Japanese Japanese Development in the Development in the

Use of Operating Use of Operating ExperienceExperience

Session1 Operational Experience Feedback: Actual Experiences

Michio IshikawaPresidentJapan Nuclear Technology InstituteMay 2006

Establishment of JANTI Established on April 13, 2005 Members…113 companies

electric utilities, manufacturers, subcontractors, etc. Purpose

　　 1)On the model of INPO, support the industrial initiatives

for safer operation.

　　 2)Improve the regulation practices

　　 agree with nuclear technology.

Function and Organization of JANTINuclearIndustry

Regulatory BodiesAcademic Societies

(Standards Development)Public

Promotesafety culture and best

practice

Requestthe scientific and rationalrule based on operating

experience

Assistdevelopment of

Codes andStandards

Showthird party evaluation

and accountability

Japan Nuclear Technology Institute

Operating Experience Analysis Division

Codes and Standards Division

Nuclear Safety Network Division

General Affairs Division

Base on Nuclear Engineering and Technology with Expertise and Sustainability

Why JANTI was established Reinforcement of safety regulationReinforcement of safety regulation after JCO accident

and TEPCO scandal.

It put heavy burden on utilities and exhausted It put heavy burden on utilities and exhausted their plant sitestheir plant sites

Mihama accident accelerated the needs further.

JANTI was established. One year earlier than Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, INC.

(JAIF)

JNES: governmental body Regulation and inspection … according to the law.

JANTI: private societyJANTI: private society Support to improve safety to manage … according to the nuclear technology rationale.

Request to improve regulatory practice based on plant data

a Vigilance Committee

Difference to JNES JNES: Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization … subsidized organization of METI

NUCIA since 1966NUClear Information Archives

(A)(A) Accident Information requested by the law Accident Information requested by the law

(B)(B) Safety Quality Information, Safety Quality Information, events shared among utilities to improve Safety

(C)(C) Other Information, Other Information, events not required but voluntary published

(A) (B) (C) Total

1,072 1,485 542 3,099As of March 31 2006

J apanese NPP Shutdown Period

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0-4

10-1

4

20-2

4

30-3

4

40-4

4

50-5

4

60-6

4

70-7

4

80-8

4

90-9

4

100-

days

num

ber o

f shu

tdow

n

J apan Unplaned ShutdownData: 47 events

Comparison of NPP shutdown period between U.S. and Japan

U.S. NPP Shutdown Period

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27

days

nunb

er o

f shu

ddow

n U.S. Unplaned ShutdownData: 54 events

27

100-

Condition of Data Collection Average Data Source

U.S. Actual shutdown period 7.3 daysUnit:103 units

Collection period:1 year(‘04)Data:54 events

Japan

Actual shutdown period 34.4 days Unit:52-53unitsCollection period:6 years

(’99-’04)Data:31 events

Estimated Shortest process period(Shutdown + Recovery process;exclude investigation process)

6.8 days

4.7times

equal

Transition of NPP Capacity FactorNuclear Power Capacity Factor

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

'75 '77 '79 '81 '83 '85 '87 '89 '91 '93 '95 '97 '99 '01 '03

Year

Nuc

lear

Pow

er C

apac

ity F

acto

r(%)

U.S.AJ apan

Inspection System in Japan; past

“Annual inspection” : Traditional inspection method Originally came from conventional power plant, back to

80 years ago Systematic but focused on disassemble test Successful achievement in nuclear power generation in

1980s-1990s… vice versa “undesirable load”

Strict QMS were added on the annual inspection

Site exhaustion

At present

Mihama accident

Rapture of large steam pipe.

FAC (Flow accelerated corrosion) of piping was not measured for 28 years because not on the list.

Fatality: 5 persons Serious injury: 6 persons Site worker eyes stay on list, not on plant

condition.

TEPCO scandal

the falsification of inspection data

in the whole organization. Rice culture: no individual but unite group is important. Hiding for the group not shame problem. irrational action out of the world fashion of glasnost. The scandal was revealed by such a peculiar way as an

anonymity from a foreigner, to fire 4 presidents from public office.

Conclusion

"Disclosure" is the one and only commitment made by the nuclear industry today.

Japanese culture exists some time in the root causes of recent incidents.

“Too-much is too-less” Feedback from operating experiences is only

tool to recover balance of system avoiding off-set.

Thank you !