89
Salam Abdallah, Abu Dhabi U., United Arab Emirates Refaat Abdel-Razek, Zagazig U., Egypt Tarun Abhichandani, Riviera Partners, USA Evon M. O. Abu-Taieh, Arab Academy for Financial Science, Jordan Kamrul Ahsan, Auckland U. of Technology, New Zealand Mahmoud Alam, The U. of Manchester, UK Luciana Alencar, Federal U. of Pernambuco, Brazil Maged Ali, Brunel U., UK Firas Alkhaldi, Arab Academy for Banking and Financial Sciences, Jordan Min An, The U. of Birmingham, UK Rafi Ashrafi, Sultan Qaboos U., Oman Morteza Bagherpour, Iran U. of Science & Technology, Iran Catherine M. Beise, Salisbury U., USA Stefanie Betz, U. of Karlsruhe, Germany Tarun Bhaskar, GE Global, India Constanta Bodea, The Academy of Economic Studies, Romania Kees Boersma, VU U. Amsterdam, The Netherlands Laurent Bourgeon, ESSEC Business School, France Mei Cao, U. of Wisconsin-Superior, USA Nicola Capuano, U. of Salerno, Italy Franco Caron, Politecnico di Milano, Italy Maiga Chang, Athabasca U., Canada Charles Y.J. Cheah, BP Singapore, Singapore Hong Long Chen, National U. of Tainan, Taiwan Jengchung V. Chen, National Cheng Kung U., Taiwan Po-Han Chen, Nanyang Technological U., Singapore Yat Hung Chiang, Hong Kong Polytechnic U., Hong Kong Jyoti Choudrie, U. of Hertfordshire, UK Kenneth Chung, The U. of Sydney, Australia Andrew Ciganek, Jacksonville State U., USA Simon Collyer, The U. of Queensland, Australia Miike Danilovic, Jönköping International Business School, Sweden Eric Deakins, U. of Waikato, New Zealand Claudio Dell’Era, Politecnico di Milano, Italy Rajib Dhar, Pure Information Technologies Pvt. Ltd., India Evan Duggan, U. of the West Indies, Jamaica Nabil El-Sawalhi, United Nations Relief and Work Agency, Israel Walter Fernandez, The Australian National U., Australia Robert Folden, Texas A&M U.-Commerce, USA Ping Gao, The U. of Manchester, UK Mihalis Golias, U. of Memphis, USA Narasimhaiah Gorla, American U. of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates Wim Van Grembergen, U. of Antwerp (UA), Belgium Peter Haried, U. of Wisconsin-La Crosse, USA Rugayah Gy Hashim, U. Technology Mara (UiTM), Malaysia Douglas Havelk, Miami U., USA Bill Hefley, Carnegie Mellon U., USA Liaquat Hossain, The U. of Sydney, Australia Martina Huemann, Vienna U. of Economics & Business Administration, Austria Zeynep Isik, Yildiz Technical U., Turkey Tony J. Jewels, United Arab Emirates U., United Arab Emirates Eduardo Miranda, Carnegie Mellon U., USA Kumar Neeraj Jha, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, India James J. Jiang, U. of Central Florida, USA Hajer Kefi, U. René Paris Descartes, France Terry T. Kidd, Texas A&M U., USA Gary Klein, U. of Colorado at Colorado Springs, USA Stefan Koch, Vienna U. of Economics and BA, Austria Sadan Kulturel, Penn State Berks, USA Vijay Kumar, National Institute of Technology, India Palitha Kuruppuarachchi, NSW Police Force, Australia Ka Chi Lam, City U. of Hong Kong, China Johannes Lehner, Johannes Kepler Universität Linz, Austria Mei-yung Leung, City U. of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Heng Li, The Hong Kong Polytechnic U., Hong Kong Hong Lin, U. of Houston-Downtown, USA Henrik CJ Linderoth, Umeå U., Sweden Lars Lindkvist, Linköping U., Sweden Julie Yu-Chih Liu, Yuan Ze U., Taiwan Martin Loosemore, U. of New South Wales, Australia Xin Luo, The U. of New Mexico, USA Caroline Mota, Federal U. of Pernambuco, Brazil Ralf Müller, Umeå U., Sweden Marja Naaranoja, U. of Vaasa, Finland Karen Nantz, Eastern Illinois U., USA S. Thomas Ng, The U. of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Udechukwu Ojiako, U. of Northumbria - Newcastle Upon Tyne, UK Stefan Olander, Lund U., Sweden Lawrence Oliva, CH2M Hill, USA Jason Papathanasiou, U. of Macedonia, Greece Zahid Parvez, U. of Wolverhampton, UK Paul H. Pittman, Indiana U. Southeast, USA Chris Procter, U. of Salford, UK Vadlamani Ravi, Institute for Development & Research in Banking Technology, India April Reed, East Carolina U., USA Kirsten M. Rosacker, U. of Wisconsin-La Crosse, USA Tomoko Saiki, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan Murali Sambasivan, U. Putra Malaysia, Malaysia Andrew Sense, U. of Wollongong, Australia Asim El Sheikh, The Arab Academy for Banking & Financial Sciences, Jordan Gregory Skulmoski, Zayed U., United Arab Emirates Derek Smith, U. of Cape Town, South Africa Jonas Söderlund, BI Norwegian School of Management, Norway Praprut Songchitruksa, Texas Transportation Institute, USA Ghaleb Sweis, U. of Jordan, Jordan Vivian Tam, U. of Western Sydney, Australia Aakash Taneja, Richard Stockton College of NJ, USA Lars Taxén, Linköping U., Sweden Hazel Taylor, U. of Washington, USA Evelyn Ai Lin Teo, National U. of Singapore, Singapore Michael Thomas, Western Carolina U., USA Charles Tichenor, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, USA Shamas-ur-Rel Toor, U. of New South Wales, Australia Dan Trietsch, American U. of Armenia, Armenia Silvana Trimi, U. of Nebraska – Lincoln, USA Bachor Vernon, St. Cloud State U., USA Giovanni Vincenti, Gruppo Vincenti S.r.l., Italy Derek Walker, RMIT U., Australia Eric T.G. Wang, National Central U., Taiwan Jin Wang, Central South U., China Chun-Chin Wei, Chin Yun U., Taiwan Eli Weintraub, Derby U. - Tel Aviv, Israel Andreas Wibowo, Research Institute for Human Settlements, Indonesia Nevan Wright, Auckland U. of Technology, New Zealand Xiaolong Xue, Harbin Institute of Technology, China John F.Y. Yeung, The Chinese U. of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Raymond Young, e8 Consulting, Sweden Angus Yu, U. of Stirling, UK Ann Yu, The Hong Kong Polytechnic U., China Nazirah Zainul-Abidin, U. Science of Malaysia (USM), Malaysia Qingyu Zhang, Arkansas State U., USA Zuopeng (Justin) Zhang, State U. of New York at Plattsburgh, USA International Editorial Review Board: IGI PublIshInG www.igi-global.com IGIP Editor-in-Chief: John Wang, Montclair State U., USA Managing Editor: Richard Peterson, Montclair State U., USA Area Editors: Adedeji B. Badiru, Air Force Institute of Technology, USA Mario Bourgault, U. of Montreal, Canada Ricardo Colomo-Palacios, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain Haluk Demirkan, Arizona State U., USA Dov Dvir, Ben Gurion U. of the Negev, Israel Walter Fernandez, The Australian National U., Australia Mark E. Gershon, Temple U., USA Bill Hefley, Carnegie Mellon U., USA James J. Jiang, U. of Central Florida, USA Gary Klein, U. of Colorado at Colorado Springs, USA Jeffrey Pinto, Penn State Erie, USA Tomoko Saiki, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan Kenneth D. Strang, U. of Technology, Australia Dan Trietsch, American U. of Armenia, Armenia Angus Yu, U. of Stirling, UK IGI Editorial: Heather A. Probst, Director of Journal Publications Jamie M. Wilson, Journal Development Editor Ron Blair, Journal Editorial Assistant Chris Hrobak, Journal Production Lead Gregory Snader, Production Assistant Brittany Metzel, Production Assistant IJITPM Editorial Board

IJITPM Editorial Board - mkwright.org · Roman Beck, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Germany Oliver Marschollek, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Germany Robert Gregory, Johann

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Page 1: IJITPM Editorial Board - mkwright.org · Roman Beck, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Germany Oliver Marschollek, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Germany Robert Gregory, Johann

Salam Abdallah, Abu Dhabi U., United Arab EmiratesRefaat Abdel-Razek, Zagazig U., EgyptTarun Abhichandani, Riviera Partners, USAEvon M. O. Abu-Taieh, Arab Academy for Financial Science, JordanKamrul Ahsan, Auckland U. of Technology, New ZealandMahmoud Alam, The U. of Manchester, UKLuciana Alencar, Federal U. of Pernambuco, BrazilMaged Ali, Brunel U., UKFiras Alkhaldi, Arab Academy for Banking and Financial Sciences, JordanMin An, The U. of Birmingham, UKRafi Ashrafi, Sultan Qaboos U., OmanMorteza Bagherpour, Iran U. of Science & Technology, IranCatherine M. Beise, Salisbury U., USAStefanie Betz, U. of Karlsruhe, GermanyTarun Bhaskar, GE Global, IndiaConstanta Bodea, The Academy of Economic Studies, RomaniaKees Boersma, VU U. Amsterdam, The NetherlandsLaurent Bourgeon, ESSEC Business School, FranceMei Cao, U. of Wisconsin-Superior, USANicola Capuano, U. of Salerno, ItalyFranco Caron, Politecnico di Milano, ItalyMaiga Chang, Athabasca U., CanadaCharles Y.J. Cheah, BP Singapore, Singapore Hong Long Chen, National U. of Tainan, TaiwanJengchung V. Chen, National Cheng Kung U., TaiwanPo-Han Chen, Nanyang Technological U., SingaporeYat Hung Chiang, Hong Kong Polytechnic U., Hong KongJyoti Choudrie, U. of Hertfordshire, UKKenneth Chung, The U. of Sydney, AustraliaAndrew Ciganek, Jacksonville State U., USASimon Collyer, The U. of Queensland, AustraliaMiike Danilovic, Jönköping International Business School, SwedenEric Deakins, U. of Waikato, New ZealandClaudio Dell’Era, Politecnico di Milano, ItalyRajib Dhar, Pure Information Technologies Pvt. Ltd., IndiaEvan Duggan, U. of the West Indies, JamaicaNabil El-Sawalhi, United Nations Relief and Work Agency, IsraelWalter Fernandez, The Australian National U., AustraliaRobert Folden, Texas A&M U.-Commerce, USAPing Gao, The U. of Manchester, UKMihalis Golias, U. of Memphis, USANarasimhaiah Gorla, American U. of Sharjah, United Arab EmiratesWim Van Grembergen, U. of Antwerp (UA), BelgiumPeter Haried, U. of Wisconsin-La Crosse, USARugayah Gy Hashim, U. Technology Mara (UiTM), MalaysiaDouglas Havelk, Miami U., USABill Hefley, Carnegie Mellon U., USALiaquat Hossain, The U. of Sydney, AustraliaMartina Huemann, Vienna U. of Economics & Business Administration, AustriaZeynep Isik, Yildiz Technical U., TurkeyTony J. Jewels, United Arab Emirates U., United Arab EmiratesEduardo Miranda, Carnegie Mellon U., USAKumar Neeraj Jha, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, IndiaJames J. Jiang, U. of Central Florida, USAHajer Kefi, U. René Paris Descartes, FranceTerry T. Kidd, Texas A&M U., USAGary Klein, U. of Colorado at Colorado Springs, USAStefan Koch, Vienna U. of Economics and BA, AustriaSadan Kulturel, Penn State Berks, USAVijay Kumar, National Institute of Technology, IndiaPalitha Kuruppuarachchi, NSW Police Force, Australia

Ka Chi Lam, City U. of Hong Kong, ChinaJohannes Lehner, Johannes Kepler Universität Linz, AustriaMei-yung Leung, City U. of Hong Kong, Hong KongHeng Li, The Hong Kong Polytechnic U., Hong KongHong Lin, U. of Houston-Downtown, USAHenrik CJ Linderoth, Umeå U., SwedenLars Lindkvist, Linköping U., SwedenJulie Yu-Chih Liu, Yuan Ze U., TaiwanMartin Loosemore, U. of New South Wales, AustraliaXin Luo, The U. of New Mexico, USACaroline Mota, Federal U. of Pernambuco, BrazilRalf Müller, Umeå U., SwedenMarja Naaranoja, U. of Vaasa, FinlandKaren Nantz, Eastern Illinois U., USAS. Thomas Ng, The U. of Hong Kong, Hong KongUdechukwu Ojiako, U. of Northumbria - Newcastle Upon Tyne, UKStefan Olander, Lund U., SwedenLawrence Oliva, CH2M Hill, USAJason Papathanasiou, U. of Macedonia, GreeceZahid Parvez, U. of Wolverhampton, UKPaul H. Pittman, Indiana U. Southeast, USAChris Procter, U. of Salford, UKVadlamani Ravi, Institute for Development & Research in Banking Technology, IndiaApril Reed, East Carolina U., USAKirsten M. Rosacker, U. of Wisconsin-La Crosse, USATomoko Saiki, Tokyo Institute of Technology, JapanMurali Sambasivan, U. Putra Malaysia, MalaysiaAndrew Sense, U. of Wollongong, AustraliaAsim El Sheikh, The Arab Academy for Banking & Financial Sciences, JordanGregory Skulmoski, Zayed U., United Arab EmiratesDerek Smith, U. of Cape Town, South AfricaJonas Söderlund, BI Norwegian School of Management, NorwayPraprut Songchitruksa, Texas Transportation Institute, USAGhaleb Sweis, U. of Jordan, JordanVivian Tam, U. of Western Sydney, AustraliaAakash Taneja, Richard Stockton College of NJ, USALars Taxén, Linköping U., SwedenHazel Taylor, U. of Washington, USAEvelyn Ai Lin Teo, National U. of Singapore, SingaporeMichael Thomas, Western Carolina U., USACharles Tichenor, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, USAShamas-ur-Rel Toor, U. of New South Wales, AustraliaDan Trietsch, American U. of Armenia, ArmeniaSilvana Trimi, U. of Nebraska – Lincoln, USABachor Vernon, St. Cloud State U., USAGiovanni Vincenti, Gruppo Vincenti S.r.l., ItalyDerek Walker, RMIT U., AustraliaEric T.G. Wang, National Central U., TaiwanJin Wang, Central South U., ChinaChun-Chin Wei, Chin Yun U., TaiwanEli Weintraub, Derby U. - Tel Aviv, IsraelAndreas Wibowo, Research Institute for Human Settlements, IndonesiaNevan Wright, Auckland U. of Technology, New ZealandXiaolong Xue, Harbin Institute of Technology, ChinaJohn F.Y. Yeung, The Chinese U. of Hong Kong, Hong KongRaymond Young, e8 Consulting, SwedenAngus Yu, U. of Stirling, UKAnn Yu, The Hong Kong Polytechnic U., ChinaNazirah Zainul-Abidin, U. Science of Malaysia (USM), MalaysiaQingyu Zhang, Arkansas State U., USAZuopeng (Justin) Zhang, State U. of New York at Plattsburgh, USA

International Editorial Review Board:

IGI PublIshInGwww.igi-global.com

IGIP

Editor-in-Chief: John Wang, Montclair State U., USA

Managing Editor: Richard Peterson, Montclair State U., USA

Area Editors: Adedeji B. Badiru, Air Force Institute of Technology, USA Mario Bourgault, U. of Montreal, Canada Ricardo Colomo-Palacios, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain Haluk Demirkan, Arizona State U., USA Dov Dvir, Ben Gurion U. of the Negev, Israel Walter Fernandez, The Australian National U., Australia Mark E. Gershon, Temple U., USA Bill Hefley, Carnegie Mellon U., USA James J. Jiang, U. of Central Florida, USA Gary Klein, U. of Colorado at Colorado Springs, USA Jeffrey Pinto, Penn State Erie, USA Tomoko Saiki, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan Kenneth D. Strang, U. of Technology, Australia Dan Trietsch, American U. of Armenia, Armenia Angus Yu, U. of Stirling, UK

IGI Editorial: Heather A. Probst, Director of Journal Publications Jamie M. Wilson, Journal Development Editor Ron Blair, Journal Editorial Assistant Chris Hrobak, Journal Production Lead Gregory Snader, Production Assistant Brittany Metzel, Production Assistant

IJITPM Editorial Board

Page 2: IJITPM Editorial Board - mkwright.org · Roman Beck, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Germany Oliver Marschollek, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Germany Robert Gregory, Johann

The Editor-in-Chief of the International Journal of Information Technology Project Management (IJITPM) would like to invite you to consider submitting a manuscript for inclusion in this scholarly journal. The following describes the mission, coverage, and guidelines for submission to IJITPM.

mission:The primary objective of the International Journal of Information Technology Project Manage-ment (IJITPM) is to provide a forum for practitioners and researchers from both public and private sectors of project management professionals, along with information systems researchers, software developers and vendors, to contribute and to circulate ground-breaking work, and to shape future directions for research, as well as to help project leaders and managers to apply various advanced techniques in information systems. It encourages discussions on how the various information systems can improve the project management as well as how the advance in project management can affect the growth of information systems.

Topics of inTeresT (include buT are noT limiTed To):• Budgeting• Communication and collaboration• Current and emerging standards• Decision support systems• Facilities and equipment support• Feasibility studies• Goals and objective setting• HRM challenges• Marketing and branding strategies• Measurement and metrics• Negotiation skills• Opportunity management• Organization change projects• Outsourcing and alliances• Project coordination and scheduling• Project governance• Project information systems• Project knowledge management

All submissions should be e-mailed to:John Wang

[email protected]

An official publication of the Information Resources Management Association!

International Journal of Information Technology Project Management

Please recommend this publication to your librarian. For a convenient easy-to-use library recommendation form, please visit: http://www.igi-

global.com/ijitpm and click on the "Library Recommendation Form" link along the right margin.

Ideas for Special Theme Issues may be submitted to the Editor-in-Chief.

• Project management teams• Project review and evaluation• Quality assurance and testing• Resource allocation• Risk assessment and management• Scheduling• Software and systems• Staffing• Systems Analysis• Virtual project• Time and cost estimating• Web-based PM

CALL FOR ARTICLES

ISSN 1938-0232eISSN 1938-0240

Published quarterly

Page 3: IJITPM Editorial Board - mkwright.org · Roman Beck, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Germany Oliver Marschollek, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Germany Robert Gregory, Johann

October-December 2010, Vol. 1, No. 4

GuestEditorialPreface

i ImprovingITProjectOutcomesbyConsideringAlternativePerspectives DeepakKhazanchi,UniversityofNebraskaatOmaha,USA StaciePetter,UniversityofNebraskaatOmaha,USA

ResearchArticles

1 CriticalBehavioralCompetenciesforITProjectManagers:WhatAreThey?HowAreTheyLearned?

HazelTaylor,UniversityofWashington,USA JillPalzkillWoelfer,UniversityofWashington,USA20 Establishing Preconditions for Spanning the Boundaries in Public Private IT

Megaprojects RomanBeck,JohannWolfgangGoetheUniversity,Germany OliverMarschollek,JohannWolfgangGoetheUniversity,Germany RobertGregory,JohannWolfgangGoetheUniversity,Germany

38 UsingRealistSocialTheorytoExplainProjectOutcomes MichaelJ.Cuellar,NorthCarolinaCentralUniversity,USA

53 RunawayInformationTechnologyProjects:APunctuatedEquilibriumAnalysis M.KeithWright,UniversityofHouston,USA CharlesJ.CappsIII,SamHoustonStateUniversity,USA

BookReview

80 ManagingItOutsourcingPerformance RicardoColomo-Palacios,UniversidadCarlosIIIdeMadrid,Spain

InternatIonal Journal of InformatIon technology ProJect

management

Table of Contents

Page 4: IJITPM Editorial Board - mkwright.org · Roman Beck, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Germany Oliver Marschollek, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Germany Robert Gregory, Johann

Improving IT Project Outcomes by Considering Alternative

PerspectivesDeepak Khazanchi, University of Nebraska at Omaha, USA

Stacie Petter, University of Nebraska at Omaha, USA

Guest editorial Preface

In the domain of information technology (IT) project management, research has a strong focus on improving project outcomes. Study after study cites statistics that suggest abysmal success rates for IT projects. There are many different research perspectives that can be used to study how project outcomes can be improved. Some research in this area focuses on the skills and knowledge of the project manager. Other research considers the relationships between firms that occur in large, complex, mega-projects. A third research perspective uses theory to shed light on past events to improve our current understanding. In this special sec-tion of the International Journal on IT Project Management, we are pleased to present three articles that consider each of these alternative perspectives to improve project outcomes.

The papers in this special section are select-ed from completed research papers presented at the 4th International Research Workshop on IT Project Management which is sponsored by the Association for Information Systems (AIS) Special Interest Group on IT Project Manage-ment (http://www.SIGITProjMgmt.org). Of the nine completed research papers and six research-in-progress papers, these were considered by peer reviewers as the papers most appropriate to be shared with readers of IJITPM.

IT project managers are the parties that

are most often held accountable for project outcomes. In their study, “Critical Behavioral Competencies for IT Project Managers: What Are They? How Are They Learned?,” Hazel Taylor and Jill Woefler explore the competencies that are most relevant among IT project manag-ers. Using data collected from interviews of project managers, Taylor and Woefler not only identify the most important behavioral compe-tencies that IT project managers rely on in their day-to-day job, but also identify how project managers learned these skills. By consider-ing the competencies of IT project managers and identifying strategies to teach IT project managers these skills, this research offers an interesting perspective about improving project outcomes through the development of better IT project managers.

Within the IT domain, the size of projects can certainly vary. There are classes of projects that are so large, that they can only be consid-ered as “megaprojects.” These megaprojects require extensive cooperation and coordination between multiple organizations to achieve suc-cess. Roman Beck, Oliver Marschollek and Robert Gregory explore this phenomenon in their paper entitled “Establishing Preconditions for Spanning the Boundaries in Public Private Megaprojects.” By reviewing a case study of the Toll-Collect project funded by the German

i

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government, Beck et al. provide insights about the preconditions that are necessary for bound-ary spanning to improve project outcomes in these large, complex projects.

The final paper in the special section introduces Morphogenetic Approach to Analytical Dualism (MAAD) as a theoretical lens to explain the outcomes of IT projects. Michael Cuellar’s paper, “Using Realist Social Theory to Explain Project Outcomes” applies the MAAD theoretical lens to a well-known case study and illustrates some additional insights that can be gleaned from the case by using this alternative perspective when analyzing IT projects. Cuellar challenges researchers to consider if the theory he presents can help researchers better understand IT project outcomes.

These papers offer very different approaches to improve IT project outcomes. We hope the articles will stimulate your thinking and your own research about IT project management.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank John Wang, the Editor-in-Chief, for allowing us the opportunity to present this special section. We also would like to thank the reviewers and participants at the 4th International Research Workshop on IT Project Management for their helpful comments to improve these papers. Finally, we would like to acknowledge the authors that substantially revised their papers from the workshop in a very short time period. We hope you find this special section interesting.

Deepak KhazanchiStacie PetterGuest EditorsIJITPM

ii

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International Journal of Information Technology Project Management, 1(4), 1-19, October-December 2010 1

Copyright © 2010, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Globalis prohibited.

Keywords: Behavioral Competencies, IT Project Management, IT Project Management Knowledge, IT Project Management Skills, Learning, Performance Management

INTRODUCTION

Information Technology (IT) projects have an unenviable reputation for poor performance, with well-publicized failures (Drummond, 1996; Lyytinen, Mathiassen, & Ropponen, 1998) and regular reports of major cost and schedule over-runs (Standish Group, 2001). There is, however, evidence that an experienced project manager, with the right project tools

Critical Behavioral Competencies for IT Project Managers:

What Are They? How Are They Learned?Hazel Taylor, University of Washington, USA

Jill Palzkill Woelfer, University of Washington, USA

ABSTRACTWhat behavioral competencies do experienced IT project managers apply when facing critical situations in their projects, and how have they developed those competencies? In this paper, the authors answer these questions. The authors interviewed 23 experienced IT project managers from 11 organizations, focusing on critical situations that they now managed differently from their earlier, novice, practices, and on how they had learned to develop these different approaches. The authors discuss a variety of management development and training interventions. They use a thematic analysis to identify the key competencies being applied and learning methods experienced by this set of managers. Results suggest that IT project managers are drawing on a different set of competencies from those required for project management in other industries. Additionally, this paper reveals the importance of informal learning channels, often involving project experiences, for the development of IT project management competencies.

and methodology, can increase the likelihood of a successful project (Cooke-Davies, 2002; Sauer, Gemino, & Reich, 2007; Standish Group, 2001). Thus, there is increasing interest and emphasis within research and practice on the need to develop and manage the performance of IT project managers.

While organizations make substantial in-vestments in the development of their functional and line managers, through the provision of general management development initiatives including formal management and leadership DOI: 10.4018/jitpm.2010100101

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2 International Journal of Information Technology Project Management, 1(4), 1-19, October-December 2010

Copyright © 2010, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Globalis prohibited.

training programs, performance appraisals, 360-degree feedback, and management coach-ing, less support is provided for development of project managers (El-Sabaa, 2001). Indeed, surveys of project managers reveal that few organizations provide specific project manage-ment training (Carbone & Gholston, 2004), with the result that project managers are often promoted to their positions based on the techni-cal expertise they have demonstrated in prior projects (Matsuo, Wong, & Lai, 2008; Nellore & Balachandra, 2001) and must develop their project management skills through on-the-job experience (Matsuo et al., 2008) or by taking commercial training programs on their own initiative (El-Sabaa, 2001).

The increasing move towards project-based work in organizations, coupled with the on-going problems in IT project performance, suggest that attention to the development of key knowledge, skills and abilities in project managers could be a fruitful avenue for orga-nizations looking to improve their IT project performance. However, identifying the right focus for training and development efforts for IT project managers is critical if organizations are to get the project performance results they expect from their personnel developmental initiatives.

In this study, we focus on identifying key behavioral competencies that experienced IT project managers apply in critical situations during their management of projects, and we explore the avenues by which these manag-ers have developed these competencies in the course of their careers. By examining both the critical competencies that experienced manag-ers are applying and how they have acquired these competencies, we are able to provide recommendations on effective development and training programs for the next generation of IT project managers. Two key objectives of this study were 1) to determine those competencies that are critical for IT project management; and 2) to identify avenues of learning these competencies that organizations can utilize for improved facilitation of training for less-experienced project managers.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Project Management Skills

Project management is a complex process re-quiring a multi-dimensional set of knowledge, skills and abilities covering the technological and business domains of the project, specific management and project management skills, and interpersonal and communication skills (Kerzner, 2001). Research investigating generic project management skills across a range of industries has highlighted the need for technical, leadership, teamwork and client relationship skills (Brill, Bishop, & Walker, 2006; Kaulio, 2008; Turner & Müller, 2006), as well as identifying the importance of emotional com-petencies such as self-management, resilience and self control (Dainty, Cheng, & Moore, 2003; Dainty, Cheng, & Moore, 2004; Turner & Müller, 2006). As noted by Crawford and Gaynor (1999), these studies have been primar-ily survey-based, seeking respondents’ opinions on the key knowledge and skill requirements of project managers working in many industries.

The IT project context has certain unique features, including high levels of uncertainty and technical complexity, a primary focus on conceptual, rather than physical, work, lower levels of continuity of project personnel from one project to the next, and a myriad group of organizational stakeholders, all of which compound the management of IT projects. Additionally, many IT project managers must assume both internal and external roles, man-aging the in-house project team as well as building and maintaining the relationship with the organization’s clients (Langer, Slaughter, & Mukhopadhyay, 2008; Matsuo et al., 2008; Webber & Torti, 2004). Thus, we might expect that the specific skills required for effective IT project performance may differ somewhat from the generic skills described above.

Some studies have suggested sets of knowledge, skills and abilities that are impor-tant for information systems (IS) professionals in general. Lee, Trauth and Farwell’s (1995) study is one of the seminal works in this area.

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International Journal of Information Technology Project Management, 1(4), 1-19, October-December 2010 3

Copyright © 2010, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Globalis prohibited.

Drawing from the perceptions of a broad range of IS and business managers and consultants about the skill requirements of IS professionals, Lee et al. concluded that the necessary skills fell into four groups: technology management skills; business functional skills; interpersonal skills; and technical skills. More recently, also examining competencies of IT professionals in general, Bassellier and Benbasat (2004) found that business competence, defined as organization-specific knowledge together with interpersonal and management knowledge was a key skill for IT professionals whose work in-volves substantial contact with business clients.

While these studies of the knowledge, skills and abilities required of IS and IT personnel provide some insight into specific requirements for IT project managers, their focus is on IS professionals in general, who might include project managers, but also include project team members, IS department managers and support staff, and IS consultants. Only a handful of studies have focused directly on the specific set of knowledge, skills and abilities that are particularly relevant to IT project managers. Jiang, Klein, and Margulis (1998) looked at whether skills previously specified as important for systems analysts were also important for IT project managers, and identified directing, managing and information seeking as key skills. A subsequent study by Jiang, Klein, and Chen (2001) focused on the importance of leadership skills for successful project outcomes, rein-forcing the importance of the team leadership competency.

More recently, Langer, Slaughter, and Muk-hophyay (2008), in a study of IT outsourcing managers noted that, while hard skills such as technology and domain expertise were nec-essary, soft skills related to managing tasks, self, career, peers, subordinates, superiors and clients were more important for this set of project managers. Finally, Napier, Keil, and Tan (2009) conducted a repertory grid study of 19 IT project managers to elicit their perceptions of the differences between more and less suc-cessful project managers. Napier et al. derived nine skill categories from their interviews:

client management, communication, general management, leadership, personal integrity, planning and control, problem solving, systems development, and team development.

In addition to these empirical research studies, there is also an extensive professional literature providing prescriptive guidelines for best practice in project management. In the United States, the Project Management Insti-tute (2004) provides a series of professional certifications based on standards set out in its Project Management Body of Knowledge (PM-BOK). The PMBOK sets out nine knowledge areas that are claimed to encompass the sum of knowledge recognized as good practice in the project management profession. In addition to these detailed knowledge areas, PMBOK also notes that effective project management requires an understanding of the application area, the project environment, general manage-ment knowledge and skills, and interpersonal skills. In the United Kingdom, the Association for Project Management (APM), reflecting con-cerns that the PMBOK had too narrow a focus on delivering projects to the specified scope, schedule and budget, developed its own APM BOK, offering a greater breadth of knowledge areas, including contextual, technological, commercial and general management topics (Morris, 2001).

While the knowledge base provided in the field’s BOKs provides a foundation of declarative knowledge for the profession, the ability of a project manager to selectively ap-ply the relevant parts of the knowledge in a particular project context, using appropriate skills, is a complex competency, not adequately encapsulated in a body of knowledge alone (Boyatzis, 1982; Spencer & Spencer, 1993). The skills identified in the empirical research discussed earlier relate to these competencies, but researchers have used varying approaches to defining their skills categories, and the cat-egories themselves are often couched in broad, generic terms that provide insufficient detail on the specific competencies required for the project management job. Thus we turn now to the job competency literature for insight into

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the specific competencies that might support effective IT project management performance.

Project Management Competencies

A job competency is an underlying characteristic of a person that is demonstrated through the person’s behavior, and can lead to more effec-tive job performance (Boyatzis, 1982; Spencer & Spencer, 1993). A set of competencies for a particular job comprises the foundational knowledge and skills in the area, together with the necessary behaviors to apply the knowledge and skills effectively in the job context. These competencies can be changed through training and behavior modeling (Burke & Day, 1986; Pescuric & Byham, 1996; Taylor, Russ-Eft, & Chan, 2005), although some are more difficult to change than others.

Building on the knowledge standards in the PMBOK, the PMI has developed a framework of project management competencies (Project Management Institute, 2002), specifying three dimensions of competency required for effec-tive project management performance. These dimensions comprise the declarative knowledge required (that is, the nine knowledge areas of the PMBOK), the procedural knowledge needed to apply the declarative knowledge (performance standards for each knowledge area), and the behavioral competencies necessary to support effective project management performance. For example, a project manager demonstrat-ing declarative knowledge would be able to explain what a project plan is; the manager has procedural knowledge if she knows how to develop a project plan; and finally, she can demonstrate competency by using appropriate behaviors to ensure all stakeholders are involved and fully engaged in developing the project plan. The competency framework is comprehensive and the declarative and procedural knowledge competencies are generally accepted as essen-tial components of any project manager’s skill set. However, the 19 behavioral competencies, shown in the left hand column of Table 1, have been adapted from general managerial com-

petencies listed in the competency dictionary developed by Spencer and Spencer (1993), and have not been empirically tested for their spe-cific applicability to project management work.

There is still little empirical research into the question of the specific behavioral compe-tencies required by project managers to do their jobs (Morris, 2001). One particularly useful program of research in the construction indus-try (Dainty et al., 2004; 2005) has led to the development of an empirically derived compe-tency model, reporting a more tightly focused group of 12 core competencies, shown in the center column of Table 1, that are regarded as critical for effective construction project man-agement performance. Dainty et al. note that two of these competencies – self control and team leadership – were the most predictive of effective construction project management performance. We have not found empirical work testing the applicability of these competencies to IT project managers, and while it seems reasonable to assume that the Dainty et al. (2004, 2005) set of skills would be required, some may not be so important for IT projects, while ad-ditional competencies from the PMI list may be more important in the IT project context.

In particular, as noted earlier, IT project managers are often required to play an espe-cially strong client relationship role (Langer et al., 2008; Matsuo et al., 2008; Webber & Torti, 2004), which requires extensive organization-specific knowledge (Bassellier & Benbasat, 2004). The organization-specific knowledge aspect of Bassellier and Benbasat’s business competence category is broader than the defini-tion of organizational awareness competence derived from Spencer and Spencer’s (1993) competency dictionary, which refers simply to an understanding of the power relationships in the organization. Bassellier and Benbasat’s (2004) definition also encompasses an under-standing of organizational structure and the business impact of IT projects. Since IT project management work typically requires significant interaction with clients and other stakeholders in the organization, this broader view of organi-zational awareness is likely to be an important

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Table 1. Behavioral competencies for project managers (*Expanded definition encompassing Bassellier and Benbasat’s (2004) business competence)

Project Management Institute (2002) Dainty et al. (2004;2005) Definitions for the current study derived from-

Spencer & Spencer (1993)

Self control Composure/self control Maintains control over emotions and avoids nega-tive actions under stress

Team leadership Team leadership Leads others in a team; is able to develop the sense of team purpose and direction to achieve team goals

Directiveness/assertiveness Directiveness/assertivenessShows ability to make others comply with own

wishes through direction, setting of performance standards, and confrontation of non-performance

Achievement orientation Achievement orientation Sets own standards for excellence in works and strives to meet them

Analytical thinking Analytical thinking Systematically understands situations by breaking them into smaller parts in a step-by-step causal way

Flexibility Flexibility Is able to adapt to and work effectively with a variety of situations, individuals, or groups

Teamwork & cooperation Teamwork & cooperation Works cooperatively as part of a team and fosters teamwork

Initiative Initiative Is proactive in taking action to avoid problems or create opportunities

Information seeking Information seeking Actively seeks out in-depth information through research and with others

Conceptual thinking Conceptual thinkingBuilds a larger understanding of a situation by

identifying patterns that are not obviously related, seeing the larger picture

Impact & influence Impact & influence Demonstrates ability to influence others to support own agenda

Customer service orientation Focus on client needs Focuses efforts on understanding and meeting the client’s needs

Interpersonal understanding Is sensitive to, listens to, and wants to understand other people

Relationship buildingWorks to build relationships with people who are, or might someday be, useful in achieving work-

related goals

Developing others Shows the intent to teach others or foster their work development

Organizational awarenessUnderstands the organizational structure and power relationships in own and client organizations; un-derstands business impact of IT and IT projects*

Self confidenceExpresses confidence in ability to deal with

challenging situations and in handling failures constructively

Concern for order, quality and accuracy

Strives to maintain or increase order in the work situation

Organizational commitment Is able and willing to align with the needs, priorities and goals of the organization

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aspect of the necessary competencies, and we adopted the expanded definition shown in the right hand column of Table 1 for the organiza-tional awareness competency.

The behavioral competencies outlined in the PMI’s competency framework, together with Bassellier and Benbasat’s business competence, provide a starting point for examining skills required for IT project management. However, it is likely that some of the required competen-cies are industry and role-specific (Dainty et al., 2005; Morris, 2001) and so further investigation of the requirements for effective performance in the IT field is required. We do not yet know which aspects of the competency framework are essential for IT project managers. Thus, one aim of the current research was to investigate which skills experienced IT project managers regard as critically important components of their project management toolkit.

IT Project Management Skill Development

Understanding the specific skills required for effective IT project management is only the first step. We also need to learn about how best to support the development of project managers in these areas. Two surveys of experienced project managers across a range of industries report that very few organizations have implemented in-house training development programs in the project management area, relying instead on on-the-job experience to develop their project managers (Carbone & Gholston, 2004; Con-ger, 2004). Indeed, there has been a somewhat unquestioning assumption in industry that project managers can be promoted based on their technical ability and that they will some-how absorb the necessary project management skills during their time on projects in a more technical capacity (Carbone & Gholston, 2004; Matsuo et al., 2008; Nellore & Balachandra, 2001). Yet managerial and inter-personal skills are generally rated of higher importance than technical skills for project managers across all industries (El-Sabaa, 2001). This is of particular concern in the IT arena because, as noted earlier,

the expectation that IT project managers will manage both the internal team and external client relationships of the project means that managerial skills are likely to be essential for effective performance.

While organizations may not be initiating project management training, the dramatic increase in project managers holding the PMI Project Manager Professional certification noted by Gray and Larson (2008) – from fewer than 3,000 in 1996 to over 200,000 in 2005 – suggests that individual project managers are taking an increasingly proactive approach to their own professional development. The ex-tensive training and certification opportunities provided by professional associations such as the PMI and the APM can address the develop-ment of the declarative knowledge base that will provide the foundational knowledge required for project managers (Morris, 2001). However, as Crawford (2005) revealed in a very interesting study comparing project managers’ knowledge of the standards encompassed in professional bodies of knowledge such as the PMBOK with their supervisors’ perceptions of their job perfor-mance, a high level of declarative knowledge is not sufficient to guarantee superior performance as judged by the supervisors.

As Crawford’s (2005) study suggests, en-suring that potential IT project managers receive project management training, either through their organizations or their own initiative, will provide a foundational level of knowledge, but the development of procedural skills and behavioral competence typically requires a more situated learning approach, embodying practice, feedback and reflection (Eraut, 2000). Cicmil (2006), drawing on Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ (1986) model, sets out conceptually the typical progress of expertise development in project management from novice, through advanced beginner, competent performer, proficient performer, and finally expert. Practitioners at the novice and advanced beginner levels rely initially on generalized rules derived from a foundation body of knowledge such as PMBOK. With more experience, the practitioners advance to the competent performer level, where they

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understand the importance of the project context and are able to exercise judgment about how and when to apply the rules. Finally, at proficient performer and expert levels, practitioners take a holistic approach, displaying high levels of competence in their decision-making, exercis-ing judgment in a highly reflective manner, and tailoring their approach to each project context. This progression is demonstrated empirically in Matsuo, Wong, and Lai’s (2008) study of career progression of IT project managers and consultants in six Japanese IT firms. Matsuo et al.’s findings reinforce the picture of IT proj-ect managers’ development occurring simply through experience gained on increasingly large and complex projects, with little reference to any organizational support for career planning and training.

While it seems clear that development of high levels of expertise in project management requires experience through exposure to many project situations, this does not mean that project managers should be left to develop these levels of proficiency through a haphazard, trial-and-error process. As McCall Jr. (2004) notes, “People don’t automatically learn from expe-rience.” The challenge for organizations is to provide support to ensure that project managers do in fact learn as much as they can from their normal work experiences (Davies & Easterby-Smith, 1984). Indeed, the typical interventions for developing general management and leader-ship skills in employees do include both formal training programs to develop the declarative knowledge foundation for key competencies and on-going developmental support initiatives aimed at building on this foundation and sup-porting continuous individual development of the procedural knowledge and behavioral com-petencies necessary to be an effective performer in the job (McCauley & Hezlett, 2001). Formal management training programs cover a range of generic knowledge and skills, such as gen-eral management knowledge and interpersonal skills, believed to be important for managers to understand. On-going developmental prac-tices, such as 360-degree feedback, coaching and mentoring, modeling and apprenticeship,

and communities of practice, are aimed at sup-porting employees in their continuous devel-opment in the workplace, and are particularly useful for supporting change in behaviors and transforming understanding in order to guide future action. In particular, apprenticeship op-portunities coupled with support and feedback to encourage reflection and sense-making of the leadership apprenticeship are regarded as valuable approaches for leadership development (Day, 2001; Kempster, 2006).

The prior research discussed above does suggest that organizations are not providing their potential project managers with specific project management training in the foundational knowl-edge area. It might also seem that project manag-ers are expected to be completely autonomous in developing the necessary project-specific procedural knowledge and competencies to further their careers, but most of the required competencies discussed earlier are similar to generic management competencies rather than being specific to the project management job. Thus organizations may rely on more general management and leadership interventions to provide the necessary development training for their project managers, and this is an area that has not been explored.

The Current Study

The research reviewed above has highlighted a framework of knowledge, skills and behav-ioral competencies that are required for project managers, but it is still unclear which aspects of this framework are of critical importance for effective IT project management. In addition, we know little about how best to support project managers in developing the required compe-tencies. Thus in the present study, we focused both on exploring the skills that experienced IT project managers regard as critically important components of their project management toolkit, and how they developed these skills during their careers. Our key objectives were to discover which competencies were critical for IT project management and to understand how individual learning from project experiences can best be

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facilitated. We used the following questions to guide our investigation:

• Which of the skills that experienced project managers have gained during their career do they see as critically important for their project success?

• How have experienced project managers learned these key skills?

• What management developmental in-terventions (such as training programs, coaching, and mentoring) have managers experienced and how have these contrib-uted to their learning?

METHODOLOGY

This research was an in-depth, multiple case study investigation, with the objective of exploring individual IT project managers’ learning. The nature of the study is exploratory and descriptive, because, while there is plenty of literature on learning and development of generic management and leadership skills, little attention has been paid to the challenges of developing specific IT project management competencies. The PMI’s project manager competency development framework (2002) with the expanded definition of organizational awareness, shown in Table 1, provided an initial research model.

Sample

We used a two-stage purposive sampling approach to identify experienced IT project managers for this study. Eleven organizations representing wide variation in terms of type of organization (both specialist IT firms and organizations with IT departments carrying out internal projects) and type of IT project (for example, software development, package implementation, infrastructure upgrades, and internet and intranet projects) were invited to participate. Within each organization, we identified key informants at the CIO, program executive, or senior project manager level and sought nominations from these key informants

of one or two expert project managers within their firm. We then used a snowball approach to seek further participants from the initial set of nominated project managers.

In total, we interviewed 23 project man-agers from the eleven organizations. The re-spondents were experienced project managers, ranging from 5 to 30 years of experience with an average of just less than 14 years. 10 respon-dents held Bachelor’s degrees, 10 had Masters degrees, and three held technical degrees or certificates. The ages of the respondents ranged from 20-29 to over 60, with 10 respondents in the 40-49 age group and 5 respondents in the 50-59 age group. Gender was evenly split (13 male and 10 female). They had typically worked for several different companies during their project management careers, and drew their learnings from across their experiences with these different companies. The respondents had wide experience across a range of project types, including in-house development, web develop-ment, infrastructure upgrades, and customized package implementation work, with varying team sizes, budgets and durations, and reported experience working on a low of 5 to a high of 120 projects during their careers.

Data Collection Procedures

The semi-structured interviews with individual project managers relied largely on the critical incident method (Flanagan, 1954), which has been demonstrated to be effective in surfacing tacit knowledge and in getting beyond respon-dents’ espoused theories (in the present case, about what and how they have learned) to reveal actual practice (in the present case, practice about actual learning) (DuBois, 2002; Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989; Taylor, 2005). Interviews lasted approximately 45-60 minutes. Interviews were tape recorded with the permission of the participants and transcribed. The transcripts were returned to participants for checking and confirmation.

We provided the interview guide to par-ticipants ahead of time, because we believed that they would be able to give more mean-

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ingful responses if they had time to reflect on the questions. While the guide explained our purpose in seeking critical situations in the project manager’s experience that had contributed to his or her learning, we were careful not to seed the guide with any specific skills or competencies, in order to ensure that we captured the respondent’s actual practice, rather than prompting espoused theories about practice. In addition to collecting basic demo-graphic data and details about project experi-ence, the interviews covered three main areas. In the first part, we encouraged respondents to focus on key incidents in their more recent projects where they had applied knowledge or skills differently from the way they would have approached these incidents early in their careers. We examined these incidents with the respondents to understand what skills were now being applied and what, specifically, these ex-perienced project managers now do differently from what they did earlier in their careers. The second stage of the interviews focused on how the respondents learned the key skills they had identified. Again, we focused respondents on identifying the specific learning events that first triggered a change in the way they approached the area under discussion. Finally, we asked project managers about a variety of interven-tions that are used by organizations to develop and improve personnel performance. For each intervention we discussed respondents’ experi-ence with the intervention, and how helpful it had been in terms of their overall development as a project manager.

After thirteen interviews had been com-pleted, we conducted a preliminary analysis, fol-lowing the procedures described in more detail below. We were surprised to find from this initial analysis that the predominant learning method reported for all competencies was reflection on experience, and that formal training was rarely identified, even with respect to the concern for order, quality and accuracy competency, which relies heavily on declarative and procedural knowledge about project management meth-odologies. This finding might have reflected the lack of organizational support for project

managers’ training, but, when we examined the management development initiatives, most of the project managers had participated in training that would be expected to be relevant for the critical learnings that they described. Moreover, most of the project managers reported that they found these management development initiatives at least somewhat useful. However, we realized that in many cases we could not tell whether the formal training had occurred before or after the critical learning experience.

In order to address this gap, we modified the interview protocol to incorporate the capture of an event history calendar - a timeline of key events. Event history calendars draw on auto-biographical memory research, and have been shown to enable respondents to reconstruct the time sequence of past events more completely and accurately, thus usefully augmenting the critical incident method to maximize the qual-ity of retrospective reports (Belli, 1998). In the remaining ten interviews, we first established the respondent’s timeline of key career events, and then asked the respondents to locate their critical learning experiences and management development initiatives on their career timeline.

Analysis Procedures

The initial research model, derived from the PMI’s project manager competency develop-ment framework (Project Management Institute, 2002), provided support for an interpretive prior-research-driven thematic analysis well grounded in the data (Boyatzis, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Ritchie & Spencer, 1994; Spencer & Spencer, 1993). The analysis proceeded in three stages, corresponding to the three research questions that guided our investigation. We first extracted the key learnings identified by each project manager as critical elements in their efforts to ensure project management success, and derived a definition for these learnings, couched in the participant’s own words. Respondents typically spoke of three or four key learnings that they had found critical, providing a total of 89 learnings from this set of project managers. We used the

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framework of competencies shown in Table 1 to categorize the learnings into the underlying competencies that they reflected. Just over two-thirds of the key learnings encompassed more than one competency, which is typical in this kind of competency research (Spencer & Spencer, 1993). One respondent identified a competency related specifically to IT tech-nical expertise, which was not covered by the PMI framework, although it is included in the Spencer and Spencer competency dictionary and was also identified as a critical skill in one (Langer et al., 2008) of the three prior studies on IT project managers’ skills. Thus we expanded the framework to 20 competencies, with 182 instances of these competencies.

For the second question, examining how managers had learned their critical skills, we allowed the categories of methods of learning to emerge naturally from the data, resulting in seven learning methods, as shown in Table 2.

For the third question about the develop-mental interventions experienced by the respon-dents, we summarized those interventions ex-perienced by each participant, and their perceptions of the usefulness to their overall development. Finally, for the ten interviews with event history timelines, we plotted the occurrences of training and critical learning experiences on a timeline in order to determine the sequence of events.

RESULTS

Critical Competencies and Learning Methods

Table 3 shows the number of critical learnings linked to each competency, and the number of project managers describing at least one learning related to each competency. Five of the competencies in Table 3 were evident in skills described by more than one third of the project managers in the present study, namely team leadership; concern for order, quality and accuracy; relationship building; impact and influence; and organizational awareness. The remaining competencies could be identified in less than one third of the respondents, suggest-ing that these areas are of lesser importance for most IT project managers

The two competencies containing the most critical learnings were team leadership, with 29 related learnings and mentioned by 19 of the 23 respondents, and concern for order, quality and accuracy, with 28 related learnings and mentioned by 17 of the 23 respondents. These two competencies together can be seen as representing the key dimensions of project management skills, as described by E2:

Hard skills get you into the business. Soft skills keep you in the business.

Table 2. Learning methods and number of respondents learning with each method

Learning method No. of PMs learning a critical skill with method (out of 23)

Reflection on experience 23

Observation of other PMs 11

Formal training 8

Coach or mentor 8

Performance feedback 6

Communities of practice 2

Independent learning 2

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Similarly, G2 commented:

It’s easy to learn hard skills, [but] it’s really hard to put those to use in a practical environment without the soft skills and a real understanding of why are you doing these things. Because you can go through the mechanics, you can give somebody a step by step ‘here’s what you do’ but projects just never quite go that way and people never respond very well to that.

The team leadership competency was an area that respondents regarded as critically important and on which they focused much on-going energy in honing their skills. As shown

in Table 4, the primary learning method here, and the only learning method for eight of the respondents, was reflection on experience. Six respondents also commented that observation of peers and senior project managers had guided them in their own practice, with three of these noting that such observations helped them learn what not to do. Five respondents described getting feedback from a superior or coaching from a mentor as the trigger for their reflection on experience and subsequent learning. One respondent described applying a formal training on team leadership in her practice.

Not surprisingly, the concern for order, quality and accuracy competency relies heav-

Table 3. Critical learnings and number of respondents describing at least one learning related to competencies

Competency (as defined inTable 1) Number of critical learnings linked to the competency (out

of a total of 89 learnings)

Number of PMs describing at least one learning linked to the competency (out of a total of 23

PMs)

Team leadership 29 19

Concern for order, quality and accuracy 28 17

Relationship building 16 13

Impact & influence 14 11

Organizational awareness 13 9

Achievement orientation 9 7

Flexibility 8 7

Focus on client needs 7 7

Interpersonal understanding 7 7

Initiative 7 6

Teamwork & cooperation 9 5

Information seeking 8 5

Directiveness/assertiveness 6 5

Analytical thinking 7 4

Self confidence 4 4

Developing others 4 3

Self control 2 2

Organizational commitment 2 2

Conceptual thinking 1 1

IT technical knowledge 1 1

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ily on declarative and procedural knowledge about project management methodologies. Ten of the 17 managers reporting a skill related to this competency actually described two critical skills in their toolkit both drawing on this competency, suggesting that concern for order was a foundational project management skill for these respondents. More surprising was how these respondents reported learning about these foundational skills (see Table 4). Only seven

of the 17 managers described formal training as the primary learning method, and all except one of these managers described supplementing their formal learning with at least one other approach, including extensive reflection on their experience, observation of other project managers, interaction in communities of prac-tice, independent learning, and being coached. The remaining ten managers described learning skills related to the concern for order compe-

Table 4. Methods reported for acquiring each competency (Note: Some respondents reported multiple methods for learning critical skills)

Competency (as defined inTable 1)

Reflection on

experience

Observation of other PMs

Formal training

Coach or mentor

Performance feedback

Communities of

practiceOther

Team leadership 14 6 1 3 1 - -

Concern for order, quality and accuracy 13 6 7 2 2 2 1

Relationship building 12 2 - 2 1 - -

Impact & influence 9 1 - 2 1 - -

Organizational awareness 8 1 - 2 - 1 -

Achievement orientation 6 2 - 4 - - -

Flexibility 6 - - - 2 - 1

Focus on client needs 6 1 - 1 - - -

Interpersonal understanding 5 2 - 1 - - -

Initiative 5 2 - 1 - - 1

Teamwork & cooperation 6 - - 1 1 - -

Information seeking 6 2 - 1 - - -

Directiveness/assertiveness 4 1 - 2 - - -

Analytical thinking 3 2 1 - 1 - 1

Self confidence 4 1 - 1 - - -

Developing others 3 1 1 - - - -

Self control 2 1 - - - - -

Organizational commitment 2 - - - - - -

Conceptual thinking - - - - 1 - -

IT technical knowledge 1 - - - - - -

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tency by reflection on experience, supple-mented by performance feedback and mentor-ing (four managers), observation of other project managers (three managers), and interac-tion in communities of practice (one manager).

A further three competencies – relation-ship building, organizational awareness, and impact and influence – were mentioned by at least nine of the 23 respondents. The primary learning method for these three competencies was reflection on experience, with triggers for learning sometimes provided by mentors, performance feedback or observation of other project managers. The relationship building and impact and influence competencies were linked, in that nine of the 16 relationship building learn-ings were also coded to impact and influence, with the managers describing the need to build relationships on a continuous basis in order to have impact and influence to promote the needs of their projects. A ‘currency’ theme was ap-parent in some of the respondents’ approaches to their relationship building and their actions to develop impact and influence. For example, B1 commented:

I [used] to assign work based on authority and position. Now, I work completely through influ-ence … It’s the idea of finding a “currency”. I have to very subtly work with people and have them do something because it’s the right thing to do, because they need to do it. So it’s not di-rect; it’s very subtle. I have to trade experience, knowledge and skill to get work accomplished.

Respondent B5 noted:

Identify all the stakeholders and involve them early, be proactive … a lot of it’s relationships … I’ve kind of viewed it as a bank account - you make deposits when you help somebody and withdrawals when you need help.

The organizational awareness competency was identified in 13 critical learnings described by nine respondents. These respondents dis-played a keen sense of looking beyond the

immediate concerns of the project to address the wider business goals. Considering the overall business goals was of paramount importance for I1:

The first question has to be, ‘are we creating business value?’ And then the second question should be, ‘what role can project management play in that?’ Sometimes that first question doesn’t get adequately addressed, and if it did, sometimes project management wouldn’t actu-ally be the answer.

Similarly, B6 commented:

The first thing I look at when I look at creating a solution …is more at what the business can become actively engaged in. … If a solution is designed and developed, it should be able to encompass the broadest possible benefit as opposed to just looking at what’s being done on a day-to-day basis.

Management Development Initiatives

In the final portion of the interviews we ex-amined what formal learning opportunities the respondents had experienced, and how useful they found these learning occasions. We have seen that, except for the concern for order, quality and accuracy competency, respondents overwhelmingly identified reflection on experi-ence as the primary learning mechanism for their critical skills, and even though formal training was important for the concern for order com-petency, reflection on experience also played a big part in the respondents’ descriptions of their skill development here. We were interested to compare respondents’ perceptions of the learning mechanisms that had been effective for their critical skills development with their views on the usefulness of their organizations’ development interventions.

As can be seen from Table 5, the respon-dents had experienced a wide range of training interventions. All except two respondents had

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participated in formal project management training, most of which was either provided in-house or paid for by their employers. While this training was generally regarded as useful, three who had studied at least some of the Project Management Institute training materials commented that they had not found the material particularly helpful. I1 explained:

They’ve gotten so focused on instituting project management practices that they’ve sometimes lost sight of the fact that ultimately what we’re all trying to do here is to create value for our organizations and project management can be a pathway to doing that, it can be one part of that, but it is a means to an end, not the end itself.

It is also interesting to note that while 16 of the 17 respondents who identified skills re-lated to the concern for order competency had received formal project management training, only seven of these 16 attributed learning their skill to their formal training, even though they may have found the formal training useful. For example, H1 commented about the project management training she received early in her career:

Having the foundation of the training just gives you tools, it gives you processes, it gives you fundamentals to work with so that you aren’t floundering in the dark so much.

Yet, when describing how she learned her skills related to the concern for order, quality and accuracy competency, she referred only to learning by reflecting on her experiences on the job. Notably, she added, when commenting about the project management training:

But don’t think that training necessarily makes you a good project manager. I think that you need to get out and get the experience.

Twenty-two of the 23 respondents had also received a variety of other management train-ings, including general management, leadership, team building, conflict and negotiation, inter-personal, intercultural and presentation skills, and these trainings were generally described as very helpful. Looking at the 19 project manag-ers who identified team leadership as a critical skill, all except one had experienced formal management training related to leadership, team building, conflict and negotiation, or intercul-tural skills – all types of training which might be expected to contribute to a manager’s overall team leadership skill development. However, even though these managers generally com-mented that their various management trainings had been useful – for example J1 commented: “those are the kind of the building blocks that you need to be a good project manager” - only one cited formal training as a major learning method for her team leadership skills. Other than reflection on experience, having a coach or mentor was highly valued by those who had the

Table 5. Development interventions experienced by respondents

Development intervention Number of respondents (out of 23) reporting experience with the intervention

Formal project management training 21

Other management training 22

Performance appraisals 22

Participating in communities of practice 22

Coaching or mentoring 22

360-degree feedback 18

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opportunity to work with someone in this role, as was the opportunity to observe other project managers in action, although in four cases, such observation of other project managers led to a learning about what not to do.

DISCUSSION

It is interesting to compare the competencies identified in this study of IT project managers (in Table 3) with the competencies identified by Dainty et al. (2004, 2005) for construction project managers (in Table 1). Three of the five most frequently mentioned competencies in the present study – concern for order, qual-ity and accuracy; relationship building; and organizational awareness – do not appear in Dainty et al.’s set. Additionally, Dainty et al. found self control and team leadership were the most predictive competencies for effective performance of construction managers, and while team leadership was the most frequently mentioned competency in the present study, self control was only identified in critical learnings described by two project managers. These results suggest that IT project managers may be drawing on quite a different skill-set from construction managers.

The two most highly mentioned competen-cies found in the present study – team leadership and concern for order, accuracy and quality - cor-respond to two types of training - management and project management - that were experienced by almost all of our respondents. Yet the formal trainings the project managers received did not feature prominently in their descriptions of learning methods for these competencies. Those managers who did mention formal project management training as a learning method for the concern for order competency typically described two or three additional experiential methods for their development in this skill, while reflection on experience was the primary learning method for team leadership skills.

We were surprised at the disconnect be-tween the positive evaluations of organization-initiated training experiences and the lack of mention of these training experiences in the methods of learning identified by respondents for their critical skills. As noted in the Meth-odology section, we thought initially that our interview protocol may have contributed to this disconnect, so for the final ten respondents, we anchored the learnings described during the in-terview against the career timeline, providing an opportunity for the respondents to recall events such as training that occurred at the same time as the learning incident. The timelines revealed that the provision of specific project manage-ment training often did not occur until later in the respondent’s career, most likely after the manager had already acquired the skills expe-rientially, thus providing a possible explanation for the disconnect related to project management training. General management training was usually provided in a timely fashion early in the managers’ careers and so might have been expected to feature more highly in the methods of learning. However, the critical learnings de-scribed by the respondents typically came from quite recent projects, even though their project management careers spanned decades, suggest-ing that a key underlying competence of these project managers may be related to the ability to build on early formal training and engage in on-going learning throughout their careers.

Indeed, we were struck by the descriptions from some respondents of the extent of their self motivation for learning and their active reflection on their experiences. Two managers described their practice of maintaining a jour-nal, while a third described his own reflective practices: “I make a mindmap and notes for myself.” Respondent B6 commented that he actively sought out developmental assignments in a spirit of continuous learning: “Even if you crash and burn, which I have as well, you learn why.” And B5 commented: “I believe I’m still learning, and probably always will be. If I ever think I’ve learned it all I think I’ll be in trouble.”

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IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND PRACTICE

The first key objective for this study was to iden-tify specific competencies that are important for IT project managers and the results presented here have identified a set of competencies largely different from those previously found to be important for construction project managers. Thus these results provide some support for the argument that project management competen-cies are industry-specific (Morris, 2001). Ad-ditionally, some competencies from the PMI competency framework (Project Management Institute, 2002) – team leadership, concern for order, quality and accuracy, relationship build-ing, impact and influence, and organizational awareness - appear to be more important for IT project managers than other competencies. While the current study is exploratory and further work is required to substantiate these findings, organizations would be wise to pro-ceed cautiously before assuming that project management skills in one practice arena can be automatically translated into relevant skills in another area.

Further research is also needed to examine which of the competencies are predictive of superior performance, and a follow-up study is under way to develop a validated competency model for IT project managers. Such a model can be used to aid selection and training and development decisions, as well as for career planning and performance management.

The second objective of the study – how IT project managers have learned their skills and competencies - related to the question of how organizations can best support the development of project managers throughout their careers. Clearly, the inter-relationship between training events and subsequent learning is a complex one requiring further in-depth research, but it seems evident that different kinds of support are required as the project manager advances through the stages of expertise development described earlier, of novice through competent performer to expert (Cicmil, 2006; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). We speculate that while

formal training alone is not enough to foster the development of a particular skill, it may provide the necessary foundation for subsequent experiential learning to occur. It is particularly of concern that the group of project managers in the present study, for the most part, did not receive specific formal project management training early in their careers so that they had a basis from which to develop. Without a solid foundation of the basic declarative knowledge relevant to the profession, practitioners are left to gain their knowledge and expertise in a haphazard and trial-and-error fashion, which exposes the organization to risks of poor project management performance through lack of basic skills, and can also result in managers reaching relatively high levels in the organization while still having significant gaps in their basic project management knowledge. Thus organizations could well benefit substantially, in terms of project performance, by instituting early formal project management training for potential proj-ect managers in order to provide the necessary foundation for their future development.

Finally, as noted earlier, even with the foundational declarative knowledge in place, procedural knowledge and behavioral compe-tence are more likely to develop in a situated learning environment, where trainees have the opportunity to practice the skills that have been addressed in the formal situation and to get feedback and reflect on their practice (Eraut, 2000). The project managers in the current study were striking for the depth of their reflections and persistence in seeking out learning oppor-tunities. Thus, organizations wishing to foster project management skills in their personnel may find that developing a supportive environ-ment and encouraging self reflective practices such as journaling and a life-long learning attitude could be a productive development route for junior project managers. In addition, organizations would be well advised to plan formal trainings and developmental assign-ments that are supported with apprenticeship or mentoring relationships between senior and junior project managers and constructive feedback on performance.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This research was funded in part by the Institute for Innovation in Information Management (I3M) at The Information School, University of Washington, under the Transfer of Learning Across IT Projects project.

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Hazel Taylor is an Assistant Professor at the Information School, University of Washington, Seattle. She holds a Ph.D. from Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia. Prior to joining the Information School, Dr. Taylor taught at the University of Waikato in New Zealand, and at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and conducted research in Hong Kong on risk management and tacit knowledge in IT projects. Her teaching and research focuses on IT project management and risk management with an emphasis on tacit knowledge and deci-sion making in these areas. Dr. Taylor has published a number of articles and book chapters on aspects of project management, risk management, outsourced projects, tacit knowledge and decision making. Prior to her academic career, Hazel worked in industry with manufacturing, construction and government organizations, both as a systems manager and an IT project manager.

Jill Palzkill Woelfer is a PhD student in Information Science at the Information School. Jill has extensive professional experience working in IT-related functions in the medical products manu-facturing sector. Since 2008, she has worked as a research assistant for the Institute for Innovation in Information Management on projects focused on the learning and behavioral competencies of IT project managers, and on a project regarding critical success factors for geographically dispersed technology teams. Jill is an alumna of the Executive Master of Science in Information Management program, and also pursues research in the role of information technologies in life skills development of homeless young people.

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Keywords: Boundary Spanning, Information Technology, IT Megaprojects, Public Private Partnerships, Trust Formation

INTRODUCTION

Public sector organizations are continuously searching for opportunities of optimizing the effectiveness and efficiency of their admin-istrative processes. These information-based processes, such as the request for a valid identification card, are the core business of public administration work. Carrying out these

Establishing Preconditions for Spanning the Boundaries in

Public Private IT MegaprojectsRoman Beck, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Germany

Oliver Marschollek, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Germany

Robert Gregory, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Germany

ABSTRACTInter-organizational cooperations between public and private partners, called public private partnerships (PPP), are increasingly gaining more importance concerning renewal, standardization, and optimization of the information technology (IT) infrastructure of public sector organizations. Reasons for this trend include the search for partners with necessary technological and innovative knowledge of sourcing IT and the iden-tification of cost-saving potentials. Unfortunately, IT-PPP-cooperations are particularly susceptible to failure due to the clash of different cultures. Divergent understandings, expectations, and pressure from the relevant stakeholders hinder a working partnership. Therefore, in this exploratory, qualitative single-case study from the German TollCollect IT megaproject, the authors draw on findings from boundary spanning literature to explain how establishing preconditions for boundary spanning and actively bridging the gap between the partners, moderated by external stakeholder support, affects the formation of mutual trust and success of an IT-PPP-megaproject.

processes requires special administrative, regu-latory, and legal know-how. Hence, outsourc-ing the provision of these services to a private sector agent (Dibbern, Goles, Hirschheim, & Jayatilaka, 2004) is no valid option for public sector organizations due to the knowledge gap of private industry of public structures and the responsibility of public administra-tion to deliver administrative services to the citizens themselves (Hodge & Greve, 2007). However, the increasing demand for delivering

DOI: 10.4018/jitpm.2010100102

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innovative information technology (IT)-based services to citizens and the lack of technological and innovative know-how on the public side requires the exchange and cooperation with private companies to acquire the necessary IT resources. For these reasons, involving the sourcing of necessary technological know-how and IT infrastructure optimization of public sector organizations, the public administration often enters into technological alliances with private industry partners, called public private partnerships (PPP) (Reijniers, 1994). Consid-ering the necessity of cooperation, PPPs allow for an opportunity for long-term, strategic co-operation focused on innovation using the core competences of both sides (Trafford & Proctor, 2006). Furthermore, this approach creates the possibility of realizing cost reductions, sharing risks, and raising new financial models for the public administration. In addition, PPPs are also gaining importance in IT megaprojects since increasingly public infrastructure projects are large IT projects rather than brick and mortar infrastructure projects as in the past (Brooks, 1987; Venugopal, 2005). IT megaprojects are unique, innovative multibillion-dollar invest-ments which are affected by political and public stakeholders (Davies, Gann, & Douglas, 2009; Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 2005) and often do not meet the desired goals (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005; Nelson, 2007). Although the number of research contributions on IT project manage-ment practices in a purely private context (Cule, Schmidt, Lyytinen, & Keil, 2000; Kappelman, McKeeman, & Zhang, 2006; Sumner, Bock, & Giamartino, 2006) and success factors in the context of PPPs is increasing (Jacobsen & Choi, 2008; Jost, Dawson & Shaw, 2005; Trafford et al., 2006), we still have a lack of understanding of how IT-PPP-megaprojects can be successfully turned around in case of a failing course of action.

Hence, we conducted an exploratory, qualitative single-case study of the German TollCollect case to analyze how this IT-PPP-megaproject, which was on the verge of failure, finally succeeded. Preliminary research results and the initial setting of the project were already

discussed in Beck and Möbs (2006). TollCollect is the German satellite-based toll collecting sys-tem for heavy trucks. With more than €3 billion of revenue streams per year and €2 billion costs for development and installation of the system, the TollCollect project is not only the single-largest PPP project ever carried out in Germany, but also the largest IT development project in Europe in the years from 2002 to 2005. Public and private partners in this project had to cope with challenges that gradually led to an initial breakdown of cooperation. However, this down-turn was stopped by spanning the boundaries and reestablishing the partnership through the formation of trust between public and private parties leading to a successful implementation of the TollCollect system. Therefore, this case offered an interesting opportunity to answer the following research question: “How can the establishment of preconditions for boundary spanning and boundary spanning activities themselves reestablish a working partnership in IT-PPP-megaprojects?”

Public private cooperation requires bridg-ing the gap of different cultural environments. Recent research on public private megaprojects has extended the external view of ongoing difficulties during their realization (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005) concerning project performance, budget and on-time delivery to an internally-focused view of actual practices in the light of project design and culture (van Marrewijk, Clegg, Pitsis, & Veenswijk, 2008). The cultural distance in these partnerships necessitates the exploration of boundary spanning practices for establishing a working partnership. Boundary spanning in this context deals with understand-ing, acknowledging, and respecting the different interests, values, norms, expectations, and regu-lations of the different cultural environments (Williams, 2002). Organizational research so far has focused on spanning the boundaries within organizations, between organizations, and between organizations and their environment (Leifer & Delbecq, 1978; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005). Prior information systems (IS) research has mainly concentrated on evaluating the ef-fects of the use of IT for boundary spanning in

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organizations and collaborations in offshoring projects (Levina & Vaast, 2006, 2008). Further-more, prior PPP research has already shed light on the role and behaviors of boundary spanning managers during the establishment of PPPs (Noble & Jones, 2006). However, considering ongoing difficulties during the realization of IT-PPP-megaprojects, we still need to know how to reestablish a working partnership for turning around IT-PPP-megaprojects in case of a failing course of action. In addition, concerning the use of boundary spanning activities, there is little research on the necessary precondi-tions for the effective installation of boundary spanners on the organizational level. Therefore, we also studied the necessary preconditions to contribute to the boundary spanning literature.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The following section discusses boundary spanning as a theoretical foundation. The next section presents our selected research methodology, employing the grounded theory method (GTM). After a brief introduction to the case, we explain the results from our theory-building case analysis and present the emerged model of boundary spanning in the context of IT-PPP-megaprojects. The final section of the paper presents the theoretical and practi-cal contributions and provides directions for future research.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

As we started searching for theoretical support during the data analysis, we found insights in the extant literature on antecedents of bound-ary spanning, boundary spanning activities and trust formation, as well as the role of manage-ment during this process. Boundary spanning has already been analyzed on various levels (individual, team and organizational level) and in different disciplines (e.g., management and IS literature). On an individual level, bound-ary spanning literature concentrated so far on evaluating the functions (Aldrich & Herker, 1977), characteristics (Tushman, 1977), and the antecedents of boundary spanning roles (Tush-

man & Scanlan, 1981). Furthermore, empirical studies on an individual level of analysis focused on the differentiation of boundary spanning roles (Friedman & Podolny, 1992) and the individual skills, competencies and behaviors of bound-ary spanners (Williams, 2002). More recent literature explores boundary spanning on a team level of analysis, identifying the effects of the cultural orientation of team members on bound-ary spanning (Golden & Veiga, 2005). A further main focus of boundary spanning literature on a team level of analysis is the identification of factors influencing team member engagement in boundary spanning (Marrone, Tesluk, & Carson, 2007) and the exploration of the effects of antecedents on team boundary spanning behavior (Joshi, Pandey, & Han, 2009). More-over on an organizational level, management literature has developed a model of boundary spanning activities to explain the relation between organizations and their environment (Leifer et al., 1978) and explored how bound-ary spanning activities affect organizational dynamics between different organizational settings (Robertson, 1995). On the other hand, IS literature has focused on how the use of IT facilitates working across boundaries in joint cooperations (Levina & Vaast, 2005; Pauleen & Yoong, 2001) and how IT can help to deteriorate boundaries within organizations (Levina et al., 2006). Furthermore, IS literature has analyzed how country and organizational contexts affect boundaries and status differences in IS develop-ment projects (Levina, 2006; Levina et al., 2008) and how different types of IS affect IT´s role in boundary spanning activities (Lindgren, Ander-sson, & Henfridsson, 2008). PPP literature has extended these research results by examining the roles and behaviors of boundary-spanning managers during the establishment of PPPs (Noble et al., 2006). However, our research concentrates on exploring the organizational preconditions and the necessary task-oriented boundary spanning activities for reestablishing a working partnership in IT-PPP-megaprojects in case of a failing course of action which was one of the main emerging issues during our data collection and analysis.

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Public sector organizations are dependent on specialized private companies for achiev-ing operational efficiency and effectiveness, reducing financial deficits, and acquiring the necessary technological resources (Robertson, 1995). These technological alliances between public and private parties are based on formal contracts, providing the legal framework for cooperating, which are often accomplished in the form of a PPP. However, formal contracts are not able to cover every possible risk scenario. Therefore, successful public private collabora-tion comprises more than designing an explicit contract and dealing with legal restrictions. It is also about managing the informal aspects of the relationship such as mutual trust (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002). Prior PPP research has already confirmed that mutual trust affects the success of PPP projects (Jacobsen et al., 2008; Jost et al., 2005). Consequently, underpinning divergences between the parties in a PPP are obstacles for the establishment of a successful partnership such as divergent expectations and interests which are anchored in their different cultural backgrounds (Reijniers, 1994).

Collaboration between public and private partners is often used to realize IT megaprojects (Clegg, Pitsis, Rura-Polley, & Marosszeky, 2002; Flyvbjerg et al., 2005) while their success strongly depends on the management ability how to deal with conflicting interests (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005). Conflicting interests in a PPP are anchored in different socio-cultural environ-ments (van Marrewijk, 2007). Bridging these different interests, managers in a PPP need to have an unprejudiced view and understand the different motivation of the participating parties which is the foundation for an unbiased rela-tionship (Williams, 2002). Besides, boundary spanning activities depend on expertise about different socio-cultural backgrounds which encompasses, among others, the knowledge of project management approaches and goals from the private side and regulatory as well as legal restrictions from the public side (Lindgren et al., 2008). Finally, the basic precondition for enforcing changes between public and private parties is formal power enabling the manage-

ment of PPPs to give instructions and directions to the participating parties in this kind of part-nership (Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992). Form-ing a cooperation between public and private parties however does not necessarily indicate that employees working for the partnership are disciplinary and functionally assigned to the new partnership and that they need to follow instructions from the management in charge.

Overcoming organizational boundaries can be achieved by boundary spanners who are individuals mediating between groups separated by location, hierarchy or function and sharing their expert knowledge (Pawlowski & Robey, 2004; Wenger, 1998). In order to create an en-vironment of trust and understanding between public and private parties, boundary spanners need to protect the parties from external pres-sure (e. g., public and political) and have to foster information exchange within and across teams (Leifer et al., 1978). Achieving transpar-ency between the parties and guaranteeing the security of not being blamed for failure during the realization of a joint project fosters open communication. In this case, open communica-tion about group-specific knowledge supports a learning environment and enables the pos-sibility of aligning different interests which is one of the main factors for the success of PPPs (Lindgren et al., 2008).

Accordingly, shared goals and a mutual understanding level the way for the develop-ment of trust and belief in PPP success (Wil-liams, 2002). Trust is the psychological state in which an individual accepts the vulner-ability relying on positive expectations of the intentions of others concerning their behavior (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). Important obstacles for the establishment of a trust-based partnership are diverging interests and cultural differences (Rosenau, 1999). The reestablishment of the partnership through trust formation can only be achieved by resolving discrepancies in mutual understanding, meeting the expected outcome conditions of the project and reinforcing trust (Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009; Williams, 2002). Hence, the necessary precondition for successfully managing IT-PPP-

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megaprojects is the establishment of a working partnership in which the partners cooperate with a single vision of project outcomes (Levina et al., 2005). Building upon prior IS research; we analyze boundary spanning phenomena at the inter-organizational level integrating the views of both, the private and public side. One of our core categories, trust formation, emerged from our analysis following GTM which we explain in more detail in the following section.

METHODS

We entered the field without any preconceived concepts or frameworks in mind, focusing on understanding failure in IT-PPP-megaprojects and how these projects can be successfully turned around which currently is not explored sufficiently. Therefore, we conducted an explor-atory, qualitative, interpretive single-case study using a GTM approach which is predestined for under-researched areas. This methodological approach can be used for discovering deep insights and understandings of the underly-ing structures and the context of phenomena (Hughes & Jones, 2003). By invitation of one of the leading corporations responsible for the development of TollCollect, we gained access to primary data, consisting of 12 qualitative expert interviews with leading managers of the public and the private side in the TollCollect project, and secondary data, including extensive docu-mentation of the historical development of toll collection on German highways. The interviews were the primary basis for our interpretative, qualitative single-case study (Walsham, 1995a, 1995b; Yin, 2003) of the German TollCollect case. On average, the interviews lasted from 52 minutes to 3 hours and 45 minutes each. The interviewees were carefully selected accord-ing to their role in the project, their position in the hierarchy, and affiliation to the project´s stakeholders, discovering insights of the project from a dyadic perspective (public and private side). All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed which resulted in 1003 recorded audio minutes and 246 pages of transcrip-

tions. Secondary material was analyzed to enable further comparisons and triangulation of findings. In addition, an analysis of press articles that appeared during the time period of the project was conducted for triangulation purposes. The first semi-structured interviews were held in an open-ended fashion and were conducted in May 2006. Following the GTM technique ‘theoretical sampling’, these initial interviews were first openly coded and analyzed, identifying discrete concepts and categories to guide subsequent data collection and analysis efforts. For coding purposes, the software Atlas.ti (Muhr, 2008) was used. Over time, the core categories started to emerge from the data and our analytical efforts became more focused. The last semi-structured interviews with a more specific focus on the core themes were conducted in June 2007. Besides, emphasis was also given to investigator triangulation, meaning that we conducted the analysis in a group of multiple researchers. The first analysis phase of open coding generated a list of approximately 330 descriptive and partly overlapping codes. Triangulation and conceptualization efforts (following the constant comparison method) led to the consolidation of the codes, constantly comparing the data according to similarities and differences and assigning multiple data incidents to a common meaning.

Following GTM (Glaser, 1978; Glaser & Strauss, 1967), our model was driven by the anal-ysis of the case study, constant comparison with extant literature, and evaluation of secondary data. The extant literature solely served as guide or sensitizing device for constant comparisons to support the conceptualization process. Our initial data collection and analysis steps focused on generating concepts and categories. Over time, we reached a point of theoretical saturation (Eisenhardt, 1989) and started to integrate our findings (Glaser, 1978). Our data collection and analysis efforts were deeply intertwined with each other. Initial analysis results were already generated in the second half of 2007. As the analysis was intensified especially during the first half of 2009, the core categories emerged from the data. During our analysis, we used the

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extant literature as slices of data to be compared with primary and secondary data. Furthermore, we analyzed the case among multiple research-ers to triangulate their different perspectives. The process of conceptualizing continued in a similar way. After identifying the indicators for the concepts in the data, we compared literature on boundary spanning related to our findings and aligned it with them. In addition, we used the extant literature as guide for enhancing the theoretical foundation of our research model. Using the extant literature as sensitizing device, we were able to develop the concepts of “bound-ary spanning activities” and “trust formation” and their relations to “preconditions of boundary spanning activities”, as well as even identify new concepts which also emerged from the data (i. e., external stakeholder support). The result of our research is a model of establishing the necessary preconditions for spanning the boundaries in public private IT megaprojects.

THE GERMAN TOLLCOLLECT CASE

As often when ‘innovation on demand’ is or-dered, the German TollCollect IT megaproject (www.tollcollect.de) was prone to high risks and potential project failure from the very beginning. The idea of building an automatic toll collecting system for heavy trucks was first born in 1994 by federal government. In November 1998, the of-ficial political announcement was made to build a toll collecting system for the German autobahn for heavy trucks. This announcement triggered the interest of a large number of multi-national companies. Subsequently, several commercial syndicates emerged to join the necessary core competencies for this project such as telemat-ics, automobile know-how, experience with toll collection, as well as bearing the financial risk. After a long and difficult commercial tendering procedure beginning in December 1999, the German Federal Ministry of Trans-port engaged the private companies Deutsche

Telekom, DaimlerChrysler Financial Services and the French freeway operator Cofiroute as the executing syndicate ‘TollCollect’ in Sep-tember 2002. Both, the tendering procedure and project realization were influenced by several law suits filed by competing bidders during the tendering procedure and the European Union during the realization. These law suits were a major obstacle for TollCollect concerning the start of operations.

‘TollCollect’ is the joint venture company which was founded for the cooperation with the German Federal Ministry of Transport. Not only were the private companies within TollCol-lect involved in this project, but also several suppliers which were for example providing parts of the technical infrastructure. Besides the numerous players on the private side, the stakeholders on the public side consisted of politics, the German Federal States, and the European Union which also were involved in project realization. The initiators of TollCol-lect in Germany had the ambitious goal to design and develop the first satellite-based toll collecting system in the world, based on the global system for mobile communications (GSM) standard and the satellite-based global positioning system (GPS). The project was carried out in cooperation between public and private partners and eventually started operating on January 1st, 2005.

The system’s infrastructure is formed by over 600,000 on-board-units installed into European trucks (which had to be updatable via GSM) and 300 enforcement bridges over-arching the autobahn for an effective control-ling. The on-board-unit (OBU) is a fat client for collecting traffic data records as well as sending the mileage data accumulated to the central TollCollect accounting system. The enforcement bridges are equipped with cameras and scales embedded into the autobahn for a visual control of the trucks, weight control, and for counting the number of axles. If a truck is not logged into the TollCollect system then an automatic check against the German license

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plate register (or registers from other European countries) is made to identify the owner and send a ticket. The TollCollect system was designed to automatically detect and charge the use of a defined roadway system depending on the emission class, weight, and number of axles of a truck. An automatic, satellite-based as well as a manual, terminal-based booking functionality was required. Although the completion was delayed several times, finally the implementa-tion of the toll collecting system succeeded on January 1st, 2005 (Rehring, 2006).

The initial problems resulted from mis-matching divergent understandings and expecta-tions between public and private parties which eventually caused the termination of the formal contract between TollCollect and the German Federal Ministry of Transport and a rising public interest. Although TollCollect was officially disengaged, the chief executive officers of Deutsche Telekom and DaimlerChrysler were still trying to achieve a mutual consent directly with the German chancellor. TollCollect devel-oped an amended project realization concept and hence publicly announced the successful renegotiation of the formal contract with the German chancellor on March 1st 2004. The new project realization concept contained a possible project start for January 1st 2005 with a technical solution that provided only a reduced number of features. The remaining set of functionalities should be implemented in a second roll out phase by January 1st 2006. After the success-ful renegotiation, TollCollect replaced their top management from DaimerChrysler with leading managers from Deutsche Telekom and changed the operative leadership of project realization to Deutsche Telekom. Overcoming the initial divergent understandings and expectations of the different fields of practice contributed to reestablish a working partnership. However, before boundary spanning and reestablish-ment of a working partnership was possible, TollCollect had to make a radical change in its leadership and management style as we will illustrate in the following section.

CASE ANALYSIS

Preconditions for Boundary Spanning

Since the project faced tremendous difficulties due to grown distrust and miscommunication, before any boundary spanning activity could have been applied successfully the right precon-ditions had to be in place which was illustrated by a member of the new management team:

Taking over the operative leadership of the project, we discovered a situation of reciprocal finger-pointing and resistance of starting over new. Before restarting the project and fulfilling our mission, this attitude had to be changed which was one of our hardest challenges.

In the case of TollCollect, that meant establishing an unbiased relation between the new TollCollect management and the public stakeholders, acquiring expertise in public administration areas of practice, as well as the power to enforce changes. These preconditions played an important role for successfully bridg-ing the divide between the parties.

The change in leadership became ultimately necessary because of the deterioration of mutual trust. The relation between the parties needed to be reestablished due to divergent understandings and expectations. Consequently, reestablishing the relationship was only possible by a radical change which was stated by a leading manager of the public side:

TollCollect had started a complete reengineer-ing of project structures which included a drastic replacement of human resources. This was the basic precondition for a project restart because we still believed that the old management had not communicated every emerging problem.

Establishing an unbiased relationship by changing the management showed the public

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authorities TollCollect´s willingness to com-plete the project successfully. The formation of the management team was related to different governance issues such as the mediation of a basis for mutual trust, representing the interests of both parties, and finally having access to the informal network of all stakeholders (Cross & Prusak, 2002; Friedman et al., 1992). Hence according to our analysis, it was necessary from both sides of the PPP to establish a management team without a tainted relationship. Consider the following remark of a leading manager from the public side which illustrates the atmosphere in the project at that point of time:

The change in management was inevitable for achieving project´s goals because mutual trust was deteriorated. Replacing people who had not communicated the ongoing problems openly had a signaling effect for the renewal of the relation.

The new managers were chosen due to their experience and qualification as successful crisis managers in other projects. Furthermore, TollCollect became aware of the necessity to install a management team which was familiar with the cultural background and administrative requirements of the public partner. In addition, the management team also needed to be aware of the processes and governance structures on the private side, identifying the key people who are necessary for realizing the project success-fully which was revealed by a leading manager of TollCollect:

After the decision to form a new management team, we knew that we needed somebody who can deal with our public partner because we were not able to realize the project without their support. At the same time, this person needed to be knowledgeable about the specialties of private industry and have the necessary insider know-how.

The change of the management team also initiated a change in the communication style

to open and timely exchanges. This change empowered them to align the formerly divergent expectations and take into account political constraints articulated by public stakeholders. Soon after the installation of the new manage-ment, mutual understanding and respect for the achievements were bridging the divide between the public and private party, as a leading manager from TollCollect remarked:

The new management carefully avoided further confrontations with public authorities, intensi-fied open communication, solved the technical complexity of the project, and finally fostered the emergence of a team spirit between the parties.

The familiarity of the new management with decision-making processes within public authorities, as well as their open communication style, enabled them to bridge the initial divide between the parties as a crucial precondition for reestablishing the relationship which is con-firmed by IS literature (Pawlowski et al., 2004; Wenger, 1998). The integration of knowledge about both participating fields of practice al-lowed for the establishment of a collaborative environment and the foundation for information exchange (Lindgren et al., 2008). Furthermore, the TollCollect management introduced and cultivated a new participatory leadership model to strengthen a common understanding among the project team members. Enforcing a shift in the relation between management and employ-ees as well as to all stakeholders was necessary for finally delivering the toll collecting system. The use of formal power in this case supported that the employees within TollCollect now were identifying with the project, for example by installing clear governance and responsi-bility structures and requiring the employees to report every single problem immediately. These management actions convinced the em-ployees of their importance for the success of the project. The concept of formal power has already been identified as an important factor for the change of behavior in management and IS literature (Bloomfield et al., 1992; Jasper-son, Carte, Saunders, Butler, Croes, & Zheng,

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2002). However, in our analysis ‘formal power’ plays an important role for establishing the preconditions for boundary spanning. Align-ing different interests could only be achieved by first underlining the importance of every employee, component supplier as well as the public authorities for the success of the project. In doing so, a mentality change took place that fostered also the emergence of a cooperative culture with stakeholders outside of TollCol-lect, as remarked by a leading manager from the private side:

The expertise and experience as well as the formal position enabled the new management team to change the way of collaborating within the syndicate, with component suppliers, and public authorities.

Boundary Spanning Activities

Changing the management team and starting a shift in the working culture of the project, the primary task of the new management team now was strengthening the initial euphoria and motivation of all participants within TollCollect. Reestablishing a working partnership through the formation of mutual trust as well as belief in project success was determining the future course of action of the project which was stated by a leading manager of the private side:

At that point of time, most of the people working for TollCollect were still motivated to continue the realization of the project, although they had sacrificed their free-time and family life for the project and their effort was always judged as failure by the public media. The continuous external influence exacerbated strengthening the belief in project success.

After setting the preconditions for the formation of mutual trust by triggering the es-tablishment of the organizational preconditions for boundary spanning, the new management had to shield their employees from the enormous public pressure. It was important to allow for an

open, even critical discussion of problems while guaranteeing that nobody will be fired or even be blamed publically. In doing so, the TollCol-lect team was able to work on problem solu-tions in spite of the constant external pressure. Creating a shielded environment for resolving difficulties in the realization of TollCollect, as well as managing the alignment of interests can be regarded as the central boundary spanning activities, as the following statement illustrates:

Due to the project status and the situation be-tween the parties, political influence had to be shielded away. In order to relieve the blockades of talking openly about technical problems, political discussions as well as media cover stories had been kept away from developers and engineers.

After creating a safe environment, openly talking about technical, managerial, and legal problems was enforced by the new manag-ers. Protecting the cooperating parties from external pressure as well as fostering mutual exchange of information facilitated the col-laboration. Comparing organizational and IS research results from an inter-organizational, purely private context with our findings, we identified similar boundary spanning activities in a public private environment (Leifer et al., 1978). Furthermore, we found great fit in the data that “shielding from external influences” was the primary boundary spanning activity that had to be conducted to mediate between the parties. In addition, open communication to all stakeholders created a situation of total transparency concerning project status. Only a joint approach could avoid another breakdown of cooperation which was confirmed by a lead-ing manager from TollCollect:

Total transparency and engaging every single person working for the project was the only solution for project success. Furthermore, explaining that everyone was important for achieving the overall goal gave further motiva-tion to the participants.

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Total transparency and fostering open communication was not only important for solv-ing technical, managerial and legal problems within the private syndicate, but also for man-aging the relation to the public side. Openness about the current status of project realization and additional open discussions with further stakeholders from all kinds of public admin-istrations reinforced the formation of mutual trust. This was stated by a leading manager on the public side:

In-time project realization was only possible if the relationship was based on openness. Technical problems as well as obstacles in negotiations with the different stakeholders had to be communicated internally before the media publicly announced it.

Openly communicating group-specific knowledge between the parties caused a learn-ing atmosphere and was the basis for the start of renegotiating the formal and informal con-tract. Shifting the organizational culture within the project towards open communication and close coordination enabled TollCollect to avoid misunderstandings of mutual expectations, for example by setting up a joint testing procedure together with the German Federal Ministry of Transport. Consider the following remark of a leading manager from the private side:

Agreeing on a joint testing scope between TollCollect, the German Federal Ministry of Transport, and the independent system reviewer supported the development of mutual trust and belief in the success of the project.

Divergent understandings and expectations which initially led to frustrations culminating into massive trust decline could have been prevented in this newly instantiated environ-ment. Bridging the gap between the parties by openly sharing expectations and understandings improved the formation of trust and created the basis for the alignment of interests, team building and admitting compromises. Our find-

ings aggregate prior research results from an individual perspective on boundary spanning capabilities to a task-oriented, organizational view on boundary spanning activities (Wil-liams, 2002). Aligning divergent interests ultimately enabled TollCollect to realize the project successfully, as a manager from Toll-Collect mentioned:

The new shared understanding between the parties was driven by open communication and a joint motivation concerning project realiza-tion. Finally, political constraints concerning technical requirements were not carved in stone anymore. Both parties had realized that only mutual compromises would lead to project success.

The Moderating Role of External Stakeholder Support

Boundary spanning activities had a positive impact on the formation of trust. For example, the creation of total transparency by openly communicating to the public side supported the belief in the success of the project. However as explained before, this open communication culture would have not been possible without shielding TollCollect from external influences. In addition to the activities of the new man-agement team for shielding the employees of TollCollect, the German Federal Ministry of Transport strengthened this influence in the public which was stated by a leading manager from the private side:

The German Federal Ministry of Transport was the determining authority for us because we always sensed a serious interest in realizing the project on their side. The publicly stated belief of the minister in project success reassured us to continue reporting even critical issues openly.

The support of the top management of the industry syndicate partners, the main leaders from politics as well as other external stakehold-ers (e.g., transport associations) strengthened the

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influence of boundary spanning activities, as il-lustrated before. Therefore, external stakeholder support had a positive moderating effect on the relation between boundary spanning activities and the formation of trust within the project. The importance of the effect of top manage-ment support has already been shown in other studies (Ragu-Nathan, Apigian, Ragu-Nathan, & Tu, 2004). Not only that TollCollect now had unlimited financial and human resources, but also top management attention from the German Minister of Transport as well as the chief executive officers of Deutsche Telekom and DaimlerChrysler positively influenced the partnership. For example, the German Federal Ministry of Transport operatively accompanied negotiations with local police and border pa-trols responsible to enforce the autobahn toll together with TollCollect. The external support facilitated the cooperation between the parties because negotiations became easier which was stated by leading managers of TollCollect:

The German Minister of Transport was the first one to draw a toll ticket which underlined his belief and trust in the successful realization of the project. This caused positive media cover stories which developed even more belief as well as efforts inside the syndicate and trust in the general public.

Moreover, transport associations also strengthened the effect of boundary spanning activities on trust formation. Mutual trust had not only deteriorated between TollCollect and the public authorities but also towards the general public. Fostering open communication and revealing the technical complexity as well as spending high amounts of efforts on solving these problems, the transport associations were convinced of the seriousness of TollCollect´s top management. Therefore, they intensified the implementation of OBUs in their trucks and publicly announced that the system now really worked. Announcements like the afore-mentioned once supported the formation of mutual trust, as a manager from TollCollect commented:

Third party communication and the public an-nouncement of the transport associations that the IT solution was working without interrup-tions initiated a breakthrough in mutual belief of project success.

Trust Formation

Setting the preconditions for boundary spanning and conducting boundary spanning activities between the parties positively contributed to the formation of mutual trust. The shift in the culture of the partnership, for example by open communication, triggered a growing mutual understanding for a joint approach. Public and private parties started to recognize that this project can only be realized jointly by making compromises which was illustrated by a leading manager from the private side:

The growing mutual understanding initiated a process of rethinking the different perspectives of the different parties. It became clear to both of them that clinging to formal procedures and regulations will not be the solution for the success of the project. Regular meetings for discussing open issues and mutual com-promises were identified as the appropriate measures for solving inherent problems within the partnership.

Bridging the gap by open communica-tion in a shielded environment and aligning divergent interests gradually restored the credibility of TollCollect. In addition, several public tests proved the stability of the IT solu-tion and fostered the belief in project success which was corroborated by a leading manager of TollCollect:

TollCollect delivered several public tests with users from various transport companies to reas-sure the internal as well as the external stake-holders of project success. The communication of test results and the public demonstration finally contributed to restore the credibility of TollCollect.

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Communicating not only problems but also capabilities of the different employees working for TollCollect initiated a growing network for knowledge exchange within the project. The par-ticipants recognized that besides managerial and technical capabilities within TollCollect also the support of the public partner was crucial for project realization. Joining the different fields of practice into a shared understanding of this IT-PPP-megaproject and a working partnership strengthened trust formation which was stated by a leading manager of TollCollect:

Identifying the key people within TollCollect which had the knowledge for integrating the different parts of the IT solution and developing a shared understanding with the public authori-ties supported the development of mutual trust between all parties involved.

Emerged Model of Boundary Spanning in PPPs

As a result of the analysis, we present the emerged model of boundary spanning between public and private parties for reestablishing a working partnership in IT megaprojects in Figure 1.

The formation of trust in the analyzed TollCollect case was highly influenced by boundary spanning activities which have been adapted to the PPP context and were not di-rectly applicable. First, the necessary precondi-tions had to be created in order to exercise boundary spanning activities effectively. This is an important yet under-researched relation in literature. Especially in already troubled projects with a failing course of action, it is necessary to level the setting for boundary spanners. In the case of IT-PPP-megaprojects, this includes knowledge from the business as well as politics and public administration world, apart from an unbiased relationship for a restart and the organizational precondition to exercise power, for example, to enforce a cultural shift in the working behavior.

While boundary spanning outcomes are characterized by mutual understanding, open communication, and the formation of a coop-erative culture, boundary spanning activities are purposefully applied capabilities that en-able boundary spanners to bridge the divide between contrary parties. As illustrated in our case analysis, these preconditions for boundary spanning were ultimately crucial for the execu-tion of boundary spanning activities. Hence, we propose:

Figure 1. Boundary spanning in public private IT megaprojects for reestablishing a working partnership

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Proposition 1: Effective boundary spanning activities in public private IT mega-projects depend on the establishment of organizational preconditions, including unbiased relationships, relevant expertise, and formal power.

Subsequently, we explained in our case analysis how boundary spanning activities contributed to the formation of mutual trust. Here again, the IT-PPP-megaproject setting has to be taken into account. Besides establish-ing an open discussion culture with the public client (e.g., allowing for total transparency by the exchange of information), all kinds of communication channels to other stakeholders need to be orchestrated while protecting the project team from too much external influence. Therefore, we propose:

Proposition 2: Boundary spanning activities in public private IT megaprojects, including shielding from external influence, foster-ing open communication, and aligning divergent interests, have a positive effect on trust formation, expressed through belief in success and close collaboration.

In addition, our analysis illustrates the mod-erating effect of external stakeholder support on the relationship between boundary spanning activities and trust formation. The support of the German Federal Minister of Transport as well as top management attention of the private parties and exemplarily transport associations strengthened the effect of boundary spanning activities on trust formation. This caused the creation of belief in project success and initiated even closer collaboration between all parties involved which supported trust formation. Hence, we propose:

Proposition 3: External stakeholder support in public private IT megaprojects strength-ens the effect of boundary spanning activities on trust formation.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Though TollCollect went through several dif-ficulties during establishing the partnership in a commercial tendering procedure and realizing the project, it finally was implemented success-fully and evaluated as a success story by all stakeholders and the general public. However, terminating the formal contract in midterm of the project was essential to reestablish a working partnership between public and private parties which was only possible due to bridging the divide between the different cultural environ-ments. In order to achieve project realization successfully, replacing the management team in charge was an initial starting point for the reestablishment of the relation to the client and to establish organizational preconditions for spanning the boundaries between the par-ties. Installing a management team with an unprejudiced view and understanding of the different motivation of the participating parties was a crucial precondition for reestablishing an unbiased relationship with the stakeholders. In addition, TollCollect recognized that bridg-ing the gap would only be possible choosing managers who are familiar with the specialties and regulations of the public side, as well as the processes and governance structures of the private side. Finally, enforcing a shift in the preconditions for cooperating, the use of formal power was the basic precondition for enforcing changes in the working mentality, for example by requiring the employees to report every single problem immediately. Increasing the identity of the employees with the project and having the formal power to install a clear governance and responsibility structure al-lowed the establishment of the organizational preconditions for boundary spanning. Boundary spanning literature so far has either concentrated on an individual level of analysis on individual capabilities and the roles of boundary span-ners (Aldrich et al., 1977; Friedman et al., 1992; Tushman, 1977; Tushman et al., 1981; Williams, 2002) and on team level of analysis

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on cultural effects and antecedent conditions influencing team boundary spanning (Golden et al., 2005; Joshi et al., 2009; Marrone et al., 2007). Our case study extended the findings of antecedent conditions for boundary spanning on an organizational level of analysis identifying an ‘unbiased relationship to the stakeholders’, ‘expertise in participating fields of practice’, and ‘power to enforce changes’ as the necessary organizational preconditions for reestablishing a working partnership in IT-PPP-megaprojects.

In addition to identifying the necessary preconditions for boundary spanning in a public private environment, we also identified the necessary boundary spanning activities for bridging the divide between public and private cultural backgrounds. In order to start a shift in the working culture of the project and to reestablish the initial euphoria and motivation of all participants, shielding the employees from the enormous public pressure was necessary for allowing for an open, even critical discussion of problems. Achieving transparency within Toll-Collect and its interaction with the stakeholders by open communication enabled a shift in the working culture towards more coordination and joint decision-making which finally created a deep understanding of mutual expectations. The initial divergent understandings and expecta-tions were finally aligned by openly sharing and communicating mutual expectations which improved the formation of trust and created the basis for the alignment of interests, team build-ing and admitting compromises. Prior research on boundary spanning activities focused so far on the relation between organizations and their environment (Leifer et al., 1978; Robertson, 1995). Our findings though aggregate prior research results from an individual perspec-tive on boundary spanning capabilities to a task-oriented, organizational view on boundary spanning activities, identifying the determining boundary spanning activities in a public private environment.

Prior IS literature so far has focused on the use of IT for boundary spanning (Levina et al., 2005, 2006; Lindgren et al., 2008; Pauleen et al., 2001) and how country and organizational

contexts affect boundaries and status differ-ences in IS development projects (Levina, 2006; Levina et al., 2008). PPP literature has extended these research results by examining the roles and behaviors of boundary-spanning managers during the establishment of PPPs (Noble et al., 2006). However, our research concentrated on exploring the organizational preconditions and the necessary task-oriented boundary spanning activities for reestablishing a working partnership in IT-PPP-megaprojects.

Our developed model provides a substantial theoretical contribution to the area of reestab-lishing a working partnership by boundary spanning in IT-PPP-megaprojects, especially in the area of enabling boundary spanning activities and establishing the organizational preconditions for boundary spanning. The generalizability of our findings is restricted to the PPP domain. However, megaprojects also occur in the private sector and are equally prone to failure such as the Channel Tunnel project (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005). Although our case study was conducted in a PPP environment, the Channel Tunnel example indicates that our findings can probably be applied to the realm of non-PPP IT projects (Nelson, 2007). Furthermore to get an even more holistic view of phenomena in IT-PPP-projects, adding the insights from a user and political perspective to a managerial perspective would allow even more details of the specifications of relationship management and governance structures within IT-PPP-projects.

Besides the theoretical contribution, we also offer practical advice. The challenge for practitioners in an IT-PPP-megaproject is to establish and maintain mutual trust as well as shielding an established relationship from external influences. In prior literature, span-ning the boundaries between different cultural and organizational fields has been referred as the necessary precondition for successfully managing IT projects (Levina et al., 2005). Our analysis shows how important the organiza-tional preconditions for boundary spanning and boundary spanning activities themselves are for the establishment of mutual understanding and

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the successful management of expectations for succeeding in IT-PPP-megaprojects. Taking the aforementioned into account, an initial failing course of action, expectations´ violation, and termination of contracts in IT-PPP-megaprojects could be avoided by constant relationship management and the introduction of adequate governance structures adapted to a public private environment. Future research may investigate in detail instruments and methods for establishing a relationship management, governance struc-tures as well as adequate leadership styles for constantly maintaining a working partnership in IT-PPP-megaprojects.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The authors thankfully appreciate the vital par-ticipation of the practitioners in this research. This work was developed as part of a research project at Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt. We are indebted to and gratefully acknowledge the financial support of ISPRAT e.V. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of ISPRAT e.V. or its sup-porting partners.

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Roman Beck is the E-Finance and Services Science Chair at Goethe University, Frankfurt, Ger-many. His research focuses on the creation, sourcing, and management of knowledge intensive IT services and has been published in journals such as Communications of the ACM, Commu-nications of AIS, Electronic Markets, Information Systems Frontiers, Information Technology & People, and others.

Oliver Marschollek is a doctoral student at the Chair of E-Finance and Services Science at Goethe University, Frankfurt, Germany. His research focuses on public private partnerships and the management of IT megaprojects as well as the use of the grounded theory method in IS. His research has been presented at the European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS) and the International Research Workshop on IT Project Management (IRWITPM) where he received a best paper award.

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Robert Wayne Gregory is a Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of Information Systems at Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt, Germany. His research interests focus on global sourcing, information technology project management, and the financial services industry. He presented his research at several international conferences and workshops, including International Con-ference on Information Systems (ICIS), Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS), European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), IFIP Working Group 8.2, and Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) where he received a best paper award. He has also published in the journal Information Technology and People.

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Keywords: Analytical Dualism, Case Study, Critical Realism, Margaret Archer, Morphogenetic Approach, Research Methods, Social Theory

INTRODUCTION

In the study of project management, it is often desired to discover why a project succeeded or failed. While the definition of project suc-cess may be disputed, it is commonly defined in the textbooks as occurring when a project produces the desired deliverables on time, on budget and with the proper quality (Brewer & Dittman, 2010; Gray & Larson, 2008; Kerzner, 2009; Schwalbe, 2007). However many times these goals are not met. The CHAOS study of the Standish Group has documented much of the issues of information systems project management (Rubenstein, 2007) in that many

Using Realist Social Theory to Explain Project Outcomes

Michael J. Cuellar, North Carolina Central University, USA

ABSTRACTIn researching IS phenomena, many different theoretical lenses have been advanced. This paper proposes the use of Margaret Archer’s Morphogenetic Approach to Analytical Dualism (MAAD) as a social theoretic approach to explain why social phenomena may occur in a case study. This paper provides a brief overview to MAAD, providing a description of its tenets and methodology for use in an empirical study. As an example, the author applies MAAD to the implementation of Lotus Notes in the Alpha consulting organization as reported by Orlikowski (2000). This approach shows that the differential success of the implementation efforts in the different organizations was due to the diverse cultures and possible experiences with technology found in those organizations. This example shows that the use of this social theory can provide explanatory purchase where social phenomena are involved. For practitioners, it suggests that structural analysis at the beginning of a project may provide direction as to how to make the project more successful.

projects fail to deliver anything at all and many fail to achieve one or all of the goals of a suc-cessful project.

Two characteristics of projects stand out as important to be considered in the study of their success. The first characteristic is that they are designed to be change activities. Projects are commonly defined as an activity with a defined lifespan, an established objective, cross-func-tional involvement and novel objectives (Gray & Larson, 2008; Schwalbe, 2007). The novel objectives described in the definition indicate that projects are designed to bring something to pass that has not existed before. That new something may be an information technology artifact, a redesigned work system or the imple-mentation of technology into a business process. In all these cases, change is involved. In infor-DOI: 10.4018/jitpm.2010100103

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mation systems, we can consider the process in two phases: development of the IT artifact and then its implementation in an organization. In the first phase, the IT artifact is brought into existence, a change from conception to reality. In the second phase, business processes are changed to incorporate the IT artifact.

Second, the definition tells us that those projects, especially information technology projects, are social activities in that they usually have cross-functional involvement. It is not an individual activity but one in which groups of people interact either in harmony or in conflict. In developing an information system groups of developers and users interact to bring the IT artifact into existence. Similarly, when an artifact is implemented into an organization, the developers and users interact to create a new business system that incorporates the artifact. The resultant artifact or implementation of an artifact is rarely that which is intended by any one of the parties. Rather, it is usually the outcome of the negotiated interactions between the parties.

Thus, the study of project success or failure (outcomes) requires an approach that considers the social aspects of change. In the field of sociology, one of the major concerns has been the issue of creating a general model of change in social structures. The question is asked that if we have a social structure such as a culture, division of labor, organizations etc. how do those structures come into exis-tence and how do they change over time? In particular, how do actors and agencies interact with the structures to produce such change and under what circumstances does it occur? This type of questions seems to be very useful for information systems research. If we consider such things as business processes (whether they involve technology artifacts or not) as social structures, then social theory, the use of theoretical frameworks to study and interpret social structures and phenomena (Wikipedia, 2009), could be one way that we can analyze project interactions to explain how the project generated the results that it did.

Social theory has typically been implicit within information systems analysis. That is project results have been analyzed without explicitly considering the context or how social structures might have affected project results. However, recently, research has been done which explicitly attempts to apply Giddens’ Structuration theory (ST) (Jones & Karsten, 2008; Jones, Orlikowski, & Munir, 2004) to a wide variety of situations in the IS literature (Jones & Karsten, 2008). Jones and Karsten (2008) indicate that ST has been used in a variety of ways. First, it has been taken as a “given” and used to offer insights on IS phenomena and applying it in general to the phenomena in question. A second way it has been used it to provide a “background” to the analysis and focus on certain aspects of it. A third, smaller group has focused on Giddens’ later writings to emphasize certain concepts. Additionally, it has subjected to reinterpretation within the IS field manifesting in variants such as Adaptive Structuration Theory (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994) and Duality of Technology (Orlikowski, 1992).

While ST has been widely utilized in the IS literature, it has been subject to a number of criticisms. For example, in general sociol-ogy it has been criticized for an a-historicity in its model of relations between structure and agency (Archer, 1995). Because of its melding of structure and agency, analysis can only take place in the “now”. Examination of the effects of previous structures is ruled out since differ-ent people than those here constituted them present. Another issue is the over-privileging of agency with respect to structure. Since social structures are regularized social practices, they do not exist until instantiated by actors. Thus they have no relatively enduring existence apart from the actors. Therefore, while they actors draw upon them to inform their practice, they cannot have any causal influence over the ac-tors. Given that structures do not endure apart from actions of the actors, ST has a tendency to direct toward the immediate moment of interaction (Stones, 2001).

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The handling of technology within ST has also been problematic. Rose, Jones, and Truex (2005) claim that ST unduly privileges human agency which causes technology to vanish into being simply “an occasion for structuring”. As dealt with in Orlikowski (2000), informa-tion technology is held to be a non-actor. It is treated as a multi-faceted tool from which users select features to be employed in structuring the organizations. In Orlikowski (2005), she seems to recognize this and advocates that we need to look at “different conceptual treatments of human and technological agencies” (p. 185). She recognizes a difference between human and technological agency preferring to call the latter “technological performativity” of settings.

Because of these issues, it seems to make sense to look at another form of social theory that might avoid these criticisms and might be able to assist us in examining project outcomes. One such theory is Archer’s Morphogenetic Approach to Analytical Dualism (MAAD) (Archer, 1988, 1995). The purpose of this pa-per is to provide a description of MAAD and to provide an illustration of how it applies to the explanation of information systems project outcomes. This theory as shall be seen below resolves many of the issues associated with ST. As opposed to the a-historicity of ST, MAAD specifically includes time into the analysis in the form of the Morphogenetic Cycle that will be explained below. Similarly, structure and agency are held apart analytically in a dualism rather than the conflationary duality used by ST. Thus neither structure nor agency is privileged. Finally, IT artifacts can find a place as a material structure within the framework of MAAD thus allowing it to be introduced into the analysis. Stones (2001) has indicated that MAAD also provides us with a series of middle and macro concepts that “precise and linked quite carefully with issues of ontology” (p. 178).

The contribution of this paper is to show how MAAD offers the capability of providing explanatory insights beyond the approaches employed by other social theories. This paper therefore seeks to describe MAAD and to dem-onstrate how it can be used to explain project

outcomes by means of a secondary case study. MAAD is a general social theory developed specifically to assist in identifying why change in social structures occurred or did not occur and thus seems to be ideal for use in analyzing project outcomes. The rest of the paper describes Archer’s theory and then show how it applies to analysis of a case of project escalation.

A DESCRIPTION OF MAAD

This section describes the basic tenets of Ar-cher’s Morphogenetic Approach to Analytical Dualism (MAAD). It describes the basic com-ponents of MAAD: structures, agencies and the morphogenetic cycle. For further study of MAAD and how it has been applied to the IS field, please see Appendix A.

Components: Material and Ideational Structures

Social structures are considered to be emergent properties of relationships between social enti-ties that as such are irreducible to those enti-ties, relatively autonomous in their influence and relatively enduring. They are considered emergent in that they arise from interactions between agencies. Structures have properties that allow them influence the world around them. Structures pre-date any particular set of individuals and thus can be only reproduced or transformed by social action (Archer, 1995, p. 168).

Structures are considered to be of two types: material structures and ideational structures (or culture). Material structures consist of relation-ships between individuals, and other material structures. In material structures, the relation-ships are between role-positions rather than incumbents of those positions. In a marriage relationship, for example, husband and wife are role positions that exist independently of who the husband and wife are. Thus the exist-ing material structure pre-exists any social interaction based on or conditioned by it and every change or elaboration of the structure post-dates the interaction. Thus every couple

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marrying reproduces or transforms the existing marriage structure. Any transformation of the structure post-dates the interaction of the agents.

Ideational structures (also called cultures or cultural systems) are logical relationships between propositions. Cultural systems are extracted from the sum total of existing “in-telligibilia” which roughly corresponds with Popper’s World Three (Archer, 1988). These propositions stand in objective logical rela-tionship with each other. For example, some propositions might be A: “all men are created equal”, B; “in Christ, all men are equal”, C: “black men are not socially equal to white men” and D: “blacks should be subservient to whites.” If these four propositions are part of the cultural system, propositions A and B are complementary to each other as are C and D. However propositions A and B are contradic-tory to C and D. As logical relationships, the cultural system is independent of any society or cultural group that holds it. Should no group espouse it, it still can exist in the accumulated cultural library of the society where it can be extracted and advocated for.

Components: Agency

Agencies are groups of social actors going through the same life experiences. These social actors in turn are derived from Persons who assume roles within the Agency. Persons are viewed as reflexive agents. They can examine their current existence and circumstances and decide to continue or discontinue their exist-ing situation. Actors derive from a relationship between the people and the agency. A person is born and socialized within a particular agency. As s/he comes to maturity, s/he can choose to take a role as an actor within that agency or seek to move to a different agency. Actors are thus a particular social identity taken on by a person as their role within an agency.

There are two kinds of agencies: primary and corporate. Primary agents are simply collec-tivities of individuals sharing a life experience. They are not organized and have neither lead-ership nor a message to articulate. A corporate

agent is a group of persons who have organized to take action. They have a set of roles and leadership that articulates a message and seeks to execute an action as a group.

These agencies have different distributions of resources (wealth, sanction or expertise). This distribution either enables or disables the agencies for undertaking desired projects.

Components: Morphogenetic Cycle

The link between the structures and the agen-cies in terms of defining how structural change occurs is the morphogenetic cycle (see Figure 1 in the Appendix). Previous cycles have created a particular set of existing structures and distribu-tions of resources as the result of prior cycles which condition the actions of existing agencies creating opportunity costs to intended actions which in turn create material and ideational interests which create situational logics of action (structural conditioning). As the agencies act to achieve their interests (Social Interaction), agencies and resources are redistributed this in turn changes the balance of power leading to the reproduction or transformation of structures (Morphostasis/Morphogenesis).

This cycle is an analytical distinction rather than an ontological one. Action is con-stantly going on and there is no static point. However, it is possible to abstract from reality salient features of societal change actions that are desired to be analyzed. These situations can be analyzed by means of this device. We will now look at each phase in more detail.

Structural Conditioning

Phase I of the morphogenetic cycle, Structural Conditioning is the result of the actions of pre-vious agents. The “first order effects” of these actions are the conditions in which the agents find themselves. These conditions have three effects on agents: 1) they enable certain actions and discourage or penalize others; 2) they create certain opportunity costs for pursuing certain ac-tions; 3) they also allocate various distributions of resources among the agents. These various

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conditions create a vested interest in the agent of either preserving or changing the status quo.

Conditioning also provides “direction guid-ance” (Archer, 1995, p. 213). The properties of the structures and cultures that exist interact to provide this guidance. These properties can be required by the nature of their relationship (e.g., employer-employee, manager-team member, husband-wife) in that they cannot exist without the other. Or their relationships can be contin-gent, only incidentally related (e.g., all people of a certain age). Additionally, the relationship between the properties can be one of coher-ence or contradiction. Coherence means that the role relationships of a material structure or the propositions support each other and are not in contradiction. Where contradictions exist, these are “fault lines” which can be exploited to

create change in the structures. Contradictions can also be created by proposals for change in the social structures. Where an existing set of structures is in the ascendency, a group can create a contradiction by advocating for a new structure to replace the old ones. Archer calls this coherence or contradiction a “second order effect” (Archer, 1995, p. 215) as they arise from the first order effects described above.

These interactions give rise to “situational logics” (Archer, 1995, pp. 216-218). Where the relationships between elements of a structure are necessary and where they are compatible with each other, agents are motivated by their vested interests and opportunity costs of change to protect the existing structures. Similarly, where relationships are necessary but are incompatible with each other, those in power are motivated

Figure 1. Archer (1998)’s MST model of social action (p.376)

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to compromise in order to retain their structure. Where relationships are not essential to the structure and are incompatible, it is possible to seek to directly eliminate the incompat-ibility either to preserve the status quo or to create revolutionary change. Lastly, where the structures are not required but are compatible, it fosters an attitude of opportunism: to create new potentials by exploiting new capabilities to increase the capabilities of the agents.

Social Interaction

Phase 2 of the morphogenetic cycle, social interaction, begins when one or more agencies decide to make an effort to effect change or maintain the status quo according to their situ-ational logics, creating environmental pressures. This shapes the context for all actors. Other agencies react to these pressures. As the agen-cies interact, the various agents constrain and enable each other and the various agencies are redefined over time. The net result is that at the end of the process, there is realignment of the relationships between the agents with regard to size, constituency, and resource allocation. The original resource (management sanction, wealth and expertise) distribution that existed at the time of structural condition is now redistributed among the realigned agencies.

Transformation

In this final phase, transformation or social elaboration, the effects of the social interaction in the previous phase are worked out. This is accomplished by transactions between the re-aligned agents carried out by means of exchange and power. This works out by engaging one of three different types of interaction: confluence of desires, where all parties are agreed on the course of action; reciprocal exchange, where each gives something in exchange for a gain in another area; and power-induced compli-ance, where the will of one agent is forced on the others. The agents’ ability to enact their desired situation logic is based on their access to resources. This interaction of the agents with their resource levels creates their bargaining

power, which in turn determines their ability to carry out the actions that they desire per their situational logic.

Bargaining power however is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the definition of an exchange because a transaction requires us to consider the bargaining power of each participant in the exchange to determine a suc-cessful transaction. This leads to the concept of negotiating strength. Depending on the re-sources possessed and needed by each partner, the negotiating power of an agent will vary. Where one agent is dependent on another for certain resources, the transaction will tend to be transacted in terms of power while where the resource requirements are evenly distributed, it will tend to be more of an exchange.

This negotiating strength then is exerted by Corporate Agents who seek to enact their desired social state in methods derived from their situational logic. Where negotiating strength is relatively equal, the new social arrangements are negotiated. Where there is a disparity in strength, the new social arrangements can be imposed by power. Whichever is the case, the resulting social/cultural structure is not predictable.

In the next section, the paper describes a methodology for how to apply this approach in IS research and then uses it in an example secondary case study.

A METHODOLOGY FOR USING ARCHER’S SOCIAL THEORY IN IS RESEARCH

Archer describes a basic process for doing explanatory research (Archer, 1995). This expla-nation takes the form of “analytic histories”. In these histories, we describe the morphogenetic cycle that occurred for the social phenomenon under study. We describe the structural condi-tions that existed and how these impacted the agencies in play during the sequence. The agencies, structures, vested interests, situational logics and resource distributions should be ex-amined. Next, we describe the interaction that occurred and how the agencies changed and

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realigned during the cycle. Changes in resource distributions should be examined. Finally, we discuss the changed bargaining power of the agencies, which led to changes in negotiating strength and power relationships. Then we should describe the nature of the negotiations over the form of the structures that took place and why the resulting structures took the form that they did.

MAAD and this methodology are most ap-propriate for use in the study of change activity: why a social structure changed as it did or did not change. Research questions focused around change are the indicators of the appropriate-ness of this approach. Questions such as why the project did not generate a usable artifact, or one at all; why did the implementation fail or succeed; why did the attitudes of the project team sour over the course of the project; why is the resource profile of the system as it is are all appropriate questions as they address the ques-tion of the change in social structures at macro levels. Questions directed at the individual level of analysis and other non-social issues such as the proper technical design of an artifact are counter-indicative for use of this methodology.

The sections below describe a set of steps to operationalize the use of MAAD for a case study.

Identification of the Structure under Analysis

The first step in the process should be the iden-tification of the social structure under analysis. If the research objective is to understand why software was allowed to develop with a flawed design concept, the target social structure is the either the IT artifact or the design specification. If the object of analysis were an implementation, the structure would be the business process or processes that would be changed as a result of the implementation activity. The research ques-tion should be framed as why did the structure either change as it did (development) or why did the organization change as it did or not change (implementation).

Data Collection

In the data collection phase of the study, one objective is to collect as much information about the pre-existing structural conditions as is possible. In the case of the retrospective studies undertaken where the project is com-plete, it relies in large part on the memories of participants and analysis of documentary evi-dence. Therefore, it is better to collect data as the project is moving forward, if at all possible. There the researcher can observe and perform data collection of structural conditions before interaction begins without relying on partici-pant memories. Data should be collected about existing social structures such as organizations, work systems (Alter, 2006), belief systems and values. Groups involved in the project should be recorded for possible identification as agencies. Effort should be made to identify the organization if any of the group and what agenda the group may have in regards to this project. The resources (expertise, wealth and sanction) possessed by the group should be identified as well. The past history of the agency interactions should be gathered as this leads to identification of the agency vested interest and situational logic.

Then the history of the project should be gathered or observed from the various agen-cies. Attention should be paid to how support, resource alignment and group membership changed over the course of the interaction between the agencies. How the interaction was started should be documented, e.g. the CIO determined that Lotus Notes should be used in the organization. The reactions of the various agencies including the splintering or combining of agencies, the motivation of primary agencies to be corporate agencies should be noted. No reaction is just as much of a reaction and violent protests and strikes.

Finally the negotiations surrounding the resulting form of the social structure should be recorded. Was it a negotiation or was it imposed? What was the ultimate result of the

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negotiations? What were the bargaining chips possessed by each agency? Were these chips desired by other agencies? If so, by how much?

Analysis

The first step in the analysis is the examination of the existing structure under analysis. Where are the incompatibilities/contradictions within the structure? This analysis identifies the poten-tial leverage points for morphogenetic activity. Then the agencies are defined, their resource allocations, whether they are primary or corpo-rate agencies in terms of the change initiative under consideration and their vested interests. From this analysis and from the structural analysis, the situational logics of each agency can be defined. Then the history of the agential interactions is analyzed with particular interest in the strategies/tactics that allowed the success-ful/unsuccessful realignment of agencies and resources. Finally a power analysis that analyzes the bargaining power and negotiating strength and the negotiating tactics used by each agency in the elaboration of a new social structure is performed. From this analysis, the causal factors in the success/failure of the change effort can be extracted and recommendations for future attempts at similar activities can be extracted.

EXAMPLE CASE STUDY

To demonstrate the capability of this methodol-ogy, this section reviews the “Alpha” case study (Orlikowski, 2000). This case was chosen, as it is a prominent case study that was used to demonstrate the “practice lens” enhancement to structurational analysis. Additionally, it pos-sesses sufficient detail that a morphogenetic analysis can be performed. By performing this reanalysis, the strengths of MAAD can be displayed compared to that of structurational analysis. This case also includes the reaction of three different agencies to a technology implementation initiative; one successful, one unsuccessful and one partially successful. This provides the opportunity to the show the meth-odology analyzing a success as well as failure.

One of the limitations of secondary study analysis is that the data is collected for a dif-ferent purpose and presented only to support the existing analysis. Thus some of the data that would be collected is not presented in the case study. While all the information desired is not found in the published article, enough exists to provide a demonstration of the results of the process. Thus when data is needed that is not found in the published case, it has been interpolated or drawn from other studies and inserted into the morphogenetic analysis.

This case concerns Alpha, a large multi-national consulting organization with offices around the world. In the late 1980s, the CIO of the organization determined that Lotus Notes would provide the organization with valuable capabilities to allow the consultants to col-laborate through the use of Email and enable knowledge sharing throughout the organization. This knowledge sharing would enable the orga-nization to avoid the costs of “reinventing the wheel” on each engagement and thus allow the company to achieve a competitive advantage through the reduction of cost and improvement of service. He therefore purchased thousands of licenses of Notes and had his technology organization install it in all offices as rapidly as possible to achieve the benefits as rapidly as possible. In this activity, the benefits of Notes were quickly achieved in the technology group; however the use Notes was largely rejected in the consulting organization with most using it only nominally and some using the system for personal productivity. The question here is why were the disparate results achieved despite implementation of the same package in the same organization.

Structure under Analysis

The structure under analysis in this case is the work processes of the consultants and technology support personnel in building a solution for their customers. The CIO sought to change this function by using Lotus Notes to increase collaboration and information sharing between them.

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Structural Conditions at the Start of the Cycle

Agencies

In looking at this project, we can identify three agencies: the CIO, the technology group and the consultants. While little information is provided about him in the published case, we know that the CIO was in a newly established position within the company and was given responsibility for the global use of information technology. The extent of his resources is not completely known, but we do know that he controlled the 40 person technology group, had enough budget to purchase several thousand licenses of Notes, but had no sanction to set policy for the use of technology with the consultant group. That is he could control the technology purchased and used but could not mandate a particular utiliza-tion of the technology. The technology group consisted of 40 people reporting to the CIO. They set corporate technology standards and supported the corporate infrastructure. They had technical backgrounds and were career programmers or computer support staff. Their resources largely came from the CIO. The case does not provide much information about the backgrounds of the consultants. We do know that they had the primary call on resources in the organization. They set their own policy on the use of technology with their group. Little information is provided about the consultants, but it is apparent that many of the consultants were skeptical about technology in general.

Structures

There were several social structures identified in the case. Within the company culture, there were different standards applied to different groups. The consultants were held to a standard that required them to bill their time to clients. It was unthinkable for them to take time that could be billed and use it for something that could not be billed. As one consulted noted, “[s]eniors and managers never have nonchargeable hours. It’s just not done” (Orlikowski, 2000,

p. 416). Additionally, they had an “up or out” career path. They would get promoted to the next step (senior, manager, partner) at the ap-propriate time or they would have to leave the company. Since, they had a normal pyramid relationship, this lead to a highly competitive and individualistic struggle for those positions. In fact, the culture of the consultants was such that they believed that they needed to hold on to information so as to maximize the competitive advantage in the race for promotion. As one manager put it, “[sharing information] is not in our culture … People hide information because it gives them and edge” (p. 417). Lastly, the consultants considered themselves to be paid to manage relationships not transfer information. The technology group was held to a different standard. They were not regarded as consultants and therefore did not have to bill their time out nor were they subject to the rigid promotion timing of the consultant group. Additionally, they had a culture of cooperation with each other in order to solve problems.

Situational Logic

These structures were all consistent with each other as applied to the various agencies. The consultants’ structures focused on the idea of generating high amounts of revenue, and building consultants that could build their own competence and their own book of business. Thus the Darwinian approach of weeding out the less fit for this environment was complementary to the other structures in place at Alpha. The CIO’s vision therefore was at a various with these structures and therefore introduced what is called a competitive contradiction in MAAD terminology: he introduced a concept at variance to the prevailing culture. Rather than sustain the existing competitive culture, he unwittingly introduced a variant concept that consultants should work together to produce better solu-tions for customers in a cooperative manner, a profoundly counter-cultural concept within the Alpha consultancy. The consultants presumably had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo to protect their investment in the large

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effort they had put into their careers. The CIO had a vested interest in proving his value to the organization. The consultants therefore adopted a strategy of preservation regarding their work processes while the CIO had and elimination strategy with regard to their processes seeking to change them with his new ones.

Within the technology group, his concept was not counted as counter-cultural as that was the way that they worked. While, the information about them is sketchy, we know that they already had a cooperative customer support culture in which they helped each other. Thus the CIO’s vision was a necessary complementarity with their existing culture. That is it supported and expanded their existing structure. Assuming that the technology group members had a vested interest in maintaining their culture and the CIO had the vested interest in proving his value by implementing notes as described above, a necessary complementarity existed between for them. The structures that existed were required for the CIOs vision to succeed and therefore were necessary. The Notes functionality was a complement to this structure of the existing work processes of the technology group.

We see now that the CIO had a found a receptive group in the technologists where an situational logic existed to preserve their culture and Notes fit well as a complementary technology for that purpose. On the other hand, the CIO presented a profoundly competitive contradiction to the existing culture of the consultant organization.

Interaction

The details of the interaction are limited in the case as presented. We do not know what occurred when Notes was introduced to the technology organization. However, we do know that after the technology organization had accepted the technology and was using it, it was introduced to the consultant organization. The case indi-cates to us that the consultants received training on the software in classes. However in those classes, no attempt was made to relate Notes to the consultants’ business process. The classes

were technical and abstract. The introduction of the technology resulted in a split within the consultants’ agency between those who chose not to make limited use of the technology and those who used it for personal productivity. Insufficient information is provided to make a definitive declaration as to why this split oc-curred, but it seems that those who resisted the technology completely were those who were technology skeptics while those who adopted it for personal use may have had a higher technol-ogy background. Resource allocations did not appear to change as a result of this interaction.

Structural Elaboration

In the technology organization, the CIO had wealth in terms of the budget, the sanction to force the issue but did not have the expertise to do it. The technologists had the expertise but not the budget or the sanction to adopt it. Both acting on their situation logic of neces-sary complementarity agreed on the adoption and combining their resources soon achieved a harmonious adoption of the technology within their organization.

However, in the consultant organization, in attempting to implement his elimination strategy to resolve the competitive contradiction, he ran into trouble. While he possessed the resources to determine what technology would be used, he did not have the sanction to enforce use. Bargaining power is based on having something that the other wants. The method by which he chose to introduce the Notes technology did not convince the consultant organization that Notes was anything that they wanted or needed. In ef-fect, they were left to themselves to determine the use of the technology. The introduction effort was did not generate any desire in the technology skeptic consultant organization for the software. In fact, they viewed the Notes technology as being able to do things they had no desire to do and was therefore a “solution in search of a problem” (p. 416). Negotiating strength is predicated on the resource alloca-tion between the agencies. The agency which has more wealth expertise and/or sanction to

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enact their situation logic along with bargaining power has more negotiating strength. In this case, the CIO had no sanction to enforce usage of Notes in the manner in which he desired it. He had therefore had insufficient negotiating strength to persuade the consultants to do more than minimally use the software let alone force them to use it.

With the less technology skeptic consul-tants, the CIO was also unable to enact his project but they did adopt the software to a certain extent. Similarly with them, his vision of cooperative work and knowledge sharing between the consultants fell on deaf ears for the same reasons as with the technology skep-tics. However, these consultants found that the software could be used consonant with their structures of competitive individuality. They saw that the software could increase their com-petitive advantage by automating their existing work, relieving them of manual activities. Thus these consultants saw in the Notes technology something that they wanted. Therefore the CIO had more negotiating strength and thus was able to achieve more adoption of the system in this group. This example shows the unintended consequences of an implementation effort. The CIO was attempting to implement his vision of cooperative work, which was rejected by the consultants. However some seeing value chose to enact a different vision of the use of the software.

What Could the CIO Have Done to Be Successful?

The CIO’s vision of Alpha utilizing Notes as a tool for knowledge sharing was such a counter cultural concept that it is difficult to conceive of how the CIO could have succeeded in his project. To have achieved his goal, the culture of the consulting organization would have to have been more like that of the technology organization which would have been a fundamental structural change. This would have changed his initiative from one that causes a competitive contradiction to one of complementarity. However this type of morphogenetic change would require the

identification and exploitation of a contradic-tion in the structures, which is not evident in the description of the case, or a fundamental change in the external environment which would cause a contradiction to occur between the existing structure and organizational survival.

DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS

As discussed above, this approach is limited by the nature of the data provided. The data was collected and reported to support a structura-tional practice lens analysis and reported as such. Therefore it lacks the richness of information that data collected for a morphogenetic analysis would have. The fact that the results do not vary too dramatically from that reported by Orlikowski can be partially attributed to this fact. A full original case analysis subject to analysis from both sides would be needed to display the difference in analysis. Nevertheless, this paper shows the power and capabilities of morphogenetic analysis.

What is important to observe here is that MAAD provides, as Stones (2001) points out, the macro- and meso- level concepts to provide the “explanatory engine” for the results whereas structurational analysis provides only “sensitiz-ing” capabilities for the analysis. This refers to concepts such as contradictions/coherence, vested interests, situational logics, bargaining power and negotiating strength. These concepts are held to “emerge” from the interaction of “lower level” entities. For example, as agen-cies interact with the existing set of structures, they develop vested interests in retaining or changing them. This is one of the features that is enabled by the dualistic conception of structure and agency that is explicitly denied by structuration theory (Archer, 1995). Thus we see in the morphogenetic approach that following the interaction of the agencies the emergence of the entities, which explains why the results occurred. This is opposed to the original struc-turational analysis, which, denying the concept of emergence, only featured the researcher’s opinion based on the evidence.

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These concepts also allow the researcher to maintain the balance between structures and agencies to ensure that we avoid emphasis on one or the other as is seen in structurational analysis with its focus on the immediate moment (Stones, 2001). Through the morphogenetic cycle and the methodological approach that traces the change activity from structural conditioning through interaction and elaboration, we can take into consideration the effects of previous actions and projects on the project under analysis and how they constrain the actions of the actors and then consider how the agencies interacted with themselves and other structures which result in changed relationships and resource realignments which lead to the rationale for the elaboration of structures.

The more structured approach to analysis of the change activity provided by MAAD guides the researcher into an understanding of the dynamics and relationships involved in the morphogenetic cycle. It provides a structural framework that guides the researcher’s analy-sis along a path leading to explanation. In this example, the methodology described here also indicates for the researcher the types of data that is needed to be collected to perform the analysis. It then leads them through the pro-cess of doing structural analysis. This analysis showed that the CIO possessed few resources to empower him to command implementation and that cultural situation was such that the consultants would oppose implementation. The interaction analysis showed that the consultant agency split into two separate agencies: those who limited their use and those who adopted it for personal productivity. And finally, the elaboration analysis showed why the CIO failed in his goal with the consultants but was partially successful with the technology group.

MAAD explains but doesn’t predict. The methodology described here allows the re-searcher to explain the outcome of the project but it doesn’t facilitate the prediction of results. As illustrated by the unintended consequences of this project where we saw that the consultants

agency split into two agencies during interac-tion, events may occur beyond what we can see on the basis of structural conditioning. Simi-larly, the results of this study are the results of an interpretive qualitative study and therefore are corrigible and subject to revision based on the acquisition of new knowledge. Therefore the explanatory results of any study must be compared to that of other studies to identify causal factors for a phenomenon that transcend the current case.

Orlikowski (2000) describes a view of the technological structure as being enacted by recurrent social practices of a community of users as they work with a technology artifact. It therefore focuses on what the users do with a certain technology in everyday practices. This seems to be due to the conception that structures, in structuration theory, are intangible things that are drawn on to guide actor behavior and to instantiate practices. In morphogenetic analy-sis, structures are considered to be real things. That is, following its critical realist (Bhaskar, 1979; Mingers, 2004) foundations, MAAD views structures as things having an existence separate from people and their conceptions of it. IT artifacts therefore can participate in structures. We may therefore consider that since information systems replace human actors in the performance of business processes (Kogut & Zander, 1992), that information systems may be viewed as actors themselves in those processes. The technology artifact placed into a work system performs work delegated to it by human actors and often includes in it deci-sion rules which decide how the data is to be processed. This artifact may assume more or less of the process as determined by the hu-man actors. In some processes such as payroll processing or health care claims processing where the process involves manipulation of information, the artifact may perform almost all of the process; the humans providing only input and exception handling of the data. At the other end where the artifact only monitors the results of a process such as manufacturing

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plant-monitoring system, the artifact may per-form only a data collection or process analysis function. Given that they generally not capable of analyzing and changing their own behavior, we may consider then non-reflexive actors in social structures. This concept should be subject to further development.

For practitioners, while morphogenetic analysis doesn’t predict results and can’t antici-pate unintended consequences, it can provide guidance for project leaders and sponsors as to the advisability of projects or suggested approaches. For, example in the case analyzed here, had a structural conditioning analysis been performed, it would have been seen that the consultants had vested interests and situational logic geared toward maintaining the status quo. This information would have allowed the CIO to select different goals or to enhance his rollout process to sell the value of the software to the consultants to bring more of them into the camp of those who used it for personal productivity. In other situations, the project leader can use structural conditioning analysis as a way to identify whether preliminary material structural change is needed prior to a project (Sarker & Lee, 2003) or whether ideational structures need to be modified by processes of social-izing or teaching change (Huy, 2001) prior to beginning a project.

CONCLUSION

This secondary study has shown that using Ar-cher’s MAAD social theory allows explanatory purchase for identifying reasons for differential adoption of technology in the Alpha consulting organization. It has shown that social struc-tures, both ideological and material, should be considered in the development of explanations for phenomena. In particular, it places focus on the reasons for why structural change oc-curred or did not occur and therefore is useful for examining cases where the introduction or use of information systems caused changes in social structures such as business processes, organizations or culture.

REFERENCES

Alter, S. (2006). The work system method connect-ing people, processes and it for business results. Larkspur, CA: Larkspur Press.

Archer, M. (1998). Realism and morphogenesis . In Archer, M., Bhaskar, R., Collier, A., Lawson, T., & Norrie, A. (Eds.), Critical realism essential readings. London: Routlege.

Archer, M. S. (1982). Morphogenesis versus structuration: On combining structure and action. The British Journal of Sociology, 33(4), 455–483. doi:10.2307/589357

Archer, M. S. (1988). Culture and agency, the place of culture in social theory. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Archer, M. S. (1995). Realist social theory: The mor-phogenetic approach (1st ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511557675

Archer, M. S. (2000). Being human the problem of agency. New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511488733

Archer, M. S. (2003). Structure, agency and the internal conversation. New York: Cambridge Uni-versity Press.

Bhaskar, R. (1979). The possibility of naturalism (1st ed.). Brighton, UK: The Harvester Press Limited.

Brewer, J., & Dittman, K. (2010). Methods of it project management (1st ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Cuellar, M. J. (2007). A realist social theory of in-formation systems. Paper presented at the AMCIS 2007, Keystone, CO.

de Vaujany, F.-X. (2008). Capturing reflexivity modes in is: A critical realist approach. Informa-tion and Organization, 18, 51–72. doi:10.1016/j.infoandorg.2007.11.001

DeSanctis, G., & Poole, M. S. (1994). Capturing the complexity in advanced technology use: Adaptive structuration theory. Organization Science, 5(2), 121–147. doi:10.1287/orsc.5.2.121

Gray, C., & Larson, E. (2008). Project manage-ment: The managerial process (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Huy, Q. N. (2001). Time, temporal capability and planned change. Academy of Management Review, 36(4), 601–623. doi:10.2307/3560244

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Jones, M., & Karsten, H. (2008). Gidden’s struc-turation theory and information systems research. Management Information Systems Quarterly, 32(1), 127–157.

Jones, M., Orlikowski, W. J., & Munir, K. (2004). Structuration theory and information systems: A critical reappraisal . In Mingers, J., & Willcocks, L. (Eds.), Social theory and philosophy for informa-tion systems (pp. 297–328). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.

Kerzner, H. (2009). Project management (10th ed.). Hoboden, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.

Kogut, B., & Zander, U. (1992). Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities and the replication of technology. Organization Science, 3(3), 383–397. doi:10.1287/orsc.3.3.383

Mingers, J. (2004). Real-izing information systems: Critical realism as an underpinning philosophy for information systems. Information and Organization, 14, 87–103. doi:10.1016/j.infoandorg.2003.06.001

Mutch, A. (2002). Actors and networks or agents and structures: Towards a realist view of infor-mation systems. Organization, 9(3), 477–496. doi:10.1177/135050840293013

Mutch, A. (2007). Concerns with “Mutual constitu-tion”: A critical realist commentary . In Stahl, B. C. (Ed.), Issues and trends in technology and human interaction (pp. 230–244). Hershey, PA: IGI Global.

Orlikowski, W. J. (1992). The duality of technol-ogy: Rethinking the concept of technology in or-ganizations. Organization Science, 3(3), 398–427. doi:10.1287/orsc.3.3.398

Orlikowski, W. J. (2000). Using technology and constituting structures: A practice lens for studying technology in organizations. Organization Science, 11(4), 404–428. doi:10.1287/orsc.11.4.404.14600

Orlikowski, W. J. (2005). Material works: Exploring the situated entanglement of technological perfor-mativity and human agency. Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, 17(1), 183–186.

Rose, J., Jones, M., & Truex, D. (2005). Socio-theoretic accounts of is: The problem of agency. Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, 17(1), 133–152.

Rubenstein, D. (2007). Standish group report: There’s less development chaos today. Software Development Times on the Web. Retrieved from http://www2.sdtimes.com/content/article.aspx?ArticleID=30247

Sarker, S., & Lee, A. S. (2003). Using a case study to test the role of three key social enablers in erp implementation. Information & Management, 40, 813–829. doi:10.1016/S0378-7206(02)00103-9

Schwalbe, K. (2007). Information technology project management (5th ed.). New York: Thomson.

Stones, R. (2001). Refusing the realism-structuration divide. European Journal of Social Theory, 4(2), 177–197. doi:10.1177/13684310122225064

Volkoff, O., Strong, D. M., & Elmes, M. B. (2007). Technological embeddedness and organizational change. Organization Science, 18(5), 832–848. doi:10.1287/orsc.1070.0288

Wikipedia. (2009). Social theory. Wikipedia. Re-trieved October 31, 2009, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_theory

Michael J. Cuellar is an Assistant Professor of Computer Information Systems at North Carolina Central University. His research focuses on the areas of project management, outsourcing and social theory for Information Systems. He has substantial experience in industry having held management positions for EDS and American Software managing software product development and infrastructure services, as well as systems management sales. He has published papers at conferences and journals such as JAIS, the e-Services Journal and the European Journal of Operational Research, ICIS, AMCIS, and the International Research Workshop on Project Management,. He is a member of the Association for Information Systems, Project Management International and the Academy of Management.

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APPENDIX A: REFERENCE WORKS ON MAAD

For those who wish to gain a deeper understanding of MAAD and to see how it has been applied within the IS field, this reference list is provided.

1. Archer (1988, 1995, 2000, 2003) are reference literature from the sociological discipline. The first two books describe MAAD as applied to culture and then generally to social structures. The last two deal with internal conversation theory

2. Archer (1982) provides an interesting critique of structuration theory from the MAAD perspective.

3. Alastair Mutch has done some significant work with both critical realism and with MAAD in the information systems fielda. Mutch (2002) provides a useful distinction between Actor-Network Theory and MAADb. Mutch (2007) compares MAAD with ST

4. Cuellar (2007) provides an overview of MAAD and how it may be applied to the IS field5. Volkoff, Strong, and Elmes (2007) is the first, although flawed, use of MAAD in IS. It is not

a true application of Archer’s theory as it does not use the critical realism underpinnings.6. de Vaujany (2008) has applied Archer’s later investigations into Internal Conversation Theory

(Archer, 2000, 2003) to the IS field.

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Keywords: Auditing, Egovernment, Health Care Informatics, Information Systems, Runaway Projects, Software Development, Systems Implementation

INTRODUCTION

Information Systems (IS) project failure is a costly problem, and it is well known that failing projects can seem to take on a life of their own without adding business value (Zmud, 1980; DeMarco, 1982; Abdel-Hamid & Madnick, 1991; Johnson, 1995). A study of over 8,000 IS projects by Johnson (1995) revealed that only 16 percent were completed on time and within budget. The most studied projects are those that wasted hundreds of millions of dollars, and attracted lots of press. Examples are the FBI Trilogy project (Knorr, 2005; US GAO, 2006),

Runaway Information Technology Projects:

A Punctuated Equilibrium AnalysisM. Keith Wright, University of Houston, USA

Charles J. Capps III, Sam Houston State University, USA

ABSTRACTThis paper presents an in-depth insider’s case study of a “runaway” information systems (IS) project in a U.S. State government agency. Because such projects are politically sensitive matters and often obscured from public view, details of how such projects operate are not well understood. This case study adds new details to the body of knowledge surrounding IS project escalation and de-escalation. The authors’ resulting project narrative details how this project went out of control for so long, raising important questions for fu-ture research in theory development for both IS project escalation and de-escalation. The paper argues that a punctuated equilibrium approach to analyzing “runaway” IS projects are a more fruitful area to explore than are “stage models.”

the California Motor Vehicles Driver Licens-ing System (Bozman, 1994), and the Denver airport baggage handling system (Montealegre & Keil, 2000). These cases of IS projects go-ing wildly over time and budget are called “runaways” (Glass, 1998; Mann, 2003). The management behavior that underlies runaway projects resembles what psychologists have called “escalation of commitment to a failing course of action” (Brockner, 1992; Keil, 1995). IS project de-escalation, on the other hand, has been defined as the reverse of this process (Keil & Robey, 1999; Montealegre & Keil, 2000; Royer, 2003; Heng et al., 2003) (see Table 1).

The literature surrounding both project escalation and de-escalation have suggested

DOI: 10.4018/jitpm.2010100104

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four general types of determinant factors of project commitment: project, psychological, social, and organizational (For a good review of this see Newman & Sabherwal, 1996). How-ever because only a handful of in-depth case studies have been published in this area (New-man & Sabherwal, 1996; Montealegre & Keil, 2000; Pan et al., 2006a; Pan et al., 2006b), little is known about the interaction effects of these factors. This is a view shared by luminar-ies in the field of IS project escalation (Staw, 1997; Mahring & Keil, 2008). Because we feel that improved understanding of IS project es-calation will increase the chance of discovering effective counter-measures, we decided to examine the case presented here.

The paper is organized as follows. First is a literature review of both IS project escalation and de-escalation -- including perspectives from psychology, information systems, and organiza-tional behavior. Second we present the (unpub-lished) case of a runaway IS project in a U.S. State agency, we call the Workers Compensation Commission (WCC). This project lasted over eighteen years, and was particularly resistant to attempts to substantially redirect or stop it, despite the presence of many of the de-escalation triggers mentioned in the IS literature (see Table 1.) Third, our paper discusses the limits of the ability of existing theory to describe the WCC case. The paper concludes with a summary of the resulting important unanswered research questions raised by our analysis. We stop short of offering a new process model for IS project escalation or de-escalation, but argue that the punctuated equilibrium theory (Eldredge & Gould, 1972) of organizational change offers a promising overarching framework for future

important research in these areas. Punctuated equilibrium models have their roots in biology (Eldredge & Gould, 1972) but are increasingly being proposed in the organizational sciences (e.g., Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Mokyr, 1990; Gersick, 1991).

LITERATURE REVIEW

The roots of both project escalation and de-escalation research can be traced to psychology and organizational science. The literature sug-gests four general types of determinant factors of project commitment: project, psychological, social, and organizational (Newman & Sabher-wal, 1996; Keil & Robey, 1999; Pan et al., 2006).

Project factors are its costs and benefits as perceived by management. Projects are seen prone to escalation when they involve a large potential payoff, when they require a long-term investment before substantial gain, and when setbacks are perceived as temporary surmountable problems (Keil, 1995; Keil, Man, & Rai, 2000).

Psychological factors are those that cause managers to believe the project will eventually be successful (Brockner, 1992). These include the manager’s previous experience, the degree to which the manager feels personally respon-sible for the project (Newman & Sabherwal, 1996, p. 28) and cognitive biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).

One line of psychological research suggests that managers may engage in a kind of “self-justification” behavior in which they tend to commit additional resources to a project rather than to end it and admit their earlier decisions

Table 1. Proposed information system project de-escalation triggers

Recognizing unambiguous negative feedback Garland and Conlon (1998); Ross and Staw (1993);Montealegre and Keil (2000)

Clarifying the magnitude of the problem Rubin and Brockner (1975); Brockner (1992)

Separation of duties Barton et al. (1989)

Redefining the problem Tversky and Khaneman (1981); Montealegre and Keil (2000)

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incorrect (Whyte, 1986; Staw & Ross, 1987; Ross & Staw, 1993). This line of research, known as self-justification theory (SJT), is grounded in Festinger’s (1957) theory of cogni-tive dissonance.

Another line of psychological research known as “prospect theory” focuses on the cognitive biases that influence human decision making under uncertainty. Prospect theory posits that people choose between risk averse and risk seeking behavior depending on how a problem is “framed” (Tversky & Kahne-man, 1981). Research has shown that people exhibit risk seeking behavior when choosing between, on the one hand, a sure loss (e.g., the initial loss on the investment resulting from a de-escalated project) and, on the other hand, a small chance for a large gain (e.g., a successful project outcome) combined with a large chance of a large loss (e.g., a failed project) (Tversky & Khaneman, 1981). Derived from prospect theory is the so-called “sunk cost” effect in which decision makers exhibit a tendency to “throw good money after bad” (Garland & Conlon, 1998). This research suggests that sunk costs may influence decision makers to adopt a negative frame, thereby promoting risk seeking (IS project escalation) behavior.

Another psychological theory related to IS project management decisions is approach-avoidance theory (Rubin & Brockner, 1975; Brockner, 1992). Approach-avoidance theory has been applied to the problem of IS project escalation, where it has been suggested there is a natural tendency for IS projects to escalate because their “driving” forces usually outweigh “restraining” forces (Pan et al., 2006). One of these driving forces “the completion effect” sug-gests the motivation to achieve a goal increases as an individual gets closer to that goal (Garland & Conlon, 1998). The completion effect may be particularly germane to software projects, which frequently exhibit the so-called “90% complete” syndrome (DeMarco, 1982; Garland & Conlon, 1998).

Social factors have also been said to pro-mote IS project escalation (Newman & Sabh-erwal, 1996; Pan et al., 2006). These factors

include competitive rivalry with other social groups, the need for external justification, and norms for consistency (Brockner et al., 1979; Hirschhem, Klein, & Newman, 1991). Projects are prone to escalation when competitive rivalry exists between the decision-making group and another social group, when external stakehold-ers believe the project will be successful, or when norms of behavior favor persistence (Ross & Staw, 1993). One social determinant of commitment is “the desire not to lose face or credibility with others” (Staw & Ross, 1987, p. 55). This concept of “face saving” is grounded in self-justification theory (Whyte, 1986; Staw & Ross, 1987; Ross & Staw, 1993) and has been discussed in the IS project de-escalation literature (Montealegre and Keil, 2000).

Organizational factors include the structur-al and political factors that form the “ecosystem” of a project. These are particularly relevant to understanding the events that transpired during our case study of the WCC. Of particular im-portance in our case is what organization theory calls the “agency effect” defining the agency relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision authority to the agent” (Jensen & Meckling, 1986). Furthermore, agency relation-ships may exist between different levels within a firm’s hierarchy (Jensen & Meckling, 1986). Agency theory predicts that goal incongruence between principal and agent creates a situation in which the agent acts in a self-interested man-ner, rather than acting in the best interests of the principal. The concept of information asym-metry is central to all principal-agent models; agents are assumed to have private information to which the principal cannot freely gain access (Baiman, 1990). Further, agents are presumed to be work-averse. This combination of informa-tion asymmetry and work aversion promotes the agent’s self-interested behavior. The agency problem is likely to occur in IS projects be-cause software’s invisible nature contributes to information asymmetry (DeMarco, 1982; Abdel-Hamidand & Madnick, 1991). Agency

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theory may also be used to explain IS project de-escalation (Montealegre & Keil, 2000).

Information systems researchers (for ex-ample Keil, Mann, & Rai, 2000) have referred to several other organizational factors relevant to our case study that may affect commitment to an IS project. These are top management’s knowledge of information technology (Vitale et al., 1986), information intensity of the organiza-tion’s value chain (Johnston & Carrico, 1988) and maturity of the IS function (Sabherwal & King, 1992). Other organizational factors identi-fied in the literature about IS project escalation and de-escalation include top management support for the project, administrative inertia in the organization, and the extent to which the project is institutionalized or the extent to which it seems strategic (Johnston & Carrico, 1988).

Recent work on IT project de-escalation suggests projects may be resistant to de-esca-lation because of organizational “inertia” which causes long periods of organizational “equilib-rium” that are difficult to disrupt because of the constancy of the “deep structure” of the orga-nization (Gersick, 1991; Pan et al., 2006). This line of research has suggested that organizations may be unable to change substantially unless forced by a crisis (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). In a number of industries, it has been observed that long periods of unsuccessful “incremental” organizational changes tend to be interrupted by short periods of “radical” changes called “revolutionary periods” (Abernathy & Utter-back, 1978; Utterback, 1994). This pattern has been called “punctuated equilibrium,” a term that originated in biology (Eldredge & Gould, 1972) and subsequently was adopted in the man-agement literature (e.g., Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Mokyr, 1990). According to punctuated equilibrium theory, organizations tend towards “equilibrium” -- due to the permanence of the “deep structure” of the organization. According to Anderson and Tushman (1990, p. 161), “The deep structure of an organization consists of its “alliances, associations and co operations with interlocking interests.”

Tushman and Romanelli (1985, p. 176) define this “deep structure” as follows: …” it

can be described by five facets: (1) core be-liefs and values regarding the organization, its employees, and its environment; (2) products, markets, technology and competitive timing; (3) the distribution of power; (4) the organiza-tion’s structure; and (5) the nature, type and pervasiveness of control systems.”

Gersick (1989) argues that sunk costs oc-curring during periods of equilibrium, along with fear of losing control over one’s situation if the equilibrium ends; contribute heavily to the human motivation to avoid significant system change. Other organizational research has discussed the inertial constraints of obliga-tions among stakeholders inside and outside a system. As Tushman and Romanelli (1985, p. 177) suggested, “even if a system overcomes its own cognitive and motivational barriers against realizing a need for change, the ‘networks of interdependent resource relationships and value commitments’ generated by its structure often prevent its being able to change.”

This analysis complements Tushman and Romanelli’s (1985, p. 179) identification of “performance pressures . . . whether anticipated or actual as the fundamental agents of organi-zational reorientation.” Tushman, Newman, and Romanelli (1986) described as typical the scenario of an organization falling into seri-ous trouble before responding by replacing its top management. They found that “externally recruited executives are more than three times more likely to initiate frame-breaking change than existing executive teams… Failures caused by inappropriate deep structures are destined to elude the (misdirected) efforts of current system members to correct them. Unless such failures kill the system, they command increasing atten-tion and raise the likelihood that newcomers will either be attracted or recruited to help solve the problems. The newcomer has the opportunity to see the system in an entirely different context than incumbent members, and he or she may begin problem solving on a new path.”

We trust the preceding literature review demonstrates the extreme complexity of the study of information system (IS) project esca-lation and de-escalation. Existing research has

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demonstrated the presence of many important factors that affect commitment to a failing IS project. We feel this research has been ap-propriately guided by the assumption that IS projects live in organizations comprised of many goal directed individuals whose purposes may be incompatible. In this context an IS project emerges within an organizational ecosystem but often develops its own identity. It is a search for detailed descriptions of a runaway IS project and its organizational ecosystem that determined our choice of research methods.

RESEARCH METHOD

To encompass the complexity of organizational research, our approach assumed a simple learn-ing and description role rather than a hypothesis testing one. This qualitative approach has been effectively used elsewhere (Sutton, 1987; Isa-bella, 1990; Ancona, 1990; Pettigrew, 1990; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Orlikowski, 1993). Our data collection and presentation method re-sembles that of the “ethnographic confessional” approach used by Schultze (2000). (See also Agar, 1986; Marcus & Fischer, 1986; Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994; Van Maanen, 1995).

We selected our research site in the fall of 2004. From press accounts, we identified a U.S. State government agency involved with health insurance claims. The health insurance industry is known for the “information intensity of its value chain” (See Johnston & Carrico, 1988) and is thus a likely birthplace of a runaway IS project. The agency, we call the Workers Compensation Commission (WCC), was well known for being one of the most inefficient of its kind in the U.S. The principal investigator (PI) approached the agency’s Director of In-ternal Audit with a request to collect data on a troubled IS project. In response, the PI received permission to collect data on a WCC software development project called the WEBCOMP project. (All proper names of projects or orga-nizations used in this paper are pseudonyms.) The agency Commissioner had recently asked Internal Audit to monitor the project. A formal

internal audit of the project was not however in the department’s audit charter that year.

The PI received permission to collect data on the project with the understanding the data might be used for published academic research. However, in return, the PI, a certi-fied information systems auditor, was asked to perform the project monitoring function for the Internal Audit Director. He introduced the PI to the organization as a part-time in-formation systems auditor with permission to monitor the WEBCOMP project. The PI’s role was a double-edged sword: the resulting visibility and legitimacy made gaining access to internal documents, auditors and technical staff easy. However, access at the managerial level was more difficult. By 2004, the status of the project as troubled had long ago become an albatross for management. The PI interacted primarily with three other groups in addition to the Internal Audit Department. One was the software development team, including contrac-tors. Second was the project management team including the agency Commissioner, the agency Director, the manager of IT Services and her three subordinates. The third was the computer system administrators.

The PI was in the field over an eight-month period, from December 2004 to mid-July 2005. He was at the agency during business hours on the three days per week when WEBCOMP project meetings were held. While in the field, he conducted twenty-eight semi-structured, interviews in his office supplied by the agency (see interview questions listed in Table 2). The interviewees included project staff, internal auditors, project management, and agency management. All interviews were one on one and each interviewee was assured of complete confidentiality.

Reliability was increased by using the narratives from one subject to confirm or con-tradict others (Miles, 1979). The PI did not attempt to privilege one story over another. During interviews and meetings, the PI took hand-written notes, which he recorded on his laptop during the day. He was always cognizant of the trade-off between writing more detailed

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descriptions of events -- and observing interac-tions with people in the field and tended to err on the side of seeking encounters with people.

While in the field, to corroborate interview data, the PI collected a variety of historical docu-ments including memos, outsourcing contracts, staff resumes, internal project documentation, public reports, and presentations to congressio-nal committees. Throughout his fieldwork, the PI was engaged in data analysis. He had lunch with the Internal Audit Director once a week to make sense of current project events, identify themes and gaps in the data, and to strategize how to fill those gaps. The PI submitted weekly reports and recommendations to the Internal Audit Director about the project.

After the PI left the field, data were col-lected via newspaper accounts and public web site postings. Telephone interviews with remain-ing staff were also conducted -- after explaining that we were conducting academic research.

As a first step in post-field data analysis, the authors analyzed project antecedent condi-tions and the project outcome. Then a detailed project history was created in narrative form from 1990 to 2008. Next, we organized the narrative into the major events that framed management commitment to the project. This approach involved reanalyzing events in terms of the commonly held determinant factors of project commitment as revealed in the litera-ture review. These included project, structural, social, psychological, and political factors. This type of protocol analysis has described similar case studies (Montealegre & Keil, 2000; Pan et al., 2006). We performed three iterations of this analysis before event descriptions were es-

tablished. The results were then presented to an appropriate manager at the state agency for his corroboration of the events, which he provided at the time of this case writing, summer 2009.

RESULTS

Case Summary

Appendix A narrates in depth the critical factors that our data suggests determined management commitment to a series of related failed IS projects at the Workers Compensation Commis-sion (WCC) from 1990 to 2008. In general, the narrative data suggests that ineffective state IT governance resulted in over $27 million wasted on these projects. Because these projects all aimed at the same underlying business prob-lem, we collectively called these the Workers Compensation System (WCS) project. The WCS project was born in a politically charged environment, and quickly became institutional-ized. This likely made the project resistant to attempts to de-escalate it for over sixteen years. Our review of WCC personnel records revealed that low salary structures probably contributed to the State’s inability to hire qualified staff (see Appendix A, Events 7, 10, 12) and diminished the agency’s belief in the eventual success of the project.1 This lack of perceived organizational self-efficacy combined with extreme political pressure encouraged project shortcutting, which resulted in insufficient requirements capture and then extensive rework (Events 2, 5, 7, 9, 11). Furthermore, parallel project tasks were attempted when obvious dependencies existed (Event 8). Finally, our data suggests the project

Table 2. Interview questions

What is your role in the WEBCOMP project?

Can you take me through the project history?

What is the next project milestone on which you are working?

What is your estimate of the probable date you will achieve this milestone?

Is there anything that I or anyone else can do to help you achieve this milestone?

Is there anything else you would like to share?

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was poorly monitored. Because of this complex set of political and structural factors, the project was officially de-escalated in 2007, after sixteen years -- by partial abandonment (Event 26).

DISCUSSION

Goal Incongruence

Our data suggests an important determinant of management commitment to the Workers Compensation Systems (WCS) project was extreme goal incongruence among the project stakeholders. As mentioned earlier, the study of goal incongruence in IS projects has been framed in “agency theory” (Jensen & Meckling, 1986) which suggests an “agency relationship” may exist between different levels of a firm’s hierarchy. On one level, our data indicated goal incongruence between those of WCC staff and those of the State’s IT governing bodies. The State’s goal, we assume, was to efficiently pro-cess workers compensation claims. However, the WCC goal was likely something else. As explained earlier, the WCC staff did not seem to believe the WCS project was feasible, given the organizational factors present at that time. Many agency staff seemed to make project decisions based mainly on self-interest rather than on project interests. WCC staff seemed committed to the WCS project only to the extent it would increase skills that they could then apply on some other -- possibly successful -- project. For example, some of the later WCS project “make-or-buy” decisions seemed to be based on the belief that the best way to learn a technology is to develop it from scratch, rather than to buy an off-the-shelf solution (Event 12).

Risk Aversion

An important determinant of management com-mitment to the WCS project suggested by our data was risk aversion. These included political risk (“face saving”) and monetary risk (Ross & Staw, 1993; Montealegre & Keil, 2000). Our narrative suggests that the inability of the WCC managers to “save face” may have been a key

reason for the runaway escalation of the WCS project. For example, it was very difficult for the State’s IT governance bodies to save face, because they were responsible for approving all expenditures throughout the long series of failed projects. Corroborating this interpreta-tion was our principal investigator’s interview with the State Auditor’s Office (SAO) (Event 22). During the interview, one of the SAO staff let it slip that, due to a fundamental lack of independence; the State’s audit function was “completely corrupted.”

However, the ability to “save face” -- and thus avoid political risk – seemed to change markedly after the transfer of the WCS project management from the Workers Compensation Commission (WCC) to the Department of In-surance (DI). For the first time in the project’s long history, business requirements analysts were in control of disbursements from the WCS technical project budget. These non-technical DI business managers could “save face” by blaming the former WCC technical manag-ers for the project failures (Event 21, 24, 25). Furthermore, seen in the light of “face saving” behavior, we assume the only way the Gov-ernor’s office could “save face” was to adopt the Sunset Commission’s recommendation to eliminate WCC in 2007.

Another important risk aversion behavior our data indicated was that of Corp2 – a proj-ect contractor. This finding is consistent with other examples of major contractors resisting project de-escalation (Ross & Staw, 1993; Mon-tealegre & Keil, 2000). Just prior to the WCS de-escalation, Corp2 was actively engaged in a bid for an $863 million contract with an agency in the same state, the Information Resources Department (IRD) (Events 25, 26). That project was to “streamline the information technology operations of 27 state agencies” including WCC (Event 26). Corp2 resistance to de-escalating the WCS project may have dropped when Corp2 won the DIR contract (Event 26). If so, the finding is consistent with the idea of the “enfranchising stakeholders” as a de-escalation trigger (Montealegre & Keil, 2000). However, it is not strong support for this trigger, because

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we have no direct data explaining why Corp2 received the new $863 million contract, espe-cially given the company’s long association with the notorious WCS project. Thus, we believe a promising specific area for future research in IS project escalation would be to examine the role of industry lobbyists in the awarding of U.S. State IS contracts. More generally, our preceding discussion of risk aversion suggests a need for a better understanding of optimal risk sharing structures in U.S. State IT governance.

The Role of Collective Belief

An important determinant of management com-mitment to an IS project is termed “collective belief” in the eventual success of the project (Royer, 2002). However, the way in which this operated in the WCC case runs counter to that re-ported in Royer (2002). Royer (2002) found that “collective belief” in the eventual success of the project was a primary determinant of continued project commitment. Yet, throughout the WCS project, there were widespread doubts about the inherent ability of the WCC to complete this project successfully. These doubts contributed to a downward spiral of events, the most criti-cal of which was probably to have bought the original software (COMPASS) system, which quickly gained the reputation of not meeting the business requirements (Event 2). However, the WCS project continued half-heartedly for years, with constant staff turnover. Historical documents and interviews with WCC manag-ers indicated that the general perception was the project was greatly under funded from the beginning. Our interviews with technical staff suggested they saw no way to gain from any behavior in their project role despite their own individual best efforts because management incompetence or inadequate legislative fund-ing would prevent the project from ultimately succeeding. These either staff members seemed to expect that management would ignore ideas for improvement because they would not be understood or thought too expensive.

Contributing to the apparent pessimism surrounding the WCS project may have been the

lack of personal accountability for it. Histori-cal documents indicated no one person outside the Governor had complete responsibility for the project. Our interviews also indicated that no one might have had sufficient formal ac-countability for the project: project problems were usually blamed on some structural factor out of the interviewee’s control. For example, WCC managers blamed the project failings on the legislature for a salary structure that did not support hiring qualified technical people (Event 4). In turn, technical staff blamed business analysts for not doing requirements correctly, and blamed management for incom-petence. The requirements analysts blamed the requirements shortcomings on the legislature for writing bad law (Events 5, 9, 10, 11). These results contradict Royer (2002) and suggest that a promising area for future research would be the effects of management experience and organizational structure on the perception of management self-efficacy. This is a view shared by Mahring and Keil (2008) and has been dealt with tangentially in the following works: Kahn (1990), Arkes (1991), Boulding, Morgain, and Staelin (1997), Schmid and Calantone (2002), and Whyte and Fassina (2007).

Project Institutionalization

A critical determinant of IS project commitment discussed in the literature is the degree to which IS projects are “institutionalized” (Johnston & Carrico, 1988; Pan et al., 2006). Institutionalized projects have also been referred to as “mission critical” (Mahring & Keil, 2008) or those of “high business criticality” (Pan et al., 2006). Our WCS project narrative supports the idea that the project was institutionalized from the beginning because WCS was strongly linked to WCC’s mission (Events 1, 5). However, our case does not clearly support prior research on project deinstitutionalization as a trigger for de-escalation (see Table 1). According to Ross and Staw (1993), “De-escalation can be facilitated when an organization de-institutionalizes a project, removing it from the core of the firm either by moving it physically away from the

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central location of the company or by em-phasizing its peripheral nature.” In this case, however it is not clear if the WCS project was ever deinstitutionalized (Event 26).

Redefining the Problem

An important IS project de-escalation “trigger” is called “redefining the problem” (Montealegre & Keil, 2000). Our data suggest there were four major WCS project redefinitions, all aimed at the same underlying business problem – the efficient processing of workers compensation claims. The original 1990 project definition was simply to use the COMPASS system purchased from another state (Event 1). The first redefini-tion was to modify the COMPASS system to fit existing business processes better (Event 4). The second redefinition was to replace COMPASS with the WEBCOMP system – a web based system to be developed from scratch (Event 7). This involved reengineering the WCC business processes. The third redefinition hap-pened after the Department of Insurance (DI) replaced the WCS project management team (Event 21). This re-definition was to convert COMPASS feature by feature to a web based system (Event 23). This involved a substantial reinstatement of the original WCC business processes. However, it was only the fourth redefinition that produced de-escalation. That definition focused on publicly redefining the underlying business problem to be mainly the expensive Corp3 contract - the maintenance contract for the original COMPASS system (Event 25). The technical solution then became simple and twofold: use the source code of the COMPASS system as the basis of a requirements document and then convert that code, feature by feature, to run on cheaper PC based servers rather than on the more expensive mainframe.

However, as of this writing, it is likely the actual original business problem underlying all the WCS project incarnations – namely, the efficient handling of workers compensation claims -- has yet to be addressed (Event 26). Thus, our data suggest the fourth and last proj-ect re-definition was used mainly for political

purposes (“face saving”) rather than to address real business problems. This finding suggests that another promising area for future research on IS project de-escalation would be to identify the conditions under which project redefinitions address underlying business problems rather than politics.

Limits of Current Theory

In brief, our previous discussion of the WCC case discussed how aspects of this case relate to some of the critical determinants of manage-ment commitment to IS projects proposed in the psychology and organizational behavior sciences literature. This literature has offered convincing but disjointed evidence of certain such determinants. In an effort to integrate and frame these disjointed theoretical contributions, the IS literature has contributed primarily by offering “stage” models of both escalation (Staw & Ross, 1987; Mahring & Keil, 2008) and de-escalation (Montealegre & Keil, 2000). Such models are based on a limited number of case studies.

For example, Staw and Ross (1987) pro-posed a model (see Table 3) which is based on the analysis of British Columbia’s decision to host the 1986 World’s Fair (Ross & Staw, 1986), where it was observed that escalation began because of project-related factors and then was reinforced by psychological, then social, and finally organizational factors. However, that model is not well supported in subsequent case research (Ross & Staw, 1993; Newman & Sabherwal, 1996). Subsequent research sug-gested the sequencing of those factors is not that simple. For example Ross and Staw (1993) applied the model to the analysis of the Shore-ham Nuclear Power Plant case, and concluded that the “contextual influences became a very powerful force in the Shoreham case in ways the model would not predict” (Ross & Staw, 1993, pp. 722-723). Newman and Sabherwal (1996) applied the Staw and Ross model to the CENTCO case, an inventory control and materials management system in a large North American firm. They found that “project and

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structural determinants are crucial in obtaining initial commitment for the IS project: social and structural determinants influence whether commitment is withdrawn, and psychological and project determinants influence escalation of commitment” (Newman & Sabherwal, 1996, p. 45).

The WCC case presented in this paper suggests that political factors were the most important project influences on both escalation and de-escalation throughout the long project. This result together with those of Ross and Staw (1993) and Newman and Sabherwal (1996) suggest that temporal sequencing of different types commitment determinates may not be a fruitful way to develop a general theory of IS project escalation or de-escalation. This is a view shared by leading researchers in project escalation theory. For example, Mahring and Keil (2008) concluded that the Staw and Ross model “fails to provide an understanding of the dynamics of escalation. It does not explain what really distinguishes one phase from another or what triggers the movement from one phase to another” (Mahring & Keil, 2008, p. 242).

In an effort to suggest a more general model of IS project escalation Royer (2002) proposed an eight-phase model (see Table 4) based on two cases. Additionally, Royer cautioned that one of the two cases grounding the model “did not seem to include the relentless phase and the other included successive identical phases” (Royer 2002, p. 6). Furthermore, Mahring and Keil (2008, p. 243) critiqued Royer’s model as an improvement over the Staw and Ross model in that it ncludes transitions triggers. However, the Royer model blurs the distinction between escalation and de-escalation.ii

The Royer (2002) model is also problem-atic in application to our WCC case because it is difficult to determine the periods in which the model can be applied. In the case of WCC, it is arguable how many “projects” there were. One could argue there were at least four -- cor-responding to the four major case “periods” (See Figure 1). On the other hand, because all these projects were intimately related, aimed at the same underlying business problem, and governed by the same state authorities, one could argue that the Royer model should be

Table 3. Staw and Ross (1987) model of IS project escalation

Phase 1: Promise of Future Outcomes

Phase 2: Receipt of Questionable Outcomes

Phase 3: Receipt of Highly Negative Outcomes

Table 4. Royer (2002) model of IS project escalation

Phase 1: Birth of the idea

Phase 2: Organization of project

Phase 3: Implementation

Phase 4: Blindly going on

Phase 5: Relentlessness

Phase 6: Diagnosis

Phase 7: Verification

Phase 8: Implementation of withdrawal

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applied as if there was only one long project, not four shorter ones.

In an effort to encompass more complex-ity than that of the Royer (2002) model, Mah-ring and Keil (2008) proposed a three phase model of escalation, where “catalysts” promote escalation within each phase and “transition triggers” push the process from one phase to the next (see Table 5). In that model, proceed-ing the period of escalation is an “antecedent condition” which encompasses the rationale for the project and how it is viewed. The first escalation phase called “drift” is when the project continues to consume resources as ambiguity concerning the project charter is resolved. “Problem emergence” then triggers the shift to the second phase, “unsuccessful incremental adaptation.” During this phase, there is a continued “mismatch between under-lying problems and attempted remedies.” To-gether, these two “catalysts” produce continued escalation that triggers the third phase, “ratio-nalized continuation.” When rationalizations lose their credibility, an imminent threat to project continuation triggers project de-escala-tion, which is modeled as the outcome of the process of escalation.

The Mahring and Keil model, although offering a better description of the WCC case than any other stage models, fails to capture the political complexity of the WCC case. Furthermore, it is again difficult to determine the period in which the model can be applied. This is because the model, as that of Royer (2002) focuses on a “project” rather than on the underlying business problem. Another limitation of applying the Mahring and Keil model to the WCC case is their model does not distinguish between a project that is success-fully de-escalated and one that is unsuccess-fully de-escalated. In our view a successful de-escalation is one in which the underlying business requirements either disappear -- be-cause of non-project related factors -- or the project is re-directed in such a way that it eventually meets its original business require-ments. Our data suggest that the WCS project

was not de-escalated successfully, because the underlying business problem remained after the project was substantially abandoned (Event 26).

In brief, the existing stage models found in our literature search do not capture the com-plexity of cases like the WCS, which seem to undulate back and forth -- creating and stopping projects, only to revive them again (See Pan et al., 2006). This difficulty lies in the over sim-plicity of such “stage” models. These models struggle with the assumption that individual systems of the same type develop along the same path and in “forward” directions. One reason for this, as Gersick (1988) points out, is that the development of such stage models “seeks commonalities in the outcomes of project decisions but dismiss individual project differ-ences as noise” (Gersick, 1991, p. 16).

Other research has supported this idea that stage models may not be particularly useful as a framework for studying organizational change and IS project management (Rubin & Brockner, 1975; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Gersick, 1991; Stubbart & Smalley, 1999; Pan et al., 2006).

Project Life Cycle as Punctuated Equilibrium

Our discussion thus far suggests that better theories of IS project escalation and de-escalation should allow for common decision/event categories, and for infinite variety in the individual systems’ particular solutions. Punctuated equilibrium theory may offer some insight here. In a punctuated equilibrium framework runaway IS projects can generally be viewed as recurring cycles of long periods of organizational equilibrium followed by shorter periods of disequilibrium. Seen in this light, an IS project tends toward escalation equilibrium because of the stability of the organization’s “deep structure.” In general, “deep structure” may be thought of as the “design of the playing field and the rules of the game” (Gersick, 1991, p. 16). More specifically, deep structure is the

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set of fundamental “choices an organization has made including the basic parts into which its units will be organized and the basic activ-ity patterns that will maintain its existence…Deep structures are highly stable because the trail of choices made rules many options out. Identifying these sets of choices is an important part of theory building for specific punctuated equilibrium models” (Gersick, 1991).

The equilibrium period -- comparable to a “game in play” -- consists of maintaining and carrying out these choices. Within equilibrium periods, the organization’s deep structure re-mains the same. “Human systems in equilibrium may look turbulent enough to mask the stability of the underlying deep structure. A project group may choose implicitly to subvert its task, or an organization may commit to a strategy it is not well equipped to accomplish, resulting in patterns of overt conflict, vacillation or failure” (Gersick, 1991, p. 16). Punctuated equilibrium theory predicts that during an equilibrium period, the only type of organizational change possible is an “incremental” one. One likely to be unsuccessful if what is really needed is a “radical” change -- of the sort that an IS project

de-escalation has been suggested to be (Pann et al., 2006).

According to “punctuated equilibrium” theory, any radical organizational change must come in short periods of “disequilibrium.” Transition from equilibrium to disequilibrium occurs because of events called “critical,” “radical,” or “revolutionary” (Gersick, 1991). The difference between the incremental orga-nizational changes in equilibrium periods and the revolutionary changes in disequilibrium periods is like the difference between changing the game of football by moving the goal posts versus changing it by removing them. Only the first kind of change leaves the game’s deep structure intact. Thus punctuated equilibrium theory predicts that an organization’s deep structure must be dismantled, leaving the system temporarily disorganized, before fundamental organizational changes can be accomplished (Gersick, 1991).

The data we were able to capture during our study of the WCS case does not permit description here of a completely satisfactory punctuated equilibrium model of IS project escalation. Nevertheless, the theory does offer

Figure 1. WCC Projects Timeline

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one of two interesting results -- depending on how we define the deep structure of the WCC. For example, under one interpretation, the WCS case can be described as four periods of “equilibrium” corresponding to the four periods seen in Figure 1. Project escalation can then be said to have occurred in periods one through three, with de-escalation occurring only in pe-riod four. The “disequilibrium” periods can be described as Events 5-6 and 21-23. These two periods could reasonably be described as what Gersick would call “revolutionary” because each resulted in a complete shakeup of the WCS project management at the agency level. However, our data does not let us conclude whether or not agency level organization should be termed the true “deep structure” of the WCS project. Nevertheless, it seems more reasonable to assume that the “deep structure” included the State level IT governance bodies including the Governor’s office, the State Legislature, and the State Auditor’s Office.

Seen in this light, the WCS case can be described as one long period of equilibrium in which different incarnations of the same project were unsuccessful “incremental” attempts to solve the underlying business problem. In this light, it seems more reasonable to assume the WCS project is today still slowly escalating and is thus not adequately addressing the underly-ing business problem. Therefore, an entirely reasonable expectation from such a punctuated equilibrium analysis is that the WCS project will continue escalating until the election of a new Governor, or a radical realignment of the State Legislature.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, many insights emerge from this study. Our research supports the prior research illustrating that after a considerable effort has been invested in an IS project, powerful forces can result in escalation. These include “completion effects” (Garland, 1990), “deaf effects” (Events 16, 17) (Cuellar et al., 2006), “mum effects” (Events 16, 18) (Smith & Keil, 2003), “face saving” behavior (Events 22-26) (Staw & Ross, 1987) and biased belief updat-ing (Boulding et al., 1997; Snow & Keil, 2002; Snow et al., 2007; Thompson, Smith, & Iacovou, 2007). Secondly, this WCC case supports the idea escalation is a complex gradual process that is difficult to capture with a temporal pro-cess model. Third our results suggest project escalation should be expected to occur in most large IS projects and that when it does, it will do so in a manner consistent with that of an organization in “equilibrium.”

Thus, the importance of employing solid project monitoring and control techniques cannot be overstated (Wright & Capps, 2008). The relationship between control practices and the escalation process is a promising area for future research (See also Kirsch, 1997; Mahring, 2002; Kirsch, 2004; Tiwana & Bush, 2007). Another promising area for research would be to go beyond the results of Mahring (2002) and Kirsch (2004) to explore further, whether the constitution and effectiveness of project governance is inversely related to escalation. For example, it would be of interest to explore if the organization’s ability to adapt control

Table 5.Mahring and Keil (2008) model of IS project escalation

Antecedent Condition: Project framing

Phase1: Drift → problem emergence

Phase2: Unsuccessful incremental adaptation, → increased visibility

Phase3: Rationalized continuation→imminent threat

Outcome: De-escalation

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practices to the dynamic nature of complex projects reduces the likelihood of escalation periods. The relationship between escalation and the requirements determination process is another possible area for future research (See Kirsch & Haney, 2006).

Our analysis suggests it is more important to study why information systems organizations are repeatedly ineffective in addressing business problems than it is to study why they do not respond to problems at all. This suggests that future models of the escalation/de-escalation process should focus less on “projects” and more on the life cycle of the underlying busi-ness problem. This study raises the following specific research questions:

1. What are the most important set of or-ganizational choices forming the “deep structure” of an information systems (IS) project organization?

2. Are U.S. State government IS projects prone to escalation and resistant to de-escalation?

3. How can large organizations be structured to prevent projects from escalation and make them more amenable to de-escalation?

4. What are the factors governing when IS project redefinitions are used mainly for political purposes rather than to address real business problems?

5. What are the factors governing when an IS project can be de-escalated without “revolutionary” organizational change?

6. How do IS projects function during revo-lutionary periods?

7. How do IS project revolutionary periods conclude?

8. How is an organization’s perception of its self-efficacy related to IS project escalation?

9. What are the factors that determine the believability of management reports about project progress?

There are at least three basic limitations of this study. The first is the production of its project narrative (See Appendix) which

depended on the personal judgment of the principal investigator and authors. The narrative contains some conjecture about what actually happened during periods where data were not readily available. Although the narrative covers eighteen years, our principal investigator (PI) was only available for direct observation from 2004-2005. Second, because the PI was viewed by the Workers Compensation Commission (WCC) organization as an auditor, he may have been threatening to management. This may have caused management to be less than candid in their responses to interview questions. Third, the PI was able to interview primarily only project management at the WCC agency level, not at the state level. Thus, there are no interview data from the state level IT governance bodies. Because of these limitations in research methods, we cannot propose a new general process model of either project escalation or de-escalation. However, we believe future study of U.S. State IT governance practices could help produce such a new important model, given more of a grounded theory approach to model development (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Martin & Turner, 1986; Orlikowski, 1993).

Despite the limitations of our research approach, we believe this paper contains some important contributions to research in both IS project escalation and de-escalation. First, the case is based on a rarely published type of in-depth ethnographic perspective (See Agar, 1986; Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994). Next, because the Workers Compensation System (WCS) project took on a misleading political identity, it would have been extremely difficult for any outsider to analyze this case. Project failure is a sensitive subject, and therefore one is seldom allowed access for in-depth case studies. As a result, one must seize single case opportunities (Herriott & Firestone, 1983; Yin, 2003). Furthermore, single cases have been recognized as an accepted way to motivate research questions and to illustrate conceptual constructs that would otherwise be harder to measure (Siggelkow, 2007, p. 21-22). Clearly more IS project management longitudinal case studies are needed -- with an aim of generating

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an explanatory theory of project escalation and de-escalation cycles. We believe additional in-sights can come from organization theory and organizational behavior models (See Sutton, 1987; Ancona, 1990; Isabella, 1990; Pettigrew, 1990; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Shenhar, 1998; Cule & Robey, 2004). Moreover, there is a need for the IS audit and academic community to join hands in conducting future academic research in government IS projects. Surveys of IS auditors concerning the frequency, circumstances and characteristics of similar projects could be most helpful. Furthermore, the Information Systems Audit and Control Association have supported this type of survey research (See Keil & Robey, 1999). The outsourcing literature (Tiwana & Bush, 2007) may give further guidance in this area, and we hope our paper offers a small contribution as well.

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ENDNOTES1 This was also reported to be a basic problem

with another eGovernment project, the FBI Trilogy case (Knorr, 2005; US GAO, 2006).

ii This critique resulted from the fact that the last two phases of the Royer model of escalation resembled the first phase of Montealegre and Keil model of de-escalation (See Table 4.)

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Wright has a Ph.D. in Management Science and Information Systems from the University of Texas at Austin, and has published in leading journals in the areas of project management, information services management, expert systems, and program comprehension. Dr. Wright now teaches project management and systems analysis but has extensive previous information systems development experience in several large organizations including United Airlines, Levi Strauss, National Semiconductor, and Advanced Micro Devices.

Capps teaches strategy and human resource management. He is a lifetime certified Senior Professional in Human Resources. Dr. Capps’ industry experience as a human resource devel-opment (HRD) practitioner includes establishing and managing a large petrochemical training program where the world’s record in safety was set. As a consultant, Dr. Capps trained hundreds of law enforcement professionals in strategic management for the Law Enforcement Manage-ment Institute of Texas (LEMIT). In addition, Dr. Capps has provided management and human relations training to national and international corporations.

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APPENDIX:

Determinants of Commitment to the Workers Compensation System (WCS) Project

Table 1a.

Event 1: (1990) New system proposedThe Workers Compensation Commission (WCC) was created by 1990 legislation, which elimi-nated the State Industrial Accident Board. The new agency’s mission provided for no-fault income replacement benefits and medical care for workers injured on the job and unable to earn their pre-injury wage. WCC was created to ad-minister key parts of the system including delivery of benefits to injured workers, and to regulate and train all system participants. The mission of the new agency was data processing intensive.

Antecedent←

Condition

The Industrial Accident Board was an agency notoriously inefficient in handling of workers comp claims. This created a politically critical need for a new information system, the Workers Compensation System (WCS).

Political fac-tors

The WCS software development project was put under financial control of an interagency gover-nance committee.

Structural factors

Instead of developing the WCS from scratch, the new agency bought COMPASS, a software system from another state. This was thought to be the least expensive option. Project factors

The legislature initially funded this acquisition project at $3 million -- a relatively modest amount compared to well-known IT project failures. For example, the FBI’s Trilogy project was funded for over $500M (US GAO 2006).

Cost

Event 2: (1991) Requirements problems identified Commitment determinants

Within a year, the new agency WCC was also unable to handle workers compensation claims efficiently. As a result, a data entry backlog was accumulating rapidly.

Structural factors

The agency was quickly getting a reputation for inefficiency. Political fac-tors

Event 3 (1991): Governance board intervenes ineffectively Commitment determinants

In response, the agency project governing body appointed a statewide task force to study how to alleviate that backlog. The task force was headed by an IT auditor from the State Auditor’s Of-fice (SAO) and staffed with two computer specialists from the Comptroller’s Office. However, in clear contrast to the commonly accepted audit principal of “separation of duties,” this task force was headed by an employee of the same agency that had originally approved the COMPASS purchase—the SAO.

Structural factors

Instead of recommending a de-escalation action, the task force found that the agency (WCC) had made “significant progress” in using automation to fulfill its mission and recommended proceed-ing with the COMPASS acquisition and conversion.

Social factors

Event 4 (1991-1998): Incremental unsuccessful efforts to address requirements shortcom-ings of the COMPASS software

Commitment determinants

During this eight-year period of relative equilibrium, there were several incremental changes to the COMPASS project charter and the COMPASS software. This period also saw a replacement of the agency director. These adaptations nevertheless did not enable the agency to alleviate the work backlog; and the COMPASS conversion project “muddled along with an insufficient annual budget, and insufficient salaries.” (Software development manager interview, January 2005).

Project factors

continued on following page

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The agency (WCC) work backlog steadily increased over this eight-year period. Structural factors

Local newspapers repeatedly cited the agency (WCC) as one of the least efficient of its kind. In 1992 one of the WCC commissioners resigned amid fraud allegations.

Political fac-tors

$1,000,000/yr. Cost

Event 5: (1999) Legislation to reduce agency paperwork (BPI) passed Commitment determinants

In 1999, The State Legislature passed a bill requiring WCC to “reduce its paper work.” This law resulted in a new WCC project known as the Business Process Improvement Initiative, or BPI project. The BPI requirements gathering project was placed under control of a WCC agency user group.The BPI related software development was placed under control of the WCC IT department. WCC planned to replace COMPASS with a new system to be developed from scratch. WCC planned to reengineer their business processes such that COMPASS could no longer be used.

Structural factors

The legislature appropriated $2.5 million for the WCC to redesign its business processes, and plan for the replacement of the mainframe that hosted the old system, which was COMPASS. Cost

Event 6: (2000) Little progress on business process initiative (BPI) reported. COMPASS use continues.

Commitment determinants

The only progress for the first two years of the BPI was a plan to replace the mainframe that hosted COMPASS.As public discontent with the agency mounted, the WCC agency Commission appointed a new agency director. This was the third such director since WCC inception. Local newspapers reported that the appointment was equivalent to “a fox being put in charge of the hen house.” A former insurance industry lobbyist, the new director had presided over a related agency during the 1990s, when it was beleaguered by criticism from consumers, workers, the Legislature, Ralph Nader and an investigation by the State District Attorney.

Political fac-tors

Event 7: (2001) New software development contract with Corp1 signed for new web based system (WEBCOMP)

Commitment determinants

Instead of simply planning to convert COMPASS to a cheaper hardware platform, WCC manag-ers planned to replace COMPASS with a new web site to be known as WEBCOMP. The new web site was to be developed from scratch by a combination of WCC employees and outside contractors. Internal project plans had expanded to five “Tiers” (or software releases). Tier 1 was to provide essential requirements needed only for medical providers. Tier 2 was to add the essential participant requirements. Mainframe replacement was pushed back into Tier 5 – after complete COMPASS replacement by WEBCOMP. Tier 1 was to complete in February 2003, Tier 2 in August 2003 and Tier 5 in 2007.

Project factors

Agency managers blamed WCC’s high operating costs on the Corp3 contract and COMPASS software inadequacies. (Corp3 housed and operated the mainframe that hosted COMPASS.)WCC managers assumed the legislature wanted a new public web site for the agency. They hoped that the web would distribute to the field offices (and the public) much of the data entry formerly done at WCC’s central site

Political fac-tors

WCC managers planned for WEBCOMP -- the State’s most technically complex “eGovernment” facility to date. The new software was to be written in the JAVA programming language. WEBCOMP was to be directed by staff that had no prior large-scale web site development expe-rience. Software development began using only former adabase natural programmers with no experience or training with JAVA and web security technologies.

Structural factors

$5,000,000/yr. for five years includes hardware and software. Cost

continued on following page

Table 1a. continued

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Event 8: (2000-2004) WEBCOMP Software development stalls Commitment determinants

The original WEBCOMP release plan called for a direct cutover from the old COMPASS main-frame system to the new web-based system. However, that plan would have pushed back the first release of the WEBCOMP web site to a politically unacceptable late date, so it was scrapped and replaced by a plan to run COMPASS and WEBCOMP initially in parallel.

Political factors

The new WEBCOMP database had to be initialized with years of old COMPASS data. After three years, this data migration project was still not complete. Technical staff was overwhelmed with new technology learning curves. During this period of relative equilibrium, the software development team missed several release dates and had extensive personnel turnover. To hasten software development, Corp1 recommended the agency buy a business rules expert system tool. However, this proved to be a costly delay. The decision to use COMPASS and WEBCOMP in parallel during the system cutover proved fatal. During the parallel phase, these two systems were to have separate but redundant data-bases. This meant the two databases had to be in real time synchronization, which later proved impossible.

Project factors

When the first version of the new website was released to the public, the agency help desk was overwhelmed with calls, but the new release could not be backed out.

Political fac-tors

Programmer’s morale became quite low. “Tools don’t work.” “No one understands this project as a whole.” (Technical staff interviews 2005)

Psychological factors

Event 9: (2003) Governance board (QAT) intervenes ineffectively Commitment determinants

The project governing body -- the Quality Assurance Team (QAT)-- hired a local software project management consulting company to evaluate the project That report indicated only that improper quality control was the reason for a dispute between Corp1 and the agency over the WEBCOMP requirements.

Structural factors

$75,000 Cost

Event 10: (2003) Agency (WCC) software development manager replaced Commitment determinants

In 2003, both the business requirements group and the software development group were put under a single manager. Project factors

The new software development manager had no prior IT experience, education, or a college degree.

Psychological factors

The new software development manager had been the former head of the WEBCOMP business requirements group. Before that, she had been a WCC branch office clerical staff member for several years. She was young, attractive, quit witted, and considered an agency up and comer, heroic for accepting the technical management responsibility for the troubled project, despite lacking a technical background.

Social factors

Event 11: (2003) New ineffective contract for re-work of WEBCOMP requirements defini-tion signed

Commitment determinants

continued on following page

Table 1a. continued

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A revised list of WCS requirements was written by Corp2, which had recently bought Corp1. Within a few weeks, there was a dispute over problems with Corp2’s contract performance including a lack of promised architecture documents.

Project factors

$300,000 Cost

Event 12: (2003-2004) New time and materials contracts for WEBCOMP development signed

Commitment determinants

Because of the dispute over Corp2’s contract performance, it was terminated. The software development manager replaced that contract with several individual time and materials contracts. Each contract was for an individual with experience in a needed web technology. Each such per-son was named a development team lead. There were fifteen WCC employees assigned to these teams, bringing the total development team size to about thirty people. The state IS project governing boards approved all these new contracts. Because WCC was now taking a much more active role in project management, a WEBCOMP project steering committee was formed This consisted of six WCC department heads, including the Internal Audit manager and the WCC director. Technical team decides to write a web security system from scratch rather than to use the one that comes off the shelf with Java. Software development stalls.

Structural factors

The WCC software development manager hired an original Corp1 employee to be project man-ager. This employee had resigned when Corp2 bought Corp1, having no prior web development experience.

Social factors

$100 / hr. average for each of the twelve contractors Cost

Event 13: (2004) WCC’s statutory time limit review nears Commitment determinants

In 2004, the State Sunset Commission, began its first and only review of WCC, and within a few months, issued its report to the Governor. (According to law, the Sunset Commission reviews each state agency’s performance at regular intervals. Unless the agency can justify its continu-ance, the Governor eliminates it.) The report contained a number of possible recommendations. One of its recommendations was to “improve WCC’s web site to be more customer friendly.” Another was to eliminate WCC and transfer its function to another state agency, the Department of Insurance (DI).

Structural factors

WCC managers perceived the report as confusing and contradictory. Social factors

Agency morale decreased. “What’s the point in finishing this project? ...we are just going to be eliminated.” (Technical staff interviews 2005)

Psychological factors

Event 14: (July 2004) WCC replaces its director again Commitment determinants

In an effort to repair its public image, the WCC Board replaced the agency director who had been with the agency since 1991 working in various management positions.

Political fac-tors

Event 15: (Sept. 29 2004) New agency director issues misleading press release Commitment determinants

continued on following page

Table 1a. continued

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In one of his first public acts, the new agency director issued a misleading press release. Follow-ing is an excerpt: “For the first time in (the State), workers injured on the job can report the injury to the WCC via the Internet. The online reporting…. was launched as part of the Commission’s WEBCOMP system. We are tremendously pleased to achieve this milestone...Injured workers still have the option of submitting a paper copy of the …form”

Political fac-tors

It was true that the WEBCOMP web site had advanced to the point where injured workers could submit an injury report to the agency remotely from a home computer or a branch office kiosk. However, the public was not told that, after such a remote report was submitted, WCC workers at headquarters had to re-enter it manually into both the COMPASS and WEBCOMP databases.

Project factors

Event 16: (2003-2005) WCC Internal Audit Department gets more involved with the proj-ect

Commitment determinants

In 2004, WCC the Internal Audit Director resigned and a staff auditor was named the new Direc-tor of Internal Audit. Although the new Internal Audit Director wanted to conduct a formal internal audit of the WCS project, the agency Commissioner would not allow it. Therefore, the new audit director had to settle for only monitoring the project. Our principal investigator (PI) agreed to perform that function.

Structural factors

Old Internal Audit reports revealed that the previous WCC audit director had been aware of serious problems with the WEBCOMP project but never raised the issue with management. (There were suspicions that the previous audit director had compromised audit independence by developing a personal friendship with the WCC software development manager.)

Social factors

The new audit director cautioned our principal investigator (PI) that, although the Internal Audit department reported directly to the agency Commissioner, he felt the audit department’s power minimal. The WCC Director had recently prohibited a previous auditor from attending software development team meetings because “he was delaying project progress”. Thus, the audit director asked our PI to keep a low profile.

Political fac-tors

The new audit director did also not have an IT background. Psychological factors

Event 17: (Jan. 2005) Principal investigator (PI) begins field work Commitment determinants

The audit directory introduced the principal investigator (PI) to the agency director as an expert technical project advisor. Although he was polite, and expressed hope that the team would even-tually turn around, the troubled project, the agency director did not seem interested in discussing the project. Next, the audit director introduced the PI to the software development manager who blamed the WCS project troubles on low state salaries and unscrupulous contractors.

Social factors

The PI began attending weekly project meetings. The agency was planning an upcoming release of the WEBCOMP web site, but was waiting for the defect list to shrink instead of grow each week.

Project factors

Event 18: (Feb. 2005) WCC software development manager staged a failed software dem-onstration

Stakeholders from throughout the State were invited to the WEBCOMP demonstration, which was advertised to be “live.” The demonstration did not go well: the effects of several obvious system crashes were projected onto a large screen in front of a large audience.

Political fac-tors

The hardware, data, and software were not the actual WEBCOMP equipment, but a “one of” configuration of staged data processed on a laptop computer. Project factors

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Event 19: (Mar. – Jul. 2005) Whistle blown on the WCS project Commitment determinants

In March of 2005, our principal investigator (PI) gave the Internal Audit Director an initial evaluation of the troubled WCS project. The report cautioned that the WEBCOMP project was probably technically infeasible and that the contractors were not bearing a reasonable level of the development risks. In July, the PI issued the final monitoring report to the new audit director. Because the PI could find no written plan that clearly described the remaining work to be done, expected costs, or predicted when the work would complete; his report recommended that all funding for the WCS software development project be stopped. The Internal Audit Director then resigned and took a job with an unrelated state agency. The PI then left the field, and continued following the project on the agency websites, newspaper ac-counts, and phone interviews with staff left behind at the agency.

Structural factors

The WEBCOMP project continued unchanged for a few more months before it finally collapsed. Project factors

Most WCC managers then believed that the Governor would eliminate the agency within a few weeks, transferring its authority to new management in another state agency.

Psychological factors

The WEBCOMP project’s economic cost exceeded $27,000,000 over the previous six years, with little to show for the money. Most of it had been spent on time and materials contracts, which specified no project deliverables, except time sheets and progress reports. More than $1,000,000 had been spent on hardware (made by Corp2) that had become merely “shelf-ware.”

Cost

Event 20: (August 2005) WECOMP website ineffectively updated, causes more problems Commitment determinants

In August 2005, the software development team updated the WEBCOMP website again. Project factors

This new web site caused a flood of help desk calls, so the release was backed out. Political fac-tors

Event 21: (Sept 2005) Governor eliminates WCC agency. Transfers control of WCS project to the Department of Insurance (DI)

Commitment determinants

DI is located in another part of the same city as the old agency WCC. This new division of the other agency is called the Division of Workers Compensation (DWC). DI replaced all the former WCC software development managers.

Structural factors

Event 22: (Dec. 2006) The State Auditor’s Office (SAO) begins “independent audit” of the WEBCOMP project.

Commitment determinants

In 2006, the Department of Insurance (DI) asks the SAO to perform a contracts audit of the WEBCOMP project. In regards to that audit, the PI agreed to an SAO interview in return for permission to interview SAO staff regarding all WCS contracts. The SAO public report issued weeks later recommended redirecting the WCS project and termi-nating the time and materials contracts.

Political fac-tors

Event 23: (Jan. 2006) The new WCS project management team at the Department of Insur-ance (DI) disagrees over project direction

Commitment determinants

In early 2006, the Department of Insurance eliminated the WEBCOMP project, and replaced it with a new very broad project charter. The new project was called once again, the “Business Project Improvement” (BPI2) project. Although the DI may have intended to de-escalate the WCS project, it in essence escalated it by planning to convert the entire COMPASS system to a web based system. Following is an excerpt from the new BPI2 charter.“It would be necessary to change the project’s scope significantly to improve the likelihood of meeting project timeframes with the amount appropriated to the project… By migrating all ap-plications from the mainframe to a web-based environment by the end of this biennium, DI will reduce expenses related to mainframe maintenance in its current operating budget.”

Project factors

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At that time, because former WCC employees, now part of DI’s DWC was physically located in a different building across town from DI, planners may have been unaware that the DWC did not have the sufficient web infrastructure for such a web project, such as enough systems administra-tors, firewalls, servers, load balancers, etc.

Structural factors

Event 24: (2006) New management team lacks confidence in project turnaround Commitment determinants

Later in 2006, public reports indicated a lack of confidence in the eventual success of the BPI2 project. Following is an excerpt: “During the last quarter of 2006, DWC staff began processing accumulated proof of Coverage data. Unfortunately, its rejection rate for this data was 40%. Without a reliable method to correct the rejected data, the Division discontinued processing.” .

Political fac-tors

DI managers, originally intending to deescalate the WCS project, realized they had mistakenly escalated the project by planning to convert all of the COMPASS functionality to the web.

Structural factors

Event 25: (2007) Project redefined and legitimized Commitment determinants

Having identified the problems with the WCS software they had inherited from WCC, DI managers explored more alternatives, and then proposed the adoption of a partial abandonment strategy. Key to this decision was a redefinition of the essential business problems which then proclaimed that the underlying problems were caused, not by the lack of a comprehensive web site, but rather the following three things: 1. lack of a document scanning and storage system; 2. an unstable private computer network infrastructure; and 3. the expensive mainframe maintenance contract with Corp3. As a result, DI managers decided to abandon plans for web based processing of workers com-pensation claims.

Structural factors

The technical team planned simply to port the COMPASS system to much cheaper PC based hardware. Project factors

Event 26: (2007) Project de-escalated

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In mid 2007, DI managers announced that the BPI project, originally chartered in 2000, was completed successfully. Following is an excerpt from a public report to the State IT governance body the Quality Assurance Team (QAT) published Sept 30, 2007. “The Division successfully completed all major aspects of the migration of COMPASS function-ality to the new computing environment. The mainframe was disconnected on September 30 2007...” Because the BPI project was then “closed,” DI managers no longer had to report to the QAT and thus there was no traceable subsequent public funding for it. Nor was there any public report-ing required for it. Nor was their any further mention of the completely abandoned WEBCOMP project. Much of the original WEBCOMP system vision does not exist today, and the DWC’s web site presence is minimal. However, there is an “informal” DWC project called “getting to the web.” DWC still does not have workflow software, a shortcoming which puts it years behind the tech-nology used in health insurance companies. Moreover, DWC still relies heavily on the converted, but outdated COMPASS system.DI managers declined to comment on the division’s recent cost and return to work performance. However in 2008 the former WCC Internal Audit Director told the principal investigator in an interview that DWC still has the reputation of not been able to efficiently handle comp claims, and that as a result, the DWC director was replaced again in 2008. Much of the original agency’s (WCC) data management responsibility has been transferred to the Information Resources Department of (IRD) after Corp2 won a new $863 million contract with the State. This contract, stemming from 2005 legislation mandating consolidation of the State data centers, was touted as a way to improve the agency’s data security, and standardize the systems; saving $178 million over the life of the contract. However, in November 2008, citing recent data losses and service problems, the Governor halted the contract and notified Corp2 that it had “breached its contractual duties and obligations to the State.” However, a State Representative, who supported the 2005 legislation, said the project has achieved its broad goals of improving state data processing services. “What we didn’t foresee is the contractor not being able to meet the terms of the contract.”

←Outcome

Table 1a. continued

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80 International Journal of Information Technology Project Management, 1(4), 80-82, October-December 2010

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Managing It Outsourcing Performanceby Hans Solli-Sæther and Petter GottschalkISBN 978-1-60566-796-6Copyright 2010256 pp.

In the current environment of IT organiza-tions, externalization of services and processes to an external and specialized organization (Raisinghani, Starr, Hickerson, Morrison, & Howard, 2008) constitutes an extended practice known as Outsourcing (Barthelemy, 2003). Outsourcing is the process by which an organi-zation moves or uses certain resources to carry specific tasks for an external organization, by means of a contract (Barthelemy, 2003). The focus of IT outsourcing has been changing, since its creation in the 1960s (Loh & Venkataraman, 1995), from a focus on hardware, to software on the 1970s, to hardware and software standard-ization on the 1980s, and to total solution on the 1990s (Lee, Huynh, Kwok, & Pi, 2003). IT outsourcing may solve two of the main issues of the sector: handle technology changes more

Book ReviewManaging It Outsourcing Performance

Ricardo Colomo-Palacios, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain

effectively and know the real cost of a process or product (Boehm, Abts, & Chulani, 2000).

In this outsourcing scenario, the relations between client and supplier, performance and performance management are the most important factors for the relationship success, particularly given that measurement of per-formance ensures the quality of outsourcing services (Saunders, Gebelt, & Qing, 1997). Performance management generates informa-tion of vital importance to govern and control the life cycle of an Outsourcing relationship (Weimer & Seuring, 2008). Moreover, poor performance management may ruin the Out-sourcing relationship (Fink, 1994).

In this scenario, in which IT Outsourcing is an undeniable and unstoppable trend, Man-aging IT Outsourcing Performance represents a key tool for managing outsourcing relation-ships, since it provides the theory along with relevant insights from industrial case studies, which demonstrate that what appears simple in theory may become extremely complex in reality. The focus of Managing IT Outsourcing Performance is relationship management, value creation and measurements in IT Outsourcing scenarios. Authors gives us a glimpse of how IT outsourcing relationships can be successfully DOI: 10.4018/jitpm.2010100105

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managed in organizations through a variety of very specific case studies, involving real-world implementations and practical examples.

Overall, I found this book to be very in-structive. At times, the volume is similar to a textbook, a form that would suit master degree student use. However, the book audience ranges from graduate or PhD students to IT project managers, CIOs or IT managers. Among the book’s nice features stand out its well organized chapters that touch on a panoply of research related topics. In the paragraphs below, this reviewer describes the chapters and concludes with an overall evaluation of the book.

This book has three sections. The first section, (Chapters 1 and 2), provides the back-ground about IT outsourcing. The second section (Chapters 3 to 8) presents the main factors of sourcing relationships: critical success factors (Chapter 3), value creation (Chapter 4), stages of the relationship growth (chapter 5), costs, benefits, and risks (Chapter 6), knowledge transfer (Chapter 7) and IT outsourcing per-formance measurement (Chapter 8). The final section of the book (Chapters 9 and 10) proposes an outsourcing governance model (Chapter 9), and describes real world outsourcing cases in Chapter 10, taking into account IT Outsourcing foundations explained in Section 2.

Foremost, Chapter 1 defines and describes IT outsourcing as the common platform for understanding the sourcing universe. This task is based on an in deep state of the art review of the sourcing literature.

The primary purpose of the second chapter is to strengthen the theoretical understanding of IT outsourcing. In order to accomplish this, it identifies eleven theoretical perspectives for IT outsourcing according to attributes such as outsourcing focus, aim, the unit of analysis, outsourcing philosophy, and critical success factors. The main output of this chapter is an extensive review of the IT outsourcing based research presented in a well defined table.

Section 2 starts with Chapter 3. Based on the theories analyzed in Chapter 2, authors develop eleven critical success factors in IT outsourcing, one for each theory.

Chapter 3 builds on Chapter 2 by de-veloping eleven critical success factors in IT outsourcing, one for each theory. In the second part of the chapter, authors conceptualize the outsourcing of IT services as an electronic business activity, where vendors electronically provides IT services to clients.

In Chapter 4 authors introduce and apply the concept of value configurations. A value configuration is the way an organization creates value for its stakeholders and clients. Given that, authors present and compare three differ-ent value configurations – the value chain, the value shop, and the value network. Taking into account that a company’s value configuration may serve as a determinant and predictor for the outsourcing extent, authors propose an analysis designed to identify sourcing options and analyze opportunities and threats associ-ated with each of them, within the framework of strategic IT planning.

Chapter 5 focuses on maturity in outsourc-ing relations. Growth and maturity models are well established tools to determine an organiza-tion state, as well as the direction in which it is moving. These models assume that predictable patterns exist in organizations and organiza-tional parts growth. Hereupon, in this chapter the three-stage model for the evolution of IT outsourcing relationships developed previously by authors (Gottschalk & Solli-Sæther, 2006) are presented along with an exploratory study of the model testing .

Chapter 6 deals with the understanding of costs, benefits, and risks of outsourcing relationships, including hidden and contract termination costs as well as risk behaviours.

Given that IT is a knowledge intensive activity, Chapter 7 discusses the importance of knowledge transfer in IT outsourcing rela-tionships.

The key issue of the book is discussed in Chapter 8: measuring IT outsourcing perfor-mance. A method for developing quantitative performance measurements is presented in this chapter from both vendor and customer standpoints. Thus, from the vendor perspective, it is presented the vendor’s value proposition.

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Whereas from the client perspective, it is in-troduced a method for developing quantitative performance measurements as well as how to measure the IT outsourcing relationships success.

Chapter 9 marks the beginning of Sec-tion 3. It focuses on proposing an outsourcing governance model. Based on several of the perspectives discussed in previous chapters, authors agree that both hard and soft sides of outsourcing have to be included in the gover-nance structures in order to be successful.

Chapter 10 presents an exploratory case study aimed to understand the complexities and the underlying constructs of managing IT outsourcing relationships, along with the performance of these relationships.

To sum up, this is a very well organized book and undoubtedly a great addition to the IT Outsourcing literature. The book is very read-able and is also very clear in its explanations. Moreover, this book presents a not-so-common double flavour: practitioner and scholar.

Therefore, I would strongly recommend this book to both those involved in IT Out-sourcing affairs, and those less familiar with this kind of scenarios.

REFERENCES

Barthelemy, J. (2003). The seven deadly sins of outsourcing. The Academy of Management Execu-tive, 17(2), 87–99.

Boehm, B., Abts, C., & Chulani, S. (2000). Software development cost estimation approaches – a survey. Annals of Software Engineering, 10(4), 177–205. doi:10.1023/A:1018991717352

Fink, D. (1994). A security framework for in-formation systems outsourcing. Information Management & Computer Security, 2(4), 3–8. doi:10.1108/09685229410068235

Gottschalk, P., & Solli-Sæther, H. (2006). Maturity model for IT outsourcing relationships. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 106(2), 200–212. doi:10.1108/02635570610649853

Lee, J. N., Huynh, M. Q., Kwok, R. C. W., & Pi, S. M. (2003). IT outsourcing evolution: past, present and future. Communications of the ACM, 46(5), 84–89. doi:10.1145/769800.769807

Loh, L., & Venkataraman, N. (1995). Diffusion of information technology outsourcing: influence sources of Kodak effect . In Khosrowpour, M. (Ed.), Managing Information Technology Investments with Outsourcing (pp. 334–358). Hershey, PA: IGI Global.

Raisinghani, M. S., Starr, B., Hickerson, B., Morrison, M., & Howard, M. (2008). Information technology/systems offshore outsourcing: key risks and success factors. Journal of Information Technology Research, 1(1), 72–92.

Saunders, C. S., Gebelt, M., & Hu, Q. (1997). Achieving success in information systems outsourc-ing. California Management Review, 39(2), 63–79.

Weimer, D., & Seuring, S. (2008). Information needs in the outsourcing lifecycle. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 108(1), 107–121. doi:10.1108/02635570810844115

Ricardo Colomo-Palacios is an Associate Professor at the Computer Science Department of the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. His research interests include applied research in Information Systems, Software Project Management, People in Software Projects and Social and Semantic Web. He received his PhD in Computer Science from the Universidad Politécnica of Madrid (2005). He also holds a MBA from the Instituto de Empresa (2002). He has been working as software engineer, project manager and software engineering consultant in several companies including Spanish IT leader INDRA. He is also an Editorial Board Member and Associate Editor for several international journals and conferences and Editor in Chief of International Journal of Human Capital and Information Technology Professionals.

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