Electoral Reform: Fact or Fiction?

New Zealand and Italy's Experience with New Electoral Systems

A Paper Presented for Workshop on Linking Institutions April 17th-18th

Jeffrey S. Hamill.

1

Introduction

There is a growing body of literature in comparative politics that advocates

different electoral systems or the reform of electoral systems. The purpose of these

studies is to help create stable democracies in new countries or to reinvigorate older,

established democracies that are beset with problems credited to the electoral institutions.

Scholars generally fall into one of two camps. There are those that favor the clear,

efficient majoritarian system. Others favor a more inclusive, ideologically diverse,

consensual or proportional system. As democracy has spread all over the globe, so have

the calls for reform and arguments for one system or another. Some areas include the

United States, Latin America, Western and Eastern Europe, as well as distant countries

like New Zealand.

These reformers or advocates base their arguments on earlier work that suggested

that the impact of electoral institutions could be effectively measured and determined.

Some would say that electoral systems functionally operate with an almost "law-like"

regularity (Sartori, 1994). Reformers and advocates have used earlier studies to suggest

that a range of issues are affected by electoral systems including voter and elite behavior

as well as party systems. The trouble with these claims is that electoral systems produce

different results in different settings.

Some of these different results include majoritarian systems that produce multi-

party systems and proportional systems that produce two party systems. Also, efforts at

tinkering electoral systems or producing wholesale changes in electoral laws have

produced mixed-results at best. This study will review the literature that debates the

2

merits of majoritarian versus proportional systems as well as the reformers' claims that

reform in places like New Zealand, Italy, the United States, and Latin America would

produce positive results. It is my contention that the reformers have overstated the

improvements that would result from one system or another. This is due to the fact that

any institution placed into a new context often lead to unexpected consequences that

scholars have yet to explain. Evidence from New Zealand, Italy, and Eastern Europe, and

Canada supports the claim that electoral systems can produce different outcomes in

different settings. Efforts at reform, while well intentioned, overstate the impact electoral

systems can have on a range of variables.

Early Electoral System Work

Before discussing the majoritarian/proportional advocates, it is important to

understand the influence of early electoral systems work. Much of the work on the

impact of electoral systems was inspired by the work of Duverger (1954). He identified

two types of effects, mechanical and psychological. Mechanical effects refer to the

impact of electoral systems on party systems, while psychological effects are the impact

on voters, policy-makers, or party leaders1. Duverger's mechanical effects led to the

identification of a law. This law stated, "the majority [plurality] single ballot majority

system tends to party dualism" and "proportional representation tend to multipartism"2

(Duverger, 1954). Electoral systems, therefore, have reductive effect on the number of

1 These definitions would be challenged by later works (Rae, 1971). Rae suggested that there were "proximal" (or immediate) effects of electoral systems, which were limited to variables like proportionality and "distal" (or indirect) effects, which impacted the party system.

3

parties. Scholars have supported these conclusions with limited variation (Riker, 1982;

Lijphart, 1984; Taagapera and Shugart, 1989; Sartori, 1994).

Electoral Systems also have a "psychological" impact on voters, which then has

an impact on the number of political parties. As Taagapera and Shugart (1989) point out

the psychological effects of electoral systems on voters also have a reductive effect on the

number of political parties. The literature suggests that a plurality or majoritarian system

cause voters to vote "strategically". Strategic voting is when a voter consciously votes

for a party or candidate that is not their first choice (Cox, 1997: pp. 12). A type of

strategic voting is the "wasted vote". This type of vote is the psychological belief by a

voter that a vote for a third party under most circumstances would be wasted. Voters

may view the third party's chances of gaining seats as slim, or because of a general

understanding of the disadvantages that third parties face against unfavorable electoral

rules (Duverger, 1954; Rae, 1971; Cain, 1978; Downs, 1954; Cox, 1997). A classic, oft-

cited example of this is Americans' collective understanding of their political system.

Americans generally understand that a vote for a third party is wasted, because of the

dominance of the two major political parties. This psychological effect is thought to e

lessened under proportional systems. These theories would be used to extrapolate other

benefits or deficiencies of proportional and majoritarian systems that the resulting

advocates would use to argue their case.

Majoritarian and Proportional Advocates

2 To be fair, Duverger didn't label his propositions "laws", but propositions. Riker (1982) should be credited for calling it a "law". Since the propositions have been consistently referred to as "Duverger's

4

Two systems of democracy have been consistently recognized by political

scientists, majoritarian and consensual style democracies (Lijphart, 1984. 1994). These

two systems differ over the question, who governs (Lijphart, 1984)? While the simple

answer to this question is the people, each system has their own conceptualization of

what "the people" meant. Majoritarian systems favor a majority of the people (Lijphart,

1984). For example a majority or plural vote (SMD) determines elections, and the

majority party dominates legislatures. Any system that has a form of minority veto, or is

subject to minority opinion is equal to minority rule according to majority advocates3.

Under consensual systems, the answer is different, instead of a majority of the

people; these systems seek to include as many different groups before constructing

policies. For those who favor these systems, the more diverse opinions involved in the

decision-making process the better (Lijphart, 1984)4.

These two different electoral rules have a relationship with other electoral

variables. This relationship can be summarized,

"Electoral rules can be said to have two kinds of consequences: (1) the delineate the probabilities that particular political parties will gain representation in Parliament. (2) They influence the electoral strategies of both voters and political parties. Hence, they also constrain the both the representative and policy-making processes in a country and affect how citizens evaluate the performance of the democracy they live in… This assumes a chain of causality running from institutions, party performance, and party system performance." (Anderson, 1998: pp. 573-5)

Law" it is the term I will use in this paper. 3 The relation to Duverger's law here is apparent. Single member districts are supposed to systematically under-represent third parties, thereby manufacturing two party systems and one party majorities. 4 It should be noted that these systems of government represent "ideal types" and that rarely does a system fit neatly into one category or another. For example, Lijphart categorizes systems that are plural, majority-plural, and alternative vote systems as majoritarian. Systems that are list proportional or have a single transferable vote, are considered consensual systems. Lijphart also identifies the types of institutions and

5

The constraints described above influence the work of the advocates that will be

explained below.

Scholars make more precise arguments for or against majoritarian or consensual

systems than just the normative conceptions of "the people" described earlier. They also

make arguments for what each system is supposed to promote and provide for. Those

that favor majoritarian systems, favor government accountability (Duverger, 1983.

Lijphart, 1994. Powell, 2000). The argument follows that consolidated power in the

hands isn't necessarily something to be feared. They hold that it is in fact desirable. The

idea is that the electorate gets to choose between two different groups of officials through

elections. From these elections, the winning group has a clear mandate from the people

to act in their name. If the winning group doesn't fulfill these obligations, then they are

removed from office through majority vote and a new majority with a different mandate

takes its place (Duverger, 1983). In majoritarian systems there is clear accountability, a

point made by G. Bingham Powell,

"[Majoritarian] systems do excel in clear government accountability. The voters know that the

governing party is responsible for past government performance, and they can decisively return this

party to power or replace it with a minority party." (Powell, 1989: pp. 11)

Stability and efficiency are other characteristics of majoritarian systems that

advocates trumpet. Scholars point to the almost 200 years of continuous democracy in

countries like the United States, Great Britain, and New Zealand (Duverger, 1954).

mechanisms that consensual and majoritarian systems have. For a complete description of these

6

These same scholars point to the instability of countries like Italy, who had a fifty year

period of successive governments are also seen as being more efficient. Efficiency can

be a benefit for developing countries that need their government to act decisively to pass,

for example, necessary economic programs (Linz, 1990; Mainwaring, 1993).

Advocates of consensual systems have different normative conceptualizations of

democracy than the advocates of majoritarian systems. The goal is to govern by

consensus, rather than by a bare majority. This means that the institutions of political

system and the elected officials that work within them are drawn from a broad cross-

section of the population. By drawing from as large a section of the population, the hope

is that there will be widespread agreement over the policies that are implemented

(Lijphart, 1994). For these advocates, there is a value to including minorities, whether

ethnic, racial, or gender. And these systems have included these groups at a higher level

(Lijphart, 1999; Lakeman, 1983; Duverger, 1954; Lakeman, 1970; Norris, 1985. 1987;

Rule, 1981).

Rather than value efficiency, consensual advocates favor cautious and incremental

governance. When more sections of society are involved in decision-making, the

decisions will take more time, but will hopefully be more widely accepted by the society

as a whole (Baylis, 1989). When governments take time and the get the support of the

people, scholars suggest leads to better policies. Quantitative, cross-national data

suggests as much considering that under consensual systems GNP is higher, growth rates

are higher, there is lower unemployment, inflation is lower, policies are more egalitarian,

and public goods are distributed more efficiently (Baylis, 1989; Lizzeri and Perisco,

2001; Myerson, 1993; Snyder, 1989).

characteristics see chapters 3 and 4 (Lijphart, 1984).

7

Consensual advocates also argue that the more involved the people feel in the

policy process, the better they well feel about their government and democracy. In short,

more democracy leads to more positive attitudes by citizens. Most of these theories can

by summarized by Warren (1996),

"Theories of democracy hold that if individuals were more broadly empowered, especially in the institutions that most directly affect their everyday lives, their experiences would have transformative effects. Individuals would become more public spirited, more tolerant, more knowledgeable, more attentive to the interests of others, and more probing of their own interests. Transformations such as these would improve the workings of higher-level representative institutions, ass well as mitigate threat that democracy is often held to pose to rights, pluralism, and governability. And institutions that make collective decisions in democratic ways will tend to generate new forms of solidarity, cooperation, and civic attachment." (Warren. 1996: pp. 241)

This is the central argument of proportional advocates. Voters who are involved

directly in the political decision-making process are more apt to feel engaged in the

community and this involvement is critical to their sense of political responsibility.

People are more likely to accept the decisions that are reached by government if they feel

that they somehow had a say in the process, even if they disagree with the decision

reached (Katz, 1997). Since voters are able to find a party that is closer to their

ideological preference, scholars believe several positive attitudes will result. They feel

that increased trust, efficacy, and support are associated with more consensual or more

democratic systems. Studies have shown that people have increased senses of efficacy

and fairness under proportional systems (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp, 1999; Banducci

et al. 1999). There are also claims that voter trust and attachment to the political system

are increased the more consensual a system becomes (Amy, 1993; Lijphart, 1984). Those

8

who advocate a change in electoral laws in order to correct whatever perceived ills

existed in a given democracy have used both cases for majoritarian systems and

proportional systems.

Calls for Reform: New Zealand and Italy

New Zealand and Italy present interesting and contrasting examples of

democracies that have attempted to improve their democratic performance by reforming

their electoral laws. New Zealand presents an interesting case for study the effects of

reforming the electoral system due to its long-standing practice of majoritarian

democracy. Once described as a "perfect example of a Westminster-style majoritarian

government" (Lijphart, 1984), New Zealand adopted a more proportional mixed-member

system in 1993. If New Zealand was known for being representative of a majoritarian

model, Italy was considered the closest to the proportional model. Like New Zealand,

Italy also changed its government to a mixed-member system in 1993. Both are

interesting cases for study, since both were reformed in order to correct some of the

weaknesses of the pure majoritarian and proportional systems. Before assessing the

results, and explanation of how the two democracies got to reform is necessary.

New Zealand

New Zealand's majoritarian government, adopted in 1854, consisted of a

unicameral legislature, single-member districts, and a strong two party system. It also

9

had all the weaknesses of these types of majoritarian systems including over-

representation of the two major parties, Labour and National, and under-representation of

third parties.

The continual over-representation of major parties and under-representation of

third parties was an evident feature of New Zealand's history with democracy. Between

1935 and 1993, Labour and National combined to win 1494 of the 1516 seats, roughly

98.5% of all seats contested (Bale and Roberts, 2002: pp. 11). This type of

majoritarianism also made it rule with minority support from voters. For example,

National in 1978 received 39.8% of votes and 55.4% of seats. National again received

minority support in 1981 with 38.8% of votes and 51.1%. Labour, in 1984 received the

distinction with 43% of the vote and 60% of the seats (Vowles et al. 2000: pp. 1). The

calls for reform began in the late seventies first when Labour was at the losing end, and

were joined by National after Labour's minority victory in 1984.

New Zealand has also historically under-represented third parties. There were

numerous occasions where third parties received significant support, but were

dramatically under-represented in Parliament. The dominance of the two major parties

began to break down in 1954 with the formation of the Social Credit Party, who picked

up 11% of the vote, but no seats in that year (Bale and Roberts, 2002: pp. 11). Again in

the 1970's third parties would be under-represented as support for Labour and National

continued to wane. The Social Credit Party continued to receive support during the

decade and the Values party (a forerunner to the Green party) also formed in the 1970's.

The two major parties dragged their feet on reform until the early 1990's when it became

clear that the system was severely flawed. In the 1990 election third parties received

10

17.7% of the vote, but garnered only 1% of the seats. In 1993, third parties received 30%

of the vote but only 4% of seats (Banducci et al. 1999: pp. 537). 1993 would mark the

end of first-past-the post democracy in New Zealand, with 85% of the electorate rejecting

it in a referendum and adopting a mixed-member proportional system5.

The reforms weren't initiated by the third parties (who always favored reform),

but by the two major parties after they were plurality winners, but became minority

governments. In 1986, the two major parties created the report of the Royal Commission

on the Electoral System, which was created in order to make recommendations designed

to fix the perceived problems of the FPP system.

One of these problems was under-representation of third parties and minority

interests. MMP was supposed to produce greater fairness between political parties by

making the vote/seat allocation more proportional. By increasing proportionality, MMP

would elect more minority parties to seats. MMP was also adopted to reduce the strength

of the two major parties and thereby increasing the strength of third parties and third

party interests.

The change in electoral system came for several reasons. First, was the dramatic

under-representation of third parties. Secondly, "rejection of FPP took place in the

context of growing disillusionment with politics caused in part by the perceived lack of

accountability of single-party government." (Karp and Bowler, 2001: pp. 57) The

5 New Zealand's electoral reform to MMP consisted of several elements. New Zealand, "Adopted MMP based on the German electoral system. Under MMP the House of Representatives, the only legislative body in New Zealand's unicameral Parliament, has increased its size to 120 members, 65 of whom are elected as candidates under simple plurality of FPP rules in single-member districts. The remaining MP's are elected by means of a party vote from closed national lists supplied by the political parties. Those list MP's are allocated so as to top up the party shares of seats in the House to ensure proportionality, in a way that distinguishes it from other less proportional systems." (Vowles et al: pp. 2)

11

change was designed to improve voter feelings toward their politics. The new electoral

system will be judged based on how successful it delivers on these concerns.

Italy

Any observer of politics in Italy or those in the study of political science can

identify with the following system,

"The casual observer of Italian politics may be forgiven if he or she judges the oft-quoted fact that Italy has had about 58 governments in about as many years as the chief problem with Italian politics that is government instability. More precisely, Italian governments have lasted an average of no more than 11 months in office, a figure without parallel in the established democracies of the modern world." (Sanchez, 2002: pp. 259)

But, those that have delved into Italian politics a bit deeper understand that Italy's

governance problems are rooted in something a bit more complicated. Giovanni Sartori,

in several writings, described what he saw as the problems with the Italian party system

between 1947 and 1992. Sartori stressed one significant factor above all others,

polarization6. The polarization that existed in Italy was described as tri-polar. The three

poles were represented by the extreme right (the MSI, Movemento Sociale Italiano, a

neo-fascist group), the extreme left (represented by the Parito comunista Italiano, PCI),

and the center which was occupied by the Christian Democrats (DC) (Pasquino, 2004:

pp. 3)

6 Poles are the political space occupied by a party or group of parties that are closely allied. (Pasquino, 2004: pp. 3)

12

The tri-polar system in Italy caused Italian democracy to be "blocked". It was

blocked because of the ideological distance between the three poles, which prevented

them from forming any type of coalition. The Neo-fascists and the Communists could

only agree on bringing down the government, but could never get together to form an

alternative government. This left the Christian Democrats in a position where they were

"obliged to govern". This was because of their strength as a pole made them

indispensable to the formation of any and all government coalitions. Also, they had to

prevent either of the two extreme parties from entering a coalition out of fear of a regime

crisis. (Pasquino, 2004: pp. 3)

Many problems associated with the Italian government occurred as a result of this

"blocked" system. The Christian Democrats had been part of every government since the

1940's, which caused,

"a lack of alteration in power giving rise to familiar maladies: inadequate turnover in and thus the aging of the political class; insufficient circulation of ideas and programs and thus insufficient public policies; and a crystallization of relationships between members of government and interest groups and hence system corruption." (Mershon and Pesquino, 1995. Sanchez, 2002: pp. 261)

This lead to early discussions about changing the electoral system during the 1970's, but

they did not gain traction for several reasons.

The main reason that parties opposed the reform was because they saw it as

detrimental to their interests. To adopt some form of majoritarian aspects would

effectively eliminate some of the smaller parties, and to support the reform, would mean

that these parties would literally have to vote themselves out of existence (Sanchez, 2002:

pp. 261). The larger parties had their own specific interests that they were zealously

13

protecting. The Italian Communist Party was essentially an unelectable party under

majoritarian rules considering the context of the cold war and did not want to give up

their status as an opposition party in government. The Italian Socialists determined that

majoritarian reform would force them to give up their status as a power broker, and

require them to give up the benefits of such a position and choose a coalition partner prior

to the election (Sanchez: pp. 262). Because of these internal misgivings, scholars have

suggested that only an external shock to the Italian political system would motivate them

to change.

Such shocks did occur in the 1990's. The fist of these was the fall of the Berlin

Wall and the end of the cold war. With the end of the east/west conflict, the Italian

Communist party became a viable electoral party, as their electoral prospects increased;

their opposition to reforms was reduced. Secondly, there was a large judicial operation

known as "mani pulite" (clean hands) that showed the extent of the corruption within the

Italian political system. This operation was the driving force behind the destruction of

the largest political party, the Christian Democrats (Sanchez, pp. 262).

Ultimately, in 1993, the voters forced a change to MMP overwhelmingly through

a referendum7. The goal of the reform was to create a system of, "moderate pluralism,

characterized by bipolar competition between alternative coalitions, each of which stands

a reasonable chance of winning the election (i.e obtaining a majority of seats in both

chambers) and thus governing." (Bartolini and D'Alimonte, 1998: pp. 34). So, the two

7 Italy's electoral system change to MMP went as follows. "Parliament introduced a system of single-member districts where candidates only need a simple majority to be elected for both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. To ensure some representation of the smaller parties, proportional representation continues to be the means of electing one quarter of the members of each chamber (75% M=1, 25% PR). But, only those parties receiving at least 4% of the votes are able to win seats through PR. In short, it is the Chamber of Deputies (total 630 deputies), there are now 475 single-member districts allocated by FPP and

14

major goals of reform were to create a bipolar, pluralist party system that would allow for

stable alterations of power and to reduce the fragmentation of the party system.

After the Reform: Mixed Results

New Zealand and Italy's electoral reforms didn't produce the desired results. Both

reforms did, however, produce unexpected consequences. Lessons drawn from the

experiences of New Zealand and Italy should give those who trumpet electoral system

reform pause.

New Zealand

In New Zealand, the electoral system change was designed to do two things, to

increase the proportionality of elections while increasing the representation of third

parties and breaking the stranglehold of that the two large parties had on New Zealand's

government. There were initial successes,

"First, fulfilling the expectation of political scientists, the number of electoral parties increased. This was the direct result of the different exogenous incentives provided by MMP, because parties tried to take advantage of the lower threshold of legislative entry. The number of significant parties also increased compared with pre-1993 FPP parliamentary elections. Second, the multi-party system, as predicted, diluted the potential governing strength of individual political parties; single-party majority governments are possible, but under MMP, less likely." (Barker and McLeay, 2000: pp. 198)

155 distributed through PR; in the Senate there are 232 SMD plus 83 allocated under PR." (Sanchez: pp. 263)

15

What the voters and elites didn't count on was what happened between 1993, the

year that electoral system change was voted on, and 1996, the year of the first election

under MMP. Voters didn't count on the type political opportunism that took place. After

1993, new parties were formed outside of parliament. Inside of parliament, members

who feared that along with the loss of 34 electorates, they would lose their seats also

formed parties. In all 13 MP's out of 99 defected from Labour or National between 1993

and 1996 to form or join other parties (Barker and McLeay, 2000: pp. 134).

Advocates of the reform weren't expecting this type of political opportunism to

take hold, especially the level of volatility and sheer power grabbing by the politicians in

and outside of parliament that took place. New parties were created within the

Parliament, without an election. Ironically, an electoral reform that was intended to

improve the accountability of parties through more proportional elections actually helped

create parties with no electoral ties. The expectation that that voters would be more

connected to their political parties was almost immediately undermined.

A second unintended consequence of the electoral system change was the

negotiations that took place after the election. The process has been described this way,

"Following the 1996 election, either party (Labour or National) could have formed a single-party minority government. Such efforts were forestalled by New Zealand First, which held the balance of power in the negotiations. NZ first exploited its position, entering into protracted coalition talks with both National and Labour that lasted almost 2 months. In the end, MMP delivered a coalition of National and NZ First, a result neither party's voter's wanted or expected." (Karp and Bowler, 2001: pp. 61)

There were serious consequences of the actions immediately following the announcement

of the coalition. Electoral support for NZ First fell apart almost immediately. In the

16

months following the announcement, support for NZ First fell from 13% to 5% (Karp and

Bowler, 2001: pp. 61). These two unexpected consequences of electoral system change

undermined the voter/party connection expected by the change. Perhaps because of some

of these consequences, since the 1996 election, public opinion in New Zealand has

soured. When given a choice between FPP and MMP a majority of voters in New

Zealand have preferred FPP since 1996, when the NZ First government was formed

(Harris, 2001)8.

Italy

The reforms in Italy also produced mixed results. Early scholars trumpeted the

changes as successful, suggesting that the reforms produced the intended results. These

scholars suggested that a left/right polarized system was enacted that would allow for

alterations of power. They also argued that smaller parties, which were blamed partially

for the instability in previous Italian governments were marginalized (Bartolini and

D'Alimonte, 1998. Cartocci, 1998). But, Italian reforms weren't able to correct the

problems associated with Italian politics in several ways. Bartolini (2004) summarized

this,

"In order to understand the actual Italian party system, specific references to three fundamental factors must be made. First, is the solidarity of the two major coalitions. Both, seem here to stay, but the Casa delle Liberta is much dependent

8 After 1999 when a Labour government was elected into office, a bill was brought forward to ban the practice of "party-hopping" that occurred prior to the 1996 election and after the National/NZ First coalition fell apart. To date this legislation has not been passed. The public's dissatisfaction with Parliament was to such an extent that in a 1999 referendum voters supported reducing the number of Members from 120 back to 99 by 82% (Harris, 2001: pp. 35).

17

on its leader S. Berlusconi and within Olive Tree there is continuous bickering and a struggle for visability. Second, the overall electoral or institutional arrangement does not seem stable and is frequently challenged by those who would like to return to PR. Third, there is no overarching agreement on the rules of the game, on procedures, and even on the institutions. As long as the regime is not widely accepted by the most important political actors, it will be impossible for the Italian party system to reach a sustainable equilibrium." (Bartolini, et al: pp. 256)

These warnings would prove fortuitous. Prime Minister Berlusconi began hinting at

returning to PR in 2003, finally acted in 2005, returning Italy to PR once again. Once

again, the electoral system changes could be hardly considered successful. The

unexpected consequence was that the change was never widely accepted. Again,

ironically an electoral system change designed to bring stability, caused further instability

by never being accepted by the populace at large, or key political actors within the

system.

Discussion/Conclusion

The difficulty both New Zealand and Italy face with their electoral system reform

is not without precedent and should not be considered surprising. Many cases that have

been discussed by scholars, show that electoral systems don't always provide the

functional results those early scholars and advocates would claim. For example, the oft

cited claim that single-member districts lead to two party systems has exceptions. There

are instances where third parties persist even in plurality systems, the NDP in Canada is

an example (Bowler and Lanoue, 1991). Also, proportional systems also don't

necessarily lead to multi-party systems, an example is Austria a proportional system that

has only two parties.

18

Unexpected consequences have also been shown to occur in other contexts. For

example, efforts to manipulate the electoral laws in Poland produced unexpected negative

consequences for both the communists in 1989 and the rightist parties in 1993 (Kaminski,

2002). In describing similar circumstances in Eastern Europe, Moraski and Lowenberg

suggest, "The parties in power have consistently misjudged both their electoral prospects

and the impact of legal thresholds on their share of Parliamentary seats." (Moraski and

Lowenberg, 1999: pp. 168)

Considering these points, what can we make the claims of reformers who

suggest that more proportional systems would improve the democratic performance of

countries in Latin American and the United States? Juan Linz (1990, 1998) has blamed

the "winner-take-all" nature of Latin American presidential systems for their continued

difficulty with democratic consolidation. Linz's contention is that if Latin American

countries adopted more consensual-style, parliamentary systems the problems associated

with "rigid" presidential systems would be solved. Similar arguments have been made in

the United States (Amy, 1993). Amy suggests that problems in the United States such as

low voter turnout, distrust of the political system, and a general disconnect between the

voters and the elected. These calls for reform are not baseless. They are based on

volumes of cross-national research. But, as scholars, we don't have many cases of reform

to work with, and the cross-national research can't adequately control for the change in

electoral systems itself.

What do the experiences of Italy and New Zealand tell us about calls for reform,

like those in the United States and Latin America, and the claims of electoral scholars and

advocates? This paper is not intended to be a critique of the overall electoral systems

19

literature. What I hope this paper will do is give reformers pause, before they suggest

that solving problems with democracy is a matter of plugging in a different electoral

system. Electoral systems aren't functional, there are a host of variables including

political culture, institutions, and history that affect the impact that electoral systems can

have in a given society. Perhaps Weaver and Rockman (1994) were correct when they

suggested that it was impossible to determine how an institution would operate in a

context where the institution had never existed before. My concern is that the push for

reforms could perhaps confuse and create more problems than those they were designed

to fix.

Work Cited

Amy. 1993. Real Choices New Voices. Columbia University Press. NY, NY. Anderson. 1998. "Parties, Party Systems, and Satisfaction with Democratic Performance in the New Europe." Political Studies. 46. Anderson and Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy." American Political Science Review. 91:1. Bale and Roberts. 2002. "Anti-party Sentiment and Electoral System Change." Commonwealth and Comparative Politics. 40:2. Banducci, et al. 1999. "PR and Attitudes toward Politics." Electoral Studies. 18:4. Bartolini and D'Alimonte. 1998. "Majoritarian Miracles and the Question of Party System Change." European Journal of Political Research. 34.

20

Bartolini et al. 2004. "The Italian Party System between Parties and Coalitions." West European Politics. 27:1. Bicchiari et al. 2004. "A Matter of Trust: The Search For Accountability in Italian Politics, 1990-2000." Bowler and Karp. 2001. "Coalition Government and Satisfaction with Democracy." European Journal of Political Research. 33:2. Bowler and Lanoue. 1990. "Strategic Voting for Third Parties: The Case of the Canadian NDP." Cartocci. 1998. "Omens of an Early Winter." European Journal of Political Research. 34. Cox. 1997. Making Votes Count. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. Duverger. 1954. Political Parties. Wiley Publishing. NY. Duverger. 1983. "Which is the Best Electoral System." In Choosing an Electoral System. Praeger. Westport, CT. Harris. 2001. "New Zealand Adopts PR: A Research Director's View." Policy Options. July/August. Jackson and McRobie. 1998. New Zealand Adopts Proportional Representation. Ashgate. Aldershot, Eng. Kaminksi. 2002. "Do Political Parties Benefit from Electoral Manipulation?" Journal of Theoretical Politics. 14:3. Killerby. 2005. "Trust Me I'm from the Government." Political Journal of New Zealand. 25. Lijphart. 1984. Democracies. Yale University Press. New Haven, CT Lijphart. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. Yale University Press. New Haven. Linz. 1998. "The Perils of Presidentialism." In Presidential versus Parliamentary. Oxford University Press. London. Moraski and Loewenberg. "The Effect of Legal Thresholds on the Revival of Former Communist Parties in East-Central Europe." Journal of Politics. 61:1.

21

Pesquino. 2004. "The Restructuring of the Italian Party System." Paper Presented at the Meeting of the Political Studies Association. Powell. 2000. Elections as Instruments of Democracy. Yale University Press. New Haven. Rae. 1971. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. Yale University Press. New Haven. Riker. 1982. "The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law." American Political Science Review. 76. Sanchez. 2002. "An Open Ended Transition." Journal of European Area Studies. 10:2. Sartori. 1966. "European Political Parties." In LaPalombra. Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton. Princeton University Press. Sartori. 1969. "From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology." In Lipsett. Politics and the Social Sciences. NY. Oxford University Press. Sartori. 1976. Parties and Party Systems. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. Taagepera and Shugart. 1989. Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. Yale University Press. New Haven. Vowles et al. 2000. Voters' Victory? Aukland University Press. NZ Weaver and Rockman. 1993. Do Institutions Matter? Brookings Institute. Wash. D.C.

22

23