ISSN 2502-0722Issue 35/ Mei 2018

Reflecting on Counter-terrorism Approach in

Indonesia after Surabaya Bombings

Lessons To Be Learned From Indonesia’s

Military Involvement in Counter-terrorism Efforts

Assessing the Threats of Returnees and Deportees in

Southeast Asia: A Case Study of Malaysia and Indonesia

+INFOGRAPHICRecent Developments in

Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in Indonesia

in memory of the victims of the May 13th bomb attack in

Surabaya, Indonesia

Project Supervisors Rahimah AbdulrahimExecutive Director,The Habibie Center

Hadi KuntjaraDeputy Director for Operations,The Habibie Center

Editor in ChiefA. Ibrahim Almuttaqi

Thinking ASEAN Team Askabea FadhillaFina AstrianaMuhamad ArifHana HanifahLany SekarVierna Tasya WensatamaWirya Adiwena

A Note From the Editor

Articles

Reflecting on Counter-terrorism Approach in Indonesia after Surabaya Bombings

Lessons To Be Learned From Indonesia’s Military Involvement in Counter-terrorism Efforts

Assessing the Threats of Returnees and Deportees in Southeast Asia: A Case Study of Malaysia and Indonesia

Infographic

Recent Developments in Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in Indonesia

ASEAN Round-Up

Malaysia’s Mahathir sworn in as world’s oldest leader

FULL TEXT: Chairman’s statement of the 32nd ASEAN Summit

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A note from the editor

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Thinking ASEAN is a monthly publication that aims to provide insightful, cogent and engaging perspectives on issues central to contemporary Southeast Asia and the ASEAN member states. It is a product of The Habibie Center, with the generous support of the Republic of Korea’s Mission to ASEAN.

The content of Thinking ASEAN does not reflect the official opinion of The Habibie Center or institutions related to the publication. The Habibie Center was founded by Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental and non-profit organization to promote the democratization and modernization of the country.

Responsibility for the information and views expressed in Thinking ASEAN lies entirely with the author(s). For comments, suggestions and prospective contributions, the Managing Editor of Thinking ASEAN can be reached at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id.

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The Habibie Center was founded by Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and family in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental, non-profit organisation. The vision of The Habibie Center is to create a structurally democratic society founded on the morality and integrity of cultural and religious values.

The missions of The Habibie Center are first, to establish a structurally and culturally democratic society that recognizes, respects, and promotes human rights by undertaking study and advocacy of issues related to democratization and human rights, and second, to increase the effectiveness of the management of human resources and the spread of technology.

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FIND OUR UPCOMINGAGENDA ON@habibiecenter

Dear readers:

Welcome to the May 2018 issue of the monthly Thinking ASEAN!

The world witnessed history when the first inter-Korean summit since 2007 took place at the Demilitarized Zone. The meeting between Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-un was highly successful, and while the journey towards lasting peace is still long, the summit was an important step in the right direction. ASEAN for its part welcomed the meeting, reiterating its ‘support for international efforts to bring about the complete, verfiable, and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula’.

Another historic moment the region witnessed was the return of Mahathir Mohamad as Malaysian Prime Minister. The 92-year old politician inflicted the then-ruling Barisan Nasional’s first ever electoral defeat in six decades, and has quickly gone to work, freeing jailed opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim and launching corruption probes against the ousted Najib Razak. In a region where democracy and human rights seems to be going backwards, recent developments in Malaysia serve as a reminder to those in authority not to abuse their power. There were, unfortunately, dark moments in Southeast Asia. Indonesia, ASEAN’s largest member-state, saw a spate of terrorist attacks against churches in Surabaya. Follow-up attacks saw police stations come under attack there and in Riau, while a few days earlier a Depok prison holding terrorist inmates saw a riot which left five police officers killed. Clearly terrorism still poses a significant threat in Southeast Asia, and in this sense our May 2018 issue of the monthly Thinking ASEAN looks deeper at efforts to eradicate this evil.

Beginning with Mohammad Hasan Ansori (Senior Analyst of Counter-terrorism and Capacity Building Program, The Habibie Center and Lecturer of Department of Sociology, State Islamic University of Syarif Hidayatuallah, Jakarta) who writes on ‘Reflecting on Counter-terrorism Approach in Indonesia after Surabaya Bombings.’

This is followed by Ali Abdullah Wibisono (Universitas Indonesia) who covers ‘Lessons to be Learned from Indonesia’s Counter-terrorism Efforts’, which in particular addresses whether the m i l i t a r y should be involved and traces why historically the police have led recent efforts in Indonesia. Lastly, Chaula Rininta Anindya (Research Analyst, Indonesian Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore) writes on ‘Assessing the Threats of Returnees and Deportees in Southeast Asia: A Case Study of Malaysia and Indonesia’

As usual, we present an infographic that this month continues this issue’s theme by looking at recent developments in terrorism in Indonesia.

Don’t hesitate to drop me aline at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id if you have comments, input, or prospective submissions.

Happy reading!

Best regards from Jakarta

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Reflecting on Counter-terrorism Approach in

Indonesia after Surabaya Bombings

Internet BusinessSource: Pexels/CCO License

Mohammad Hasan Ansori, Ph.D., Senior Analyst of Counter-terrorism and Capacity Building Program, The Habibie Center, and Lecturer of Department of Sociology, State Islamic University of Syarif Hidayatuallah, Jakarta

Putting Surabaya Bombings into a Broader Landscape of Terrorist Attack in Indonesia

A series of suicide bombs attacked Surabaya, the second biggest city in Indonesia after Jakarta. Precisely on a Sunday morning (12/05/2018) at a time when the Christian population in Surabaya were just starting to conduct their worship services around 07.00 A.M., a group of terrorists launched suicide bombings against three churches, namely: the Catholic Church of Santa Maria Tak Bercela at Ngagel Madya Street; the Central Church of Pantekosta at Arjuno Street; and the Christian Church of Indonesia at Diponegoro Street. During the evening of the same day, at around 21.20, another incident of a bomb attack appeared in the Wonocolo area. The series of bomb attacks were finally closed by the suicide bombing in front of the Surabaya Metropolitan Police (Polrestabes) headquarters the following day.1 Three days after the Surabaya attack, on Wednesday (16/05/2018), another group of terrorists also attacked Riau police station, with Indonesian police responding by shooting dead four men after they used samurai

swords to attack police officers. 2

Almost all the suicide bomb attackers reside and grew up in Surabaya, Dita Oepriarto, Puji Kuswati (the wife of Dita Oepriarto), and their four children. Dita Oepriarto is mostly known as the Surabaya head of Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD). The deadly Surabaya suicide bomb attacks have caused a horrible impact. Within only 25 hours, at least 21 people were killed, consisting 9 bomb attackers and 12 civilians, a number of civilians were injured and several buildings were badly damaged. Meanwhile, the bomb attack in front of Polrestabes headquarters of Surabaya killed four actors of the attack. 3

The city of Surabaya, widely known as the City of Heroes (Kota Pahlawan), is the second biggest city in Indonesia with a projected population number of 2,885,555 in 2018. The religious composition of the city indicates that the Muslim population relatively dominates the city with 2,432,502 people in 2014, covering almost 90% of the city’s population. In addition, the Index of Human Development of the City reaches 81.07% and grew by around 0.86% in 2017. That is to say, the Index of Human Development of the City has been claimed as the highest among other cities and districts in East Java Province, or together with the cities of Madiun and Malang.4 It is important to be aware about the demography of the city particularly when examining the absent linkage between terrorism and poverty. Surabaya is one of the fastest developing and prosperous cities in Indonesia. It is also particularly strengthened by the fact that the actors of the suicide bomb attacks not only lived in Surabaya, but also came from a middle-class and well-educated family.5 That is, it is important to underline here that “people living in poverty are less likely to turn to terrorism”. Together with poverty, religion and psychological deviance are mainly seen as prevalent myths of terrorism.6

Based on the type of the target attack and strategy of attack, the actors of the suicide bombs in Surabaya are mostly assumed or analyzed to be part of the Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) network and were involved in the broader cell of JAD in East Java Province that has close affiliation with ISIS. As previously said, Dita Oepriarto served as the Surabaya head of JAD.7 In the broader context of Indonesia, JAD can be generally considered as the most active and aggressive terrorist group recently in Indonesia (Graphic 1).

Graphic 1: Trend of Terrorist Attack in Indonesia Based on Terrorist Group or Perpetrator (1970-2016)8

The data as seen in Graphic 1 specifically indicates that the trend of terrorist attacks in Indonesia has been predominantly associated with JAD since 2010 and reached its peak in 2014. In addition to JAD, two other relevant terrorist groups mainly relates to Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) and Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT). However, it is important to keep in mind that the broader landscape of terrorist attack in Indonesia is predominantly started by Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) that appeared since 2000s.

Moreover, East Java Province, where Surabaya serves as its capital, is one the Indonesian provinces that are prone to terrorism (see Graphic 2).

Graphic 2: Incident and Trend of Terrorist Attack across Indonesian Provinces (2001-2015)9

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The data explicitly emphasizes that none of the Indonesia provinces are free from terrorist attacks and threats. The terrorist attacks mostly take different forms and degrees across the provinces. Central Sulawesi, East Java, Central Java, Maluku, West Nusa Tenggara, North Sumatra and Greater Jakarta are the Indonesian areas that predominantly experienced terrorist attacks and suffered from the impacts of terrorism from 2001 to 2015.

More specifically, about 13 incidents of terrorism appeared in East Java Province from 2001 to 2015, causing 7 deaths and 3 injures.10 That is, it is reasonable to say that the suicide bomb attacks in Surabaya can be deemed as the most deadly and horrible one seen in East Java Province on the basis of its impacts, including the deaths, injuries and damaged buildings. In a response to the forthcoming 2018 simultaneous local elections, for instance, the head of Badan Nasional Pemberantasan Terorisme (BNPT/National Agency for Combating Terrorism), Suhardi Alius, states that there are about 14 Indonesian provinces that are prone to terrorist attacks and threats, namely: Central Sulawesi, West Nusa Tenggara,

Jakarta, East Java, Central Java, North Sumatera, Kalimantan, Aceh, Palembang, Lampung, and the others.11

The nature of terrorist attack Indonesia can be also examined from the trend and dynamic of its impacts (see Graphic 3).

Graphic 3: Incident and Impact of Terrorist Attack in Indonesia (2001-2015)12

The data particularly indicates that terrorist attacks in Indonesia tend to be constantly increasing since the events of September 11 in New York, the United States. The trend reached its peak in 2012 and started to sharply decrease in 2015.13 That is, it is fairly safe to argue that almost none of the years in Indonesia have passed without incident of terrorist attack and threat. In addition, the number of deaths and injuries are the most dominant impacts caused by the incidents. The data also mainly suggests that the incidents of terrorism in 2012 and 2013 are considered as the most deadly ones.

Terrorism generally takes diverse forms in Indonesia, including foreign fighters, home-grown terrorism and the latest trend of lone-wolf terrorism. The JAD network that is affiliated with ISIS is more properly categorized as a home-grown terrorism. Dita Oepriarto and his family members, the actors of the Surabaya bombs, are

among the 500 Indonesian fighters who returend from Syria. Furthermore, the motive of the Surabaya bomb attack is identified to be related with the defeat of ISIS in Syria. The terrorist groups affiliated with ISIS, wherever they are, are commanded to conduct Amaliyah Jihadiyah, taking the form of suicide bomb attacks.15

Indonesia is mostly deemed as one of the Southeast Asia countries that experiences ceaseless terrorist attacks and threat and awfully suffers from its impacts. For instance, only in 2015, the Government of Indonesia legally processed around 1,143 terrorist attack suspects. It is estimated that 501 of 1,143 terrorist attack suspects were released and 328 others are still in prison. In addition, data from the Indonesia Police indicates that there are about 200 Indonesia citizens that joined ISIS and reside in Syria. The Coordinating Minister of Politics, Law and Security, Wiranto, stated that around 53 Indonesia citizens that joined ISIS in Syria had returned to Indonesia in October 2016.16

Surabaya Bombing Attacks and the Assessment of Counter-terrorism Approach in Indonesia

The series of suicide bomb attacks in Surabaya and Sidoarjo have been widely perceived as the worst cases of terrorist attacks in the history of Indonesia, particularly by looking at its relatively horrible impacts. In addition, the type of the bomb used has been identified as pipe bombs with the explosive material of Triaseton Triperoksida (TATP) that is frequently used by ISIS in Iraq and Syria and often dubbed as “Mother of Satan”.17 The bomb attacks are also identified as having links with the recent riot between terrorist prisoners and prison officers at the Mako Brimob prison in Depok.18 Public criticism is extensively directed towards the Government of Indonesia, particularly the Indonesian Police and the State Intelligence Agency, for the failed early detection of the suicide bombers. However, the Indonesian Police defensively refutes all criticisms by highlighting the long delay in passing a new anti-terrorism law. The question becomes whether the suicide bomb attacks should be evaluated as the victory of the terrorist group or the unreliable broader approaches adopted by the Government of Indonesia in fighting terrorism.

There is no denying the fact fighting terrorism generally is not an easy and simple effort. It unquestionably relies on strategic, comprehensive and sustainable approaches and programs. Many more developed countries with more sophisticated technologies and professional apparatuses, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, still often suffers from terrorist attacks. Fighting terrorism in Indonesia tends to become complicated and complex on account of some crucial factors, such as the geography of Indonesia, the network of terrorist group that gets more and more dynamic and keeps changing, the institutional professionalism and the deficit of a comprehensive anti-terrorism law. Moreover, a wide variety of fighting terrorism initiatives, either implemented by the Government of Indonesia or civil society groups, have received sharp criticisms. The programs and initiatives are broadly seen as

being partial ad-hoc,responsively and reactively characterized, and having no serious evaluation system (see Graphic 4).19

Graphic 4: Diverse Challenges of Fighting Terrorism in Indonesia

Furthermore, the assessment of the performance of the Government of Indonesia in combating terrorism should be conducted by considering three inter-related dimensions, as significantly suggested by diverse studies and researches on terrorism. They are preventive strategy, counter-terrorism and rehabilitation and social reintegration strategy. A number of studies and literatures on terrorism generally suggest that fighting terrorism should compressively involve three dimensions: preemptive/preventive, repressive and rehabilitative/integrative.

The preemptive approach or early detention strategy mainly refers to the initiative of eradicating or preventing the intention of people planning to conduct terrorist attacks. The preventive approach generally relates to eradication of people’s opportunities for conducting terrorist attacks. Furthermore, repressive approach specifies for direct counter-terrorism efforts that mostly takes of the form of securitization and legal process of terrorist suspects.20 Finally, rehabilitative and integrative approach is associated with process of religious rehabilitation, generally also called “de-radicalization” and socio-psychological one as well as the process of social integration. In essence, the process of social rehabilitation that is an integrated part of rehabilitation is mainly intended to make ex-terrorists socio-economically independent and openly received and welcome by their communities.

Based on the analytical framework of assessment, it is fairly reasonable to argue that counter-terrorism dimension taking the form of strong securitization tends to be more dominantly practiced in fighting terrorism in Indonesia than the other two

important dimensions or approaches. For instance, it is estimated that 60 ex-terrorist prisoners returned to their networks and repeated their violence acts through as suicide bomb attacks. Moreover, it is also indicated that another 25 ex-criminals that were non-terrorist and were released would later go on to be involved in terrorism-related activities.21 It seems that these 25 ex-criminals of non-terrorism crimes were radicalized during their stay in prisons by fellow terrorist prisoners. Moreover, it is almost certain that the success of a series of suicide bomb attacks in Surabaya and Sidoarjo indicates the weakness and inefficiency of the terrorism early prevention dimension. This condition is implicitly confirmed by the Indonesia Police that strongly further demands the accelerated finalization and issuance of the anti-terrorism law. The new anti-terrorism law will significantly cover a larger portion of prevention dimension of terrorism.

In addition to this sort of analytical framework, a number of academic literatures also suggest that fighting terrorism can be also examined by referring to distinguished approaches, soft power

and hard power (see Graphic 5). 22

Graphic 5: Hard and Soft Approaches of Fighting Terrorism

In essence, this analytical framework actually provides us with another way of examining initiatives of fighting terrorism in Indonesia. It is fairly founded to argue that the hard approach has seemed to be much more dominantly applied and relied by the Government of Indonesia in fighting terrorism in Indonesia than the soft one. That is, these hard and soft approaches should be equally applied for comprehensively combating terrorism in Indonesia. The critical question becomes to what extent the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (Badan Nasional Pemberantasan Terorisme/BNPT) properly plays its appropriated roles since, while Densus 88 is responsible for the hard approach, the Agency is broadly assigned to mainly deal with the soft one.

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Conclusion

The Surabaya suicide bomb attacks that were followed by the similar and inter-connected one in Sidoarjo have stunned the majority of the Indonesian people and received great attention from the world. The series of bomb attacks, considering its impacts, should be considered as one of the worst cases of terror attacks in the history of Indonesia. The Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) network that is word-widely known as having an affiliation with ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) has been widely deemed as being responsible for the terror attacks. The actors of the suicide bombs are deportant/returnee from Syria alongside their spouse and children. The involvement of children, and not only woman, in suicide bombing related activities should be viewed as a new phenomenon in the history of Indonesia.

Policy wise, the Surabaya suicide bomb attacks mainly indicates that the Indonesian way of dealing with terror attack is more likely to rely on repressive approach taking the form of massive securitization. It seems that the Government is practicing an unbalanced approach to fighting terrorism in the country. The soft approach that is conceptually expressed through preventive, rehabilitative and integrative approaches is more underdeveloped in the country, as well as only partially implemented through poor ad-hoc planning. Ideally, rehabilitation of terrorist prisoners should cover not only religious dimension, but also other dimensions of family, education, recreation, art, social-psychology, etc. A comprehensive, holistic and balanced approach, professional state apparatuses, and coordinated institutional instruments are needed by the Government to effectively end terrorism in the country.

Bibliography

• Ansori, M.H. et.al. (2018). Monograf: revisi atas undang-undang no. 15 tahun 2003 tentang penetapan peraturan pemerintah pengganti undang-undang no. 1 tahun 2002 tentang pemberantasan tindak pidana terorisme menjadi undang-undang, The Habibie Center.

• Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Bureau of Statistics) Surabaya, Indeks Pembangunan Manusia (Index of Human Development) . Retrieved from https://surabayakota.bps.go.id/pressrelease/2018/04/25/102/indeks-pembangunan-manusia--ipm--kota-surabaya-tahun-2017-.html, on May 18, 2018.

• BBC.com (2018). Dari Mako Brimob sampai Polestabes Surabaya: satu minggu penuh terror, May 14, 2018. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/trensosial-44110808, on May 18, 2018.

• Center for Terrorism and Social Conflict Studies, Universitas Indonesia. Ancaman ISIS di Indonesia, 2018.

• Detik.com (2018). Terungkap, ini motif serangan bom Surabaya-Sidoarjo, May 14, 2018. Retrieved from https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4019604/terungkap-ini-motif-serangan-bom-surabaya-sidoarjo, on May 18, 2018.

• Eddine, M.N. et al. (2010). Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): Literature Review. Austrlian Government, Department of Defense.

• Global Terrorism Database. Derived from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/, on May 18, 2018.

• Gunaratna, R. (2015), countering violent extremism: revisiting rehabilitation and community engagement. Dalam Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, RSIS (Rajaratnam School of International Studies), vol. 7, issue 2, April 2005, p. 4.

• Ika, A. (2018). Kapolri: waspadai sejumlah kelompok terkait ISIS di Indonesia, at kompas.com, May 14, 2018. Retrieved from https://regional.kompas.com/read/2018/05/14/08104371/kapolri-pelaku-utama-bom-di-surabaya-baru-pulang-dari-suriah, on May 18, 2018.

• Jackson, R. et al. (2012). The Causes of terrorism: deconstructing the myths. In Arches Quarterly, Vol. 5, edition 9, pp. 68-72.

• Karmini, N/ (2018). Family that carried out suicide bombings on Indonesia churches was upper middle class, neighbors say, at time.com, May 14, 2018. Retrieved from http://time.com/5276455/indonesia-church-bombings-family/, on May 18, 2018.

• Muzani, T.H. (2018). Adakah hubungan antara kejadian Mako Brimob dengan ledakan Surabaya? At brilio.net, May 14, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.brilio.net/creator/ternyata-ada-hubungan-ledakan-bom-surabaya-dengan-mako-brimob--051327.html, on May 18, 2018.

• Liputan6.com (2018). Kepala BNPT sebut 14 Provinsi rawan terorisme. Retrieved from https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/rawan-terorisme-14-provinsi-di-bawah-penjagaan-/2566109.html, on May 18, 2018.

• Mackie, T. (2018). terror as bombs explode at three Indonesian churches causing multiple fatalities. At express.co.uk, May 13, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/958906/indonesia-church-terror-bomb-explosion-dead-surabaya-city-east-java, on May 18, 2018.

• Nangoy, F. (2018). Indonesia police shoot dead four men after attack on Riau HQ, at reuters.com, May 16, 2018. Retrieved from https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN1IH092, on May 18, 2018.

• National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS). Retrieved from http://snpk.kemenkopmk.go.id/Account/ResendPassword/?lang=en, on May 18, 2018.

• Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2014). Preventing terrorism and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism: a community-policing approach. Vienna: Stanzell Druck Press.

• Riyanta, S. (2017). Prediksi dan analisis ancaman terorisme tahun 2017 di Indonesia. Retrieved from https://news.detik.com/kolom/d-3387780/prediksi-dan-anal is is-ancaman-terorisme-tahun-2017-di-indonesia?single=1, on May 18, 2018.

• Schamitt, M.N. (2002). Counter-terrorism and the use of force in international law. At The Marshal Center Papers, no. 5

• Spalek, B. & Laura Z. McDonald (2012). Counter-terrorism: police and community engagement in Britain and the US. Dalam Arches Quarterly, Vol. 5, edition 9, h. 20-27.

• Spalek, B. & Lambert, R. (2008). ‘Muslim Communities, CounterTerrorism and CounterRadicalisation: A Critically Reflective Approach to Engagement. Dalam International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, vol. 36, 257-70, doi:10.1016/j.ijlcj.2008.08.004.

• Tempo.co, (2018). Bomb explodes at Surabaya Polrestabes headquarters, May 14, 2018. Retrieved from https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2018/05/14/055918408/Bomb-Explodes-at-Surabaya-Polrestabes-Headquarters, on May 18, 2018.

End Note

1. Derived from diverse sources or mass media, including theguardian.com, Indonesia church bombings: police one family and their children behind attacks, May 13, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/13/deaths-bomb-attacks-churches-indonesia-surabaya, on 18 May, 2018; Thomas Mackie, terror as bombs explode at three Indonesian churches causing multiple fatalities. At express.co.uk, May 13, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/958906/indonesia-church-terror-bomb-explosion-dead-surabaya-city-east-java, on May 18, 2018.

2. Farnsiska Nangoy, Indonesia police shoot dead four men after attack on Riau HQ, at reuters.com, May 16, 2018. Retrieved from https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN1IH092, on May 18, 2018.

3. Tempo.co, Bomb explodes at Surabaya Polrestabes headquarters, May 14, 2018. Retrieved from https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2018/05/14/055918408/Bomb-Explodes-at-Surabaya-Polrestabes-Headquarters, on May 18, 2018.

4. Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Bureau of Statistics) Surabaya, Indeks Pembangunan Manusia (Index of Human Development) . Retrieved from https://surabayakota.bps.go.id/pressrelease/2018/04/25/102/indeks-pembangunan-manusia--ipm--kota-surabaya-tahun-2017-.html, on May 18, 2018.

5. Niniek Karmini, Family that carried out suicide bombings on Indonesia churches was upper middle class, neighbors say, at time.com, May 14, 2018. Retrieved from http://time.com/5276455/indonesia-church-bombings-family/, on May 18, 2018.

6. See Richard Jackson, Lee Jarvis, Jereon Gunning & Marie B. Smyth (2012). The Causes of terrorism: deconstructing the myths. In Arches Quarterly, Vol. 5, edition 9, pp. 68-72.

7. Derived from diverse sources or mass media, including Karina M. Tehusijarana and Moses Ompusunggu , what is JAD? Terror group behind Mako Brimob riot, Surabaya bombings, at thejakartapost.com, May 18, 2018. Retrieved from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/05/14/what-is-jad-terror-group-behind-mako-brimob-riot-surabaya-bombings.html, on May 18, 2018.

8. Global Terrorism Database. Derived from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/, on May 18, 2018.

9. National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS). Retrieved from http://snpk.kemenkopmk.go.id/Account/ResendPassword/?lang=en, on May 18, 2018.

10. The data mainly indicates the absence of Bali Province that was severely attacked by terror bombs, mostly known as Bali Bombs 1 and 2. The reason behind the absence of Bali province is that the province was just included in the database only since 2012.

11. Liputan6.com (2018). Kepala BNPT sebut 14 Provinsi rawan terorisme. Retrieved from https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/rawan-terorisme-14-provinsi-di-bawah-penjagaan-/2566109.html, on May 18, 2018.

12. National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS). Retrieved from http://snpk.kemenkopmk.go.id/Account/ResendPassword/?lang=en, on May 18, 2018.

13. It is important to note that latest update of the data is only until March 2015.

14. Aprillia Ika, Kapolri: waspadai sejumlah kelompok terkait ISIS di Indonesia, at kompas.com, May 14, 2018. Retrieved from https://regional.kompas.com/read/2018/05/14/08104371/kapolri-pelaku-utama-bom-di-surabaya-baru-pulang-dari-suriah, on May 18, 2018.

15. Detik.com, terungkap, ini motif serangan bom Surabaya-Sidoarjo, May 14, 2018. Retrieved from https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4019604/terungkap-ini-motif-serangan-bom-surabaya-sidoarjo, on May 18, 2018.

16. Stanislaus Riyanta (2017). Prediksi dan analisis ancaman terorisme tahun 2017 di Indonesia. Retrieved from https://news.detik.com/kolom/d-3387780/prediksi-dan-analisis-ancaman-terorisme-tahun-2017-di-indonesia?single=1, on May 18, 2018.

17. BBC.com, Dari Mako Brimob sampai Polestabes Surabaya: satu minggu penuh terror, May 14, 2018. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/trensosial-44110808, on May 18, 2018.

18. Derived from diverse sources, including Teuku Harist Muzani, adakah hubungan antara kejadian Mako Brimob dengan ledakan Surabaya? At brilio.net, May 14, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.brilio.net/creator/ternyata-ada-hubungan-ledakan-bom-surabaya-dengan-mako-brimob--051327.html, on May 18, 2018; tribunnews.com, hubungan antara kerusuhan Mako Brimob dan terror bom Surabaya, video ini pemicunya?, may 15, 2018. Retrieved from http://manado.tribunnews.com/2018/05/15/hubungan-antara-kerusuhan-mako-brimob-dan-teror-bom-surabaya-video-ini-pemicunya, on May 18, 2018.

19. See Rohan Gunaratna (2015), countering violent extremism: revisiting rehabilitation and community engagement. Dalam Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, RSIS (Rajaratnam School of International Studies), vol. 7, issue 2, April 2005, p. 4.

20. Focus Group Discussion (FGD) at The Habibie Center, Jakarta, 23 Mei 2017. See also Mohammad Hasan Ansori, et.al. (2018). Monograf: revisi atas undang-undang no. 15 tahun 2003 tentang penetapan peraturan pemerintah pengganti undang-undang no. 1 tahun 2002 tentang pemberantasan tindak pidana terorisme menjadi undang-undang, The Habibie Center.

21. Center for Terrorism and Social Conflict Studies, Universitas Indonesia. Ancaman ISIS di Indonesia, 2018.

22. See Minerva Nasser-Eddine, et al. (2010). Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): Literature Review. Austrlian Government, Department of Defense; Basia Spalek & Laura Z. McDonald (2012). Counter-terrorism: police and community engagement in Britain and the US. At Arches Quaterly, Vol. 5, edition 9, h. 20-27; See also Rohan Gunaratna (2015), countering violent extremism: revisiting rehabilitation and community engagement. At Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, RSIS (Rajaratnam School of International Studies), vol. 7, issue 2, April 2005, p. 4; Michael N Schamitt (2002). Counter-terrorism and the use of force in international law. At The Marshal Center Papers, no. 5; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2014). Preventing terrorism and countering violent extremism and radicalization that leads to terrorism: a community-policing approach. Vienna: Stanzell Druck Press; Stephen White & Kieran McEvoy (2012). Countering Violent Extremism: community engagement programs in Europe. At Qatar International Academy for Security Studies, Phase 2, Vol. 1, February

• Tehusijarana, K.M. & Ompusunggu, M. (2018). What is JAD? Terror group behind Mako Brimob riot, Surabaya bombings, at thejakartapost.com, May 18, 2018. Retrieved from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/05/14/what-is-jad-terror-group-behind-mako-brimob-riot-surabaya-bombings.html, on May 18, 2018.

• Theguardian.com, (2018). Indonesia church bombings: police one family and their children behind attacks, May 13, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/13/deaths-bomb-attacks-churches-indonesia-surabaya, on 18 May, 2018 .

• Tribunnews.com (2018). Hubungan antara kerusuhan Mako Brimob dan terror bom Surabaya, video ini pemicunya?, may 15, 2018. Retrieved from http://manado.tribunnews.com/2018/05/15/hubungan-antara-kerusuhan-mako-brimob-dan-teror-bom-surabaya-video-ini-pemicunya, on May 18, 2018.

• White, S. & Kieran McEvoy (2012). Countering Violent Extremism: community engagement programs in Europe. Dalam Qatar International Academy for Security Studies, Phase 2, Vol. 1, February.\

8Issue 34/ April 2018

Introduction

The involvement of the military in Indonesia’s counter-terrorism efforts is one of the controversial issues in the ongoing deliberation regarding the revision of the country’s Anti-Terrorism Law (Law 15/2003 on the Legislation of By-Law 1/2002 on the Eradication of Terrorism Crime as National Law) since early 2016. At the moment, Parliament has decided to govern the involvement of the military in a separate regulation from the Anti-Terrorism Law.

The involvement of the military in Indonesia’s policy response against terrorism has taken place since the republic’s independence. However, Indonesia’s experiences in the involvement of the military in counter-terrorism have created an indelible mark in the nation’s collective memory of human rights abuses and unconfirmed-nor-denied conspiracies against political Islam.

Nevertheless, the historical records of domestic counter-terrorism of democratic states around the world show that the military is not a dominating actor but should always be ready to be deployed when circumstances and decision-makers’ dictate so, particularly when the combat skills and logistical capability of the military is needed. Therefore, I argue here that the involvement of the military should not be banned in Indonesia’s future counter-terrorism; rather, the decision-making procedure of such involvement should be governed to facilitate a swift yet accountable use of the military. Counter-terrorism policy should no longer be emphasised as war between the terrorists and the security apparatus; rather, the civilian political decision-makers must take larger ownership in the planning, decision-making and execution-accountability of counter-terrorism operations. With better planning and stronger civilian leadership, public trust in the military’s involvement can be rebuilt, while flaws and effectiveness can become lessons to be learned for future operations.

History

The reluctance of responding to the threat of terrorism with the decisive use of military force is inherent within Indonesian governments since its first President Sukarno. Although before 1949 Darul Islam had showed signs of defiance, it took the President a while before he finally decided to deploy the military to respond to the problem of Darul Islam in 1959. The military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia/TNI) was the backbone of the state’s counter-insurgency efforts. The

nature of the response as a counter-insurgency against Darul Islam dictated the military to be the instrument of choice to make sure logistical and combat capability in guerrilla warfare was provided for. The newly acquired skills of the TNI in guerrilla warfare which they had learned fighting against the re-invading Dutch were to become useful as the military engaged the civilians to participate in securing a perimeter around Darul Islam’s militants’ base in the mountains of West Java, creating a sense of encirclement to the militants and deterring the civilians from aiding them with food and shelter. The Fence of Legs Operation (Operasi Pagar Betis) was to last until 1962 when Darul Islam’s leader Kartosuwirjo was captured. He was tried in a military tribunal that sentenced him to death. Although the Fence of Legs Operation was an excellent example of civil-military cooperation in counter-terrorism, there are not many documents of accountability that today’s analysts can learn from about the seriousness of the threat posed by Darul Islam and to what extent the military’s victories actually put an end to the movement.

Meanwhile, President Suharto launched intelligence-led counter-terrorism efforts to fight elements of the still-lingering networks of Darul Islam, in which members of the military were being involved in the state’s internal security intelligence super body, namely the State’s Intelligence Coordinating Body (BAKIN) as well as the Security and Order Recovery Command (Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban). Together with the organic structure of the TNI, BAKIN and KOPKAMTIB held centrality in the fight against terrorism, using the Anti-Subversive Law as their legal weapon. As the regime’s development projects caused disappointment and a sense of exploitation by the Central Government in rural areas that were rich with resources, the sleeping cells of Darul Islam once again emerged to the surface and transformed into militant jihadist cells that the Indonesian intelligence community labelled Komando Jihad.Some authors have argued that the Darul Islam cells were radicalized by the intelligence propaganda, causing them to re-unite and commit jihadist activities that made them easier to capture. TNI’s role in the targeting of Komando Jihad members between 1976-1979 was marred by records of human rights abuses due to its self-tasking nature and absence of accountability. Once again, no official records documented what really happened and therefore practically no

lessons can be learned in regard to the terrorist threat and the impact of the state’s response. What we can be sure of is that the state’s responses to terrorism produced a recycling of terrorist cells and their radicalization (in the sense of providing justification for violence against civilians).

The jihadist actions resulting from the re-emergence of Darul Islam cells continued well into the 1980’s and the TNI was involved to combat them. A cell called the Warman group was taken down in 1979 after committing a series of robberies to collect money for jihadist activities. Another cell called the Imran group committed a hijacking of a civilian DC-9 aircraft departing Jakarta; the airplane was forced to land at Dong Muang Airport, Thailand, before it was boarded by Indonesian Special Forces (Komando Pasukan Khusus/KOPASSUS, leading to the anti-terrorist unit formation called Detachment 81 Gultor within the KOPASSUS. In 1989, another military-led counter-terrorism effort was conducted against the Warsidi group in Lampung Province. Colonel Hendro Priyono directed three platoons to attack the group’s base, which killed 27 and capturing 20 others. The bloody ending of the operation led to public questioning of the government’s handling and TNI’s involvement; question marks that remain relevant in today’s counter-terrorism efforts. During the democratic era of post-1998, elite forces within the three branches of the TNI - the Bravo Detachment (Air Force), the Jala Mangkara Detachment (Navy) and the 81 Gultor (Penanggulangan Teror/Anti-Terrorist) Detachment (Army) - were never dissolved.

However, the terrorism threat had taken a new form as it acquired a transnational and stronger jihadist character, which actually meant that something beyond military/non-military deliberation was required. Writing in early 2002, Rabasa and Haseman illustrated Al-Qaeda links to Indonesian mujahidin groups Laskar Jihad and and ‘terrorist network’ Jemaah Islamiyaah or JI. The capture of Fathur Rahman Al-Ghozi and his confession that he had planned attacks against American facilities in Singapore, in addition to his involvement in the bombing of a Metro Manila train station in the Philippines on 30 December 2000 provided an impetus for a more serious discussion on policy response to terrorism, starting with Indonesian public discourse on the state of their homegrown terrorism that had already maintained connection with Al-Qaeda network, particularly in

Lessons To Be Learned From Indonesia’s Military Involvement in Counter-

terrorism Effor ts

Ali Abdullah Wibisono, Lecturer of Departement of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia

The NegotiationsSource: Pexels/CCO License

10Issue 34/ April 2018

Current Development

The era of Joko Widodo’s presidency marked the government’s change of perception of terrorism threat from that of crime to national security. As a result, the executive branch pushed for more involvement of the military, although maintained the criminal-justice framework of the policy response, thus placing the military as assistance to the police force. In addition to involve the TNI in Operation Camar Maleo led by the police in eliminating MIT and securing the border with the Philippines that was suspected to facilitate militants from both countries to go back and forth to smuggle arms and people, the Government also empowered the anti-terrorist detachments of the Armed Forces and allocated IDR 1.9 trillion (USD 136 million) of state budget to them. On 9 June 2015, the TNI Commander officiated the formation of Joint Special Forces Command whose members were 90 selected soldiers from the three anti-terrorist units in the Armed Forces. Such formation was meant to fulfil the President’s order for the TNI to be involved in counter-terrorism efforts at a moment’s notice.

While the TNI’s involvement in the Camar Maleo Operation and the formation of the Joint Special Forces Command gathered no resistance from the public or from Parliament, a different story took place when the involvement of the military was included in the draft of a revision to the Anti-Terrorism Law, which until the time of writing has not been passed. The executive leader, the TNI Commander and even the National Police (POLRI) Chief have expressed their support for the regulation of the involvement of the military in counter-terrorism efforts; the Chief of POLRI Tito Karnavian in this matter has stated that the TNI’s capability is needed for their operational skills in territorial intelligence and take-down operations. Territorial intelligence has become increasingly important in avoiding scenarios such as Marawi City, the Philippines from taking place again in Southeast Asia.

Resistance to legislating for the TNI’s involvement is largely due to the association of such a policy with the potential of human rights abuses and a biased association between a law-enforcement approach and high ethical and procedural accountability.The second point of resistance to the TNI’s involvement is the potential of conflict between the TNI and the police due to

differences in operational doctrines: between enemy-capitulation oriented doctrines and law-enforcement. Thirdly, there is no clear procedure to this day as to the accountability procedure for casualties of innocent civilians due to military operations. Finally, the involvement of the military has been concerned to potentially divert Indonesia’s counter-terrorism towards a purely armed-combat with the terrorists, leaving the risk of civilian casualties and a growing perception that democratic law-enforcement measures have failed.

Ways Forward for Military Involvement in Counter-terrorism Efforts

The lesson that we can draw so far is that human rights abuses recorded in the involvement of the military in the past, due to non-accountability of such abuses led to the difficulty of institutionalizing the military involvement in today’s counter-terrorism efforts. In the future, the involvement of the military should be based on strategic policy-making process by civilian leaders, instead of ad hoc security developments resulted from counter-terrorism dynamics of the security agencies. The instance of military involvement in responding to the Santoso-led MIT in Poso showed that such a late response resulted in a prolonged conflict taking place. The longer it gets, the harder it is for the conflict to be resolved. Part of the problem is the absence of a national strategy in responding to terrorism, which means that the policy response depends heavily on day-to-day surveillance and pre-emptive strikes of the security forces with little capability to stop an escalating development. Another part of the problem is the long bureacracy that needs to take place for military assistance to take place. In the future, terrorism crises such as the one in Poso should be identified early on, and the President should be able to order military assistance first and later on report it to Parliament.

Secondly, the involvement of the military should be based on the escalation of the conflict in the field of counter-terrorism efforts. A counter-terrorism operation most of time is an operation conducted by law-enforcers or law-enforcers with assistance from the military. In both of these variations, counter-terrorism remains a criminal-justice process, which means the military should help in capturing not eliminating terrorist suspects. However, in situations where the escalation has gone too far, the military

could be deployed as a leading instrument; this is especially the case when counter-terrorism is facing heavily armed enemies with foreign support,. Therefore, the role of the military should not be limited to providing assistance to the law-enforcers. The TNI Law (Law 34/3004) has stated in its explanation that the role of the military includes fighting armed acts of terror. In any of the domestic security operations, however, the military’s deployment should be temporary before law-enforcers take over and civilian order can be restored.

Thidly, the BNPT should reform itself to be a communication hub between the executive leadership and its advisors and with those conducting counter-terrorism operations who are closer to the situation on the ground. Executive leaders must have complete and accurate information regarding the conflict situation. Therefore, all of the security operators on the ground must have a clear channel to the BNPT who evaluates the gravity of the situation and reports actionable intelligence to the executive leadership; the latter is to decide whether law-enforcement operation is still capable or military assistance is needed. The opposite flow should also be facilitated by the BNPT: executive orders should be translated into unambiguous orders for the security forces on the ground.

Finally, control of information is crucial. Human rights violations may not be avoidable, but at least their damage can be contained. First, control of information of what takes place in the area of operation should be maintained. Pieces of information regarding casualties can be used as misinformation by extremist websites to incite hatred. Secondly Parliament should form select committees to thoroughly evaluate the conduct of officials and decision-makers in order to evaluate their effectiveness and appropriateness with confidence.

The involvement of the military needs not be perceived as an alteration of our counter-terrorism effort into one of war. Domestic response to terrorism must remain within the confines of a criminal justice model; the involvement of the military is therefore a temporary aberration in restoring civil order and law-enforcement functions. The involvement of the military requires all other elements of decision-making and coordinating bodies to function effectively and avoid negative precedence that may contribute to public distrust in the democratic institutions in resolving security matters.

southern Philippines. The notion of Al-Qaeda’s presence in Southeast Asia was a precursor to pressure from the United States to demand for a more assertive counter-terrorism practice by Indonesia.

It was difficult, however, for Indonesia to establish a decisive response against terrorism, especially one that involves the military. Military involvement in domestic security operations acquired a further bad record in their handling of horizontal conflicts. During 1998-2002, the military was the primary instrument in responding to riots and horizontal conflicts and they were publicly questioned and protested in Jakarta for their failure to prevent a massive civilian casualty ; some accused that such calamity had encouraged an Islamic militia called Laskar Jihad to form up and participate in the communal conflicts between Christian and Islamic communities in Maluku. Communal conflicts and secessionist struggles that marked the initial years of the Reformasi era were publicly discussed as partly a result of neglect and unprofessional management of the Armed Forces.

Due to these apprehensions as a result of the military’s record in responding to horizontal conflicts as well as cases of terrorism in the past, the anti-terrorist response that built up in the post-authoritarian era, and particularly after the 2002 Bali Bombings, has been directed to respond to terrorism as a criminal issue. Terrorism is not even considered as political violence in the current Anti-Terrorism Law (Law No. 15/2003), which was legislated in March 2003 from By-

Law 1/2002; the latter was released within a week in the aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombings. Therefore, the TNI’s anti-terrorist special forces played only a secondary role of providing intelligence for the police which is empowered by the new Anti-Terrorism Law to apprehend suspects based on intelligence reports vetted by the district court. The capacity-building of Indonesian counter-terrorism efforts emphasised almost solely on the police, more specifically the police’s anti-terrorist unit Detachment 88 that was formed in 2004. Nevertheless, the criminal-justice model has been successful in preventing Indonesia from falling into a terrorism crisis as the level of terrorist attacks fell sharply between over 100 incidents per year in 2001 down to fluctuative levels between close to 0 to near 30 incidents per year between 2007 and 2017.

The institution-building of Indonesian counter-terrorism efforts developed slowly with the coordinating body for anti-terrorism (National Terrorism-Handling Body/BNPT) built in 2010. The latter was supposed to coordinate all of the state’s agencies in counter-terrorism effort. However, BNPT underwent internal rivalry within itself between the police and the TNI, which rendered its operational execution ineffective. BNPT later on focused on deradicalization campaigns, while Detachment 88 gradually and steadily increased its capacity to conduct surveillance on terrorist cells and pre-empt their attacks. While the BNPT strived to re-integrate ex-convicts of terrorism back to society, Detachment

88 ‘deradicalized’ captured terrorists through interrogations and aids in order to extract information on terrorist networks from them. Needless to say, these two methods do not get along, and Indonesia saw recycling and continuation of terrorist cells as recidivists returned to their radical networks.

The most fatal of this recidivist pattern was that of Santoso who was arrested in 2006 for stealing a car for the purpose of terrorist-financing, incarcerated for two years, before being promoted to commander of Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) in 2011. MIT conducted terrorist attacks against police officers and other guerrilla warfare operations in the forests of Biru Mountain in Poso, Central Sulawesi. As police-led counter-terrorism effort against MIT failed to defeat the terrorist network, and in 2015 the Indonesian government deployed the TNI’s regular forces as assisting forces to the police. The rise of the MIT marked the re-emergence of transnational connection between Indonesian jihadists and their foreign counterparts as they broke up with Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jemaah Islamiyah and associated themselves with the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS). Their methods changed from long-term ideological radicalization and sophisticated planning of attacks to instant radicalization bent on conducting small-scale but more frequent attacks targeted almost exclusively on the police force as Indonesia’s tip of the spear in counter-terrorism efforts.

The historical records of domestic counter-terrorism of democratic states around the world show that the military is not a dominating actor

but should always be ready to be deployed when circumstances and decision-makers’ dictate so, particularly when the combat skills and logistical

capability of the military is needed.

12Issue 34/ April 2018

Wood BoatSource: pxhere/CC0 Public Domain

Background

The Islamic State (IS) is being pushed back from their major strongholds in the Middle East. As a result, experts expect foreign fighters who had joined the battle in Syria and Iraq will return to their home countries, including the ones from Southeast Asia. Not to mention, many aspiring jihadis did not manage to cross the Syrian border since Turkey as the main transiting point has strengthened its border security. Thousands have been deported for their alleged intention to join extremist groups. IS might be losing thousands of foreign fighters in the Middle East, yet they will not give up their ambitions to establish Islamic Caliphates. While hijrah (to emigrate) will no longer be the first priority for IS sympathizers, conducting an attack on home soil will be an alternative. In 2014, Abu Muhammad Al-Adnani, IS spokesman, encouraged their sympathizers to launch attacks wherever they are, whenever they could, with any necessary means without waiting for instructions.

However, Byman (2016) argues the fear over returnees have been overstated. While the potential threat is high, the actual threat remains low. The threat posed by returnees might be higher than homegrown terrorist because of their acquired skills while in the battlefield, but governments still have mitigating factors to counter the actual threats. For instance, various government policies that could decrease the likelihood of terror attacks by returnees. Against these backdrops, this article seeks to address these questions: Do all returnees and deportees pose an immediate threat to a country? How should a country treat returnees and deportees? This article will discuss the case of Indonesia and Malaysia whereby thousands of Indonesians and Malaysians have travelled to Syria and Iraq, and hundreds more were deported before entering Syria and Iraq. The presence of Katibah Nusantara as the Malay Archipleago unit of the Islamic State also raises concern over the combat skills of returnees and their leverage in recruiting aspiring jihadis. This article will first discuss current developments in both countries. Second, it will discuss the possible scenarios once returnees and deportees return to their home countries which reflect on past trends and current development. Third, it will elaborate the existing regional cooperation to handle the influx of returnees and deportees. Lastly, it discusses how the authorities should respond to returnees and deportees.

Malaysia

Malaysia has been arresting dozens of returnees and deportees. Data reveals by the end of 2017, 53 Malaysians remain in Syria, while 34 others were killed fighting for IS. In the same year, Malaysia arrested 45 foreign fighters who are affiliated to IS. Returnees and deportees in Malaysia are made up of a number of different nationalities, such as Indonesians, Filipinos and Yemenis.The Malaysian authorities suspect Turkey has been expelling deportees to Malaysia due to Malaysia’s “visa-friendly” policy to Middle Eastern nations. Turkey provides Malaysia as an alternative destination for deportees, thus deportees do not need to come back to their last point of disembarkation.Aside from IS-affiliated militants, Malaysia has also arrested a Malaysian national who joined an Al-Qaeda-linked group. On December 2015, Bukit Aman Special Branch Counter-Terrorism Division apprehended Mohamad Hidayat Azman, a former college student in Egypt, upon his arrival at Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA). Mohammad Hidayat was only 18 years old when he decided to join the Al-Qaeda-linked group, the Jund Al-Aqsa in Syria.

Malaysia has yet to witness any terror attacks by returnees or deportees. In 2017, Malaysia thwarted five terror plots which brings the total number of foiled terror plots to 19 since 2012.Despite this, the first successful terror attack conducted by homegrown IS-affiliated militants did occur in Puchong on 28 June 2016. This attack injured eight people and Muhammad Wanndy Mohamed Jedi, a Malaysian IS fighter in Syria, claimed on his Facebook post that the attackers were IS followers. He ordered local IS sympathizers to carry out the attack. In 2016, the authorities thwarted terror attacks in Johor Bahru, Bukit Aman, and Putrajaya. Three Malaysians were arrested along with three Iraqis for planning these attacks. They were waiting for further orders from Wanndy to launch the attacks.

The source of radicalization for Malaysians mainly revolve around messaging apps and social media platforms. Authorities estimated 75 percent of ISIS supporters are recruited online. Wanndy played pivotal role in online recruitment and coordinating attacks from Syria until his death on April 2017. The Malaysian government has a tight control over public sphere activities, thus it is difficult to have offline meeting between terrorist groups and their sympathizers.

Malaysia has several legal instruments as preventive measures for terrorism issues, which are: the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012, the Prevention of Crime Act (POCA), the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), and Special Measures Against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Act 2015 (SMATA). Under these laws, the authorities are allowed to take preventive detention ranging from 28 days to two years.At least 8 returnees from Syria were arrested under SOSMA.

Indonesia

Indonesia has been receiving hundreds of returnees and deportees. The Indonesian National Police Chief Gen. Tito Karnavian claims over 1,100 Indonesians have travelled to Syria, with 500 remaining in Syria, 103 others were killed in Syria, and the rest were deported back to Indonesia.In the case of deportees, the Ministry of Social Affairs’ (Kemensos) social shelters have hosted 226 deportees in 2017. Deportees are not only those who were arrested in Turkey before crossing the Syrian and Iraqi borders, there are also a number of migrant workers from other countries who were deported because they were exposed to radicalism while abroad.

The Indonesian authorities have been facing obstacles to track down and handle returnees and deportees. Authorities only have the data of people who were formally deported, such as Dwi Djoko Wiwoho – former director of the Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board’s licensing office in Batam - and his family whose return to Indonesia were assisted by the government officials. In contrast, it is hard to track down those who individually returned to Indonesia without the assistance/coordination of the government. Many of them make multiple stops before arriving in Indonesia. Not to mention, authorities cannot apprehend returnees and deportees unless there is strong evidence that they are involved in terrorist networks. On June 2017, the very first terror attack done by a returnee in Indonesia took place. Syawaluddin Pakpahan, who fought alongside the Free Syrian Army (FSA), stabbed to death a police officer at the police provincial headquarters in Medan. As for deportees, the Indonesian government could only provide a one-month rehabilitation programme which seems to be insufficient. Such a short-span programme could not completely deradicalize the deportees who did not manage to enter Syria and Iraq, meaning most of them are still curious about

Assessing the Threats of Returnees and Depor tees in Southeast Asia: A Case Study

of Malaysia and Indonesia

Chaula Rininta Anindya, Research Analyst with the Indonesia Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

14Issue 34/ April 2018

life under a caliphate. The reintegration programme for deportees also does not yet run effectively due mis-coordination among relevant agencies. Anggi Indah Kusuma alias Khanza Syafiyah Al Furqon, a former Indonesian migrant worker in Hongkong, joined the rehabilitation programme at the social shelter located in Bambu Apus, East Jakarta. But, in a couple of months, the security apparatus arrested her for plotting terror attacks against PT. PINDAD (state-owned arms manufacturer), Mako Brimob (the police’s Mobile Brigade command headquarters), and the State Palace.

At the time of writing this article, there is only one terror attack that is successfully launched by a returnee. The other notable terror attacks by IS-affiliated groups for the past few years were done by homegrown militants whereby some of them were coordinated by Bahrun Naim, an Indonesian IS fighter based in Syria. Bahrun Naim is believed to be the mastermind of the Sarinah Bombing on January 2016 and Kampung Melayu Bombing on May 2017.

Scenario

The challenge posed by returnees and deportees are twofold. First, returnees might have leverage in recruiting more supporters. Their first-hand experience in the battle field would draw respect from prospective recruits. For example, Indonesia’s Afghan veterans who fought in the Soviet War were welcomed back as heroes.This legitimacy helped them to draw support in building local camps in Indonesia. Syawaluddin Pakpahan, the perpetrator of the Medan attack, also played key role in radicalizing and recruiting the other three perpetrators of the attack. Second, returnees and deportees may launch terror attacks on home soil, immediately or in the future. Experts warn that returnees may launch more deadly attacks compared to homegrown terrorist due to their fighting capabilities. As for now, there has been only one attack in Indonesia and none in Malaysia by IS returnees. Most of terror attacks were done by homegrown terrorist. Yet, we should not underestimate the potential threat by IS returnees because at the moment they might be still in the planning stage. Aside from returnees, we should also pay close attention to deportees. Deportees have yet to witness the miserable life in Syria and Iraq. Most of them still have strong willingness to emigrate because they have done everything they could to do so, including selling all their assets in their hometown.

Failing to emigrate might cause anxiety and frustration which leads to planning domestic terror attacks. They do not need to acquire skills from the battlefield, a simple internet guideline could help them to prepare terror attacks. For instance, Anggi Indah Kusuma, an Indonesian deportee who was arrested for assembling explosive devices. She learnt to assemble explosive devices from the internet.

The case might be different with Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups. Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), for example, has also been sending their members to Syria, such as Abu Jibril and Imam Samudra’s sons who died while fighting with Jabhat Al-Nusra group. Some of them may return from the battlefield but will not conduct terror attacks any time soon. JI has been focusing on the use of non-violence means. Nevertheless, Abu Rusydan, the former emir of JI, has warned that JI may use violence means when they deem it necessary. Take the case of Afghan veterans, many waited for about 10 years before implementing the lessons from Afghanistan on home soil. Thus, it is not an actual threat but rather a potential threat in the years to come.

However, it would be folly to assume all returnees are still highly radicalized and plan to launch terror attacks on home soil. Some of them returned to their countries because of disillusionment. For instance, Dwi Djoko Wiwoho admits that he regrets joining IS in Syria and he and his family were deceived by IS propaganda.Mohamad Hidayat Azman also returned to Malaysia after he was filled with remorse for joining an extremist group in Syria.

Regional and Domestic Responses

Indonesia and Malaysia are taking parts in several initiatives in the region to tackle terrorism issues, including with regards to returnees and deportees. First, Indonesia and Malaysia together with the Philippines have been conducting the Trilateral Maritime Patrol Indomalphi in the Sulu Sea. One of the aims of this patrol is to prevent the flow of militants from one country to another, especially to the southern Philippines. A number of Indonesians and Malaysian took part in the Marawi Siege in 2017. As such the patrol is aimed at preventing the movement of returnees or deportees to rebase and unite in Marawi. Second, six Southeast Asia nations – Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – launched an intelligence pact called the “Our Eyes Inititaives” (OEI) to exchange strategic information related to terrorism, radicalism, and violent extremism.This

initiative is also important as many aspiring jihadis who seek to emigrate to Syria and Iraq, as well as returnees often make multiple stops in neighboring countries.

Indonesia and Malaysia have different legal approaches to counterterrorism. Malaysia has preventive legal instruments which allows authorities to arrest people who join terrorist organizations overseas. Whereas, Indonesia’s legal instrument is outdated and relatively weak. Unless there is a strong evidence of returnees or deportees’ involvement in terrorist networks, such as funding and recruitment, authorities in Indonesia can not arrest them. Nonetheless, “hard” legal measure will not be the sole answer to deal with challenges from returnees and deportees. Prisons in Malaysia and Indonesia are notoriously known as incubator of terrorism. Unless both countries address their prison management problems, imprisonment may be counterproductive. They could radicalize other inmates or even wardens and prison guards.

Effective rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for returnees and deportees are urgently needed. It should not merely focus on the religious dimension and economic empowerment because the underlying causes of their radicalization are not religion and economic deprivation per se. Understanding the psychological and cultural dimension is also important. Self-doubt and disconnection from family and friends may lead someone to radical groups. A sustainable mentorship programme for returnees and deportees may help them to at least have someone to consult on anything related to their current life. Experienced mentors from civil society organizations, social workers, volunteers, or even government officials could play a role in helping returnees and deportees to reintegrate with non-radical environment. Deradicalization is not an instant process, thus sustainability is crucial.

In addition, the society should avoid stigmatization against returnees and deportees. Isolation and marginalization from society may lead them to return to radical environments. Authorities should also address the issue of intolerance within the society in both countries because it will only worsen the state of radicalization of returnees and deportees. Lastly, governments must have a clear chain of coordination. Overlapping responsibilities will cause nuisance for returnees and deportees which makes them reluctant to engage with the programmes provided by authorities.

Imagine ASEANat your finger tipsthcasean.org

16Issue 34/ April 2018

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TERRORISM ANDCOUNTER TERRORISM

Source: www.deteksiindonesia.com

1 January 2017

JAD: Jamaah Ansharul DaulahJAT: Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid

BNPT: National Counter-terrorism BoardFKPT: Coordinating Forum for Preventing Terrorism

IN INDONESIA- 25 May 2018

18Issue 34/ April 2018

Ninety-two-year-old Mahathir Mohamad was sworn in as the world’s oldest elected leader late Thursday after a stunning election win that swept Malaysia’s establishment from power after more than six decades.

Why it matters:

The latest election in Malaysia is momentous for many different reasons, not only because the nation just elected the world’s oldest Prime Minister, but also because it uncovers a whole new dynamic of Malaysian politics. Furthermore, the recent event also signals the democratic power of the people of Malaysia to put an end to the governing coalition that had been ruling for over 60 years since Malaysian independence.

Mahathir Mohamad, who served as Prime Minister between 1981-2003, came out of retirement two years ago in order to restore the country’s reputation, which was damaged by the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal during the nine-year tenure of Najib Razak. His victory was unprecedented. Many—including pollsters, investors and political analysts—expected Najib Razak would return for another term. Mahathir’s coalition began as the underdog—a hastily assembled group lacking adequate finances and public profile. They went against Barisan Nasional, which has a well-oiled party machinery with deep pockets. But almost overnight, the winning coalition of Pakatan Harapan defied

all the expectations by attracting mostly urban voters from the minority ethnic Chinese and Indian communities.

It seems that the country had had enough decades of poor governance and divisive politics that they are ready to turn against the Barisan Nasaional coalition that had been mired in corruption scandals and accusations of heavy-handedness. Mahathir Mohamad met this demand by leading the opposition and landing voters support through Pakatan Harapan or Alliance of Hope—a motley, multiracial, left-of-centre opposition grouping. It was a significant stray from his iron-fist leadership in United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) during his initial term as Malaysia’s fourth Prime Minister, which was characterized by favourable policy towards ethnic Malays, the country’s biggest ethnic group. His first administration was also marked by financial and political turbulence which also caused the downfall of many of his rivals.

But Mahathir Mohamad claimed that he has reinvented himself as a ‘listening dictator’. The winning coalition he led initiated a royal pardon for Anwar Ibrahim—his own protege whom he sent to jail without trial in 1998 for simply challenging him. Mahathir Mohamad would like to serve

for one or two years before possibly passing

the baton to Anwar Ibrahim.

However, it does not mean that Mahathir’s

leadership is not without challenges. It would be interesting

to see how Mahathir can rule in the

same coalition with his f o r m e r p o l i t i c a l

nemesis who he sent to jail in

the 1990s as well as navigate Pakatan

Harapan as mulitcultural party which has always against UMNO ever since Mahathir’s first term.

Despite these whole political dynamics, the latest Malaysian election has brought a fresh air for democracy in Southeast Asia. As the world sees the region shift towards authotitarian politics, the democratic election of Mahathir Mohamad has proven that a single cause can unite the voters. The election, dubbed as the ‘Malaysian tsunami’ was a firm rejection to the status quo. People came together despite religious and ethnic differences. It is reported to be done so peacefully and democratically despite Mahathir’s initial concern that this might be the dirtiest election in Malaysia’s history.

Malaysia’s Mahathir sworn in as world’s oldest leader

Bangkok Post, 11 May, 2018https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asean/1462413/malaysias-mahathir-sworn-in-as-worlds-oldest-leader

A S E A N R O U N D - U PA S E A N R O U N D - U P Askabea Fadhilla is a Researcherof the ASEAN Studies Program of The Habibie Center

“The leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on Saturday concluded their summit in Singapore by releasing a communiqué that calls for exercise of self-restraint in the disputed South China Sea and “irreversible” denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”

Why it matters:The 32nd ASEAN Summit 2018 that was held in Singapore managed to issue a Chairman’s Statement that address a wide range of issues in the political-security, economic, and socio-cultural areas.

Under Singapore’s chairmanship, there were several notable outcomes in the economic area such as the establishment of ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN) and the finalization of the list of 26 ASCN ‘pilot cities’; establishment of an ASEAN Agreement on E-commerce, initiative on the ASEAN Digital Integration Framework and the ASEAN Innovation Network; and intention to evaluate ASEAN’s readiness for the Fourth Industrial Revolution. These new initiatives were mostly driven by the urgency to cope with technology advancement.

In the area of politics, one issue that received significant emphasis was the cyber security. The ASEAN Leaders’ Statement on Cybersecurity Cooperation was adopted in light with the rising urgency and sophistication of transboundary cyber threats. It was not strange that Singapore brought up the issue since the city-state

needed to maintain its security and stability as the hub for business.

Under the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, several initiatives were renewed and established. The ASEAN Leaders’ renewed the Singapore-ASEAN Youth Fund with a total of SGD 5 million top up by Singapore in order to support ground-up initiatives by ASEAN Youth. The Leaders also welcomed the establishment of the Advisory Board for the implementation of the recommendations on Rakhine States as part of ASEAN’s effort to address humanitarian situation in Rakhine States.

While there were some new initiatives and renewed commitments as the outcome of the Summit, critiques towards the Associations still came up. The Association was still seen to put more attention on economic and political security issues. Human rights activists were concerned that ASEAN still did nothing to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in the region. They highlighted several human right violation cases across the region in which there were no further reactions from ASEAN such as Cambodia shut independent media organizations, war on drugs that leads to extrajudicial killings in the Philippines, the escalation of fighting in Kachin state in northern Myanmar, as well as the Rohingya issue.

For the latter case, Human Rights Watch even demanded ASEAN to put pressure on Myanmar so that it could find those who were responsible for the atrocities against Rohingya and hold them accountable. However, such direct pressure is unlikely to happen since ASEAN is known for its non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs.

In addition to that, although ASEAN leaders have released statement on the South China Sea, many analysts still considered it as bland and even removed any critical language. It shows that ASEAN is still not united enough to build a common position on the South China Sea issue. It is in the hand of Singapore as the current chairman to build such position. However, Singapore is also in a difficult position. Since China is Singapore’s largest trading partners and foreign investors, the city-state cannot be directly opposing China. Hence it needs to act carefully in addressing the South China Sea issue.

FULL TEXT: Chairman’s statement of the 32nd ASEAN Summit

https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/04/28/1810321/full-text-chairmans-statement-32nd-asean-summit, 28 April 2018

A S E A N R O U N D - U PA S E A N R O U N D - U P Fina Astriana is an Economic Researcherof the ASEAN Studies Program of The Habibie Center

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