow the Frankfurter Parliament.

By the time 1848 rolled around, republican attitudes had shifted to a more illiberal variety,

evident in 1. A prioritization of economic progress over republican ideals 2. A growing fear of

parliamentary tyranny instead of monarchical tyranny and 3. Significant backlash against radical

revolutionary activity.

VI. Concluding Remarks With an Extended Analysis and Application

137 Sheehan, James J. German History, 1770-1866. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. Print.

57

The leading question of this project has always been: why did the Frankfurter Parliament

dissolve so quickly in 1849? Throughout my research, I have acknowledged that complex,

historical movements like the 1848/49 March Revolutions are impacted by multiple factors. No

one dimensional narrative suffices. But even after reading the vast amount of historiographies on

this subject, I was continually left unfulfilled. The story did not seem complete to me. I was

fascinated by the fact that the revolutionaries did not launch a second wave after the Paulskirche

Constitution was rejected. After much thought, I concluded that the revolutionaries were not

truly committed to the movement; they sought to revolt moderately and illiberally. I focused on

republicanism at the beginning of this essay and used it as a fulcrum throughout the intellectual

history because I was making the argument that though republicanism was seriously considered

in Germany from 1787-1848, it was not embraced in the traditional sense. Germans were much

too enamored with the monarchy to replace their long-standing government with a republic. This

was the main reason why the Frankfurter Parliament dissolved so easily; German traditionalism

and conservatism with regard to the monarchy were far too strong.

The argument is neither complex nor popular among the scholarship surrounding this

topic. However, I find the argument crucial in two aspects. The first is that it adds another

dimension to the already prolific scholarship seeking to explain why the movement died so

easily. The second is that the argument was made by analyzing a case study that I believe to be

highly applicable to contemporary democratic movements. Yes, the case study I used is 150

years old. I do not, however, believe that time should disqualify the 19th century German case

study. The various elements I highlighted throughout the intellectual history such as distrust of

the masses, appeasement by the government, prioritizing stability over democracy, and fear of

change are all highly applicable elements in today’s world. In our world today there are a

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plethora of revolutionary movements challenging the legitimacy of existing state structures. I

comprehend the audacity of this claim, but I am not seeking to immediately apply it to

contemporary revolutions. I do believe, however, that I have adequately laid the groundwork for

the possibility of further research and scholarship. The 19th century German case study supports

the claim that a traditional republic is not a model that works for everyone nor are radical

revolutions.

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