[1]

IntroductionThinkingTechnicity

Now,sincethesoulisimmortalandhascometobemanytimesandhasseenboththethingshereandthose inHadesinfactallthingsthereisntanythingithasntlearned.Asaresult,itsbeingabletorecollectwhatpertainstovirtueandotherthingsis nothing to be wondered at, since it also knew them allpreviously. For, nature as a whole being akin and the soulhaving learnedall things,nothingprevents someone,oncehehas recollected just one thingwhat human beings calllearningtodiscoverallelse,ifheiscourageousanddoesntgrow weary in the search. For searching and learning as awholearerecollection[anamnsis].1

In theMeno and other texts, Plato institutes a now infamousoppositionbetween theSocraticrecollectionof the immortalsoul, called (anamnsis), and the artificial ortechnical supplement to memory, called (hypomnsis).Itiswiththisentirelyunprecedentedoppositionthatwesternmetaphysics and, arguably,western philosophy

1 Plato,Meno, 81c81d, inProtagoras andMeno, trans.RobertC.Bartlett (Ithaca:

CornellUniversityPress,2004)10.Tobesure,Platosphilosophy istoomultifaceted to be condensed into a simple or monolithic idealism. It is onlynecessarytoturntothelaterTimaeustofindakindofPlatonicmaterialism:theDemiurge constructs the Forms out of an original and primordial matterthrough a series ofapparently contingentacts of techn. In an intriguingmove, theparticularorarbitraryactsofcreationundertakenby theDemiurgeareonlysubsequentlyrecognisedtobe,ortransformedinto,universalFormsthatexistinanindependentidealrealm(46d48).

[2]

more generally, comes into existence. To Platos way ofthinking,thoughtisnothingotherthantheactoftheimmortalsoulremembering itselfonceagain.On theoneside, then,wehave thought, the infinite, the transcendental and somethingcalled philosophy.On theother,however,wehave artifice,finitude, the empirical and something called technicity.Yetwhat happens to the finite worldwith all its inherentcontingency,variabilityandfallibilitywhentheimmortalsoulrecollects itself? If thought is defined as the recollection ofimmortality, then finitude,contingencyand technologyare,asBernardStieglerhasargued,therebyconsignedtothedarknessoftheunthought:trueanamnsisapparentlyhasnoneedofthesophisticalor technical supplement that ishypomnsis.What,though,mightitmeantothinkthisunthought,thatistosay,technicityitself?

ItisusuallyAristotle,ratherthanPlato,whoiscreditedwithinventingthephilosophyoftechnologyinthemodernsenseofthe term.Aswas thecasewithPlato,he institutesahierarchybetween theoretical (epistm) and practical thought orknowledge(techn):theMetaphysicsandtheNicomacheanEthics,for instance, consistently distinguish between philosophicalknowledgewhich is an end in itselfand technicalor craftknowledgewhich is merely a means to an end. However,Aristotle isalsothefirstthinkertoconstructanontologyofthetechnical object. To Aristotles eyes, techn is an essentiallyinert, neutral toolwhose status is entirelydetermined by theuse to which it is put by human beings.2 If nature (physis)contains theprincipalof itsownmotionan acornwillgrowintoanoaktreeallbyitselfthesameisobviouslynottruefora technical or fabricated object: an oak table or bed framerequiresanefficientcause(causaefficiens)suchasanartisantobringitintobeing.Inthisway,wearriveatanideaoftechnicitythathasdominatedphilosophyforalmost3,000years:technisa prosthesis (: prothesis, i.e., an addition;whatis

2 Aristotle,Physics,trans.RobinWaterfield(Oxford:WorldsClassics,1999)336,

192b193b.

[3]

placedinfrontof)consideredinrelationtonature,humanityor thought;one that canbeutilised forgoodor illdependinguponwhoorwhathappenstowieldit.

Yet,astheessaysinthiscollectionwillshow,itispreciselythis conceptof technicityas tool, instrumentorprosthesisthatnowmosturgentlyneedstoberethought.Itissomethingof a clichbut no less trueto say that developments incontemporary technology have radically transformed ourunderstandingofwhatitistobehuman.Asthedisciplinesofartificial intelligence, genetic engineering and informationtechnology continue to develop at a bewildering pace, theontological boundaries between the human and thetechnologicalconstantlyneedtoberedrawn:whatweusedtothink of as the defining properties of human beingmind,agency, affect, consciousness, the very operation of thoughtitselfarerevealedtobe inextricablyboundupwithcomplex,quasimechanical and technically replicable processes. Mantoday is lesshomo cogitans thanwhatHansHolstein termedhomocyberneticus.3Toput itcrudely, technology in thiswayappears lessan instrumentumofan apriorireason, than anontological state. Consequently, technicity names somethingwhich can no longer be seen as just a series ofprostheses ortechnicalartefactswhichwouldbemerelysupplemental(orsupernumerary) to our naturebut the basic and enablingcondition of our lifeworld. From thewatchwewear to theserverwe log into,we exist prosthetically, that is to say, byputtingourselvesoutsideourselves.Iftheclassicaloppositionandhierarchy between thought and technology can no longer besustained from this perspectivesuch that what Plato callsanamnsismaybenothingother thanacomplex repertoireofmotor functions, cybernetic loops and selfreplicatinghypomnesic systemsthen it is clear that this insightposes anewandurgenttaskforanyphilosophyoftechnology.Inotherwords, thequestionarisesas towhether it ispossible to think

3 SeeHansHolstein,HomoCyberneticus(Uppsala:Sociographica,1974).

[4]

something that is nothing less than the basic condition ofthoughtitself.

Tobesure,modernphilosophyof technologyhassuppliedmanydifferentanswers to thisquestionfromMarx, throughNietzsche, Freud, Bergson, Husserl, Benjamin, Simondon,Deleuze and Guattari, to Derrida and Stieglerand thisconceptual debate forms the backdrop tomany of the essaysthat follow. ItwasKostasAxeloswhoargued that the titleofthe first penseur de la technique belongs to Karl Marx:historicalmaterialism,hesuggested,set inmotion thecritiqueof the Aristotelian concept of techn as an essentially inert,neutral prosthesis.4 In a crucial sense, the very idea of anhistorical materialism inverts the Platonic order betweenthought and technics: consciousness is condemned to play afutilegameofcatchupwithasetofmaterialconditionsthatarealways running ahead of it.However,Marxs radical insightinto thesheer irreducibilityof technicityitsutter resistance toanyattempt toboil itdown toasimpleobject thatexists forathinking subjectis also pressed into the service of a newmaterialistanthropology.ForMarx, it is clear that technologycan never simply be opposed to humanity because it issomethingthatisessentiallycoterminouswithournature:weare what we do, and what we do is labour with tools orinstruments. What Marx defines as the labour process inChapter7ofCapital isnothing less thananoriginary interfacebetweenhumanity and technologywhereby each invents andconstitutes the other across time.5 IfMarxs insight into the

4 Kostas Axelos, Marx, penseur de la technique: De lalination de lhomme laconqutedumonde(Paris:Minuit,1967).

5 KarlMarx,Capital,trans.SamuelMooreandEdwardAveling(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995). InChapter7,Marxoffers the followingdescriptionofthe labourprocess:Labour is, in the firstplace,aprocess inwhichbothmanandNatureparticipate,and inwhichmanofhisownaccordstarts,regulates,and controls thematerial reactionsbetweenhimselfandNature.Heopposeshimself toNatureasoneofherown forces, setting inmotionarmsand legs,heads and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriateNaturesproductionsinaformadaptedtohisownwants.Bythusactingonthe

[5]

mutual implication of the human and the technical isundoubtedlyaradicalstep,itcouldneverthelessbearguedthathis political critique of machine capital (whereby theunalienated human subject can emancipate itself fromdomination by technology) still implicitly assumes theAristotelian concept of a pretechnological causality withoutwhich techn itself would merely be inert matter. In otherwords,wemightarguethatforallhisundoubtedradicalityMarxstillremainsbeholdentothemetaphysicalphilosophyoftechnology: somethinga collective human subject oressencestillexistsoutsidetechnicity.

ItisMartinHeideggerwhoheretakesthemoreradicalstepin asserting that the question concerning technology (dieFragenachderTechnik)mustbeposedonanontological level,framedwithinacritiqueof themetaphysicsofpresence:whatbeginsasananthropologyorsocialsciencethuscomestoreflectnothinglessthantheveryscienceofbeing.Accordingly,andtoacertaindegreebywayofMarx,thisscientiaoralso impliesadeconstructionof the logicofpresence thathasunderwrittenclassicalontologyhitherto.Thethinkingofbeingbywayoftechnicity,asanoperationoftechnologicalbecoming,brings into view a certain distanciation and mechanicaliterabilitythatinvestspresence,asitwere,fromtheoutset.Thismeans that ontology, as a reflection upon being, is above allinvolvednotonlywithacognitiveobjectthatmaybedescribedastechnical,butwithanoperationofreflexivitythatcouldevenbedescribedastheveryapotheosisoftechnicity.

InHeideggerswriting,itthusbecomesnecessarytoregardMarxsaccountofthealienationofhumanityundercapital(asamodeofdistanciation) lessasanhistoricalmaterialistprocessand more as a technoontological condition: the humanbecomesthesiteofaspecificdestiningordisclosureofbeingas

externalworldandchangingit,heatthesametimechangeshisownnature.Hedevelopshis slumberingpowersand compels them toact inobedience tohissway(115).

[6]

such.6Heideggers readingof techndatesback tohisearliestworksandgoesthroughanumberofimportantdevelopmentsacross his career.7 In his later writings, for instance, theessence of technology has nothing to do with ontic orempirical technology itself somuch aswithwhathe calls theGestellorEnframingthatconstitutesthedominantrevelationofBeing in theepochof technoscience:everythingincludinghumanityis disclosed as a standing reserve (Bestand) ofenergy to be liberated and stockpiled.8 However, evenHeideggers radical attempt toontologise technics still retainsanidealistormetaphysicalresiduum,atleastaccordingtosuchthinkersasDerrida.IfHeideggerconsistentlyseekstomaintaintheontologicalpriorityofanessenceof technologywhich isonly tangentially connected to any ontic or empiricaltechnologythen thedanger is thathis thought reestablishesthePlatonicoppositionbetween the infiniteand the finite, thetranscendentalandtheempirical,thoughtandtechnology,thatitotherwisedoessomuch toplace indoubt:itmaintains thepossibilityof thought thatquestions,which isalways thoughtof the essence, protected from any original and essentialcontamination by technologyDerridawrites.9The consistentappeal toadogmaticallynontechnologicalessence (Wesen)oftechnology that remains to be thought arguably deprivestechnologyitselfofanyroleintheconstitutionofthought.Thiswouldappear to leaveempirical technology in thesame inert,

6Martin Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, BasicWritings,ed.DavidFarrellKrell(London:Routledge,1978)21765;243.

7 Asiswellknown,HeideggersearliestexplorationsoftheAristotelianconceptoftechnascraftknowledgetakeplaceinthe1920sinsuchworksasthe1925lecturecourseonPlatosSophist.The30sessayTheOriginoftheWorkofArtintroducesthenewconceptoftechnaspoisis.InTheQuestionConcerningTechnologyandtheotheressaysofthe40s,HeideggerintroducestheconceptoftechnasdasGestell.

8Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, The QuestionConcerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York:Harper,1977)3335;15.

9 JacquesDerrida,OfSpirit:HeideggerandtheQuestiontrans.GeoffreyBenningtonandRachelBowlby(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1989)10.

[7]

undynamicstateofpassivitymutelyawaitingthatwhichwillgive itmeaningtowhichAristotleoriginally consigned it inthe Physics. In this sense, Heidegger, too, still posits anoutsidefromwhichtechnologyitselfmightbethought.

AfterHeidegger, themost influential recentphilosopheroftechnology,withinthecontinentaltradition,isJacquesDerrida.It is with the advent of deconstruction that we perhapsencounter themost radicalattempt toarticulatewhatDerridacalls our technological condition,10 and this attempt providesthe impetus foranumberofessays in thiscollection.From itsseminalexplorationsofarchwritinginOfGrammatologytothelater meditations upon teletechnology in Archive Fever andEchographiesofTelevision,deconstructioncan,withhindsight,beseen to represent a careerlong attempt on Derridas part toquestionwhathecalls themetaphysicaldissociationbetweenthought and technology.11 According to the deconstructivelogic of the supplement (of recursion and metonymy), anyattempt to oppose something technical to something nontechnical(uptoandincludingHeideggersdistinctionbetweentechnology and the socalled essence of technology) isautomatically renderedproblematic.This iswhatDerridahasreferredtoastheparadoxical logicoftherelationofessenceand supplementas, for example, technology and thetechnological,technicsandtechnicity,orindeed(althoughinadifferent sense) techn and physis, logos, etc.echoing thetopological contiguity named by Heideggers onticontological difference,whose terms each come to operate asthough theywerethedetached fragmentofa softwaremore

10 Jacques Derrida, The Rhetoric of Drugs, PointsInterviews, 19741994, ed.

ElizabethWeber, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford University Press,1995)2445.

11 JacquesDerrida,MemoiresforPauldeMan,trans.C.Lindsay,etal.(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1986)108.

[8]

powerfulthantheother,apartlargerthanthewholeofwhichitisapart.12

ForDerrida, technicsmustbealready installedat theheartof whatever we understand under the concepts of nature(physis), life (both zo and bios) and thought (logos,psyche, anamnsis, et al.). It quickly becomes clear that anyattemptatrecuperating technicity forontologyas if itwereaLogos to be discoverednecessarily returns us to theproblematicofpurepresence, the idealityof thesign,and themetaphysicsoftemporalisation.Accordingly,whenwespeakofa technological ontology, or technicity, we are alreadyspeakingofwhatDerridatermsdiffrance;whichisalsotosaya recursionandadtournement,bywhich themetaphysicsofpresence is opened to the logic of the fold, to technopoiesis,andtoradicaldistanciation.Ifontologynecessarilyrequiresanassent to the is of presentbeing, technicity discloses thisbeingastelepresent, in themodeofaprosthesisof/at theorigin,asDerridasays.

WhileDerridas thoughtenablesus toglimpse theconceptof an originary technicity, Bernard Stiegler has recentlyargued that the accompanyingwork of deconstruction is toooften carried out on a predominantly formal, logical, and ahistoricallevel.Ifwefailtoattendtothetechnologicalcharacterofhistoricaldiscourse itself (andhence toa certainhistoricityand discursiveness of technics), the deconstruction of theopposition between philosophy and technology may appearpurely philosophical, and the historical or material role thatspecific technological supplements themselves might play inthat process is potentially occluded. Viewed within apositivisticorinstrumentalframework,thisgesturewouldthusrisk reestablishing the categoricalmode of thought that hastraditionally, within the history of Western metaphysics,accompanied such classical oppositions as anamnsis /

12 JacquesDerrida,TwoWordsforJoyce,PoststructuralistJoyce:EssaysfromtheFrench, eds. Derek Attridge and Daniel Ferrer (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,1984)148.

[9]

hypomnsis,atoneand thesame timeas itcallsprecisely thisoppositional logic into question. In this sense, we might betempted to wonder, as Stiegler does, whether or not evenDerridas rethinkingof technologydoesnt remainvulnerableto the metaphysical pitfalls he identifies, in Echographies ofTelevision, with a certain Heideggerianism : Doesnt he[Heidegger] suggest that there is a thinking pure of alltechnics?13

Thiscollectionofessaysinvitesustotakeupthequestionoftechnologyanew.Itisnowbecomingpossibletospeakofanewtechnological turnwithin contemporary continental thoughttomatch themuchvaunted ethical and political turns ofthe 1980sand 90s.From thegroundbreaking explorationsofsuch seminal figures asMarx,Heidegger andDerrida to theworkofmorerecent thinkers likeFriedrichKittler,ManueldeLanda and N. Katherine Hayles, the theory and praxis oftechnicity has become one of the definingperhaps thedefiningconceptual tasks of our moment. Yet despite thegrowingamountof importantwork in this fieldduringrecentyears, it still often appears that there is no agreement on theprecise termsof thedebate itself.Technicity remainsa termwhosemeaning is, ifanything,morecontestednow thaneverbefore,some2,500yearsafterAristotlefirstattemptedtodefineit: it is variously defined today as everything from aphilosophical conceptor idea,ahistoricalormaterialprocess,ananthropologicaltoolorprosthesis,anontologicalcondition,amodeofdiscourse,awayofthinkingtoeventhebasicstateoflife itself. If themeaning of technicity remains verymuch inquestion, then it ishardlysurprising that themuch largerandmore fraught questions of its relation to the status of thehuman, theanimal,nature, culture,history,evolution, scienceandthepoliticallieequallyunarticulated.Inthissense,westillneed a sustained or concerted debate about the larger

13 Jacques Derrida and Bernard Stiegler, Echographies of Television: FilmedInterviews,trans.JenniferBajorek(Cambridge:Polity,2002)133.

[10]

implicationsofourtechnologicalconditionandthisiswhatthefollowingcollectionseekstosetintomotion.

Firstly, Technicity offers a series of theoretical reflectionsupon the formal relation between thought, technology andhumanism. Bernard Stiegler, whose ongoing project LaTechnique et le temps (1994)hasdone somuch to reopen thequestionoftechnologyafterHeideggerandDerrida,opensthecollectionwithanewmeditationuponthePlatonicoppositionbetween anamnsis and hypomnsis. Pursuing a critique ofwhat he has recently termed the epoch of hyperindustrialisationwhere the inherently technical status ofhumanmemory and knowledge are now at themercy of anunparalleled industrial exploitationStiegler argues that thequestion ofhypomnsis isnowperhaps thedefiningpoliticalquestionofourage.LouisArmandpicksupthequestionoftheoriginallytechnicalconstitutionofmanthrougharereadingofMarx,Heidegger and Derrida. Far from being a question orproblemthatisposedbyahumansubject,Armandarguesthatageneralisedstateoftechnicityturnsthissituationonitshead:whatwe call thehuman isdisclosed technologicallyasabeingvested in the logic of the stereotype, the iterative event,supersession, futurity, and themechanics of thepossible. ForArthurBradley,DerridaandStieglersphilosophyoforiginarytechnicity remains complicitwitha residuallyanthropologicalaccountofthehuman:whatunitestheirworkisatendencytoconsider the implicationsof technicity foracertain ideaof thehumanratherthanintermsofthetechnicalconstitutionoflifein general.Approaching this problem byway of the sciencefictionaltenetsofcognitivescience,ChristopherJohnsonoffersasetofpostulatestowardsananthropologyofwhathecallsourtechnological imaginary.Why, he asks, dowe consistentlyimagine the general process of technological replication, forexample, in terms of the simple reproduction of humancapacitieswhatRuskintermedthepatheticfallacy?

Secondlyandmoregenerallythecollectionbroadensouttoofferaseriesoftheoreticalandempiricalexplorationsofthe

[11]

relationbetween technicity,materialityand culture ina rangeofdifferentcontexts.Itispossible,HartmutWinklerarguesinattemptingtoconstructanewtheoryoftheculturalcontinuityof mediato negotiate a middle ground betweenanthropocentric and technocentric media theorieswherebytechnicity is eitherwholly dependent upon a human user orevolvesautonomouslyofhumanitybymeansofwhathecallsaneconomyofdiscourses. InWinklersview, it isonly thiseconomythatproducesbothcontinuityandrupture,innovationand stasis, dynamism and inertia within culture. In turn, J.HillisMiller offers ameditation on the role played by newcommunication technologies in globalisation. According toMiller, the global impact of such technologies demands anequivalentlyglobalacademicresponse.Inhisconclusion,Millercallsforaglobalisedculturalstudiescapableofarticulatingthemyriad different ways in which culture is consumedandindeed producedthroughout the world. Belinda Barnet issimilarly concernedwith the quasiintentional role played bytechnicity in the production and transmission of culture.Pursuing and broadening Stieglers concept of tertiarymemorythe exteriorisation and preservation of humanmemory in the formofmanuscripts,worksofartorcomputerprogrammesvia a reading of the work of Niles Eldredge,Barnet offers a prolegomena for a theory of evolution oftechnicalartefacts.

Assessingtheculturalevolutionofoneparticular,ifnowallpervasive, technical artefactthe internetDarren Toftsaddresses the longstanding assumption thatwith its quasiinfinite capacity for virtual, realtime communicationtheworldwidewebcreatesorfostersnewformsofcommunityandconnectivity. Far from bringing people together, Tofts arguesthatthewebcontributestothediminutionofcommunity.Inhisview, what began as a new means of connectivity andinteractivityhas in factproduced littlemore than increasinglyindividualisedandprivatiseddiscursivespaces(epitomisedbysuch sites as Myspace.com). Geert Lovink and Kenneth C.

[12]

Werbins dialogue also concerns the status of one specifictechnicalmedium: the list. From the earliest literate societies,through the totalitarianhorrorsofNaziGermany,all thewaydown to the electronic mailing lists of today, Lovink andWerbinsdiscussionshowshowlistculturehasalwaysbeeninextricablytiedtoquestionsofpower,knowledge,surveillanceand what Giorgio Agamben has recently termed thepoliticisation of bare life (zo). ForMcKenzieWark, it is thevirtual space mapped by the computer gamerather thanstrictly theworld of cyberspacethat is thedefining topos oftechnicityinthe21stcentury.InthegamespaceofCivilisationIIIand its equivalents,Warks analysis shows thatwe enter anuncannyworldwhich is both rulebound and limitless, bothabsolutelyquantifiableand infinitelysubstitutable,bothactualandyettocome.

IfTofts,Lovink,Werbin andWark are all concernedwithpresentorfuturemedia,thecontributionsofDonaldTheallandNiallLucyreturnustothe(recent)past.Theallarguesthattheintegrationof theartsand sciences in James JoycesFinnegansWakeanticipatesmuchofthecontemporarydebatesurroundingoriginary technicity.ToTheallseyes, thechaosmosof theWakeisnothinglessthanametatextualexplorationoftheroleofthebookinwhathecallstheelectromachinicworldofthenew technology. For Niall Lucy, it is the socalled NewJournalismpioneered by such figures asTomWolfe in the1960s and early 70s that provides a privileged historicalvantage point for a critique of our technologicalmoment. InLucys account, theNew Journalism enables us to glimpse adifferentorderofinquiry,knowledgeanddisclosuretowhatheterms the conventional journalisticand technologicalordering of the world as always already coherent andcalculable.LaurentMilesi,meanwhile,explorestheontologicaland phenomenological implications of new technologies oftouchandtasteinlightofDerridaslateworkLeToucherPourJeanLucNancy.According toMilesi, the new forms of hapticmedia thatarecurrently indevelopment reveal the inherently

[13]

technicalstatusof thereal itselforwhatafterDerridahecalls the virtureal.MichaelGreaneys essay analyseshow arange of technophobic cultural texts respond to theirreducibly technicalorvirtualisedstatusofhumanbeing.ForGreaney,contemporaryculturalattempts tothink technicityinvest everything in amassive repression of its unthinkability:what is nothing less than the internal condition of humanthought and action is consistently externalised into anessentially foreign or alien threat. Finally, Mark Amerikasgrammatological collage proposes a brief critical praxisfocusedupon theassumedmutualexclusivityof technicsandperformativity,inwhichthequestionoftechnicityisnotmerelyposedordescribedbutenacted,raisinganewthequestionposedbyDerridaas towhetherornot ithasyetbecomepossible tojointhethinkingofthemachinetothethinkingoftheevent.

Viewedasanensemble,thiscollectionofwritingssetsouttoexplorewhattechnicityhascometomeanatthebeginningofthe 21st century, whether theoretically, empirically, or both.Whatunitesthemislessacommonconceptual,politicalorevenmethodologicalagendathanasharedseriesofquestions:

1. Firstly,what characterises technicity today?Does thistermmerelystandforarevisedutilitarianlogic,apositivismforthe digital age, a posthuman residuum or some metaontologicalstate? Faced with the ever present spectre of areturntosomething likeamachinemetaphysics,might itbepossible to articulate an originary technicity that is bothfundamentally material and yet inseparable from thought,beingor language itself?Towhat extent, indeed, is technicitythinkableatall?

2. What is the relationship between contemporaryphilosophiesoftechnicityandtheirhistoricalpredecessors?Dothey represent a repetition of, or a radical break from, thephilosophies of Aristotle,Marx orHeidegger?How do theymake possible a new dialogue between philosophy, thetechnosciences and the life sciencesfor example, in theexploratory modelling of consciousness by way of quantum

[14]

computing, or in the physical interaction of brains andcomputers byway of neural implants? Towhat extent doestechnicity thereby entail a radical revision of our traditionalphilosophical categories (physis and techn, zo and bios,causality,automation,instrumentality,eventheveryconceptofphilosophy)?

3. What are the larger cultural, ethicopolitical orphilosophical implications of this new thinking of technicity?Howdoesthequestionoftechnologywehavesofarattemptedtoarticulate inherewithin,orariseoutof,whatAdornocalledthe contemporaryculture industryand theaestheticsof thenewmedia(whether in film, literature, journalism,games, theInternet, email, locative media, electronic mailing lists,digitalisation, real time communication and transmissiontechnologies)?Towhatextentcanwewitnessitatworkinthepoliticalorgeopoliticalsphere(globalisation,internationallawand rights, industrial, post or hyperindustrial capitalism,production and consumption, the emergence of a newproletariatorwhatFoucaultand,morerecently,Agambencallthebiopolitical)?

Finally, and for us at leastmost pertinently,what impactdoesthisstateoftechnicityhaveuponourconceptsofwhatitisto be human (rational animal, homo faber, homo sapiens,Dasein, even the socalled posthuman cyborg)? Whatifanythingconstitutes the essence of human being today?How might we begin to construct a thought that could dojusticetothatbeing?Andifthetaskofthinkingtechnicityislessamatterofanamnesicallyrecollectingsomeimmortalpastthanof enteringa radically indeterminatehypomnesic future,thenwhoorwhattogobacktowherewestartedwouldbetheagenttheegocogitoofthatthought?

ArthurBradleyandLouisArmand