President Bush asserts that U.S. military actionagainst Iraq was justified because SaddamHussein was in material breach of United NationsSecurity Council Resolution 1441. But even if Iraqwas in violation of a UN resolution, the U.S. mili-tary does not exist to enforce UN mandates. Itexists to defend the United States: its territorialintegrity and national sovereignty, the population,and the liberties that underlie the American wayof life. So whether Iraq was in violation ofResolution 1441 is irrelevant. The real question iswhether Iraq represented a direct and imminentthreat to the United States that could not other-wise be deterred. If that was the case, then pre-emptive self-defense, like Israel’s military actionagainst Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq in the 1967Six Day War, would have been warranted. And ifIraq was not a threat, especially in terms of aidingand abetting Al Qaeda, then the United Statesfought a needless war against a phantom menace.

In the final analysis, the war against Iraq wasthe wrong war. Not because the United Statesused preemptive military force—preemptive self-defense would have been justified in the face of atruly imminent threat. Not because the UnitedStates acted without the consent of the UnitedNations—no country should surrender its defense

to a vote of other nations. And not because Iraqhad weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—nonehas been discovered and, even if they existed, theywere not a threat.

The war against Iraq was the wrong war becausethe enemy at the gates was, and continues to be, AlQaeda. Not only was Iraq not a direct militarythreat to the United States (even if it possessedWMD, which was a fair assumption), but there isno good evidence to support the claim thatSaddam Hussein was in league with Al Qaeda andwould have given the group WMD to be usedagainst the United States. In fact, all the evidencesuggests the contrary. Hussein was a secularMuslim ruler, and bin Laden is a radical Muslimfundamentalist—their ideological views are hardlycompatible.

Ironically, President Bush provided his ownindictment of the Iraq war when he addressed theUnited Nations General Assembly in September2003: “No government should ignore the threat ofterror, because to look the other way gives terror-ists the chance to regroup and recruit and pre-pare.” But that is exactly what the United Statesdid by going to war against Iraq. To make matterseven worse, the American taxpayer is stuck withthe bill for the war and postwar reconstruction.

Iraq: The Wrong Warby Charles V. Peña

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Charles V. Peña is director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute.

Executive Summary

No. 502 December 15, 2003

Introduction

Standing aboard the USS Abraham Lincolnon May 1, 2003, President Bush declared anend to major combat operations in OperationIraqi Freedom and told the members of theU.S. armed forces, “Because of you, our nationis more secure.”1 On September 7, 2003, Bushaddressed the nation and declared, “Iraq is nowthe central front”2 in the war on terrorism. Andon November 3, 2003, in Birmingham,Alabama, he said, “We are aggressively strikingthe terrorists in Iraq, defeating them there sowe will not have to face them in our own coun-try.”3 Those assertions are central to determin-ing whether there was casus belli for the U.S.invasion of Iraq.

According to President Bush, SaddamHussein’s material breach of United NationsSecurity Council Resolution 1441 was casusbelli.4 But Resolution 1441 never really setforth grounds for military action, nor did itmake clear that military action would be anexplicit consequence of noncompliance.5 Evenif Iraq was in violation of UN resolutions, thereality is that the United States military existsto defend the United States: its territorialintegrity and national sovereignty, the popula-tion, and the liberties that underlie theAmerican way of life. So the real question iswhether Iraq represented a direct and immi-nent threat to the United States that could nototherwise have been deterred. If that was thecase, then preemptive self-defense, like Israel’smilitary action against Egypt, Syria, Jordan,and Iraq in the 1967 Six Day War, would havebeen warranted. And if Iraq was not a threat,especially in terms of aiding and abetting AlQaeda, then the United States fought a need-less war against a phantom menace.

Changing the Focus fromAl Qaeda to Iraq

That the administration changed course tofocus its efforts on Iraq rather than Al Qaedashould come as no great surprise. In theimmediate aftermath of September 11, 2001,

Iraq was already being discussed as an eventu-al target. According to Bob Woodward in Bushat War, at a National Security Council meetingon the afternoon of September 12, 2001:“[Secretary of Defense Donald] Rumsfeldraised the question of Iraq. Why shouldn’t wego against Iraq, not just Al Qaeda, he asked.Rumsfeld was speaking not only for himselfwhen he raised the question. His deputy, PaulD. Wolfowitz, was committed to a policy thatwould make Iraq a principal target of the firstround in the war on terrorism.”6 In fact,Wolfowitz argued that Iraq would be easierthan Afghanistan.7 And five days later thepresident said: “I believe Iraq was involved, butI’m not going to strike them now. I don’t havethe evidence at this point.”8

Although military action against Iraq wasput on hold to focus on Afghanistan, thewheels had been put in motion. Respondingto Rumsfeld about a routine request to hit tar-gets in the Iraqi no-fly zone, Bush said, “Wehave to be patient about Iraq.”9 So the admin-istration’s shift of focus from Al Qaeda to Iraqevolved over time and in increments.

On September 20, 2001, before a joint ses-sion of Congress, President Bush addressedthe American people and held Osama binLaden and the Al Qaeda terrorist networkresponsible for the September 11 attacks. Healso condemned the Taliban regime inAfghanistan for aiding and abetting AlQaeda. Bush said, “Our enemy is a radical net-work of terrorists, and every government thatsupports them” and that the war on terrorism“will not end until every terrorist group ofglobal reach has been found, stopped, anddefeated.”10 Ostensibly, the only terroristgroup with demonstrated global reach was(and still is) Al Qaeda.

In an October 2001 radio address to thenation, the rhetoric began to shift slightly andsubtly when the president stated that “Americais determined to oppose the state sponsors ofterror” and that the “enemy is the terroriststhemselves, and the regimes that shelter andsustain them.” And instead of a war against ter-rorist groups with global reach, Bush spoke ofa “global campaign against terror.”11

2

Even if Iraq wasin violation of

UN resolutions,the reality is thatthe United States

military exists to defend the

United States: its territorialintegrity and

national sovereignty, the

population, andthe liberties that

underlie theAmerican way of

life.

In a November 2001 Rose Garden ceremo-ny welcoming back aid workers HeatherMercer and Dayna Curry rescued fromAfghanistan, President Bush remarked: “Ifanybody harbors a terrorist, they’re a terrorist.If they fund a terrorist, they’re a terrorist. Ifthey house terrorists, they’re terrorists. . . . Ifthey develop weapons of mass destructionthat will be used to terrorize nations, they willbe held accountable.”12 Thus, the presidentlinked the war on terrorism to weapons ofmass destruction (WMD), claiming that coun-tries that develop WMD were always part ofhis definition of terrorists.13 And he specifical-ly said that Iraq needed to allow weaponsinspectors back into the country. In responseto a question about the consequences forSaddam Hussein if he did not allow inspectorsinto Iraq, Bush said, “He’ll find out,”14 whichfueled speculation that the administrationwas planning military action against Iraq.

The rhetoric about rogue states and WMDwas used again when President Bush addressedcadets at the Citadel in December 2001: “Roguestates are clearly the most likely sources ofchemical and biological and nuclear weaponsfor terrorists.”15 And Bush was explicit aboutexpanding the war on terrorism: “America’snext priority to prevent mass terror is to protectagainst the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction and the means to deliver them.”16

In his State of the Union address onJanuary 29, 2002, President Bush did notmake a single direct reference to either AlQaeda or Osama bin Laden. Seemingly forgot-ten were previous comments about wantingbin Laden “dead or alive.”17 Instead, he statedthat the United States would be “steadfast andpatient and persistent in the pursuit of twogreat objectives. First, we will shut down ter-rorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bringterrorists to justice. And second, we must pre-vent the terrorists and regimes who seekchemical, biological or nuclear weapons fromthreatening the United States and the world.”The president specifically named Iraq (alongwith Iran and North Korea) as part of “an axisof evil, arming to threaten the peace of theworld” and said that “by seeking weapons of

mass destruction, these regimes pose a graveand growing danger.”18

Yet little more than a week after the presi-dent included Iraq in the axis of evil, Directorof Central Intelligence George Tenet testifiedbefore the Senate Select Committee onIntelligence that “Al Qaeda leaders still at largeare working to reconstitute the organizationand to resume its terrorist operations” andthat the Al Qaeda terrorist network was still“the most immediate and serious threat”19 tothe United States. A month later, RobertMueller, director of the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, stated, “We believe that we arestill targeted, that there are Al Qaeda associ-ates or individuals around the world and somein the United States that are intent on com-mitting terrorist acts within the country.”20

In spite of those warnings about the con-tinued threat posed by Al Qaeda and despitethe fact that the joint resolution passed byCongress in the wake of 9/11 was very specificabout authorizing the president to respond“against those nations, organizations, or per-sons he determines planned, authorized, com-mitted, or aided the terrorist attacks thatoccurred on September 11, 2001, or harboredsuch organizations or persons,”21—the AlQaeda terrorist network and the Talibanregime in Afghanistan—the president spentthe rest of 2002 laying the groundwork forregime change in Iraq rather than focusing thewar on terrorism against Al Qaeda.22

Iraqi Military Was Nota Real Threat

According to the International Institute ofStrategic Studies’ Military Balance 2002–2003,Iraq’s defense expenditures were $1.4 billion in2001 (compared to U.S. defense spending ofnearly $330 billion).23 Its army consisted of350,000 troops (the vast majority of whomwere ill-trained conscripts) and had 3 armoreddivisions, 3 mechanized divisions, and 11infantry divisions, as well as 6 RepublicanGuard divisions and 4 Special RepublicanGuard brigades. But despite the Iraqi army’s

3

If Iraq was not athreat, especiallyin terms of aidinand abetting AlQaeda, then theUnited Statesfought a needlesswar against aphantom menace

relatively large size, all of the divisions otherthan the Republican Guard were reported tobe at 50 percent combat effectiveness.Moreover, the army (including the eliteRepublican Guard) was outfitted with olderSoviet and Chinese equipment—such as the T-55, T-62 and Type-59 main battle tanks—andhalf of all the army’s equipment was lackingspares.24 In other words, Iraq’s army wasn’tmuch of an army and probably not much of areal threat to its neighbors (especially if itswealthy Persian Gulf neighbors were willing tospend some of their oil money on their owndefense), let alone the United States.

Similarly, the Iraqi air force did notamount to much. Its aircraft inventory con-sisted largely of older Soviet aircraft—such asthe MiG-21 and MiG-23—and a few FrenchMirage F-1s. Moreover, the serviceability ofthose aircraft was only about 55 percent.Compounding the problem was Iraqi pilots’lack of flying experience; senior pilots aver-aged 90–120 hours per year and junior pilotsas little as 20 hours.25 In comparison, U.S. AirForce fighter pilots average 205 hours.26

Military analyst Anthony Cordesman at theCenter for Strategic and International Studiesmade the following assessments in a reportpublished about a year before the Iraq war:

• “Iraq has lacked the funds, spare parts,and production capabilities to sustainthe quality of its consolidated forces.

• “It has not been able to recapitalize anyaspect of its force structure, and abouttwo-thirds of its remaining inventory ofarmor and aircraft is obsolescent byWestern standards.

• “Equally important, the U.S. has mademajor upgrades in virtually every aspect ofits fighter avionics, attack munitions,cruise missile capabilities, and intelligence,reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities.

• “Iraq’s inability to recapitalize and mod-ernize its forces means that much of itslarge order of battle is now obsolescentor obsolete, has uncertain combat readi-ness, and will be difficult to sustain incombat.”27

And according to another analysis of Iraqimilitary capabilities by Cordesman:

• “About half of its land order of battleconsists of relatively low-grade infantryunits, and only one of its seven corpsreally seems combat ready enough toconduct major offensive or defensiveoperations. . . . It’s land force equipmentis at best mid-1980s technology andcombat worn, and much of its is obso-lescent. Even its much-touted T-72tanks proved incapable of successfullyengaging earlier models of the U.S. M-1[main battle tank] during the Gulf War.

• “Iraq lacks all of the modern airborneplatforms, sensors, and other equip-ment needed to carry out effective airbattle management for either air defenseor offense. Only about one-third of itsforce now consists of relatively modernhigh performance aircraft like the Su-20,Mirage F-1, Su-24, MiG-25, and MiG-29.Even these airframes are now 1970s–1980s models, with no major modern-ization of avionics, munitions, or elec-tronic warfare equipment. While someindividual pilots perform well, overall airbattle training is outdated, unrealistic,and incompetent.”28

The bottom line is that the Iraqi militaryposed no real threat to the United States.That the Iraqi military was no match for U.S.forces was borne out by the war itself.Although the war was not the “cakewalk”that some observers predicted,29 U.S. militaryforces effectively swept away Iraqi forces inthe span of less than four weeks.30

WMD or No WMD Is Notthe Question

Of course, it was not Iraq’s military per sethat the Bush administration portrayed as athreat to the United States but its alleged pos-session of WMD. Speaking in Nashville,Tennessee, in August 2002, Vice President

4

Iraq’s army wasn’t much of

an army andprobably not

much of a realthreat to its

neighbors, letalone the United

States.

Dick Cheney said that “Saddam Hussein willacquire nuclear weapons fairly soon” and that“there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein nowhas weapons of mass destruction; there is nodoubt that he is amassing them to use againstour friends, against our allies, and againstus.”31 In Cincinnati, Ohio, in October 2002,the president said:

Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction arecontrolled by a murderous tyrant, whohas already used chemical weapons tokill thousands of people. This sametyrant has tried to dominate theMiddle East, has invaded and brutallyoccupied a small neighbor, has struckother nations without warning, andholds an unrelenting hostility towardsthe United States. . . .

As a former chief weapons inspectorfor the U.N. has said, “The fundamentalproblem with Iraq remains the natureof the regime itself: Saddam Hussein isa homicidal dictator who is addicted toweapons of mass destruction.”

In 1995, after several years of deceitby the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq’smilitary industries defected. It was thenthat the regime was forced to admit thatit had produced more than 30,000 litersof anthrax and other deadly biologicalagents. The inspectors, however, con-cluded that Iraq had likely producedtwo to four times that amount. This is amassive stockpile of biological weaponsthat has never been accounted for, andis capable of killing millions.

We know that the regime has pro-duced thousands of tons of chemicalagents, including mustard gas, sarinnerve gas, and VX nerve gas. SaddamHussein also has experience in usingchemical weapons. He has orderedchemical attacks on Iran, and on morethan forty villages in his own country.These actions killed or injured at least20,000 people, more than six times thenumber of people who died in theattacks of September 11.

And surveillance photos reveal thatthe regime is rebuilding facilities that ithas used to produce chemical and bio-logical weapons.32

And just three days before the war began,Cheney reiterated, “We know he’s [SaddamHussein’s] absolutely devoted to trying toacquire nuclear weapons, and we believe hehas, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.”33

Chemical and Biological WeaponsFrom December 1998 until November

2002, Iraq had refused to allow UnitedNations weapons inspectors into the countrydespite the requirements of Security CouncilResolution 687. Many analysts understand-ably surmised that Iraq had used that timeperiod to reconstitute its prohibited WMDprograms. According to a 2002 CentralIntelligence Agency report: “Since inspec-tions ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained itschemical weapons effort, energized its mis-sile program, and invested more heavily inbiological weapons.”34 But an important partof the CIA’s assessment of Iraq’s chemicalweapons program was that “Baghdad contin-ues to rebuild and expand dual-use infra-structure that it could divert quickly to CW[chemical weapons] production.”35 The CIAcited the chlorine and phenol plants inFallujah as examples of dual-use infrastruc-ture but also noted that “both chemicalshave legitimate civilian uses.”36 Iraq’s biolog-ical weapons program was considered similarto its chemical weapons program: “Iraq hasthe capability to convert quickly legitimatevaccine and biopesticide plants to biologicalwarfare (BW) production.”37

It is also important to note that CIA esti-mates of Iraq’s chemical and biologicalweapons used as the basis for the Bushadministration’s decision to go to waragainst Iraq were not significantly differentfrom the CIA’s pre-9/11 assessment that Iraq“has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the guise of, legiti-mate civilian use. This equipment—in princi-ple subject to U.N. scrutiny—also could be

5

CIA estimates ofIraq’s chemicaland biologicalweapons used asthe basis for theBush administration’s decision togo to war againstIraq were not significantly different fromthe CIA’s pre-9/11 assessment.

diverted for WMD purposes.”38 So there wasreally nothing new about Iraq’s chemical andbiological weapons capabilities or programsthat constituted an imminent threat.

Nuclear Weapons ProgramDespite ominous claims by administra-

tion officials (most notably Vice PresidentCheney) about a seemingly imminentnuclear threat from Iraq, the 2002 CIA reportwas more equivocal. According to the CIA:

• “Although Saddam probably does notyet have nuclear weapons or sufficientmaterial to make any, he remains intenton acquiring them. . . . How quickly Iraqwill obtain its first nuclear weaponsdepends on when it acquires sufficientweapons-grade fissile material.”39

• “More than ten years of sanctions andthe loss of much of Iraq’s physicalnuclear infrastructure under IAEA[International Atomic Energy Agency]oversight have not diminished Saddam’sinterest in acquiring or developingnuclear weapons. . . . The acquisition ofsufficient fissile material is Iraq’s princi-pal hurdle in developing a nuclearweapon.”40

The CIA concluded that “Iraq is unlikelyto produce indigenously enough weapons-grade material for a deliverable nuclearweapon until the last half of this decade.Baghdad could produce a nuclear weaponwithin a year if it were able to procureweapons-grade fissile material abroad.”41 Buteven that possibility was not a foregone con-clusion. The IISS agreed with the CIA’sassessment, but with an important caveat: “IfIraq were somehow able to acquire nuclearweapons–usable nuclear material from a for-eign source, however, it could probably pro-duce nuclear weapons in a relatively shorttime, assuming that Iraq’s nuclear weapons designteam has completed their work.”42

Again, the pre-9/11 CIA estimate of Iraq’sability to develop a nuclear weapon was large-ly the same: “Iraq has probably continued

low-level theoretical R&D associated with itsnuclear program. A sufficient source of fissilematerial remains Iraq’s most significantobstacle to being able to produce a nuclearweapon.”43

Exaggerated WMD ThreatIt is clear now that the administration’s

concerns about Iraq’s WMD were overstated.Before and during the Iraq war, administra-tion officials implied that the United Stateswas relatively certain where WMD were locat-ed.44 But after nearly six months of searching,David Kay, who is heading up the U.S.-led,1,400-person inspection team in Iraq, testi-fied before Congress that the United Stateshas “not yet found stocks of weapons” andhas discovered only “WMD-related programactivities.”45 According to Kay, “It clearly doesnot look like a massive, resurgent program,based on what we discovered.”46 More point-edly, Kay admits that “information found todate suggests that Iraq’s large-scale capabilityto develop, produce, and fill new CW muni-tions was reduced—if not entirely destroyed—during Operations Desert Storm and DesertFox, 13 years of U.N. sanctions, and U.N.inspections.”47

No Nuclear ProgramIraq’s alleged nuclear weapons program

has also been debunked. The claim byPresident Bush in his 2003 State of the Unionaddress (and three other Bush administrationstatements that month) that Saddam Husseinwas seeking “significant quantities of urani-um from Africa”48 is now discredited.49

Similarly, the aluminum tubes purchased byIraq, which the administration claimed werefor building centrifuges for uranium enrich-ment,50 have turned out to be “not suited forcentrifuges,” and “Iraq had no program to usethem as such.”51 Australian Brig. Gen. StephenMeekin, who commands the Joint CapturedEnemy Material Exploitation Center thatreports to Kay, claims, “The tubes were usedfor rockets.”52

According to Kay, Iraq took “steps to pre-serve some technological capability from the

6

It is clear now that the

administration’sconcerns about

Iraq’s WMD wereoverstated.

pre-1991 nuclear weapons program,”53 andits nuclear weapons program was in “the verymost rudimentary”54 state. Postwar inspec-tions have revealed that, although SaddamHussein certainly had nuclear ambitions, Iraqdid not have an active nuclear weapons pro-gram. According to Kay, “Despite evidence ofSaddam’s continued ambition to acquirenuclear weapons, to date we have not uncov-ered evidence that Iraq undertook significantpost-1998 steps to actually build nuclearweapons or produce fissile material.”55

Ballistic MissilesEven if Iraq possessed chemical or biolog-

ical weapons (which was a fair assumption)or even a nuclear weapon (which was astretch of the imagination), it did not havethe long-range military capability to strikethe United States and thus pose a directthreat. According to the IISS:

Iraq’s current ballistic missile capabili-ties are very modest, compared to itsrobust missile force and substantialmissile development and productioninfrastructure in 1991. The Gulf Warand subsequent UN efforts cost Iraq itslarge missile force and destroyed mostof its infrastructure for indigenousdevelopment and production of Scud-based missiles. . . .

Since the end of inspections in 1998,it is unlikely that Iraq has been able toreconstitute its previous missile produc-tion capabilities for long range missiles,which would have required significantforeign assistance.56

None of the Iraqi ballistic missiles cited bythe CIA—al-Husayn variants of Soviet Scud Bmissiles with an extended range of 650 kilo-meters, the al-Abbas with a range of 900 kilo-meters, and the Badr-2000 with an estimatedrange of 750 to 1,000 kilometers57—had therange to reach the United States. It is impor-tant to note that the last two missiles wereconsidered in development, not operational-ly deployed. The CIA’s 2001 assessment of

the ballistic missile threat had previouslyconcluded that “although Iraq could attemptbefore 2015 to test a rudimentary long-rangemissile based on its failed Al-Abid SLV[space-launched vehicle], such a missilealmost certainly would fail,”58 and that “Iraqis unlikely to test before 2015 any ICBMs thatwould the threaten the United States, even ifUN prohibitions were eliminated or signifi-cantly reduced in the next few years.”59

Iraq Could Be DeterredFurthermore, the evidence suggests that

even if Saddam Hussein had WMD he couldbe deterred from using them against theUnited States. During the Gulf War, Iraq wasbelieved to possess chemical and biologicalweapons but did not use those weaponsagainst coalition forces, presumably becauseof the possibility of U.S. nuclear retaliation. InAugust 1990, then–defense secretary Cheneystated that “it should be clear to SaddamHussein that we have a wide range of militarycapabilities that will let us respond with over-whelming force and extract a very high priceshould he be foolish enough to use chemicalweapons on United States forces.”60 And theAmerican government reportedly used third-party channels to privately warn Iraq that “inthe event of a first use of a weapon of massdestruction by Iraq, the United Statesreserved the right to use any form of retalia-tion (presumably up to and including nuclearweapons).”61 According to Keith Payne, a for-mer deputy assistant secretary of defense inthe current Bush administration:

What, for example, was the value ofnuclear weapons for deterrence in theGulf War? By Iraqi accounts, nucleardeterrence prevented Iraq’s use ofchemical and biological weapons(CBW) that could have inflicted hor-rendous civilian and military casualtieson us and our allies. Senior Iraqiwartime leaders have explained thatwhile U.S. conventional threats wereinsufficient to deter, implicit U.S.nuclear threats did deter Saddam

7

Even if Iraq possessed chemical or biologicalweapons or evena nuclearweapon, it didnot have thelong-range military capability tostrike the UnitedStates.

Hussein’s use of chemical and biologi-cal weapons. As the then-head of Iraqimilitary intelligence, Gen. Waffic alSammarai, has stated, Saddam Husseindid not use chemical or biologicalweapons during the war, “because thewarning was quite severe, and quiteeffective. The allied troops were certainto use nuclear arms and the price willbe too dear and too high.”62

That Iraq could be deterred was reinforcedby an October 7, 2002, letter from CIA direc-tor George Tenet to Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL),then chairman of the Select Committee onIntelligence. According to Tenet:

Baghdad for now appears to be draw-ing a line short of conducting terroristattacks with conventional or CBW[chemical and biological weapons]against the United States.

Should Saddam conclude that aU.S.-led attack could no longer bedeterred, he probably would becomemuch less constrained in adopting ter-rorist actions. Such terrorism mightinvolve conventional means, as withIraq’s unsuccessful attempt at a terror-ist offensive in 1991, or CBW.

Saddam might decide that theextreme step of assisting Islamist terror-ists in conducting a WMD attackagainst the United States would be hislast chance to exact vengeance by takinga large number of victims with him.63

The October 7 letter also declassified the fol-lowing dialogue at a closed hearing:

Senator Levin: . . . If [Saddam] didn’t feelthreatened, did not feel threatened, is itlikely that he would initiate an attackusing a weapon of mass destruction?Senior Intelligence Witness: . . . Myjudgment would be that the probabili-ty of him initiating an attack—let meput a time frame on it—in the foresee-able future, given the conditions we

understand now, the likelihood I thinkwould be low.64

So even if WMD are eventually found inIraq (which is less and less likely as time pass-es), their mere existence would not qualify asan imminent threat that absolutely requiredpreemptive military action. If possession ofWMD constitutes a threat requiring preemp-tive military action, then Iraq would not be theonly country targeted by the United States.The list would not even be limited to the othermembers of the axis of evil—Iran and NorthKorea. According to the Department ofDefense, the extant and emerging threats tothe United States, friends, and allies include12 nations with nuclear weapons programs,13 nations with biological weapons, 16nations with chemical weapons, and 28nations with ballistic missiles.65

No Ties to Al Qaeda

To make the threat of WMD seem evenmore dire, President Bush argued eitherexplicitly or implicitly on several occasionsthat Saddam Hussein could (the implicationbeing that he would) give WMD to terrorists:

• State of the Union address, January 29,2002: “By seeking weapons of massdestruction, these regimes pose a graveand growing danger. They could providethese arms to terrorists, giving them themeans to match their hatred.”66

• At the United Nations on September 12,2002: “With every step the Iraqi regimetakes toward gaining and deploying themost terrible weapons, our own optionsto confront that regime will narrow. Andif an emboldened regime were to supplythese weapons to terrorist allies, thenthe attacks of September the 11th wouldbe a prelude to far greater horrors.”67

• In the Rose Garden on September 26,2002: “The Iraqi regime possesses bio-logical and chemical weapons. The Iraqiregime is building the facilities necessary

8

Even if WMD are eventuallyfound in Iraq,

their mere exis-tence would not

qualify as animminent threat

that absolutelyrequired

preemptive military action.

to make more biological and chemicalweapons. And according to the Britishgovernment, the Iraqi regime couldlaunch a biological or chemical attack inas little as 45 minutes after the orderswere given.

“The regime has long-standing and continuing ties to terrorist organiza-tions. And there are Al Qaeda terroristsinside Iraq.”68

• In Cincinnati, Ohio, on October 7, 2002:“Iraq could decide on any given day toprovide a biological or chemical weaponto a terrorist group or individual terror-ists. Alliances with terrorists could allowthe Iraqi regime to attack America with-out leaving any fingerprints. . . .

“If the Iraqi regime is able to produce,buy, or steal an amount of highly-enriched uranium a little larger than asingle softball, it could have a nuclearweapon in less than a year. . . . AndSaddam Hussein would be in a positionto pass nuclear technology to terror-ists.”69

• In Sioux Falls, South Dakota, onNovember 3, 2002: “Saddam Hussein isa man who told the world he wouldn’thave weapons of mass destruction, buthe’s got them. He’s a man who a whileago who was close to having a nuclearweapon. Imagine if this madman had anuclear weapon. It’s a man who not onlyhas chemical weapons, but he’s usedchemical weapons against some of hisneighbors. He used chemical weapons,incredibly enough, against his own peo-ple. He can’t stand America. He can’tstand some of our closest friends.

“And, not only that, he is—would likenothing better than to hook-up with oneof these shadowy terrorist networks likeAl Qaeda, provide some weapons andtraining to them, let them come and dohis dirty work, and we wouldn’t be ableto see his fingerprints on his action.”70

• In New Orleans, Louisiana, on December3, 2002: “It’s important for our fellowAmericans to understand that, when

we’re talking about Saddam Hussein,we’re talking about a man who said hehas had no weapons of mass destruction,yet we believe has weapons of massdestruction—a man who has not onlyhad weapons of mass destruction, buthe’s used weapons of mass destruction.He used weapons of mass destruction onhis neighbors and he used weapons ofmass destruction on his own citizens.He’s a man who has professed hate toAmerica, as well as our friends and allies.He’s a man who has got terrorist ties, aman who helps train terrorists. He’s athreat and he’s a danger.”71

• State of the Union address, January 28,2003: “With nuclear arms or a full arse-nal of chemical and biological weapons,Saddam Hussein could resume hisambitions of conquest in the MiddleEast and create deadly havoc in thatregion. And this Congress and theAmerican people must recognize anoth-er threat. Evidence from intelligencesources, secret communications, andstatements by people now in custodyreveal that Saddam Hussein aids andprotects terrorists, including membersof Al Qaeda. Secretly, and without fin-gerprints, he could provide one of hishidden weapons to terrorists, or helpthem develop their own.”72

But those “doom and gloom” statementshave to be contrasted with the fact thatSaddam Hussein never gave chemical or bio-logical weapons to anti-Israeli Palestinian ter-rorist groups that he supported. And afterbeing briefed by David Kay in Iraq, CSIS mil-itary expert Anthony Cordesman has con-cluded that there is “no evidence of any Iraqieffort to transfer weapons of mass destruc-tion or weapons to terrorists.”73

The Specter of 9/11To further heighten fears of Iraq’s alleged

WMD, the president and other senior admin-istration officials often created the impres-sion, without explicitly making the charge,

9

Saddam Hussein nevergave chemical or biologicalweapons to anti-IsraeliPalestinian terrorist groupsthat he supported.

that Iraq was involved with the September 11terrorist attacks:

• “And we know that after September the11th, Saddam Hussein’s regime gleefullycelebrated the terrorist attacks onAmerica.

“Iraq could decide on any given day toprovide a biological or chemical weaponto a terrorist group or individual terror-ists. Alliance with terrorists could allowthe Iraqi regime to attack America with-out leaving any fingerprints.”74

• “What’s important for us as we work tosecure the homeland is to remember thestakes have changed. After September the11th, the world changed. It changed for alot of reasons. Perhaps the most pro-found reason on a foreign policy perspec-tive, or from a homeland security per-spective, is that we’re no longer protectedby two big oceans. Used to be if there wasa threat overseas we could deal with it ifwe chose to do so, but we didn’t have toworry about something happening hereat home. It used to be oceans could pro-tect us from conflict and from threats.

“But that’s changed, and it’s impor-tant to have people in the Senate who areclear-eyed realists. It’s important to havepeople who see the world the way it is,not the way we hope it is. And the worldis a dangerous place, particularly withpeople like Saddam Hussein in power.”75

• “Before September the 11th, many in theworld believed that Saddam Husseincould be contained. But chemicalagents, lethal viruses and shadowy ter-rorist networks are not easily contained.Imagine those 19 hijackers with otherweapons and other plans—this timearmed by Saddam Hussein. It wouldtake one vial, one canister, one crateslipped into this country to bring a dayof horror like none we have ever known.We will do everything in our power tomake sure that that day never comes.”76

At a press conference just prior to invading

Iraq, President Bush said:

• “If the world fails to confront the threatposed by the Iraqi regime, refusing touse force, even as a last resort, freenations would assume immense andunacceptable risks. The attacks ofSeptember the 11th, 2001 showed whatthe enemies of America did with fourairplanes. We will not wait to see whatterrorists or terrorist states could dowith weapons of mass destruction.

• “My job is to protect the American peo-ple. It used to be that we could thinkthat you could contain a person likeSaddam Hussein, that oceans wouldprotect us from his type of terror.September the 11th should say to theAmerican people that we’re now a battle-field, that weapons of mass destructionin the hands of a terrorist organizationcould be deployed here at home.

• “I hope they understand the lesson ofSeptember the 11th. The lesson is, isthat we’re vulnerable to attack, whereverit may occur, and we must take threatswhich gather overseas very seriously. Wedon’t have to deal with them all militar-ily. But we must deal with them. And inthe case of Iraq, it is now time for him todisarm.”77

The president continued to imply a connec-tion between 9/11 and Iraq after the war:

• “The battle of Iraq is one victory in a waron terror that began on September the11, 2001.”78

• “Since America put out the fires ofSeptember the 11th, and mourned ourdead, and went to war, history has takena different turn. We have carried thefight to the enemy. We are rolling backthe terrorist threat to civilization, not onthe fringes of its influence, but at theheart of its power.

“This work continues. In Iraq, we arehelping the long suffering people of thatcountry to build a decent and democrat-

10

President Bushhas been forcedto concede that

“there is no evidence that

Saddam Husseinwas involved

with Septemberthe 11th.”

ic society at the center of the MiddleEast. Together we are transforming aplace of torture chambers and massgraves into a nation of laws and freeinstitutions. This undertaking is diffi-cult and costly—yet worthy of our coun-try, and critical to our security. . . .

“And for America, there will be nogoing back to the era before Septemberthe 11th, 2001—to false comfort in adangerous world. We have learned thatterrorist attacks are not caused by theuse of strength; they are invited by theperception of weakness. And the surestway to avoid attacks on our own peopleis to engage the enemy where he livesand plans. We are fighting that enemy inIraq.”79

On Good Morning America on September 8,2003, National Security Advisor CondoleezzaRice responded to a question about Iraqbeing the central front on the war on terror-ism by saying: “The president told theAmerican people shortly after September11th that we were going to fight this war onthe offense. We were going to fight it on theterritory of the terrorists.”80 Clearly, theimplication was that Iraq was the territory ofthe terrorists responsible for 9/11. VicePresident Cheney was even more explicit onMeet the Press less than a week later:

If we’re successful in Iraq, if we canstand up a good representative govern-ment in Iraq, that secures the region sothat it never again becomes a threat toits neighbors or to the United States,so it’s not pursuing weapons of massdestruction, so that it’s not a safehaven for terrorists, now we will havestruck a major blow right at the heartof the base, if you will, the geographicbase of the terrorists who have had usunder assault now for many years, butmost especially on 9/11.81

It should come as no surprise, then, thataccording to an August 2003 Washington Post

poll, 69 percent of Americans believed that itwas likely that Saddam Hussein was involvedin the September 11 terrorist attacks.82 Buttwo years after 9/11, President Bush has beenforced to concede that “there is no evidencethat Saddam Hussein was involved withSeptember the 11th.”83

Mohammed AttaIf the evidence linking Hussein to 9/11

amounts to nothing, then the evidence of anyactive cooperation between Hussein and AlQaeda is next to nothing. The first claim of apossible linkage between the former Iraqiregime and Al Qaeda was that MohammedAtta (one of the September 11 suicide hijack-ers) met with an Iraqi intelligence officer inPrague in April 2001. But shortly after thatclaim was first made, U.S. officials stated thatthe meetings did not constitute hard proofthat Iraq was involved in the September 11attacks,84 NATO’s secretary-general LordRobertson told U.S. senators that there was“not a scintilla”85 of evidence linking Iraqwith the September 11 attacks, and Israel’schief of military intelligence stated, “I don’tsee a direct link between Iraq and the hijack-ings and terror attacks in the UnitedStates.”86 Even the Czech government hasdistanced itself from its original stance:

But that same month [December2001], Czech President Vaclav Havelwas retreating from the more definitiveaccounts provided by his government,saying there was “a 70 percent” chancethe meeting took place. Indeed, whileCzech officials never officially backedaway from their initial stance, officialsat various agencies say that, privately,the Czechs have discredited the accura-cy of the untested informant who cameto them with the information.According to one report, Havel quietlyinformed the White House in 2002there was no evidence to confirm themeeting.

The Czechs had reviewed recordsusing Atta’s name and his seven known

11

If the evidencelinking Husseinto 9/11 amountsto nothing, thenthe evidence of any activecooperationbetween Husseinand Al Qaeda isnext to nothing.

aliases provided by the CIA and foundnothing to confirm the April 2001trip.87

And according to FBI director RobertMueller, “We ran down literally hundreds ofthousands of leads and checked every recordwe could get our hands on, from flight reser-vations to car rentals to bank accounts,”88

but neither the FBI nor the CIA could findany evidence that Atta left or returned to theUnited States (either using his own name orknown aliases) at the time of the allegedmeeting.89

Ansar al-IslamThe second alleged link between Saddam

Hussein’s regime and Al Qaeda is based on thepresence of the Ansar al-Islam terrorist groupin northern Iraq. This was the case made bySecretary of State Colin Powell at the UnitedNations Security Council in February 2003:

But what I want to bring to yourattention today is the potentially muchmore sinister nexus between Iraq andthe Al Qaeda terrorist network, a nexusthat combines classic terrorist organi-zations and modern methods of mur-der. Iraq today harbors a deadly terror-ist network headed by Abu Mud’ab al-Zarqawi, an associate and collaboratorof Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaedalieutenants.

Zarqawi, a Palestinian born in Jordan,fought in the Afghan war more than adecade ago. Returning to Afghanistan in2000, he oversaw a terrorist trainingcamp. One of his specialities and one ofthe specialties of this camp is poisons.When our coalition ousted the Taliban,the Zarqawi network helped establishanother poison and explosive trainingcenter camp. And this camp is located innortheastern Iraq. . . .

Those helping to run this camp areZarqawi lieutenants operating in north-ern Kurdish areas outside SaddamHussein’s controlled Iraq. But Baghdad

has an agent in the most senior levels ofthe radical organization, Ansar al-Islam,that controls this corner of Iraq. In 2000this agent offered Al Qaeda safe havenin the region. After we swept Al Qaedafrom Afghanistan, some of its membersaccepted this safe haven. They remaintheir [sic] today.

Zarqawi’s activities are not confinedto this small corner of northeast Iraq.He traveled to Baghdad in May 2002for medical treatment, staying in thecapital of Iraq for two months while herecuperated to fight another day.

During this stay, nearly two dozenextremists converged on Baghdad andestablished a base of operations there.These Al Qaeda affiliates, based inBaghdad, now coordinate the movementof people, money and supplies into andthroughout Iraq for his network, andthey’ve now been operating freely in thecapital for more than eight months.90

But as Secretary Powell himself acknowl-edged, Zarqawi and Ansar al-Islam were based“in northern Kurdish areas outside SaddamHussein’s controlled Iraq,” which is hardly astrong case for close ties between Hussein andAl Qaeda (and raises the question of why theU.S. military did not take action earlier againstan alleged Al Qaeda target inside the coalition-controlled no-fly zone). Moreover, the StateDepartment describes Ansar al-Islam as “aradical Islamist group of Iraqi Kurds andArabs who have vowed to establish an inde-pendent Islamic state in northern Iraq.”91

That is a clear divergence, not a convergence,of the ideology and goals of Ansar al-Islamand the former regime in Baghdad—again, notconvincing evidence that Hussein and AlQaeda were in league with each other.

No Affinity between Hussein and AlQaeda

In fact, the evidence suggests the opposite.Rohan Gunaratna, director of terrorismresearch at Singapore’s Institute of Defenseand Strategic Studies and author of Inside Al

12

In the war’s aftermath the

administrationhas not

unearthed anynew and com-

pelling evidenceto support its

claim thatSaddam Hussein

had ties to AlQaeda.

Qaeda, is considered one of the world’s fore-most experts on Al Qaeda and was affordedthe opportunity to examine several thousandAl Qaeda documents and videos afterOperation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.Gunaratna “could not find any evidence of AlQaeda links to Saddam Hussein or theBaghdad administration,” and the videos hewatched “speak of [Saddam] as a real monsterand not a real Muslim.”92

Even more telling is the fact that in thewar’s aftermath the administration has notunearthed any new and compelling evidenceto support its claim that Saddam Husseinhad ties to Al Qaeda. One would think that,with all of Hussein’s documents in the handsof U.S. military and intelligence and so manyhigh-ranking members of the regime in cus-tody, such evidence would have surfacedmore than six months after the fall of theregime. Instead, the president and othersenior administration officials simply keeprepeating the mantra that Saddam and AlQaeda were linked without providing anyreal proof.

Despite President Bush’s assertion that“there’s no question that Saddam Husseinhad Al Qaeda ties,”93 the reality is that, atmost, both share a common hatred of theUnited States. That is hardly enough to makethem allies or to warrant the conclusion thatHussein would give WMD to Al Qaeda. It isimportant to remember that Hussein was aMuslim secular ruler while bin Laden is a rad-ical Muslim fundamentalist—their ideologi-cal views are hardly compatible. Indeed,Saddam Hussein’s regime was exactly thekind of government that bin Laden claims isillegitimate and would be a target for AlQaeda. To the extent that bin Ladenexpressed any sympathy for Iraq, it was forthe Iraqi people, not the regime in Baghdad.For example, an audiotape attributed to binLaden released a month before the Iraq wardescribes Iraq as a “former capital of Islam”and says that Muslim resistance to Americanaggression “should not be for championingethnic groups, or for championing the non-Islamic regimes in all Arab countries, includ-

ing Iraq.”94 Intelligence analysts inside andoutside the government have pointed outthat bin Laden (if the voice on the tape wasindeed bin Laden’s) went out of his way inthe recording to show his disdain for Husseinand the Baath Party by referring to them as“infidels” and an “infidel regime” thatshould be aided only for the “sake of Allah.”95

Iraq’s Ties to Terrorism Not a Threat tothe United States

That does not mean that the former Iraqiregime did not have links to terrorism.According to the State Department’s 2002“Patterns of Global Terrorism” report:

Baghdad overtly assisted two categoriesof Iraqi-based terrorist organizations—Iranian dissidents devoted to topplingthe Iranian Government and a variety ofPalestinian groups opposed to peacewith Israel. The groups include theIranian Mujahedin-e Khalq, the AbuNidal organization (although Iraqreportedly killed its leader), the PalestineLiberation Front (PLF), and the ArabLiberation Front (ALF). In the past year,the PLF increased its operational activi-ties against Israel and sent its membersto Iraq for training for future terroristattacks.

Baghdad provided material assis-tance to other Palestinian terroristgroups that are in the forefront of theintifadah. The Popular Front for theLiberation of Palestine-General Com-mand, HAMAS, and the PalestineIslamic Jihad are the three most impor-tant groups to whom Baghdad hasextended outreach and support efforts.

Saddam paid the families ofPalestinian suicide bombers to encour-age Palestinian terrorism, channeling$25,000 since March through the ALFalone to families of suicide bombers inGaza and the West Bank. Public testi-monials by Palestinian civilians andofficials and cancelled checks capturedby Israel in the West Bank verify the

13

It is important toremember thatHussein was aMuslim secularruler while binLaden is a radicaMuslim funda-mentalist—theirideological viewsare hardly compatible.

transfer of a considerable amount ofIraqi money.96

But the few terrorist groups that previouslyreceived some support from Iraq were notdirect threats to the United States, and thosethat had previously attacked U.S. targets hadnot done so for almost 20 years.97

The important point to stress here is thatthe terrorist threat to the United States is theAl Qaeda terrorist network, not other terror-ist groups who attack other countries.Because terrorism is an unjustifiable andheinous act that kills innocent people, it is alltoo easy to lump all terrorist groups (espe-cially those that are Muslim affiliated) withAl Qaeda, but that would be a grave error.The State Department lists 36 designatedforeign terrorist organizations and 38 otherterrorist groups.98 But other than Al Qaeda,few, if any, attack U.S. targets. The terroristgroups that target other countries (e.g.,Israel, Britain, Spain, India) are not directthreats to America, and the United Statescannot realistically target everyone else’s ter-rorist enemies—more than 70 groups. Evenworse, if the United States did make othercountries’ terrorist enemies our enemies,those terrorist groups that do not currentlyattack the United States would have incen-tive to make America their target.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, the war against Iraqwas the wrong war. Not because the UnitedStates used preemptive military force—pre-emptive self-defense would have been justifiedin the face of a truly imminent threat. Notbecause the United States acted without theconsent of the United Nations—no countryshould surrender its defense to a vote of othernations. And not because Iraq had WMD—sofar none has been discovered, and, even ifthose weapons existed, they were not a threat.

The war against Iraq was the wrong warbecause the enemy at the gates was, and con-tinues to be, the Al Qaeda terrorist network

operating in 60 countries around the world.Although it seems obvious, it is worthreminding ourselves that the attacks ofSeptember 11 were carried out by Al Qaedaunder Osama bin Laden’s leadership, not byIraq led by Saddam Hussein. None of the 19hijackers was Iraqi. Iraq has not been provedto be linked to the planning, financing, orexecution of those attacks. And the formerregime was not known to support or providesafe harbor to Al Qaeda, as did the Talibanregime in Afghanistan.

Therefore, President Bush’s three postwarstatements don’t ring true.

“Our nation is more secure.”This presumes that Iraq was a correct tar-

get, as was the Taliban regime in Afghanistan,in the war to dismantle the Al Qaeda terroristnetwork. But Iraq was more a case of “back tothe future” than of making real progressagainst Al Qaeda. In the rush to war againstIraq, one thing has seemingly been forgotten:prior to September 11, much of the nationalsecurity focus of the Bush administration wason missile defense against WMD and the so-called rogue states, including Iraq. The para-digm used by the administration then (andnow) was that of state-sponsored terrorism,which has traditionally been defined asnations using “terrorism as a means of politi-cal expression.”99 But this is exactly the wrongapproach because Al Qaeda’s terrorism is notstate sponsored; it is private terrorism,100 inde-pendent of any one nation-state. To be sure, AlQaeda will take advantage of a willing host asit did in Afghanistan. However, Al Qaeda’s ide-ology and agenda are internally driven, not apolitical extension of a government. And AlQaeda’s capabilities are largely self-financedand self-acquired, not bestowed by a nation-state benefactor such as Iraq. So removing anunfriendly regime and an admittedly brutaldictatorship in Iraq—however beneficial thatmight be for the people of Iraq and howevernoble the intention of bringing democracy tothat country and region—did not diminish,and may have increased, the Al Qaeda terroristthreat, which is the real threat to U.S. security.

14

The terroristgroups that target other

countries are notdirect threats to

America, and the United

States cannotrealistically target

everyone else’sterrorist

enemies—morethan 70 groups.

“Iraq is now the central front [in the waron terrorism].”

If Iraq has become the central front in thewar on terrorism, it is only because of the U.S.decision to invade that country. Iraq was nota hotbed for Al Qaeda under SaddamHussein’s brutal rule, but Al Qaeda has skill-fully used the Iraq war to rally more people toits cause. In February 2003 an audiotapebelieved to be the voice of Osama bin Ladencalled for Muslim resistance against anAmerican attack on Iraq:

• “We stress the importance of the mar-tyrdom operations against the enemy—operations that inflicted harm on theUnited States and Israel that have beenunprecedented in their history, thanksto Almighty God.

• “We also point out that whoever sup-ported the United States, including thehypocrites of Iraq or the rulers of Arabcountries, those who approved theiractions and followed them in this cru-sade war by fighting with them or pro-viding bases and administrative sup-port, or any form of support, even bywords, to kill the Muslims in Iraq,should know that they are apostates andoutside the community of Muslims.

• “We also stress to honest Muslims thatthey should move, incite, and mobilizethe [Islamic] nation, amid such graveevents and hot atmosphere so as to lib-erate themselves from those unjust andrenegade ruling regimes, which areenslaved by the United States.

• “Regardless of the removal or the sur-vival of the socialist party or Saddam,Muslims in general and the Iraqis in par-ticular must brace themselves for jihadagainst this unjust campaign andacquire ammunition and weapons.”101

A May 2003 audiotape believed to be thevoice of bin Laden’s top lieutenant, Ayman alZawahiri, condemns Arab countries that sup-ported the U.S.-led war against Iraq andurges Muslims to carry out more suicide

attacks.102 A videotape aired on the secondanniversary of 9/11 showed bin Laden and alZawahiri and included audio of al Zawahiricalling on Iraqi guerrillas to “bury” U.S.troops.103 And an October 2003 audiotapebroadcast on Al Jazeera and attributed to binLaden calls on young Muslims to take upholy war against the United States: “O youngpeople of Islam everywhere, especially in theneighboring countries [of Iraq] and inYemen, you should pursue jihad and rollyour sleeves up.”104

The irony is that the Iraq war has made theanti-U.S. terrorist problem worse. Althoughthe administration claims that the war on ter-rorism is not a crusade against Islam, Gen.William Boykin’s remarks to the contrary,105

the U.S. occupation makes the radicalIslamists’ case that the West is invadingIslam,106 which only encourages the Muslimworld (regardless of its sympathies for binLaden and Al Qaeda) to unite against theUnited States. The U.S. military presence inIraq serves as a target (much as it was inLebanon in the 1980s) and is a magnet andrecruiting poster for Isalmic jihadists (AlQaeda or otherwise). And the decision to go towar against Iraq could ultimately make prose-cuting the war against Al Qaeda more difficult,because the administration’s focus on Iraqcomes at the expense of focusing attention andresources on Al Qaeda and the ill will of manyfriends and allies generated by the war couldadversely affect future cooperation needed todismantle Al Qaeda cells around the world.

“We are aggressively striking the terror-ists in Iraq, defeating them there so wewill not have to face them in our owncountry.”

To be sure, Al Qaeda may be taking advan-tage of the U.S. situation in Iraq and could bebehind some of the terrorist attacks there—for example, the bombing of the UN head-quarters in Baghdad in August 2003, thebombing of the Red Cross in Baghdad inOctober 2003, and the bombing of theItalian paramilitary base in Nasiriyah inNovember 2003. But the opposition to the

15

The U.S. occupation ofIraq makes theradical Islamists’case that the Wesis invading Islamwhich onlyencourages theMuslim world tounite against theUnited States.

U.S. occupation of Iraq does not come pri-marily from Al Qaeda. First and foremost,the Sunni Baathists, who formerly held thereins of power under Saddam Hussein, areresisting the change brought by U.S. militaryaction.107 Over time, their attacks have grownmore frequent, more sophisticated, and morelethal, but they are not terrorists who wouldotherwise attack the United States. Second,and seemingly overlooked, is the fact that agrowing number of Iraqis are resentful offoreign military occupation and control oftheir country. Again, these are not peoplewho would otherwise flock to Al Qaeda’scause and kill innocent Americans. Andthose Al Qaeda operatives who may be in Iraq(ironically, there are probably more Al Qaedain Iraq now than when Saddam Hussein wasin power) are more than likely there simplybecause the U.S. military presence is a conve-nient target in their own neighborhood. It isfar easier for Al Qaeda to filter over the rela-tively porous and largely unguarded Iraqiborders (essentially equivalent in length tothe U.S.-Mexican border that hundreds ofthousands of illegal immigrants sneak acrossevery year) than to fly thousands of miles tothe United States.

President Bush’s statement also assumesthat, because the U.S. military is engaged inIraq and Al Qaeda may be behind some of theterrorist attacks in Iraq, Al Qaeda is preclud-ed from attacking elsewhere. The evidencesuggests otherwise. Car bombings in Riyadhon May 12, 2003, and November 9, 2003, inCasablanca on May 16, 2003, and in Istanbulon November 15, 2003, have all been attrib-uted to Al Qaeda. To be sure, Al Qaeda maynot currently have the resources and capabil-ities to mount an attack against the UnitedStates (especially a massive attack on thescale of 9/11). However, if that is the case,Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghan-istan, not U.S. military operations in Iraq, isresponsible for degrading Al Qaeda. Accord-ing to the IISS:

U.S.-led military action in Afghanistanin response to the 11 September 2001

attacks and the continued allied mili-tary presence there released theTaliban’s stranglehold on the countryand deprived bin Laden, his inner cir-cle, and hundreds of rank-and-file AlQaeda members of a friendly host, arecruiting “magnet,” and a comfort-able physical base for training andoperations.108

Iraq is not Afghanistan where Al Qaedawas given safe haven and known to operate.Thus, U.S. military action in Iraq has had lit-tle or no direct effect on the ranks of AlQaeda or its infrastructure. According to theIISS:

The counter-terrorism effort has alsoperversely impelled an already highlydecentralized and evasive transnation-al terrorist network to become more“virtual” and protean and, therefore,harder to identify and neutralize . . . AlQaeda’s greatest advantage is the logis-tical and operational flexibility afford-ed by having no state to defend, allow-ing it to maintain a flat, transnational,and clandestine organizational schemewith minimal dedicated “bricks-and-mortar” infrastructure. . . .

The only physical infrastructure AlQaeda now requires is safe houses toassemble bombs and to store weaponscaches. Otherwise, notebook comput-ers, encryption software, the Internet,multiple passports, and the ease of glob-al transportation enable Al Qaeda tofunction as a largely invisible entity.109

Therefore, continuing U.S. military opera-tions in Iraq should not be cause to dismissthe warning issued by a group linked to AlQaeda, the Abu-Hafs al-Masri Brigades, inthe wake of the November 2003 car bomb-ings in Turkey: “We tell the criminal Bushand his Arab and Western tails—especiallyBritain, Italy, Australia, and Japan—the carsof death will not stop at Baghdad, Riyadh,Istanbul, Nasiriyah, Jakarta, etc., until you see

16

Iraq is notAfghanistan

where Al Qaedawas given safe

haven and knownto operate. Thus,

U.S. militaryaction in Iraq has

had little or nodirect effect onthe ranks of Al

Qaeda or itsinfrastructure.

them with your own eyes in the middle of thecapital of this era’s tyrant, America.”110

Even worse, the continued U.S. militaryoccupation and insistence on creating ademocracy in the image of this country maydo more to create anti-American sentimentin Iraq, which breeds hatred that becomes asteppingstone to violence, including terror-ism. A Gallup poll conducted in August andSeptember 2003 that shows growing Iraqiskepticism about the United States’ motivesand intentions is indicative of this possibility:

• “More than half of Baghdad’s residents . . .did not believe the United States wouldallow the Iraqi people to fashion theirpolitical future without the direct influ-ence of Washington.

• “Only 5 percent of those polled . . .believed the United States invaded Iraq‘to assist the Iraqi people,’ and only 1percent believed it was to establishdemocracy there.

• “Forty-three percent of the respondentssaid they believed that U.S. and Britishforces invaded in March primarily ‘torob Iraq’s oil.’”

• Eleven percent “believed the motive wasto ‘change the Middle East map as theU.S. and Israel want.’”111

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of thepoll is that “those who believed such attacks[against U.S. troops] were somewhat or com-pletely justified—11 percent and 8 percent,respectively—would translate to 440,000adults 18 or older among Baghdad’s adultpopulation of 2.3 million.”112 Those Iraqisform the basis of a recruiting pool for AlQaeda.

And stepped-up U.S. military action in Iraqagainst Iraqi insurgents, not Al Qaeda, mayalso do more to create potential anti-Americanterrorists. For example, in the so-called SunniTriangle, which is viewed as the hotbed of theIraqi resistance and where most of the coali-tion deaths have occurred, the United Statesincreased the intensity of its operations in mid-November 2003.113 According to one U.S. offi-

cer, “Part of warfare is coercion and affectingthe hearts and minds of the enemy and cer-tainly a show of force is a tool that can be usedby a commander.”114 One such “show of force”was U.S. F-16 fighter jets dropping several 500-pound bombs in Fallujah, which may have hadmore of an effect on Iraqis previously sympa-thetic to the United States than on the enemy.According to one resident in the area where thebombs exploded: “We used to have hopes ofthe Americans after they removed Saddam. Wehad liked them until this weekend. Why didthey drop bombs near us and hurt and terrifymy children like this?”115

In other words, the United States mayexperience a cycle very similar to the one theIsraelis experience in the West Bank, wheremilitary action, however well justified, createsspillover effects that result in more new ter-rorists. For example, the suicide bomberresponsible for killing 19 Israelis in Haifa atthe beginning of October 2003 was a 27-year-old apprentice lawyer, Hanadi Jaradat. Ms.Jaradat’s parents said they “had no indicationthat their daughter had any contacts withIslamic militants—no sense, they said, thatshe had any ambition but to establish hercareer as a lawyer, marry, and have chil-dren.”116 But she had motivation: an Israelicrackdown that resulted in the shootingdeath of her brother, Fadi, 23, and her cousinSaleh, 31. Aggressive U.S. military tacticsmay, in fact, be necessary to deal with Iraqiinsurgents and terrorists. But such tacticsmay create more terrorists. If the Israeli expe-rience is any indication, such a cycle will onlyplay into the hands of Osama bin Laden andAl Qaeda.

Finally, we know that the presence of 5,000U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf Warwas a basis for Osama bin Laden’s hatred ofthe United States and one of his stated reasonsfor engaging in terrorism, including the devas-tating attacks of September 11 that killedmore than 3,000 innocent people.117 EvenDeputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz,thought by many to be the architect of theadministration’s Iraq policy, admits that U.S.forces in Saudi Arabia were “a huge recruiting

17

The continuedU.S. militaryoccupation and insistence oncreating a democracy in theimage of thiscountry may create anti-American sentiment in Iraqwhich breedshatred thatbecomes a steppingstone toviolence, includ-ing terrorism.

device for Al Qaeda. In fact if you look at binLaden, one of his principal grievances was thepresence of so-called crusader forces on theholy land, Mecca and Medina.”118 Althoughvirtually all U.S. troops have now beenremoved from Saudi Arabia,119 President Bushhas talked about making a commitment todemocracy in the Middle East (presumablystarting with Iraq) that “must be a focus ofAmerican policy for decades to come.”120 Anddespite Pentagon plans to reduce U.S. trooplevels in Iraq in 2004, the projected force willstill be 105,000 troops.121 The troop draw-down, however, “does not mean we wouldphysically leave the country any sooner,”122

according to Secretary Rumsfeld. PresidentBush asserts, “We will stay there [in Iraq] untilthe job is done and then we will leave,”123 butthe question of when “the job is done”remains unanswered.124 One can only imaginehow such a large U.S. military presence in theheart of the Middle East over a protracted peri-od might fuel Al Qaeda’s rhetoric, recruiting,and future actions.

Ironically, President Bush provided hisown indictment of the Iraq war when headdressed the UN General Assembly inSeptember 2003: “No government shouldignore the threat of terror, because to lookthe other way gives terrorists the chance toregroup and recruit and prepare.”125 But thatis exactly what the Iraq war has done. And tomake matters even worse, the American tax-payer is stuck with the bill for the war andpostwar reconstruction—currently $150 bil-lion126 and likely to grow.127 When you add itall up, it’s hard to imagine how the Iraq warcould have been more wrong.

Notes1. White House, “President Bush AnnouncesMajor Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended,”news release, May 1, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html.

2. White House, “President Addresses theNation,” news release, September 7, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/iraq/20030907-1.html.

3. White House, “Remarks by the President atBush-Cheney 2004 Luncheon,” news release,November 3, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/200311003-08.html.

4. “THE PRESIDENT: David Kay’s report saidthat Saddam Hussein was in material breach of1441, which would have been casus belli. . . . Butone of the things that he first found was that thereis clear violation of the U.N. Security CouncilResolution 1441. Material breach, they call it in thediplomatic circles. Casus belli, it means . . . thatwould have been a cause for a war.” White House,“President Holds Press Conference,” news release,October 28, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031028-2.html.

5. Resolution 1441 states that “Iraq has been andremains in material breach of its obligationsunder relevant resolutions” and that the resolu-tion was “a final opportunity to comply with itsdisarmament obligations under relevant resolu-tions of the Council.” Furthermore, “failure byIraq at any time to comply with, and cooperatefully in the implementation of, this resolutionshall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’sobligations,” and Iraq is warned that “it will faceserious consequences as a result of its continuedviolations of its obligations.” Military action isnever explicitly directed. At best it is implied bythe term “serious consequences” and the state-ment that “resolution 678 (1990) authorizedMember States to use all necessary means touphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990)of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions sub-sequent to resolution 660 (1990) and to restoreinternational peace and security in the area.”United Nations Security Council Resolution1441, November 8, 2002, http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement. To be sure, those state-ments could be interpreted to authorize the useof force (and may even be generally accepted tomean such), but they are not an explicit autho-rization.

6. Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon& Schuster, 2002), p 49. CBSNews.com also report-ed that “barely five hours after American AirlinesFlight 77 plowed into the Pentagon, DefenseSecretary Donald H. Rumsfeld was telling hisaides to come up with plans for striking Iraq—eventhough there was no evidence linking SaddamHussein to the attacks.” CBSNews.com, September4, 2002, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/04/september11/main520830.shtml.

7. “Wolfowitz seized the opportunity. AttackingAfghanistan would be uncertain. He worriedabout 100,000 American troops bogged down inmountain fighting in Afghanistan six months

18

President Bushprovided his ownindictment of theIraq war when headdressed the UNGeneral Assembly

in September2003.

from then. In contrast, Iraq was a brittle oppres-sive regime that might break easily. It was doable.”Woodward, p. 83.

8. Ibid., p. 99.

9. Quoted in ibid., p. 107.

10. White House, “Address to a Joint Session ofCongress and the American People,” news release,September 20, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.

11. White House, “Radio Address of the Presidentto the Nation,” news release, October 6, 2001,http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011006.html.

12. White House, “President Welcomes AidWorkers Rescued from Afghanistan,” news release,November 26, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011126-1.html.

13. “Q: I’m just asking if you’ve expanded yourdefinition to countries who don’t just harbor ter-rorists, but also develop such weapons. THEPRESIDENT: Have I expanded the definition?I’ve always had that definition, as far as I’m con-cerned.” Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. White House, “President Speaks on War Effortto Citadel Cadets,” news release, December 11,2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011211-6.html.

16. Ibid.

17. “Wanted: Dead or Alive,” ABCNews.com, Sep-tember 17, 2001, http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/WTC_MAIN010917.html; and“Bush: As Long As It Takes, Dead or Alive,”CNN.com, December 28, 2001, http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/12/28/gen.war.against.terror/.

18. White House, “The President’s State of theUnion Address,” news release, January 29, 2002,http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.

19. Quoted in Walter Pincus, “Tenet Says AlQaeda Still Poses Threat,” Washington Post,February 7, 2002, p. A1.

20. Quoted in John J. Lumpkin, Associated Press,“Al-Qaeda Operations Found in Pakistan,”YahooNews.com, March 7, 2002, http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20020307/ap_on_re_as/attacks_al_qaida_8&cid=535.

21. “Authorization for Use of Military Force

(Agreed to by the House),” H. J. Res. 64, September14, 2001.

22. That Al Qaeda was no longer central to thewar on terrorism was further evidenced by thefact that the Basque separatist movement E.T.A.was added to the list of organizations that theBush administration is taking financial actionagainst as part of the war on terrorism. TreasurySecretary Paul H. O’Neill characterized the E.T.A.as a terrorist organization of global reach andsaid: “Our crackdown on terrorists is blind tonationality and origin. It’s a net being cast on allterrorist parasites that threaten our allies and ournational security.” Quoted in Joseph Kahn,“Expanding Financial Assault on Terror, U.S.Penalizes Basque Group,” New York Times online,February 27, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/27/international/europe/_27ASSE.html.Also, the U.S. war on drugs was combined withthe war on terrorism in Colombia. KarenDeYoung, “U.S. May End Curbs on Aid toColombia,” Washington Post online, March 15, 2002,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A29575-2002Mar14.html.

23. International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISI), Military Balance 2002–2003 (London:Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 241, 279.

24. Ibid., pp. 105–6.

25. Ibid., p. 106.

26. Ibid., p. 22.

27. Anthony H. Cordesman, “If We Fight Iraq:Iraq and the Conventional Military Balance,”Center for Strategic and International Studies,January 31, 2002, p. 1.

28. Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iraq’s MilitaryCapabilities: Fighting a Wounded, But Dangerous,Poisonous Snake,” Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, December 3, 2001, p. 6.

29. “I believe demolishing Hussein’s militarypower and liberating Iraq would be a cakewalk.Let me give simple, responsible reasons: (1) It wasa cakewalk last time; (2) they’ve become muchweaker; (3) we’ve become much stronger; and (4)now we’re playing for keeps.” Ken Adelman,“Cakewalk in Iraq,” Washington Post, February 13,2002, p. A27. Of course, characterizing the waragainst Iraq as a “cakewalk” begs the question ofhow Iraq could be such an imminent threat.

30. President Bush announced the commence-ment of Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 19,2003. On April 14, 2003, “Maj. Gen. StanleyMcChrystal, vice director of operations for theJoint Chiefs of Staff, said in Washington that the

19

fall of Tikrit meant ‘major combat operations areover’ in the 26-day military campaign.” RajivChandrasekaran, “Mission Shifts to RestoringOrder, Finding Militiamen,” Washington Post, April15, 2003, p. A1.

31. “In Cheney’s Word’s: The AdministrationCase for Removing Saddam Hussein,” New YorkTimes, August 27, 2002, p. A8.

32. White House, “President Bush Outlines IraqiThreat,” news release, October 7, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html.

33. Quoted in Walter Pincus, “Bush FacedDwindling Data on Iraq Nuclear Bid,” WashingtonPost, July 16, 2003, p. A1. That statement has sincebeen clarified. According to Cheney, “We neverhad any evidence that [Hussein] had acquired anynuclear weapons.” Quoted in Helen Thomas,“Hussein Link Was Sales Job,” Miami Herald,September 27, 2003, p. A27.

34. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Iraq’sWeapons of Mass Destruction Programs,”October 2002, p. 1.

35. Ibid., p. 10.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., p. 13.

38. CIA, “Unclassified Report to Congress on theAcquisition of Technology Relating to Weaponsof Mass Destruction and Advanced ConventionalMunitions, 1 January through 30 June 2000,”http://www.cia.gov.cia/publications/bian/bian_jan_2002.htm (accessed on May 9, 2002).

39. CIA, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass DestructionPrograms,” p. 1.

40. Ibid., pp. 5, 6.

41. Ibid., p. 6.

42. IISI, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: ANet Assessment,” September 9, 2002, p. 27.Emphasis added.

43. CIA, “Unclassified Report to Congress on theAcquisition of Technology Relating to Weaponsof Mass Destruction and Advanced ConventionalMunitions.”

44. In his presentation to the United Nations onFebruary 5, 2003, making the case for militaryaction against Iraq, Secretary of State ColinPowell stated: “We also have satellite photos thatindicate that banned materials have recently been

moved from a number of weapons of massdestruction facilities. . . . This one is about aweapons munitions facility, a facility that holdsammunition at a place called Taji. This is one ofabout 65 such facilities in Iraq. We know that thisone has housed chemical munitions.” Colin L.Powell, “Remarks to the United Nations SecurityCouncil,” February 5, 2003, www.state.gov/secre-tary/rm/2003/17300.htm. During the war, onMarch 30, 2003, Secretary of Defense DonaldRumsfeld said: “We know where they [WMD] are.They’re in the area around Tikrit and Baghdadand east, west, south and north somewhat.” Hehas since backtracked: “I should have said, ‘Ibelieve they’re in that area; our intelligence tells usthey’re in that area.’” Quoted in Vernon Loeb,“Rumsfeld Backs U.N. Resolution on Iraq,”Washington Post, September 11, 2003, p. A17.

45. David Kay, “Kay Text,” Associated Press,October 2, 2003, http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20031003/ap_on_re_mi_ea/kay_text_6.

46. Quoted in Dana Priest and Walter Pincus,“Search in Iraq Finds No Banned Weapons,”Washington Post, October 3, 2003, p. A1.

47. Quoted in Dana Milbank and Walter Pincus,“Cheney Goes on Offensive over Iraq,” WashingtonPost, October 11, 2003, p. A1.

48. White House, “President Delivers ‘State of theUnion,’” news release, January 28, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.

49. “Fake Iraq Documents ‘Embarrassing’ forU.S.,” CNN.com, March 14, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/14/sprj.irq.documents/index.html; “Ex-Envoy: Uranium Claim Unfounded,”CNN.com, July 8, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/07/07/cnna.wil son/index.html; and “TenetAdmits Error in Approving Bush Speech,” CNN.com July 12, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/07/11/sprj.irq.wmdspeech/index.html.

50. Before the war, there was open disagreementwithin the U.S. intelligence community overwhether the aluminum tubes were for centrifugesor artillery rockets. State Department andDepartment of Energy analysts thought the tubeswere too long and too thick for centrifuges. TheCIA and Pentagon analysts thought the tubescould be cut down and reamed out. See Pincus,“Bush Faced Dwindling Data on Iraq NuclearBid.” And the Iternational Atomic Energy Agencyconcluded in January 2003 that the tubes werelikely for artillery rockets and not suitable for ura-nium enrichment without significant modifica-tion. See Joby Warrick, “Doubts Remain aboutPurpose of Specialized Aluminum Tubes,”

20

Washington Post, February 6, 2003, p. A29.

51. Barton Gellman, “Search in Iraq Fails to FindNuclear Threat,” Washington Post, October 26, 2003,p. A1.

52. Quoted in ibid.

53. Quoted in ibid.

54. Quoted in Priest and Pincus.

55. Quoted in Milbank and Pincus.

56. IISI, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction,” p.71.

57. CIA, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass DestructionPrograms,” p. 17.

58. CIA,” Foreign Missile Developments and theBallistic Missile Threat through 2015,” December2001, http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/Unclassifiedballisticmissilefinal.htm.Emphasis in original.

59. Ibid. Emphasis in original.

60. Quoted in William B. Arkin, “U.S. Nukes inthe Gulf,” The Nation, December 31, 1990, p. 834.

61. Neil Livingstone, “Iraq’s Intentional Omission,”Sea Power, June 1991, pp. 29–30.

62. Keith B. Payne, “Why We Must Sustain NuclearDeterrence,” National Institute for Public Policy,1998, http://www.nipp.org/Adobe/Op%20Ed%203_20_98.pdf.

63. George Tenet, letter to Bob Graham, October7, 2002, http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/cia/ciassci10702iraqltr.pdf.

64. Ibid.

65. U.S. Department of Defense, “Findings of theNuclear Posture Review,” January 9, 2002. Notethat the actual countries are not named in thisbriefing.

66. White House, “The President’s State of theUnion Address,” January 29, 2002.

67. White House, “President’s Remarks at theUnited Nations General Assembly,” news release,September 12, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html.

68. White House, “President Bush Discusses Iraqwith Congressional Leaders,” news releaseSeptember 26, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/iraq/20020926-7.html.

69. White House, “President Bush Outlines IraqiThreat.”

70. White House, “Iraq Must Disarm SaysPresident in South Dakota Speech,” news releaseNovember 3, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/iraq/20021103-3.html.

71. White House, “Remarks by the President inTerrell for Senate and Louisiana Republican PartyLuncheon,” news release, December 3, 2002,http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/iraq/20021203-3.html.

72. White House, “President Delivers ‘State of theUnion,’” January 28, 2003.

73. Quoted in Walter Pincus, “CIA Finds NoEvidence Hussein Sought to Arm Terrorists,”Washington Post, November 16, 2003, p. A20.

74. White House, “President Bush Outlines IraqiThreat.”

75. White House, “Iraq Must Disarm SaysPresident in South Dakota Speech.”

76. White House, “President Delivers ‘State ofthe Union,’” January 28, 2003.

77. White House, “President George BushDiscusses Iraq in National Press Conference,” newsrelease, March 6, 2003, http://www.white house.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030306-8.html.

78. White House, “President Bush AnnouncesMajor Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended.”

79. White House, “President Addresses theNation.”

80. “Interview with Condoleezza Rice: The Waron Terror and in Iraq,” ABC Good MorningAmerica, transcript, September 8, 2003.

81. “Vice President Dick Cheney Discusses the Warwith Iraq, the Economy, and Other Topics,” NBCMeet the Press, transcript, September 14, 2003.

82. Dana Milbank and Claudia Deane, “HusseinLink to 9/11 Lingers in Many Minds,” WashingtonPost, September 6, 2003, p. A1.

83. Quoted in Dana Milbank, “Bush DisavowsHussein–Sept. 11 Link,” Washington Post, September18, 2003, p. A18.

84. “Atta Met Twice with Iraqi Intelligence,”CNN.com, October 11, 2001, http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/10/11/inv.atta.meetings/.

85. Quoted in Robert Novak, “No Iraqi Connec-

21

tion,” TownHall.com, October 15, 2001, http://www.townhall.com/columnists/robertnovak/rn20011015.shtml.

86. Quoted in “Israel Denies Iraqi Terror AttackLink,” BBC News, September 23, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middle_east/newsid_1559000/1559353.stm.

87. Dana Priest and Glenn Kessler, “Iraq, 9/11 StillLinked by Cheney,” Washington Post, September 29,2003, p. A1.

88. Quoted in ibid.

89. Ibid.

90. White House, “U.S. Secretary of State ColinPowell Addresses the U.N. Security Council,”news release, February 5, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/iraq/20030205-1.html.

91. U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of GlobalTerrorism 2002,” April 2003, p. 128.

92. Quoted in Spencer Ackerman, “The WeakestLink,” Washington Monthly, November 2003, p. 18.

93. Quoted in ibid.

94. “Bin Laden Tape: Text,” BBC News online,February 12, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2751019.stm.

95. Quoted in Dana Priest and Walter Pincus,“Bin Laden–Hussein Link Hazy,” Washington Post,February 13, 2003, p. A20.

96. U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of GlobalTerrorism 2002,” p. 79.

97. According to the State Department, the AbuNidal organization “has not staged a major attackagainst Western targets since the late 1980s.” TheAbu Abbas faction of the Palestine LiberationFront “was responsible for the attack in 1985 onthe Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murderof US citizen Leon Klinghoffer.” Ibid., pp. 101, 117.

98. Ibid., pp. 99, 125.

99. U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of GlobalTerrorism 2000, Overview of State-SponsoredTerrorism,” April 30, 2001, http://www.state.gov/s /ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/2441.htm.

100. This is how Peter Bergen, author of Holy War,Inc. and one of the few Western journalists tointerview Osama bin Laden, described Al Qaeda inan interview, “Terrorism’s CEO,” The Atlanticonline, January 9, 2002, http://www.theatlantic.

com/unbound/interviews/int2002-01-09.htm.

101. “Bin Laden Tape: Text.”

102. “‘Al Qaeda’ Urges Fresh Attacks,” BBC Newsonline, May 21, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3047457.stm.

103. “Al Qaeda Tape ‘Authentic,’” BBC Newsonline, September 11, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3101182.stm.

104. “Bin Laden Messages: Full Text,” BBC Newsonline, October 18, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3204230.stm.

105. Lt. Gen. William Boykin is the deputy under-secretary of defense for intelligence and war-fight-ing support. He is an evangelical Christian whohas made several controversial statements aboutIslam while wearing his military uniform at pri-vate gatherings. Some of his remarks include: “Iknew that my God was a real God, and his [aMuslim fighter in Somalia] was an idol” and “Theenemy [Islamic extremists] is a spiritual enemy.He’s called the principality of darkness. Theenemy is a guy called Satan.” Quoted in Reuters,“Rumsfeld Praises Army General Who RidiculesIslam as ‘Satan,’” New York Times, October 17,2003, p. A7.

106. See Michael Vlahos, “The Story of War,” TechCentral Station, November 6, 2003, http://www.techcentralstation.com/110603A.html.

107. According to Army Gen. John Abizaid, headof the U.S. Central Command and the top mili-tary commander in Iraq, the “clear and most dan-gerous enemy to us at the present time are the for-mer regime loyalists.” Quoted in Mike Allen, “AlQaeda at Work in Iraq, Bush Tells BBC,”Washington Post, November 6, 2003, p. A22.

108. IISS, The Military Balance 2003–2004 (London:Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 354.

109. Ibid., pp. 354, 355.

110. Quoted in Molly Moore, “Al Qaeda ClaimsAttacks in Turkey,” Washington Post, November 17,2003, p. A1.

111. Walter Pincus, “Skepticism about U.S. Deep,Iraq Poll Shows,” Washington Post, November 12,2003, p. A18.

112. Ibid.

113. It is telling that the mid-November 2003 mili-tary operation was dubbed Operation IronHammer, which carries a much harsher and darkertone than the original Operation Iraqi Freedom.

22

114. Quoted in Slobodan Lekic, Associated Press,“U.S. Military Policeman Killed in Iraq,” Novem-ber 10, 2003, YahooNews.com, http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20031110/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_313.

115. Quoted in Andrew Gray, Reuters, “BremerSees More Iraq Attacks, Oilman Shot,” November10, 2003, YahooNews.com, http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/nm/20031110/wl_nm/iraq_dc_138.

116. John F. Burns, “The Mideast in Turmoil: TheAttacker,” New York Times, October 7, 2003, p. A13.

117. According to Al Qaeda expert RohanGunaratna: “What Osama and his followers objectto is not so much the American way of life, not somuch Americans themselves, as what they perceivethe American government, in the shape of its for-eign policy, is doing to Muslim countries, includ-ing Saudi Arabia, the occupation of which is intol-erable to Osama.” Rohan Gunaratna, Inside AlQaeda (New York: Columbia University Press,2002), p. 45. This is reinforced by Peter Bergen, oneof the few Western journalists to interview binLaden: “What he condemns the United States for issimple: its policies in the Middle East. Those are, torecap briefly: the continued U.S. military presencein Arabia; U.S. support for Israel; its continuedbombing of Iraq; and its support for regimes suchas Egypt and Saudi Arabia that bin Laden regardsas apostates from Islam.” Peter L. Bergen, Holy War,Inc. (New York: Free Press, 2001), p. 223.

118. “Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview withSam Tanenhaus,” Vanity Fair, May 9, 2003, newstranscript, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030509-depsecdef0223.html.

119. John R. Bradley, “US Troops Quit SaudiArabia,” August 28, 2003, The Telegraph (London)online, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/08/28/wsaud28.xml.

120. White House, “President Bush Discusses

Freedom in Iraq and Middle East,” news release,November 6, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html.

121. Bradley Graham, “Pentagon to Shrink IraqForce,” Washington Post, November 7, 2003, p. A1.

122. Quoted in Barry Schweid, Associated Press,“U.S. Troops to Stay in Iraq for a While,”YahooNews.com, November 14, 2003, http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=540&ncid=716&e=3&u=/ap/20031114/ap_on_re_mi_ea/us_iraq.

123. Quoted in ibid.

124. After a meeting with Iraqi women at the WhiteHouse, Bush said: “I assured these five women thatAmerica wasn’t leaving. . . . When they hear me saywe’re staying, that means we’re staying.” Quoted inTerence Hunt, Associated Press, “Bush Says U.S.Forces Won’t Leave Iraq,” November 17, 2003,YahooNews.com, http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=544&ncid=716&e=4&u=/ap/20031117/ap_on_go_pr_wh/bush_iraq.

125. White House, “President Bush AddressesUnited Nations General Assembly,” news release,September 23, 2003, http://www.white house.gov/news/releases/2003/09/iraq/20030923-4.html.

126. See Dana Milbank and Mike Allen, “Bush toDouble Iraq Spending,” Washington Post, Septem-ber 8, 2003, p. A1.

127. The White House is assuming no futurespending on Iraq and Afghanistan. However aCongressional Budget Office report assumes thateven a gradual reduction in troop strength in Iraqwill result in $160 billion in spending over thenext 10 years. The CBO also assumes that therewill be an additional $20 billion request forrebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan. JonathanWeisman, “Bush Proposals Will Keep Budget inRed, CBO Projects,” Washington Post, November 8,2003, p. A11.

23

Published by the Cato Institute, Policy Analysis is a regular series evaluating government policies and offer-ing proposals for reform. Nothing in Policy Analysis should be construed as necessarily reflecting the viewsof the Cato Institute or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before congress. Contact theCato Institute for reprint permission. Additional copies of Policy Analysis are $6.00 each ($3.00 each for fiveor more). To order, or for a complete listing of available studies, write the Cato Institute, 1000Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001, call toll free 1-800-767-1241 (noon - 9 p.m. easterntime), fax (202) 842-3490, or visit our website at www.cato.org.