Indian Building Congress Presentation By- Ajit Kumar Mishra

8/12/2019 Indian Building Congress Presentation By- Ajit Kumar Mishra

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Information Technology in Disaster ManagementAn Indian Railways Perspective

Authors:

Ajit Kumar Mishra, IRSEAdditional General Manager,

Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India Ltd,New Delhi

Saurabh Misra, IRSESenior Divisional Engineer,

East Central Railway,Samastipur

Abstract:

Indian Railways is the third largest Railway network in world running over19000 trains each day to carry over 25 millions passengers and 3 milliontonne goods on daily basis. While handling such large-scale operations,disasters do occur, despite best of efforts by the organization.

Many a time, we read in newspaper or hear in TV reports that Railways

apathetic response resulted into loss of human life or property. In suchcases, while negligence of Railway staff cannot be ruled out, a discrete view on

the issue will definitely put the incidence in proper perspective.

The present paper explains the Railways complex operation and enumeratesthe disaster prone areas. Use of technology has resulted in fail-safe operationsin many areas of train operations improving overall safety performance.However, human interventions are not completely obviated because of eithercost or technology constraints. The playful intrusion due to undisciplinedpublic or poor law and order has defied all safety precautions resulting intosevere accidents.

The present paper discusses such disasters, which are purely due to human

interventions. It then describes how such disaster can be mitigated usinginformation technology tools. Use of technology in Indian Railway has alwaysmet with cold reception if not resisted out rightly. The paper discusses thesecases and suggests cost-effective technological solutions, which can best beutilized in quick restoration and rehabilitation. While appreciating thathuman errors cannot be fully eradicated fully with the best warning systems,the paper also focuses on the training and psychological needs of theemployees to reduce the vulnerability of human elements.


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1.0 CONCEPT OF DISASTER

1.1 Disaster Risks in India:

India is, in varying degrees, susceptible to a large number of natural as wellas man-made disasters. 58.6% of the landmass is prone to earthquakes of

moderate to very high intensity; over 40 million hectares (12% of land) isprone to floods and river erosion; of the 7516 km long coastline, close to 5700km is prone to cyclones and tsunamis; 68% of the cultivable area isvulnerable to drought and hilly areas are at risk from landslides andavalanches. Vulnerability to disasters/emergencies of Chemical, Biological,Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) origin also exists.

1.2 Disaster defined in Indian Railways context:

The definition of Disaster Management was legislated for the first time byGovernment of India in the Disaster Management Act, 2005. The broadprinciples of disaster for any department of the government changed to theconcept of any incident which could not be handled with alone by thatdepartment i.e. if it was beyond the coping capacity of a particulardepartment, the incident could be termed as a disaster. This concept ofdisaster has been adopted by Indian Railways and Railway Board has issueda comprehensive document in the form of Disaster Management Plan.

1.3 Philosophy of Disaster Management on Indian Railways:

Disaster in the Railway context was traditionally a serious train accident,caused by human/equipment failure, which may affect normal movement oftrain services with loss of human life or property or both. This is nowextended to include natural and other man made disasters. Different types ofdisasters are described as below:

(a) Natural Disaster: Earthquakes, Floods, Cyclones, Land Slides, SnowAvalanches, and Tsunami etc.

(b) Train Accident related Disaster: Collisions, Train marooned (flashfloods), derailments at a bridge over a river, train washed away incyclone, derailment of a train carrying explosives or highly inflammable

material, tunnel collapse on a train, fire or explosion in trains, andother miscellaneous cases etc.

(c) Man made Disasters: Acts of Terrorism and Sabotage, which includes- Setting fire to a Train, Railway installations etc., bomb blast atRailway Station/Train, Chemical (Terrorism) Disaster, Biological,Radiological and Nuclear Disaster.

Instead of being focused merely on rescue and restoration, a HolisticApproach for Disaster Management has been adopted to incorporate:

Prevent and Mitigate disasters

Audit Existing Systems for Disaster Resistance, Disaster


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Prevention and Mitigation on the basis of NDMAs and self

prepared guidelines

Disaster Management in Developmental PlanningNew activitiesshould be disaster resistant

Preparedness, Rescue, Relief and Rehabilitation Expertise based response from all stake holders Pooling of resources of all agencies, e.g. local administration,

community, defence, hospitals and other Govt. organizations.

1.4 Categorization of Disaster Alerts:

A uniform system has been devised by categorizing each type of disaster alertin stagesYellow, Orange and Red. For Indian Railways, this categorizationis as under:

Category Description Code

Minor Accident involving 50 or more casualties(inclusive of death and injuries)

Yellow

Medium Accident involving 51-99 deaths Orange

Major Accident involving 100 or more deaths, or wherethe Ministry of Railways seeks additionalassistance from other ministries.

Red

2.0 STRENGTHS OF THE RAILWAYS TO HANDLE A DISASTER

In handling disasters, Indian Railways is in a unique position as it has anumber of strengths not available with many other departments ofGovernment of India. These include:

Railways own Communication Network. Operating Control on each Division linked with each Station. Territorial Army Units. Uniformed force of RPF/RPSF and Localized GRP personnel Railways own Medical Infrastructure Civil Defence Organization An army of Gang men spread out all over the Railway track


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Scouts and Guides (for background support) Dedicated Rescue/Restoration and Medical Equipment on wheel

3.0 APPRAISAL OF STATISTICS OF CONSEQUENTIAL TRAIN ACCIDENTS

3.1 An analysis of consequential train accidents on Indian Railways will givean insight into the weak areas leading to accidents. It is mentioned that thedata maintained in Railway Board office pertains to only those train accidentswith apparent consequences and train accidents of minor nature and nearmisses are not included in the figures. Further, the casualties due totrespassing of railway track, or for other reasons connected with railwayinfrastructure and casualties of IRs own staff while on duty, though quite

substantial, are not included in the statistics of train accident relatedcasualties.

3.2 Analysis of 05 years data of Consequential train accidents for the periodfrom 2006-07 to 2010-11 reveals the following:

3.2.1 Total Consequential train accidents have come down from 195 in2006-07 to 141 in 2010-11 (Fig.1) and consequential train accidents permillion train Kilometer have also come down from 0.23 to 0.15 duringthis 5 year period (Fig.2).

3.2.2Derailments constitute largest chunk of 50% of total accidents followedby 36% accidents at unmanned level crossing gates, 5% collisions, 4%accidents at manned level crossing gates, 2% fire accidents and balance 3%accidents are due to miscellaneous reasons (Fig.3).

2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11

Fig.-1: Consequential

Train Accident per year195 194 177 165 141

0

50

100

150

200

250

NumberofAccidents

Fig.-1: Consequential Train Accident per year


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However, deaths have gone up from 208 to 381 and total casualties from 610to 844 during the same period due to severity of accidents.

3.2.4 Cause-wise analysis indicates that 42 % of accidents took place due tofailure of railway staff, 43 % due to failure of other than railway staff, 7% dueto sabotage, 3 % each due to failure of equipment and incidental and balance1% each due to combination of factors and non-establishment of cause(Fig.4). Thus a large chunk of 85 % of accidents is on account of humanfailure.

2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11

Fig.-2: Consequential

Train Accident per

Million train km0.23 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.15

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

AccintsperMillionkm

Fig.-2: Consequential Train Accident

per Million train km

Fig.-3: Cause of Accident

Derailment

Unmanned LC

Collision

Manned LC

Fire

Miscellaneous


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3.3 Casualties of Railways own staff while on duty are also remarkably high.About 1600 railway staff were killed and 8700 injured while workingduring the period from 2007-08 to October, 2011 which is substantially morethan 1019 deaths and 2118 injuries in train accidents for the period from2007-08 to 2010-11. It is to be noted that casualties in train accidentsinclude a large chunk of 723 deaths and 690 injuries due to unmannedlevel crossing accidents attributed to the negligence of road users.

3.4 The data presented in para 3.2 and 3.3 reflects that there is greateremphasis on IR to control human errors to contain the 85% of consequentialtrain accidents, deaths at un-manned level crossings and death of Railwaysown staff.

4.0 TYPICAL DISASTERS AND RESPONSE MEASURES

4.1 Case-1 (Head-on Collision between two passenger trains)

A. Description of Accident

Train no. 9112 Dn Jammu Tawi Ahmedabad Express collided with 1 JMPDiesel Multiple Unit Passenger train between Bhangala and Mirthal stationsof Northern Railway on 14.12.2004 at 11.53 hrs in which 38 persons losttheir lives, 40 persons were injured.

B. Cause of the Accident

The two Station Masters did not exchange messages properly and dispatchedtrains in the same block section from opposite directions on a single linesection which lead to collision of two trains.

C. Key Observations

i. Quad cable supporting the block circuits was damaged due to

Fig.-4: Cause-wise Analysis of Accident

Failure of Railway Staff

Human Error other than

Railway Staff

Sabotage

Failure of Equipment

Incidental

Combination of Factors

Cause not established


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construction activity in the section causing failure of Block instrumentsand block phones at both the stations.

ii. Trains between Mirthal and Bhangala were being worked on Paper LineClear (PLC) since about 24 hours prior to the accident.

iii. PLC cannot be issued to the driver unless line clear has been obtainedthrough section controller in accordance with Northern Railway BlockWorking Manual.

iv. Both the Station Masters dispatched trains from their respectivestations towards each other in the same block section by granting lineclear on VHF sets exchanging private numbers and issuing PLC.

v. Poor supervisory and managerial intervention was continuing in thismost unsafe and accident-prone condition.

D. Human Element

Human element came into vulnerable functioning after the technical failure

i.e. the cutting of quad cable supporting control circuits during excavation ofearth. Both the Station Masters adopted the least cumbersome process ofgranting line clear after the failure of Block instruments and block phones i.e.VHF communication over controller communication being easy to use.

Though the practice of granting line clear using VHF communication hadbeen going on for about 24 hours, by which time this abnormal working hadlost its alert value in the minds of individuals involved and a lapse was boundto take place at the level of Station Masters.

Work of locating and rectifying the fault was not undertaken on an emergency

basis and was postponed for the next day to avoid night working.

4.2 Case-2 (Run-over of public by a passenger train)

A. Description of Accident

On 19.08.2013, by train no. 12567 Up Saharsa-Patna Rajyarani Express, 28persons were run-over and 08 persons got injured while this train waspassing through main line of Dhamaraghat station at about 8.52 Hrs.

B. Cause of the Accident

Dhamaraghat is a 3-line station in Saharsa- Mansi section of Samastipurdivision having simultaneous reception and crossing facility. Two trains,55533 (UP Passenger) and 55566 (DN Passenger) were standing on loop lines-3 and 1 respectively. The fateful train 12567 (UP Rajyarani Exp) was plannedto run through via mainline (L-2). Some passengers who were detrained fromthese two passenger trains were proceeding towards a nearby temple viamainline and got run-over by the train.

C. Key Observations

i.

Dhamaraghat station is situated at a curvature from Saharsa end.When both the loop lines (L-1 and L-3) are occupied by trains, the LocoPilot of the approaching train could not see the position of mainline (L-


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2) unless he is very close to home signal.ii. There is an old Katyayani Temple near Dhamaraghat station and a

religious fete was organized in this temple on this date. Devotees inlarge number had gathered from nearby locations. Some of them hadalso detrained from the two passenger trains standing on the station.They were moving towards the temple on Railway track/embankment,as there was no road available nearby.

iii. The devotees were making noise and beating drums (Dhol-Nagara) whilemoving toward the temple. Due to which they could not hear the soundof whistle of the approaching Express train.

iv. The station has no approach road being on a high bank bound by KosiRiver on north side and Baghmati River on south side. The only way toapproach this station was by train or by walking through the Railwayembankment.

v. The Station Master of the station while observing large movement ofpublic on mainline cautioned the Driver of approaching train on Walkie-

Talkie (VHF) set but, by the time Driver applied emergency brake,several persons got trapped between the two standing trains and run-over by approaching train.

vi. After the run-over incidence, the irate mob set Engine & 15 coaches oftrain 12567, Engine & 05 coaches of passenger train, Station Buildingon fire. The crowd also ransacked the station, looted the cash anddamaged signaling equipment.

D. Human Element

In this case, no technical failure was reported. It is result of sequential

human failures at different levels. The passengers after detraining should notbe moving on the railway track. The Station Master, after seeing largemovement of people on track, should not have given line clear to the Expresstrain. Once line clear is given, the driver of the train had very little controlover the train and even after application of emergency brake; it could stopafter about 600-1200m only. Hindustan Times in its opinion poll hasmentioned that 94% people believe that this incidence is due to carelessnessof people crossing the track.

P-1: Fateful Rajyarani Express afterincidence

P-2: Angry crowd set two trains onfire

P-3: Dead Bodies along track


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P-4: People gathered along track P-5: People gathered on Accident

Relief Train

P-6: People crossing the bridge in

unsafe manner

5.0 CAPACITY BUILDING TO HANDLE DISASTER IN RAILWAY

Disaster Management to be inbuilt in Developmental Plans Adequate Funding for Mitigation Plans Modernization of Relief/Rescue during Disasters Crowd control and Management of rush at Railway Stations during

festivals

Terrorist attacks on a freight train carrying inflammables Capacity Building to reduce destruction due to earthquakes, floods etc.

6.0 PSYCHO-SOCIAL ASPECT IN DISASTER MITIGATION

Blaming the human operator, and if not the human operator, thenmalfunctioning of equipment, tends to shield both the organization andregulatory agencies from the costly and time-consuming process of statutoryaccident investigations that might reveal deliberate indifference necessitatingsystemic reforms. Following psycho-social aspects needs to be address forcreating a safe working environment:

Better training and conducive work environment of safety related staff More tolerant management attitude in case of hold-ups in train

operations at the time of failures

Counseling to staff to follow procedures regardless of delays Co-coordinated working at the construction site Emergent action to set right failed asset involved in train operation. Strengthening of staff availability to undertake and supervise operations

under such conditions.


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Safe and simple prescription of alternatives needing humanintervention.

Slow down operations in view of vulnerability or at the time of anycompromise in laid-down standards

Intense super checks for compliance of procedures and Penal action incase of non-compliance even if not resulting in accidents.

Strong crackdown on trespassers to appreciate Railways right of waydue to specific signal based train operation

Removal of encroachments and handling of acts of sabotage/vandalism/ tampering of Railway system by strong political order

Sensitization of public towards damage of national property and utility7.0 ROLE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN DISASTER MITIGATION

One of the simplest ways to eliminate human error is by replacement ofmanual processes by technology driven systems. The increased use ofinformation technology tools, along with other technological advancements,will definitely lead to system improvements and equip the public with betterinformation

7.1 Elimination of Human Element:

Automation to the extent possible will reduce the human intervention and

thus the chance of human error will also reduce. As already pointed out 85%of the accidents are due to human error, any such effort to eliminate humanintervention is a welcome step.

7.2 Adoption of Automated Signaling System:

Worldwide, Automated Train Protection Systems in which train position andspeed are correlated with precision using GPS signals in addition to track-sidesignals are being used. This reduces the probability of collision between trainsand works all along the rail route.

Indian Railways has introduced Automatic Collision Device (ACD), designedindigenously on the concept of locating the train position and calculating thespeed based on GPS signals along with necessary computations. ACDbroadcasts its position and identification which are picked up by the nearbypassing locos for due protection as required. It is presently deployed on KRCLand NF Railway on about 1800 route kilometers.

Another type of in-cab signaled system known as Train Protection andWarning System (TPWS) has been deployed and put on trial at Chennai sub-urban since 2009. TPWS is based on ETCS Level-1 as applicable in European

Countries. In this system, driver gets audiovisual indication of the signalaspect and in case he fails to acknowledge yellow/red signals within astipulated period, brakes are applied automatically.


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However, the above two cases present a bleak picture of implementationstrategy of critical safety items. Ten Year period is too long a period for designand development of ACD which was once accepted as a remedy to preventtrain collisions. Similarly poor functioning of TPWS also indicates lack ofcustomization of to Indian conditions.

7.3 Effective Communication Network:

Although Indian Railways has its own communication network, little has beendone to provide communication based onboard systems to assist loco pilotsin train operation. This has now become an urgent requirement due toincreasing traffic and trailing loads on the existing sections most of which aresaturated.

7.4 IT Based Recruitment systems:

There is approximately 18% vacancy in safety category posts in IndianRailways, which lead to shortcuts in work and results into undue workpressure in the worker and affects safety. The present recruitment system islengthy and time taking. So it is necessary that all the vacancies ofsupervisors and staff in safety category shall be filled up in a time boundmanner by leveraging IT based recruitment systems.

7.5 Whole System Approach:

The traditional approach to rail disaster accident investigations is fault treeanalysis.This method for the study of discrete events begins with the facts of

the accident and works backward in time in search of the contributory factorsthat caused the eventan approach focused exclusively at the operationallevel. It is required that an accompanying collective choice-level, whole-systems analysis be done to complement this operational focus in allinstances. Such an analysis might reveal whether factors existed in thesuperordinate legislative/regulatory context that might have contributed justas much to an accident as failures at the operational level.

7.6 Quality Management System:

Supervisors and officers doing technical inspections must not only be aware

of the frequency to carry out inspections but should also be aware as to whatis to be inspected. The follow up action observed also need to be ensured bythe officer. The conventional method of technical inspection is replaced with amodern IT based Quality Management System for which necessary checksheets should be developed by the respective departments directly associatedwith safety. The check sheets should be based on present rules, regulations,manuals, instructions, etc. and should form part of the safety manual of theRailway to be done on real time basis.

7.7 Intelligent Security System:

The internal security is primarily, except for law & order issues, lies withRailway Protection Force (RPF). Several initiatives have been taken for bettersecurity at railway stations and within a train. The security at busy railway


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stations where a large number of passengers of all classes are handled shouldbe of different order as compared to the airports. Railway stations shouldhave Intelligent Security largely based on CCTV camera with proper

monitoring in the control room.

7.8 Wider Public Awareness:

Apart from the casualties due to consequential accidents, a large number ofcasualties take place over the entire railway system due to unlawfultrespassing. The estimation is almost 15000 persons, including 6000 inMumbai Suburban only get killed, in such manner on the Indian Railwayevery year. Indian Railways does not own these casualties, which are not inthe purview of train accidents but are nevertheless accidents on account oftrains. No civilized society can accept such massacre on their railway system.Increasing use of IT system can be helpful in alerting the trespassers.Trespassing takes place mainly on account of lack of barricading, fencing,

absence of adequate number of pedestrian over bridges, reluctance to replacepedestrian level crossings with foot over bridges etc. Lack of passengerfacilities such as inadequate and narrower platforms, absence of escalatorsand elevators for physically challenged, insufficient train services etc. are themain reasons for such a heavy human toll on the Mumbai Suburban System.

7.9 IT Based Monitoring and Reporting of Accidents:

IT system based on email / SMS has been introduced on Indian Railways toreport safety related matters by railway and non-railway persons. IT basedsystem has also been put in place to collect and collate all train accidents

whether consequential or of little significance, near misses, safety relatedasset failures, etc which is promptly posted on the website also.

8.0 CONCLUSION

Indian Railways, the lifeline of India, has implemented various safety relatedmeasures which has resulted into reduction in accidents. Still heavyautomation and use of IT tools are is order of the day to make Indian Railwayscompetitive with world Railways. We have to have a total paradigm shift in themanner in which serious train accident relief is to be managed and also forimplementation strategy for deploying modern and effective signaling systems.

A much more radical approach would be gradually needed to be introducedwith the help of IT Systems to make a train journey safer and pleasurable.

REFERENCES:

1. Courting Disaster: Systemic Failures And Reactive Responses InRailway Safety Regulation, Lloyd Burton & M. Jude Egan, CornellJournal Of Law And Public Policy, 2011

2. Indian Railways Disaster Management Plan 2013,Ministry of Railway.3. Report of High Level Safety Review Committee, February 2012, Ministry

of Railway.

4. Human Interface in Railway SafetyA New Dimension, Amitabh, 2006.5. Photographs and newspaper reports from websites are duly

acknowledged.

Documents

Indian Building Congress Presentation By- Ajit Kumar Mishra