Chapter - 5

IN'I'ERNAL COMPULSION AND IZIGID A'I"I'I'1'UUE

The tlominant role that India was able to play in the international arena

increased the prestige and pride of the country. The increasing prestige of the

country contributed to a high level of confidence about self. Nehru viewed ant1

judged thc curscllt cvents ill tlie light of past o ~ i e s i g ~ i o r i ~ i g specific f i ~ ~ t ~ i l~l(l

stressing the broader and more abstract context. This lnade it easier for him to

infer that India and China share a past of colonizatio~n and therefore expected

that they must also share n future of common interests ant1 co-operation, Nehru

was fanat~cal ly expecting Clil~na to follow what India was followilng fosgetti~lg

the fact that China would view and interpret the situation accortling to its own

requirc~nclnt ;unil u~l t lers ta~~tl ing. l'hat is Nclnrt~ disreg;crtled t l ~ c C : l ~ i ~ ~ e s e cIl.ive f o r

big powcl slatus, t l ~ o u g l ~ Ncl~ru 11;ttl t~cccptctl Clii~ia :IS n big power. Nchru 11:1tl

extentlctl t l ~ e 11;1ntl of f'ric~~tlslnip will1 C ~ I ~ I I ; I lo lr;i~isI'or~ii ( I ~ I I I ~ C S O I I S i ~ l c o I ~ ~ ~ i c ; ~ l

tc~~siotns III[{I ~ ~ o ~ i - i ( l c o l o ~ i c ; ~ l ~ I I I C ~ I I ~ I I ~ ~ I I ; I I ( ; o -ope r ;~ l io~~ . I t W ; I S \ v i t l ~ illis ; I ~ I I I 111

n ~ i ~ l t l tl~af Ncltru 11;ltl fr;1111ei1 11i.y C . ' I I~ I I ; I policy ;I! :I t i~tlc wI)c11 I I O OI IC wws willi~ng

to i ~ s s o c ~ i ~ t c wi l l I i . NC: I I I I I wiis O V C ~ C I I I ~ I I I S ~ ~ I S I ~ C i~liou[ Asii111 solicl;~ri~y

becatrse Ile expected that new nations which wert: 110 I ~ ~ n g c l . untlcr colonin1

dorninatiol~ woulrl give up tlieir belligerence and re~nain constructive iund coop-

erative. I t was against this background that a turning point or crisis occured in

Sino-111tll:ln relatiol~ in 1959. I t was at this juncture that the Chinese renctioli

to the c r ~ s i s was seen as an attempt to question India's prestige ant1 her sta~ntl-

ing almong the nations, especially by the anti-China lobby in Intlia. Therefore,

an attelllpt is made in this chapter to analyze the extent to which internal

compulsions contributed to rigid attitude of the policy rnalie1.s t l u r i ~ ~ g the crisis.

Only ~ I I in depth understi~ntling of this aspect will help i l l analyzillg w l ~ y the

whole issue during the crisis lost its historical perspective.

Intlln's China policy \v:~s i'os~i~ulatetl agoillst stilf o p l ~ o s i r i o ~ ~ to Neliru

especially from the Parliarnent. Parliament's role in formulating foreign policy

making was very insignificant yet o n matters concerning country's security

Parliament hod taken lot of interest which the policy makers found i t difficult

to ignore. Generally no Prime Minister would ever accept that some aspect of

his policy or thinking had changed as a result of discussion in Parlinrnent. ' 111 India for the first time the Parliament had started dictating to Prime Minister

Nchru ;untl lie was forcctl to c l i ;~~igc illc policy i n conll)lcie rcvcrsnl of his cilrlicr

stand. India formulated its policy on China with positive hope that real protcc-

tion fro111 China would be. ;ls Nehru stressetl, by having sotne kind of under- 2 standing with China. Indian President's address to the l'rovisio~lol i'nrliament

on 31st January 1950 clearly showed the expectation that lntli;~ h;lrl on the

inatter whcn Indian l>rcsidcnl Dl-. Rajendra l'rasad strcsscd t l ~ a ~ lntlia ant1 Cl~inn

had friendly relations in the past for rnore than two thousand years and looked

forward to the maintenance of those friendly contacts in the interest of preserv- 3 ing peace in Asia and world. But the Indian Press and a good number of

Indian political elite and bureaucrats, including Deputy Prime Minister Sardar

Patel were for a policy of keeping China at a distance froin India and wanted

India to take a stand favouring status quo of Tibet based on its de facto

autonomy. On 1st January 1950 just two days after India's recognition of

People's Republic of China, the Chinese had declared that People's Liberation

A r ~ n y would liberate Tibet and on 30th September 1950 Chou En-lai sciitl that

his governinent was committed to the liberation of the people of Tibet ~uitl 4 would stand o n guard at the Chinese frontiers. India out of its anxiety re-

quested China to go slow on the issue of Tibet. India hacl recognized the

s o v e r e i g ~ ~ t y of China over Tibet but in its note of 26th October 1950 it hatl

1. N. Je*cy. lodia. 1947-77 (Delhi, 1979). p. 9

2. D. Das, .. . I . (Ahemedabad, 1974), Vol. 10, pp. 342 - 47

3. Parliamenla~v Debab ; 1950, Vol. 1, col. 22

4. B.B. Sengupta, The Fulcrum of Asia (Bombay, 1970). p. 104

deplored t l ~ c invasion of Tibet and was rather sever in its tone. 'l'hus o n the

issue of 'fillet lntlia hut1 sow11 tile seetls of suspicion i n 1950 itsell. ' f h ~ s s u s ~

picion was to do~ninate the Sino-Indian relations i n the later yews especially

after the revolt 01' 1959 i n Tibet. 'fllus right from the beginning Incliu's ;utitutlc

towards Tibet was linked to the frientlsllip with Chinil. The Chinese (lid not like

the Indian reaction o n Tibet and ;~ccusetl India of Interl'c~.ing in their t lo~ncstic

matters. T l ~ e 1ntli:ln Govcrnn~c l~ t i l l its tl~irtl ilntl f i n i l l note t~gilin strcssctl. " ~ I I ; I I

s e t t l e~ne r~ t of Tibet problem should be effected by peaceful negotiations atljust-

ing legitim;~te claim to Tibetan autonomy." China reactetl sharply by tlescrib- 6

ing it as an open interference ;inti attempting to internationalize the issue. 'fhe

point of v ~ c w .

The process of rethinking which had started i n some circles of Indian

political elite was clearly reflectetl in presidents addl-ess to the Pa r l i a~~ ien t on

14th November 1950.

My Government have been consistently following a policy of friendship with our great neighbour country, China. I t was a matter of deep regret to us therefore, that the Chinese Government should have undertaken military operations i l l Tibet. when the way of peaceful negotiations was open to them. Tibet is not only a neighbour of Intlin but has hutl close cultural and other ties with her for ages past. Intlia nlust thel-efol-e nec- essarily concern herself with what hnppcns in Tibet :untl hope that the autonomy of this peaceful country will be preserved.

5. N . Jctly, n . I , p. I 0

6 . B.U. Scngupta, 11. 4, pp. 69 - 77

7. D. D;Is, n.2, pp. 342 - 47

8. Parlianlentnw Debates 1950, Vol. 6, col. 11

Witli~n the ruling party also anti-Chinese attitude was builtling up. %en)-

bers began to tloubt tlie security, safety and freedom of I n t l i n following C l ~ i ~ i e s e

occupatio~l of Tibet wliicl~ ct.e;lted ;I border of 2000 miles betweell lntlin :uitl

China wliicli w;ls earlier lntlo-'l.iliet:~n border. I " Indian Pi~rl in~ncnt was (lisillu-

sioned by tlie developments in Tibet. ' I A senior Co~igress member J.B. Kripalani

was of the opinion that Tibet's freetlotn was intimately c o n ~ ~ e c t e t l with that of

I ? India's interest iul(I security. N C I I ~ I I reacted to this colicerli by rciter;lti~lg tlie

governrnelit policy of continuing recognition of China's sovereignty over Tibet

but stressed on the autonomy of Tibet by stating. China was a great country

and, "can any one deny China at tlie present moment tlie right of a g r r ~ ~ t power

.... She is a great power whether you like or i t or dislike it." And also said,

"I t is not ~r~gl i t for any country I O t : ~ l k about its SCIVCI-eignty or suzcl.:~i~iIy ovcr I :I

ill1 ;Lrcik o~itsiclc its ow11 i~ l l~ lnc ( l i ;~ t~ r i~~ ige" But 11ii111y l i r o ~ l i i ~ ~ c ~ l l I ~ i ~ c l ~ r s 01

Congress w a r ~ ~ e t l the goverllnielit against smugness o n the matter ;111(1 C X ~ I I - C S S ~ ~

concern nt the manner i n wliicli the wiiole issue was being viewetl by the

Government. Government, especially Neliru became c;~utious iunti expected the

i~npass r would get over. '"India, under Neliru, was thus following a policy IS wliicli \voi~ld ~ i o t C ; I I I S ~ tlie sl~illover of the Tibetan issue to its Oortlel..

The signing of Sino-Tibetan agreement in May 195 I brougl~t some kind o f

relief in 111dia and Government of l ~ i d i a also trietl to i~iiprove l'u!.tlier the rela-

tions with Clii~la. The Presitlential atltlress to the Parliament on 5th February

9 N . .lc~lcy. 11. I, 1). 20

10. l'arli;r~nent;~rv llcb;rlc$ 1950, Vol. 0, col. 44

11. N. .Jelly, 11. 1, p. 20

12. Parliamentam Debate$ 1950, Vol. 6, col. 1288

13. Ibitl, cols. 1375 - 76

14. N. Jctley, 11.1, p. 29

15, '. ' . . . - I05 I . VOI. 8. col. 270 1

1952 rcllc< ~ c r ~ l I I I I S 111oot1. '1'111. k o r e i ~ ~ ~ C I . ~ S I S , I I I C . C ~ I J ! : I I I I I I ~ O I I ) ! I I I 1111' 1~1r< ' 1111.

s t I i t .. I t ~ t l ; ~ r l t . t l I I I I I I I I tlte ~ ' ~ I I I I ~ I I I I C I I I C A ~ ) I C I \ C I I

anguish at the Cllinese nttitutle towards Intlia and i t was tlescl-ihetl by tlle

members of the Parliunient as tlie consequences of 1ntli;l's weak policy towartis I6 C l ~ i n i N C ~ I ~ C I re;~cted to this criticis111 01' CI l \ i~ l : i iiolicy by s1;11i11g LII :CL "il Oy

some reniote and unlikely chance Hon. Members opposite have sharing of this

policy, they woi~ltl inevitably li:~vc to l'ollow s o ~ ~ i e t l ~ i ~ l g like this I 'o rc ig~~ ~irllicy".

He further atlded that "we have to consider our policy i n I-egnrcl to China

remembering not only wlintever past we may have Il;ld but the present ant1

future that we have to live together in peace ant1 Sriendsliip ant1 I hope co-

operat ion. ' Nelil-u's stress o l ~ peace ant1 co-operation between lntlin :untl

China in India's own interest was not accepted fully by the Parliament ant1 tlle

Governnle~it was bla~iied for its inability to evolve, "a positive Himalayon

I8 policy." Nellru rebutted this charge by declaring that tlie McMalion line was

India's bc~tlndary alitl there was no question of discussing i t with :IIIY olller. I ' I country. He was also emphatic that frontier was not an issue at all to be

discussed ;uitl said tlie talks that were going on will1 C l l i ~ ~ a woultl have !lo

relation tu ;uny otl~el. p roble~n except those in regard to Tibetan trade, pilgriln- 20 age and such like other problems. In view of the possibility of spill-over of

the Tibetan issue into India, Nehru saw an advantage in not taking u p the

border issue with China. He never wanted the border issue to spoil the relation-

ship as t r ~ e ~ i t l s l ~ i p with Cllinil was nlore inipol.tant to Indi:~ L ~ I ~ I I I to :lny otller

country i ~ r the subcontinent.

- . Illc signing of 1954 ngrcelnent with Panclisl~ecl inclutletl in tlle I'rennlble

16. N. Jetlcy. 11. I ? 11, 29

17. Lok S , ~ b l ~ r Debale&, 195.3, Vol. 2 . col. 2787

18. Ibitl. 1954 Vo1. 2, col. 2787

19. Ibid, col. 2967

20. Ibitl. 1953 Vol. 10, cols. 3002 - 93

of tlie treat, n~;~t lz Nehru think that his China Policy 1i;ltl ncl~ieved its goal ant1

he rlecliirerl i n the Pi~rliament :

I t is ;I matter of iniport;~~rcc to us as well as to Clli11:1 t l ~ ; ~ t tllesc two ct~ulitrics wllicli have now about 1.800 miles of l'ronticr. s l ~ t ~ ~ t l c l livt: i l l

terms of peace iuirl Iric~itlliness i k ~ l r l S I I O L I I ( I respect e;lcll otlier's sovcr- eignty ant1 integrity, shoultl agree not to interfere with each other in any way and, i n fact, though i t is not forlnally stated as such. but practic;illy speakiirg, not co~iimitting iiggression on ei~cli other. By this Agrce~iie~l t we ciisurc t o ;I vcry inrgc c s t c ~ ~ t pc;lcc i l l I r t i ~ I I ' A s . 1 wok~I(l earnestly wish that tlie nl-cil o l peace coultl be spread over the rest ol' Asia and indeed over the rest of tlie world. ? '

The Parliament and the Press hailed the 1954 Sino-Indian agreement on

trade in Tibet, But there were tl~ssenting voices from ~l ie~l lbers like J.B. Kripalani

who w;lrnerl l n t l i n of tlie long term collscquences of the t le~llolit io~l of ;I hul'l'el. 22 st;ltc. 1 1 1 t11t: yciir Ic)5H t i l t . ( ' l l i ~ ~ c s c wc1.t: O V C ~ I I I ~ I I ~ : r.o~i(.(.r~it'cI will1 I I I C

activities ol t l ~ e 'fihetiul refugees i l l lntlin ;111tl the C:lii~~ese lor~n;ll ly protcstctl to ? 3

India in t l i~ s reg:lrtl. The worrying t leve lopme~~t i l l Tibet I ~ n t l I'orcetl t l ~ e

Chinese authorities to t l e ~ ~ y tile illvitation to Nel~rii by Dalai L;~m;l to visit 'l'ibet

in Septe~nher 1058. Nehru visitetl Bhutan during this periotl via Y n t u ~ ~ g . (I-egion

of Tibet). 111 B l i u t a ~ ~ , Nehru c;lutioned the Bhutanese King ngi l i~~s t the Chi~lese

expansionism under com~nunism and told him that the Tibetans were "unhappy

at the changes being wrought hy tlie Chinese" and pro~nised Bliutan all protec-

tion. The ('hinese were aware of the s t r e ~ ~ g t h e n i ~ l g o l ties l ) e t w c c ~ ~ l3l1ut:11i ; lntl

India 24 To tl~elii SI ICI I ill1 ili~;llysis h y Nehru to tlie Hl~ut ;~nese kin^ ; l n t l (;ov-

ernlnent woulrl have been ;I hreacli of taitli a11d q u e s t i o ~ ~ i n g o l tlleir ;~ut l~or i ty

over Tibet by 111diil.

21. Ibitl, 1054 Vol. 5, col. 7405

22. Ibitl, ctrls. 7547 - 48

23. S . Gopill, Jawal~orl;~l Netlsu, A Biocr;lnl~y (I)ellli. 1084). VoI. 3, p. X I

24. Ibid, p. X2

In Nove~nbcr 1958 the Clli~lesc openly qucstionctl the n l ign~nc~l t s tlcpictetl

on 1ntli;ul illaps ;ultl wanted i t to hc ;I 11i;ltter c ~ f tlisc~ission hcrwccn t11c co1111-

tries concer~led but tliey assured tliey would not unilaterally make changes to

it. 25 Nehru was surprised by this attitude of the Chinese ant1 he wrote to CIIOLI

En-lai on 14th December 1958 outrightly rejecting their view ant1 st;itetl. " I do

not know wll;lt kintl o f survcy can ;lffec.t thew wcll k1111w1i ; I I V I l'ixr.(l O I ~ I I I I ( I ? (.

nries".

Earlier i n a conversation with T.N. Kaul Chou E n - l i ~ i Itilil told l l i~ l i th;it

"some problems had been left over by ilnperialism but these could be resolvetl

peacefully through normal diplo~natic channels" and "there ;we no such fears o r '7 . suspicions between India and China. There slioultl he none" - I'lierefore Nehru's

letter to Chou En-lni 011 14th Dccc~nl)cr 105X tnusl hiivc I>ccn :I bit ol' s11rl)risc

and coultl 1i:lve given them no s;ltisl':lctioi~ :IS i t apl~e:iretl i t 1 lorcc :I tlcc.isio~l 1111

them regartling the frontier. I t was i n s ~ ~ c l l c i r cu~ns t :~~ lccs I hy 1'150 I n i l i ; ~

was once again t1r;lwn into the matters relating to Tibet. The 1ntli:ln press which

had hailetl the 1954 agreement, now beg;ln to play ;I 11cg;ltive role ill tlescribing

events i n ' libel forcing Neliru to say tll;lt press reports o n 'l'ibet were exagger- ? X ated. The press reports c;~usetl sharp re;lction i n thr P;~~. l i ; rmcil~. I l lus

despite Neliru trying to keep away from the develop~nents i l l Tibet. he was

dragged into the issue, forcing Nehru to state, "that there are other conditions

which rnove people powerfully". 29 I n spite of this lie was reluctant to discuss

the problem of Tibet in the Parliament saying that, "The house will appreciate

that this is :I difficult tind delicate situation and we sllcir~ld ;~voitI tloing t~nytll i~lg

25. White Paper, Vol. I , p. 47

26. Ibid, pi,. 47 - 5 1

27. T.N. Kaul, Diwlomacv in Peace ant1 War (Dellii, 1979). pp. 53 - 54

28. Lok Sablla Debates 1959.-Vol. 27. col. 1685

2 9 Prime Minister 011 Sino-Indian Relations (Press) p. 9

which will worsen i t . " '' Tlie Parliament began to put pressure on Nehru for

a debate UII 'l'ibct but Nehru ielt, "a general tliscussion over cvcilts which tu-c

happening 111 another country woultl be a bad precedent which may have far 3 1 reaching cunsecluences". Neliru's statement did not go wrong. 'l'lie Chinese

reacted to tlte Indi;~n discussio~l on Tibet i l l Parlia~nent as "inlpolite iultl inl-

proper", since it concerned tlie internal affairs of a friendly country. 32 The

Chinese out of irustration tow;~rtls the developnlent i n Tibet bl;t~tlctl K i t l i n ~ p o ~ ~ g

in India as tlie coniniantling centl-e of the revolt in Tibet. Tlie Cl~inese statement

further ignited tlie passions i n India (such ;1 statement could h;~vc been avoidetl

by China). 'l'lle inembers o i Pnrliameilt reacted very sharply and got :III o l~por-

tunity to corner Nehru ant1 the Government of India on tlte policy towortls 3 3

China. Imn~ediately there was tlemand to review tlie relationsllip with China.

The reactio~i of Chinese to tlie discussions in Parlia~iient was deplored and the 31

then I-lome Minister statetl "liitlia tleplol-cs such ;111 attitutle by China."

On 3 1 st March Dalai L;uiio crossetl over to lntlin :uitl Ile was give11 asylum

in lntlia. Dalai Lo~na ' s escape from Tibet w;ls give11 lot o l promlncncc ; t n t l l ) : ~ l ; ~ i

L a n i i ~ ' ~ sL;~Ie~iit:~its 011 Clli~iese excesses were give11 lot ol' sy~ii l~; t t l~el ic covcr;~gc i s by Indian press. Tlie Intli;t~i coverage of these tlevelop~iients in Tibet re-

flected vel-y b;ldly on Chinese Co~nmunism and also highlighted tlie Chinese

failure in ribet. To rub salt into the wound, all tlie major political parties

except tile Communist parties passetl resolution criticizing C1iin;i's high Ii;uitl-

edness in Tibet. 3h Even the Congress Working Coninlittee adopted a resolution

30. Lok Sablin Debates 1959. Vol. 28 cols. 7707 - X

31. Ibid, col. 7709

32. N. Jetlcy, n. I , p. 59

33. Ibitl

34. I,ol\s;~bl~i~ I>cbi~(cs 1959, Vol. 28. col. 0022

35. N. Jetley, 11. 1, p. 64

36. Ibid, p 05

011 10111 May 1!159 cxpres s i~~g syn~ l~a lhy with tlie sul'lering o i ' l ' i l , c t ; ~ ~ ~ i,cr~l>lc. 3 1

The ild0pt1011 o i resolutio~l by Co~lgress Worki~ig C ~ I I I I I I ~ ~ I ~ ~ w:~s i ~ ~ ( l i c i ~ ~ i v c (11.

liow 111dia's C I I ~ I ~ : I 11oIicy was g e i t i ~ ~ g out of Nel11-u's Ii:111(1 ; I I I C I 111c 1);1ssi11g o i

such a rescllution was boulltl to he interpreted as i~i ter lcre~lce i n Cllinesc inter-

nal offairs ;111cl tllc: reactioli o i tlie C l ~ i ~ i c s e was bou~ltl 111 be 11;1rsl1 ;IS I ' :~~ic l~s l~ee l

had enjoined upon both countries to observe strict non interterence and non

intervent1011 i n each otlicr's al'i;lirs.

The Chinese rationalized their failure in Tibet ;IS a revolt engineered by

reactionary ele~nents in Kal i~npo~lg i n collusio~i with tlie uppel- strata re;lctiol~-

3 X aries. Nellru reacterl to this statement by soyi~lg they wel-e "l;lrgc tlralt U I I the

i ~ ~ l i l g i ~ ~ i ~ t i o i ~ " i1111l r e ~ ~ r k c l "I I I : I I ;I I I I I I I ~ I I s t c c t i ~ ~ r i e s were

responsible for this appears to be all extra-ordinary simplification of a colnpli- i '1

cated s i tua t~o~ l" . Nehru's sLcctetllents basctl on internal 111oocl of the pei~plc

was bound not to please the Chinese. To balance what he said, Nehru tlitl try

to restraint the press and public. 'file Cllillese iln~~lctliatcly re;~ctecI 1 0 N C I I I ~ I ' S

statements iiy CI-iticizing him lor making such collllnents but co~lcluded the

statelnent b~ appreciating Nelirc~'s tlcsil-e for stl-ong S i ~ ~ o - I ~ l t l i a ~ ~ l 'rie~~tlsliip. 'rile

Chinese aIs11 assul-ed that Tibet will llot be and nor can it possibly be i111y sol-t

of inenace to the Republic of 11idii1. 40

The uprising in Tibet soon got inadvertently linked with the problem of

frontier or border. Indian press at this time carne out with the information that

the Chinesr were nibbling at our borders. When q u e s t i o ~ ~ e d on the tnatter in

Parliament Nehru tried to untlerplay the matter by saying that he was not aware

37. U . U . Sc~igupt;i, n . 4, p. 291

38. N. Jetley, n . 1, p. 59

3 Idol\ Sablrir I ) c b ; ~ ~ u 1959. Vol. 30. Cols. 13500 - 501

40. Peo~~le's I)itily, 6th May 1050

thnt is still our oh;ccrivc ;111tl we sl~nll c o ~ i t i ~ ~ u c lo work I'or i t . ' l ' l1;11 tlocs 11ol

i e 1 1 t we S I I I I I s r r e ~ ~ t l e I y t l ~ i ~ g we c o ~ ~ s i l e r r i g I I ~ I ; I I we S I I I I ~ I I ~ I

liaud over bits 01' territory 0 1 ' Intlia to C h ~ n n lo please ~ I I C I I I . '1'11:1( I S our iIig1111y

01. self rcsl)ccl. R u t il l r l~c loll)! rau, i t is o l ~ I I I O ~ ~ I I ~ L I ' t l~rst . two gri!i~t ,,.l'l

countries, whatever tlieir intern;~l structures or policies 111igl1l lle, to 110 I 'rie~~iIs.

On S e p t e ~ i ~ b e r 7th 1959 tlie first Wllite Paper was plncetl before the Par-

l ia~i lent covering correspondence between April 1954 to August 1959. The

White Paper burst the bubble of Sino-Indian frienrlsl~ip formetl i l l 1954. Even

before tlie furore was creatcd in Pa r l i ame~ i t the 1ntlia11 A~nIi;~ss;it lor G .

Parthasaratlii hncl informed form Peking "that thel-e was I I O meeting grountl

between t l ~ c two c o u ~ ~ t r i e s on 'l'ihet;un issue ; ~ n t l 1ntli;i- Cliin;~ r c l ; ~ t i o ~ ~ s s l ~ c ~ ~ ~ l t l

be no longer viewed as ;ui eui~otional matter". 4X 111 1956 itself Chou En-lai liatl

told Nel~ru thnt regnrrling 'fibct they will not toleratc ally foreign iutel-l'er-

e n ~ e . ~ ' But Neliru was sy~npatlnetic to tlie problem of Tibetatis ~ u i d on 27111

April 1955) he toltl the Parli ;~~iient tlint lntlinn ~renctio~i

Was 1;lrgcly one of sympatliy basctl OII s c ~ l l i ~ n e ~ ~ t ;111tl I I L I I I I ; I I ~ ~ ~ ; I ~ ~ ; I I I r c ;~so~ l ' also on certain feeling of kinship with tlie Tibetan people derived from long established religious and cultural contacts. I t was all i~istitictive re- action ... I f tliat was tlie !reaction here one nray well iniagilie the ~reaclion among Tibetans themselves.. We have every desire to maintain the frientl- ship between India ant1 China but at the sarne time we have sympathy for the people of Tibet and we are greatly distressed at their helpless plight ... M y sympathy goes o u t to this young man (Dalai Lama) who at an early age has to shoulder respt)nsibilities.

Sucli ;I stnlement by Neliru on n sensitive issue like t l~ i s olilv co111ril)utetl

to strengthen the suspicio~i sown i l l 1950s when Intlia pleatletl for the ;~utono~l iy

47. Ibitl, col. 05.52

48. V.K. Matlliv;~~nhutty. V.K. Kr is l i~~;~ Menon l%io~rat~lny (1)cllii. I'IXX), 1). 1.5 1

49. J . LLeliru, IncJiil's 1;oreiell I'olicy (Dclhi, 1971), p. 343

50. Ibid, 11. 325

of a n y s l l c l l tlllng ;ult\ rem:lrkctl, " In fact - I hove (lot ilcortl ;I ~1lllloLll' (0 tl1:lt

0 1 . effect, lea,,c: o u t pacts". fhe Chinese mLlp callic out with large tl-;lcls C J ~

~ ~ ~ l i ; ~ ~ ~ ter r i tory sl10wll as C l ~ i ~ ~ c s c . Ncl~ru in this rcg;lr~l sl;llctl 1)cloI'c lllc l'ilr-

lialnent t l~at McMahon line is the "firm frontier, fir113 by treaty, firm by usage

a ~ ~ d f ' i r~n by gcog~. ;~pl~y" a ~ ~ t l CIIOU E11-1ili gave I I ~ I I I LIIC i ~ ~ i p r e s s i o l ~ tl~ilt CIli~ii! 4 ?

;lcceptecl 1 1 1 ~ McMalloll lillc ;is the i ~ ~ t c r ~ ~ n t i o ~ ~ ; ~ l bortlcr. 11 was :It ~ I I I S l i l l l ~

that Migytuir ; I I I ( I Lo~~g.ju i ~ ~ c i c l c ~ ~ t s took pli~ce i l l w l ~ i c l ~ ~ I I C CI I~I ICSC killctl ~ I I

Indian soldier a~ltl drove away [lie Intli;u~ fol-ccs. 'l'l~c renctiol~ of p11hlic o ~ ~ l

press was i~lstniit. E x p l n i ~ l i ~ ~ g t l ~ c p o s i t i o ~ ~ Ncl~ru st;~tctl. "'l'l~crc is I I O pl~ysicnl

r l e~nurcu t io~~ o l tllc (ronticr in i l~osc i l lout l t ;~i~~ p;~sscs, ~ ~ l l l ~ o u g l ~ 0111. I I I : IOS L I ~ C

4 3 quite clear o n this subject". 111 connectio~i wit11 tliese t l e v e l o p ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ t s Nel~ru

also informed the Parliament that in Western Sectol- too tlie Chinese Il;lve

claimed large parts of 1ndi;ln territory. Nehru at the same time fearing strong

reaction il l tcr~~;llly tried to play i t clown by stating tl1;rl these were petty

intrusions ancl not "ext~-aortlii~ilry as these were tlie aleas witlir>ut t l e~~ l :u . c ;~ t io~~

and somet i l~~es cl-ossing coultl take place accitlently." ' I3 But the men~bers i l l

1 5 Parliament were lot s;~lisfictl a ~ ~ t l sougl~t White I':~l~er 0 1 1 ~ I I C I I I : L ~ ~ C ~ . N C I I ~ I I

told the h c ~ t ~ s e tli:lt he really tlitl not know what the Chinese i ~ ~ t e l l t i o l ~ s were . I h

At the sLumc tit11c Nchru also 111;1tlc i t cle;lr t l l ; ~ t l'ricntlship C:III o ~ ~ l y 1)c (111 tcrlxls

of ecluality lhy st~lting : "t;rientlship cannot exist betweell the wc;~k i l ~ l c l tllc

strong, betwee11 the country tl1;lt is trying to bully :urcl the o t l~e r who accepts

to be bullietl .... But subject to that we did work Sol- t l ~ e i r i e ~ ~ t l s l ~ i p o f 1 1 1 ~ l i : ~ ; t l l t l

China. May 1 sny that in spite o f all that lias happened ant1 is 11:lppening to ( l a y

- 41. Loksahho Debate3 1959, VoI. 28. col. 8515

42. Ibid, col. 12721

43. Ibid, 1050. Vol. 33, col. 4791

44. Ibid, col. ,180 l

45. Ibid, col. ,187 1

4 lbitl, 1950. Vol. 34, col. 6546

of Tibet .111tl now i l l completc revers:~l of nlutiial respect ;inti I ~ O I ) interference

Nellru tllc lcailer of interuatio~lnl stature was express ing openly sy~lrpotlly lor

the Tibet:uis a11tl i~nplic; i t ing the Chinese fo r their plight. Intliii l ' i~rgot the i';~ct

that regartlless of historical arguinents the political fac t r e ~ n i ~ i n c t l t11;lt O I I C C

China 's sovereignty over T ibe t was recognized wli;itevcr ;illtonomy tile 'l'ibettlns

may have eqjoyed f rom then on depenrietl not o n international pressures but o n

C l ~ i n : ~ ' s c o i ~ s c ~ l t . Nelll.ti's rc:~i.titr~l to Tibet could l l ;~ve hccn tluc lo lllc i l l l l c re~~t

democrat 111 him and following tlie revolt in Tibet in 1959 Nehru mus t have felt

a guil ty feeling over the stlrrciitler of Tibet to Cllilla. Tllerefore to s;tlvr 111s

conscience he took a stand totally different froin that of ear ly 1950.

In spite of Iris sympathetic outbursts towartls Tibet Nelil-u still hoped that

the mood of excitenient will pass away i n both the countries and lie told tlie

Parliamenr to act with restraint so that "~na in ta in ing our d igni ty , maintaining

our se l f - r rspect and yet not al lowing ourselves to drif t in to wrong att i tudes and

hosti le a t t ~ t u d e s and trying to help in removing or in solving such problems ns

arise. W e inay llelp a l i t t l e -hey callnot be solvctl qu ic l t ly - l l~ ;~I is tlle vory

ut11iost t l i i ~ l one call d o i n 1111: ci~-cu~nst; l l lces o r a t any rnLe cl.entillg ill1 ; l l l l l ( l -

5 1 sphere wli~cll 11rny help in t lo i~rg this. I-low far i t will go , I (lo not know".

Th i s was ;I vel-y modest ant1 reillistic policy to prevent l 'ur t l~c~- tlctcrio~- tion on of

relat ions between India ancl I:lrilra. Thus Nellru w;u~ ted the iuattcrs to r e~u : i i~ l

5 2 as they wcrc and wait for tllc Chinese to respond. Nelrrtl ;llso expcctctl

China to rcsponcl to 111dio's p o s i ~ i v e at t i tude of not g iving up its ~ l o ~ l - ; ~ l i g n n l e n t

for the sakt o f tlefence pact with P;tkist;~n vis-;I-vis tile C l l i~ iese . Soon Nehru's

h o p c ~ w c r r tl:~sllctl wl le~l tllc ( ' l ~ i l ~ c s c A~irl~;~ss: i t lor i l l New I)c l l~i t:~lkctl of two

I ' i l l Ills S I ; I I ~ I I I C I I I I I O I I I M ; I V 1050. ' ' I ' I I I ~ I I ~ I I Ilis 1 , 1 1 1 ~ 1 1 ,v;ls

warning lntlin of Chinese drifting towards Pakistan so as to put pressure o n

India to reilch a meeting point on bilateral 1n;ittel.s. '' l3ui ille ol.liciols ol. 4 5

Ministry of External Affairs interpretetl this as nn ope11 blnckm;~il.

The Chinese meanwhile to put further pressure on India began to circulate

lnaps clairiiil~g large tracts of iantl in India as Chinese. The Chitlese no more

clnitned tlint they wet-e reprotluction of Kuomintnng 111;lps. As sl;~tetl corlicr

Nehru had illready written to Chou En-lai that there existed no border tlisyutes

and exprctctl t l ~ ; ~ t 1954 : I ~ I . ~ C I I I C I I ~ 11;1(l seiilcd i l l1 t l ~ c O I I ~ S I ~ I I I ~ ~ ~ I I ~ p r o l ) l e ~ ~ ~ s 5 h between two countries. Cllou En-lai's reply, laid to rest all such hopes wlie~i

he stated that "I-listorically no treaty or agreement on the Si~>o-l~~tl i ;un border 5 7

has been signed betwee11 Chinese Central Governme~rt and Intlia~i Government".

Me further statetl the matter was not raised i n 1954 because "the contlitions 5 8 .

wel-e not ripe ant1 China lintl no timc to study the questiotr" flle Chi~lese

were t ryi~ig to use the border issue to restrair~ lntlia or1 the Tibetell crisis 21s well

as to ratio~ralize their f ~ ~ i l u r e i n Tibet. This is clear beciu~se earlier Cllou Ell-

lai had told his Burmese counterpart that he wantetl to take up the border issue 5 '1 in 1954-55 itself but had to ship i t tlue to Nehru's stl-trng view ~ I I t l ~ c 1n;rttcr.

Further i n his Jiunuary 19.59 letter Chou En-lai also requested Nehru to maintain

status quo to avoid furtller incidents and proposed each side should keep to the

area untlet control anti hopctl the matter coultl be finnlizetl oil the psinciplcs o l 6 0 Panchslieel. Nehru coutrterctl this letter with a pre - c o n t l i t i o ~ ~ that status cluo

54. Ibitl

55. S. C;op;ll n. 23, 11. 93

56. Wliitc I'aucr, Vol. I, p1). 48 - 40

57. Ibitl. 11. 52

58. lbitl

59. S. (;o[)al, Jnwahorlal Nehru A Uiocroohy (Delhi. IWO), Vol. 2. pp. 22X - 20

60. Wllitc l 1 ; i o ~ . Vol. I . pi). 52 - 54

(I I s l~ould be observe(l on the position lleld prior to tllese tlisputes. 'l'his wiis :I

p rvpos i t i o~~ wllich Chinese woultl nevcr accept in western scctor through wllicli

Sinkiang Tibet ro;uil cut across. 1:ollowing the t l c v e l o p ~ ~ i e ~ ~ t s i l l .fillet, the news

that the Cliincse are nibbli~ig tlic Intliai~ tel-ritc~ry put pressurc on Nclil-u ;.in(l he

was forcetl to place the Wl~ i t e I'apcr on S i n o - l n t l i ; ~ ~ ~ liortlcr tlisl)utc.

T l ~ c ~cactioli to the I I ~ I I of Wl~i tc I ' I~cl'orc tlic I ~ r l i ~ ~ c i t W ~ I S

explosive. Parlialllent new delnanded an explanatio~l fl-om the Government lor

taking Chlnese lightly and for inisleading the public. The placing o f the White

Paper i n rile Parlitument m;ttlc thc press and the Parliaiment raise ;I c o ~ ~ c c r ~ c t l 62

voice against the Government's policy towards China.

In s ~ c h ;I tensed up situation the only way to defuse the crises was by

freezing tlie dispute till the political conditions became congenial i n both the

countries. But i n Sino- l~ltliall boundary dispute no such thing could be done

bccnuse Cllou En- ln i i n his letter tlntetl 8th September 1950 out rightly rejectetl

India's c l a i ~ n on the boundary ant1 even refused to accept the b o u ~ ~ i l a r y between

chin;^, Sikkiln and Bhut;un as i t tlid not come within scope o f Sino-Indian

0 i - d i s c u s s i o ~ ~ . fllis was seen by the Indian Parliament press and public as all

open insult to I~idia 's treaty with Bhutan ant1 Sikki~l i thereby q u e s t i o ~ ~ i ~ l g I ~ ~ t l i ; ~ ' s

sovercig~ily. 'fhe publication of Wl~i tc Paper vit~tlict~tctl ;111ti-(:lli11;1 l(~l,l,y i l l

Parliamcl~t ant1 press ant1 Nel~ru was accusctl 01' 11ot lak i t~g l l ~ c I'arli:unc~~t into

confidencc and for jeopardizing country's security tllrough a policy of appease- 62 . ment. I'he inflamed reaction of the Parliament ant1 press was to seek an

ossur;uncc i 'ro~n Ncliru tI1i1t Sine-l~itlinll fricntlsl~ip slloultl 1101 bc pro~~itrtctl ;)I r l~c

expense of c o u ~ ~ t r y ' s security. I'arliament niade it clear that not ;r11 "Inch" of 6 5 land should be concetled to China. Nehru now began to feel t l ~ e weight n n t l

pressure of the I':~rli;unent on l ~ i s China ~)ol icy. Ile :~l) l~c;~let l to the m c ~ n l ~ c r s lo (16 show restr;~int . Nellru w:~s fully conscious of the l';~ct t11;it cxcilc111e111 ;111rl

1 , I rcli;ulcc 011 l~rcstigc by n;~tic~ns cc~t~lcl ol'tc~i lc:~tl to w r t r ~ ~ g s tc l~s . And 11c

thonght i t would bc foolis11 to fight for tllc p o s s c s s i o ~ ~ of S O I I I C 0o1.tlcr ;irc;ts. (I H I-lc wanted t l ~ c (loor to be o l ) c ~ ~ lor ; ~ c c o n ~ ~ ~ ~ o d o t i o n ;r11c1 S ~ L I I C I I I C I I ~ . U l l t tllc

Pnrlia~nent had already set the pattern of things to come basctl o n its disillu-

sionment and bitterness over the Govcvn~~lent 's ll:ultlli~lg of the Cllinn policy.

The whole issue was viewed so passionately that the impression was created

that India was being bullied. Such an attitude was built up to ;r great extent by

the opposition leaders and critics of Nehru within the Congress party because

they did nor care to inform the~nselves of realities on the ground or even tile

hard facts o f the dispute. Nehru too on his part did not try to enlighten them

on the issue because probably l ~ e was aware of the strong anti-China lobby thnt

was active i n his party and as well as in the opposition. Any attempt by him

to enlighten them o n the intric;~cics of the issue woultl have 0cc11 tlubbctl by

them (opposition) a s appeasement of China or rationalization of his China

policy. Thus placed i n such a situation Nehru was left with no option but to try

and convince the Chinese that i t should accept the boundary line as declal-ed by

India. There opposition of critics of China policy was because in the beginning

Nehru had unilaterally taken a decision of establishing friendship with China.

Now the critics of China policy got an opportunity to pin Neh~-u clown on the

bountl;~ry issue as most of the critics were opposition ine~nhers wllo h ; ~ r r i ~ ~ ~ t l l c

65. Ibid

66. S. Gopal, n . 23, p. 96

67. Ibid

68. lbid

left parties were against es t ; ib l i s l~ i~~g Srientlship wit11 Cliinn i n the Ircgin~ii~ig

itself.

The debate i n Porli;ume~~t t l i t l t l i s ~ ~ ~ a y Neliru w~t l he contle11111ctl tlie pctll-

II I I ICL ' 0 1 1 L11(. 1 ) i l l l 111' I ~ C l l l l ! l l l l l l : l ' ~ i l l l c l w i l l l l~~I 1111: ' i l l l l l l l l l ~ 111 ~ I C ~ I ~ I V I . I l l

;~ccortl:~ncc will1 ils iruc clig1111y. l l e ~ ~ e e e ~ r l ~ ~ ~ l his c r~ .o r 01' I I O ~ 111:1ei11g 111c 00

inlol .n~; t t io~~ lrcl 'o~c tllc house i ~ n t l ~ r rc~n~isc( l 11o1 lo relrc;ll lhc i ~ ~ i s l i ~ k c ; I ~ ; I ~ I I .

111 his over e n t l ~ i ~ s i i ~ s ~ ~ i to co111roI liis critics ;I I I ( I ol)~rosition I I I C I I I O C ~ S I I C ( I c -

clared "there can be no metlintion conciliation or arbitration ; I ~ ( I L I L these tlc-

mands of the Chinese about large chunks of territol-y". 7U He further c;tlletl i t

as "undoubtetlly a breach of tllat agreement of 1954." ;~ncl reitcri~tctl the posi-

tion regarding Bhutan and Sikki~n , "We have publicly rightly undertaken certain

responsibilities for the defence of Sikkitn and Bhutan, if they are attacked .... I f

something happens o n their borders, then i t is the same thing as interference 7 1

with the border of India". To underline the significance of the Parlia~ilerrt he

wrote to Cliou En-lai on 26th September 1959 stating that untler intlinn Cull-

stitution r i a i e i t is supreme ; u ~ d India hat1 also n free press n n t l it was

difficult t c ~ i - e s t r ; ~ i ~ ~ the public cr i~icism. He also inntic i t c lc ;~r t l i ; ~ t the tliscus-

sion in l~ i t l i a~ i I'nrliame~it was tiot to put pressure trn Cliinn ant1 "any such

thinking on her part is a complete misreading of tlie facts of the situation". 72

The developments in 1959 eleel-ly showed Nehru's aptness to be cal-I-ied away

by his feelings and according to his biographer lie was sornetilnes so impressed

by the tl~eoretical consideration that he was apt to under estimate tlie realities

7 0 of the situation. To Neliru tlie Chinese attitude was not straiglit with Inrlia

69. Lok Si~bha Debates, 1959, Vol. 34, cols. 8109 - 1 I

70. Ibid. cvl. 8 1 16

71. Ibitl, ctrls. 8124 - 25

72. White I'apcr, Vol. 2, pp:34 - 46

73. S. Gopal n. 59, p. 327

anti he also developed a feeling that they attached low value to friendship with

Intlia. 74 Thus Ncllru was co~lvi~lcet l t l~ot thc Chinese attitittle to the inattcr was

breach of f;ritlbOn lOt11 Septen~her . 1959 he soitl : "l.r;~nkly i t is serious hec;lusc

I just do i ~ o t know I I O W the Chir~ese ~nintl 111ay t l ~ j ~ ~ k 1 just (lo 1101 klfow :111tl

I have bee11 surprised at the recent developments. So 1 do not know. 1 have

admiration for the Chinese mind logical, reasonable anrl I-elatively calm. But

socnetimes I wonder if all those old qualities have not perl~nps been partly 3 . 7 5 0v~rwl1~l1111:~I.

Despite his Jis111ay over I Cl~incsc ottitutlc tow;trrls 111cI i ; l 11c It.ie(l lo

safeguard the principles of his Chinese policy that is. protection o f territorial

integrity of India and at the same time trying to reach a peaceful settlement

avoiding hostility without reducing the significance of Tibetan autonomy. Nehru's

attenipt to get out of this problem was not succeeding as the parties involved

in the dispute were forced to stick to their positions.

In India nleanwhile the Kongka pass incident i n which 11i11c 111tlin11 Soltliers

were killeil ;lnd ten soldiers were cnpturetl inf la~ned the passion of the public

and fury o f India11 public rencheil ;L new pi tcl~ ant1 t iover~l lnent 's i~r~tbili ty to

prevent Chinese aggression wits severely criticized by the press. The press was

severely harsh on Nehru anti the Defence Minister Krishna Mc~ton lor having

played wcth the security of the country. Some sections of the Press even began

to voice the desire that country should look out for a new leader to defend the 7 0 country. The newspaperThe Hindu commented that, "In the present conflict

with China the resentment against the Chinese is taking form of a personal 77 attack on Nehru". The Parlia~nent moved an otljournment motion in Lok

74. S. Gopul. n. 23, p. 97

75. Ra!~a Sabha Debates 1959, Vol. 36, col. 4015

76. N. Jetley, 1 1 . 1 . p. 100

77. Tlrc I lindu, 20th Octobel- 1959

Sabha rcg;~rtling "the failure of the Gove1.11mc11t lo L:~kc i)rolnl)l ant1 cllcclivc

action agallist unabashed violat~on oC lntlia's sovcrcignty by Cl~inn 011 21st 7 K

October 1959, when Clii~lcse troops penetrated deep into 11lrli;i's territory."

Fearing tllrcat to his position Nel~ru without disclosi~lg the exact military po-

sition told t h c Purlialnent t h u t "our d e f e ~ ~ c e forces were i l l gc~otl conclitlo~l i111tl

are capable of looking after our security." '' But the then Arlny Con~~nalrtler

General 'fliim~nayya had niadc it clear that Indian Army was not in u posilio~l

to withstantl the Chinese and i t was for political leaders to secul-e our frclntiel-s

with chin:^ 'rhe threat to his position firstly made Nel~ru place the tloctl-

ments before the Parlia~ilent and after Kongka pass iucident he began to assure

the p u b l ~ c that there was no room for worry and overconfitlently PI-aised the

Indian Army's ability to prevent any kind of Chinese threat. In the subsequent

years this assurance to the lndian public began to put pressure on Nehru and

on the lntlian Army on matters related to Sino - Indian dispute. B y tile end of

1959, that is in Nehru's letter tlated 16th November 1959, to the Chinese that

faill), i l l r v e s I'aitl~ i l l t ~ u r cou~ltry, l':~illl i l l I p:~st ant1 l ' ;~ i t l l i l l our

future." N C I I ~ U did try to tulle clown tile I~:~rshncss ol. thc criticism i l l i ' ;~ r l i ;~ -

Iiiellt nntl w;unlctl the oppositio~l lo colill-ol its l ) ; iss io~~. l%ul 1l1c 11011 - C ~ I I I I I I ~ I I I ~ \ I

oppositio~i led by Kripalalli was very 11;u.sll arguing t l ~ ; ~ t ihc i~cgot i ; l t io~~s sl~oultl

83 . be wountl up as they are not going to serve any purpose, f o furthel- restrict

Nehru's tllplolnatic maneuverability Nehru was w;unetl by the o l )pos i l io~~ t l ~ ; i ~

78. Lok Sabha Debiktes 1959, Vol. 35, col. 83

79. Ibitl, cols. 1680 - 90

80. Gene~al Thi~nayya, "Adequate l~lsurance" in Seminar, No.35, July 1962, p. 14

81. Lok Sobha Debates, 1950, Vol. 35, cols. 1742 - 46

82. Ibitl.

83. Ibid, 1059, Vol. 37, col. 6270

people wo~iltl lose faith in the Government's capacity to resist aggression, if tlie X .I

policy o l tlril't, in the guise ol l'rr~itlcss ilegotiotiol~, w ;~s c o n l i ~ ~ u c t l .

To n u k e matter worse Neliru had a Detence Minister (Krishna Menon?

wlio despite his i~itelligence was liatetl by tlie majority in the Parliament (but11

ruling and the opposition). Neliru on the other liantl despite Krishna Menon's

unpopularity had great regard and faith in liim because of his intelligence and

ability anrl it appears Krishna Menon was one of tlie few colleagues with whom

he had an rntellectual rapport. Neliru wrote to Krishna Menon, "Your presence

somewhere within reach is a great comfort to me, I really have few persons

with whom I can discuss any matter with confidence. " According to Neliru's

biographer Dr.S.Gopal, Neliru relished Krishna Me~lon 's intellectual performance.

He got Nehru's admiration and among them there was inutual sympathy on most

of the matters. '"rishna Menon like his Inelitor Prime Minister Nehru hat1 an

inclination towards socialism which was not liked by inany of the senior C o ~ r -

gress Leaders wlio were more pro-right i n their thinking ant1 nttitutle. A se~i ior

leader o f 1ntli;ul National Congress ~uid freedom fighter Abtlul K;il~uir Aziltl

8 , U l stroiigly i c v l t I r ; ~ t Krislr~ia M c ~ i o ~ i l~atl " c o ~ n ~ n u ~ i i s t tc~i t lc~icics . I ic 11i1t1

not only t l~sl iked Krishna Meiron but even hat1 contempt for liim. 111 I954 Neliru

wanted to inclutle Krislina Melion i n tlie cabinet hut Azi~tl opposetl i t vche-

X X . nic~itly by sentling in his rcsignatio~i. I'l~crcl'orc i n 105h wl1c11 Kris l i~~; t M ~ I I O I I .

all outsitlcl- wit11 iro political li:~sc, was illtluctctl illto tlrc c ;~ l l i~ ic [ Ilc c ~ ~ t c r c t l wit11

a tag of being a "crypto-co~i)rnunist".

After joining the c;tbi~iet Krisli~~ii MCIIOII li;rtl I'iille~r 0111 will1 SOII IC of his

84. Ibitl, cols. 6099 - 7000

85. S. Gopal, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 3 , p. 474

86. S. Gopal, n. 59, p. 140

87. A.K. Azatl, Intli;~ Wills frectlo~n, (Delhi, 1990), p. 200

88. Ibid, 11. 252

colleogucs 111 t l ~ c c:~hi~rct : I I I ~ ~ IOI.IIIII : I IC~Y or L I I I I O ~ I I I I I : I I ~ I Y ~ I I C S C I I I C I I I ~ C ~ S I I ~ I ~ I .

pened to be of the pro-right faction. Krishna Meno11 hat1 vet-y bat1 relatiol~s wit11

the Finance Minister T.T.Krishnanlachari and after him his successor Morar.ii

Desai. R9 Krisl~l i i~ MCIIOII'S ~ i i ; i i ~ i ~ ~ ~ C V ; L I I C C ;ig:iillst this g r ( ~ l ~ r ) wiis tl1:11 tliey were Y O

promoting the right wing n s c c ~ ~ r l a ~ ~ c y i n l~ i i l i a~ i politics. 'l'hcsc Iciitlcrs who

were opposetl to Krishna Melion were indirectly agoit~st Ncliru n ~ ~ t l his views

on social is~n. The Indian National Co~lgress was ~ i o tloubt o inonolithic trrgo-

nization but i t was driven with ideological differences among the top leaders,

C.Rajngop;~l:lcl~;lri, Azad. Patel and their followers were :inti-socialist c:ump

followers. After iildependence, the Nel~ru cabinet hat1 moi-e pro-right wing

members, inaking matters very difficult I'or Kr is l i~~n Menon. (l'llosc w l ~ o ;lc-

cusetl Krislinn Menon o f being :I crypto Communist failed to take not of tlle 9 I

role played by hiin in Intlia joining the Cominonwe:~ItIi).

Krislina Menon's opponents could not tolerate thc fact that n 111~111 without

ally political base wit11 slleer intellige~icc could asce~id the latltlcr o l c n ~ i n c ~ ~ c c

especially at a time when the corridors o f powers i n Dellli where crowtled by

nlen of " s ~ l ~ a l l stature" and "slinllow mintls':Nelrru I I L I ~ intluctetl K r i s l i ~ ~ a Menon

into tlre cabinet because lie had decitled that while he himself ha~itlletl the

foreign policy i t would be better that defence was liar~tlled by sociie one close

92 to him in thinking, as these two portfolios are closely linked. Thus the close

inter-con~~ect ion between these two ~ninistries ant1 tlie Sino-1ntli;un crisis came

i n handy to get ritl of Krishna Menon and to cliallenge Nehru's Ieatlt:rsl~ip.

Tlic right wingers let1 by Mor;irli Desai tlie then Fi~i ;~l lce Minister turned

9 S. Gopal, 11. 23, p. 130

90. lbid

91. A.K. Uanerjce, "Role of the 1liploni;it in Decision Making I'rocess" i ~ i I l ~ t l i ; ~ Ou:u-[el-ly,

Apr~l-June, 1979. pp. 207 - 222

2 V K . Madliava~rkutty, 11. 48, p. 135

down any propos;~l put lorw;~rtl by Melion lor tlic c leve lop~~le l~ t ol ~ I e l c ~ l r c

forces on grounds of economy and shortage of foreign excI1:111ge etc. General

B.M. Kaul i l l his book has accused the Finance Minister of refusillg fulltls for

estab]islllrlcil[ of ortlirior~cc i:~ccory. Kris l i~l ;~ Melion w;t~ilcd lllc (lclcnce b;lsc(l-

industries to be self - sufficient atid he made it clear that lie woultl strive for

it. " The outornobile industry was against Krishna Melion bec;u~se liis nlove lo

develop ~ I I C ~ i o r A Veliicles I I J : t : t l ~ ~ r ; f ' f c i c 10i:ir ec(111o11iic

interest. Therefore with tlieir financial power wntl clout i l l politic;tl cil-cles. ;I

vicious propaganda in tlie press was started against Krislina Menon. He was

even ncci~sctl ol' a11 t i - l i i l i : ~ ~ ~ outlook ant1 working ;~g;~ins t ihc i~ltcrcsl o l

lnrlian intlustrinlists who hntl stootl by the Congress in tlie struggle lor l'ree-

dotn." 111 l'arli:uiient the industrial lobby, in order to run down Krish~la Menon.

openly stated that they were more concerned about defence policy and not

about f o r c ~ g n policy. 95 To emphasis&their anger against Krislina Menon, the

meriibers of tlie Parliament doubted his patriotism and demanded liis resigna-

tion. Nehru regretted these personal references to Krislina Menon by stating

that, "I k ~ l o w that apart from his outstanding ability lie is a Inan of the deepest 0 6

patriotis~l; :111ci national f e e l i ~ ~ g " . But Neliru's tlecp fnit l l ill Krislinn Me~ioli

and his assurances on Krishna Menon instead of changing tlie intransigent mood

of the l'nrliamrnt only aggr;~v:~tetl tlie suspicio~i o l the members o l the I1;irli:~-

ment about Krislina Menon.

I t w ; ~ s i n this backgrountl that Neliru's letter lo Cllclu Eli-l;ti o l St11 Fell-

ruary 1960 was made public when debate on Presitlent's atldress was going o n .

The oppositio~i fountl, "unw;~rruntetl reversal of gover~ime~l t ' s tlccloretl chin;^

93. Ibid

94. Ibid

95. Prime Minister on Sino-lntlian Relations (Parlia~nent) Vo. 1, p. 127

96. b k Sablia Debates, 1959, Vol. 35, cols. 2188 - 90

Policy app~ovet l and endorsed by Parliament as evidenced in Prime Minister's

latest corn~nunication to tlie Chinese Premier, accepti~lg Chinese propusal for all

uncond i t i o~~ ;~ l meeting between tlie two Prime Ministers" " 'Flie Govern~nent

was r c m ~ ~ ~ t l c t l t l ~ ; ~ t I'nrliamcnl l i ;~t l o~ i ly npprovetl 01' tlic ( i o v c r ~ ~ ~ n c r i t ' s cnrlicr

stiuitl tliat any tl isci~ssio~l or tiiceting c;ui be lieltl only al'tcr v;rc;itirr~~ by C l i i ~ ~ c s c C ' lorccs T ~ O I I I tlic I I I C ~ ~ ; I I I territory. l ? r~r i t l '~~l t l i scuss io~~ C; I I I h k c III;IC:C o111y W I I C I I

certain prccontlitio~is :Ire fulfillctl. A ineeting without i111y P ~ C C ( I I I ( ~ ~ I ~ O I I S is fr;111gl11

with grave da~iger" " Neliru's invil;ltion to Chou in- lo i was dcscribctl ns ;I

clinib down. As there was no reference regarding tlie invitation to Clii~iese

Premier i l l tlie I'reside~ltial acltlress i t was doubtetl whethel- the President wns

aware of i t " " Nehru was :\ccusetl with twin images of Cl i~~rchi l l n ~ i t l C:li;un-

berlain. Even hcfol-e tlie talks 1i:ltl started Neliru was put i n the (lock. when

Porli:~~iicnr cxl,rcssctl co1iccr11 ( ~ v c r l l ~ c possil>ility of Aks:~i (-11i1i 11cirlg cxi:Ii;111g~c1

for peace I"" Neliru was pili~~ccl clown by the I ' :ul i ; r~~~c~lt by Ii11ki11g tile 11cgo-

tiation with sentiments of the people and tlie honour of nation. 'l'lius tlie l9hO

talks were bound to fail.

The neglect of tlie opposition in tlie framing of tlie foreign policy was

evident when the political parties in the opposition wanted Neliru to consult

the~i i on ; I I I ;~grcctl l i~ i e hcforc rc;~cliing ;I s c t l len ic~~t witli l l ~ c Clii~icsc ;11i(1 1 0

check Neliru's initiative they expressed fears tliat Neliru was trying to yield to

101 tlie Chinese pressure Neliru opposed the opposition move to bluck his

diplomatic m~uieuverability but tlie hostile mootl of tlie I';~rli:ulle~it especially

the opposition and tlie sent in~ents of tlie public affected Neliru thereby restrict-

97. Ibi~l. 1960, Vol. 38, col. 1166

98. Ibid, ~ o l . 1452

99. Ibid, col. 1452

100.Ibid. culs. 1494 - 1501

101. Ibid. 1960, Vol. 40, col. 6338

1Ll2 . ing his i n i t~ ;~ t ive n t :I crucial st;lge in the I Y O O t ;~lks. I ' I I I I S n l this st;~gc.

Nehru war plocctl i n :I peculiar ~10~1t1011 of' I . C S L I . ; I I I I I I I ~ ; I I I ~ I I I ~ I . ~ I ) ; I I~~ : I I I IL : I I I

while at the same time he h n r l to avolrl provoking ;In allgry Cllitiil.

.l'he cllasln i l l Sino-1ntli;ul lielotiolls could not Oe ni~rrowctl tlowll bcc:lusc

of the situation in which Nehru had placed hi~nself following the placing of

White Papers in Parliament. The meeting of 19 April, 1960 could only result

in deadlock because Nehru had entered the talk wit11 a decision "that there is

nothing to discuss". This attitude only widened the cllasm between China :11ld

India. The meeting o f the two Prime Ministers coultl only tlecitlc on tlie formil-

ti011 of official reports comlllittees to study tlle docutl~ellts relevant to the

boundary probleln and that every effort should be made by both parties to avoid I U 3 .

friction ant1 clashes in the border areas. fhe opposition utilizetl this ngrcc~.

merit as a n oppol-tunity to I-un down the Government when the oificinl report

on tlie boundary was placed before the Parl iamen~. This volur~iinous report

clearly brougl~t out the t l i l ' icrc~~ce betwccl~ tllc two coulltrics 0 1 1 the boul~rlnry

issue. The Chinese refusal to deal with tlie boundary beyond Karkorum West

on the Western Sector enrligctl India's critics of China policy. The Chinese

refusal to [leal with this area was on grounds that the area was disputed with

Pakistan. Such a statement intensified Intlia's emotional attachment to the area

and was seen not only as all act of tleviousness on tlie part of the Chinese but

also trying to question the sccessio~l of Kashmir to Indin. China was now

clc;~rly I I S I I I ~ K;~sl~lll ir to p11t I ) I . C S S I I I C 0 1 1 111cl i i1 to Icgili~l~izl: I I I C I ~ O I ~ ~ I C I . I)ilse<l

On StallIS L I L I O . 111 this reg;lrtl Cllillcsc s c c ~ ~ ~ c t l to I)(: ;lctillg wirll vcllgc;lllcc.

I i t o h o t I - I I I9hO 11:1d r;~isctl lllc I~opcs o i ; I I I c :~rly scttlc-

I I I C I I ~ 0 1 1 1111: I ) ~ I . I I c I ~ S S I I C 0111 N C I I ~ I I ' S : I (~:IIII : I I I~ ; ~ ~ t i l l ~ ( l e I I I I ( I C I . I I I I C I I I : ~ ~ I ) I C S S I I I C .

p rcvc~~lc t l :III : I ~ ~ C ~ I I I C I I ~ t lcsp~tc Cllou IJII-lni's i l~iti : l~ivc i l l 111c rcg:~rtl. Moreover

102. N. Jetly, 11.1. p. 127

103. Foreirn Affairs liecord, Vol. 0, No. 5. May 1960, p. 107

t 1 i l l 1 g g i s t I ~ l i for c x t e ~ i l i ~ i g I I I I,;lnl;l ;I s t : l t ~ l s wllic:ll

(li(l 11ot l ? ~ t ' i t ;I tlcsl;rt~:r. '1.0 t11,. (:!~i!lc:\c 111t* ltc~111 111' :I I,CI,IIIII !.$.,l~i~,l\ i \ ;II~

in tegra l par t o f China. w l lo flees r i n i i t I s e e S ~ I I ill ; t ~ ~ o t l ~ c r c o l ~ n l ~ . y

whose relet ions w i t l i the fo rmer are col-tl ial, i s accord ing t o intern: l t ional d i p -

l omat i c convent ions, e i ther a t ra i to r o r a deserter. T h e e x t e n s i o ~ l o f asylutn to

such an ind iv idua l b y ;I f r iend ly count ry i s tantelnount to a b latant l?ctr;~y;ll o f

the t rust based on pr inc ip les o f Panchsheel, i f no t an act o f provocat ion. D a l a i

La tna was not o n l y g iven asy lum but Ind ian Pr ime M i n i s t e r perscinnlly v is i tet l

him. N e h r u woulcl 11;ive v is i tet l I i i n i m~ :IS :I spirit11;il le;ltlcr. 'l'llc ( ' l l i ~ l e s e wcre

u ~ ~ a b l e t o r~n( l t : rs t ;~nd th is ant1 I ; i t tclnpt was n t :~ l lc t c ~ ( lo SII I I ~ I I I S tl i t .

Chinese presence i n T i b e t was be ing questionetl. l'he C'l~inese P r i ~ l i e M in i s te r

C h o u E n - l a i hat1 i n fact compla ined to I n d i a n A~nbassa t lo r P;irth;~s;u-;ithi 111;lt

I0.I D a l a i L a r n ; ~ \*.;IS be ing p c r ~ n i t t e t l to cxcectl the l i n i i t s o f i i o l i t i c ; ~ l ; IS~~I I I I I . '1'0

make Inatlcrs wossc. l l ;~ l :~ i L i ~ ~ l i n . I'vo111 Int l ia. ~ n ; ~ t l c c o ~ ~ l ~ n c ~ ~ t s (111 MCM:IIII~II l i ~ i c

and on status of' 'l'ihet. D n l : ~ i l,:l~n;~'s presence :lntl p o l i t i c i ~ l r cs l ) cc t i~h i l i t y ill

I n d i a coup led w i t h l i i s open l los t i l i t y tow;irtls C l l l i~ ia wits c a u s i ~ i g :I lot or r111-

easiness to th' Chinese. These ;~c t ions of D : ~ l a i L a m a t l i t l 11ot l i ;~vc t l lc : ~ l ~ p r o v ; ~ l

of I n d i a n Government and i f G o v e ~ - n n ~ e n t o f ln t l ia l int l sestrictetl h i s : tct ivi t ics

in accordance w i t h the t l ip lom;~t ic ethics then p r o h ; ~ h l y lo r o f m i s u n t l r r s t ; ~ n d i n g

cou l t l have bee11 t~vo i t l cd . B y str;knge c o i n c i t l e ~ ~ c c i t w;~s t l u l - i ~ i g t l ~ e s c t l :~ys tI1;1t

I n d i a n troops began to press io rw; l r t l across the M c M ; l l l o ~ ~ l i ~ ~ r g i v i ~ l g t l lc

impress ion t l i :~t l n t l i a was t r y i n g lo u t i l i ze the s i tuat ion to f(11-ce t l ~ e Chinese to

105 accept the h o ~ ~ n d ; ~ r y :IS t lesiretl ontl clepicted h y ind i ;~ , T h c F;~ i lu re o f I 0 0 0

ta lks betwee11 the t w o countr ies gave the Chinese an o l lpor tu l l i ry t o p ~ ~ t pres-

sure o n I n d i a l i y re fus ing to accept K a s h m i ~ - as an in tegra l par t o f l ~ i c l i a . I f 'I'ibet

was a sensit ive issuc to the Ch ines t then K; ts l l~n i r w ; ~ s cqu ;~ l l y ~ I I I ~ I : to

I n t l i ; ~ f r o m tlic etnot iot l ;~ l angle. Wi l l1 I?otl l thc c o ~ ~ n t r i v s 11;lvinl: pot c ;~ug l l t ill

the gl.il) t r l ~111nlior1nlis111 llley W C I L . 00111ttl 10 I C ~ I C ~ I I I O L V I I C V C . Slowly t l ~ t ( i o v -

C ~ I I I I I C I I ~ S 0 1 ' 00111 I I I C cout~tries w e t i r i g 1)osi1io11s ;111t1 ~ ~ u l i l i c t ~ l l y I I I I -

c o ~ n p r o t i . ~ i s ~ t ~ g stontl u~itlcr 1l1c i t ~ ~ l > ; ~ c t ol eti~otiot~nlis~r~.itt I l ~ t l i ; ~ , t l ~ c I';~rli:lll~ct~l

through its tliscussio~t crenletl ; I I I ilnpl-cssiolt t h i t t Ilttli;~n s c ~ ~ l i ~ ~ ~ c ~ ~ l s hi~tl I > C C I I

t ~ ~ l r i ~ g e t l . I I W; IS I I i ~ l o w e l i ~ t 111(li:t I vicw I I I C W I I ~ I C ~ S S I I I :

dispassion;~tely, especially the rival claims keeping the nat iol~;~l i l ~ t c r c s ~ i l l

inilt(1. ' f l ~ c C:l~i~~csc vicwctl I t ~ ( l i ; ~ l t S I ~ I I I C C 011 the I)ortltr issue ;IS ; I I I i ~ l ' l ' r o~~ l 10

their status ant1 an attempt to show thew small in the comity of i ~ a t i o l ~ s , that

too by a nntioti which had i~cccpted P;uichslteel and was much more weaker ill

military power. Thus both Intlia and China soon tleveloped a one-track tnintl on

the border dispute for different reasons.

The Sino-Indian boutlrlary dispute after the brcaktlown 01' IOhO nrgolia-

tiotls reachctl a point where Nehru was trying harti to balallce tlie ellraged

Indian public opinion and to prevent any serious dntnage to his pet topic of

Sino - I n t l ~ n ~ i friendship and peaceful co-existence. Ile w:~s tl-ying 10 bi1l:111ce

two diametrically opposecl p o s i t i o ~ ~ s :~ncl in 1961 it bcca111e c l ew t l ~ a t Nel~ru

would not l ~ e ; ~ h l c to (lo so l)ec;~use of the release of the OfliciaLl<eport 011 tlir

boundary ~ I I I C I its placing heforc the Parliaulent.

By placing the docu~nents related to the border dispute with China before

the Parliament, Nehru had unconsciously made a comtnitment to the Parliametit

that he would seek Parliament's guidance on China policy. By having done so

Nehru was being very sensitive to tlie opposition ant1 COI- the first tinle two of

his pet ideals of a foreigt~ policy for peace a11d d e l ~ ~ o c r a t i c institutionalization

were placetl alltagonistically ;untl he was finding i t difficult to manage them.

Conscqt~e~l t ly , o n April 1st 1961 he told the Parli;unent that the 0Sl'iciol~Repol.t

had stretlgthened India's position before the worltl as well as C h i ~ ~ n . 106 He

106.N. Jetlcy, n. 1 , p. 139

cx~)cc tcc~ L I I C 11.11111 to CI ;LWII 0 1 1 (111: C l i i ~ ~ c s c G ~ V C ~ I I I I I C I I ~ . lo' ,111ere w ~ s 11ot11i11g

to be so excited about this report hecnusc this ofl'icial con~mit tcc on the ho t i~~ t l -

ary was basicnlly ntlvocatillg the G o v c r ~ ~ n l c ~ ~ t a l position. 'l'llc ol l ic i ;~l report

c o ~ n ~ n i t t e e coultl not have done mucll I I I view of tllr l:~ct t11i1t the (iover11111e111ilI

stantls were olre;~tly e ~ ~ u n c i ; ~ t c t l by the lheatls of G o v e r ~ i ~ i ~ c t ~ t :III(I 1)111ilicIy IS-

scrtcrl. The offici;~ls on both sides coultl not slitlc into c o ~ l ~ l ) r o ~ ~ ~ i s c s ; I I I ( I I I C ~ O -

. . 1i;itioll. 1111s rcpc~rt coultl 11;lvc 0cc11 useful i f i t h i l t1 g o ~ ~ c i t ~ l o 1I1t: Iic~~.tlrr

p r o b l c ~ ~ ~ l)clorc tllc C ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I I I I I ~ I I I l~c ;~ t l s took ;I p111~Iic S ~ : I I I C I .

As tlilys p:~ssctl, Nehrt~ was l'orccil to l ) e c o ~ ~ i c ilcl 'c~~sivt: ~ I I I ~ : I C C O I I I I I I O ~ ; I -

ti011 on territorial issues becoliles equivalent to insensitivity lo il:tlion;~l tligliity.

Having co~nmit ted llimseli publicly to the view that the bou~lrlary was firm,

there was I I O latitude for negotiations. Repeated co~i i~ni tments i n Parliament.

after the publication of official report, under pressure from members that inilia

would nut concede an inch of land, further made the bountlary issue co~npl i -

cated. The concept of bountl;~~-y was of a very complex nature, of whicli the

Indian puhlic was not properly i l lfor~~lctl whicli c~ l ;~hlc t l ~ I I C I I I to i l~akc so I I I I I C I I

of noise o11 i t . Iiut tlie 1nni11 i~lctlin 111rough wllicll spre;~tl of the infor~nnl io~l on

such S ~ C L I I I ~ ~ I I I C ; I S L I ~ C S W;IS possible WLIS i l l the 11;111ils 01' C ~ I I S C ~ V ; I ~ ~ V C ; I I I ( I right I O U wing groups. The press i l l the hands of rig111 wing groups was bound to he

strident against China as it was under the influence of the Western worlti

concept that China represented the aggressive wave of commu~l is t power i!1

Asia and i t liatl to be checketl at ;111y cost . I o 9 'I.he 11itlio11 111-ess wns so severe

in its anti-China propaganda that Nehru had to admonish them lor being cheap. 110

The mediii ca~npaign backed ihe opposition i n Parli;lme~lt so that very soon the

107.Lok Sablia Debater, 1901. Vol. 53, col. 8577

108. Arthur LnII, The Emerrellce of India (New York, 198 1). p. 154

109. lbid

110.- (P~inorKelatiollsia~~~e~amellt) Vol. 1, p. 265

oppositioll p;~rtics ontl the press begill1 to set the ngentln 1111 the pol icy towartls

chin;^, '1'1111s 111 :I s c ~ ~ s i ~ i v e I ~ S L I C l ikc this Nel1r11 was IIII:IIIIC 10 u~ i l i / . c 1111.

potenlinl I rhc press ill 1 i t i v I I I I I I~ 'fhc 111(liil11 IIICSS II:I(I I)).II,JCCICLI

C l ~ i ~ l a us a l l expar~sionist i t 1 [llc l 'or~n;~t ivc ycnrs of l 'co~)le's l < e ~ ) ~ ~ l ~ l i c 01' CII~II;I.

The 1954 ;lgrccllietlt he twcc l~ ln t l i ;~ 11;1tl Chinil. III;I(IC t l ~ c IIIC~~;III I'I.CSS CI.C;IIC the

image o f " I l in t l i Cl l in i I3l1;li 13hni" ;u~ l l the w l ~ o l c 1latio11 was carrictl ; ~w ;~y by i t .

'rl lc l ~ l t l i ; ~ ~ ~ l 1 1 . c ~ ~ w l ~ i c l ~ II;I(I (;;~rlier i t 1 1I1e e;~r ly I050 CI~C;IIC(I 1I1c i111;lgc 0 1 :III

~ X ~ I ; I I I S ~ O I I ~ ~ ~ (;IIIII;I I;ll~!r OII c ~ ~ l o g i / , i ~ ~ g Ihe I ' r i e n ~ l s l ~ i ~ ~ will1 ('IIIII:I ;IS "lIi11(1i ('IIIIII

13l1;ii l3l1;li" l ' ;~i lct l to gouge the e o ~ ~ ~ ~ ) I e x i ~ i e s 01' IIIC (I~SIIIIIC. NCII~II. 1oo. 0111 01

conl'itlcncc ;uld c x p c c t o t i o ~ ~ !lever usctl the press c l l cc l i vc ly l o e x l i thc

co~np lex i ty of lhe problem. l'he press too never ;ltre~nptetl III :in:~lvzc: the t l i s -

pute i n its totality. The I 954 agreement w;~s not analyzed properly ontl the

press vicwed the Government o f Indin as having s~~ccess fu l l y " t i ~ ~ ~ l e d " the Red

Chinese", Views of the great intel lectu~l ls i n the ru l ing party and those Ol'

I I I o p p o s i l i o ~ ~ were IIOL pr(~,jcctc(I :IS i t s11o11l~I II~IVC I)CCII. As ;I icsult 111~:

Government showed hesitation and vacil lation instead o f grasping the opport11-

nities for permanent solution to the problems between two cou l~ t r i cs . l l : ~ t l i t

been so t l ~ c lcvc l o f expcc tn t i o~~ o f the people on the bori lcr issue crc;~tctl by

the comnl~tment of leadershil) would not have been so high and Int l ia woultl

have treated China w i th al l sel-iousness i t tleservetl. I t was at this t ime the

Supreme C:ourt o f India gave the judgement that terr i tor ial collcessions cannot

be given b y the Government o f lntlin. The r ig id ngcnd;~ set by the P; l r l in~nc~i t

and press on India's pol icy towards C h i ~ i a dit l cl-eate c o ~ l i t ~ s i o ~ l i n the inintls ol'

Nehru because he allowed the public opinion to get better o f h im. This confu-

sion in Nc l~ ru ' s inirltl has been explained by Dl-. S. (;opal i n his O i o g r ; ~ ~ , l ~ ~ ~1111s:

6' Nothing 1s more tlepressing than confusetl thinking i n any v i ta l matter. One

can face twy probleln liowevel- d i i f i cu l t but there i s no hope wllen tllcre i s

11 I. V. Longer, India Defence anti Fo re i~n Policy (Delhi, 1988) pp. 125 - 20

Nehsu's nppsoncli of colnbining "frientlsliip" ; ~ n t l " f i r~ i~ncss" ngiiinst tlic

Cllinesc was slowly c ru rnb l i~~g n ~ l t l Ilc Oeg;i~i to pcsccivc :I tI1sc:il Lo his own

position. llis co11ce1-11 lor his ow11 positio~i pl-cvc~itctl l i i l l i 1so111 ev i l l i~ i i t i~~f L I I C

situation properly. He developetl n false sense of public opinion wllicli rcsultctl

in over-estimation of tlie actual milit:uncy of the public op in io~l . Accortling to

the public opinion survey contluctetl i l l August 1962 by 1ndi:un Institute of

Public Opinion, there was :I strollg support for s e~ t l i ng the horcler issue b y

peaceful llleans (45.2%) tliat is by ~iiobilizing world public op in io~i etc. Only

37.5% fell otherwise but even among them a majority did not approve of a

war.'I3 That the public opinion on tlie border issue was not against the policy

of governlrlent is clear from tlie election results as tlie 1962 elections were won

by Coligrcss, despite so mucli excitement over tlie bosdes issue, ~lntl Neliru's

personalily was mainly respo~isible for the victory with n gootl i i l ;~rgi~i i l l tlie 114

elections. Nehru failed to appeal to the people of 11itli;r ovcs the Irencls of

the opposition ant1 press.

The rigid attitude that Nehru lield on tlie border issue slioultl also be seen

from anotller angle. Apart from tlie pressure of the Pnliament ant1 Press, Nehru's

own state~nents followil~g the establish~nent of People's Republic of China in

' l ' t be~ I S \cry ilnposlalit. 111 211 ear^ e a p ~ we I I I L I I C I I S C L I ~ ~ C I I ~11e I 01

India's Anibassador Sardar K . M . Panikknl. ant1 the China policy : r ~ i t l tlien i t was

pointed out that Nehru started on a right note o n India's boundary on tlie

eastern sector. K.M. Panikkar in his book had explained tlie reasons wlry lntlia

11s should extenti its border up to McMalion line. McMahon negotiations were

112. S . Gopal, n. 59, p. 130

113. hlonllilv I'ublic Oui~iion Survey, October-Novelllbes 1002, pp. 40 - 50

114. The Ilindu, 8th April 1901

115. K.M. l'wn~hk;u., C;eo~raullic:~l I-;rcto~.s ill 111dii111 I-listosy (Ro111b;ly. 1959). p. 71

origil~c~lly 1 1 1 ~ I C ~ C ~ I I I I I ~ C lhe Ii01111(li1ry I I C ~ W C C I I I I I I I C ~ I ' I I ? ~ ~ ~ I I I C I o u ~ c r ' l ' i l ic~ :IS I ) C ~

tlie Siml:~ c.onlerel~cc. The tlclincution b e ~ w e e l ~ outer 'l'ibet ; I I I ~ l l l t l i ; ~ C I I C C I ~ C ~ I I10 . by McMnl i<~l~ was i~~ci t lc~rl ; \ I . I ' I ~ s c t I ' I I I ~ I ' S I I I i c y was

the ques~ion of Srolitier wliicl~ with tlie occupi~t iol~ of Tibet by 1'eol)lc's I<cl~uli-

lie ol' C l l i ~ ~ i ~ II:I(I O C C O I I I C live will1 i~ C O I I I I I I ~ I I I r o l~ l i c~ . wi111 C:IIIII:~ I I . O I I I 1 2 i ~ t l i ~ k l ~

i l l the I I O I - I I I W C S ~ to ~ I I C j u ~ ~ c t i o ~ ~ with UUTUI:I i ~ i I C ; I S ~ . I I ' S;~rtl:\r l):i~cl

brougl~t to ~ l l c 11otice of N e l ~ r l ~ t l ~ e t l n ~ ~ g c r lurkillg i l l 111cIi:1's Cro~~tier W I I C I I I I ~

wrote to Neli~.u, "111 our c ; ~ l c u l : ~ t i o ~ ~ we s l~a l l 11ow hi~ve to reckol~ wit11 c0111-

llluliist Cl i i l~ :~ i l l tlie 1101-111 illid 1ior111 ei~st . :I colll~~lullist Cllil~it wllicI1 II;IS (IcI'iliitc

alnbitions ~ I I I ~ i~ilils ill111 W I I ~ C I I (Ioes I I O L i l l L I I I Y wily S C C I I I l ' r ic~~(IIy ~libllosctl

towards us". ' I X Nel11.u was not i ~ n ~ i i i ~ ~ t l f u l of the fact alitl i l l his re l~ ly to I'atel

this was ev,clent. l '%ut Nehru wanted the issue to be viewed fro111 a loll& terln

perspective As a farsighteil person, he was conscious of the fact that i l l 1950.

raking up the \)order issue would be inviting unnecessary trouble with Cllil~n.

He on the ;~dvice of his Ambassatlor K.M. P;uiikk:u. I~atl made the unilateral

decl :~r ;~t ioi~ O I I 20th Novell~bcr 1050 tli;it : "Our I I I ~ I ~ S show t11i1t McMnl~olr lille

is our bou~r~iary and that is our bou~itlury-nlnp or n o , inay. 'l'l~e l'itct r c l ~ l i i i ~ ~ s

atid we stal~tl by that boundary and we will not allow nliyhotly to come i~cross

that bounrlary". 1 2 " By this unilateral declaration Ncliru was a t t eml~ t i l~g to get

China to i-rcognize the border as ilesired by lntli;~. 121 To Ncl~ru u~iilnternl

cieclaratioll was Inore advant;igeous than raising i t ourselves with China t l i -

116. A.P. Velikateswxan, "Obstacles in Sino-Indian Relations", P i ~ ~ e r I'reselitetl ;it [lie

semin;~~ heltl in Ncliru Memorial Museum ant1 Libriiry, 18-20 I;el?rua~-y 1992, p. 2 1

117. S. Gopi11 n. 59, p. 176

118. D. Das 11. 6, [I. 337

119. lbid

120. Parliiinlcntary Debates, 1950, Vol. 5, cols. 155 - 56

121. B.N. Mullick, Mv Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayl (Dellii, 1971) pp. 78 - 80

I !! rcctly. N C I I I I I ' S 11oI1cy. i i h ~ r i~re t l C ~ I I . ~ I C I . , t t ~ w i ~ ~ t l ~ [ ' I I I I I ~ I with I I I ~ I I 1 1 sIit1111tl

be n c o ~ n h ~ n i i t i o ~ ~ o f frientlliness i111tl i i r l ~ r ~ ~ e s s , b c c i ~ ~ s e i t ' we S I I O W we;~k~iess I ' I

ittlv;l~lt;~gc will i)c i i ~ k c ~ ~ ol this i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ c t l i a t c l y . S~IC:II ~ I I I i1tt1111t1c O I I I I I C 1 l i11.1

crl' N c l ~ r l ~ W ; I S I I ~ : C : ~ I I I S ~ : 1 1 1 i l i i 1 W ; I S 111o I)ig 11) I I C ; I I I ~ I ) I I ~ I ~ ' S ~ I I I I I O I . J , ~ I I I ~ I ~ . I . . 1 1 1 t l i : l

W ~ I S strong e110~1gli to I I ~ L V C ; III i ~ ~ t l e p e ~ ~ d e t ~ t approi~cl~ . But s o ~ ~ r c tilnc gootl

neiglrbourl~ness was imperative in tlie nation's interest because O I I ~ c;tnllot cl~iurge

neighbours. Tlre statement of Nel~ru unilaterally decl i~ri~rg 111tlii1's 1)ortlcr i l l t l ~ c

north-east convinced the public of the genuineness of India's border and re- 1 1 4 .

maining f i r m prevented all oli.jective enquiry on the l~ortler. 1'111s S ~ : I ~ ~ I I ~ C I I ~

of Nehrii wliicl~ bec;~mc ;I t l o g ~ ~ ~ a tl~creby tietl N e l ~ r ~ i ' s 11i111tl i n : I C I V ~ I I I C I : tluril~g

the subsequent developme~~ts irncl prevented him f r o ~ n r e e x ~ ~ i ~ i g i t ;111t1 the

Parliament ;rlso woultl not allow him to d o so. A sou~rtl policy is a lw;~ys lor-

rnulated in the given international environn>ent and to that extent the beginning

was good but i ~ r the later years when a change in tlre policy was requil-ed

according to the needs of tllen enviro~rmeilt we attempteci something i~npos -

sible. The 11utional solidarity (rigidity) was strengthe~lecl clue to ~ I I ~ ~ I - I I ~ I ~ COII I -

pulsions ti1 Nelu-u. 'To a great extent this pronroted scl l -r igl~tcous~icss w l ~ i c l ~ i l l

the later )cars domi~~ntecl our tl~ilrking to tlie tletrin~ent of the ~ ~ o t i o ~ ~ .

Nehru's cornlnitlnent on the border, especially on the eastern sector, was

not reacted to or challenged by China. If the Chinese were against the McMahon

line they s l~ould have protested in the manner i n wl~ich People's Republic of

China (lid o n tlie invasion of Tibet. In the absence o f ally protest from China

on the inarter. Nehru was convinced that his expect ;~t io~l on the u~lilaterol

declaration o n tlre border was working. I n tlie absence of Clii~lesz ireaction to

McMahon line on 211tl Februal-y I951 the Gave~-~ lmcn t of 11itlii1 C I I O S C to t i~ke

over 'Saw:u~g wl~icll tllough soutll of McMal~on line was untler the atl~ninistr:~-

tion of l'illct but was strnteg~c;\lly i~nportant to L n c l i ; ~ . T l ~ e Cl~inese tlitl I I ( I ~

protest t l~ough the Tibetans st;~ged demonstration before the 1ncli;ln mission i n

Lhaso. The ;~bscnce of ; u~y rc;lction from the Cllinesc on these tlevclol)~ncnts

convinced Indians that whole of NEFA could be brought under the Gover~lnlcnt

of India a~ltl that psychologic;~lly Peiking was ready to accept the McMahon

line. To the Chinese these ;ireas wcrenot.import;l~lt srr;~tegic:illy hut to 111(li:1

they were important f r o n ~ the military point of view. In spite of initial

irritiu~t in Sirlo-lritli;tr~ r e l a t i o ~ ~ s over 'ribel, I l l r l i ; ~ t o ~ ~ h 111) ' l ~ c c;iuse ol' I'ccll)lc's

Republic o l China i n U N a11tl i n I lntlia ;untl 13ur1n:i were tllc two c o ~ ~ ~ ~ l r i c s

of n o n - c o ~ n ~ ~ i u n i s t bloc to oppose the U.S.-spo~~soret l resolutio~l i n t l ~ e ON 1'211

General Asseml)ly tlcclari~lg C'l~inn ;IS guilty or aggl-cssio~l i l l Kol-c:~. l ~ i d i ; ~ ' s

r s ; I Lo ~ I I I I I I I I O S o - I ~ I I t ' r i c ~ c l s l ~ i I I ~ ~ ~ l i i t was : I I I I C

10 eo11vi11ct, ( ' I I I I I ; ~ 01. 111(li;1's I ! . L . I I ~ I ~ I I ~ I I ~ ~ I ~ ; I I ~ S I I I l ~ ~ c l i ; ~ was ; I I I I C 10 I . ~ I I I I I V ? I I I ?

ill-will L I I ; I I hail crept i n tllc r e l ~ ~ t i o ~ l s l ~ i p lollowing the inv;~sion o l 'I'iOel by

People's Kepublic of China.

The McMnhon line tlcli~letl only the border i n the c ; ~ s l c r ~ i scctor. On tllc

region bctwec11 1,:itl;lhh :u~tl Ncpnl Ncl11-u s;hitl "tl~is ;irc;t has 1,cc11 cl~icl ly tlc-

127 fined by long usage and cus to l~~s" . This statement appe2ir.s to be vague and

lack of clarity is there on the matter. In 1959 on August 28th Nehru told Lok

Sabha that Aksai Chin though shown as our territory had ;~lways been under

challenge and is a desolate region. He further stated that this was the boundary

of the old Kash~liir state with Tibet and Chinese Turkistan. Nobotly had marked 128 it. 'The border was not properly demarcated on the ground ;und there was

125. K. Guptn, Sootlipl~t o11 Sill(] - Initl;~n Relations (Calcutt;~. I Y X I ) , PI). 47 - 48

126. Ibid, 1). 48

127.l'nrli;imenta1--v Ilebnte. 1950, Vol. 5, cols. 155 - 5h

128. J. Neliru, 11. 48, p. 360

I I ~ treaty oi ; I & ~ - ~ C I I I C I I ~ wllicll c o ~ ~ l t l :I( Ic;lsr colilir111 111c l~ou~ i i l i~ ry . 111 \ ~ ) i l c (11'

such a pliant nttitude shown l h v Neliru over Aks;~i Chin i t puzzles :111y sc . l~~i I ;~r

why a c o ~ n l ) r r l ~ ~ ~ i s c on the borclcr was 1 1 0 1 rcocl~ctl l ~ e t w c c ~ ~ I i ~ t l i i i I I I ~ I I I . A

coinpro~nise here would have averted tlie Sino-Indian war, because China woultl

then have ;iccepted the McMnlion line.

'The S~no-Indian friendship wns ~ I I the upswing Iro111 1951 ollwutls. As n

gesture of goodwill and out of helplessness India decitletl to give u p all its extra

territorial I-~glits i n Tibet to tlie satisfaction of tlie C l ~ i ~ ~ e s e n ~ ~ t l India i ~ n d Cliill:~

had started tliscussion o n tratlc :uid cultural rights in Tibet. I t was a r o u ~ ~ t l this

time that is i n 1953 that Govc1-nment of India tlecitlctl to i~lclu(lc Aksni Chi11 i l l

I ?'I 111tlio. 1 1 1 I954 the a g r c c ~ ~ ~ e i ~ ~ ~ I I 'l'ibct was sig~lctl l ) c t w c c ~ ~ I i l t l i ; ~ : I I I ~ ~ C:llilln

without touclii~lg o n the border issue. The signing of this t l o c u ~ n c ~ ~ l inatle 111dii1

remark : ' ' i l l1 the outst;unding cluestio~ls were settled". ''" 'I.llrough senl:wtics.,

India sougllt to score a debating point. After the 1954 agreement was sig~letl

a few weeks after Chou EII-lai hat1 visited lnciin Nehrt~ circulntetl :I Illemor;lil-

d u ~ n to Ministry of External Atlairs, Defencc Ministry ;ultl Ilo111e Mi11is11.y i l l

July 1954 in which Neliru tlcscribetl "the 1954 ; ~ g ~ - e e ~ n e ~ ~ t ;IS a new startilig

point in our relations with China and Tibet affirmed both as flowing from our

policy and that as a consequence of our agreement with China, the nort1ie1-n

frontier should be considereti a firm and a definite one which was not open to

discussion with anybody. A system of checkposts should be spread along this

entire frontier. More especially, we should have checkposts i l l such pl;~ces ;IS

131 might be co~lsitlered disputetl areas." I n 1947 also Nehru hatl issuetl tlirec-

tive to provinci;ll Governments to push the administration right upto the bor- 132 ders.

129. S. Hot l'mall, India China CI-isis (Delhi. 19911) p. 25

131. Ma~lkekal-, The Guilt" Men of 1962. (Bombay, 1908) p. 138

132,s . Gopill, 11. 59, 1). 1x1

Prior lo the rise of iiiodern states Asian rulers did not h:ive l ine~ir bouod- I \ ( . ary. O n t h v other lli~ild tlicy C O I I S I C I C ~ C ~ I lal-gc Z O I I C S 21s L I O I I I I C ~ ; I I ~ I ~ S . 1‘11ih

concept of boundary resulted in lot of areas being a~nbiguous. Neliru was trying

to take advantage of this ambiguity regarding the border areas based on tlie

modern anti western concept. Probably India was trying to introduce historical 134 borders basctl o n the linear concept. After 1954 agreenient Ncl~ru l'elt more

confident bccause ;IS stated earlier this agreement see~iied to have settled all

tlie outst;lntling proble~ns. Following this ;Igrecnlcnt l n t l i ; ~ unil;~ccr;~lly issuctl

maps showing the disputed areas as part of Intlia but tlie Clii~iese did 11ot react

as tlie Hint11 Cllini Uhai Ul~ai spirit was alive. The Chinese wi~l~tet l to raise thc

border issue then but a s Cliou w;~s to state later Nel~ru ' s s t ro l~g attitude pre-

vented it ant1 i t was left to be pursued later.

The loss of Tibet as a buffer zone created tlie necessity of a new area

which woultl act as a kind of buffer tuitl at tlie same time woultl he wirliin

I I ~ ~ I I I I I I I I A I r e I S I I t I I I '(1111: 1111(1c:r

I I I ( / ~ ; I I I c01111111. 1 1 W ; I S I I ~ X : C S S ; I ~ ~ 1 0 r s ~ : ~ l ~ l i s l ~ I I O I . ( I ( . ~ ~ . I ; I ~ I I I S c ~ s ~ ) c ~ ~ ~ i ; ~ l l v i l l :I 1i111c

W I I C I I i ~ ~ t l i ; ~ . 1 i 1 ( 1 ( ' l 1 i 1 1 ; l W C I C I ~ i ( , ~ ~ c l l y . ' I ' l ~ i . ( ' I I~I ICSI : 11:1el 11111 j~~:~( . ( . iv~ .cI ; I I I Y I ~ I I I . ; I I

fro111 tlic 111cli:111 sitlc I ) U I t>cforc 111dii1 I i ~ ( i iss11u1 I I I ~ ~ S 111c ( ' I I ~ I I ~ s ~ l ' r c~~i ic r l1;1(1

mntle i t c lc ;~r 10;1t "slabilizi~tio~l of \)ortiers woultl he t lo~lc : ~ l ' ~ c r t l i scuss io~~" . 115

India expectetl tlie whole affair to be ;I mere formality because of tlie prevailing

friendly r e l : ~ t i o ~ ~ s between the two countries. China I~otl inntle sucll a stxtetl1ent

that is tlie stabilization of bortlers would be tlo~ie after tliscussion bec;u~se tlie

People's Kcpublic of China'h rulers had not co~iit: to t l~cse :wens ;IS they wrre

yet to cons(~l idate their hold ovel- Tibet which was ot' great importmice to the111

at that point of time. Hence the Chinese reply to India's queries o n the bortler

133.N. Maxwell, India's China War (Bombay, 1970) p. 7

134.A. Lamli, India China Border (Lontlon. 1964) pp. 67 - 68

135.N. Maxwell. 11. 113. pp. 76 - 77

:1r11l I I I ~ I ~ I S ~ I I ; I I 111,. I I I I I C W ; I ~ 11111 iril~e. M U ~ C O V L ' I I I r l y 1'150~ W ~ I C I I I ~ I ~ I I ; I I I

Secretary (;cncr;rl 111 Ministry 1 ) 1 i < x i c r ~ ~ ; ~ l A1'I';lirs Sir ( i . S . 11;il11;11 w;ii~lt:tl Nclirl~

to take up the border issue will1 CI~illii I ' i ~ ~ l i k k i ~ r ~-e~)IietI to lli111 sli~tillg why i t

should not be taken up, beci~use negotiations woultl not he :~tlvnntageous lo

us.136 The i ~ i ~ n was to secure the bortlers through frientlship iultl lntlin llatl not

militarizetl its bortlers as then i t was not in a position to do so. It was probably

due to this reason that tlie Kulwilnt Singli report on indin's hortlcrs i l l ille 11or1ll I37

was shelved at the cabinet level ant1 the matter was raised ollly i l l 1050. 'l'lie

Chinese too hat1 publislietl ;I innp ill 1954 but i t was on ;I sm;~ll scale :ultl i t t l i t l

not make clciu- or illtlicate the 1erritori;ll claims of Chi~ln. I i X llcsl,ite the tlouhis

on the iiclu;~l hortlcrs, the rclntionsl1ip wit11 Chi11:r wits 111oving oil tlrc cxpcclctl

liilcs anti li~tlio was being lullctl illto ;I co~np l ;~ce~ lcy .

Hence Nellru's utteriunces on the border gave a finality witliout le:lviilg

any rooill tor any kind of shill of elnpllasis tllcrcby prcvcl~t i l~g the t lc l~ t l~ o f

treatment to it.

Altllougli tlle signing of 1954 agreement created the feelitlg of "Hindi

Chini Blta~ Bh;li", the protest notes on border had also started iinmediately

afterwards, by July 1954. The White Paper on tlie notes exchangetl between the

two countries clearly showed that between July 1954 to July 1058 the areas of

dispute wele small areas i n the midtlle sector. These disputes arose because

I ~ l d i a ~ l s were setting up posts it1 the areas where the borders were not t le~nar-

cated anti (111 thc o ~ l ~ c r \)and the Clii~iese were taking up a survey ol' tlic bol.tler

region in t l l~s sector after establislling their Government in Tibet. I n view of the

lack of clat-ity on the boundary, like Indians the Chiilese too woultl have been

tempted to supljort irredcntisi claims in respect of the bountl;~ry. Tile talks

137. J.P. Dalvi, Ilimi~lnviln Blu11tlc1- (Bombay, 1969) p. 22

138. S. Gopal, n . 59, py. 177 - 70

between Cl~ou lin-lai in 1950-57 wintcl. dill not touc l~ up tlicsc i ro~ l~ ic l . tlis- 1 3 9 . putes. lllc talks were confiuetl mainly on the north eastern irontier ;~ntl Chou

En-lai had told 11i1n that the Chinese did not approve or accept McMahon line

but with Burma they have accepted it as a fait acco~npli ant1 with Intlia also Id0 they would accept it as such. The issue of Western sector was not tliscussetl

a t all. The developments in wcstern sector were not unknown to lntlia. 'fhougll

in 19.53 lncl~a had decided to inclutle Aksai Chin as ;I part of I n t l i n i l l the maps

issued, it did not raise any objection to the one corner of this area being used

by the Chinese. According to the Intelligence Chief of Nehru, U.N. Mullick;

... enough of information was available about the construction of the road right from 1951 to 1957, when the road was forn~al ly declared open .... All through these years no question were raised by the Army Head Quarters or the Ministry of External Affairs about this road. It was only after the road had been completetl and heavy traffic had started plying that some attentton was turned o n i t though even then ..... it wns only consitlerctl to be o f nuisance value and not one that affected our secul-ity. I 4 l

The then Defence secretary Khera too in his book confirms the govel-n- I J2 lnent of 1nd1;l was aware of it. As pointed out earlier Nehru hi~nself was not

sure about this region and he attmitted this before the Parliiument. Nehru once

again, in 1'159 emphasized the desolation of the region by stating in Parliament

that "not even a blade of grass grows there." 14' Nehru never expected this

place to become such a strong issue because he himself had stated in the

Parliament that to the Chinese this road was important and it cut across Aksai

Chin. 144 Nehru's attempt to belittle the significance of this area is also evident

139.K. Gupta, 1). 125, p. 58

140,s . Gopal. n . 23. p. 36

141.B.N. Milllick, n. 121,p. 199

142. Khera, 111dia's L)efcnce I'rublc~n (Delhi, 1968), p. 157

143.3. Nelil-(I, n. 40, p. 349

144. Ibitl, p. 134

from tlie f ; ~ c ~ \h;11 i n 1958 lie only w;~~l te<l ;In inI'orlrr;~l protest 11otc 10 lic sc~l t 145

to the Chincse regarding tlie claim of India on this region. I t is only with

the develuplnents in Tibet that Nehru once again came out firmly stating that

as far India was concerned there had never been a boundary dispute and there

was no question of large parts of India being anything but India. The bountl- 140 aries were fixed ant1 well known. Nehru's sweeping statement, :tt n time

when Tibe1 was in turmoil, served as n gootl g im~nick with ; I I ~ i ~ ~ l i ~ ~ f o r ~ l l e d

public but then the same uninformed public became a big liability bec~luse it

failedto ulitlcrsta~itl tlie complex i ~ ~ t t u r e of the border. Moreover i t wos ;~ssu~nccl

that refusing to accept that the border problem was is disputed woultl help i n

its resolution. Denying the tlispute will not make the tlispute nun-existent.

These sweeping statements were in fact inade under pressul-e causetl by the

agenda set by the I'nrliament ;111d press. Such sweepi~lg stateinelits hat1 driven

N e l ~ r l ~ lo t l ~ i : o ~ r I 111- ~ 0 1 1 1 ~ 1 co~i ie 0111 11111y I k :I I I I O I ~ : I ~ ~ : I I I I : I I I ~

stantl on t l ~ c 111;11ler. ' 1 . 1 1 ~ rigi(l :~ t~ i tu ( l e 0 1 1 the o i ~ r ~ 01 ' NCII I I I . W ~ I S 11111s 1 1 ~ : I C S I I I I

of ;i situaticr~i cre;uctl by N ~ I I I - L I I I ~ I I I S C I I ' .

W i t l i i ~ ~ the C o ~ ~ g r e s s illso llle irigI1t-wi1lg gr011l1 win very I ) O W C I - ~ I I I W ~ I C I I

compared to the left wing and Nehru had to prevent tlie coming together of the

right wing and the oppositio~l. It bec:\~lle o kind of o b s e s s i o ~ ~ to IGnl and this

led to overenthusiastic attempt to control them by tlie same ~iationnlist aspect

which they bad ruisetl against l i i~n. 14' Nehru was nfr ;~ ic l of loosi~ig his uniclue.

emotional and political st;untli~~g i l l the eyes of 1ntli:w public. I t is this fear th;lt

preventetl Nclil-11, who liatl tlie capacity, capability ant1 stature to convi~ice the

people of the real position of the dispute, from doing so. Insteatl Neliru himsell

resorted to chauvinistic rhetoric. Probably Nehru was ;i statesm;un who lacketl

145. S. Gopiil 11.23, p. 79

146. White I'aoer Vol. 1 , pp. 48 - 52

147. Y.I. Vel-tzberger, Misoercc~t~o~ls in Sino-lntlia~l lielatio~ls (Coloratlo. 1980). p. 14'9

~ ' I ~ I I I I I C S S , 1I1~1clo1.c i t W:IS (1111t1: 11;1ll1ri11 0 1 1 111s 11;11'1 1 0 W ; I I I ~ 10 soliilily his

d o ~ ~ ~ e s t i c sul,ptrl.t whicl~ i l l tur11 ~cst l -~ctet l h ~ s ratio11;11 O ~ ) I I O I I S . ' I ( I I I I : I ! ~ ~ i~li~ltel-s

worse Nel~rtl 's ~i111inet had :I ( l i s j~ in ted opi11io11 011 the bor(1er ( l i s~ ) t~ t e wl~icli

leatl to prcposlcrous conclusio~is.

In sucli s i t t~:~t ions only positive intentions contrihl~lc to tllc c ~ - r ; ~ t i o n of :III

allnosphere I I I wl~icli i~cgotiations c ;u~ be inore eflectivcly cuntlucletl ant1 sctllr-

lnents can be achieved. Further i f Nehru had realized that i f a tlispute is tlis-

sected, perhaps some positive ;letion could have been undertaken to meet the

demands of llie other party. I f this was not possible then n solution tlirougll tl-ial

of strength alone could be achievetl. India was thus placetl in a peculiar position

that it was against negotiations as well as trial of strength. Though against trial

of strength, 1ntli;in leatlers l'clt that there is something ;kt s t ;~kc which inight l)c

lost through tnegoti;ttions. I-laving placed herself in this peculiar position Intlia

attempted t(1 ~rnlionalize her stantl on the matter twtl befllll to cl1lpll: l~i~c the

historical v:~lidity of the border. (In the next chapter rationnlizntio~i through

historical facts has been dealt i n detail.) Such a position was viewetl by C h i ~ i ; ~

as an extensioi~ of imperialislll and a position which was wholly contrary to

India's m u c l ~ PI-ofessed intentions. India had taken such a stand out of internal

compulsions discussed above, but China could never understand i t and India's

stand gave iln impression that India had in effect arrogated to itself the right

of an unil;~tcl-al imposition of 11ercnti1-e northern 0ountl:u-y with Cl~ina o n Chi~ia .

Untlcr sucli situ:ltions only ;I true st;itcslii;tn coultl have s;~vctl intlclicntlcnt

Intlin, because only ;I leatlcr with st;ltcsmiul clualities coultl h:~ve crc;~tctl tile

necessary c11:tligc b:~sccl 011 rcq~~ircrncnts of time rather tl1:~11 woiti11g ('or tllc

cllil~tge to ~ V C ~ W I I C I I I I 111c s i t t~i~t ion. NCIII-II W;IS i~~dcc ( I :I S I : I ~ C S I I I I I I I ; I I I C I 11;1~1 l ~ t ~ i l t

up a reputatloll of being the britlge builtler par cxccl lc~lcc ; ~ l l ( l a stl-ong atlvoc;ltc

of c o ~ n ~ ~ - o l ~ ~ ~ s c i l l i ~ ~ t c r n ; ~ l i o ~ ~ : t l co11Clicts. Wl1c11 Nclil-u 11i111scll' w:~s plncctl il l ;I

conflictual situation he beg;u~ to view t l~ings fro111 llis owl1 personal allgle.

klaving vlewetl the situation fro111 his personal angle 11e became so 111~ch con-

cerned about his ow11 positio~i t l in t lie was not ;tble to appreciate the extent to

which he mu51 compromise.

Tlie failure of expectations had made Nehru politically vulner;tble on matters

rclatctl to ( : l i~~in. 'I'l~c Cliina policy lor~~~ul ; t te t l by Ncllru fro111 tlic I I C ~ ~ I I I I ~ I ~ ~ was

opposeil by ;I 11owc1-ful lobby : tn t l tliis lobby inclutlctl I k l ~ t ~ t y I'rin~c Minister i l l

Neliru's C a b ~ n e t Sal-dar Patel. The occupatio~i of Tibet by Chinn llntl ful-ther

strengtlie~ietl tliis lobby against 11itli;t's Cliinn policy. Nchru, illspite of this

opposition, followed a policy which would avoid tlie spill-over of Tibetan issue

to 1ntli;t. Nel~ru's policy towitrtls China was i n intlin's ow11 intcrcst but ;I strong

itn(l I > O W C I ~ I I I S C C ~ ~ ( I I I i l l ~ I I C I ' ; t~Ii; t~nc~it i ~ n c l ~ I I C 1 1 t . e ~ ~ W C I C 1 1 0 1 lully conv i~~cc t l

by Nehru's ji~stil'icntio~i of liis Clli~in policy.

'The signing of 1954 Tratlr: Agreement on Tibet bctwee~t India and Cliin:~

was generally hailed i n Intlia except for few tlisenting voices fro111 tlie people

like J.B. Kripal;tni. By the year 1958 tliings began to Clitwge in 'l'ibet ;tntl t l ~ c

Chinese were b e c o ~ i ~ i ~ i g wol.l.ictl :thout the tlevelop~iicnts in 'l'ihct :tntl by the

activities of Tibetan refugees in India. Chinese suspectetl lntlian involvement in

Tibetiui ;tff;tirs ant1 began to question tlie alignment on tlie 111np sliowing Sino-

Indian bou~idary. Neliru rejected tlie Chinese version regarding the alignnients

on t l ~ c S i n o - l n t l i : ~ ~ ~ I~ountlnry.

In 1959, 'Sibet was in turnroil following tlie revolt of Tibetans against tlie

Chinese rulc in 'l'ibet. Tlie 1ntli;ln Parliament questioned Nehl-u o n tlie matter by

linking Tibetan proble~n with India's China policy. Neliru tlitl try to skil-t tlie

question of -l'ibct;ui problem but tlie Anti-China lobby was able to put pressul-e

on Nehru to have a tliscussion o n the issue. The Chinese took ;I very sel-ious

notsof 11itlia11 reaction to Tibetan tlevelopments i n the I'arliament. When 11tdii1

was hotly debating tlie Tibetan issue, Dalai Liuna fled Tibet ant1 sought asylum

i l l l ~ i t l i i ~ , Di~l i~i l2i~1l~:~'s I'rt!se~ice I I I 111(li:1 s t r e ~ ~ g t l ~ e ~ ~ t : ( l tlii! ~ ( I S I ~ I O I I 111 : I I I ~ ~ - < ' ~ I ~ I I ; I

lobby in lntlia. The Congress Working C o n ~ ~ n i t t e e too pz~ssed ;I resolution

c o l l t l c ~ ~ l ~ ~ i ~ ~ g tile Cllil~csc brutnlity i l l ' l ' il~cl. 'l'l~e t l c v e l o p ~ ~ ~ c ~ ~ t s i l l 'l'ibct cxl~osctl

Cliini~ to the outsitlc world zuntl i t was trying h;~rtl lo cover u p ifs i:lilurc i l l

Tibet. The Cliinese used the asylum of Dalai Lama in India and the reaction of

the Indian I'nrlizunent to accuse India (if encouraging ;~ l i t i - ch i~~ ; l prop;~g;~nt l :~.

The t l c v e l o p m c ~ ~ t s in Tibet got linked with tlie border issue wliicll

u,nfortuniuely was also the 11itlo-'l'ibcti~n hol-tler. .l'l~c Cl~illcse now hegall to

claim large tracts of l a ~ ~ d i l l 11ldiil i111d t w t ~ skir~~iis l les took pl i~cc I)etweell 111tlii111

and Cliinestr soltliers in tlie border areas i n 1959. Parlii~lnelll usctl tliesc tlcvel-

opments to put pressure on Neliru to review his China Policy ant1 d e ~ n n ~ ~ d e d

White Paper on the subject. Nehru obliged the Parliament by I White

Paper before i t . The placing of White Paper i n the Parliament t'urt1ie1- providetl

the anti-chi~ia lobby to prove that the China policy followetl by Neliru was a

failure. Tliougli Nehru c o n t l e ~ n ~ ~ e t l the petulance of tllc 11ieml)ers of l ' ;~ r l i :~~~ie~i t .

lie too i n his over entl~usiasln to control critics rleclarctl publicly that 11e will

not metli;ttt with the Chinese. I t was for this reasotl tl~itt when (:lio~t En-li~i

came to l n t l ~ i ~ Nelil-11 refused to arrive at a compro~nise on the h o u ~ ~ t l i ~ ~ - y dispute

based on the principle of give ; ~ t l t l take.

' I I I I I I ~ C ~ S worse 101. Nel~ru. wit11111 t l ~ c ( ' ( I I I ~ I . C S S pitrty ~ I I S O rig111

wingers were nlore powerful ant1 were tl-ying to ~ L I ~ S I ~ I I I I his ~)t~lici.es i111tl rile

Sino 11idia11 crisis C X I I I ~ i l l h:ll~tly t c ~ run 11i111 low^^. 'Sherefore to prevent forces.

thilt were against him, from coming togctllcr Nrllru took a v~:ry 11i11.tl S I : I I I ( I 011

the dispute. The Chinese coultl never untlerst:uid the positio~l in which Nel~ru

had placed himsclf because they were inore concernetl :tbout their prestige ant1

to them the Indian attitude towilrtls Tibet-and tlie the border proble~n amountetl

to impositio~l of Illtli;~'s u~~ i l a t c r a l decision on China, that too at a t i ~ n c when

Cliina was trying to cover up its failure i n Tibet. T l ~ e illternill c o m p u l s i o ~ ~ s t l~us

forced N e l i r ~ ~ ro i:~he n p o s i t i o ~ ~ wliicl~ w;is :\gair~st a n y kil~tl 01' c t i ~ ~ ~ l ~ r o t ~ ~ i s c will1

the Chinese. I'rol>;~lrly ;I su'itlcllr ;111tl stillil~g I ' : ~ r l i ; ~ ~ ~ i c ~ ~ t ; i r y - ~ ~ r c s s C ; I I I I ~ ) ; I ~ ~ I I Iorc~cI

Ne111.u to view tllil~gs from l ~ i s own pcrson:~l ;i~iglc wliicl~ ~ ~ r c v c ~ ~ l c t l ;illy I I ~ I r(i>

I~ci~tlctl p~.ucr~c;il ; i s s c s s~ i i c~~ t o l strc~lgtlls ;illtl wc:ik~icss. tlle 11;1turc o l tllc cili~l-

lenge and the nature of the respollse that s l~ould be l'ollowetl 0 1 - ;itloptetl to such

problems.