TM 5-858-7TECHNICAL MANUAL

I

DESIGNING FACILITIESTO RESIST

NUCLEAR WEAPON EFFECTSFACILITY SUPPORT SYSTEMS

‘

This reprint includes all changes in effect at the time ofpublication; change 1.

H E A D Q U A R T E R S , D E P A R T M E N T O F T H E A R M YOCTOBER 1983

REPRODUCTION AUTHORIZATION/RESTRICTIONS

This manual has been prepared by or for the Government and, except to theextent indicated below, is public property and not subject to copyright.

Copyrighted material included in the manual has been used with the knowl-edge and permission of the proprietors and is acknowledged as such at pointof use. Anyone wishing to make further use of any copyrighted material, byitself and apart from this text, should seek necessary permission directlyfrom the proprietors.

Reprints on republications of this manual should include a credit substantial-ly as follows: “Department of the Army, USA, Technical Manual TM5–858–7, Designing Facilities to Resist Nuclear Weapon Effects, FacilitySupport System.”

If the reprint of republication includes copyrighted material, the creditshould also state: “Anyone wishing to make further use of copyrighted mate-rial, by itself and apart from this text, should seek necessary permission di-rectly from the proprietors. ”

TM 5–858–7C1

DESIGNING FACILITIES TO RESIST

NUCLEAR WEAPON EFFECTS

FACILITY SUPPORT SYSTEMS

TM 5--858-7, 15 October 1983, is changed as follows:

Page i. change the title of Appendix C from “REFERENCES” to “BIBLIOGRAPHY.”Page i. After Appendix C. add Appendix “D. REFERENCES. . . . . . D–l. ”Page 1–1.. Change title of TM 5-858-4 to “Shock Isolation Systems.”Page B-2, paragraph B-7. Delete OPNAVINST-9330-7A.Page C-1. Delete lines 1, 2, 3, 17, 18, 19, and 20.Page D-I. Appendix D is added as follows:

Official:DONALD J. DELANDRO

Brigadier General, United States AmyThe Adjutant General

JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Distribution:To be distributed in accordance with DA Form l2--34B requirements for TM 5-800 Series: Engineering and

Design for Real Property Facilities.

HEADQUARTERSDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON , DC, 15 October 1983

DESIGNING FACILITIES TO RESISTNUCLEAR WEAPON EFFECTSFACILITY SUPPORT SYSTEMS

Paragraph Page

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTIONGeneral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–1TM 5-858-7: Facility Support Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–2

2. POWER SUPPLYThree Operating Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2–1Open-Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2–2Closed-Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

3. WASTE-HEAT REJECTIONDesign Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3–1Waste Heat Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3–2Nominally Hardened Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3Moderately Hardened Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4Superhard Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3–5

4. AIR-QUALITY CONTROLIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4–1Air-flow Velocity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4–2Air Temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4--3Humidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4Oxygen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5Carbon Dioxide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6Contaminants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4–7

5. UTILITIES AND SERVICESIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5–1Groundwater Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5–2Fire Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3Personnel Support Services.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4

1-11-1

2-12-12-3

3-13-13-23-23-3

4-14–14-14-24-24–24-4

5-15-15-15-2

APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..- . . ----- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

B. PERSONNEL SUPPORT SERVICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-l

C. REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1

LIST OF TABLES

Table

3–1 Personnel Heat Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3–2

3–2 Approximate Heat-Sink Requirements for Closed-Cycle Waste-Heat Rejection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

4-1 Personnel-Dependent Oxygen Requirement and Carbon Dioxide Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

2–1 Electrical Power- System Types vs. System Hardness Level... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2–2

B–1 Typical Living Quarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

i

TM 5-858-7

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1 –1. General.

a. This series of manuals, entitled Designing Fa-cilities to Resistnized as follows:

TM 5-858–1

TM 5-858-2

TM 5-858–3

TM 5-8584

TM 5-858–5

TM 5-858-6

TM 5-858-7

TM 5-858–8

Nuclear Weapon Effects, is orga-

Facilities System Engineering

Weapon Effects

Structures

Stock Isolation Systems

Air Entrainment, Fasteners,Penetration Protection,Hydraulic-Surge ProtectiveDevices, EMP ProtectiveDevices

Hardness Verification

Facility Support Systems

Illustrative Examples

A list of references pertinent to each manual isplaced in an appendix. Additional appendixes andbibliographies are used, as required, for documen-tation of supporting information. Pertinent biblio-graphic material is identified in the text with theauthor’s name placed in parentheses. Such biblio-graphic material is not necessary for the use of thismanual; the name and source of publications relat-ed to the subject of this manual is provided for in-formation purposes.

b. The purpose of this series of manuals’ is toprovide guidance to engineers engaged in design-ing facilities that are required to resist nuclearweapon effects. It has been written for systems,structural, mechanical, electrical, and test engi-neers possessing state-of-the-art expertise in theirrespective disciplines, but having little knowledgeof nuclear weapon effects on facilities. While it isapplicable as general design guidelines to all Corpsof Engineers specialists who participate in design-ing permanent military facilities, it has been writ-ten and organized on the assumption a systems-engineering group will coordinate design of thefacilities.

c. Technical Manual 5-858 addresses only thedesigning of hardened facilities; other techniquesto achieve survival capacity against nuclear weap-on attacks are deception, duplication, dispersion,nomadization, reconstitution, and active defense. Afacility is said to be hardened if it has been de-signed to directly resist and mitigate the weaponeffects. Most of the hardening requirements are al-

located to the subsidiary facilities, which house,support, and p ro t ec t t h e p r i m e m i s s i o nmateriel/personnel (PMMP). This manual is appli-cable to permanent facilities, such as those associ-ated with weapon systems, materiel stockpiles,command centers, manufacturing centers, andcommunications centers.

d. The nuclear weapon threats considered arelisted below. Biological, chemical, and conventional.weapon attacks are not considered.

—Weapons aimed at the facility itself or atnearby targets

—A range from many, relatively small-yieldweapons to a single super-yield weapon

—Weapon yields from tens of kilotons to hun-dreds of megatons

—Weapon delivery by aerial bombing, air-to-surface missile, surface-to-surface missile,or satellite-launched vehicle

—Detonation (burst) of a weapon in the air, atthe ground surface, or beneath the groundsurface

—Direct-overhead bursts for a deep-buriedfacility

—Near-miss bursts for a near-surface facility,producing peak over-pressures from tensto thousands of psi at the facility

e. The designing of facilities resistant to nuclearweapon effects is an evolving specialty using a rel-atively narrow data base that incorporates bothrandom and systematic uncertainties. The range ofthese uncertainties may vary from significant (or-der of 1 to 2 magnitudes) to normal (10 to 100 per-cent variation from average values). The applicableuncertainty value depends on the specific weaponeffect or hardening objective under consideration.Loading uncertainty is generally more significantthan resistance uncertainty. Awareness of the ap-propriate uncertainty (extent of ignorance) factoris essential not only for system engineering trade-offs, but in the utilization of available analysis ortest procedures. Studies and experiments are be-ing conducted to improve methodology, to betterdefine random uncertainties, and to reduce system-atic uncertainties. This manual will be revised assignificant improvements occur in either methodol-ogy or data base.

1-2. TM 5–858-7: Facility support systems.This volume presents design guidelines for the fa-cility support systems: Power supply, waste-heat

1-1

TM 5-858-7

rejection, air quality control, and utilities and serv- weapon effects, but is heavily influenced by theices. The designing of these facility support sys- fact that there is a survival requirement for theterns is essentially independent of the nuclear system.

1-2

TM 5-858-7

CHAPTER 2

POWER SUPPLY

2–1. Three operating modes.

a. Overview. View the power supply systemwithin the context of three operating modes: pre-attack, transfer, and transattack/postattack. Usu-ally, it will be most effective to use a different sys-tem to satisfy each of these three modes.

b. Preattack power. Use either commercial pow-er or a dedicated power-supply to satisfy thepreattack power requirements. Use commercialpower if it is compatible with the system power re-quirements. Conventional civil-power technology isquite adequate to adapting commercial power to ahardened system. The basic weakness is that lossof commercial power forces the system to operateon the transattack/postattack power supply, whichhas, of course, a finite endurance.

(1) This is a fundamental issue: When does amysterious, or even a not-so-mysterious, loss ofcommercial power constitute an “attack” on thesystem? An onsite, dedicated preattack power sup-ply reduces the potential for a mysterious loss ofpower but does not eliminate it.

(2) If commercial power is not satisfactory, usean onsite, surface power plant. State-of-the-art,open-cycle systems are satisfactory candidates,whether the surface plant is unhardened or is nom-inally hardened. Diesel-powered generators are themost promising candidates for small and moderatepower levels. Fossil-fueled or nuclear-poweredsteam-turbine generator systems offer comparablethermal efficiency only in large (>10 MW)installations.

c. Transfer power. Design of transfer power sys-tems are controlled by functional requirements ofthe total facility. Delay tolerance and facility relia-bility must be considered in selecting subsystemsto transfer power mode from preattack condition totransattack/postattack. The transfer-power systemcan be as simple as a compressed-air supply con-trolled by battery and sequencing valve that canstart the engine of the postattack power system.More typically, it will be a combination of such asystem with an uninterruptible power system(UPS) in the form of a battery-inverter supply forcritical loads.

d. Transattack/postattack power. This is thecritical operating mode and requires selection ofsubsystem compatible with requirements for thehardness level of the entire facility. With prime-mission materiel/personnel (PMMP) needs defined,design the transattack/postattack power-supply

system to include no fewer than the followingcapabilities:

—Satisfy peak-power and peak-energy demands.—Satisfy normal power demands at acceptable

efficiency.—Provide acceptable power quality.—Provide acceptable preattack availability.—Provide acceptable endurance availabil-

ity/reliability.—Accommodate preattack exercising.

(1) Choose the effective degree of atmosphericisolation of the power supply system and the at-tendant waste-heat rejection system. Bear thesethree facts in mind:

—Except for exported communication signals,the total electrical energy produced reap-pears in the facility as waste heat to beadded to the waste-heat rejection load.

—For open-power systems that use air cooling,the parasitic electrical power demands ofthe waste-heat rejection system greatlyincreases the power level requirements ofthe power-supply system.

—The costs of a closed-cycle power supply sys-tem and a closed-cycle waste-heat rejec-tion system can dictate the cost of the en-tire facility.

In general, the more severe the survivability re-quirement, the more effective must be the closed-cycle operation of both the power supply systemand the attendant waste-heat rejection system (fig.2-l).

(2) During the preattack (peacetime) period,the transattack/postattack system would be period-ically operated to demonstrate readiness; other-wise, it would idle in a standby mode or stand dor-mant. I n o t h e r t h a n t h e d o r m a n t m o d e ,consumables must be replenished to maintain ac-ceptable “button-up.”

2–2. Open cycle.

a. Candidate systems. The diesel engine is thebest candidate for prime mover in open power sys-tems. Compared to diesels, steam-turbine-poweredsystems are relatively inefficient except in themultimegawatt range. They have the additionalhandicap of requiring heat removal at relativelylow temperatures. The same objections apply tonuclear steam-powered systems, as well as the fur-ther handicap of exorbitant capital cost at the lowpower levels generally required for hardened facili-ties. Gas-turbine systems may present an alterna-

2-1

tive at some power levels, but are inefficient atlower power ranges. Missions requiring very lowtotal power may be served by battery-poweredsystems, which are discussed in paragraph 2-3b.

b. Parasitic power demand. Open waste-heat re-jection systems using air cooling add substantialparasitic power loads. The total parasitic load in-cludes coolant circulation pump power; refrigera-tion (largely compressor) power for facility air cool-ing; normal radiator or cooling tower fan power;and booster fan power to overcome the air entrain-ment system (AES) air-flow head loss. (AES is dis-cussed in TM 5–858–5. ) Fan power rapidly becomesthe dominant parasitic electrical load at values ofhead loss greater than about 5 in. of water. The to-tal power demand of the power system can be de-termined only after the air-flow head loss due toAES blast protection has been established. This re-quires at least a conceptual design for the AES,and that design, in turn, must be based on theairblast management concepts, primarily for thewaste-heat rejection system (chap. 3). An enginecombustion air supply and exhaust system shouldbe closely integrated with the waste-heat rejectionsystem, air supply and exhaust.

c. Weapon-effect protection. It is important todistinguish between cooling system air demand andcombustion air demand. Cooling-system air re-quirements for evaporation-cooled systems are onthe order of 50 times greater than the average re-quirements for combustion air supply and exhaust;radiator-cooled systems are about 100 times great-er. Consequently, both the physical size of thecomponents and the kinds of components involvedmake airblast protection for open-cycle, air-coolingsystems an order of magnitude more difficult thanthat for combustion air supply and exhaust sys-tems. Most air-cooling system components will nec-essarily be larger and more difficult to harden thancorresponding combustion air system components.

(1) For air-cooling systems, the cooling tow-ers, radiators, and fans are airblast-sensitive com-ponents. In combustion air systems, super-chargers, scavenging blowers, and intake andexhaust ducting will have limited air shock andpressure-transient tolerance. For either system,dust separation and filtration equipment, air ducts,and particularly flexible duct connections betweenhard-mounted and shock-isolated equipment willrequire special consideration.

(2) Experiments have shown diesel enginesthemselves to be relatively unaffected by pressuretransients to several hundreds of psi applied simul-taneously to intake and exhaust. Eliminate poten-tial problems with superchargers by using natural-

ly aspirated engines. Use blast valves and reliefvalves to protect, and momentarily bypass, the air-cleaning equipment. Special high-strength intakeand exhaust ducting will be needed. Air-shock re-sistant, hard-mounted supply, and exhaust ductsare straightforward design problems. Adapt stand-ard commercial high-pressure expansion joint de-signs to meet the requirements of supply andexhaust connections between hard-mounted andshock-isolated duct segments.

(3) Choices between hardening techniques andruggedization of subsystems and components asso-ciated with both air supply and power supply aredelineated in volume five of this technical manual.Shock isolation of equipment mentioned herein isdescribed in volume four. Remember, this is a totalsystem-engineering approach, all facets integrated.

d. Endurance. Endurance requirements will bea direct function of power profile and subsystem ef-ficiency at all profile power levels, which will de-termine the volume of stored fuel and, for coolingtower systems, the volume of stored cooling towermake-up water. These storage volumes strongly af-fect the endurance-dependent design of a facility.Usually, off-peak power operation of a single en-gine will substantially reduce prime mover efficien-cy and increase relative fuel and cooling demandper unit electrical power produced. Substantial to-tal power demand reductions are possible if boosterfan power in the air-entrainment system can be re-duced at low heat loads by variable speed fandrives and variable pitch fans, or by cutting outpart of a multifan system. Base preliminary esti-mates of fuel storage requirements on theweighted average power demand over the totalpower profile.

2-3. Closed cycle.

a. Candidates. Candidates for closed-cyclepower-supply systems include:

—Battery—Fuel Cell—Combined Fuel Cell and Battery Systems—Nuclear Reactor—Diesel—Stirling

Except for the battery, none of the closed-cyclepower-supply systems listed have been developedto the point where they can be considered as prac-tical, reliable candidates. Continued research, de-velopment, and testing are still required in orderto transfer the developing systems to practicalapplications.

b. Battery. Except for a paucity of data on me-chanical shock resistance, battery-powered electri-

2-3

TM 5-858-7

cal systems offer a nearly ready-made design ap-proach to closed-cycle power systems. Therequired rectifier charger-inverter equipment isavailable off-the-shelf from a number of manufac-turers. Lead-acid cell batteries are commonly usedin battery systems. More than 100 years of exten-sive development, and use of lead-acid cells has re-sulted in extremely high reliability of suchbatteries when properly maintained. Except atvery high rates of discharge, batteries generatevirtually no waste heat.

(1) Since lead-acid batteries are capable ofvery high power output for short periods, the peakpower output capability of battery systems is usu-ally limited only by the inverter units. The rectifierunits are normally designed to carry the rated in-verter load with sufficient excess capacity to per-mit simultaneous battery charging at about 1/8 ofthe 8-hour battery rating, or 1/8 of the maximumdischarge rate as limited by the inverter capacity,whichever is smaller. With better inverter systemsoperated. in a standby mode, the changeover to bat-tery power on failure of the external power sourceis virtually undetectable on an oscillogram of theinverter a.c. output. The high reliability of theinverter section is obtained by the use of high qual-ity parts, oversizing, and redundancy, but at rela-tively high cost in size, weight, and dollars. In-stalled cost, weight, and volume (exclusive ofbatteries) for the larger capacity systems (250 kWor more) are comparable to those for complete,high quality, diesel-generator installations. Sim-pler, more compact, and less costly inverter sys-tems can be built, and could be adequate for someprime-mission requirements; however, lack of reli-ability data could be a serious problem.

(2) Rectifier-inverter systems are available asintegrated units up to about 250 KW (300 kVA) ca-pacity. These units can be paralleled to obtain out-puts to 3 MW or more. In high-quality systems theoverall rectifier-inverter system efficiency willrange from about 50 percent to 88 percent, at 25and 100 percent, respectively, of rated load. Wasteheat should probably be based on an averagerectifier-inverter system efficiency of no higherthan 80 percent. Most of the losses will be in theinverter section.

(3) The calcium-hardened lead-acid cell isstrongly recommended to eliminate potentialpoisoning by gaseous antimony hydride. These arelead-acid cells in which the alloying material usedto harden the lead plates is calcium rather than an-timony. Calcium-hardened cells are somewhathigher in first cost than regular lead-acid cells, butare longer lived, require less maintenance, andhave much lower internal losses. On open circuit

these cells undergo a loss of energy capacity on theorder of 0.0042 percent/hour (about 3 percent in 30days), based on the 8-hour rating, as indicated by the float charge current necessary to maintain afully charged condition. The rates of loss andcompensating float charge are nearly constant overthis useful life (20 to 25 years). In comparison, theopen circuit energy loss rate for new antimony-hardened, lead-acid cells is about eight timesgreater (about 0.032 percent/hr) and increases withage. Whenever the specified pastattack enduranceperiod exceeds a few days, the 0.028 percent/hourdifferential becomes an important consideration.

(4) For large installations, the largest stand-ard cell, rated at 8000 amp-hr (or 15 kWh) understandard conditions, will maximize storage density.A 46-MWh installation of this type, including main-tenance access space, support structure, shock iso-lation, and rattlespace, and fitted to a cylindricalcapsule configuration, has been estimated to have apacking factor of about 0.17 and to require about4350 ft3 of installation volume per MWh of batterycapacity. Based on 82 percent overall postattacksystem efficiency, the space requirement wou1d beabout 5305 ft3/MWh of net useful energy. At cur-rent (1976) design weights, the battery cell netweight would be about 143,000 lb/MWh. Theseweights and volumes do not include the capsuleshell itself. See TM 5—858-4 for area and volumeneeds of shock isolation platforms needed undervarious specified threats.

(5) The large unit weight anti space indicatedfor large battery installations make it important torecognize that the numbers quoted are intendedonly for preliminary estimates and apply to typical(lead-acid cell) batteries. Variations in dischargetime, system efficiency, and cell operating condi-tions can increase initial cell requirements.

c. Fuel cell. Fuel cells convert chemical energydirectly to direct current electrical energy. Indi-vidual fuel cells usually operate at less than onevolt, and become useful power sources only asbatteries or stacks of individual cells connected inseries to produce higher voltages. In addition tothe fuel cells themselves, all fuel-cell systems in-clude a relatively complex array of auxiliaries toprovide and control fuel, oxidizer, and electrolyteflow, and waste-heat rejection. Since fuel-cell out-put is direct current, it is necessary to consider fuel-cell systems in conjunction with inverters tomake useful comparisons with other potential pow-er sources considered herein. This necessarily re-duces overall thermal efficiency and increases totalpower-system weight and space requirements. —

(1) In higher power ranges no fuel-cell systemhas been perfected that is cost-effective (1973)

2-4

compared to the more widely used electrical powergeneration systems. With few exceptions, verylimited data are to be found on reliability of fuelcells in service. Fuel cells offer some advantages tothe designer of hardened facilities and their devel-opment should be watched.

(2) Of the fuel-cell types that have been mostextensively tested, the hydrogen-oxygen fuel cellused in the Apollo space program is of the typebest suited to closed-cycle operation and possiblythe only specific system design for which reliabilitydata are available. The Apollo fuel-cell system wasdesigned for maximum power-to-weight ratio andmaximum efficiency and is, consequently, relative-ly costly (on the order of $100,000 to $400,000/kWat 1976 costs). The system is packaged in unitsrated at about 1.4 kW d.c. output at 27 to 31 V.The claimed efficiency, based on the low heat valueof the hydrogen fuel, is nearly 90 percent. Basedon the high heat value, which is of prime interestfrom the standpoint of waste-heat generation, theefficiency would be about 75 percent.

(3) Limited data from larger hydrogen-oxygenfuel-cell systems indicate that increased power de-mand of auxiliary systems will reduce the overallsystem efficiency. Based on an average inverter ef-ficiency of 85 percent, the probable overall, aver-age thermal efficiency is on the order of 50 percent.Hydrogen-oxygen fuel cell systems have an advan-tage over all power sources except batteries in thattheir part-load efficiency does not decline belowrated-load efficiency until the load falls to about 20percent of rated load. If hydrogen and oxygen arestored as liquids, problems associated with excessboil-off and long-term storage of cryogenics shouldnot be overlooked.

(4) Cost considerations make it unlikely thathydrogen-oxygen fuel-cell inverter systems will beused to meet very high peak power demands, butsuch systems may be applicable to long term, low-level power profiles. They are readily adaptable toclosed-cycle operation since the only waste efflu-ents are heat and water and the cell operating tem-peratures are high enough (about 500°F) to permit

final water temperature of nearly 212°F for anunpressurized heat sink.

(5) Phosphoric acid fuel cell power plants havebeen developed and are currently being tested. A40 kW phosphoric-acid-type fuel cell has been de-veloped under joint sponsorship of the U.S. De-partment of Energy (DOE) and the utility industryrepresented by the Gas Research Institute (GRI).This fuel cell is costly (approximately $500,000 fora 40 kW unit based on a test project). Phosphoricacid fuel cells should be commercially available in

the latter—1980’s. A natural gas supply is the rec-ommended fuel; however, bottled gas can be pro-vided. Most units are provided electric-powered re-former units; however, if necessary the hydrogengas can be obtained by use of the destructive distil-lation of coal and wood, which is an expensive proc-ess. These units are being tested in a cogenerationmode, with the thermal energy being used forspace heating and domestic hot water heating.

(6) For a relatively low-powered system and amoderately long endurance period, say 10 kW and60 days, the fuel-cell system space requirementbased on the Apollo system and a packing factor of0.2 would be only about 300 ft3; the storage spaceat 50 percent overall system efficiency for liquidhydrogen and oxygen will be substantially greater.For liquid gas storage in shock-isolated dewars,with reasonable allowances for ullage, replacementof “boil off” at 30-day intervals, and a packing fac-tor that allows for pumps, plumbing, and rattle-space, the estimated fuel-cell system gas storagespace requirements would be on the order of 1500ft3, or about 104 ft3/MWh. The ratios of shock-isolated weight and shock-isolated space appear tobe 100:1 and 50:1, respectively, in favor of the fuel-cell system over the battery power system.

(7) The direct capital costs of the fuel-cell sys-tem plus fuel and oxygen supply for the systemidentified (14.4 MWh at 10 kW) would be competi-tive with a battery-powered system. Further ma-jor reductions in fuel-cell costs are entirely proba-ble, but substantial reductions in battery costs areless likely.

d. Combined fuel-cell and battery systems.Where power profiles call for standby periods atlow-power level interspersed with shorter periodsof substantially higher power demand, there maybe considerable advantage in combined fuel-cell/battery systems. Together fuel cells andbatteries would support the peak loads and thefuel-cell system would support the standby loadand recharge the batteries during low powerdemand.

(1) In a single example, doubling the peak out-put of the fuel-cell system discussed above, withthe same total energy output (14.4 MWh), wouldnearly double the first cost of the system. How-ever, if the peak output were to be doubled to 20kW for 8-hour in 24-hour by use of a battery in par-allel with the fuel-cell system, the battery rechargerequirement (at 80 percent discharge/ charge effi-ciency) would absorb about 62.5 percent of the fuel-cell system capacity during the remaining time,leaving 37.5 percent or 3.75 kW of the net fuel-cellsystem output for the facility’s load during a16-hour day. With the same liquid hydrogen and

2-5

oxygen storage space the total energy output ofthe system would be reduced by about 8 percent(lost in battery charging), but the system costwould increase only about 1 1/2 percent (for batteriesand additional inverter capacity) and the systemspace occupancy would increase only about 0.5percent.

(2) There are numerous variations of combinedfuel-cell and battery systems. In all such systems,maximizing use of direct current power will mini-mize inverter costs and losses. In general, thegreater the peak power demand relative to facilitystandby power demand and the smaller the energydemand at peak power relative to the total energyrequirement, the greater will be the advantage ofusing batteries to support peak loads on fuel-cellpower systems.

e. Nuclear reactor. Nuclear-reactor power sys-tems always appear attractive, since they are in-herently closed systems with respect to the energysource. Cost data on reactor power systems withinthe power range up to 3MW are very scant. Costsof record of the smaller power systems developedfor the Army Nuclear Power Program (ANPP)strongly indicate costs could be competitive withthose for battery or Apollo type of fuel-cell pow-ered systems at net useful power and energy levelson the order of 20 KW and 35 MWh, respectively.

(1) Any estimate of the space requirements forthe shock-isolated, power-dependent elements ofsmall reactor-powered systems is subject to verylarge uncertainties. However, for the same netelectrical power output, it is probable that thevolume requirement of reactor systems will be 5 to10 times greater than those for the power-dependent elements of battery or fuel-cell systems.Based on the average efficiency and waste-heat re-jection temperature of the ANPP power systems,heat-sink volume requirements will be on the orderof four times that for fuel-cell systems.

(2) All reactor power systems in the powerrange of interest are one-of-a-kind experimentalsystems with limited operating history, hencewithout reliability data. No reactor power systemdesigned as a shock-isolated installation for a highground-shock environment is known to have beenassembled or operated. For the first such system,the system operating characteristics, overallthermal efficiency, reliability, and costs must beverified by actual system construction and opera-tion. The complete power system, including reac-tor, shielding, steam generators, turbogenerator,feed water heaters, and feed water pumps, must bemounted on a common, shock-isolated supportstructure. Any redundancy requirement would

have a major effect on power-system costeffectiveness.

f. Diesel. In principle, closed-cycle diesel sys-tems are relatively simple. Standard diesel fuelsmay be used. Part of the exhaust gas is cooled andenriched with oxygen from storage, and recircu-lated to replace the normal air supply. Excesswater is condensed from the exhaust and excesscarbon dioxide is removed by a caustic scrubber.Trace quantities of other gases and impurities fromthe exhaust stream are dissolved in the scrubbersolution; all exhausted scrubber solutions are re-jected to storage. The only change in actual engine-operating conditions is the substitution of an arti-ficial working fluid for air. The Navy andAerojet-General Corp. (Hoffman et al., 1970) haveexperimented with a working fluid of water vapor,carbon dioxide, and oxygen. Design of the scrubbersystem would depend on power generation re-quirements.

(1) In general, closed-cycle diesel systems arefeasible. However, to maximize thermal efficiencyand minimize space needs (chiefly heat sinks), asubstantial development effort would be requiredto identify the optimum water vapor, oxygen, andcarbon dioxide mix; engine input temperatures;caustic scrubber conditions; waste-heat rejectiontemperatures; and equipment configuration. A fur-ther substantial test effort would be required to es-tablish reliability and availability data. For themost part, all major items ‘of equipment would beoff-the-shelf and the entire development and testprogram would be an order of magnitude less cost-ly and of substantially shorter duration than thatrequired for a nuclear-reactor powered system.

(2) While available data are inadequate forfirm design analyses, it is possible to estimateprobable costs and space requirements. Assumethe closed-cycle system efficiency to be at least 65percent of that of a normal, open-cycle diesel-electric system, and the cost no more than 50 per-cent higher than the open-cycle diesel. Using theseconservative assumptions, small, closed-cycle pow-er system (say, 10 to 100 kW) average costs wouldbe on the order of $600/kW, and the cost per unitnet power should decline to about $400/kW in the 1to 3 MW range (1976 prices). Even if subjected towide variations, these costs are down more thantwo orders of magnitude from those probable forbattery, fuel cell, or small nuclear-reactor-basedpower systems.

(3) Space requirement for shock-isolationequipment and power-dependent elements aug-menting the closed-cycle diesel system may not dif-fer greatly from those of battery or fuel cell sys-tems, but will be substantially less than the space

2-6

TM 5-858-7

requirements for nuclear-reactor power systems.Based on the overall system efficiency and flowrates reported for the Aerojet experimental sys-tem (overall thermal efficiency about 20 percent),the fuel and oxygen demand would be about 900lb/MWh and 3200 lb/MWh, respectively. Assuminghard-mounted fuel storage with a small allowancefor ullage and tank, the fuel volume occupancywould still be only about 17 ft3/MWh. Oxygen, ifstored as a liquid in dewars on shock-isolated struc-tures, would require a total storage space of about120 ft3/MWh. Caustic scrubber solution must bestored separately but would not add appreciably tototal space requirements.

(4) The heat of formation of either potassiumcarbonate or sodium carbonate is on the order of1100 Btu/lb of carbon dioxide absorbed. This heatadds to the total waste-heat load.

(5) A recent survey (1977) of 15 projects totest hydrogen-fueled internal-combustion enginesindicated that 26 conventional automotive engineswere modified for hydrogen fuel and 14 were beingroad tested. With hydrogen in place of hydrocar-bon fuel, a caustic scrubber and solution storagewould be eliminated and the system simplified.

However, the fuel storage space would be in-creased because of cryogenic storage of hydrogen.

g. Stirling. The Stirling engine is an external-combustion engine that can use any fuel. TheStirling engine has not been widely used becausethe diesel engine costs less. The current high andrising cost of petroleum-based fuels has caused re-newed interest in the Stirling engine because of itspotentially high thermal efficiency. However, in aclosed-cycle system the efficiency of the Stirlingengine may be similar to that of a diesel engine.

(1) If it is assumed (conservatively) that lowerparasitic loads would permit the Stirling enginesystem to operate at a thermal efficiency of 25 per-cent the required heat-sink capacity should bebased on a waste-heat load of 4 MWh t/MWh e. Hy-drogen and oxygen consumption would be about 56and 444 lb/MWh t, values are 12.5 and 6.2ft3/MWh t, respectively. The cryogenic hydrogenand oxygen storage space requirement would beabout 300 ft3/MWh e.

(2) The weight and space occupancy of power-dependent system equipment should be less for theStirling than for the diesel system. Hydrogen fuelwould eliminate need for a caustic scrubbersystem.

2-7

TM 5-858-7

CHAPTER 3WASTE-HEAT REJECTION

3–1. Design requirements.

a. Preattack. Reject all waste heat to the atmos-phere during the preattack time frame. The designof these open rejection systems is similar to thosefound in conventional facilities.

b. Transattack/postattack. Design the trans-attack/postattack waste-heat-rejection system toinclude no fewer than the following capabilities:

—Accommodate the peak waste-heat generation.—Accommodate the cumulative wast-heat gen-

eration.—Provide acceptable preattack availability.—Provide acceptable endurance availabil-

ity/reliability.—Accommodate preattack exercising.

(1) Choose the effective degree of atmosphericisolation of the transattack/postattack waste-heatrejection system. In an open system, the heat sinkis the atmosphere; in a closed system the heat sinkis generally a closed (underground) coolant-filledcavity. In general, the more severe the survivabil-ity requirement, the more effective the closed sys-tem (fig. 2–l).

(2) After identifying the primary sources ofwast eheat, design the transattack/postattack re-jection system to fit the level of hardness specifiedfor the facility:Open

INominally Hardened (tens of psiFacilities overpressure)Moderately Hard- (hundreds of psi)ened FacilitiesSup-hard Facilities (thousands [and

greater] of psi)closed

3–2. Waste-heat sources.a. General. Estimating heat loads for the design

of cooling systems in hardened facilities differsonly in minor details from heat-load estimation formore conventional facilities. For hardened facili-ties, eliminate atmospheric air heat and humidityfor design consideration. Consider three heatsources: heat from geological media, heat from per-sonnel, and heat from power generation and con-sumption. Include a reasonably accurate evaluationof the influence of metabolic heat and the heat ofcarbon dioxide absorption reactions.

b. Geological heat. When an underground open-ing is maintained at a temperature different from

that of the medium, such as a chilled-water heatsink in warm rock, there will be appreciable butdeclining heat transfer at the interface as a tem-perature gradient is established in the rock. Theheat-transfer rate is influenced by the temperaturedifferential and the medium properties. Many vari-ables influence the relative importance of this heatsource; methods for obtaining quantitative esti-mates of the source are given in TM 5–855-4.

c. Personnel related. Personnel-dependent heatsources become increasingly important as popula-tion increases and will be the principal heat load forthose facilities that are primarily personnel shel-ters. Table 3–1 gives metabolic values correspond-ing to various activity levels for personnel,including a breakdown of sensible and latent (dehu-midification) heat rates, which can be used forestimating total heat loads for design of facilitycooling and dehumidification systems. In applyingthese heat rates, use the personnel activity profilesto determine the total heat load. The allowancesfor heat from personnel-dependent electrical powerloads may be subject to substantial revision on thebasis of specific facility design criteria, but are in-cluded in the interest of completeness.

(1) The sensible heat shown for lighting, airconditioning, and miscellaneous is intended to cov-er only that fraction of electrical power requiredfor personnel needs in occupied facilities. It doesnot include the associated waste heat or additionalpower to operate the heat-rejection systems. Allother values are based on average, adult-malemetabolism.

(2) The heats of carbonate formation with pos-sible reactants for carbon dioxide absorption canvary between limits of about 850 and 1800 Btu perpound of carbon dioxide gas converted to the car-bonate form; but the more probable reactants andprocesses have reaction heats in the range of 1000to 1100 Btu per pound of carbon dioxide. Carbondioxide absorption will produce about 15 percent oftotal personnel-dependent heat.

d. Power generation and consumption. Powersupply systems are the primary waste-heat sourcefor facilities other than personnel shelters. Exceptfor electrical power removed from a facility viacommunications or power cables, the total electri-cal power consumed by the facility will reappear aswaste heat. Consequently, estimate the power-system-dependent waste heat as the total energyinput to the power-generation system, minus any

3-1

exported power. Estimate air heating by radiation mand and is more vulnerable to damage throughand convection from equipment, including power-generation equipment, by conventional methods.As indicated in chapter 2, the parasitic power de-mand is very strongly influenced by the heat-rejection system used.

3-3. Nominally hardened facilities.

a. The waste-heat rejection system for nominallyhardened facilities is an open system for both thepreattack and postattack periods. Design the sys-tem for waste-heat rejection to the air through oneof two types of subsystems located in hardened fa-cility cavities: air-cooled heat exchanger, orevaporation-cooled water tower. Use a hardenedAES to conduct inlet and outlet air from the facili-ty cavities to the ground surface. Air from the at-mosphere will be the transport medium. The AESwill handle air for both the personnel and the air-breathing power generation systems.

b. Air-cooled heat exchangers have the singleadvantage of not requiring a consumable watersupply. Consequently, their endurance (aside fromweapon effects) is limited only by the fuel supply ofthe power system. In nearly all other aspects, thedirect air-cooled system compares poorly with theevaporation-cooled system, especially in that theair-cooled system has a higher parasitic power de-

3 -2

the AES. Design an air-cooled system for theworst-case ambient air temperature.

c. Evaporation cooling with hardened coolingtowers or hardened refrigeration condensers re-quires about half of the air flow necessary for di-rect air cooling. Because the air flow is smaller,both the parasitic power demand and its resultingwaste heat are reduced. In addition, cooling wateris provided at lower maximum temperatures (typi-cally less than 85°F) than are possible with directair cooling, therefore increasing the percentage ofwaste heat handled with water-cooled heat ex-changers and decreasing the mechanical refrigera-tion load. The major disadvantage of an evapora-tive cooling system is the requirement for amake-up water supply of approximately 55ft3/MWh of waste heat rejected. Therefore, themake-up water storage capacity imposes an addi-tional limitation on the facility’s endurance. Also,evaporative condensers are undesirable from amaintenance standpoint. Design evaporativelycooled systems for the worst-case air conditions.

3-4. Moderately hardened facilities.

a. As the hardness level requirement and corre-sponding burial depth increase, the open waste-heat rejection system becomes less feasible for

-

postattack because of theof the AES and the rapidment for parasitic powerthe AES.

increasing vulnerabilityincrease in the require-to transport the air via

b. Reduce the necessary AES air-handling ca-pacity by restricting use of atmospheric air to thatrequired for personnel and air-breathing powergenerators. About 20 percent of the facility wasteheat can be rejected via engine exhaust throughthe AES outlet duct for a diesel-generator powersystem. For preattack, reject the rest of the facili-ty waste heat by water transport system to asurface-located, unhardened water-cooling tower.For postattack, reject the balance of waste heat toa closed heat sink. (The cooling tower will be usedpreattack to maintain the heat sink unreadiness atthe required temperature, and must be sizedaccordingly. )

c. The AES for a moderately hardened facilitycould also be used to reject high-temperaturewaste heat via ebullient cooling. Use of this meth-od of waste-heat rejection would decrease the heat-sink storage volume by factors from 10 to 25 forthat fraction of the heat rejected as steam fromebullient cooling.

3-5. Superhard facilities.

a. During the preattack period, the waste heatof a superhard facility would be rejected to the at-mosphere via, for example, a water transport sys-tem to a surface-located, unhardened water-coolingtower, sized to maintain the closed heat sink at therequired temperature condition. However, super-hard facilities are deeply buried, and duringpostattack will require completely closed waste-heat rejection and air-reconstitution systems. De-sign considerations for the closed-air reconstitutionsystem are discussed in chapter 4. Factors to beconsidered in the design of closed heat sinks arediscussed below.

b. In closed-system waste-heat rejection, the to-tal waste heat is rejected to a closed heat sink,which is generally a water-filled cavity. Heat sinkvolume depends on the initial water temperatureand the maximum allowable final water tempera-ture. The maximum final water temperature willdepend on the type of electric power supply systemused and the design of the waste-heat transportsystem. Without allowance for heat-sink inefficien-cies and heat load from geologic media, the heat-sink volume in cubic feet per magawatt-hour ofthermal energy is approximately equal to57,000/∆Τ, where ∆Τ is the water temperature risein “F. When ebullient cooling is used, the waterstorage volume is less than 55 ft3/MWh. The heat-

TM 5-858-7

sink volume can also be reduced by use of ice-watermixtures.

c. Heat-sink volume requirements are greatlyinfluenced by the power system’s efficiency andmaximum heat-rejection temperatures. Some ap-proximations useful for preliminary design esti-mates of water-filled heat sinks are given in table3–2. The heat-sink volumes given in the table arebased on the assumptions indicated for waste-heatdistribution and heat-rejection temperatures. Allwaste heat is treated as power-system dependent,with the total electrical power converted to low-temperature waste heat.

d. To attain the greatest possible heat-sink us-age with the least possible heat-sink volume, strivefor the smallest feasible differential between themaximum heat-rejection temperature and the max-imum heat-sink temperature. The minimum differ-

with direct water-cooing or substantially larger-than-normal counterflow heat exchangers. How-ever, the minimum practical differential achievable

ample, if air cooling of personnel shelters is thecontrolling requirement, the maximum heat-sink

mechanical refrigeration is used.

e. The waste-heat distribution for the closed-cycle diesel system, as shown in table 3–2, allowsfor a 25 percent increase in total waste heat in thelow temperature range for carbon dioxide absorp-tion. The assumed overall thermal efficiencies forthe diesel and Stirling engine systems are inten-tionally conservative because the closed-system ef-ficiency and heat balance are the least clearly de-fined for these systems. For 7 of the 10 caseslisted, the low-temperature cooling requirementlimits the maximum heat-sink temperature, i.e.,the final water temperature cannot approach themaximum reject temperature. The assumption of90 percent heat-sink efficiency may or may not beconservative. Unquestionably, there will be somemixing of cold heat-sink water with warm returnwater and some conductive heat transfer withinthe heat sink. Such mixing and conductive transferwill reduce the effective heat-sink capacity to somedegree.

f. The last column in table 3-2 compares heat-sink volume required per unit of electrical powerproduced by different power systems, based on theassumed system efficiencies and heat-sink condi-tions. Substantial reductions in heat-sink volumeare possible by reducing the initial heat-sink tem-

frigeration to raise the rejection temperature of

3 -3

TM 5-858-7

low-temperature waste heat could reduce heat-sinkvolume for the battery inverter and fuel cell-inverter systems, but would have limited value forthe other three systems under the conditionsassumed.

g. Since low-temperature waste heat usuallycontrols heat-sink requirements, raise the cooling-system efficiency wherever possible by maximumuse of direct liquid cooling of equipment. In thecase of large-size equipment, it is generally a mat-ter of selecting liquid-cooled rather then air-cooledequipment. In the case of smaller equipment it maymean specifying liquid cooling for small unitswhere air cooling has been customarily consideredmore cost effective. Consider liquid cooling for aircompressors, and receivers, vacuum pumps, refrig-eration compressors, and power transmission ele-ments such as bearings, clutches, brakes, andtransmissions. Wherever possible, specify directheat removal from refrigeration compressors bycooling-water or oil-to-water cooling systems, rath-er than using the refrigerant to cool the compres-sor. It may be possible to use liquid cooling, ratherthan traditional air cooling, for electrical genera-tors, motors, and transformers; radio transmittertubes, tank coils, and tuning capacitors; power fac-tor correction capacitors; and high-power solid-state device heat sinks.

h. Mechanical refrigeration offers a potentiallymore effective approach to efficient heat-sink utili-zation. Mechanically refrigerated dehumidifiers

and water chillers for part of the low-temperaturecooling allow higher heat-sink temperatures, com-pared to the temperatures required with directcooling systems. Potential gains may be limited bythe refrigeration system’s power demand and theadditional waste heat produced. For a spread of

water and the condenser cooling water, the powerdemand for refrigeration is about 20 percent of theheat rejected, which increases the heat-sink re-quirements by the same percentage. Larger tem-perature spreads due to either low chilled-watertemperature or higher condenser-water tempera-ture will reduce the refrigeration efficiency andincrease the added power and waste-heat loads.

i. The use of refrigeration brines offers a techni-cally feasible and well-developed (although not nec-essarily cost effective) method of developing lowerinitial heat-sink temperatures without using ice.Disadvantages are the requirements for increaseduse of inhibitors to minimize the corrosive effect ofbrines, and for increased refrigeration costs tomaintain the heat sink at the lower temperaturesfeasible with brine. However, compared to fresh

ride brine would extend the feasible initial heat-sink temperature down to about 15°F and reducethe volume requirement by about 33 percent. Simi-larly, use of calcium chloride brine over the range

about 66 percent.

3-5

TM 5-858-7

CHAPTER 4

AIR-QUALITY CONTROL

4–1. Introduction.

a. This chapter deals primarily with quality con-trol of the air required to support personnel. Ref-erence is made to operating equipment when nec-essary, but does not address the quantity (orquality) of air needed for combustion systems.View the air-quality control system within the con-text of two operation modes: preattack, andtransattack/postattack. In general, it will be mosteffective to use an open ventilization system duringthe preattack time frame. The design of this sytemis similar to the ventilation systems found in con-ventional facilities, except that a hardened airentrainment system (A ES) will be used to ex-change air between the facility and the atmos-phere. The AES is discussed in TM 5-858-5.

b. Design the transattack/postattack air-qualitycontrol system to include no fewer than the follow-ing capabilities:

—Provide acceptable preattack availability.—Provide acceptable quality control of air-flow

velocity, temperature, humidity, oxygen,carbon dioxide, contaminants—as deline-ated below.

—Accommodate exercising preattack.

c. Transattack/postattack ventilation systemsthat communcate with the atmosphere must pro-vide for removal of large dust loads and insidiouschemical, biological, and radiological warfarecontaminants. This is an extremely difficult taskthat should be avoided by using a closed ventilationsystem whenever possible.

4–2. Air-flow velocity. Design the system forminimum circulation velocity of 50 ft/min in anypart of the facility that is contaminated by carbondioxide, water vapor, or toxic and combustiblegases and of 100 ft/min in areas normally occupiedby personnel. Substantially higher air velocitiesmay be justified in some occupied locations tomaintain required effective temperatures at higherdry-bulb temperatures, without excessive demandsfor power to dehumidify the air.

4–3. Air temperature.

a. Temperature control in hardened facilities willtypically require heat removal. Two prime consid-erations govern the establishment of design airtemperatures: personnel comfort and efficiency,and cooling requirements for air-cooled equipment.

b. Where personnel efficiency is the prime con-sideration, the average effective air temperature

order to permit combined cooling and dehumidifi-cation at moderate coolant temperatures. (The in-dicated dry-bulb and effective temperatures to-gether with an air velocity of 100 ft/min areconsistent with a relative humidity of 50 percent,which is also considered the optimum for control ofair-borne bacteria. )

c. For facilities that are primarily personnelshelters (as opposed to operational facilities), per-sonnel efficiency and comfort could be compro-mised to the extent of permitting somewhat highereffective and dry-bulb temperatures. With higherambient temperatures the maximum useful heat-sink temperature range and capacity could be in-creased by raising the cooling water temperature,for example, from 68°F to 78°F. However, the ap-parent advantage is illusory where the major heatload is the metabolic heat of personnel, since athigher temperatures the percentage of total meta-bolic heat rejected as water vapor (latent heat) in-creases rapidly and dehumidification requires low-er coolant temperatures (50°F or less).

d. Where operating equipment is the importantconsideration, air temperatures will be limited byequipment cooling requirements. In general, thereliability of electronic and electrical power equip-ment is inversely proportional to the air tempera-ture. Battery-inverter systems, for example, areprime candidates for closed-cycle power systems,and the recommended operating temperature forinverter systems and storage temperature forbatteries is usually no higher than 75°F. Invertersystem availability and battery cell life improve atlower ambient air temperatures.

e. For cooling facility air, use air-to-chilledwater or air-to-refrigerant fan-coil units. To mini-mize power demand and heat-sink requirements forair cooling, specify liquid-to-liquid heat exchangersto remove waste heat from equipment at the sourcewherever possible.

f. For any heating required, use the waste heatof the power systems as much as possible to mini-mize heat generation. Where this is not feasible,specify electrical heating rather than gas, to pre-clude gaseous combustion products that wouldneed venting at further expense.

4-1

TM 5-858-7

4-4. Humidity.

a. The humidity gains in the closed-ventilationsystem of well-constructed facilities will originatelargely from the respiration and perspiration ofpersonnel, and are treated as a waste-heat load.Where there are no other overriding considera-tions, 50 percent relative humidity should be main-tained for human comfort and control of air-bornebacteria.

b. Chemical dehumidification will usually be un-desirable because nearly all commercial absorbentand adsorbent systems must be thermally regener-ated, which adds additional heat load to the waste-heat rejection system. Where there is already asubstantial load of sensible heat to be removed,consider dehumidifying by direct extraction of la-tent heat via condensation.

c. Although the use of water spray towers maybe the most efficient means of dehumidification atlow water temperatures, a possible rise in heat-sink water temperature during the facility missionperiod would require the use of mechanical refrig-eration for dehumidification. Dehumidification sys-tem design should be based on the maximum heat-sink temperature allowable at the end of themission. At cooling coil temperatures approachingthe freezing point, provide the automatic de-frosting of dehumidifier coils.

d. To minimize space requirements, specify inte-grated cooling and dehumidification units.

4-5. Oxygen. If the principal oxygen demand isby personnel, us the values given in table 4–1 toestimate the rate of consumption. In view of theprobable low cost of oxygen for this purpose, an ar-bitrary allowance of 3 lb per man-day is reason-able. The most practical storage will usually be instandard, 250-ft3, high-pressure cylinders up to atotal of about 12,000 ft3. For larger storage re-quirements, specify larger capacity cylinders to im-prove the packing factor and to simplify ducting.Use standard two-stage pressure regulators to setthe flow rate. Since variation of oxygen content be-tween the normal 21 percent and about 17 percentis acceptable, highly accurate or automatic controlof oxygen flow is not essential. Periodic checking ofoxygen concentration and manual adjustment offlow rate is adequate.

4-6. Carbon dioxide.

a. Carbon dioxide buildup in hardened-facilityventilation air will originate largely, if not exclu-sively, from personnel. Formation rates can be es-timated from the data in table 4–1. Carbon dioxideis present in atmospheric air at about 0.03 percent

by volume, and acts on the human nervous systemto maintain involuntary respiration. At levels inexcess of 1 percent it begins to cause hyperventila-tion, increased oxygen consumption, and increasedrespiratory carbon dioxide production; concentra-tions higher than about 4 percent are toxic. Thenatural air content of 0.03 percent carbon dioxideshould not be reduced by the carbon dioxide-control system, but this is not likely to be a prob-lem. The maximum carbon dioxide conent of theroom exhaust air should not exceed 1 percent andthe corresponding concentration in return airshould be less than 0.08 percent.

b. Carbon dioxide can be removed readily fromair by causing the gas to react with strong bases(caustics) to produce carbonates. The reactions areexothermic and will add significantly to anypersonnel-dependent heat sources. From severalfeasible combinations of reactant and process, theoptimum method will be chosen by consideringcost, convenience, and minimum release of wasteheat, in approximately that order. In a gas absorp-tion system widely used by industry, a sodium hy-droxide solution is recirculated counter-current tothe carbon dioxide-contaminated air stream,through a spray or packed scrubber tower. Thissystem is recommended for large-capacity carbondioxide removal systems for hardened facilities onthe basis of reactant, and low heat of reaction(about 1020 Btu per pound of carbon dioxideabsorbed).

c. If the scrubber solution temperature exceedsthe desired dew point temperature of the air, anadditional load will be placed on the humidity con-trol system. In addition to the heat of carbonateformation, latent heat and sensible heat trans-ferred to or from the air stream must also be con-sidered in the heat-load calculations for the scrub-ber. In any case, the scrubber design should becoordinated with the design of the air temperatureand humidity control systems.

d. The wet scrubber system is highly amenableto continuous process application with automaticcontrol. In such a system, carbon dioxide removalefficiency and outlet concentration are controllableand adjustable while the system is in operation byvarying solution concentration, temperature, flowrates, and air-stream velocity through thescrubber.

e. Dry process absorption in attractive for rela-tively small-capacity carbon dioxide rem-oval re-quirements (less than about 5 lb per hour). Thesesystems consist of trays or canisters of dry granu-lar absorbents through which air is circulated atlow velocity. Since absorbers must be replaced pe-

4-2

Tab

le 4

-1.

Per

sonn

el-D

epen

dent

O

xyge

n R

equi

rem

ent

and

Car

bon

Dio

xide

P

rodu

ctio

n

TM 5-858-7

riodically, dry process absorption is a batch proc-ess and therefore has had limited industrial use.However, dry lithium hydroxide, LiOH, has beenused as a carbon dioxide absorber in both sub-marines and space capsules. Dry LiOH absorbersremove moisture as well as carbon dioxide from theair; this may necessitate the air be dehumidified tomaintain a 50 percent humidity level. The heatgenerated by water absorption could be severaltimes greater than the heat of carbonate formation.

f. An absorption system based on Baralyme (atrade name for a mixture of 20 percent barium hy-droxide hydrate and 80 percent calcium hydroxide)was designed and tested by NCEL (Williams, 1968)as a carbon dioxide control system for survivalshelters. The LiOH-based system is the more ex-tensively tested and the more efficient in terms ofcarbon dioxide absorbed per unit weight and perunit volume. The cost (1978) is about the same (onthe order of $4.10 for LiOH compared with about$3.50 for Baralyme per man-day).

4–7. Contaminants.

a. Particulates. Control of particles such as dustand lint is of great importance for good control ofairborne bacteria in closed ventilation systems.Extensive tests in hospitals and barracks havedemonstrated that a high percentage of infectiousbacteria are transported by dust or lint and can beeliminated by effective dust control. Particles willbe eliminated by regularly serviced, high-efficiencyfilter sytems in supply ducts to all manned areas.Prefilters can be treated with a bactericidal emul-sion spray. Electrostatic precipitators cannot beused because of the problem caused by ozonebuildup.

b. Flammable and toxic gases. Internally gener-ated gases can build up to significant concentrationlevels in closed systems. Potentially combustible ortoxic vapors and gases can be released by numer-ous very ordinary products including cleaners, sol-vents, inks, anesthetics, antiseptics, disinfectants,refrigerants, and photocopy chemicals. In openventilation systems, most of these contaminantsare minor problems that require, at most, in-creased air flow for dilution and direct discharge tooutside air. In closed systems, however, controlmeasures should include prevention, monitoring,and treatment, with the emphasis on prevention.All liquid and gaseous products used in facilitieshaving closed-ventilation systems should be inves-tigated as potentialtoxic and flammablelimits in ventilation

4-4

sources of the more than 200gases for which concentrationair have been established by

OSHA (1972) and others. Where potential sourcescannot be eliminated, strict regulations controllingtheir storage and use should be mandatory provi-sions of the facility operating procedures. Specifythe installation of monitoring sensors near poten-tial sources and at possible concentration pointsand provide suitable air-treatment equipment ei-ther as part of the full-time air processing systemor for use as required.

(1) Most gases and vapors are somewhat solu-ble in water and tend to dissolve in the condensatein dehumidification equipment or in wet-scrubbersolutions. Additionally, acid gases such as the ox-ides of nitrogen will be removed by chemical reac-tion in carbon dioxide scrubbers. Many gases andvapors, particularly organics, are effectively re-moved by activated charcoal filters. Restrict maxi-mum permissible concentrations of gases andvapors to 25 percent of their lower flammabilitylimit, unless the maximum allowable concentrationmust be further reduced because of their toxicproperties.

(2) Catalytic oxidation is effective foreliminating combustible gases. However, use cau-tion in specifying oxidation devices where the airmay contain contaminants that could break down torelease still more hazardous compounds (e. g., chlo-roform releases phosgene gas). Specify the use ofcatalytic oxidation devices on an “as required” ba-sis, since they operate at elevated temperatures(usually with electrical heating) and add to bothelectrical-power and waste-heat loads. Provide bat-tery installations in closed ventilation systems withone or more standard US Navy catalytic hydrogeneliminators. The poison gas antimony hydride canbe completely eliminated by restricting batteries tothose using calcium rather than antimony as ahardening agent in the lead alloy.

c. Ozone control. The low allowable concentra-tion of ozone in ventilation air (0.1 ppm) can makethis gas a problem in closed ventilation systems.The principal sources are high-voltage corona dis-charge and electrical arcs. Smooth, non-weathered,insulation of high-voltage lines will minimize coro-na discharge. Arcing in motor and generatorbrushes and control switches, relays and circuitbreakers can be minimized by use of solid-statebrushless motors; solid-state zero-currentswitching; solid-state transient suppressors; andvarious surge voltage protectors, gas discharge de-vices, and vacuum spark gaps available in the elec-trical power and communications fields.

d. Odors. Control of odors will require use of ac-tivated charcoal filters.

TM 5-858-7

CHAPTER 5

UTILITIES AND SERVICES

5–1. Introduction. The numbers, kinds, and rela-tive importance of the utilities and services re-quired for hardened facilities vary with the primemission assignment, manning requirements, andlength of specified endurance period. However, theonly design considerations appreciably differentfrom normal standards stem from the problems ofmaintaining postattack personnel isolated from am-bient atmosphere and external support. Control ofgroundwater, prevention of fire, and details of per-sonnel services are delineated in this chapter.

5-2. Groundwater control.

a. Gravity drainage. For hardened undergroundfacilities under postattack conditions, gravitydrainage of seepage water into a reservoir is theonly viable concept. The problem will be com-pounded by weapon-induced ground shock increas-ing water permeability in the surrounding media.Successful gravity drainage depends on overbur-den dewatering, wet-rock drainage, and under-ground reservoir capacity, all of which are sitedependent.

b. Site selection. Review of long-term climato-logical data and detailed investigation of ground-water sources, flow paths, and flow volumes shouldbe part of all hardened facility site-selection stud-ies. Assessment of the severity of groundwaterproblems will strongly influence site selection.

c. Overburden dewatering. As early as possibleduring construction of any buried facility, the sur-face drainage should be reworked to minimize localsurface-water infiltration. Overburden that con-tains aquifers above a buried facility should be sur-rounded by grout curtains and dewatered. Whereheavily flowing aquifers are cut off, reroute the in-terrupted flow at the upstream face of the grout toprevent elevation of the water table. Specify per-manent installation of water-table logging wells,dewatering wells, and a pumping system adequateto eliminate free groundwater down to the level ofimpervious rock within the site area.

d. Wet-rock drainage. During construction, allrock in the vicinity of permanent underground cav-ities must be investigated for water sources bydrilling from the cavities before permanent linersare installed. Wet-rock areas will be mapped andpermanent drain piping installed. Within five cavi-ty diameters of cavity surfaces increase the num-ber of drain holes until the total drainage ratebecomes constant or declines. Permanent flow-

monitoring sensors will be installed in the trunkdrains so that flow rates can be read at any timeand continuously recorded. Wet rock at cavity sur-faces should be grouted to a depth of at least onecavity radius from the opening, or to the depth re-quired to eliminate seepage at the rock surface,whichever is greater.

e. Reservoir capacity. For conservative design,assume the total discharge drains into the under-ground reservoir during the postattack enduranceperiod. The combined discharge of the under-ground drainage and overburden dewatering sys-tems will be monitored during construction on ayear-round basis, with particular attention paid toseasonal variations. The final estimate of totalvolume required for the postattack drainage reser-voir will be based on three values:

—Maximum flow rates during the seasonproducing greatest water volume

—Total volume of discharge from surface, facili-ty, and buried drainage

—Maximum volume of hygienic water requiredfor personnel use during postattack

5–3. Fire protection.

a. Fire prevention in hardened facilities hasmore than normal importance because of closedventilation systems or very limited provision forobtaining outside air to dilute smoke or fumes.Construction materials and furnishings should ex-clude pyrotechnic metals and other combustibles.Operating procedures and regulations should mini-mize storage and handling of paper and other com-bustibles. Waste paper should be collected fre-quently, compacted, and baled. Smoking should beprohibited or confined to specific safe areas.

b. The outer shells of hardened facilities usuallywill be reinforced concrete, but the operating areasusually will be housed in shock-isolated inner struc-tures of steel, often more than one story high. Con-formance to National Fire Code NFPA 220, 4-hourclassification shall be adhered to except as modifiedherein. Floor areas should be subdivided in unitspreferably not larger than 2500 ft2, with floor-to-ceiling walls having not less than two-hour fire-resistive rating. All openings, included ventilationducts, through fire-rated floors and walls are to beprovided with self-closing fire-door or fire-damperassemblies. Stair and elevator shafts will be en-closed with three-hour walls and fire-door assem-blies. Except for blast-resistant doors, fire-door

5-1

TM 5-858-7

assemblies must bear the Underwriter’s Laborato-ry Class “B” label.

c. Elimination of combustible materials shouldremove the potential for a class “A” fire. However,if there is a Class “A” hazard and if exposed equip-ment can tolerate water, use high-pressure waterfog or water-based foam extinguishing systems.Where water or water-based foam are used, thedehumidification system will be sized to reestablishwithin 24 hours the relative humidity selected foroperating conditions.

d. Wherever possible, specify airtight enclo-sures for any equipment subject to Class “B” or“C” fires, and specify an internal atmosphere of ni-trogen or carbon dioxide to be maintained in theenclosures. For facilities having closed ventilationsystems, a carbon dioxide cover should be used,leakage should be monitored, and the absorptionsystem sized so that CO2 concentration never ex-ceeds 5 percent at any time, 4 percent for morethan 8 hours, nor 1 percent for more than 24 hours.Normal waste heat generated within artificial at-mospheres of carbon dioxide or nitrogen will be re-moved by fan-coil units mounted inside theenclosures.

e. Facility operational procedures will stressquick fire control by personnel using fire hoseswith fog nozzles or portable Class B–C foam, orpowdered dry chemical or carbon dioxide extin-guishers. Carbon dioxide extinguishers should notbe supplied where foam or powdered chemical ex-tinguishers are acceptable. Foams and dry chemi-cals must be limited to those that do not releasetoxic vapors or gases when heated. Never use car-bon tetrachloride extinguishers.

f. Personnel gas masks should be provided in re-dundant and readily accessible locations. Masksmeeting U.S. Bureau of Mines Standards will beused whenever it is necessary for personnel to en-ter an area where there is a fire or where a fire hasoccurred.

5-4. Personnel support services.

a. Quantitative. Personnel support services willvary with the facility prime mission and with themaximum possible number of personnel within thefacility at the time of attack. The possibility of at-tack during change of shift must be included. Thespecified personnel survival period is likely to bebased on the predicted radiation hazard, independ-ent of the prime mission endurance, and will prob-ably be 30 days or more. Consequently, differencesin the required personnel support services will bequantitative rather than qualitative.

b. Quarters. In the absence of other specifica-tions, quarters planning and space allowances willbe based on the specifications provided in appendixB.

c. Furnishings. All furnishings will be built in orsecurely anchored to the structure to resist accel-erations of not less than 1 g in any direction. Allmovable supply items will be stored in racks, draw-ers or cabinets where they can be secured againstdamage by an acceleration of not less than 1 g, ac-companied by displacements on the order of inches,in any direction. Walkways, walls, fixed equip-ment, and furnishings in occupied areas will be pro-vided with continuous handrails or grab bars forpersonnel safety under ground-shock effects.

d. Lighting systems. Lighting is exclusively apersonnel-dependent system and fixed lightingshould be limited to normally occupied areas. Tominimize lighting requirements, interior finisheswill be light colored. Lighting levels in occupiedareas will be the minimum consistent with safetyand efficient operations. Lighting calculations andlayout should be based on: use of high-efficiencyfluorescent lamps producing not less than 70 lu-mens per watt for lamps rated at 25 watts or more;and use of high-efficiency fixtures without bafflesor covers. All lighting fixtures and conduits will besecured to resist at least 1 g acceleration in any di-rection. Emergency lighting will be supplied by in-candescent, battery-charged units using sealed-cellbatteries; the complete assemblies will be mountedto resist 1 g acceleration.

e. Supplies. Storage of consumable supplieswithin hardened facilities is based on continuouspersonnel occupancy for drills, alert periods, andthe postattack survival periods. Supplies consumedduring drills and alert periods will be replacedweekly so that the maximum supply inventoryneed not exceed that required for the specified sur-vival period plus one week.

f. Food. The food supply will maximize use ofprepared dehydrated foods and minimize require-ments for refrigeration and cooking. Food will beheated in well-insulated ovens vented directly toair revitalization equipment to avoid odors in venti-lation air.

g. Potable water supply. Potable water will bestored in sterile, sealed containers suitable for usein pipeless unit dispensers and will be taken fromthe stored supply in order of time of storage (firstin/first out). Water will be checked regularly forbacterial or other contamination.

h. Hygienic water. Water for washing andshowers can be piped for the return side of the

5-2

TM 5-858-7

waste-heat rejection system cooling water if afresh-water heat sink system is used. Provide for aconsumption rate of 4 gallons (O. 54 cubic feet) perman-day. Waste water will be disposed to the facil-ity drainage reservoir. The hygienic water supplyshould be chlorinated to inhibit bacterial growth.

i. Waste disposal. Solid wastes will be compact-ed to minimize storage space and fire hazard. Gar-bage and sanitary waste will be disposed of by thesame type of waterless recirculating oil flushed dis-posal systems being used increasingly by the U.S.Park and Forest Services at locations where con-ventional sewage systems are impractical. Thesesystems use a mineral oil flushing and cover fluid,which is filtered, chlorinated, and recirculated.

This system has virtually no aerobic bacterial ac-tion, only limited anaerobic action and methanegeneration; however, as a precaution, the entiresystem would be vented to a catalytic oxidizer, acarbon dioxide absorber, a dehumidifier, and an ac-tivated charcoal filter, in that order. The residualgases will be negligible, and processing throughthe ventilation air-revitalization system should bepracticable. Sludge storage tank capacity may beconservatively sized at 0.5 gallons per man-day ofpersonnel occupancy. The typical minimum tankcapacity is 200 gallons and actual capacity is usual-ly based on sludge pump-out at 30-day intervals.To this must be added capacity to accommodate thesurvival period.

5 - 3

TM 5-858-7

APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY

Air Entrainment System:

Blast Valve:

Endurance:

Hard Mounted:

Heat Sink:

Moderately Hardened Fa-cility:

Nominally Hardened Facili-ty:

Postattack:

Preattack:

Preattack Availability:

Prime Mission:

Rattlespace:

Superhard Facility:

Survivability:

Transattack:

UPS:

Accomplishes continuous or a periodic trans-fer of air (gas) between the atmosphereand the facility; abbreviated AES.

Prevents entry of airblast overpressure intohardened facilities.

Combined transattack and postattack timeframes in which the facility must fulfill itsfunctions.

Equipment attached directly to its supportswithout the use of shock isolation.

A medium used to absorb the waste heat re-jected by power generation or air-conditioning systems. Ice or water in cav-ities is generally used for hardenedsystems.

Facili ty hardened to hundreds of psioverpressure.

Facility hardened to tens of psi overpressure.

The timeframe beginning after the last burst.

The time frame prior to first burst or tobutton-up.

Percent of time during a given preattack peri-od (or, alternatively, the probability) thatthe component is in a fully operable orcommittable state at the start of the at-tack or button-up, when the attack occursat an unknown (random) point in time.

Primary mission of the system to which thefacility is a subsidiary element.

Displacement envelope of a shock-isolatedequipment or structure.

Facility hardened to thousands (and greater)of psi overpressure.

The probabili ty that a facili ty/subsys-tem/component failure-mode will physi-cally survive a nuclear-weapon attack andretain its physical integrity during thespecified endurance period.

The time frame between the first burst (orbutton-up) and the last burst.

Uninterruptible power supply.

A-1

TM 5-858-7

APPENDIX B

PERSONNEL SUPPORT SERVICES

B–1. Introduction. The following criteria are pre-sented as guidance for the providing of personnelsupport services. The references provide philoso-phy and details that can be used to meet thesecriteria.

B–2. Quarters.

a. Provide 4-man rooms for 90 percent ofpersonnel.

b. Provide 2-man rooms for 10 percent ofpersonnel.

c. Provide l-man rooms for Commanding Officerand deputy (room to include bathroom facilities).Figure B–1 shows examples of the above.

B–3. Sanitary spaces.

a. Location to be as near as feasible to livingquarters.

b. Washrooms designated as decontaminationspaces to have a minimum of two doorways.

c. Sanitary fixture requirements.—Lavatory— 1 for every 8 persons.—Shower—1 for every 10 persons.—Urinal—1 for every 20 males.—Watercloset—l for every 8 males.—Watercloset—l for every 4 females.

B-4. Food preparation and dining.

8’ II

B-1

TM 5-858-7

b. Seatingcomplement.

to be planned for 40 percent of theEating area to be planned at 10 ft2

per seat. Four-person tables to be used

c. Each serving line to serve 600 persons an hourand 150 seats to meet this rate. Adjustments tothis criterion will be based on total complementand eating schedule.

d. Scraping stations to be provided.

e. Criteria for United States Navy ships 300 ftto 600 ft to be utilized

f. Food preparationthe food supply.

for detail requirements.

areas to be consistent with

B-5. Recreation areas.

a. Motion Pictures —Utilize eating area.

b. Library—Provide 1 1/2 books per person and 1linear ft of shelving per five persons. Shelves to beinstalled in recreation room.

c. Recreation Rooms —Provide seats for one-

fourth the complement. Provide 15 ft2 (gross area)for each seat.

B-6. Services.

a. Laundry —Provide for 18 pounds per weekper person in complement, using a central service.

b.

c.

d.

Barber Shop - 1 chair for every 200 persons.

Retail Store (ships store) —Provide facility.

Brig —Provide a room with a three-tier berth,a lavatory, and a watercloset. A shower stall to beprovided outside this room.

B–7. References:

0PNAVINST-9330-7A.

Naval Ship Systems Command HabitabilityManual, NAVSHIP-0933-005-8010.

U.S. Navy Shipboard Furniture Catalog,NAVSEA-0933-LP-005 -5050.

CSGN Habitability Study, 1 October 1976.

B-2

TM 5-858-7

APPENDIX C

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Corps of Engineers (COE). Heating and Air Conditioning of UndergroundInstallations, TM 5–855-4. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept ofthe Army, Nov 1959.

Crowe, Bernard J. Fuel Cells, A Survey, NASA–SP–5115. Falls Church,VA: Computer Sciences Corp, 1973.

Dept of the Army and the Air Force (A/AAF). Water Supply Water Treat-ment, TM 5–813–3 and AFM 88–10, Chapt. 3. Washington, DC:A/AF, Sep 1966.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Process Design Manual forSludge Treatment and Disposal. Washington, DC: EPA, Ott 1974.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Process Design Manual for Sus-pended Solids Removal. Washington, DC: EPA, Jan 1975.

Hoffman, L. C.; Stansburry, R. D.; and Williams, H. W. Compact Closed Cy-cle Diesel Power System Design Study & Test Program (U),AGC–TR–3914. Azusa, CA: Aerojet-General Corp., Jan 1970.(SECRET)

Humphreys, C.M. et al. “Sensible and Latent Heat Losses from Occupantsof Survival Shelters, ” ASHRAE Jn1 8:5, May 1966.

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Building Types, NFPA-220.Boston, MA: NFPA, latest edition.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) “Toxic & HazardousSubstances,” General Industry Standards and Interpretations, Vol.1, Part 19.0, Subpart Z. (Basic Manual). Washington, DC: OSHA,with supplementary changes to date.

Williams, D.E. Air Revitalization for Survival Shelters, TN–N–987. PortHueneme, CA: Naval Civil Eng. Lab., Dec 1968.

C-1

APPENDIX D

REFERENCES

Government Publications

Department of the ArmyTM5-855-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TM 5--858-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TM5-858-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .TM5-858-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .TM 5-858-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .TM 5-858-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TM 5-858-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .TM5-858-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TM 5-858-8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Department of the NavyNAVSHIP-0933-LP-005-0810 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NAVSEA-0933-LP-005-5050 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Department of TransportationCSGN, l Oct 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Non-Government Publications

Engineering and Design: Heating and Air Conditioningof Underground Installations

Designing Facilities to Resist Nuclear Weapon EffectsFacilities System Engineering

Weapon EffectsStructuresShock Isolation SystemsAir Entrainment, Fasteners, Penetration Protection,

Hydraulic-Surge Protective Devices, EMP ProtectiveDevices

Hardness VerificationFacility Support SystemsIllustrative Examples

Naval Ship Systems Habitability ManualU.S. Navy Shipboard Furniture Catalog

Habitability Study

American Society of Heating, Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAM), Publications Dept.,1791 Tullie Circle, NE, Atlanta, GA 30329

Journal 8:5-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sensible and Latent Heat Losses from Occupants ofSurvival Shelters

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)Publications Dept., Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02269No. 220-1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Types of Building Construction

TM 5-858-71

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.General, United States Amy

Chief of StaffOfficial:

ROBERT M. JOYCEMajor General, United States Army

The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:To be distributed in accordance with Special List.

TM 5-858-7

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. If you want to receive future changes to this manual or to correct your ad-dress, return this page to:

CommanderUS Army Corps of EngineersATTN: DAEN–ECE–TWashington, D.C. 20314

2. Do you have any other questions, comments, or suggestions? (Depart-ment of Army respondents: use DA Form 2028)

3. Your Address: (Attach marked up mailing label with correctionsindicated)

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