Indicators of public attitudes toward science and technology

Scientometrics, VoL 2. No. 5-6 {1980) 439-448

Public Opinion

INDICATORS OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

T. R. LA PORTE with the assistance of D. CHISHOLM

Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720 (USA)

(Received December 12, 1979)

The use of attitude surveys in Science Indicators - 1976 is reviewed and found sufficiently flawed to limit the utility of survey results. The primary confusion throughout is the treatment of science and technology as if they were indistinguishable activities. Suggestions for conceptual improvement are presented both for describing attitudes and for predicting changes in them.

Introduction

Science Indicators, 1972, 1974, and 1976 report the results of sampling the pub-

lic's attitudes toward science and technology. In the interest of understanding these

attitudes and perhaps buttressing its case for public support, the National Science

Foundation (NSF) commissioned biennial surveys of national samples of about 2 000

respondents 18 years of age or older. Respondents were asked from thirteen to fif- 1

teen questions on their opinions about aspects of American science and technology. This paper reviews these surveys in science indicators volumes and finds flaws

which severely limit the utility of the survey results. First we present a critique of

the conceptual bases of these studies and then we suggest ways of improving them

for the purposes of describing attitudes and for understanding and perhaps predict-

ing attitude change.

Implicit rationale and hypotheses of the surveys

The science indicators series, like other collections of indicators, are organized on

the basis of the sponsors' motivations for doing the studies and their usually im-

plicit assumptions and hypotheses about what should be known about the pheno-

menon in question. The wording of the questions used in the surveys, suggests that

Scientornetrics 2 (1980) 439

T. R. LA PORTE: PUBLIC ATTITUDES

.the sponsors were on the defensive. They, along with the survey designers, appear to have fallen prey to the "temptation of self-validation", that is the desire to know how much the public shared the scientific community's own perceptions of science and technology, of the worth it accords its achievements, and of the public's enthu- siasm for governmental support of research. The abstractness of the items and the emphasis on evaluation rather than exploration of the cognitive underpinnings of attitudes toward science and technology heighten this impression. Few items deal with specific policy issues that might be relevant to decisions by Congress or the Executive. Moreover, the data are not disaggregated, hence the public is treated as a homogeneous mass (with the exception of simple demographic groupings), thus precluding analysis of opinions of sub-groups most likely to act on their beliefs a- bout science and technology.

The fundamental flaw in the surveys is the continuous linking of "science" and "technology" as if they were the same things. This fails to recognize that the public experiences the outcomes of science in fundamentally different ways from those of technology and that the conditions of governmental regulation and support for these activities also tend to be significantly different. As a result there is a fundamental ambiguity in both the rationale for the surveys and their findings.

In caricature, the designers' rationale and implicit hypotheses that resulted in the questions in the surveys seem to have been the following:

Public and legislative criticism of "science and technology" may have lead to a decline, both relatively and absolutely, in the public's regard for and confidence in scientists, engineers, physicians and architects. The explanation for such a decline in public regard, if this has in fact occurred, may be a sense that "science and technology change things too fast"; that they are a source of a good many problems; and that they have "caused more harm than good."

The decline in the public's regard for and confidence in the usefulness of science and technology for solving future problems may signal a new unwillingness by the public (and with it the Congress and other legislative bodies) to maintain the flow of resources for science and technology. This could also result in greater regulation of scientists and technologists, limiting both the number of available jobs in these fields and the freedom accorded to those who work in them. 2 This implicit rationale resulted in a series of surveys revealing what could be seen

without such an effort. The cumulative findings on these questions can be summa- rized as follows: the public regards the past contribution of "science ~_nd technology" to be quite positive, and still holds its practitioners in relative!y high regard. 3 There is, however, a softening of this e.qthusiasm with regard to the f~mre use of "science and technology", but governrner~t decision makers, not scientists, draw the blame for perceived misuses of "science aad tecianology". At the same time, the pub-

440 Seientometrics 2 (1980)


lic is decreasingly willing to support "science and technology" and there is some evi- dence for support of attempts to control "science and technology". This could be expressed in support for continued funding for medical and health related research and reduced funding for all other areas of research and development. The data also suggest an additional, perhaps ominous, interpretation: Since the public seemsqess willing to support the full range of technologies and blames government decision makers for problems stemming from "science and technology", it v~ould not-be surprising to see decision makers initiate attempts to control "science and technology"i These trends in attitudes could be easily discerned at the time these surve~?s were made, they added nothing to understanding either the origins or the context of these attitudes.

Conceptual confusions and missed opportunities

Thus the science indicators effort appears to use attitude surveys to document the obvious; it tells the careful reader as much, and perhaps more, about beliefs and assumptions of the survey designers as it does about public perceptions and beliefs about science and technology. The following list of assumptions, inferred from the questions asked in the surveys, concerns the nature of scientific and technological development, and the appropriateness of regulatory measures as applied to scientists and to technologists. (In each case we do not think the assumptions can be supported.)

1. The social organization, norms of work, and results of both science and technology are closely linked and theoretically and methodologically homogenous. That is, scientists' conduct of research is quite similar to the conduct of work of technologists (engineers, physicians, architects). The results of their work are nearly indistinguishable. Therefore, the terms "science and technology" can be joined in the questionnaire items for the purpose of detecting public attitudes toward these activities and their results. This is the central confusion in studies of public attitudes in the science indicators volumes, as it is in much of the public policy debate concerning these different activities.

2. The activities of scientists and technologists are such that regulatory measures or conditions of support appropriate to one group are equally appropriate to the other. This assumption allows the joining of these groups in the question, "Should the degree of control that society has over science and technology be in- creased?" Questions of this sort seem to suggest that the freedom to define research problems that scientists insist upon applies equally to technologists - engineers, physicians and architects - and that conversely, the degree to which these professionals subordinate their work to the specifications of clients may appropri-

Scientometrics 2 (1980) 441


ately be expected of scientists. Furthermore, respondents who indicated that "control of science and technology should remain the same" must somehow believe that the same measures of control at whatever level now practiced would have

similar effects upon scientific activities as upon technical ones. Due to their undeveloped conceptual foundation, the surveys have missed at least

two important opportunities: (1) to clarify the character of the public's experiences

of and sentiments toward scientific development - the more powerful understanding of the physical, biological and social worlds - as contrasted with their perceptions

of the results of technology - applying knowledge in finding solutions to socially defined problems, and (2) to clarify the value preferences the public uses in evaluat-

ing their experiences with science as contrasted to technology and the relationships they see between technically rooted distress and the institutions apparently respon-

sible for them. Other missed opportunities are apparent both in methodological development and

in the analysis of the data. There is a clear need to reduce the level of abstraction

used in framing the questions about science and technology. As these terms are em- ployed in the surveys they apply to an enormous range of activities and phenomenon. Neither ha.s a standardized meaning and when they are joined together the referent

used in answering the questions is utterly ambiguous. 4

As for data analysis, the science indicators series typically reports only the mar- ginal distributions of responses to questions asked; occasional references are also made to primitive cross-tabulations of these responses by some eleven socio-econom- ic status variables, s This is a pity, for while there was considerable variation of re-

sponses for several questions, the SES variables shed little light on the reasons for such variation and there appear to be several interesting possibilities for analysis of

inter-item correlations as well as the construction of multiple-item indices. In effect, two procedures for improving understanding were not used: first, the treatment of SES variables shed little light on what variations there were in attitudes toward "science and technology", and second, no effort was made to examine the internal or-

ganization of these attitudes. The most obvious opportunity to explore the cognitive organization of attitudes

would have been, in addition to more complete bi-variate cross tabulations, to as- sociate the pattern of responses to items on the "results" and "capacities of science and technology", on the one hand, and items on attitudes toward "preferences (and control) of science and technology", on the other. Such analysis would be interesting for it could show either the expected consistency or confirm the surprising result of another study that found there is an uncertain relationship between estimates of past performance and expectations for continued positive contribution and the control of and support for science and technology. 6

442 Scientornetrics 2 (1980)


Finally, efforts could have been made to identify subgroups in the public who could be expected both to know more about issues concerning technology and science and to be more likely than others to act upon their beliefs. To assume that a survey of the general public will say anything about the views of those likely actu- ally to participate politically is as fallacious as it is to assume that letters to Con- gressmen accurately reflect the opinions of the general public. Typically, the same people who are motivated to follow issues more closely are also motivated to act on their beliefs, and the substance of their beliefs may in fact be different from those of the general public. Thus policy makers need to know the characteristics of those people with whom they will most likely come in contact. In the study noted earlier, it was found that the "potential public for technological politics" had much more organized, internally consistent perceptions of the effects of technology and sentiments about them than did ~the rest of the public. This "potential public" tended to have generally more favorable views of science. Analysis of the attitudes of those people most likely to participate in the politics of technology is essential to an understanding of the possible pressures that may be brought to bear on decision makers in particular issue areas.

Beyond Science Indicators - 1976: A prospectus 7

Because studies of public attitudes toward science and technology have generally been flawed conceptually and truncated by limited resources, it is gratifying to learn that improvement in the National Science Foundation's program is in the offing. Work to improve the survey instrument has been completed and another series of more carefully designed and adequately funded projects are being developed. 8 Due to the importance of the topic and to the complexity of the phenomenon, a series of surveys dedicated wholly to this area is essential, with samples sufficiently large so that important regional as well as social and political subgroups can be identified. Such a

series should have sufficient support to improve methodological sensitivity and to provide complete statistical analysis and reporting. But it is in the conceptualization of the phenomenon that the most work is needed, especially with regard to the assumptions that have limited the usefulness of earlier studies. The remainder of this paper suggests some first steps in conceptual clarification. These are: distinguishing between "science" and "technology"; probing the meaning for respondents of specific technologies and sciences, especially the estimated likelihood of impact and consequence; improving our understanding of the basis respondents use to evaluate the outcomes of technological developments and the institutions that deploy them, and finally, ad-

Scientometrics 2 H980) 443


dressing directly two matters at the heart of the politics of technology - sentiments toward regulating technologies as contrasted to science, and attitudes concerning the export of risks into the future.

Science and technology contrasted

The design of all public attitude efforts for Science Indicators in the future must distinguish systematically between the phenomenon and consequences of "science", and those of "technology". These activities differ markedly in fact and coupling them as if they were tightly joined serves only to confuse and obfuscate. Differences are evident in the activities of scientists as contrasted to technologists, the goals they serve, the spirit in which they conduct their work, and the organizations they in- habit. It is important to know to what extent the public is aware of these differences. On the one hand, the evidences of scientific activity remain at a far remove from everyday experience. On the other, the involvement of those members of society touched by technological activities is immediate and pervasive. While technology in this sense is very much a part of everyday life, it is certainly plausible that many in the public only dimly recognize the existence of scientTfic activities, and if they do they might very well perceive them differently from technological activities. The terms "science" and "technology" denote a great variety and sweep of activities, disciplines, types of work, and institutions, and careful attention should be paid to devising questions more finely attuned to each phenomenon. If the public does distinguish "science" from "technology" realistically, then notions such as "in- vestigation", "study", and "knowledge" would lie at the core of popular notions of scientific activity; and notions of "use", {'production", and "invention" at the core of such perceptions of technological activity. Questionnaire items designed to tap these distinctions, especially as they might relate to differences in judgments about the value or benefits of each set of activities, estimates of their differential impact and of a preference for regulating one as contrasted to the other, would be of sub- stantial use in reviewing public policy and programs of education related to each broad area.

Aspects of responses to "science" and "technologies"

Four aspects of the public's attitudes are most directly relevant to the institutions that support scientific and technical work and deploy technologies: (1) the value preferences the public holds to be important in making decisions about supporting "science" as contrasted to "technologies"; (2) the perceived utility of various technologies in solving significant social problems;. (3) the degree to which the public be-

444 Scientometrics 2 (1980)


lieves it is desirable to regulate scientific activities as contrasted to technological activities; and (4) the degree of public confidence in various actors responsible for de- veloping policies about particular technological possibilities.

Although the first three aspects have been broached in quite primitive form in the science indicators surveys, these notions are sufficiently complex to demand con- siderably more attention than they have received so far. The fourth, the character of public confidence in various decision.makers on matters technological, did not appear in the science indicators surveys but could become one of the more important political indicators in this field. In addition to variations in public confidence, there appears to be an expanding range of values pressed by the public on the decision maker regarding all policy decisions, including those about technological projects and the ends of scientific research. These values must be incorporated into the implementa- tion of technology and the policies encouraging scientific work. The degree of per-

ceived involvement of various decision makers in policy decisions about deploying particular technologies and the degree to which the public believes such actors ought

to be involved are significant elements in setting the tone of the politics of science and technology. 9

Steps toward prediction and understanding

Conceptual refinements of the sort we have noted provide the first step toward improving our understanding of the reasons why particular attitudes, evaluations and expectations arise and change. Next we suggest some further steps in improving future science indicators surveys.

Implicit in studies of attitudes is the assumption that individual opinions are important in determining behavior. But the link between particular attitudes and specific actions has proven difficult to determine. It cannot be inferred that persons who have negative or hostile attitudes toward a particular technology will actively oppose its deployment. Therefore, in addition to tapping the strength of motivation

to act (the type of information most surveys are designed to identify) future science indicators surveys should also include questions designed to gauge two other correlates of individual action: (1) the extent to which individuals possess the skills

which give them confidence that they can act effectively, and (2) the degree to which opportunities for action are perceived to exist and would likely be effective. ~ o

Perhaps the most significant aspect of repeated surveys such as those of public attitudes towards technologies is their obvious assumption that changes in attitudes are possible and that public policy could be devised to alter them in the future. But to realize such promise, two requirements, not met in the studies reviewed here, must be satisfied.

$cientometrics 2 (1980) 445


One is predominantly technical. Time-series studies are persistently plagued by the problem (clearly evident in the science indicators studies) of the need to add new questions based on analysis of earlier efforts and the need to preserve continuity de- rived from asking the same questions repeatedly. Resources should be made available to expand surveys in an effort to reduce this inevitable problem.

The more important challenge is to specify the items that provide ways to under- stand the causes of attitude change when it occurs. To do this requires a careful analysis of the origins of attitudes, especially regarding the roots of affective or eval- uative reactions. Especially useful would be the identification of those attitudes that, if changed, would lead to the most significant changes in responses to scientific and technological change. Attitudes toward the sciences or toward technologies are like, ly to be a mix of information and symbolic meanings. 11 Therefore we need to know more about the information the public possesses about both the theoretical founda- tions of science and the operational/value context within which scientific work takes place. But more essentially, we need to repair the near absence of knowledge about the symbolic meanings attached by individuals to specific technologies including those in medicine, energy development, transportation, information processing, and com- munication and weapons development.

Finally, we believe there is an attitude set that is central to understanding public

participation in technological politics: variations in the willingness o f individuals to export risks and negative consequences o f a technology into the relatively far future as contrasted to an insistence upon drastically reducing future risks or negative con-

sequences. There is an increasing public awareness that what we do now can have dire consequences for future generations, perhaps generations that will not receive in any direct way the benefits of the te6hnologies that are the source of the problems they will face. Perhaps the most vivid expression of this attitude set can be found in the current debate about the short-term benefits of nuclear energy versus the potentially very long-term, dangerous risks of radioactive wastes. 12 We argue that the degree to which people insist on taking future effects of a technology development into account or choose to ignore them is correlated with their evaluation of the benefits of that technology and, hence, with support or opposition to it. At present, we do not know how many people are sufficiently future oriented and a- ware of potential long-term harm to be able to articulate such a position. However their current number is quite likely to grow and as it does, so will the intensity of the politics of technology. We are also unsure of the underlying cognitive and affec- rive factors that might be associated with long-term risk aversion, or with the position that present benefits are so necessary that future risk need not be taken into account.~ a Clearly, considerable effort to identify them would be necessary if our understanding of resistance to technological change is to improve.

446 Scientometrics 2 (1980)


Conclusion

The principal message o f this review of studies o f public at t i tudes reported in Sci-

ence Indicators 1972, 74, and 76, is generic to at t i tude surveys in any field; it is

necessary to assure an adequate and sensitive conceptualizat ion of the phenomenon

about which the public forms opinions. This has not been the case for the Science

Indicators series thus far. Without bet ter conceptualization and more adequate sup-

port , addit ional efforts to chart public perceptions need not be pursued. That would

amount to throwing good money after bad. I t would also perpetuate the impression

that social science is unable to progress much beyond documenting the obvious. In

fact, this conclusion is not warranted on the basis of the uses o f opinion surveys in

other domains. I t is in no one's interest to continue the past practices; indeed some

harm could result i f the technically educated leaders of the science pol icy commu-

ni ty were to infer on the basis o f efforts such as the studies under review that the

contr ibut ions from social science were not worth the effort and expense. This would

be a false conclusion and would result in several missed opportunit ies: (1) increas-

ing understanding o f the bases for public hosti l i ty to or approval o f new technolog-

ical proposals and (2) discovering the extent to which pol icy makers accurately or

erroneously suppose their perceptions are adequate representations of the at t i tudes

o f impor tant segments o f the public. The public issues and problems in question are

far too important to permit such opportuni t ies to be missed. ~4

Notes and references

1. See Opinion Research Corporation, Attitudes o f the U. S. Public Toward Science and Tech- nology, Study I, II, and III, Princeton, NJ, September 1972, 1974 and 1976, respectively.

2. Only in the 1976 survey was there a hint in its last question that perhaps science and technology, i.e., scientists and technologists, could be distinguished from one another, at least for the purposes of the control and regulation of their work.

3. A quite abbreviated survey conducted by Commission of the European Communities, Science and European Public Opinion, Brussels, October 197, covering nine European countries found similar high regard for the accomplishments of science and technology. The author went on to note that it is "interesting to reflect on the gulf that separates public attitudes as revealed (in the survey) from the feelings of frustration in the scientific world which believes that it is ill appreciated by the general public for whose benefit it applies its skills." (p. 16-17).

4. A second technical point is that the response categories are so limited in range that statistical analysis is difficult to carry out with much confidence. These categories should have been expanded from the usual three or four used to at least five, exclusive of the "don't know" and "other" categories.

5. These included indications of sex, age, race, education, income, occupation, regional and rural/urban location of residence, home ownership, and number of children in the household.

Scientometrics 2 (1980J 447


6. See T. LA PORTE, D. METLAY, Public Attitudes Toward Present and Future Technologies: Satisfaction and Apprehensions, Social Studies of Science, 5, November 1975, pp. 378-384; and T. LA PORTE, D. METLAY, They Watch and Wonder: Public Attitudes Toward Ad- vanced Technologies, Final Report to Ames Research Center, NASA (Grant NGR 05 -003 -1471) , Institute of Government Studies, University of California, Berkeley, CA, December 1975, Chapter VI.

7. Due to space limitations, this article has been substantially shortened primarily by deleting the conceptual rationale for the next two subsections. The elaborated version is available from the primary author.

8. See J. MILLER, K. PREWlTT, NSF Survey of Public Attitudes Toward Organized Science, National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, March 1979.

9. See T. LA PORTE, D. METLAY, Technology Observed: Attitudes of a Wary Public, Science, 188 (April 1975) 121-125, for the unsettling results of data gathered regarding such confidence.

10. For general discussions of at t i tude-behavior linkages see K. THOMAS, Attitudes and Behav- iors, Penguin Books, London, 1974. For a more directed analysis of political attitudes see J. CITRIN, Political Alienation as a Social Indicator: Attitudes and Action, Social Indicators Research, 4, October 1977, pp. 381-449.

11. For example, see D. SEARS, T. TYLER, J. CITRIN, D. KINDER, Political System Support and Public Response to the Energy Crisis, American Journal of Political Science, 22, February, 1978, pp. 56 -82 ; for an analysis of cognitive versus symbolic determinants of attitudes and behavior.

12. C. HOHENENSEM, R. KASPERSON, R. KATES, The Distrust of Nucle~ Power, Science, 196 (1 April 1977) 25-34 .

13. See P. SLOVIC, The Psychology of Protective Behavior, Journal of.,Safety Research, 10 (Summer, 1978) 5 8 - 6 8 and P. SLOVIC, B. FISCHOFF, How Safe is Safe Enough? Deter- minants of Perceived and Acceptable Risk, in: Too Hot to Handle: Social and Policy Issues in the Management o f Radioactive Waste, L. GOULD and C. A. WALKER (Eds), Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, forthcoming.

14. Special acknowledgement must go to Dan S. METLAY who, but for heavy responsibilities at Indiana University, would have joined as co-author. We have worked long on the matter of examining public attitudes toward technology and his contributions to the ideas in the latter part of the paper are considerable. He should not, however, be held responsible for errors in logic or critique. I bear those solely. Thanks also to the staff of the Insitute for help with the work upon which this paper is based and witl~ its preparation. It is much appreciated. TRL.

4 4 8 Scientometrics 2 (1980)

Documents

Indicators of public attitudes toward science and technology