Introduction to German Idealism - 5(26) Texts

8/14/2019 Introduction to German Idealism - 5(26) Texts

1/62

Introduction to German Idealism 5/26 - Robbert Veen at www.wiziq.com

Introduction to GermanIdealism (5/26)

"Self-consciousness as Principle of

Cognition"

Reading material for the lecture on

Monday February 15

th

,7 PM GMT (8 PM, CET)

The text of Hegel will be read in detail

onFriday, February 19th, at the sametime.

1


2/62


www.wiziq.com

Robbert Veen -http://www.robbertveen.com

2
http://www.wiziq.com/http://www.robbertveen.com/http://www.wiziq.com/http://www.robbertveen.com/


3/62


1. Hegel on Kant (History of Philosophy)

2. Phenomenology of Spirit: Selfconsciousness

3. Jill Vance Buroker: Kant's Critique of PureReason. An introduction

NB the passages marked in red will be used for Monday'smeeting

3


4/62


Hegel on Kant (History of Philosophy)

1. Critique of Pure Reason

4


5/62


1. In the first place, as to the theoretic philosophy, Kantin the Critique of Pure Reason sets to work in apsychological manner, i.e. historically, inasmuch as hedescribes the main stages in theoretic consciousness.The first faculty is sensuousness generally, the secondunderstanding, the third reason. All this he simplynarrates; quite empirically, without developing it from

proceeding by necessity.

a. The a priori fact of sensuous existence, the forms ofsensuous existence, constitute the beginning of thistranscendentalism. [

b. The second faculty, the understanding, is somethingvery different from sensuousness; the latter isReceptivity, while Kant calls thought in generalSpontaneity an expression which belongs to the

philosophy of Leibnitz.The understanding is activethought, I myself; it is the faculty of thinking the objectof sensuous perception. Yet it has thoughts merelywithout real content: Thoughts without content are voidand empty, sensuous perceptions without Notions are

5


6/62


blind.

The understanding thus obtains from the sensuous itsmatter, both empirical and a priori, time and space; andit thinks this matter, but its thoughts are very differentfrom this matter. Or it is a faculty of a particular kind,and it is only when both occur, when the sensuous

faculty has supplied material and the understanding hasunited to this its thoughts, that knowledge results. Thethoughts of the understanding as such are thus limitedthoughts, thoughts of the finite only.Now logic, as transcendental logic, likewise sets forth the

conceptions which the understanding has a priori in itselfand whereby it thinks objects completely a priori.Thoughts have a form which signifies their being thesynthetic function which brings the manifold into a unity.I am this unity, the transcendental apperception, the

pure apperception of self-consciousness. I=I; I mustaccompany all our conceptions. This is a barbarousexposition of the matter.

As self-consciousness I am the completely void, general

6


7/62


I, completely indeterminate and abstract; apperception isdetermination generally, the activity whereby Itransplant an empirical content into my simpleconsciousness, while perception rather signifies feelingor conceiving. In order that a content may enter thisOne, it must be infected by its simplicity; it is thus thatthe content first becomes my content. The

comprehending medium is I; whatever I have to do withmust allow itself to be forced into these forms of unity.

7


8/62


This is a great fact, an important item of knowledge;what thought produces is unity; thus it produces itself,for it is the One. Yet the fact that I am the one and, asthinking, the simplifier, is not by Kant satisfactorily setforth. The unity may likewise be called relation; for in sofar as manifold is pre-supposed, and as this on the oneside remains a manifold while on the other side it is set

forth as one, so far may it be said to be related.

Now as I is the universal transcendental unity of self-consciousness which binds together the empirical matterof conception generally, there are various modes in this

relationship, and here we have the transcendentalnature of the categories or universal thought-determinations.[]

8


9/62


Thinking understanding is thus indeed the source of theindividual categories, but because on their own accountthey are void and empty, they only have significancethrough their union with the given, manifold material ofperception, feeling, &c. Such connection of sensuousmaterial with categories now constitutes the facts ofexperience, i.e. the matter of sensation after it is brought

under the categories; and this is knowledge generally.(13)

9
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hp/hpkant1.htm#fn13http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hp/hpkant1.htm#fn13


10/62


Kant however connects with this the statement thatexperience grasps phenomena only, and that by meansof the knowledge which we obtain through experiencewe do not know things as they are in themselves, butonly as they are in the form of laws of perception andsensuousness. For the first component part ofexperience, sensation, is doubtless subjective, since it is

connected with our organs. The matter of perception isonly what it is in my sensation.

I know of this sensation only and not of the thing. But, inthe second place, the objective, which ought to

constitute the opposite to this subjective side, is itselfsubjective likewise: it does not indeed pertain to myfeeling, but it remains shut up in the region of my self-consciousness; the categories are only determinations ofour thinking understanding. Neither the one nor the

other is consequently anything in itself, nor are bothtogether, knowledge, anything in itself, for it only knowsphenomena a strange contradiction.

10


11/62


Hegel on Kant

2. Self-consciousness in the

Phenomenology of Spirit

11


12/62


THE TRUTH WHICH CONSCIOUS CERTAINTYOF SELF REALIZES

IN the kinds of certainty hitherto considered, the truth forconsciousness is something other than consciousnessitself. The conception, however, of this truth vanishes inthe course of our experience of it. What the object

immediately was in itself--whether mere being in sense-certainty, a concrete thing in perception, or force in thecase of understanding--it turns out, in truth, not to bethis really; but instead, this inherent nature (Ansich)proves to be a way in which it is for an other. The

abstract conception of the object gives way before theactual concrete object, or the first immediate idea iscancelled in the course of experience. Mere certaintyvanished in favour of the truth.

There has now arisen, however, what was notestablished in the case of these previous relationships,viz. a certainty which is on a par with its truth, for thecertainty is to itself its own object, and consciousness isto itself the truth. Otherness, no doubt, is also found

12


13/62


there; consciousness, that is, makes a distinction; butwhat is distinguished is of such a kind thatconsciousness, at the same time, holds there is nodistinction made. If we call the movement of knowledgeconception, and knowledge, qua simple unity or Ego, theobject, we see that not only for us [tracing the process],but likewise for knowledge itself, the object corresponds

to the conception; or, if we put it in the other form andcall conception what the object is in itself, while applyingthe term object to what the object is qua object or for another, it is clear that being "in-itself" and being "for another" are here the same. For the inherent being (Ansich)

is consciousness; yet it is still just as much that for whichan other (viz. what is "in-itself") is. And it is forconsciousness that the inherent nature (Ansich)of theobject, and its "being for an other" are [219] one and thesame. Ego is the content of the relation, and itself the

process of relating. It is Ego itself which is opposed to another and, at the same time, reaches out beyond thisother, which other is all the same taken to be only itself.[]What seems to have been lost, then, is only the principal

13


14/62


moment, viz. the simple fact of having independentsubsistence for consciousness. But, in reality, self-consciousness is reflexion out of the bare being thatbelongs to the world of sense and perception, and isessentially the return out of otherness. As self-consciousness, it is movement. But when itdistinguishes only its self as such from itself, distinction

is straightway taken to be superseded in the sense ofinvolving otherness.The distinction is not, and self-consciousness is only motionless tautology, Ego is Ego, Iam I. When for self-consciousness the distinction doesnot also have the shape ofbeing, it is notself-

consciousness. For [220] self-consciousness, then,otherness is a fact, it does exist as a distinct moment;but the unity of itself with this difference is also a fact forself-consciousness, and is a second distinct moment.With that first moment, self-consciousness occupies the

position of consciousness, and the whole expanse of theworld of sense is conserved as its object, but at the sametime only as related to the second moment, the unity ofself-consciousness with itself. And, consequently, thesensible world is regarded by self-consciousness as

14


15/62


having a subsistence which is, however, onlyappearance, or forms a distinction from self-consciousness thatper se has no being. This oppositionof its appearance and its truth finds its real essence,however, only in the truth--in the unity of self-consciousness with itself. This unity must becomeessential to self-consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness is

the state ofDesire in general. Consciousness has, quaself-consciousness, henceforth a twofold object--the oneimmediate, the object of sense-certainty and ofperception, which, however, is here found to be markedby the character of negation; the second, viz. itself,

which is the true essence, and is found in the firstinstance only in the opposition of the first object to it.Self-consciousness presents itself here as the process inwhich this opposition is removed, and oneness or identitywith itself established.

For us or implicitly, the object, which is the negativeelement for self-consciousness, has on its side returnedinto itself, just as on the other side-consciousness hasdone. Through this reflexion into self, the object hasbecome Life. What self-consciousness distinguishes as

15


16/62


having a being distinct from itself, has in it too, so far asit is affirmed to be, not merely the aspect of sense-certainty and perception; it is a being reflected into itself,and the object of immediate desire is something living.For the inherent reality (Ansich), the general result of therelation of the understanding to [221] the inner nature ofthings, is the distinguishing of what cannot be

distinguished, or is the unity of what is distinguished.This unity, however, is, as we saw, just as much its recoilfrom itself; and this conception breaks asunder into theopposition of self-consciousness and life: the former isthe unity for which the absolute unity of differences

exists, the latter, however, is only this unity itself, so thatthe unity is not at the same time for itself.Thus,according to the independence possessed byconsciousness, is the independence which its object initself possesses. Self-consciousness, which is absolutely

for itself, and characterizes its object directly asnegative, or is primarily desire, will really, therefore, findthrough experience this object's independence.The determination of the principle of life(2) as obtainedfrom the conception or general result with which we

16
http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/texts/hegel%20phen/hegel%20phen%20ch%204.htm#N_2_http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/texts/hegel%20phen/hegel%20phen%20ch%204.htm#N_2_


17/62


enter this new sphere, is sufficient to characterize it,without its nature being evolved further out of thatnotion. Its circuit is completed in the following moments.The essential element (Wesen) is infinitude as thesupersession of all distinctions, the pure rotation on itsown axis, itself at rest while being absolutely restlessinfinitude, the very self-dependence in which the

differences brought out in the process are all dissolved,the simple reality of time, which in this self-identity hasthe solid form and shape of space. The differences,however, all the same hold as differences in this simpleuniversal medium; for this universal flux exercises its

negative activity merely in that it is the sublation ofthem; but it could not transcend them unless they had asubsistence of their own. Precisely this flux is itself, asself-identical independence, their subsistence or theirsubstance, in which they accordingly are distinct

members, parts which have being in their own right.Being no longer has the significance of mere [222]abstract being, nor has their naked essence the meaningof abstract universality: their being now is just thatsimple fluent substance of the pure movement within

17


18/62


itself. The difference, however, of these members interse consists, in general, in no other characteristic than

that of the moments of infinitude, or of the meremovement itself.The independent members exist for themselves. To bethus for themselves, however, is really as much theirreflexion directly into the unity, as this unity is the

breaking asunder into independent forms. The unity issundered because it is absolutely negative or infiniteunity; and because it is subsistence, difference likewisehas independence only in it. This independence of theform appears as a determinate entity, as what is for

another, for the form is something disunited; and thecancelling of diremption takes effect to that extentthrough another. But this sublation lies just as much inthe actual form itself. For just that flux is the substanceof the independent forms. This substance, however, is

infinite, and hence the form itself in its very subsistenceinvolves diremption, or sublation of its existence foritself.If we distinguish more exactly the moments containedhere, we see that we have as first moment the

18


19/62


subsistence of the independent forms, or the suppressionof what distinction inherently involves, viz. that the forms

have no beingper se, and no subsistence. The secondmoment, however, is the subjection of that subsistenceto the infinitude of distinction. In the first moment thereis the subsisting, persisting mode or form; by its being inits own right, or by its being in its determinate shape an

infinite substance, it comes forward in opposition to theuniversal substance, disowns this fluent continuity withthat substance, and insists that it is not dissolved in thisuniversal element, but rather on the contrary preservesitself [223] by and through its separation from this its

inorganic nature, and by the fact that it consumes thisinorganic nature. Life in the universal fluid medium,quietly, silently shaping and moulding and distributingthe forms in all their manifold detail, becomes by thatvery activity the movement of those forms, or passes

into life quaProcess.The mere universal flux is here theinherent being; the outer being, the "other", is thedistinction of the forms assumed. But this flux, this fluentcondition, becomes itself the other in virtue of this verydistinction; because now it exists "for" or m relation to

19


20/62


that distinction, which is self-conditioned and self-contained (an undfr sich), and consequently is the

endless, infinite movement by which that stable mediumis consumed--is life as living.This inversion of character, however, is on that accountagain invertedness in itself as such. What is consumed isthe essential reality: the Individuality, which preserves

itself at the expense of the universal and gives itself thefeeling of its unity with itself, precisely thereby cancelsits contrast with the other, by means of which it existsfor itself. The unity with self, which it gives itself, is justthe fluent continuity of differences, or universal

dissolution. But, conversely, the cancelling of individualsubsistence at the same time produces the subsistence.For since the essence of the individual form-universallife-and the self-existent entityper se are simplesubstance, the essence, by putting the other within itself,cancels this its own simplicity or its essence, i.e. itsunders that simplicity; and this disruption of fluentundifferentiated continuity is just the setting up, theaffirmation, of individuality. The simple substance of life,therefore, is the diremption of itself into shapes and

20


21/62


forms, and at the same time the dissolution of thesesubstantial differences; and the resolution of this

diremption is just as much a process of diremption, ofarticulating. Thus both the [224] sides of the entiremovement which were before distinguished, viz., thesetting up of individual forms lying apart and undisturbedin the universal medium of independent existence, and

theprocess of life - collapse into one another. The latteris just as much a formation of independent individualshapes, as it is a way of cancelling a shape assumed;and the former, the setting up of individual forms, is asmuch a cancelling as an articulation of them. The fluent,

continuous element is itself only the abstraction of theessential reality, or it is actual only as a definite shape orform; and that it articulates itself is once more abreaking up of the articulated form, or a dissolution of it.The entire circuit of this activity constitutes Life. It isneither what is expressed to begin with, the immediatecontinuity and concrete solidity of its essential nature;nor the stable, subsisting form, the discrete individualwhich exists on its own account; nor the bare process ofthis form; nor again is it the simple combination of all

21


22/62


23/62


richness, and will be unfolded in the way we have seen inthe case of life.

The simple ego is this genus, or the bare universal, forwhich the differences are insubstantial, only by its beingthe negative essence of the moments which haveassumed a definite and independent form. And self-consciousness is thus only assured of itself through

sublating this other, which is presented to self-consciousness as an independent life; self-consciousnessis Desire. Convinced of the nothingness of this other, itdefinitely affirms this nothingness to be for itself thetruth of this other, negates the independent object, and

thereby acquires the certainty of its own self, as truecertainty, a certainty which it has become aware of inobjective form.In this state of satisfaction, however, it has experience ofthe independence of its object. Desire and the certaintyof its self obtained in the gratification of desire, areconditioned by the object; for the certainty existsthrough cancelling this other; in order that this cancellingmay be effected, there must be this other. Self-consciousness is thus unable by its negative relation to

23


24/62


the object to abolish it; because of that relation it ratherproduces it again, as well as the desire. The object

desired is, in fact, something other than self-consciousness, the essence of desire; and through thisexperience this truth has become realized. At the sametime, however, self-consciousness is likewise absolutelyfor itself, exists on its own account; and it is so only by

sublation of the object; and it must come to feel itssatisfaction, for it is the truth. On account of theindependence of the object, therefore, it can only attainsatisfaction when this object itself [226] effectuallybrings about negation within itselfThe object mustper

se effect this negation of itself, for it is inherently (ansich) something negative, and must be for the otherwhat it is. Since the object is in its very self negation,and in being so is at the same time independent, it isConsciousness. In the case of life, which is the object ofdesire, the negation either lies in an other, namely, indesire, ortakes the form of determinateness standing inopposition to an other external individuum indifferent toit, orappears as its inorganic general nature. The abovegeneral independent nature, however, in the case of

24


25/62


which negation takes the form ofabsolute negation, isthe genus as such or as self-consciousness. Self-

consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.It is in these three moments that the notion of self-consciousness first gets completed: (a) pureundifferentiated ego is its first immediate object. (b) This

immediacy is itself, however, thoroughgoing mediation;it has its being only by cancelling the independentobject, in other words it is Desire. The satisfaction ofdesire is indeed the reflexion of self-consciousness intoitself, is the certainty which has passed into objective

truth. But (c) the truth of this certainty is really twofoldreflexion, the reduplication of self-consciousness.Consciousness has an object which implicates its ownotherness or affirms distinction as a void distinction, andtherein is independent. The individual formdistinguished, which is only a living form, certainlycancels its independence also in the process of life itself;but it ceases along with its distinctive difference to bewhat it is. The object of self-consciousness, however, isstill independent in this negativity of itself; and thus it is

25


26/62


for itself genus, universal flux or continuity in the verydistinctiveness of its own separate existence; it is a living

self-consciousness.A self-consciousness has before it a self-consciousness.[227] Only so and only then is it self-consciousness inactual fact; for here first of all it comes to have the unityof itself in its otherness. Ego which is the object of its

notion, is in point of fact not "object".The object ofdesire, however, is only independent, for it is theuniversal, ineradicable substance, the fluent self-identical essential reality. When a self-consciousness isthe object, the object is just as much ego as object.

With this we already have before us the notion ofMindorSpirit. What consciousness has further to become awareof, is the experience of what mind is--this absolutesubstance, which is the unity of the different self-relatedand self-existent self-consciousnesses in the perfectfreedom and independence of their opposition ascomponent elements of that substance: Ego that is "we",a plurality of Egos, and "we" that is a single Ego.Consciousness first finds in self-consciousness - thenotion of mind - its turning-point, where it leaves the

26


27/62


parti-coloured show of the sensuous immediate, passesfrom the dark void of the transcendent and remote

super-sensuous, and steps into the spiritual daylight ofthe present.

27


28/62


3. Jill Vance Buroker:

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Anintroduction

28


29/62


The Metaphysical Deduction is the first stage in Kants

argument forthe categories, in which he identifies the pure conceptsof the under-standing. The argument has two parts. First Kantestablishes that the

understanding has one function, which is to judge. Hethen identifiesthe pure concepts based on the forms of judgment, allthe possibleways in which one can judge. The concepts of these

judgment formsrepresent logical or syntactic features of judgment, suchas subjectand predicate. Thus a list of the forms of judgment yieldsa completesystem of pure concepts in their logical use. In thesecond part Kantargues that these pure logical concepts also have a realuse, as first-order or semantic concepts of the objects about which

29


30/62


one judges.This follows from his analysis of judgment as synthesis,

and the claimthat the same synthetic operations that producejudgments also pro-duce unified representations of space and time from themanifold of

pure intuition. Thus Kant concludes that the pureconcepts express-ing logical features of judgment can represent categorialfeatures ofthe objects being judged. This is the first step in arguing

for synthetica priori knowledge of the understanding.

[]

30


31/62


1. Consciousness of conceptual unity presupposes a

unitary con-sciousness. (A1034)2. The notion of an object of representation includes theidea of anecessary unity. (A1046;A1089)

3. Consciousness of objective unity requires atranscendental self-consciousness (as opposed to an empirical self-consciousness).Awareness of this identical self makes possible the

notion of atranscendental object. (A1067;A108)4. A transcendental self-consciousness is consciousnessof unity ofsynthesis by means of pure concepts. (A1078)5. Thus the pure concepts are presupposed in allobjective awareness.(A10911)

[]

31


32/62


Section 16: the original synthetic unity ofapperception

The deduction officially begins here, where the firstsentence statesthe first premise:

The I think must be able to accompany all my

representations; for otherwise something would berepresented in methat could not be thought at all, which is as much as tosay that therepresentation would either be impossible or else at least

would benothing forme (B1312).

This sentence includes several claims. First, it isnecessarily true of me, as a discursive intellect, that Ican attach the I think to any state that representssomething to me. Kant is not saying that in fact I alwaysdo this, only that it must be possible for me. If I couldnot, he says, the representation would be nothing forme.

32


33/62


This means that states that represent something to mehave

two features:first, I can recognize them as my own states;and second, they have an intentional object of which Ican be conscious.In other words, states that are representations for me

have both subjective and objective aspects, which I candistinguish.

Now the act of attaching the I think is the act ofapperception

or self-consciousness. Insofar as I recognize arepresentation as mine, Iascribe it to myself, and thus must be conscious ofmyself as the sub-ject of the state. As in the A edition, Kant calls this self-consciousnessthe transcendental unity of apperception (t.u.a.), and hedistinguishesit from empirical self-consciousness. The t.u.a. is originalbecause it

33


34/62


is not derived from any other representation, but is aprimitive fact of

consciousness. It is pure rather than empirical because ithas no dis-tinguishing content of its own. Kant says it is in allconsciousness oneand the same, [and] cannot be accompanied by any

further represen-tation (B132). Recall that empirical self-consciousness isawareness ofoneself as a particular subject. In addition to the I thinkit includes

the specific content of inner sense. By contrast, throughthe I, as asimple representation, nothing manifold is given (B135).In a latersection in the Dialectic, Kant calls the I of apperceptiona singlething that cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects,and hence alogically simple subject (B407). Thus the t.u.a. is thebare thought

34


35/62


of the numerical identity of the self as the thinkingsubject.

In several passages Kant says this first premise isanalytic: thisprinciple of the necessary unity of apperception is, to besure, itselfidentical, thus an analytic proposition (B135; also B138

and B407).Now it is important to understand exactly what claim isanalytic,since from this premise Kant wants to derive thesynthetic conclu-

sion that the categories apply necessarily to any objectof thought.The key is the scope of the statement, The I think mustbe able toaccompany all my representations. Kant is claiming notthat thisstatement is analytically true of all conscious beings, butrather thatit is analytically true for any consciousness that canrecognize its own

35


36/62


representations.There are two relevant contrasts here. At B1389 Kant

distinguishes human consciousness from an intuitiveintellect whichgenerates its own manifold through its thinking. For suchan intel-lect, there is no distinction between subjective and

objective states,and so such an intellect would not be capable of thisoriginal self-consciousness. The second contrast is with animalperceivers, which

lack intellectual capacities altogether and thus cannotrecognize theirrepresentations as such. They might have a unifiedconsciousness,but they would lack a unified self-consciousness. In otherwords, it is

a brute fact (and therefore a synthetic truth) that humanperceiversare discursive intellects who can recognize their ownrepresentations.

36


37/62


But it is an analytic truth that any consciousness that canrecognize

its own representations can attach the I think to any ofthem.The second premise occurs at B133: this thoroughgoingidentity ofthe apperception of amanifold given in intuition contains

a synthesisof the representations, and is possible only through theconscious-ness of this synthesis. To say that the t.u.a. contains asynthesis

means that in order to think the identity of the I onemust con-nect a manifold of representations in thought. Torecognize that itis the same I in I think a and in I think b one mustconnect

the thoughts so that one thinks I think a + b. Kantsstrong claimhere is that performing such a synthesis is a necessarycondition for

37

I d i G Id li 5/26 R bb V i i


38/62


recognizing the identity of self-consciousness. In thinkingones self-

identity by ascribing representations to oneself, one bothconnectsthe representations and (at least implicitly) recognizesthis connec-tion. At B1334 Kant repeats his A edition claim that

consciousnessof ones numerical identity cannot be derived fromempirical self-consciousness. Instead, to recognize the empirical selfrequires one to

unite the empiricalmanifold in a numerically identicalconsciousness.Thus empirical self-consciousness presupposes the t.u.a.The final point in section 16 concerns Kants claim atB1334 thatthe apperception, like concepts, has both an analytical

and a syn-thetic unity. This is easier to grasp if we begin with hisdiscussionof concepts in the footnote. Here Kant argues that

38

I t d ti t G Id li 5/26 R bb t V t i i


39/62


although bothkinds of unity are essential to general representations,

the syntheticunity provided by concepts is more fundamental thantheir analyticalunity. The analytical unity of a concept is the unity itprovides as a

common characteristic of things. In thinking the conceptsolidity,we recognize it as a feature that belongs to potentiallymany things. Inrepresenting a feature common to its instances, theconcept providesanalytic unity. But these instances are complex things,which havemany different properties. For example, they must alsobe spatiallyextended and have other physical properties. Kant says

the objectsanalytically united under the concept also havesomething differentin themselves (B134). And he concludes: therefore

39

Introduction to German Idealism 5/26 Robbert Veen at www wiziq com


40/62


only by meansof an antecedently conceived possible synthetic unity

can I representto myself the analytical unity. That is, to represent theobjects thatpossess common characteristics, one must firstrepresent the unity

of the complex object. In its synthetic function, a conceptunifiesdiverse features of the object. For example, the conceptchair uni-fies the diverse properties such as shape, size, weight,and locationthat belong to a chair. Kants point is that althoughconcepts containboth kinds of unity, synthetic unity is more fundamentalbecause itis presupposed by analytical unity.

At B1334 he makes the same claim about the t.u.a.:the analyt-ical unity of apperception is only possible under thepresupposition

40

Introduction to German Idealism 5/26 Robbert Veen at www wiziq com


41/62


of some synthetic one. In other words, the I think asattached to

each representation functions on one hand as a commoncharacter-istic. Abstracted from all content of representation, it hasan analyticunity. But since this identical self-consciousness requires

a synthesisof representations, the I think also produces asynthetic unity. Inthis respect it functions as the form of any thought inwhich one uni-fies different representations. For this reason Kant calls itthe highestpoint to which one must affix all use of theunderstanding . . . indeedthis faculty is the understanding itself (B134n). In short,the t.u.a. is

the very basis, and thus the form, of all thinking.Section 17: the relation between the t.u.a. and the notionof an objectIn section 17 Kant establishes what Allison calls the

41

Introduction to German Idealism 5/26 - Robbert Veen at www wiziq com


42/62

Introduction to German Idealism 5/26 Robbert Veen at www.wiziq.com

reciprocity the-sis, namely that the t.u.a. is both necessary and

sufficient for repre-senting objects.This is equivalent to showing both that whenever oneperforms the I think one thereby represents an object(or objective state of affairs), and that whenever one

represents an object one thereby connectsrepresentations in the synthetic unity of apperception. Itdoes not become clear until section 19 that this act isjudgment.

Once we put these points together we can get a betteridea of whatKant means by the objective validity of representation.Kants entire argument in section 17 is contained in thesecondparagraph:

Understanding is, generally speaking, the faculty ofcognitions. These consist in the determinaterelation of given representations to an object.

An object, however, is that in the concept of which

42



43/62

Introduction to German Idealism 5/26 Robbert Veen at www.wiziq.com

the manifold of a given intuition is united. Now, however, all unification of representations

requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis ofthem. Consequently the unity of consciousness isthat which alone constitutes the relation ofrepresentations to an object, thus their objectivevalidity, and consequently is that which makes

them into cognitions and on which even thepossibility of the understanding rests. (B137)Let us take this argument point by point.

First Kant describes the understanding as the faculty ofcogni-tion, which implies that the mere data given in intuitionare not inthemselves cognitions. Next he defines a cognition as adeterminate

relation of given representation to an object, whichsimply means arepresentation of a determinate object. His point is thatthe function

43



44/62

q

of the understanding is to know objects. Implicit is theidea that at

the first order, the representations are those given in themanifoldof intuition. Next comes the key to this section, Kantsdefinition ofan object as that in the concept of which the manifold of

a givenintuition is united. This tortured sentence in effectdefines an objectas whatever is thought as a unified manifold by means ofa concept.The object here is the object of thought; the definitionestablishesthat it must be a complex whose parts (the manifold) areunifiedby a concept. Drawing on section 15, the next sentencestates that

all unified representations contain consciousness ofunity. From sec-tion 16 we know that consciousness of unity is based onthe t.u.a.

44



45/62

q

Thus, Kant concludes, it is the t.u.a. that confersobjective valid-

ity on representations. That is, the act of bringingrepresentationsto the I think is necessary and sufficient for makingthem intorepresentations of an object. Put less technically, Kant

has arguedthat when one unifies some manifold by means of aconcept, onethereby renders themanifold thinkable as an object orgives it objective validity.

At B1378 Kant emphasizes that the mere manifoldgiven in intu-ition does not by itself represent an object, but providesonly the datafor cognition: the mere form of outer sensible intuition,

space, is notyet cognition at all; it only gives the manifold of intuitiona priori fora possible cognition. To cognize some spatial region

45



46/62

requires con-necting the spatial manifold in some determinate way by

means of aconcept. Thus to represent a line in space one mustdelineate the partof space making up the line by means of the concept of aline. Kant

concludes that this consciousness of synthetic unity isrequired of allcognitions, and thus applies to any manifold given inintuition inorder to become an object for me. It is important tonotice the subtleshift in this last sentence, which claims that the object isthe (mani-fold of ) intuition itself. In other words, this analysis hastaken placeon the second-order level, where the objects (of thought)

are onesrepresentations (the manifold given to one in intuition).At the endof this chapter we shall see the significance of this

46



47/62

aspect for Kantsresponse to skepticism.

47


F l t i th t f th t i


48/62

For now, let us summarize the steps of the argument insections 16

and 17:

1. It is necessarily true of humans as discursive intellectsthat they canattach the I think to any of their representations, and,

by doingso, express the numerical identity of self-consciousness.2. Attaching the I think is possible only insofar as oneconnectsones self-ascribed representations by means ofsynthetic acts.3. Any synthetic unity of representations requiresunification undera concept.4. Any manifold unified under a concept counts as athought of an

object.5. Therefore, thinking of an object is necessary for thet.u.a.6. Therefore, the t.u.a. is a sufficient condition for

48


ti


49/62

representing anobject.

49


Section 18: objective vs subjective unity


50/62

Section 18: objective vs. subjective unityHere Kant distinguishes an objectively valid unity of

representationsfrom a unity that has only subjective validity, as a way tointroducethe notion of judgment in section 19. The first kind is theunity con-

tained in the thought of an object; the second kind ischaracteristicof a mere association of representations. UnfortunatelyKant con-fuses two different notions of subjective validity. Hebegins section18 by contrasting the objective unity of the t.u.a. withthe subjec-tive unity of consciousness, which is a determination ofinner sense(B139). By the latter hemeans amere association of

representations inconsciousness: One person combines the representationof a certainword with one thing, another with something else; and

50


51/62


connection a determination of inner sense he means


52/62

connection a determination of inner sense he meansthat it represents

a temporal ordering of the actual contents ofconsciousness. But theconnection is not conceptual; a mere association doesnot representan object, and hence lacks objective validity. Associated

perceptionsare united temporally in consciousness, but do notproduce a unityof self-consciousness. Now one can of course take anassociation asan object of thought by reflecting on it. In recognizingthe sequenceas one in which one representation triggers another, onethereby con-fers objective unity on it. This is equivalent to taking aunity in

consciousness as a unity for consciousness. Clearly,however, the abil-ity to associate representations does not entail theability to represent

52


the association as such Kant thinks that animals possess


53/62

the association as such. Kant thinks that animals possessthe former

ability but lack the intellectual capacities for the latter.Unfortunately, in this passage Kant confuses thesubjectivity of anassociation of perceptions with that of the empirical unityof apper-

ception. The latter, as we have seen, is awareness ofoneself as aparticular subject. Empirical self-consciousness includesthe contentof inner sense, but is not a mere association ofperceptions, sinceit represents the self as an object. Although empiricalapperceptionvaries in content by subject, and thus is subjective in thesecondarysense, it nevertheless contains an objective unity of

representations.Thus Kant is mistaken to use empirical apperception toexemplify anon-objective unity, which is the kind of subjectivity

53


relevant to the


54/62

relevant to thededuction here.

Section 19: objective unity and judgmentIn section 19 Kant argues that representing an object isequivalentto judging. He begins by complaining that the standard

definitionof a judgment as a relation between two concepts fails tospecify thenature of the relation. At B1412 he says that injudgment one bringsa manifold to the objective unity of consciousness. In thesimplestcase of a categorical judgment, this objective relation isrepresentedby the copula is connecting the subject- and predicate-concepts.

13Now to say that judgment possesses a necessary unity isnot to denythat there are empirical or contingent judgments. The

54


objective unity


55/62

objective unityof the judgment, even if empirical, resides in the fact

that judgmentsrepresent assertible thoughts about objects or objectivestates of affairs.Even if it is only a contingent truth that my cat is orange,the judgment

Burokers cat is orange unifies diverse representationsto producean assertible claim about an object. Unfortunately Kantsexamples atthe end of the section obscure this point, since he triesto express an

association of perceptions by the conditional judgmentIf I carry abody, I feel a pressure of weight. By his own argument,however, once one judges an association, one hasthereby unified the representations in the objective unity

of apperception.As Allison points out, Kants theory of synthesis entailsthat all judgments confer objective validity onrepresentations, even if the objects of judgment are

55


subjective states.


56/62

jThis step clarifies the notion of objective validity, for

unlike asso-ciations of representations, judgments are true or false.For a repre-sentation to have objective validity is for it to be capableof having

a truth value. What Kant has shown, then, is thatsubjects who canrecognize their own representations must be able toascribe them tothemselves by the I think. This act is synthesis, whichconnects

a given manifold of representations in the (objective)unity of self-consciousness. But synthesis is equivalent to judging; injudging oneconceives a manifold as related in a way that can be

asserted to obtain.Since assertions are true or false, Kant has argued thatthe t.u.a. isboth necessary and sufficient for producing

56


representations that have


57/62

pobjective validity, that are assertible. The objects here

are objects ofjudgment or thought. There is as yet no reference tospatiotemporalobjects of human intuition.[]

Sections 245: the paradox of self-knowledgeTo complete this discussion, let us look at Kants view ofself-knowledge in sections 24 and 25.AtB1523 he describesthe para-

dox of self-knowledge as following from the Aestheticdoctrine thatin inner sense we are presented to ourselves only as weappear toourselves, not as we are in ourselves, since we intuit

ourselves only aswe are internally affected, which seems to becontradictory, since wewould have to relate to ourselves passively. The

57


paradox follows from


58/62

ptranscendental idealism. Because space and time are

merely subjec-tive forms of sensibility, all objects intuited in space andtime are onlyappearances, and not things in themselves. This appliesequally tothe empirical self, given in inner sense. Accordingly, wecan no moreintuit the self in itself than we do physical objects inthemselves. Inthe Analytic, however, Kant has shown that the I thatthinks is

active and spontaneous. Judging is an activity consistingof syntheticoperations the I performs on the manifold given inintuition. So itseems paradoxical to claim both that the I must be

active and thatit can know itself only as it passively appears to itself.Kants solution is to deny both that the I think is acognition

58


of the self, and that we can cognize the thinking self. In


59/62

transcen-

dental self-consciousness, Kant says, I am conscious ofmyself notas I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only thatI am. Thisrepresentation is a thinking, not an intuiting(B157). Self-awareness inthe t.u.a. is not a cognition of the self as an object, but amerely formalrepresentation of ones existence as thinking. (This iswhy Kant dis-agrees with Descartess view that the I of the cogito

must be a mental substance.) This self-awareness isdevoid of the intuition required to distinguish oneselffrom other objects and thus to represent oneself as aparticular object. In his footnote at B157 Kant says, TheI think expresses the act of determining my

existence.The existence is thereby already given, but theway in which I am to determine it, i.e., the manifold that Iam to posit in myself as belonging to it, is not yetthereby given. And at B158n he denies that we can

59


60/62


for applying the categories to objects of experience. TheA di


61/62

A edi-

tion version argues that apprehending the data ofintuition succes-sively requires the imagination to reproduce previouslyapprehendedrepresentations, which presupposes concepts of theunderstanding.Although this version introduces Kants theory ofsynthesis and thet.u.a., it does not link the categories to judgment. Thesignificantlyrevised B edition version corrects this defect, arguing

that the cate-gories are required to represent objects of both thoughtand percep-tion. By analyzing the notion of an object in terms ofjudgment, Kant

links the categories to the logical forms of judgmentidentified earlier.Thus he defends the application of pure conceptsexpressed in syn-

61


62/62

Documents

Introduction to German Idealism - 5(26) Texts