IN THE CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR THE SIXTH

JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA

APPELLATE DIVISION

Ref. No.16-000056AP-88B

UCN:22016AP000056XXXXCI

Frances Mann and Peter Stack

Petitioners

vs.

Landmark Oaks Condominium, Assoc., Inc

Respondents

__________________________________________________/

APPENDIX

Petitioner’s Petition For Writ Of Certiorari Seeking to Quash

The County Court’s Order For A Writ Of Possession

DATE: TUE 13 DEC 2016

By: /s/Frances R. Mann_______

Frances R. Mann

3017 Landmark Blvd. Unit 501

Palm Harbor, FL 34684

727-798-3134 fran.r.mann@gmail.com)

By: /s/Peter G. Stack

Peter G. Stack

3017 Landmark Blvd. Unit 501

Palm Harbor, FL 34684

727-698-7383 (p.garrett.stack@gmail.com)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA

APPELLATE DIVISION

Lower Court Case No. 14-004835-CO

Ref. No. 16-000056AP-88B

UCN: 522016AP000056XXXXCI

Frances Mann and Peter Stack

Petitioners

vs.

Landmark Oaks Condominium, Assoc., Inc

Respondents

_________________________________________________________________/

APPENDIX

Petitioner’s Petition For Writ Of Certiorari Seeking to Quash The County

Court’s Order For A Writ Of Possession

DATE: TUE 13 DEC 2016

By: /s/Frances R. Mann_______

Frances R. Mann

3017 Landmark Blvd. Unit 501

Palm Harbor, FL 34684

727-798-3134 fran.r.mann@gmail.com)

By: /s/Peter G. Stack

Peter G. Stack

3017 Landmark Blvd. Unit 501

Palm Harbor, FL 34684

727-698-7383 (p.garrett.stack@gmail.com)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

[APP 1]

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION

AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

AND MOTION TO DISMISS

[APP 2-9] LANDMARK OAKS COMPLAINT W/EXHIBITS (Filed 06/16/2014) (Declaration of Condominium APP page 8 line 1 & 2)

(Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction) (No recorded “interest” at the time of filing to foreclose)

[APP 10-18]

ADDENDUM AND MATERIALS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S ANSWER

11/10/2014

[APP 19-37]

Defendant Peter Stack’s Objection & Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Notice of

Dropping of Defendants Peter Stack & Frances Mann as Parties In This Action

Without Prejudice Pursuant to Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420(a)(1), 1.250 (b) & 1.540 (b)

With Exhibits 05/25/2015 (APP page 33, 34, 35 & 36)

[APP 38-53] MOTION TO STRIKE W/EXHIBITS 07/19/2015 (APP Page 43 line 13 thru APP Page 44 line 11 and line 12 thru line 19)

[APP 54-59]

DEFENDANT’S ADDITIONAL MATERIALS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO

STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION 08/29/2016 (APP pages 54 thru 59)

[APP 60] Florida Statute 26.012 (2)(g)

[APP 61-63]

GAGNON V. BOARD OF TRUSTEES

[APP 64] CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

APP1

APP2

APP3

APP4

APP5

APP6

APP7

APP8

APP9

APP10

APP11

APP12

APP13

APP14

APP15

APP16

APP17

APP18

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR THE SIXTH

JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY,

FLORIDA

Case No. 14-004835-CO

UCN No. 522014CC004835XXCOCO

Landmark Oaks Condominium Assoc., Inc.

Plaintiffs,

vs.

United States Secretary of Housing and Urban,

et al

Defendants.

____________________________________________________/

Defendant Peter Stack’s Objection &

Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Notice of Dropping

of Defendants Peter Stack & Frances Mann as

Parties In This Action Without Prejudice

Pursuant to Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420(a)(1), 1.250 (b) &

1.540 (b)

Date: MON 25 MAY 2015

By:/s/ Peter G. Stack

3017 Land mark Blvd. Unit 501

Palm Harbor, FL 34684

727.698.7383

p.garrett.stack@gmail.com

APP19

1

I, Defendant Peter Stack, objects and wishes the Court to strike the Plaintiff’s Notice of

the Dropping of Defendants Peter Stack and Frances Mann as parties in this action without

prejudice.

Pursuant to Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.250 (b) Dropping Parties, parties may be dropped by the

adverse party in the manner provided for voluntary dismissal in rule 1.420 (a)(1) subject to the

exception stated in that rule.

Pursuant to Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420 (a)(1) & Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540 (b), Plaintiff does not have an

absolute right for voluntary dismissal / dropping defendants as parties, under the following

exceptions to Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420 (a)(1).

I. Timeliness For Dismissal / Dropping Defendants As Parties.

A. Vol. dismissal must be taken before there is a formal adjudication on the merits.

Once a final judgment is entered, vol. dismissal under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420 (a) is not available.

Equibank, N.A. v. Penland, 330 So 2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)

Default judgment was entered 10/10/2014.

This vol. dismissal / dropping of parties is dated 04/22/2015, greater than (6) months after the

judgment.

B. Vol. dismissal is probably not available after a claimant obtains any affirmative relief.

Select Builders of Fl. Inc. v. Wong, 367 So 2d 1089 (Fla, 3d DCA 1979)

C. Claimant’s right to take a vol. dismissal / dropping parties under

Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420 (a)(1) is absolute only if it is timely.

This instant case already has a judgment & affirmative relief for the Plaintiff and thus

does not fit the timeliness requirements for Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420 (a)(1) & Plaintiff’s Notice of

Dropping Parties should be striken.

APP20

2

II. Defendants Frances Mann & Peter Stack Have Established the Common Law Exception

to the Right to Vol. Dismissal / Dropping of Parties Under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420 (a)(1).

A. This vol. dismissal / dropping of parties filed by the Plaintiff came after the

Defendant’s have already acquired substantial rights which entitled them to a deposition of their

cause in this case.

B. 1. Plaintiff has a judgment in this instant case.

2. Defendants have:

a. filed a motion in this court under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540 (b) to vacate the judgment

based on lack of monetary jurisdiction of this court.

b. have shown this instant case is dependant on another unresolved case still in

court. This fact was intentionally hidden from the court by the Plaintiff when

filing this court’s worksheet. ( Exb. A)

c. Already shown and appearing in the court record by the Defendant, the fraud on

the Defendants and the Court by the Plaintiff’s manipulation of the monetary

jurisdiction of the Court and the fact Plaintiff had the “inferior” lien and is barred

by the Fl. Statute 718.116 (5)(a) from filing this foreclosure action.

3. Defendants are entitled to receive affirmative relief, a hearing and disposition

of their motions on their merits.

4. In the record to date, Defendants have provided irrefutable evidence of lack of

monetary jurisdiction.

Since the Defendants have proven that Plaintiff’s judgment is void, a vol.

dismissal / dropping parties would be grossly inequitable.

APP21

3

5. Defendants have shown conclusively that absent the vol. dismissal / dropping

of parties, a judgment would have been entered in the Defendant’s favor.

Defendants are entitled to an adjudication of their post-judgment motions

and relief.

Plaintiff’s judgment is void since this court lacks monetary jurisdiction

and another case on which this case is based is unresolved.

Plaintiff’s vol. dismissal / dropping of parties is to cover this up (conceal).

III. Fraud On The Court Is An Exception To Vol. Dissmissal As An Absolute Right.

A. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Dropping Defendants, to prevent the trial Court from

correcting the fact:

1. The default judgment was void 2nd to the court’s lack of monetary jurisdiction

and…

2. an unrelated prior case on which this instant judgment was based (is

unresolved & still in court) clearly shows that Frances Mann & Peter Stack are

still challenging HUD’s title obtained by a non-judicial foreclosure and that HUD

still has a ““superior”” lien as 1st mortgage holder and the Condo Assoc.

(Plaintiff) has an “inferior” lien.

The ownership of the title and the related case is unresolved and still being

litigated.

A judgment in this case would not be equitable since a judgment in the

other case would have a prospective application and be subject to vacation under

Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540 (b)(5).

APP22

4

B. 1. “Plaintiff engaged in fraud which resulted in affirmative relief from the court

and upon obtaining that relief vol. dismissed the case to prevent the court from

taking away the ill-gotten relief.”

Select Builders of Fl. Inc. v. Wing, 367 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)

In this instant case, dropping the Defendants is to prevent them from exposing the

Plaintiff’s fraudulent scheme.

2. “it can be demonstrated, clearly & convincingly that a party has sentiently set

in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial

systems ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly informing the

trier [of fact] or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party’s claim

of defense.” Aoud v. Mobl Oil Corp,, 892 F.2d 1115, 1112 (1st Ca. 1989)

3. “The scheme must go the very core issue at trial. In support of a dismissal /

[dropping of parties,] the court must find the “false” testimony was directly

related to the central issue of the case.” Morgan v. Campbell, 816 So. 2d 251, 253

(Fla.2d DCA 2002)

The Plaintiff presented false testimony to the court which was directly related to

the central issues of the case, in an attempt to rush thru the Court a judgment for

the property in order to obtain a windfall profit.

1. Hide the fact to the Court that there was another related case on which this

instant case depends which was not resolved.

Plaintiff lied and submitted a court worksheet / coversheet stating there

were no other related cases (Exb. A ) This was to obfuscate to the court the fact

the ownership of title to the property was still being litigated in another case and

APP23

5

that HUD as 1st mortgage holder had a ““superior”” lien and the Condo Assoc.

had an “inferior” lien and was barred by Fl. Statute 718.116.(5)(a) from

foreclosing on the property for assessments.

In other words, Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER, had no standing to file this

complaint for foreclosure.

Plaintiff was aware of cases 11-006246-CO & 13-000065 AP 88B, since

they had filed a lien which was on the docket.

Misinforming the Court on the worksheet / coversheet was done with

intent by the Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER..

Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER has repeatedly given the Court the

impression that it had a “superior” lien, which clearly they do not.

2. Plaintiff from the very beginning of this instant case has tried to misinform &

manipulate the Court for their own benefit.

Defendant’s Motion To Strike Court Order Requiring Rent to be Paid Into

Court Registry, signed by Judge Carrassas demonstrates clearly and convincingly

Plaintiff’s scheme to interfere with the judicial system’s ability to impartially

adjudicate the case, when Plaintiff obtained a signed “Order for Rent”, before

Defendant Frances Mann and myself Peter Stack were served with the Complaint

and before the Court had personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.

The above order is a clear cut total lack of and denial of due process for

the Defendants engineered by the Plaintiffs / RABIN | PARKER for their benefit.

3. Fraudulent manipulation of Court Jurisdiction.

APP24

6

Plaintiff misrepresented to the Court as to the amount of the assessments

not paid by HUD in order to lead this Court to believe it had monetary jurisdiction

in this instant case, when in fact the Court does not as per

Fl. Statute 34.01 (1)(c)(4), since the amount of the assessments actually owed by

HUD is greater than $15,000.00.

a. Plaintiff foreclosed on $3583.00, which they state is assessments owed thru

06/30/2014.

b. The actual amount owed was $19,776.00 as of 06/30/2014.

(See Exb. B & Exb. C) each on (2) different attorney /law firm lettetheads.

c. Plaintiff asked for the total amount of unpaid assessments plus interest, late

charges, costs & attorneys fees.

d. Plaintiff presents to the Court a sworn affidavit by Twila Anderson, Collections

Clerk, in which she stated assessments due as of 11/2014 are $5580.00 (See Exb.

D1 & D2) in total contraversion to the evidence submitted by the Defendants

showing the actual amount owed by HUD to be $21,356.00 thru 11/2014,

(See Exb. B & C) thus giving the impression to the Court it had monetary

jurisdiction.

This was done with intent by the Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER.

Foreclosing for assessments of $3585.00, a minimal fraction (3.5%) of the

market value of the property which is $101,521.00 as per the Property Appraiser’s

Office as of 2014 (See Exb. E) allows the Plaintiff to obtain an unconscionable

profit from a 100 year old Defendant.

APP25

7

Plaintiff using fraudulent, illegal means has tried to use this Court to rush

thru a foreclosure for minimal assessments in order to obtain a windfall profit on

100 year old Frances Mann’s property, steal her home, deny her the right to

litigate her case and commit grand theft, abusing an elderly person in violation of

Florida’s Elder Abuse Statute 825.

4. The only reason for the Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER to request vol.

dismissal / dropping of parties (6) months after final judgment is “to prevent the

court from taking away the ill-gotten relief.” id Select Builders.

5. Not only has the Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER, misinformed &

manipulated the Court, they have disregarded and failed to follow Fla. Statutes,

Fla.R.Civ.P. and Case Law in multiple Court pleadings.

A sampling, specifically Fla. Statutes, 57.105(4), 718.116 (5)(a), 825.

Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.100(A), 1.100(B), 1.150 (A) & (B)

Fla.R.Jud.Adm. 2.516 (See the detail of the above in Defendant’s Motion to

Deny Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions on Defendant Peter Stack 10/13/2014)

This again was done with intent by the Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER

in total disrespect of the Court.

6. In summary… all of the proceeding in this filing (I. thru III.) documenting

the misrepresentations, lies, & manipulation of the Court was in support of

Plaintiff’s / RABIN | PARKER’s fraudulent scheme to obtain a windfall profit on

Defendant Frances Mann’s property in violation of multiple Fla. Statutes,

Fla.R.Civ. P. and Case Law by tricking the Court into allowing a judgment in the

Plaintiff’s favor to cover-up their grand theft of Frances Mann’s property in spite

APP26

8

of the fact this Court did not have monetary jurisdiction and another case on

which this instant case is based is ongoing and unresolved.

7. Specifically the Fraudulent Scheme.

a. Plaintiff / Rabin | Parker, represented to this Court that foreclosure was for

all unpaid assessments. Clearly this representation was false & known to be false

by the Plaintiff / Rabin | Parker, and without regard to the truth. In fact, the owed

assessments exceed $15,000.00, which is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.

The Court has relied on this representation by the Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER,

and granted a default judgment against HUD, transferring the title to the Condo

Assoc. (Plaintiff) causing direct harm to the Defendants who are in Court

challenging HUD’s title and harm to the Court which has issued a judgment

which is void.

b. Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER represented to this Court it had a “superior”

lien. It was known to the Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER that this representation

was false. This, since they were aware of the ongoing case between Frances

Mann involving HUD’s non-judicial foreclosure and HUD’s subsequently

obtaining title to the property, which is still unresolved in an open case. Plaintiff /

RABIN | PARKER knows that a 1st mortgage is always “superior” to a condo

lien. The Court relied on this representation by the Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER,

andhas allowed a default judgment against HUD to be granted, having the Court

issue a void judgment (which is covering up Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKKER’s

illegal acts, and harming the Defendants by making it difficult for Frances Mann

to regain her property by interceding a 3rd

ownership into the dispute).

APP27

9

c. Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER has violated Fla. Statute 825.102, by

knowingly deceiving the Court on its jurisdiction, manipulating the Court into

believing the Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER has a “superior” lien.

All of this to prevent Frances Mann from regaining her property thru litigation

and abusing and using the Court system to permanently deprive France Mann of

her property, which is for the benefit of the Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER by

providing them with, the Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER, of an approximate

$97,900.00 windfall profit & unjust enrichment against a 100 year old woman in

violation of Fla. Elder Abuse Statute 825. (See Addendum & Materials in

Support of Peter Stack’s Answer 11/10/2014)

d. With this fraudulent scheme against the Court, Plaintiff / RABIN |

PARKER, is using this Court to “launder their ill-gotten” judgment by trying to

have this Court give it the stamp & the air of a legitimate action.

By dropping the Defendants as parties, which does not meet the

requirements of Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.250(b), 1.420 (a)(1) & 1.540(b), the Plaintiff /

RABIN | PARKER is trying to prevent the Defendants from having the Court hear

their evidence & unveil Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER’s scheme for a windfall

profit.

This is the only reason Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER would try to drop the

Defendants as parties (6) months after they received a judgment. This is in

response to Defendant’s Motions for post-judgment relief.

IV. Counterclaims Exist In This Action.

APP28

10

A. “If a counterclaim has been filed a claimant cannot voluntarily dismiss as a matter of

absolute right by filing a notice of dismissal.”

Layne Dredging Co. v. Rejus, Inc. 622 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2DCA 1993)

B. “when a counterclaim is pending, plaintiff cannot unilaterally dismiss complaint

without order of the court.” Ryder System, Inc. v. O’Connor, 369 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 4th

DCA

1979)

C. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420 (a)(2) counterclaim must remain for independent adjudication if a

vol. dismissal is taken.

D. “If the Court has original jurisdiction of the claim, the claim can be dismissed

voluntarily and the court retains jurisdiction over the counter-claims even if the court might not

have had independent jurisdiction over the counterclaims because of the amount of money at

issue.” Gordon v. Goodrich, 347 So 2d 715 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)

E. “If a counterclaim is intended but is mistakenly labeled as an affirmative defense the

court shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation if justice so requires.”

Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.110(d) Moore v. Alterman Transp., Inc., 301 So 2d 143 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)

F. Thus a counterclaim is a claim by a Defendant against Plaintiff (Fla,R.Civ.P. 1.170

(a)). Counterclaim seeks affirmative relief for the Defendant(s).

G. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420 (a)(2) states ”if counterclaim has been served by a defendant prior

to service upon the defendant of the plaintiff’s Notice of Vol. Dismissal, the action shall not be

dismissed against defendant’s objection until counterclaims can remain pending for independent

adjudication by the court.”

All of the Defendant’s’ counterclaims seeking affirmative relief were filed before

04/22/2015, when Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER’s motion to drop parties was filed.

APP29

11

H. Since counterclaims exist, the requirements of Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420(a)(1) are not met

and the Defendants cannot be dropped and their counterclaims need to remain to be adjudicated.

As per Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.250 (b), this is an exception to Rule 1.420(a)(1).

V. Plaintiff’s Notice to Drop Parties, Was To Use The Process Of The Court To Cover-up

Plaintiff’s Fraudulent Scheme To Obtain A Windfall Profit On Frances Mann’s Property.

In light of all the preceeding documentations (I thru IV)

A. Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER has no standing to file a foreclosure complaint for

unpaid assessments.

B. This Court does not have monetary jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff / RABIN |

PARKER’s complaint thus the judgment is void & the complaint should be striken.

C. The Defendants, I, Peter Stack & Frances Mann have the right to bring this pleading

to the Court since Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER’s Notice to Drop Parties under Fla.R.Civ.P.

1.250 (b) & 1.420 (a)(1) is not valid since it does not meet the prerequisites of the rules,

specifically timeliness, and the exceptions to the Rule 1.420 (a)(1) exist.

The Defendants have already established the common law exception to the rule,

documented the fraud on the Court, documented counterclaims filed by the Defendants before

Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER’s Notice of Dropping Parties was filed on 04/22/2015.

WHEREFORE, I, PETER STACK, pursuant to Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540 (b), 1.250 (b) and

1.420 (a)(1, ), move this court to strike Plaintiff’s NOTICE OF DROPPING PARTIES Peter

Stack & Frances Mann.

Move this Court to rule on:

1. Defendant’s 1.540 (b) motion that the judgment is void and to lack of monetary

jurisdiction.

APP30

12

2. Defendant’s Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540 (b)(5) motion that the judgment should be striken

since it’s dependent on another unresolved case that s still in court.

3. Dismiss Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER’s complaint second to fraud on the court and

the defendants.

4. Hear defendant’s counterclaims and motions for post-judgment relief under 1.540 (b).

Date: MON 25 MAY 2015

By:/s/ Peter G. Stack

3017 Land mark Blvd. Unit 501

Palm Harbor, FL 34684

727.698.7383

p.garrett.stack@gmail.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, HEREBY CERTIFY, that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished

using email, this MON 25 MAY 2015, to Monique Parker, Ben Rabin, Jonathan Peskin, 28163

U.S. Hwy. 19 North, Suite 207, Clearwater, FL 33761, email addresses

(monique@rabinparker.com) (ben@rabinparker.com) (jonathan@rabinparker.com) and also has

been furnished using email, this MON 21 APR 2014, to: Michael J. Posner, 4420 Beacon Circle,

Suite 100, West Palm Beach, FL 33407, (mjposner@warddamon.com), and using fax to A. Lee

Bentley, III, Esquire, 400 North Tampa St., Tampa, FL 33602, 813-274-6358, by U.S. Mail to

Eric Holder, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20530,

By: /s/Peter G. Stack

Peter G. Stack

3017 Landmark Blvd. Unit 501

Palm Harbor, FL 34684

727-698-7383 (p.garrett.stack@gmail.com)

APP31

APP32

APP33

Exb. C

APP34

APP35

APP36

APP37

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR THE SIXTH

JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY,

FLORIDA

Case No. 14-004835-CO

UCN No. 522014CC004835XXCOCO

Landmark Oaks Condominium Assoc., Inc.

Plaintiffs,

vs.

United States Secretary of Housing and Urban,

et al

Defendants.

____________________________________________________/

MOTION TO STRIKE

Date: SUN 19 JUL 2015

By:/s/ Peter G. Stack

3017 Land mark Blvd. Unit 501

Palm Harbor, FL 34684

727.698.7383

p.garrett.stack@gmail.com

APP38

1

I, Defendant, Peter Stack, move this Court to strike Plaintiff, 1

LANDMARK OAKS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION / CIANFRONE, 2

NIKOLOFF, GRANT, GREENBURG & SINCLAIR’S (Plaintiff / C, N, G, G 3

& S) Motion For Summary Judgment because it is both inappropriate, 4

(lacking any legal basis) and is frivolous. 5

Defendants Peter Stack & Frances Mann, have standing to file this motion 6

since Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER’s “Notice of Dropping Defendants Peter Stack 7

and Frances Mann as Parties in This Action”, is invalid since it fails to meet the 8

requirements of Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.250 (b), 1.420 (a)(1), and 1.540 (b). This was 9

outlined in detail in my, Defendant Peter Stack’s Objection and Motion to Strike 10

Plaintiff’s Notice of Dropping of Defendants Peter Stack and Frances Mann as 11

Parties, in this action pursuant to Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.250 (b), 1.420 (a)(1), and 1.540 12

(b), filed on MON MAY 25, 2015 and remains unanswered by the Plaintiff / 13

RABIN | PARKER or CIANFRONE, NIKOLOFF, GRANT, GREENBURG & 14

SINCLAIR… and not yet adjudicated by the Court. 15

Plaintiff / RABIN | PARKER’ s “Notice of Dropping Parties” was done in 16

conjunction with Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S’S, FRI JUL 03, 2015, Motion for 17

Summary Judgment, as part of Plaintiff and Counsel’s fraudulent scheme, in order 18

to rush it thru the Court and give their position the appearance of having legal 19

APP39

2

standing to obtain a judgment Plaintiff is not by Fla. Statute, case law or 1

Fla.R.Civ.P. entitled to receive. 2

All this without ever answering the Defendant’s motions, thus covering up 3

and burying from the Court their unlawful actions, laundering thru the Court to 4

give the appearance of legality. This is a fraud on the Court and the Defendants 5

being objectionable under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540 (b) 6

7

I. Inappropriate Without Any Legal Basis. 8

A. There is no legal basis for their Motion for Summary Judgment For 9

Foreclosure for Additional Condo Fees since Plaintiff has already received a 10

default judgment for foreclosure against HUD docketed by the Clerk of The Court 11

for this case #14-4835-CO on 10/10/2014. 12

1.) Defendants have filed the following motions for post judgment relief 13

which have to this date not been adjudicated by the court: 14

08/04/14, Peter Stack’s Motion to Strike Default Judgment 15

08/11/14, Peter Stack’s Answer 16

10/08/14. Peter Stack’s Motion to Strike and/or Deny Plaintiff’s Request for 17

Summary Judgment 18

11/12/14, Motion to Vacate Default Judgment & Dismiss Complaint, (Pursuant to 19

Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540 (b)) 20

APP40

3

12/19/14, Defendant’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment 1

01/06/15, DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO DENY PLTFFS MOTION FOR 2

FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND AWARD ATTORNEYS FEES AND 3

COSTS 4

05/25/15, Defendant Peter Stack’s Objection and Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s 5

Notice of Dropping of Defendants Peter Stack and Frances Mann as parties in this 6

action pursuant to Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420 (a)(1), 1.250 (b) and 1.540 (b) 7

2.) Plaintiff / C, N, G, G & S, have presented no Fla.R.Civ.P., Case Law, or 8

Fla. Statute, no logical explanation which would provide them with the ability to 9

foreclose a 2nd

time on HUD for condo fees when they already have a final 10

judgment for foreclosure on HUD which was entered on the docket 10/10/2014. 11

B. Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, have no standing to file a foreclosure 12

action against HUD since the condo association has an inferior lien as 13

per Fla. Statute 718.116(5)(A). Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, is misinforming the 14

court, without documentation (see paragraph 11 of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 15

Judgment 07/03/2015) in stating they have a superior lien. 16

1.) Fl. Statute 718.116 (5)(a) 17

A 1st mortgage is always superior to a condo association lien if the mortgage was 18

recorded before the assoc. lien. 19

APP41

4

Thus a condo association cannot foreclose on superior lien and is prohibited by 1

statute. 2

Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, have produced no statute, case law, or rule to support 3

their position that the condo association has superior lien. 4

2.) The Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, was and are aware that I, Peter Stack 5

along with co- Defendant Frances Mann, are challenging HUD’s non-judicial 6

foreclosure and subsequent title in an ongoing case 7

#11-006246-CO and Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, have chose to hide this from the 8

court. This was documented with evidence by Defendants, me/STACK in all my 9

pleadings. (See specifically 11/10/2014 Addendum & Materials in Support of 10

Defendant’s Answer, 11/12/2014, Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Default Judgment 11

And Dismiss Complaint, 12/10/2014, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment) 12

3.) Fla. Statute 90.202 (6) (2009) provides that a court take judicial notice of 13

the “[r]ecords of any court of this state”. 14

4.) Defendant’s Motion Under 1.540 (b)(5) 11/12/2014 to inform the court 15

that this instant case cannot be filed because case no. 11-006246-CO, involving 16

HUD & Frances Mann, in which, I, STACK is a Defendant, is challenging HUD’s 17

non-judicial foreclosure & subsequent title and would have a prospective effect in 18

this instant case. 11-006246-CO is still ongoing with Defendant’s counterclaims 19

APP42

5

still not adjudicated, (Thus the validity of the non-judicial foreclosure and 1

subsequent title to HUD are not yet settled.) 2

5.) “Because the general rule is that the proper scope of a foreclosure suit is 3

merely to enforce the lien against the title or interest of the mortgagor and those 4

claiming under him, it follows that parties claiming title superior to the lien of a 5

mortgage being foreclosed are not proper parties to the foreclosure suit.” Gonzalez 6

v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 37 So. 3d 955 (Fla. App 3Dist. 2010) 7

Thus, Fla. Statute 718.116 (5)(a) stating a 1st mortgage is always superior to 8

a condo association lien and a condo assoc. cannot foreclose a superior lien and is 9

prohibited by law. 10

6.) Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, has no standing to foreclose for condo fees in 11

this instant case. 12

C. This Court since the initial filing, 07/25/2014 of Plaintiff’s foreclosure 13

case, has lacked monetary jurisdiction. 14

1.) Plaintiff’s / RABIN | PARKER’s Fraudulent Manipulation of Court 15

Jurisdiction was documented with irrefutable evidence entered into the court 16

record by the Defendants, in order to rush thru a foreclosure action in this court 17

and provide the Plaintiff with a $97,900.00 windfall profit on Frances Mann’s 18

property. (See motions by Defendant(s) I, A. 1. Of this pleading.) 19

2.) Plaintiff filed Claim Lien 06/19/2013 against HUD, 20

APP43

6

O.R. Book 6000, page 238 for fees 04/2011 to 06/2013 1

for $13, 223.63 (Exb. C) 2

Plaintiff filed an additional Claim Lien 02/21/2014, against HUD 3

O.R. Book 18316 page 295 for fees 10/2013 – 02/2014 for $1989.00 as stated in 4

Plaintiff’s / CIANFRONE, NIKOLOFF, GRANT, GREENBURG & SINCLAIR’s 5

pleading. 6

Plaintiff’s letter to HUD 06/2013, stated “ This lien secures the amounts set 7

forth below as well as additional assessments, costs, interest and attorney fees. 8

Assessments owed by HUD 09/2009 to 06/2013, $18, 182.00” (EXB. B) 9

3.) Fla. Statute 34.01 (1)(c)(4) sets the monetary jurisdiction of this court at 10

$15,000.00. 11

As documented above, from the moment Plaintiff’s / RABIN | PARKER, 12

filed their complaint, this Court lacked monetary jurisdiction. 13

4.) “Objection of lack of jurisdiction of subject matter may be raised at 14

anytime.” Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.40 (h)(2) & 2.140 15

5.) “A judgment rendered in an action in which the court lacks jurisdiction 16

of the subject matter is void.” Malone v. Meres, 91 Fla. 709, 109 So. 677 (1926) 17

Thus the Plaintiff’s Default Judgment of Foreclosure 10/2014, is void and 18

this Court lacks jurisdiction in all matters of this case. 19

20

APP44

7

II. Frivolous Action 1

A. Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, relies on Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.510 in filing a 2

Summary Judgment of foreclosure against HUD for a condo assessment lien. 3

1.) Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.510 (c) requires the motion to state with particularity the 4

grounds upon which it shall be argued & 5

2.) Show there is no genuine issue as to material fact and moving party is 6

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 7

B. It is obvious from Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S’s pleading that their 8

affirmative obligation to due a pre-filing injury and ensure that the filing has a 9

basis in law and fact was not done. 10

1.) If the docket had been reviewed as required, Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, 11

would have seen that a default judgment for foreclosure has already been issued to 12

the Plaintiff and that there are multiple motions by the Defendants for post 13

judgment relief. 14

Nowhere in Fla.R.Civ.P. or Florida Statutes would a 2nd

foreclosure for 15

additional condo fees be the right vehicle when the Plaintiff already has a 16

foreclosure judgment. 17

2.) Obviously, the Plaintiff did not review or consider the case docket or 18

Defendant’s pleadings as required by Rule 1.510, to meet "the initial burden of 19

demonstrating the non-existence of any genuine issue of material fact.” 20

APP45

8

Defendants in their pleadings “have shown multiple disputed issue[s] by 1

either providing countervailing facts or by offering justifiable inferences from 2

those facts which have been presented.” 3

Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, is aware of the above, since these are his quotes 4

from his motion. Despite Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S’s awareness, of the 5

requirements, other than denial, Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, has presented no 6

evidence, case law, Fla. Statute or Fla.R.Civ.P. to controvert Defendant’s position. 7

Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, have not met their initial burden, not even close. 8

This pleading by the Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, is merely a template / 9

form… fill in the blanks, submitted to the Court with no legal basis in law. 10

3.) Defendants have presented material issues of fact and evidence, not 11

controverted by the Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, in any way that: 12

a. Plaintiff has no standing to foreclose since they have an inferior lien. 13

b. Any judgment, including the 10/12/2014, judgment is void since this 14

court lacks monetary jurisdiction. 15

Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, misleads the Court in paragraph #8 of his Motion 16

for Summary Judgment in stating the Plaintiff “filed and recorded an initial claim 17

for said assessments” 02/21/2014 for $1989.00 omitting the Claim Lien of 18

06/19/2013 Plaintiff filed against HUD for $13,223.63, thus already putting the 19

APP46

9

claim for lien above the $15,000.00 jurisdictional limit of the court. The actual 1

amounts owed are greater than $20,000.00 (See I, C. of this instant pleading. 2

c. Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, has engaged in fraud on this court and undo 3

influence on this court’s decisions (documented in I., A., 1 of this instant pleading) 4

which requires an explanation of the facts and circumstances preventing any 5

consideration of Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 6

d. In Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S’s template / form Summary Judgment 7

pleading, paragraphs 8

#2, #8 and #11 of their “Uncontroverted Facts” are flat out lies and 9

misrepresentations to the court to get a quick judgment for the Plaintiff. (See 10

Defendant Peter Stack’s Objection and Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Notice of 11

Dropping of Defendants Peter Stack & Frances Mann as Parties In This Action 12

Pursuant to Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420 (a)(1), 1.250 (b) and 1.540 (b)) 13

C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment of Foreclosure, is a frivolous 14

motion in everyway possible. 15

1.) Since the Defendants are pro se, these actions should prompt a sua 16

sponte order for sanctions against the Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, by this Court. 17

2.) There has been no reasonable investigation of the law, including legal 18

research to be sure their position is well grounded in law. 19

APP47

10

3.) No evidentiary support for Plaintiff’s position and they have the duty not 1

to persist with their contention that this Court has monetary jurisdiction and 2

Plaintiff has a “superior” lien when their position is no longer feasible. 3

4.) Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, should have known that there already is a 4

foreclosure judgment in this instant case on the docket. 5

5.) There has been no due diligence by the Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S. 6

D. Plaintiff and their past and current attorneys have participated in conduct 7

that frustrates and interferes with any fair rulings by this court in order to 8

manipulate this court to rush thru a foreclosure judgment which the Plaintiff is not 9

entitled to receive. 10

1.) Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, has mislead this court in paragraph #8 of 11

their pleading, that the 02/21/2014 claim of lien was the initial claim for 12

assessments, when in fact Plaintiff had filed 06/19/2013, another claim for 13

assessments and with all the prior assessments owed by HUD is beyond the 14

$15,000.00 jurisdiction of this court. 15

2.) This was done with knowledge and intent by the Plaintiff to fraudulently 16

manipulate this court’s jurisdiction. (See Def. Addendum and Materials in 17

Support, Exb. B and Exb. C) 18

3.) In this instant case, Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, has already demonstrated 19

their ability to exercise undo influence and control of the court by obtaining a court 20

APP48

11

order against the Defendants before they were served with the Complaint. (see 1

08/14/2014, Defendant’s Motion for Disqualification, 08/04/2014, Motion to Strike 2

Default Judgment, 08/05/2014, Motion to Strike Court Order Requiring Rent to be 3

Paid Into the Court Registry, signed by Judge Carrassas.) 4

4.) All of this being done as part of Plaintiff’s fraudulent scheme to obtain a 5

$97,900.00 windfall profit on Frances Mann’s property. (See 01/06/2015, 6

Defendant’s Response to Deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment of 7

Attorney’s Fees and Costs. 05/25/2015, Defendant Peter Stack’s Objection & 8

Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Notice of Dropping of Defendants Peter Stack and 9

Frances Mann as Parties In This Action With Prejudice Pursuant to Fla.R.Civ.P. 10

1.420 (a)(1), 1.250 (b) and 1.540 (b). 11

D.) This Motion for Summary Judgment by the Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, 12

is without any doubt a template / form, fill in the blanks, pleading, submitted to 13

generate legal fees by the Plaintiff’s / CIANFRONE, NIKOLOFF, GRANT, 14

GREENBURG & SINCLAIR, and an attempt to unduly influence and manipulate 15

this court into ordering a judgment which has no legal basis in Fla.R.Civ.P., case 16

law and Fla. Statutes and certainly does not meet the requirements of Fla.R.Civ.P. 17

1.510. 18

WHEREFORE, Defendant Peter Stack, requests this court to: 19

APP49

12

1.) Strike / Deny Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S’s “Motion for Summary Judgment for 1

Foreclosure”, Strike Plaintiff’s / RABIN | PARKERS “Notice of Dropping of 2

Defendants Peter Stack and Frances Mann. 3

2.) Rule on Defendant’s Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540(b) Motion that “judgment” is void 2nd

4

to lack of monetary jurisdiction of this court. 5

Rule on Defendant’s Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540 (b)(5) Motion that the “judgment” should 6

be stricken since it is dependent on another unresolved case still in court. 7

3.) Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint 2nd

to “fraud” on the court and the defendants, 8

by obscuring the lack of monetary jurisdiction of this court and lack of 9

Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S’s standing 2nd

to their inferior lien. 10

4.) Sanction the Plaintiff / C, N, G, G, & S, for #3 and filing a frivolous pleading. 11

12

[DATE: SUN 19 JUL 2015] 13

By:/s/ Peter G. Stack 14

3017 Land mark Blvd. Unit 501 15

Palm Harbor, FL 34684 16

727.698.7383 17

p.garrett.stack@gmail.com 18

APP50

13

[DATE: SUN 19 JUL 2015]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, HEREBY CERTIFY, that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been

furnished using electronic filing (email), this SUN 19 JUL 2015, to Stephan C.

Nikoloff, Attorney with Cianfrone, Nikoloff, Grant, Greenberg & Sinclair,

P.A.,1964 Bayshore Boulevard, Suite A, Dunedin, FL 34698

Steve@attorneyjoe.com, Attorneys for Landmark Oaks Condominium Association,

Inc., also has been furnished using email, this SUN 19 JUL 2015, to Michael J.

Posner, 4420 Beacon Circle, Suite 100, West Palm Beach, FL 33407,

(mjposner@warddamon.com), and using fax to A. Lee Bentley, III, Esquire, 400

North Tampa St., Tampa, FL 33602, 813-274-6074, by U.S. Mail to Loretta

Lynch, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, D.C.

20530,

By: /s/Peter G. Stack

Peter G. Stack

3017 Landmark Blvd. Unit 501

Palm Harbor, FL 34684

727-698-7383 (p.garrett.stack@gmail.com)

APP51

APP52

Exb. C

APP53

1

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA

Case No. 14-004835-CO

UCN No. 522014CC004835XXCOCO

Landmark Oaks Condominium Assoc., Inc.

Plaintiffs,

vs.

United States Secretary of Housing and Urban, et al

Defendants.

____________________________________________________/

DEFENDANT’S ADDITIONAL MATERIALS IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION

The “Writ of Possession” cannot be issued because it is based on

a fraudulent, void “Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure”

I A Default Judgment Against HUD Was Issued By This Court

10/10/2014, 1 Yr. 9 Months Ago.

A. The court has not set aside the default judgment.

B. Upon entry of clerk’s default, defaulting party may not

participate as a party or otherwise defend against plaintiff’s

claims against non-defaulting defendant.

Bacardi v. DiLindzon, 728 So. 2d 309 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1999)

C. There have been no timely motions for reconsideration of

default by defendant (HUD) pursuant to Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540(b) or

1.500(d).

APP54

2

D. The trial court may not grant relief where the motion is not

timely filed. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Gower, 390 So. 2d 117 (Fla. Dist

Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1980)

E. Entry of default precludes party from contesting existence of

plaintiff’s claims and liability thereafter party has right to

contest damages caused by party’s wrong but no other issue.

Rule 1.500 (b) The Florida Bar v. Porter, 684 So. 2d 810 (Fla.

1996) Thus they cannot enter into a “deed in lieu of

foreclosure.”

F. The default of one defendant does not operate as an admission

of those allegations as against a contesting co-defendant.

Myakka Co. v. Edwards, 68 Fla. 372, 68 Fla. 382, 67 So. 217

(1914)

G. Thus HUD, the defaulting party, does not have the legal right to

enter into a deed in lieu of foreclosure 1 yr. and 9 months after

a default judgment against them. They have no rights to

participate further in this instant case with the co-defendants,

who have multiple post-judgment motions still to be heard by the

court.

II. Chain of Title Found In Official Records.

A. The court cannot rely on the chain of title found in the official

records because it is only valid with the parties not having

actual knowledge of adverse unrecorded right.

Buck v. Mcnab, 139 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 2d DCA)

APP55

3

B. The chain in this instant case is not confirmed and was known by

both HUD and Landmark Oaks, at the time of entering into the

deed in lieu of foreclosure, but they went ahead anyway because

they knew the court would rely on the official record only.

1) Both knew of case #11-006246 which is open and

awaiting the court’s adjudication of defendant’s

counterclaims and 1.540 motion challenging HUD’s

title obtained by a non-judicial foreclosure on a

reverse mortgage.

2) Both know that a “deed in lieu of foreclosure”

could not be issued 1yr. 9mos. After a default

judgment but they went ahead anyway… committing

grand theft and abuse of the elderly.

C. The chain of title depends on the absence of actual knowledge

of adverse unrecorded right but both HUD and Landmark Oaks,

provided a false affidavit to the court that there was no adverse

or legal or equitable claims to the property when they entered

the “deed in lieu of foreclosure”.

D. Both HUD and Landmark Oaks, knew the court would only rely

on the chain of title on the official records which was their

intent despite their knowledge of an adverse unrecorded right.

E. The intent of both HUD and Landmark Oaks, was to hide the above

from the court and push thru the “Writ of Possession”.

III. Fraudulent Transfer or Conveyance…

APP56

4

A. Defendant Frances Mann becomes a judgment creditor if she

succeeds with her counterclaims in case #11-006246-CO and

HUD becomes a judgment debtor.

B. The “deed in lieu of foreclosure” is a fraudulent transfer /

conveyance.

C. Fla. Statute 726.105

1) The proof required to show that a transfer is fraudulent is

the preponderance of the evidence.

2) Proof of fraud, so as to prove fraudulent conveyance,

requires proof of intent.

3) A combination of badges [of fraud] will justify a finding of

fraud.

4) Existence of badges of fraud create a prima facie case and

raise a rebuttable presumption that an allegedly

fraudulent conveyance is void.

5) Fla. Statute 726.105 (2) determining actual intent.

Fla. Statute 726.105 (2)(d) Before the transfer was made

or obligation incurred, the debtor (HUD) had been sued or

threatened with suit. (HUD was a participant in case #11-006246

and of course knew defendant Frances Mann was challenging

HUD’s title in her counterclaims… HUD was aware.)

Fla. Statute 726.105 (2)(h) The value of the consideration

received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of

the asset transferred or amount of obligation incurred.

APP57

5

HUD (debtor) transferred a title to Landmark

Oaks for a debt listed in this court of less than

$15,000.00 on a property appraised by the

county for $100,000.00,

6) Additional factors under Fla. Statute 726.105 (2).

a) Both HUD and Landmark Oaks, with intent, ignoring a

default judgment went ahead with a “deed in lieu of

foreclosure” and conspired to have the court ignore

and/or not consider the “default judgment”.

b) Both HUD and Landmark Oaks, with intent, conspired

to ignore an ongoing case # 11-006246-CO

challenging the title to the property by Frances

Mann, in order to present a false chain of title to the

court and push thru a “Writ of Possession”.

7) The above (4) four “badges of fraud” confirm the “deed in

lieu of foreclosure” was a fraudulent conveyance.

IV The “Deed In Lieu Of Foreclosure” Is A Void Deed…

A. LANDMARK OAK’S deed was made with the intent to hinder

and defraud Frances Mann and prevent her from regaining

her property, which is currently being adjudicated in an

open case.

B. A deed is invalid by reason of fraud.

C. A void deed does not convey real estate. Crozier v. Ange, 85

Fla. 120, 95 So. 426 (1923)

APP58

6

D. A void deed of itself is not valid for any purpose.

Am Jur. 2d Deeds § 162

Furthermore, as brought up in multiple defendant’s pleadings,

this court lacks jurisdiction to issue any order or judgment second to

lack of jurisdiction which would render any of this court’s judgments

or orders void.

State ex. Rel. Coleman v. Williams, 147 Fla. 514, 3 So. 2d 152 (1941)

Outer v. Berman, 234 So. 2d 724 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1970)

WHEREFOR, Plaintiff’s Motion for Writ of Possession based on a

Fraudulent transfer and conveyance of title and thus a void deed

should be stricken.

DATE: MON 29 AUG 2016

By: /s/Peter G. Stack

Peter G. Stack

3017 Landmark Blvd. Unit 501

Palm Harbor, FL 34684

727-698-7383 (p.garrett.stack@gmail.com)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, HEREBY CERTIFY, that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been

furnished using electronic filing (efiing), this MON 29 AUG 2016, to Stephan C.

Nikoloff, Attorney with Cianfrone, Nikoloff, Grant, Greenberg & Sinclair,

P.A.,1964 Bayshore Boulevard, Suite A, Dunedin, FL 34698 Steve@attorneyjoe.com,

Attorneys for Landmark Oaks Condominium Association, Inc., also has been

furnished using efiling, this MON 29 AUG 2016, to Michael J. Posner, 4420 Beacon

Circle, Suite 100, West Palm Beach, FL 33407, (mjposner@warddamon.com), and

using fax to A. Lee Bentley, III, Esquire, 400 North Tampa St., Tampa, FL 33602, 813-

274-6074, by U.S. Mail to Loretta Lynch, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania

Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20530.

By: /s/Peter G. Stack

Peter G. Stack

3017 Landmark Blvd. Unit 501

Palm Harbor, FL 34684

727-698-7383 (p.garrett.stack@gmail.com)

APP59

Statutes & Constitution :View Statutes : Online Sunshine

http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0000-0099/0026/Sections/0026.012.html[12/12/2016 1:54:12 PM]

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The 2016 Florida Statutes

Title VJUDICIAL BRANCH

Chapter 26 CIRCUIT COURTS

View Entire Chapter

26.012  Jurisdiction of circuit court.—(1) Circuit courts shall have jurisdiction of appeals from county courts except appeals of county

court orders or judgments declaring invalid a state statute or a provision of the State Constitution andexcept orders or judgments of a county court which are certified by the county court to the districtcourt of appeal to be of great public importance and which are accepted by the district court ofappeal for review. Circuit courts shall have jurisdiction of appeals from final administrative orders oflocal government code enforcement boards.

(2) They shall have exclusive original jurisdiction:(a) In all actions at law not cognizable by the county courts;(b) Of proceedings relating to the settlement of the estates of decedents and minors, the granting

of letters testamentary, guardianship, involuntary hospitalization, the determination ofincompetency, and other jurisdiction usually pertaining to courts of probate;

(c) In all cases in equity including all cases relating to juveniles except traffic offenses asprovided in chapters 316 and 985;

(d) Of all felonies and of all misdemeanors arising out of the same circumstances as a felonywhich is also charged;

(e) In all cases involving legality of any tax assessment or toll or denial of refund, except asprovided in s. 72.011;

(f) In actions of ejectment; and(g) In all actions involving the title and boundaries of real property.(3) The circuit court may issue injunctions.(4) The chief judge of a circuit may authorize a county court judge to order emergency

hospitalizations pursuant to part I of chapter 394 in the absence from the county of the circuit judge;and the county court judge shall have the power to issue all temporary orders and temporaryinjunctions necessary or proper to the complete exercise of such jurisdiction.

(5) A circuit court is a trial court.History.—s. 3, ch. 72-404; s. 1, ch. 74-209; s. 1, ch. 77-119; s. 1, ch. 80-399; s. 1, ch. 81-178; s. 22, ch. 81-259; s. 12,

ch. 82-37; s. 2, ch. 84-303; s. 5, ch. 91-112; s. 27, ch. 94-353; s. 52, ch. 95-280; s. 3, ch. 98-280; s. 1, ch. 2004-11.

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APP60

GAGNON v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 730 So.2d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) | Casetext

https://casetext.com/case/gagnon-v-board-of-trustees[12/12/2016 1:56:27 PM]

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District. ·730 So.2d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

GAGNON V. BOARD OFTRUSTEES

PATTERSON, Judge.

Donald Gagnon appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his

action to quiet title for having failed to exhaus his

adminisrative remedies. We reverse.

This case involves chapter 8537, Laws of Florida (1921),

commonly referred to as the "Butler Act," later codifed as

section 271.01, Florida Statutes (repealed by implication

1951, expressly repealed 1957). The Butler Act granted title

to sub merged lands to riparian owners when those

submerged lands had been bulk headed, flled in, or

permanently improved. The grant of title can run from the *815

high water mark to the neares channel.

For a detailed explanation of the Butler Act, see City ofWes Palm Beach v. Board of Trusees of the InternalImprovement Trus Fund , 714 So.2d 1060 (Fla. 4thDCA 1998), review granted , No. 93,821 (Fla. Mar. 5,1999).

Gagnon, an owner of riparian lands in Manatee County, sued

the Board of Trusees of the Internal Improvement Fund (the

Trusees) to confrm title in himself to certain adjacent

submerged lands. The Trusees moved to dismiss the

1

1

SIGN IN

APP61

GAGNON v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 730 So.2d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) | Casetext

https://casetext.com/case/gagnon-v-board-of-trustees[12/12/2016 1:56:27 PM]

complaint, asserting that Gagnon had failed to exhaus

adminisrative remedies available to him under Florida

Adminisrative Code Rule 18-21.019. That rule provides for

the Trusees to issue disclaimers of sate ownership to

submerged lands to all persons who can esablish title to such

lands pursuant to the Butler Act. The trial court granted the

motion to dismiss. Although there are a subsantial number of

appellate decisions concerning the Trusees and the Butler

Act, this appears to be the frs time this issue has surfaced.

In Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Department of Natural

Resources, 466 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1s DCA 1985), Jacksonville

Shipyards' Butler Act claim reached the Firs Disrict through

the adminisrative process; Jacksonville Shipyards appealed

the Department's fnal order which denied its application to

the Trusees for the issuance of a disclaimer to submerged

lands.State Board of Trusees of the Internal Improvement

Trus Fund v. Key Wes Conch Harbor, Inc. , 683 So.2d 144

(Fla. 3d DCA 1996), review denied , 695 So.2d 698 (Fla.

1997), and City of Wes Palm Beach v. Board of Trusees of

the Internal Improvement Trus Fund , 714 So.2d 1060 (Fla.

4th DCA 1998), review granted , No. 93,821 (Fla. Mar. 5,

1999), were both quiet title actions insituted in the circuit

court. Although both cases discuss Jacksonville Shipyards ,

neither makes any reference to adminisrative remedies.

We conclude that a quiet title action in the circuit court and an

adminisrative application under rule 18-21.019 are

alternative remedies available to the land owner. This is true

because section 26.012(2)(g), Florida Statutes (1997),

provides that circuit courts "shall have exclusive original

jurisdiction:

. . . (g) In all actions involving the title and boundaries of real

APP62

GAGNON v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 730 So.2d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) | Casetext

https://casetext.com/case/gagnon-v-board-of-trustees[12/12/2016 1:56:27 PM]

property." Our conclusion is underscored by the confict

exising between Key Wes Conch Harbor and City of Wes

Palm Beach as to the extent of the grant of title under the Butler

Act. The Fourth Disrict in City of Wes Palm Beach has held

that only the "footprint" of certain docks and piers are subject

to the Butler Act grant. The Third Disrict in Key Wes Conch

Harbor has determined that the grant extends not only to the

"footprint" of such sructures, but also to the dredged

submerged lands between the sructures. Until this confict is

resolved by our supreme court, the Trusees have no controlling

precedent as to the extent of its disclaimers. This issue has not

been addressed in this disrict and only the circuit court in a

quiet title action has the authority to make that determination as

it applies to Gagnon.

Therefore, we reverse the trial court's order of dismissal and

direct that Gagnon's complaint be reinsated.

CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and GREEN, J., Concur.

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APP63

Certificate of Service

I, HEREBY CERTIFY, that a true and correct copy of the foregoing

has been furnished using electronic filing (e-filing / email), this TUE

13 DEC 2016, to Stephan C. Nikoloff, Attorney with Cianfrone,

Nikoloff, Grant, Greenberg & Sinclair, P.A.,1964 Bayshore

Boulevard, Suite A, Dunedin, FL 34698 Steve@attorneyjoe.com,

Attorneys for Landmark Oaks Condominium Association, Inc.,

By: /s/Peter G. Stack

Peter G. Stack

3017 Landmark Blvd. Unit 501

Palm Harbor, FL 34684

727-698-7383 (p.garrett.stack@gmail.com)

APP64