Ireland Bank Anal 23 Jan 09

8/14/2019 Ireland Bank Anal 23 Jan 09

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Europe Equity Research23 January 2009

Irish banks

BKIR.I, BKIR IDUnderweight0.37

Price Target: 0.50

Is there still a way out? Assessing recapitalisationoptions fro BOI and AIB

ALBK.I, ALBK IDUnderweight0.57

Price Target: 1.20

Banks

Ignacio CerezoAC

(44-20) 7325-4425

[email protected]

Andrea Unzueta

(44-20) 7325-7454

[email protected]

J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd.

For Specialist Sales Advice,please contact:

Oliver Doeltl

(44-20) 7779-2187

[email protected]

Nick Gough

(44-20) 7325-9459

[email protected]

Justine Shih

(44-20) 7779 2149

[email protected]

See page 22 for analyst certification and impor tant disclosures, including non-US analyst disclosures.J.P. Morgan does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm m

have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making th

investment decision. Customers of J.P. Morgan in the United States can receive independent, third-party research on the company or compan

covered in this report, at no cost to them, where such research is available. Customers can access this independent research

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Three main alternatives to recapitalize BOI and AIB (i) Thecontinuation of the recapitalization program announced by the government

in December, though requiring 3.8bn capital for BOI and 4.8bn for AIB,

instead of the 2-3bn proposed at the time, (ii) A loan protection scheme, in

line with the UK, where the Irish government guarantees credit losses over

and above a preset first loss piece borne by banks, implying c.5.0-5.5bn

injection (35-40% by shareholders), (iii) The creation of a good/bad bank

structure, where the government purchases a selection of problematic loansfrom banks at a significant discount, and runs the bad bank going forward.

Good/bad bank best relative option implying a higher capital injectionfor shareholders (5.0-5.3bn vs. 1.8-3.6bn), it offers them the chance to

look at a clean bank (higher returns, lower capital requirements) in anaccelerated fashion, without any governments management influence. For

the government, it brings the option to present the whole process as one

where no additional taxpayers money needs to be directly injected, and

accelerates a potential economic/lending recovery. Historically, this has

proved as the most effective tool to manage similar situations.

Returns not too compelling under any scenario, full nationalizationrisks in place, stay UW despite having assumed higher PNAV multiples

in a good-bad bank scheme and sticking to our view about both BOI/AIB

having viable business models in the long run, we do not find material

upside for shareholders under any scenario over a reasonable period of time,

making private investments a more unlikely option. Hence, we retain our

UW on both AIB (1.2 Dec-09 SOP PT) and BOI (0.5 Dec-09 SOP PT),

as, in our view, risks of outright nationalization should be seriously

considered if efforts to find private investors fail and government ends up as

the sole provider of equity. (See Table 16 for earnings estimate changes).

Table 1: Irish banks Summary features of t he three potential recapitalization programs

AIB

Capitalinjection

APS Bad bank Capital inject ion APS Bad ba

Total capital needed 4,812 5,624 5,291 3,795 5,345 5,018Direct cost for government 2,000 2,000 0 2,000 2,000 0Cost for shareholders 2,812 3,624 5,291 1,795 3,354 5,018

Ownership post actiongovernment 39% 32% 0% 48% 35% 0%

other shareholders 61% 68% 100% 52% 65% 100%NAV/share 1.48 0.80 0.49 0.67 0.22 0.07P/NAV 0.43 0.81 1.31 0.52 1.31 2.88Core Tier 1 ratio 08E 9.3% 7.0% 6.0% 9.2% 7.0% 6.0%Tangible equity to assets 7.3% 4.4% 2.7% 4.7% 2.5% 1.0%% RWA reduction 0% -20% -48% 0% -20% -54%

Source: JP Morgan Estimates


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Ignacio Cerezo(44-20) [email protected]

Andrea Unzueta(44-20) [email protected]

Is there still a way out? Analyzing theoptions to recapitalize AIB and BOI

It can hardly come as a surprise if we say we have felt clear signs of capitulation of

investors with respect to Bank of Ireland and AIBs future as listed, privately owned

entities, following the nationalization of Anglo Irish and widespread skepticism

about the health of global banking stocks accelerating their share price declines in the

last week. With both banks' capital bases looking insufficient to absorb the

accumulated credit losses likely to be faced in coming years, the assumption the

market appears to be taking is one where private money cannot be found to

recapitalize Irish banks, hence leaving an outright nationalization as the default

solution for both entities.

Having flagged our concerns about their solvency since our initiation, we also stick

to our view about AIB/BOI appearing as viable entities in the medium term provided

a full recapitalization is implemented, given their dominant market shares in Ireland

and their extensive deposit franchises, both features that Anglo was missing in our

opinion. Rather than venturing to forecast the likely outcome of Irish banks' future

status, the purpose of this note to present the three main scenarios we believe arise as

the most likely options at this stage, flag their advantages and disadvantages and

determine their implications for shareholders;

a) The continuation of the recapitalization program already announced by the

government back in December, though under more onerous conditions than those

presented then, both in terms of the dilution implied in current share prices and

especially with regards to the amount of capital needed (c.4-5bn in our updatedforecasts vs. 2-3bn planned by the government). Qualitatively, we have assumed the

government subscribes 2bn of that rights issue, and private shareholders the rest,

though that might end up proving too an optimistic assumption.

b) A loan protection scheme, consistent with that announced by the UK Treasury

earlier this week, where the Irish government would guarantee credit losses over and

above a preset first loss piece borne by banks (15% of our bad bank calculations we

have assumed). In exchange, banks pay an upfront or annual fee for that guarantee,

and are also responsible for a 10% residual exposure beyond that first loss piece.

c) The creation of a good bank/bad bank structure, where the government

purchases a selection of problematic loans from banks at a significant discount,

probably in exchange of some government bonds, and runs that bad bank on its

own going forward. Shareholders lose their existing equity to cover credit losses,

and will have to inject fresh capital to replenish the banks solvency, but will also

benefit from a clean bank with much improved earnings generation and materially

lower Basel II capital requirements.

At this point, when valuations are already discounting a full stress scenario, it goes

without saying that none of these three approaches is exempt of risks or can

described as a positive solution in absolute terms, neither for the government nor for

banks shareholders. In fact, we believe a reasonable balance between the interests of


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all parties involved is essential, without which a full nationalization appears as the

most likely outcome.

For the government, the main reward arising from a properly functioning banking

system providing with adequate levels of new lending comes from at least putting the

brakes on the accelerated downturn the Irish economy is now immerse, after years of

heavy property-led expansion. In turn, and considering the amount of criticism

already received in the press and public opinion, we do not expect the government to

adopt a too "generous" stance towards banks and banks' shareholders, aware of

sizeable amounts of taxpayers' money being at stake, and growing consensus about

the excess risks taken by banks in recent years. In other words, its status as lender of

last resort for banks makes us assume the bargaining power throughout the process

is more on the governments side, this being reflected in some of our assumptions.

For shareholders, extensive dilution derived from the virtually total loss of equity

value is unlikely to be reverted in the foreseeable future under any of the threescenarios, given the ample capital injections needed to replenish banks solvency and

the still challenging environment affecting Ireland and UK, two of the most

overleveraged economies in Europe. In other words, any shareholder willing to

participate in a potential rights issue for AIB or BOI needs to be aware of the costly

and long-term nature of that investment, even at such seemingly depressed prices as

those seen today. Earnings generation will remain subdued, with risks to the

downside, and dividends appear as a distant option for the time being. In addition,

two of the scenarios we suggest would involve governments partial ownership of the

banks, this always raising questions about profitability being at the top of

managements priority list.

With all this in mind, we present below a summary of the main numerical and

qualitative implications of the three methods we analyze throughout the note. Asseen in the table, we foresee capital injections ranging from 4.8bn to 5.6bn for

AIB and 3.8bn to 5.3bn for BOI, or lower 2.8-5.3bn and 1.8bn-5.0bn capital

requirements for shareholders.

Table 2: Irish banks Summary features of t he three potential recapitalization programs

AIB

Capital injection APS Bad bank Capital injection APS Bad bank

Total capital needed 4,812 5,624 5,291 3,795 5,345 5,018Direct cost for government 2,000 2,000 0 2,000 2,000 0Cost for shareholders 2,812 3,624 5,291 1,795 3,354 5,018

Ownership post actiongovernment 39% 32% 0% 48% 35% 0%other shareholders 61% 68% 100% 52% 65% 100%

NAV/share 1.48 0.80 0.49 0.67 0.27 0.12P/NAV 0.43 0.81 1.31 0.52 1.31 2.88Core Tier 1 ratio 08E 9.3% 7.0% 6.0% 9.2% 7.0% 6.0%% RWA reduction 0% -20% -48% 0% -20% -54%

Source: JP Morgan Estimates


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We derive two main conclusions from our analysis

1. On a relative basis, a good bank- bad bank structure stands as the mostattractive option for both parties, provided conditions for banks are reasonable.

Main reasons behind our opinion are the following;

a) Accelerates a potential (slow) recovery of lending activity and hence theeconomy, which can only be seen positively by the government and banks

themselves.

b) It offers the government the option to present the whole process as onewhere no additional taxpayers money needs to be injected, at least in

the short term, making it more easily digestible for Irelands public opinion.

c) For shareholders, such a scheme should be seen as "short term pain,

potential long term gain". On a positive note, it offers them the chance tolook at a clean bank in an accelerated fashion, avoiding management

distraction once problematic loans are removed from the balance sheet and

sold to the government, which should not have any influence on how the

good bank is run going forward. Naturally, this will come at a higher cost

(i.e. bigger rights issue) than if any of the other methods are followed, but

we believe it is also likely to offer higher returns in a shorter period of time,

as the clean bank will generate a more resilient earnings stream and will

need to operate with structurally lower regulatory capital ratios.

2. Upside from current prices does not look impressive under any of the three

scenarios

In direct relationship with the returns investors should expect from Irish banks in a

post recapitalization environment, we have attempted to throw some light on howpotential NAV/share levels would look like under the three scenarios, linking them

with the PNAV multiple we believe investors should/would be ready to pay. We

fully accept the limitations of this exercise given the high level of subjectivity

embedded in our estimates and the lack of details about which approach will be used

and under what terms, though we are comfortable with the qualitative conclusions it

offers, and hope it somehow contributes to the ongoing debate.

a) As shown in the table, and again without trying to be dogmatic over the

exact figures, we assume higher PNAV multiples on the good-bad bank

structure (2.0x for AIB, 3.0x for BOI), as a clean bank would more easily

achieve returns over a much leaner equity base and less risky balance sheet

in the 20-40% region in a reasonably accelerated way. the asset protection

scheme appears as an intermediate option, and we have assumed banks'

RONAV sits close to their 10% COE, hence applying a 1.0x NAV multiple,

as investors are protected by the government's guarantee. Finally, the

normal capitalization scenario throws lower returns (c.0.5x PNAV), as

credit losses will still come through the P&L in a normal manner, and given

the risks of final losses being higher than our assumptions, and hence

leading to additional capital injections.

b) We have assumed higher returns for BOI given its lower tangible equityto assets ratio, before and after a recapitalization, as our earnings

expectations are based on similar assumptions for both banks.


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c) Share price returns cannot be described as particularly compellingunder any of the scenarios if one stops to think about the accumulated

declines seen in the last year, which have virtually eliminated the equityvalue of both banks. Unless some of our various assumptions prove too

conservative or investors with a particularly long-term investment horizon

arise

Table 3: AIB/BOI Valuation potential under th e three recapitalization options

AIB

Rights Issue APS Bad bank Rights issue APS Bad Bank

Capital injection 4,812 5,624 5,291 3,795 5,354 5,018o..w. shareholders 2,812 3,624 0 1,795 3,354 5,018NAV 12,510 7,704 4,466 7,934 4,357 1,861NOSH 8,418 9,647 9,128 11,528 15,858 14,925

NAV/share 1.49 0.80 0.49 0.69 0.27 0.12P/NAV 0.43 0.81 1.31 0.52 1.31 2.88

Core Tier 1 ratio 9.3% 7.0% 6.0% 9.2% 7.0% 6.0%

Tangible equity/assets 7.3% 4.4% 2.7% 4.7% 2.5% 1.0%

Fair PNAV 0.4 1.0 2.0 0.5 1.3 3.5Current price 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.35 0.35 0.35Fair pri ce 0.59 0.80 0.98 0.34 0.35 0.43Upside/downside (%) -7% 25% 53% -4% -1% 21%Implied RoNAV 4% 10% 20% 5% 13% 35%

Source: Company reports and J.P. Morgan estimates.

With this in mind, we retain our UW on both AIB and BOI, as risks of outright

nationalization have to be seriously considered if efforts to find private investors fail

to materialize and the government ends up as the sole provider of equity for the two

banks. A properly thought recapitalization program, with more attractive conditions

for shareholders than those implied in the assumptions presented in this note could

make us reconsider our stance on BOI and AIB, though too much uncertaintyremains in place to adopt a more positive stance at this stage. We have cut our Dec-

09 SOP PT on both AIB (to 1.2 from 3.5) and BOI (from 1.2 to 0.5), though note

both figures do not incorporate any potential recapitalization program.

Table 4: AIB SOP 2010 Valuation ( mn)

Net profi t Valuation Valuation basis Per share () P/BV (x)

AIB Bank ROI -419 3,087 RoE - g/CoE - g 3.4 0.7AIB Bank UK -30 547 RoE - g/CoE - g 0.6 0.6Capital Markets -23 1,677 RoE - g/CoE - g 1.8 0.5Poland 180 1,195 RoE - g/CoE - g 1.3 2.4Corporate activities -56 -1,240 PE / BV -1.4 0.0Capital excess / sho rtfall -59 -3,572 BV -4.7 0.0

Total AIB -407 1,693 1.2 1.3


Table 5: BOI 2010 Valuation ( mn )

2010E Net prof it Valuation Valuation basis Per share () P/BV (x)

Retail Ireland -16 2,074 RoE - g/CoE - g 1.9 0.7BOI life 57 749 RoE - g/CoE - g 0.8 1.9Capital Markets 340 3,111 RoE - g/CoE - g 3.2 1.0UK -325 1,921 RoE - g/CoE - g 2.0 0.9Corporate activities -188 -1,504 PE / BV -1.5 0.0Capital excess / sho rtfall 0 -5,676 BV -5.8 0.0

Total BOI -133 676 0.5 0.1


Risks to our Rating and PT:

Upside risks to earnings and PT

are (i) material improvement of

Ireland/UK economic conditions, (ii)

softer than expected correction of

Ireland/UK property market, (iii)

sizeable easing of ECBs monetary

stance, (iv) normalization of credit

markets behavior, and (v) lower

than expected RWA growth

forecasts derived from more benignasset quality indicators (vi) better

economical environment in Poland

(applies for AIB)


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Three main options to recapitalize Irish

banks Breaking up the bad risk

Since our initiation report, we have been advocating for a widespread recapitalization

of Irish banks as a necessary step to fully restore the sector's health and market

credibility. Having always considered Anglo as a "unique" case, with excessive risk

concentration in UK/Irish CRE markets, smaller size (relative to AIB/BOI), and lack

of a defensive retail deposit base, we focus now on BOI and AIB, where solvency

bases have also come under intense market scrutiny, due to the persistently high

pressures surrounding the quality of the lending books, the adverse implications on

earnings generation and risks of negative pro-cyclical impacts from Basel II

implementation.

As mentioned above, we are still focusing our attention on the loan loss provisioningfront, as Irish banks key problem is related to their vulnerability to a quickly

deteriorating credit cycle. From an operating perspective, and after frequent

downward revisions in the last 6 months, we are leaving our estimates largely

unchanged in this note, though risks to our low single digit annual average growth in

08-11E remains clearly skewed to the downside, as it basically incorporates: (i) little

or no lending growth in the foreseeable future, with a weaker demand driving a

sustained deleveraging process, (ii) 7-8%annual declines of non interest income

deriving from current market conditions and (iii) more restrictive cost policies with

generally flat expense levels and with banks attempting to offset some of the

inevitable revenue squeeze.

To address the issue of Irish banks lending portfolios and the alternatives arising for

their full recapitalization (standard capital injection, loan protection scheme and thecreation of a bad bank), our common approach is derived from the identification of

the most problematic portion of those books, to then assess the magnitude of the final

losses borne by the banks, in line with the analysis done by our UK banks analysts in

a recent note (for more details, see The way out Running the Numbers on Good

Bank - Bad Bank dated January 13th). In short, and acknowledging the subjectivity

of our assumptions, we summarize our bad bank calculation in two steps:

1. On a first step we have estimated c.16% of BOIs and 18% of AIBs total book to

have a higher probability of default, by assigning a bad bank portion for every

type of loan by geography. More specifically by segment, we estimate 26-38% of

the CRE book to be bad" (assuming c.45-50% of the development CRE loans

and c.30% of the investment CRE book to be riskier) and only 6-9% and 7% of

the personal and corporate loan books respectively. By region, we estimate 15%

of the Irish book and 16% of UK book to be considered bad for BoI and 19%

and 18% for AIB, for which we also incorporate 10% of the total Polish book.

2. On a second step we have assigned a 75% probability of default (PD) to all thoseloans and assumed Loan Given default ratios (LGDs) of 40-45% for investment

CRE loans, 50% for development CRE loans, 50-60% for corporate loans, 30%

for residential loans and a higher 80-90% for consumer loans. Based on these

assumptions, we then calculated the expected losses arising from the bad bank

portion of each bank, which derived in accumulated losses representing 5.5% of


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BOI 6.4% of the book for AIB, implying NPL ratios of 12% and 13%

respectively (as a percentage of the overall lending portfolio).

Table 6: Irish banks: Bad bank summary

AIB Badbank(%)

Badbank (

mn)

PD(%)

LGD(%)

Expectedloss

As % ofTotalbook

Badbank(%)

Badbank (

mn)

PD(%)

LGD(%)

Expectedloss

As % oTotalbook

IRELAND1. Loans to indiv idual s 6% 2,092 75% 50% 777 2.3% 7% 2,206 75% 37% 614 2.0%o.w. residential mortgages 5% 1,274 75% 30% 287 1.1% 7% 1,945 75% 30% 438 1.6%o.w. unsecured lending 10% 818 75% 80% 491 6.0% 10% 261 75% 90% 176 6.8%2. Property & con stru ction 40% 13,204 75% 48% 4,741 14.3% 38% 6,936 75% 48% 2,472 13.4%o.w. commercial property 36% 7,354 75% 47% 2,603 12.9% 32% 3,398 75% 46% 1,164 10.9%o.w. Investment 30% 4,128 75% 45% 1,393 10.1% 30% 2,947 75% 45% 995 10.1%o.w. Development 50% 3,226 75% 50% 1,210 18.8% 50% 451 75% 50% 169 18.8%o.w. residential property 46% 5,714 75% 49% 2,086 16.8% 46% 3,538 75% 49% 1,308 16.9%o.w. Investment 30% 749 75% 40% 225 9.0% 30% 485 75% 45% 164 10.1%o.w. Development 50% 4,965 75% 50% 1,862 18.8% 50% 3,053 75% 50% 1,145 18.8%

o.w. contractors 30% 136 75% 50% 51 11.3% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.3. Corporate banking 7% 1,756 75% 50% 659 2.6% 7% 1,358 75% 60% 611 3.2%TOTAL IRELAND 19% 17,052 75% 48% 6,176 6.7% 15% 10,500 75% 47% 3,697 5.4%

UK1. Loans to indiv idual s 6% 354 75% 50% 132 2.3% 10% 3,768 75% 40% 1,130 3.0%o.w. residential mortgages 5% 214 75% 30% 48 1.1% 10% 3,768 75% 40% 1,130 3.0%o.w. unsecured lending 10% 140 75% 80% 84 6.0% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.2. Property & con stru ction 37% 4,810 75% 46% 1,648 12.7% 36% 7,226 75% 48% 2,576 12.9%o.w. commercial property 34% 2,558 75% 43% 824 10.9% 33% 4,535 75% 46% 1,567 11.3%o.w. Investment 30% 1,806 75% 40% 542 9.0% 30% 3,574 75% 45% 1,206 10.1%o.w. Development 50% 752 75% 50% 282 18.8% 50% 961 75% 50% 360 18.8%o.w. residential property 43% 2,063 75% 49% 754 15.6% 44% 2,690 75% 50% 1,009 16.4%o.w. Investment 30% 529 75% 45% 178 10.1% 30% 577 75% 50% 216 11.3%o.w. Development 50% 1,534 75% 50% 575 18.8% 50% 2,114 75% 50% 793 18.8%o.w. contractors 30% 189 75% 50% 71 11.3% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.3. Corporate banking 7% 1,171 75% 50% 443 2.6% 7% 1,435 75% 60% 646 3.2%

TOTAL UK 18% 6,335 75% 47% 2,223 6.3% 16% 12,428 75% 47% 4,351 5.6%

GROUP1. Loans to indiv idual s 6% 2,669 75% 50% 992 2.4% 9% 5,974 75% 39% 1,744 2.6%o.w. residential mortgages 5% 1,625 75% 30% 366 1.2% 9% 5,713 75% 37% 1,568 2.4%o.w. unsecured lending 10% 1,044 75% 80% 626 6.0% 10% 261 75% 90% 176 6.8%2. Property & con stru ction 38% 18,252 75% 47% 6,471 13.4% 37% 14,161 75% 48% 5,048 13.1%o.w. commercial property 34% 10,069 75% 46% 3,478 11.9% 32% 7,933 75% 46% 2,730 11.1%o.w. Investment 29% 6,031 75% 43% 1,964 9.5% 30% 6,522 75% 45% 2,201 10.1%o.w. Development 47% 4,038 75% 50% 1,514 17.7% 50% 1,412 75% 50% 529 18.8%o.w. residential property 44% 7,846 75% 49% 2,866 16.0% 45% 6,228 75% 50% 2,317 16.7%o.w. Investment 30% 1,280 75% 42% 404 9.4% 30% 1,061 75% 48% 380 10.7%o.w. Development 48% 6,566 75% 50% 2,462 18.0% 50% 5,166 75% 50% 1,937 18.8%o.w. contractors 28% 336 75% 50% 126 10.6% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.3. Corp orat e bank ing 7% 3,356 75% 50% 1,263 2.7% 7% 2,792 75% 60% 1,257 3.2%

TOTAL GROUP 18% 24,277 75% 48% 8,726 6.4% 16% 22,928 75% 47% 8,049 5.5%



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With these figures in mind, we have performed three different scenarios we see as

possible under current conditions:

1. Proceed with the recapitalization plan governmentsannounced injection does not look enough

This first option is simply the implementation of the recapitalization measures

announced by the Irish government back in December, where a 2bn preference

share injection was guaranteed for each BOI and AIB, with additional commitment

to underwrite 1bn of ordinary equity if banks were not able to find appetite from

private investors.

How would it be structured, which is the total cost?

With this in mind, we revisit the exercise presented in our note Irish banks: Funding

just one side of the problem recapitalizations still necessary dated October 7th

2008, and calculated the amount of additional capital required to reach a Core Tier 1ratio of 7% by 2011E, having incorporated our more conservative new earnings

forecasts, still assuming no (cash or scrip) dividend payments over the 2009-11

period and with our RWA forecasts still hovering around 6-11% p.a. That 7% core

figure by 11E implies an equivalent 9.0-9.5% by YE08E.

Excluding any alternative capital management tools (such as potential capital

gains/RWA reduction from the sale of M&T or BZ WBK for AIB or the more recent

decision to run off its UK mortgage portfolio by BOI), we estimate additional capital

needs of c.3.8bn for BOI and 4.8bn for AIB.

Table 7: AIB-BOI: J.P.Morgan estimated capital need to reach a Core Tier ratio of 7% by 2011E.

2008E 2009E 2010E 2011E 2008E 2009E 2010E 2011E

J.P.Morgan estimated Tier I capital (mn) 10,626 10,629 10,496 10,517 12,130 12,099 11,691 11,358J.P.Morgan estimated Core Tier I capital (mn) 7,536 7,539 7,406 7,427 8,998 8,967 8,559 8,226J.P.Morgan estimated RWAs (mn) 122,831 129,805 144,261 160,325 148,048 158,536 175,960 186,245% yoy growth 5% 6% 11% 11% 10% 7% 11% 6%

Implied Tier 1 ratio 8.7% 8.2% 7.3% 6.6% 8.2% 7.6% 6.6% 6.1%Implied Core Tier 1 ratio 6.1% 5.8% 5.1% 4.6% 6.1% 5.7% 4.9% 4.4%

Estimated capital needed to reach a Core Tier I ratio of 7% 3,795 3,795 3,795 3,795 4,812 4,812 4,812 4,812o.w. borne by govt 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000o.w. borne by shareholders 1,795 1,795 1,795 1,795 2,812 2,812 2,812 2,812

Resulting Tier I capital (mn) after capital injection 14,421 14,424 14,291 14,313 16,941 16,910 16,503 16,169Resulting Core Tier I capital (mn) after capital injection 11,331 11,334 11,201 11,223 13,809 13,778 13,371 13,037

Resulting Tier 1 ratio after capital injection 11.7% 11.1% 9.9% 8.9% 11.4% 10.7% 9.4% 8.7%Resulting Core Tier 1 ratio after capital injection 9.2% 8.7% 7.8% 7.0% 9.3% 8.7% 7.6% 7.0%


How is the cost split between government and private shareholders and what

are government/shareholders left with?

From those amounts, our central case in this exercise is one where the government

subscribes the announced 2.0bn and ordinary shareholders take up the rest. Note we

have also assumed no discount for newly issued shares vs. current prices given the

stocks sharp share declines in the last 12 months, and considered all shares (be it

ordinary or hybrid) as ordinary equity, given the redeemable nature of the

governments preference shares after a maximum period of 5 years.


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For the government, and having already announced its commitment to provide

banks with capital, this method implies finding private funds willing to share the

financial burden of recapitalizing the two largest Irish banks and then minimize thefinancial impact for the taxpayers in the short term, so the result can be described as

reasonably positive. Risks are mainly related to the need to inject additional equity in

an even more protracted credit crisis than that incorporated in our forecasts. Medium

term upside will arise from a potential disposal of its existing stake in the banks.

For shareholders, we see this as the "easiest", but not necessarily the most attractive

option, as (i) implies a substantial injection of capital in the short term, bearing an

enormous dilution for existing holders, (ii) the possibility of additional equity needs

if our forecasts prove too optimistic, (iii) sharing the ownership of the banks with the

government in the foreseeable future, with risks of capping earnings generation and

hence returns, and (iv) risks of delaying the "recovery" scenario, as the full

absorption of credit losses is likely to prove long lasting, especially in the absence of

visibility about the depth of the property downturn. In other words, shareholderswilling to participate in a mixed capital injection with the government must be aware

in our view of the returns of their investment being uncertain and having a long term

nature.

Table 8: AIB-BOI Continuation of the recapitalization pr ocess - Valuation summary

BoI AIB

2008E 2009E 2010E 2011E 2008E 2009E 2010E 2011E

J.P.Morgan current shareholders equity 6,903 6,906 6,773 6,794 9,512 9,481 9,073 8,740(+) capital injection ( mn) 3,795 3,795 3,795 3,795 4,812 4,812 4,812 4,812

o.w. borne by govt 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000o.w. borne by shareholders 1,795 1,795 1,795 1,795 2,812 2,812 2,812 2,812

Existing NOSH (mn) 985 985 985 985 900 900 900 900NOSH issued (mn) 10,543 10,543 10,543 10,543 16,039 16,039 16,039 16,039

o.w. bought by govt 5,556 5,556 5,556 5,556 6,667 6,667 6,667 6,667o.w. bought by shareholders 4,987 4,987 4,987 4,987 9,372 9,372 9,372 9,372

Issue price () 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3current share price () 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3discount vs. current share price (%) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%Resulting NOSH (mn) 11,528 11,528 11,528 11,528 16,939 16,939 16,939 16,939

o.w. owned by govt 5,556 5,556 5,556 5,556 6,667 6,667 6,667 6,667o.w. owned by shareholders 5,972 5,972 5,972 5,972 10,272 10,272 10,272 10,272

Resulting shareholders' equity ( mn) 10,698 10,701 10,568 10,590 14,324 14,292 13,885 13,551Old Tangible BV ( mn) 6,014 6,017 5,884 5,905 8,886 8,836 8,409 8,055Resulting Tangible BV ( mn) 9,809 9,812 9,679 9,701 13,697 13,647 13,220 12,867Old NAV ( mn) 4,139 4,132 4,506 5,678 7,698 7,757 7,657 7,342Resulting NAV ( mn) 7,934 7,928 8,301 9,474 12,510 12,569 12,469 12,153

BV/share () 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.85 0.84 0.82 0.80TBV/share () 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.76NAV/share () 0.69 0.69 0.72 0.82 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.72

P/BV (x) 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.37PTBV (x) 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.39PNAV (x) 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.44 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.42

ROE (%) 6.1% 0.0% -1.3% 0.2% 8.3% -0.2% -2.9% -2.5%RBTV (%) 6.6% 0.0% -1.4% 0.2% 8.6% -0.2% -3.1% -2.6%RONAV (%) 8.2% 0.0% -1.6% 0.2% 9.5% -0.2% -3.3% -2.7%


2. Loan insurance scheme the UK example

A second alternative we believe Irish banks could be presented with comes from

replicating an asset protection scheme like that announced by the UK Treasury


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earlier this week. Note we have assumed assets included in such an initiative would

solely be loans, excluding securities from our analysis at this stage.

How would it be structured, which is the total cost?

We have included the whole amount of our bad bank calculations in the

asset protection scheme (24.3bn for AIB and 22.9bn for BOI, some 13%

and 11% of their whole balance sheets, respectively). Note our base case

scenario only incorporates loans into the bad bank, as Irish banks have been

reasonably insulated from impairments related to the writedown of

problematic securities.

We estimate AIB/BOI will assume a first loss piece of 20% of their badbank balances, or 2-3% of their overall balance sheet. Note this is higher

than the 8% shown by Bank of America or the 10-12% our UK banks

analysts have assumed, as we take a view about the government trying to

future hidden losses and setting up conservative first loss pieces.

In line with UKs program, we assume Irish banks will take responsibilityfor a 10% residual exposure over and above the first loss piece.

Lacking any additional details, we have assumed banks will have to pay a3.4% fee to the government in exchange of their participation in the

protection scheme, in line with that announced by Bank of America.

As shown in the table, and once we net it of by taxes, total upfront cost for

banks stands at 6.3bn for AIB and 6.0bn for BOI.

Table 9: Irish banks - Total cost under the loan insur ance scheme

BOI AIB

Assets included in scheme ( mn) 22,928 24,277Fee over assets 3.40% 3.40%Fee paid by Irish banks ( mn) 780 825

First loss assumed by Irish banks ( mn) (1) 4,586 4,855as % of assets included in scheme 20% 20%as % of total group assets 2% 3%Residual Exposure ( mn) (2) 1,834 1,942as % of losses exceeding first loss 10% 10%Maximum losses to be borne irish banks ( mn) (1+2) 6,420 6,797

Gross cost for Irish banks (fees + maximum losses) 7,199 7,623Tax Rate 19% 19%

Net cost for Irish banks ( mn) 6,012 6,331


How big a recapitalization banks would need?

With all these numbers in mind, we estimate a 5.6bn capital injection for AIB and a

5.4bn for BOI. Key assumptions backing those figures are (i) we have assumed a

20% reduction of RWA, as shareholder will only face a limited amount of losses,

implicitly reducing PD/LGD levels, and (ii) a minimum 7% core Tier 1 ratio going

forward, as management time will still be devoted to clean up the lending portfolio

and there is a risk of final losses being higher than our expectations.


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Table 10: J.P.Morgan estimated capital needs under the loan insurance scheme

BOI AIB

Pre-clean up

Clean upimpact

Postclean up

Capitalinjection

Postinjection

Pre-cleanup

Clean upimpact

Postclean up

Capitalinjection

Postinjection

Shareholders' Equity 6,903 -6,012 891 5,354 6,246 9,512 -6,331 3,181 5,624 8,805Intangibles -889 0 -889 0 -889 -626 0 -626 0 -626Tangi ble BV 6,014 -6,012 2 5,354 5,357 8,886 -6,331 2,554 5,624 8,179

Hidd en reser ves -1000 0 -1,000 0 -1,000 -1188 0 -1,188 0 -1,188Pension surplus/deficit 0 0 0 0 0 -713 0 -713 0 -713Excess/shortfall LLP coverage -1,000 0 -1,000 0 -1,000 -475 0 -475 0 -475NAV 5,014 -6,012 -998 5,354 4,357 7,698 -6,331 1,367 5,624 6,991

Tier 1 capital 10,626 -6,012 4,614 5,354 9,969 12,130 -6,331 5,798 5,624 11,423Core Tier 1 capital 7,536 -6,012 1,524 5,354 6,879 8,998 -6,331 2,666 5,624 8,291RWA 122,831 -24,566 98,265 98,265 148,048 -29,610 118,438 118,438

Tier 1 ratio (%) 8.65% 4.70% 10.14% 8.19% 4.90% 9.64%Core Tier 1 ratio (%) 6.14% 1.55% 7.00% 6.08% 2.25% 7.00%


How is the cost split between government and private shareholders and what is


We have assumed the government subscribes 2.0bn of that potential capital

injection, this number being in line with the recapitalization program announced in

December, though we assume the preference capital planned becomes ordinary

shares for accounting purposes (i.e. fully dilutive). For the government, we believe

this system reduces the immediate injection of capital, making it more palatable for

the public opinion, though we also see some additional losses are likely to be borne

by taxpayers in future years, unless the first loss piece set for banks is conservative

enough (around 35% of the bad bank in our estimates), which does not seem a likely

scenario. In our base case scenario, where we expect 8.0-8.5bn of accumulated

losses for AIB/BOI over 08-11E, our assumptions imply banks would only cover the

first 4.5-5.0bn each, leaving the government bearing the remaining c.40-45%.

Long-term upside for the government looks limited to a potential gain on the sale of

its stake, though we would not attach a high likelihood of that happening over the

next 2-3 years.

For shareholders, we estimate the reading is also quite dependent on that first loss

piece, with a 20% figure not appearing as too bad a deal under current circumstances,

as it also limits the amount of capital that needs to be pumped in at this stage (3.6bn

for AIB and 3.4bn for BOI), and future credit losses are also capped by the

reduction of tail risks. We however find two main caveats that temper our

optimism regarding the benefits of such a scheme for existing/new shareholders (i)

we do not believe an asset protection scheme removes the bad risk from the bank

shareholders will have to deal with in coming years, delaying the creation of a cleanbank that helps bringing investors confidence back, and (ii) if the government

2.0bn investment assumption proves correct, shareholders will participate in a bank

where public ownership stands at 30-35%, increasing the uncertainty about some

measures devoted to increase overall profitability measures being more difficult to

implement under government's auspices.


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Table 11: Irish banks Loan insurance scheme Valuation summary

BOI AIB

Capital injection 5,354 5,624o.w. borne by government 2,000 2,000o.w. borne by shareholders 3,354 3,624

Existing NOSH (mn) 985 900o.w. owned by government 0 0o.w. owned by shareholders 985 900NOSH issued (mn) 14,873 8,747o.w. bought by government 5,556 3110o.w. bought by shareholders 9,318 5637issue price () 0.36 0.64current price ( ) 0.36 0.64issue vs. current price (%) 0% 0%Resulting NOSH (mn) 15,858 9,647o.w. owned by government 5,556 3,110o.w. owned by shareholders 10,303 6,537

Shareholder's equity 6,246 8,805

Tangible BV 5,357 8,179NAV 4,357 7,704

BVPS 0.39 0.91TBVPS 0.33 0.85NAVS 0.27 0.72

PBV 0.91 0.70PTBV 1.06 0.76PNAV 1.31 0.81


3. Good bank/bad bank the Swedish/Mexican example

The last scenario we explore resembles the measures implemented by the Swedish

government back in 1992, when post a period of substantial credit expansion, market

prices began to decrease and a substantial NPL creation occurred. Ultimately, tolimit the damage, Swedens government set up two banks to handle the

nonperforming loans of distressed banks. The bad banks ran off assets over a

period of 4 years and were then dissolved. The analysis presented in this note is also

consistent with the exercise done by JP Morgans UK banks analysts.

How would such a scenario be structured in Ireland

We again include the whole amount of our bad bank calculations for this

scenario (24.3bn for AIB and 22.9bn for BOI, some 13% and 11% of their

whole balance sheets, respectively) and assume the government buys these bad

portions (via debt issuance), which in turn the clean banks write off from their

books.

We assume the government acquires that bad book with a c.40% discount toface value. That estimate derives from (i) the accumulated expected losses, which(as we explained above) we see representing 33%-35% of the total bad book

for BOI and AIB by assigning an average 75% PD and c.45-50% LGD, and (ii)

an additional 4-5% haircut which we expect the government will charge for the

assumed risk, the latter being a subjective assumption that tries to address a

higher "bargaining" power on the government's side.

Thus, as we expose in the table below, we estimate losses of c.9.2bn for BOIand 9.7bn for AIB to be written off from existing equity.


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Table 12: Irish banks Summary of loss es under a good bank - bad bank str ucture

BOI AIB

Group loans 146,401 136,133Bad bank loans 22,928 24,277PD 75% 75%LGD 47% 48%Implied loss (1) 8,049 8,726Implied loss over total book (%) 5.5% 6.4%Implied loss over bad bank book (%) 35% 36%Government purchase price (haircut vs. par) 40% 40%Additional loss (%) 5% 4%Additional loss ( mn) (2) 1123 985TOTAL LOSS (1+2) 9,171 9,711as % of total book 6.3% 7.1%


In addition, we consider the risk weights that are implied by the bad bank portion.

For this calculation, and maintaining the split by region and segment, we used the

Basel II formulas to determine the asset weighting correspondent to each segmentunder the implemented method (standard or advanced IRB) and obtained

weighting of 290% for BoI's total bad bank book and 296% for AIB's. Note these

numbers compare to 300-400% for UK banks (with the difference easily

explained by the implementation of the standard method for some divisions of

Irish banks, which reduces initial saving of capital vs. Basel I, but also mitigates

Basel II pro-cyclical impacts).

Table 13: Irish banks RWA reduction derived fr om removing the bad bank

BoI AIB

Bad bankmn

RWAs( mn)

RWAWeigthing

Bad bankmn

RWAs( mn)

RWAweigthing

1. Loans to indi vidu als 5,974 19,579 328% 2,669 5,652 212%o.w. residential mortgages 5,713 19,383 339% 1,625 4,870 300%

o.w. unsecured lending 261 196 75% 1,044 783 75%2. Property & cons truc tion 14,161 34,974 247% 18,252 57,395 314%o.w. commercial property 7,933 17,922 226% 10,069 31,719 315%o.w. Investment 6,522 15,121 232% 6,031 17,868 296%o.w. Development 1,412 2,802 198% 4,038 13,851 343%o.w. residential property 6,228 17,052 274% 7,846 24,926 318%o.w. Investment 1,061 2,476 233% 1,280 3,258 254%o.w. Development 5,166 14,576 282% 6,566 21,668 330%o.w. contractors 0 0 n.a. 336 750 223%3. Corpo rate banki ng 2,792 11,895 426% 3,356 8,698 259%

TOTAL GROUP 22,928 66,448 290% 24,277 71,746 296%


How big a recapitalization banks would need?

With these numbers in mind, we basically eliminate banks existing equity bases

(writing off the 40% estimated discount) and reduce the correspondent riskweightings of the assets to then estimate the amount of capital the clean banks

would need to reach core Tier ratios of 6%. The reasoning behind a lower required

ratio relies on a cleaner balance sheet leading to a more neutral organic capital

generation. Under this scenario, we estimate a 5.3bn capital injection for AIB and a

5.0bn for BOI.


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Table 14: Irish banks Capital injections needed under a good bank-bad bank struct ure

BoI AIB

Pre-clean up

Clean upimpact

Postclean up

Capitalinjection

Postinjection

Pre-cleanup

Clean upimpact

Postclean up

Capitalinjection

Postinjection

Shareholders' Equity 6,903 -9,171 -2,268 5,018 2,750 9,512 -9,711 -199 5,291 5,092Intangibles -889 0 -889 0 -889 -626 0 -626 0 -626Tangi ble BV 6,014 -9,171 -3,157 5,018 1,861 8,886 -9,711 -825 5,291 4,466

Hidden reserves -1000 1000 0 0 0 -475 475 0 0 0Pension surplus/deficit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Excess/shortfall LLP coverage -1,000 1000 0 0 0 -475 475 0 0 0

NAV 5,014 -8,171 -3,157 5,018 1,861 8,411 -9,236 -825 5,291 4,466

Tier 1 capital 10,626 -9,171 1,455 5,018 6,473 12,130 -9,711 2,419 5,291 7,710Core Tier 1 capital 7,536 -9,171 -1,635 5,018 3,383 8,998 -9,711 -713 5,291 4,578RWA 122,831 -66,448 56,383 56,383 148,048 -71,746 76,302 76,302

Tier 1 ratio (%) 8.65% 2.58% 11.48% 8.19% 3.17% 10.10%Core Tier 1 ratio (%) 6.14% -2.90% 6.00% 6.08% -0.93% 6.00%


How is the cost split between government and private shareholders and what is


Unlike the announced recapitalization plan or the asset protection scheme, we

assume the government does not require any immediate capital injection under

the bad bank structure. In such a scheme, the government ends up owning the

problematic loans and their attached funding, probably in exchange of some public

bonds, which are purchased by banks involved in the program at a pre determined

discount (40% in our assumptions). Hence, the plan can be presented to the public as

once where banks' shareholders bear most of the short term losses, with the only

caveat of increased public borrowing levels as bonds are issued. Going forward, the

government will run the bad bank, restructure it, and has the option of selling it back

to investors in the medium term or decide to set up a permanent public bank and use

it as an instrument to achieve a better functioning banking system. Direct benefits for

taxpayers are twofold (i) banks willingness to lend will undoubtedly rise, a key

aspect for a heavily indebted Irish economy, and (ii) a gain if final losses stand

below those projected in the haircut assumed by the government/banks in the

separation process.

For shareholders, the short term impact could be seen as negative, as this scheme

will imply a higher capital injection than the other two alternatives we present in this

note (5.0-5.3bn vs. 1.8-2.8bn), given the absence of government equity involved in

the process, and potentially less favourable conditions than those seen in the asset

protection scheme in terms of the "additional guarantees required by the

government (i.e. higher haircut). However, in terms of sustainability and proper

functioning of the system (and hence the economy, a good/bad bank structure hastraditionally proved as the most productive alternative in this type of scenario. main

advantages for shareholders can be summarized as follows (i) it increases the chances

of kick-starting investor confidence in Irish banks, as the market perceives entities

have been properly cleaned up, and hence can become investable again, (ii) implies

an indirect derisking of banks balance sheets and thus a capital optimization tool, as

highest weighted assets are sold to the government and the good bank can operate

with old world core Tier 1 ratios (i.e. our 6% assumption), (iii) frees up

management time to run the clean bank on a new business" basis, once problematic

loans are removed, and (iv) ownership is 100% private, with no public influence on

how the bank is run. With this, we do not want to imply a good/bad bank program


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would immediately lead to a quick recovery of Irish banks growth prospects and

hence returns, but it clearly appears as the best option to accelerate that process.

Table 15: Irish banks Capital/valuation summary post a good bank-bad bank struct ure

BOI AIB

Capital injection 5,018 5,291o.w. borne by government 0 0o.w. borne by shareholders 5,018 5,291

Existing NOSH (mn) 985 900NOSH issued (mn) 14338 8229o.w. bought by government 0 0o.w. bought by shareholders 14338 8229issue price () 0.35 0.643current price ( ) 0.35 0.64issue vs. current price (%) 0% 0%Resulting NOSH (mn) 15,323 9,128o.w. owned by government 0 0o.w. owned by shareholders 15323 9128

Shareholder's equity 2,750 5,092Tangible BV 1,861 4,466NAV 1,861 4,466

BVPS 0.18 0.56TBVPS 0.12 0.49NAVS 0.12 0.49

PBV 1.95 1.15PTBV 2.88 1.31PNAV 2.88 1.31



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Valuation and recommendation

As we mentioned above, and leaving our operating estimates largely unchanged, we

have adjusted our loan loss provision estimates to reflect the accumulated expectedlosses we estimated to result from the bad portions of the balance sheets (8-8.7bn

for BOI and AIB respectively, representing 6-7% of total 07 lending book). As a

result, and still skewing to the downside, we have cut our estimates and are now

expecting both banks to generate losses by 2010E. As a result of these changes, we

are cutting our SOPT to 1.2 for AIB (vs. previous 3.5) and 0.5 for BOI (from

previous 1.2).

Table 16: Irish banks: Changes in estimates (%)

Bank of Ireland Mar-09E Mar-10E Mar-11E Mar-12E

New Net income estimate 708 3 -133 21Old Net income estimate 716 98 39 n.a.% difference -1% -97% -444% n.a.

New diluted EPS (c ) 71.1c 0.3c -13.5c 2.2cEPS growth (%) -100% -4603% -116%Old diluted EPS (c ) 71.9c 9.9c 3.9c n.a.

Allied Irish Banks Dec-08E Dec-09E Dec-10E Dec-

New Net income estimate 1,184 -31 -407 -334Old Net income estimate 1,196 306 16 52% difference -1% -110% -2642% n.a.

New diluted EPS (c ) 124.1c -3.5c -45.5c -36.8cEPS growth (%) -103% 1196% -19%Old diluted EPS (c ) 125.5c 34.4c 1.8c n.a.


On this basis, we retain our UW on both AIB and BOI, with our new Dec-09 SOP PT

of 1.2 for AIB (vs. previous 3.5) and 0.5 for BOI (from previous 1.2). We see

high risks of a nationalization and although a properly thought out recapitalization

program, could make us reconsider our stance on BOI and AIB, we see too much

uncertainty at this point.

Risks to our Rating and PT: Upside risks to earnings and PT for both banks are (i)

material improvement of Ireland/UK economic conditions, (ii) softer than expected

correction of Ireland/UK property market, (iii) sizeable easing of ECBs monetary

stance, (iv) normalization of credit markets behavior, (v) lower than expected RWA

growth forecasts derived from more benign asset quality indicators and (vi) a better

economic environment in Poland (applies for AIB only).

Company DataPrice () 0.37Date Of Price 21 Jan 09Price Target () 0.50Price Target End Date 31 Mar 1052-week Range () 11.18 - 0.27Mkt Cap ( bn) 0.4Shares O/S (mn) 995Price Target () 0.50Price Target End Date 31 Mar 10

Bank of Ireland (BKIR.I;BKIR ID)

FYE Mar 2008A 2009E(Old)

2009E(New)

2010E(Old)

2010E(New)

2011E

Adj. EPS FY () 1.50 0.72 0.71 0.10 0.00 (0.13)Adj P/E FY 0.2 0.5 0.5 3.7 123.8 NMHeadline EPS FY () 1.75 0.67 0.66 0.10 0.00 (0.13)P/NAV FY 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1P/BV FY 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1Dividend (Net) FY () 0.641 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

ROE FY 25.5% 9.9% 9.7% 1.4% 0.0% -1.9%Tier One Ratio FY 8.1% 8.7% 8.7% 8.1% 8.2% 7.3%1-IFRS Compliant,ConsolidatedSource: Company data, Reuters, J.P. Morgan estimates.


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Company DataPrice () 0.57

Date Of Price 21 Jan 09Price Target () 1.20Price Target End Date 01 Dec 0952-week Range () 16.34 - 0.29Mkt Cap ( bn) 0.5Shares O/S (mn) 894

Allied Irish Banks PLC (ALBK.I;ALBK ID)

FYE Dec 2007A 2008E(Old)

2008E(New)

2009E(Old)

2009E(New)

2010E

Adj. EPS FY () 2.10 1.25 1.24 0.34 (0.04) (0.45)Adj P/E FY 0.3 0.5 0.5 1.7 NM NMHeadline EPS FY () 2.22 1.35 1.34 0.34 (0.04) (0.45)P/NAV FY 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1P/BV FY 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1Dividend (Net) FY () 0.79 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00ROE FY 22.4% 12.7% 12.6% 3.2% -0.3% -4.4%Tier One Ratio FY 8.2% 7.5% 7.5% 7.7% 7.7% 8.2%Source: Company data, Reuters, J.P. Morgan estimates.


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Bank of Ireland: Summary of FinancialsProfit and Loss Statement Ratio Analysis

in millions, year end Mar FY07A FY08A FY09E FY10E FY11E in millions, year end Mar FY07A FY08A FY09E FY10E FY11E

Per Share Data

Net interest income 2,757 3,263 3,640 3,553 3,687 EPS Reported 1.72 1.75 0.66 0.00 -0.13

% Change Y/Y 19.5% 18.4% 11.5% (2.4%) 3.8% EPS Adjusted 1.44 1.50 0.71 0.00 (0.13)

Non-interest income 1,114 -168 -304 -82 24 % Change Y/Y 23.9% 4.6% (52.7%) (99.6%) (4,602.8%)

Fees & commissions - - - - - DPS 0.60 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00

% change Y/Y - - - - - % Change Y/Y 15.0% 5.3% (100.0%) - -

Trading revenues - - - - - Dividend yield 5.3% 4.4% 6.5% 0.0% 0.0%

% change Y/Y - - - - - Payout ratio 35.1% 36.4% 0.0% 0.0% -0.0%

Other Income 349 1,227 664 654 623 BV per share 7.08 6.72 7.01 7.01 6.88

Total operating revenues 4,220 4,322 4,001 4,125 4,334 NAV per share 5.38 4.84 4.20 4.20 4.57

% change Y/Y 13.4% 2.4% (7.4%) 3.1% 5.1% Shares outstanding 950.0 965.0 985.0 985.0 985.0

Admin expenses -2,159 -2,156 -2,106 -2,006 -2,054

% change Y/Y 6.9% (0.1%) (2.3%) (4.8%) 2.4% Return ratios

Other expenses - - - - - RoRWA 1.5% 1.6% 1.5% 0.5% 0.0%

Pre-provision operating profit 2,017 2,120 1,895 2,089 2,246 Pre-tax ROE 32.5% 29.3% 11.3% 0.4% (2.0%)

% change Y/Y 21.7% 5.1% (10.6%) 10.3% 7.5% ROE 27.1% 25.5% 9.7% 0.0% (1.9%)

Loan loss provisions -103 -232 -1,137 -2,091 -2,419 RoNAV 31.2% 30.4% 15.9% 0.1% (3.1%)

Other provisions - - - - -

Earnings before tax 1,958 1,934 758 28 -138 Revenues

% change Y/Y 22.5% (1.2%) (60.8%) (96.3%) (590.5%) NIM (NII / RWA) 2.8% 2.9% 3.1% 2.9% 2.8%

Tax (charge) (306) (229) (106) (5) 26 Non-IR / average assets 1.0% 0.9% 0.5% 0.2% 0.3%

% Tax rate 15.6% 11.8% 14.0% 18.5% 18.5% Total rev / average assets 2.7% 2.6% 2.2% 2.0% 1.9%

Minorities (1) (5) 15 (5) (5) NII / Total revenues 66.0% 76.3% 91.0% 86.8% 85.8%

Net Income (Reported) 1,636 1,686 652 3 (133) Fees / Total revenues - - - - -

Trading / Total revenues - - - - -

Balance sheet

in millions, year end Mar FY07A FY08A FY09E FY10E FY11E in millions, year end Mar FY07A FY08A FY09E FY10E FY11E

ASSETS Cost ratio s

Net customer loans 125,048 135,738 148,407 144,592 148,547 Cost / income 54.9% 51.7% 50.4% 52.6% 49.0%

% change Y/Y 23.5% 8.5% 9.3% (2.6%) 2.7% Cost / assets 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 0.9%

Loan loss reserves 428 601 1,269 2,770 4,466 Staff numbers 15,952 15,952 15,952 15,952 15,952

Investments 46,676 40,335 40,013 40,236 40,463

Other interest earning assets 10,158 14,075 14,068 14,576 15,196 Balance Sheet Gearing

% change Y/Y (20.4%) 38.6% (0.0%) 3.6% 4.3% Loan / deposit 129.4% 173.0% 157.4% 151.2% 137.8%

Average interest earnings assets 135,206 149,813 162,475 159,168 163,743 Investments / assets 24.7% 20.4% 19.0% 18.4% 17.9%

Goodwill 347 293 319 319 319 Loan / assets 66.2% 68.8% 70.4% 66.2% 65.7%

Other assets 5,400 5,816 5,545 16,208 19,144 Customer deposits / liabilities 39.7% 45.2% 48.1% 49.6% 50.6%

Total assets 188,813 197,434 210,774 218,422 226,232 LT Debt / l iabi li ties 42.3% 41.2% 38.3% 37.2% 36.4%

LIABILITIES Asset Quality / Capital

Customer deposits 72,277 86,234 98,133 104,905 111,310 Loan loss reserves / loans 0.3% 0.4% 0.9% 1.9% 3.0%

% change Y/Y 17.1% 19.3% 13.8% 6.9% 6.1% NPLs / loans 0.5% 0.8% 2.2% 3.7% 4.8%

Long term funding 77,002 78,634 78,118 78,727 79,956 LLP / RWA 0.11% 0.20% 0.97% 1.70% 1.86%Interbank funding 20,648 14,384 16,504 16,666 16,830 Loan loss reserves / NPLs 63.1% 56.6% 39.8% 52.5% 64.5%

Average interest bearing liabs 64,303 77,818 78,376 78,422 79,341 Growth in NPLs (14.7%) 56.4% 200.6% 65.4% 31.2%

Other liabilities 11,538 10,853 10,247 10,553 10,869 RWAs 97,510 112,940 116,961 122,831 129,805

Retirement benefit liabilities 590 807 831 856 882 % YoY change 28.5% 15.8% 3.6% 5.0% 5.7%

Shareholders' equi ty 6,758 6 ,522 6 ,941 6,716 6,386 Core Tier 1 - - - - -

Minorities 34 38 38 38 38 Total Tier 1 7.9% 8.1% 8.7% 8.2% 7.3%

Total liabilities & Shareholders Equity 188,813 197,434 210,774 218,422 226,232



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All Data As Of 22-Jan-09

Quant Return Drivers (a Score >50% indicates company ranks 'above average') J.P. Morgan Composite Q-ScoreScore 0% (worst) to 100% (best) vs Industry Raw Value

Value

P/E Vs Market (12mth fwd EPS) 92% 0.4x

P/E Vs Sector (12mth fwd EPS) 56% 1.0x

EPS Growth (forecast) 1% -50.0%

Value Score 36%

Price Momentum

12 Month Price Momentum 1% -95.7%

1 Month Price Reversion 99% -45.2%

Momentum Score 13%

Quality

Return On Equity (forecast) 47% 10.5%

Earnings Risk (Variation in Consensus) 0% 4.51 Quant Return Drivers Summary (vs Industry)

Quality Score 5%

Earnings & Sentiment

Earnings Momentum 3mth (risk adjusted) 76% -8.4

1 Mth Change in Avg Recom. 65% 0.01

Net Revisions FY2 EPS 48% -67%

Earnings & Sentiment Score 63%

COMPOSITE Q-SCORE* (0% To 100%) 11%

Targets & Recommendations** EPS Revisions** Historical Total Return (%)

Consensus Growth Outlook (%)

Closest in Industry by Size (Consensus. ADV = average daily value traded in US$m over the last 3 mths)

Code Country ADV PE FY1 Q-Score*SAB-ES 33.74 7.4 56%

BTO-ES 6.61 6.6 48%

BCP-PT 14.38 7.6 38%

BES-PT 10.31 5.8 49%

BP-IT 44.11 3.7 28%

BKT-ES 14.47 9.8 39%

PMI-IT 19.30 7.2 16%SWED.A-SE 65.47 1.7 47%

PAS-ES 1.58 6.8 34%

BIR-IE 18.42 0.5 11%AIB-IE 25.97 0.4 12%

Source: Factset, Thomson and J.P. Morgan Quantitative Research. For an explanation of the Q-Snapshot, please visit http://jpmorgan.hk.acrobat.com/qsnapshot/Q-Snapshots are a product of J.P. Morgans Global Quantitative Analysis team and provide quantitative metrics summarized in an overall company 'Q-Score.'Q-Snapshots are based on consensus data and should not be considered as having a direct relationship with the J.P. Morgan analysts recommendation.* The Composite Q-Score is calculated by weighting and combining the 10 Quant return drivers shown. The higher the Q-Score the higher the one monthexpected return. On a 14 Year back-test the stocks with the highest Q-Scores have been shown (on average) to significantly outperform those stocks with the

lowest Q-Scores in this universe. ** The number of up, down and unchanged target prices, recommendations or EPS forecasts that make up consensus.

Portugal

Italy

Spain

30%

Name

Banco Popolare S.C.

vs Country

54%

90%

50%

5%

94%

11%

8%

Ireland

61%

Banco Espanol de Credito S.A.

Banco Comercial Portugues S/A

Banca Popolare di Milano S.C.A.R.L.

Swedbank AB

Banco Espirito Santo S/A

IrelandAllied Irish Banks PLC

3,651

2,102

1,730

1,862

532526

Sweden

Italy

3,206

Banco Pastor S.A.

Bank of Ireland Ord Stk EUR0.64

Banco de Sabadell S.A.

10%

Bankinter S.A.

5%

21%

0%

4,697

84%

57%

Spain

Spain

Portugal

USD MCAP

Spain

Q-Snapshot: Bank of Ireland Ord Stk EUR0.64

EPS Momentum (%)

I N D U S T R Y

3,718

6,780

6,185

-45

-81

-96 -97-120

-100

-80

-60

-40

-20

0

1Mth 3Mth 1Yr 3Yr

(LocalCurrency%)

0

5

10

15

20

Up Dn UnchangedConsensusChanges(4wks) Targets Recoms

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Up Dn Unchanged

ConsensusChanges(4wks)

FY1 FY2

-70.0

-60.0

-50.0

-40.0

-30.0

-20.0

-10.0

0.0

-1 Mth -3 Mth

(%)

FY1 FY2

HIGH/STRONGER

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

0% 25% 50% 75% 100%

LOW/WEAKER

C

O

U

N

T

R

Y

-50.0 -50.0 -50.0

-38.1

1.3

-60.0

-50.0

-40.0

-30.0

-20.0

-10.0

0.0

10.0

EPS Actual To FY1 EPS FY1 To FY2 EPS FY2 To FY3 Dividends FY1 To FY2 Sales FY1ToFY2

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

VALUE PRICE QUALITY EARNINGS


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Allied Irish Banks PLC: Summary of FinancialsProfit and Loss Statement Ratio Analysis

in millions, year end Dec FY06A FY07A FY08E FY09E FY10E in millions, year end Dec FY06A FY07A FY08E FY09E FY10E

Per Share Data

Net interest income 2,999 3,418 3,732 3,622 3,666 EPS Reported 2.51 2.22 1.34 -0.04 -0.45

% Change Y/Y 18.5% 14.0% 9.2% (2.9%) 1.2% EPSA djusted 1.87 2.10 1.24 (0.04) (0.45)

Non-interest income 1,327 1,450 1,145 1,084 1,076 % Change Y/Y 25.3% 12.4% (41.0%) (102.8%) 1,196.1%

Fees & commissions - - - - - DPS 0.72 0.79 0.30 0.00 0.00

% change Y/Y - - - - - % Change Y/Y 10.0% 10.0% (61.9%) (100.0%) -

Trading revenues - - - - - Dividend yield 3.3% 5.2% 46.8% 0.0% 0.0%

% change Y/Y - - - - - Payout ratio 28.6% 35.5% 22.5% -0.0% -0.0%

Other Income - - - - - BV per share 9.14 10.46 10.57 10.46 9.94

Total operating revenues 4,326 4,868 4,877 4,706 4,742 NAV per share 7.16 9.20 8.56 8.56 8.39

% change Y/Y 18.6% 12.5% 0.2% (3.5%) 0.8% Shares outstanding 887.5 892.3 899.7 906.3 912.9

Admin expenses -2,314 -2,521 -2,487 -2,385 -2,416

% change Y/Y 15.1% 8.9% (1.4%) (4.1%) 1.3% Return ratios

Other expenses - - - - - RoRWA 1.9% 1.5% 0.9% (0.0%) (0.3%)

Pre-provision operating profit 2,012 2,347 2,391 2,321 2,326 Pre-tax ROE 34.2% 28.8% 17.2% 1.4% (3.4%)

% change Y/Y 23.0% 16.7% 1.9% (2.9%) 0.2% ROE 28.6% 22.4% 12.6% (0.3%) (4.4%)

Loan loss provisions -118 -106 -997 -2,303 -2,760 RoNAV 25.8% 25.3% 13.8% (0.4%) (5.3%)

Other provisions 14 7 -6 -2 -2

Earnings before tax 2,615 2,508 1,620 136 -311 Revenues

% change Y/Y 53.3% (4.1%) (35.4%) (91.6%) (328.1%) NIM (NII / RWA) 2.4% 2.5% 2.8% 2.4% 2.3%

Tax (charge) (433) (442) (308) (26) 59 Non-IR / average assets 0.9% 0.9% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%

% Tax rate 16.6% 17.6% 19.0% 19.0% 19.0% Total rev / average assets 3.0% 2.9% 2.7% 2.5% 2.6%

Minorities 3 (117) (129) (142) (156) NII / Total revenues 69.3% 70.2% 76.5% 77.0% 77.3%

Net Income (Reported) 2,185 1,949 1,184 (31) (407) Fees / Total revenues - - - - -

Trading / Total revenues - - - - -

Balance sheet

in millions, year end Dec FY06A FY07A FY08E FY09E FY10E in millions, year end Dec FY06A FY07A FY08E FY09E FY10E

ASSETS Cost ratio s

Net customer loans 107,115 127,603 136,134 131,607 133,476 Cost / income 53.5% 51.8% 51.0% 50.7% 50.9%

% change Y/Y 25.7% 19.1% 6.7% (3.3%) 1.4% Cost / assets 1.5% 1.4% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3%

Loan loss reserves 707 744 1,582 2,925 4,506 Staff numbers 24,085 25,898 25,898 25,898 25,898

Investments 28,618 29,225 29,571 29,571 29,571

Other interest earning assets 17,582 15,704 16,038 16,383 16,738 Balance Sheet Gearing

% change Y/Y 56.6% (10.7%) 2.1% 2.1% 2.2% Loan / deposit 143.1% 156.9% 149.3% 142.9% 136.5%

Average interest earnings assets - - - - - Investments / assets 18.1% 16.4% 15.8% 16.1% 15.9%

Goodwill 550 636 636 636 636 Loan / assets 67.6% 71.7% 72.6% 71.7% 71.8%

Other assets 2,949 3,032 3,116 3,202 3,291 Customer deposits / liabilities 50.4% 48.8% 52.0% 53.7% 56.1%

Total assets 158,526 177,862 187,401 183,427 185,901 LT Debt / l iabil i ties 24.2% 30.5% 28.3% 26.5% 24.3%

LIABILITIES Asset Quality / Capital

Customer deposits 74,875 81,308 91,168 92,084 97,803 Loan loss reserves / loans 0.7% 0.6% 1.2% 2.2% 3.4%

% change Y/Y 19.6% 8.6% 12.1% 1.0% 6.2% NPLs / loans 0.9% 0.8% 1.9% 3.1% 4.2%

Long term funding 35,997 50,807 49,663 45,420 42,387 LLP / RWA 0.57% 0.53% 1.18% 1.98% 2.84%Interbank funding 33,433 30,389 30,389 31,301 32,240 Loan loss reserves / NPLs 75.8% 70.9% 61.3% 71.1% 79.5%

Average interest bearing liabs - - - - - Growth in NPLs 7.5% 12.4% 146.1% 59.5% 37.6%

Other liabilities 3,372 3,757 3,722 2,180 1,425 RWAs 123,034 139,386 134,091 148,048 158,536

Retirement benefit liabilities 937 423 436 449 462 % YoY change 21.0% 13.3% (3.8%) 10.4% 7.1%

Shareholders' equity - - - - - Core Tier 1 - - - - -

Minorities 1,307 1,351 1,395 1,395 1,395 Total Tier 1 0.6% 8.2% 7.5% 7.7% 8.2%

Total liabilities & Shareholders Equity 158,526 177,862 187,401 183,427 185,901



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All Data As Of 22-Jan-09

Quant Return Drivers (a Score >50% indicates company ranks 'above average') J.P. Morgan Composite Q-ScoreScore 0% (worst) to 100% (best) vs Industry Raw Value

Value

P/E Vs Market (12mth fwd EPS) 92% 0.4x

P/E Vs Sector (12mth fwd EPS) 56% 1.0x

EPS Growth (forecast) 6% -40.7%

Value Score 48%

Price Momentum

12 Month Price Momentum 1% -95.7%

1 Month Price Reversion 99% -65.5%

Momentum Score 15%

Quality

Return On Equity (forecast) 57% 12.5%

Earnings Risk (Variation in Consensus) 0% 1.38 Quant Return Drivers Summary (vs Industry)

Quality Score 6%

Earnings & Sentiment

Earnings Momentum 3mth (risk adjusted) 71% -12.2

1 Mth Change in Avg Recom. 58% -0.01

Net Revisions FY2 EPS 16% -100%

Earnings & Sentiment Score 49%

COMPOSITE Q-SCORE* (0% To 100%) 12%

Targets & Recommendations** EPS Revisions** Historical Total Return (%)

Consensus Growth Outlook (%)

Closest in Industry by Size (Consensus. ADV = average daily value traded in US$m over the last 3 mths)

Code Country ADV PE FY1 Q-Score*SAB-ES 33.74 7.4 56%

BTO-ES 6.61 6.6 48%

BCP-PT 14.38 7.6 38%

BES-PT 10.31 5.8 49%

BP-IT 44.11 3.7 28%

BKT-ES 14.47 9.8 39%

PMI-IT 19.30 7.2 16%SWED.A-SE 65.47 1.7 47%

PAS-ES 1.58 6.8 34%

BIR-IE 18.42 0.5 11%

AIB-IE 25.97 0.4 12%

Source: Factset, Thomson and J.P. Morgan Quantitative Research. For an explanation of the Q-Snapshot, please visit http://jpmorgan.hk.acrobat.com/qsnapshot/Q-Snapshots are a product of J.P. Morgans Global Quantitative Analysis team and provide quantitative metrics summarized in an overall company 'Q-Score.'Q-Snapshots are based on consensus data and should not be considered as having a direct relationship with the J.P. Morgan analysts recommendation.* The Composite Q-Score is calculated by weighting and combining the 10 Quant return drivers shown. The higher the Q-Score the higher the one monthexpected return. On a 14 Year back-test the stocks with the highest Q-Scores have been shown (on average) to significantly outperform those stocks with the

lowest Q-Scores in this universe. ** The number of up, down and unchanged target prices, recommendations or EPS forecasts that make up consensus.

Portugal

Italy

Spain

28%

Name

Banco Popolare S.C.

vs Country

54%

90%

61%

5%

99%

19%

14%

Ireland

45%

Banco Espanol de Credito S.A.

Banco Comercial Portugues S/A

Banca Popolare di Milano S.C.A.R.L.

Swedbank AB

Banco Espirito Santo S/A

Ireland

Allied Irish Banks PLC

3,651

2,102

1,730

1,862

532

526

Sweden

Italy

3,206

Banco Pastor S.A.

Bank of Ireland Ord Stk EUR0.64

Banco de Sabadell S.A.

20%

Bankinter S.A.

13%

26%

12%

4,697

80%

42%

Spain

Spain

Portugal

USD MCAP

Spain

Q-Snapshot: Allied Irish Banks PLC

EPS Momentum (%)

I N D U S T R Y

3,718

6,780

6,185

-65

-85-96 -96

-120

-100

-80

-60

-40

-20

0

1Mth 3Mth 1Yr 3Yr

(LocalCurrency%)

0

5

10

15

20

Up Dn UnchangedConsensusChanges(4wks) Targets Recoms

0

5

10

15

20

Up Dn Unchanged

ConsensusChanges(4wks)

FY1 FY2

-30.0

-25.0

-20.0

-15.0

-10.0

-5.0

0.0

-1 Mth -3 Mth

(%)

FY1 FY2

HIGH/STRONGER

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

0% 25% 50% 75% 100%

LOW/WEAKER

C

O

U

N

T

R

Y

-31.5

-50.0

50.0

-50.0

0.6

-60.0

-40.0

-20.0

0.0

20.0

40.0

60.0

EPS Actual To FY1 EPS FY1 To FY2 EPS FY2 To FY3 Dividends FY1 To FY2 Sales FY1ToFY2

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

VALUE PRICE QUALITY EARNINGS


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Analyst Certification:

The research analyst(s) denoted by an AC on the cover of this report certifies (or, where multiple research analysts are primarilyresponsible for this report, the research analyst denoted by an AC on the cover or within the document individually certifies, with

respect to each security or issuer that the research analyst covers in this research) that: (1) all of the views expressed in this reportaccurately reflect his or her personal views about any and all of the subject securities or issuers; and (2) no part of any of the researchanalysts compensation was, is, or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed by theresearch analyst(s) in this report.

Important Disclosures

Market Maker/ Liquidity Provider: JPMSL and/or an affiliate is a market maker and/or liquidity provider in Allied Irish BanksPLC, Bank of Ireland.

Lead or Co-manager: JPMSI or its affiliates acted as lead or co-manager in a public offering of equity and/or debt securities forAllied Irish Banks PLC, Bank of Ireland within the past 12 months.

Client of the Firm: Allied Irish Banks PLC is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSIprovided to the company investment banking services, non-investment banking securities-related service and non-securities-relatedservices. Bank of Ireland is or was in the past 12 months a client of JPMSI; during the past 12 months, JPMSI provided to the

company investment banking services, non-investment banking securities-related service and non-securities-related services.

Investment Banking (past 12 months): JPMSI or its affiliates received in the past 12 months compensation for investment bankingservices from Allied Irish Banks PLC, Bank of Ireland.

Investment Banking (next 3 months): JPMSI or its affiliates expect to receive, or intend to seek, compensation for investmentbanking services in the next three months from Allied Irish Banks PLC, Bank of Ireland.

Non-Investment Banking Compensation: JPMSI has received compensation in the past 12 months for products or services otherthan investment banking from Allied Irish Banks PLC, Bank of Ireland. An affiliate of JPMSI has received compensation in the past12 months for products or services other than investment banking from Allied Irish Banks PLC, Bank of Ireland.

0

11

22

33

44

Price()

Jan

06

Apr

06

Jul

06

Oct

06

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07

Apr

07

Jul

07

Oct

07

Jan

08

Apr

08

Jul

08

Oct

08

Jan

09

Allied Irish Banks PLC (ALBK.I) Price Chart

UW 3.5

UW 5.5

UW 8.5

Source: Reuters and J.P. Morgan; price data adjusted for stock splits and dividends.

Break in coverage Jun 27, 2005 - Sep 10, 2008. This chart shows J.P. Morgan's continuing coverage of this stock; the

current analyst may or may not have covered it over the entire period.

J.P. Morgan ratings: OW = Overweight, N = Neutral, UW = Underweight.

Date Rating Share Price()

Price Target()

10-Sep-08 UW 8.75 8.50

06-Oct-08 UW 7.50 5.50

06-Nov-08 UW 4.30 3.50


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0

9

18

27

36

Price()

Jan

06

Apr

06

Jul

06

Oct

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Jan

07

Apr

07

Jul

07

Oct

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Jan

08

Apr

08

Jul

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Oct

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Jan

09

Bank of Ireland (BKIR.I) Price Chart

UW 1

UW 2.7

UW 4.3

Source: Reuters and J.P. Morgan; price data adjusted for stock splits and dividends.

Break in coverage Jun 27, 2005 - Sep 10, 2008. This chart shows J.P. Morgan's continuing coverage of this stock; the

current analyst may or may not have covered it over the entire period.

J.P. Morgan ratings: OW = Overweight, N = Neutral, UW = Underweight.

Date Rating Share Price

()

Price Target

()

10-Sep-08 UW 5.90 4.30

17-Sep-08 UW 4.62 2.70

17-Nov-08 UW 0.83 1.00

Explanation of Equity Research Ratings and Analyst(s) Coverage Universe:

J.P. Morgan uses the following rating system: Overweight [Over the next six to twelve months, we expect this stock will outperform theaverage total return of the stocks in the analysts (or the analysts teams) coverage universe.] Neutral [Over the next six to twelvemonths, we expect this stock will perform in line with the average total return of the stocks in the analysts (or the analysts teams)coverage universe.] Underweight [Over the next six to twelve months, we expect this stock will underperform the average total return of

the stocks in the analysts (or the analysts teams) coverage universe.] The analyst or analysts teams coverage universe is the sectorand/or country shown on the cover of each publication. See below for the specific stocks in the certifying analyst(s) coverage universe.

Coverage Universe: Ignacio Cerezo: Allied Irish Banks PLC (ALBK.I), Anglo Irish Bank (ANGL.I), BBVA (BBVA.MC),

BPI (BBPI.LS), Banco Comercial Portugus (BCP.LS), Banco Espirito Santo (BES.LS), Banco Pastor (PAS.MC), Banco

Popular (POP.MC), Banco Sabadell (SABE.MC), Banesto (BTO.MC), Bank of Ireland (BKIR.I), Bankinter (BKT.MC),

Criteria Caixa Corp (CRIT.MC), Santander (SAN.MC)

J.P. Morgan Equity Research Ratings Distribution, as of December 31, 2008

Overweight

(buy)Neutral

(hold)Underweight

(sell)

JPM Global Equity Research Coverage 38% 44% 18%

IB clients* 54% 52% 43%

JPMSI Equity Research Coverage 37% 49% 14%

IB clients* 76% 71% 62%

*Percentage of investment banking clients in each rating category.

For purposes only of NASD/NYSE ratings distribution rules, our Overweight rating falls into a buy rating category; our Neutral rating falls into a holdrating category; and our Underweight rating falls into a sell rating category.

Valuation and Risks: Please see the most recent company-specific research report for an analysis of valuation methodology and risks onany securities recommended herein. Research is available at http://www.morganmarkets.com , or you can contact the analyst named onthe front of this note or your J.P. Morgan representative.

Analysts Compensation: The equity research analysts responsible for the preparation of this report receive compensation based uponvarious factors, including the quality and accuracy of research, client feedback, competitive factors, and overall firm revenues, whichinclude revenues from, among other business units, Institutional Equities and Investment Banking.
http://www.morganmarkets.com/http://www.morganmarkets.com/http://www.morganmarkets.com/


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Registration of non-US Analysts: Unless otherwise noted, the non-US analysts listed on the front of this report are employees of non-US

affiliates of JPMSI, are not registered/qualified as research analysts under NASD/NYSE rules, may not be associated persons of JPMSI,and may not be subject to NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 restrictions on communications with covered companies, public

appearances, and trading securities held by a research analyst account.

Other Disclosures

J.P. Morgan is the global brand name for J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. (JPMSI) and its non-US affiliates worldwide.

Options related research: If the information contained herein regards options related research, such information is available only to persons who

have received the proper option risk disclosure documents. For a copy of the Option Clearing Corporations Characteristics and Risks of

Standardized Options, please contact your J.P. Morgan Representative or visit the OCCs website at

http://www.optionsclearing.com/publications/risks/riskstoc.pdf.

Legal Entities DisclosuresU.S.: JPMSI is a member of NYSE, FINRA and SIPC. J.P. Morgan Futures Inc. is a member of the NFA. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. is a

member of FDIC and is authorized and regulated in the UK by the Financial Services Authority. U.K.: J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd. (JPMSL) is a

member of the London Stock Exchange and is authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority. Registered in England & Wales No.

2711006. Registered Office 125 London Wall, London EC2Y 5AJ. South Africa: J.P. Morgan Equities Limited is a member of the Johannesburg

Securities Exchange and is regulated by the FSB. Hong Kong: J.P. Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited (CE number AAJ321) is regulatedby the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Securities and Futures Commission in Hong Kong. Korea: J.P. Morgan Securities (Far East) Ltd,

Seoul branch, is regulated by the Korea Financial Supervisory Service. Australia: J.P. Morgan Australia Limited (ABN 52 002 888 011/AFS

Licence No: 238188) is regulated by ASIC and J.P. Morgan Securities Australia Limited (ABN 61 003 245 234/AFS Licence No: 238066) is a

Market Participant with the ASX and regulated by ASIC. Taiwan: J.P.Morgan Securities (Taiwan) Limited is a participant of the Taiwan Stock

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member of the Mexican Stock Exchange and authorized to act as a broker dealer by the National Banking and Securities Exchange Commission.

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207/01/2008 and Co. Reg. No.: 199405335R] which is a member of the Singapore Exchange Securities Trading Limited and is regulated by theMonetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and/or JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Singapore branch (JPMCB Singapore) which is regulated by the

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Ireland Bank Anal 23 Jan 09