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1 HYBRID REGIMES IN MODERN TIMES: Between Democracy and Autocracy Fall semester 2021/2022 (2 credits, 4 ECTS credits) Dr. Inna Melnykovska Assistant Professor Department of Political Science Central European University Office: Quellenstr. 51, Room QS A408 Email: [email protected] Class meetings: Thursdays 15:40-17:20 in D211 Office hours: Regular consultations will be offered on Tuesdays, 10:00-11:00 (by appointment) and Thursdays, 17:20-18:20 (by appointment). The office hours will be held on-site in my office (QS A408) or in MS Teams. Send me, please, an e-mail indicating when you would like to talk to me and what about (your course performance, your research ideas in general, etc.). An individual consultation can be arranged on different days and time slots if requested via email to: [email protected] Introduction to the issue Hybrid regimes that alloy democratic rules with authoritarian governance are the most widespread political systems in the world at the beginning of the 21st century. Conventional accounts describe them as defective democracies or competitive authoritarian regimes. Alternative views point to the genuine features and functions of these regimes that cannot be reduced to those of half-democracies or half-autocracies. In fact, hybrid regimes are puzzling in several ways: (1) their establishment and sustainability have been unexpected either by the school of democratization/transitology or by the school of (new) authoritarianism; (2) neither democratic institutions (e.g. elections) nor autocratic institutions (e.g. dominant parties) function in a conventional way there; and (3) contrary to the expectations of stability, hybrid regimes have demonstrated a variety of (within-type) dynamics. Topics In this course, we will seek to unpack the category of hybrid regimes and explore the following questions:

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HYBRID REGIMES IN MODERN TIMES:

Between Democracy and Autocracy

Fall semester 2021/2022 (2 credits, 4 ECTS credits)

Dr. Inna Melnykovska Assistant Professor Department of Political Science Central European University Office: Quellenstr. 51, Room QS A408 Email: [email protected]

Class meetings: Thursdays 15:40-17:20 in D211

Office hours:

Regular consultations will be offered on Tuesdays, 10:00-11:00 (by appointment) and

Thursdays, 17:20-18:20 (by appointment). The office hours will be held on-site in my office (QS

A408) or in MS Teams. Send me, please, an e-mail indicating when you would like to talk to me

and what about (your course performance, your research ideas in general, etc.). An individual

consultation can be arranged on different days and time slots if requested via email to:

[email protected]

Introduction to the issue

Hybrid regimes that alloy democratic rules with authoritarian governance are the most widespread political systems in the world at the beginning of the 21st century. Conventional accounts describe them as defective democracies or competitive authoritarian regimes. Alternative views point to the genuine features and functions of these regimes that cannot be reduced to those of half-democracies or half-autocracies. In fact, hybrid regimes are puzzling in several ways: (1) their establishment and sustainability have been unexpected either by the school of democratization/transitology or by the school of (new) authoritarianism; (2) neither democratic institutions (e.g. elections) nor autocratic institutions (e.g. dominant parties) function in a conventional way there; and (3) contrary to the expectations of stability, hybrid regimes have demonstrated a variety of (within-type) dynamics.

Topics

In this course, we will seek to unpack the category of hybrid regimes and explore the following questions:

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What are the origins of hybrid regimes?

What are the specifics of their institutional functionality in comparison with democracies and/or autocracies?

What determines their stability and dynamic nature? We will review the major research approaches that analyze the political regimes in the ‘grey zone’ between democracy and autocracy and further link these approaches to the broader literature on statehood, economic development and social order. We will identify ‘who governs’ in hybrid regimes and by which means (coercion, patronage, ideology, control of the Internet, among others) the power is exercised and maintained. We will look at how governments interact with elites and citizens, as well as with their regional neighbors and international community. Also, the strategies and the activities of opposition and civil society in the hybrid regimes will be studied. Finally, we will identify the ways the study of hybrid regimes can inform contemporary policies and practices in the democratization processes.

Regional focus

This course offers an opportunity to study the current landscape of hybrid regimes in Eastern Europe and Eurasia in depth and with a worldwide comparative perspective. Most of our focus will be on the post-Soviet area, where some of the most obvious examples of hybrid regimes may be found. In addition, hybrid regimes from Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia will be included in comparison. Each participant will take the role of a “country-expert”: assign to a preferred case of hybrid regime and represent this case in our discussion, group work exercises and presentations.

Course organization

The course follows a flipped classroom approach of teaching and learning and involves asynchronous elements and synchronous on-site (or in Zoom) sessions. Asynchronous elements include collaborative readings on Perusall, pre-recorded students’ presentations and their discussions, and pre-class preparations for group work exercises. Asynchronous elements are pre-class activities and need to be completed before the synchronous online sessions.

The course consists of 11 topics (weeks 2-11). Each topic runs for one week. Each week follows

the schedule:

(1) Perusall readings & students’ presentations [weekend – Thursday morning]: students

are asked to collaboratively read the assigned articles or chapters and/or watch pre-recorded students’ presentations and comment on them. The link to the course readings on Perusall is integrated into Moodle. Students’ presentations should be uploaded on Moodle (Discussion Forum). The assignments on Perusall become available on the weekend prior to the topic/week.

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(2) On-site/Zoom-session [Thursday 15:40-17:20]: The professor will introduce students to contemporary research, theoretical approaches and debates on the topic of a week. Students deal with and compare the working of relevant empirical cases of hybrid regimes in group work. Also, we will have a policy-relevant discussion or exercise on contemporary word-based problems related to the topic of the week.

Learning outcomes

At the end of the course, you will

gain the understanding of the differences between hybrid, democratic and authoritarian regimes;

become familiar with the major research schools dealing with hybrid regimes, their (normative) premises as well as their strengths and weaknesses;

accumulate the knowledge about the actors, institutions and processes responsible for establishment, functioning, and dynamics of hybrid regimes;

understand the interaction mechanisms between actors and structures as well as the links between global and local in hybrid regimes;

know specifics of East European and Eurasian hybrid regimes relative to the hybrid regimes in other world regions;

learn how to identify empirical puzzles and how to address them with theoretical knowledge and methodological tools;

be skilled in ‘translation’ of research findings into practical policy recommendations.

Course requirements and assessment

The grading follows the standard scale adopted by the Department of Political Science A: 100-96; A-: 95-88; B+: 87-80; B: 79-71; B-: 70-63; C+: 62-58; F: 57-0 The final grade will be composed as follows:

Active participation, including questions, comments, etc. in asynchronous and on-site/synchronous discussions and group work exercises – 20%

Presentation – 35%

Final essay – 45% Active participation score will take equally into account students’ contributions in both asynchronous and synchronous on-site/Zoom activities. There is no minimal requirement or maximal limitation on the number of students’ contributions on Perusall or during on-site/synchronous sessions. The active participation score will be calculated according to the ranking of the best and worst students’ performance in the class.

Apart from the quantitative performance, the quality of the students’ contributions will count a lot. To be successful students should deeply engage with the readings through posting

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informative questions or comments, and helping others by addressing their questions or confusions.

Students are expected to join on-site/online sessions prepared. If you are unable to attend on-site/online class, you should notify me, the professor, via e-mail prior to the session. To do well on this part of the grade I recommend you the following strategy: participate regularly in the group work, make informed (by the mandatory readings at least!) contributions, focus on the main points and argumentation lines of the readings, formulate your statements clearly and support them with explanatory argumentation, respond to others in discussions, pose own new questions and demonstrate critical engagement.

Taking over the roles of a presenter or a note taker in the group work exercises will add to the score. During our on-site/online students will work in regional groups. Each student will take the role of a country-expert within the group and will need to prepare the information and references to the literature about his/her country of expertise along the questions distributed in advance by the professor. If (for whatever reason) you are not very active during our on-site/online sessions, you could compensate by commenting on students’ presentations posted on Moodle (see next assessment component).

Active participation will be evaluated taking into account all your contributions and scored as follows

A = demonstrates exceptionally thoughtful and thorough comments and questions on the entire assignment that meaningfully relate to some additional readings and previous knowledge of empirical cases;

A- = demonstrates thoughtful and thorough comments and questions on the entire assignment;

B+ = demonstrates thoughtful reading of only part of the assignment;

B = demonstrates superficial reading of the entire assignment;

B- = demonstrates superficial reading of only part of the assignment;

C+ = demonstrates no substance; does not demonstrate any thoughtful engagement and interpretation of the assignment.

Each student does a short presentation on the topics in weeks 3-11. The presentation should demonstrate the puzzle (either empirical or theoretical), the research question related to the selected hybrid regime(s) of student’s interest and a research design addressing this specific puzzle and question. Against the background of contemporary research students are asked to formulate 2 explanatory hypotheses and with reference to methodological rules select the cases of hybrid regimes, either within a region or across the world or across the time, to test

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these hypotheses. The aim is to get first-hand experience with the research design on hybrid regimes. The presentation can be done on one of the (sub-)topics of the week. The presentation should be done as a PowerPoint presentation of max 20 minutes, recorded and posted on Moodle. Presentation recording can be done for example with Zoom. You can find the guidelines for the research design in the “how to research design” file on Moodle. The presentation recordings should be posted on Moodle for questions and comments by Monday 23:59 in the week in which the topic is dealt with. The final essay should address a recent or forthcoming empirical event in one or several hybrid regimes of student interest. Students should provide the interpretation, explain the meaning, causes or effects of this event referring to contemporary research on the hybrid regimes. It should be no more than 2000 words long (without references and possible appendices). Details will be discussed in the last session in week 12. For examples see the articles in WP Monkey Case blog: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/10/about-monkey-cage/ Please note that for all assessments, late submission, and violation of the word or time limit will result in a lower grade. Plagiarism is not acceptable and will be punished according to the departmental rules.

Pre-conditions

No prior knowledge is assumed. Some basic skills of qualitative research design and methodology is desired. On methodological issues I recommend to study the following readings to prepare for the course:

Van Evera, Stephen. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

Diana Panke. Research Design and Method Selection: Making Good Choices in the Social Sciences. (Sage, 2018).

Goertz, G. and J. Mahoney (2012). A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences, Princeton University Press.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

Deadlines:

1. Choose the seminars you are going to record a short presentation and country you take the role of an expert for – by 01.10 (fill in the shared doc-file).

2. Submit the pre-recorded short presentation on selected hybrid regime(s) by Monday 23:59 in the week in which the topic is dealt with.

3. Submit the final essay – by 20.12

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Reading material

The reading material includes readings of three types:

- *mandatory readings, which students should read collaboratively on Perusall prior to

Zoom sessions. While the selected pages from the readings are assigned on Perusall, the

full articles/chapters are available for download in electronic form through

https://ceulearning.ceu.edu/. Students will be able to download the readings (selected

pages) with all the comments and their notes from Perusall.

- further recommended readings are included in the syllabus to deepen student

knowledge and are optional for individual learning.

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COURSE SCHEDULE

Week 1 – Introduction: topics, requirements and organizational issues The sessions in the first week introduces students to the topics of the course, explains course requirements and clarifies all organizational issues. In these sessions we will refresh the rules of concept building and start to explore the conceptual question: what hybrid regimes are (and aren’t). The regional groups will be formed and the hybrid regimes for group work will be selected. Videos: Competitive Authoritarianism: A Conversation with Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way 20 mins, Feb 11, 2020: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B1drTNx-FrA&t=5s Valerie Bunce on the Challenge of Hybrid Regimes Jul 14, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qsd6U7jNNus&t=2460s Readings:

*Diamond, Larry (2002). "Thinking about hybrid regimes." Journal of Democracy 13(2): 21-35.

Carothers, Thomas (2002). "The end of the transition paradigm." Journal of Democracy 13(1): 5-21.

Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2020). The New Competitive Authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy, (1), 51-65.

Morlino, Leonardo (2009). "Are there hybrid regimes? Or are they just an optical illusion?" European Political Science Review 1(02): 273-296.

Week 2 – What is hybrid regime? Democratic and authoritarian paradigms. Genuine perspectives Sessions in week 2 will be devoted to the approaches to hybrid regimes that are rooted in the concepts of democracy and/or autocracy. Also, we will discuss weaknesses and strengths of the democratic and authoritarian perspectives on hybrid regimes and explore novel approaches to deal with these regimes as a genuine regime type. Video: Talk by Balint Magyar: https://youtu.be/h_qC7MZ6-3s Readings:

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*Cassani, A. (2014). "Hybrid what? Partial consensus and persistent divergences in the analysis of hybrid regimes." International Political Science Review 35(5): 542-558.

*Levitsky, S. and L. A. Way (2002). "The rise of competitive authoritarianism." Journal of Democracy 13(2): 51-65.

*Merkel, Wolfgang (2004). “Embedded and Defective Democracies.” Democratization 11, 5: 33-58.

Bogaards, M. (2009). "How to classify hybrid regimes? Defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism." Democratization 16(2): 399-423.

Bogaards, Matthijs (2018) De-democratization in Hungary: diffusely defective democracy, Democratization, 25:8, 1481-1499, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2018.1485015

Collier, David and Steven Levitsky (1997). “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research.” World Politics 49 (10): 430-451.

Lührmann, Anna & Staffan I. Lindberg (2019) A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it?, Democratization, 26:7, 1095-1113, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2019.1582029

Magyar, Bálint. Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of Hungary. NED - New edition, 1 ed., Central European University Press, 2016. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7829/j.ctt19z391g. Ch. 4 and 5.

Schmitter, Philippe C., and Terry L. Karl. 1991. “What Democracy Is... and Is Not.” Journal of Democracy 2(3): 75–88.

Week 3 – Why do some hybrid regimes survive while the other collapse? Conditions of revolutionary breakdowns and stability In week 3 we will address the puzzle of stability and breakdown of hybrid regimes. In particular, we will elaborate debates between so called diffusion/agency-centered and structural explanations. Readings:

*Bunce, V. J. and S. L. Wolchik (2010). "Defeating Dictators. Electoral Change and Stability in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes." World Politics 62(1): 43-86.

*Way, L. A. (2008). "The real causes of the color revolutions." Journal of Democracy 19(3): 55-69.

*Gerschewski, J. (2013). "The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic regimes." Democratization 20(1): 13-38.

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Gerschewski, Johannes, and Christoph Stefes, eds. (2018) “Crisis in Autocratic Regimes”. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Way, L. A. & Casey, A. (2018) The structural sources of postcommunist regime trajectories, Post-Soviet Affairs, DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2018.1494959

Week 4 – Why do autocrats need formal democratic institutions? Elections, Legislatives, Constitutions and authoritarian practices In week 4 we will deal with interactions of formal democratic institutions and authoritarian practices. We will look at some examples how elections, legislatives and contribute to the stability of hybrid regimes. Video: MWL with Professor Valerie J. Bunce (Cornell University) - 16 October 2019https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lk6lGTNyrd8 (optional) Readings:

*Brownlee, J. 2009. “Portents of Pluralism: Democratic Hybrid Regimes Affect Transitions.” American Journal of Political Science 53 (3): 515–532.

*Gandhi, J. and E. Lust-Okar (2009). "Elections Under Authoritarianism." Annual Review of Political Science 12(1): 403-422.

*Williamson, Scott and Magaloni, Beatriz (2020) Legislatures and Policy Making in Authoritarian Regimes, Comparative Political Studies, 1–19, DOI: 10.1177/0010414020912288

Albertus, Michael and Victor Menaldo. 2012. “Dictators as Founding Fathers? The Role of Constitutions under Autocracy” Economics and Politics 24(3): 279-306.

Baturo, A. and R. Elgie (2018). "Why do authoritarian regimes adopt bicameralism? Cooptation, control, and masking controversial reforms." Democratization 25(5): 919-937.

Gel'man, V. (2008). "Party Politics in Russia: From Competition to Hierarchy." Europe-Asia Studies 60(6): 913-930.

Hale, H. E. (2011). "Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics: Institutions and Democratization in Post-Soviet Eurasia." World Politics 63(4): 581-617.

Magaloni, Beatriz (2006) Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Selected Chapters 7 and 8.

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Smyth, Regina (2020) Elections, Protest, and Authoritarian Regime Stability Russia 2008–2020. Cambridge University Press. Selected chapters.

Turchenko, M. and G. V. Golosov (2020). "Smart enough to make a difference? An empirical test of the efficacy of strategic voting in Russia’s authoritarian elections." Post-Soviet Affairs: 1-15.

Week 5 – Sources and mechanisms of patronage In week 5 we will deal with sources and mechanisms of patronage the incumbent rulers in hybrid regimes use to coopt their clients.

Video: Henry Hale: Explaining Post-Soviet Authoritarianism, 1992-2015 - good video about informal politics, Aug 11, 2017: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EIuH5qvHMkk&t=364s Michael Ross The Oil Curse, Jun 7, 2012: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y7ESq_O3Odw&t=520s Readings:

*Magaloni, Beatriz. (2008) Credible Power Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule, Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 4 (2008): 715–741. doi: 10.1177/0010414007313124

*Hale, H. E. (2014). Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, Ch. 1.

Andrews, Sarah & Lauren Honig (2019) Elite defection and grassroots democracy under competitive authoritarianism: evidence from Burkina Faso, Democratization, 26:4.

Bove, V. and M. Rivera Celestino (2015). "Elite Co-optation, Repression, and Coups in Autocracies." International Interactions 41: 150501080927000.

Franke, A., et al. (2009). "Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as Post-Soviet Rentier States: Resource Incomes and Autocracy as a Double 'Curse'in Post-Soviet Regimes." Europe-Asia Studies 61(1): 109-140.

Gould, John and Sickner, Carl, Lee (2008) Making Market Democracies? The Contingent Loyalties of Post-Privatization Elites in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Serbia, Review of International Political Economy 15(5), pp. 740-769, DOI: 10.1080/09692290802408923

Junisbai, Barbara (2012) Improbable but Potentially Pivotal Oppositions: Privatization, Capitalists, and Political Contestation in the Post-Soviet Autocracies, Perspectives on Politics, Volume 10, Issue 4, pp. 891-916, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271200285X

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Kendall-Taylor, Andrea (2012) Purchasing Power: Oil, Elections and Regime Durability in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, Europe-Asia Studies, 64:4, 737-760, DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2012.671567

Kopecký, P. and M. Spirova (2011). "‘Jobs for the Boys’? Patterns of Party Patronage in Post-Communist Europe." West European Politics 34(5): 897-921.

Mahdavi, P. (2020). Power Grab: Political Survival through Extractive Resource Nationalization (Business and Public Policy). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108781350

Svolik, M.W. (2009), Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes. American Journal of Political Science, 53: 477-494. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00382.x

Radnitz, Scott (2010) The color of money: Privatization, economic dispersion, and the post-soviet “revolutions”, Comparative Politics 42 (2), 127-146

Reuter, John and Gandhi, Jennifer (January 2011) Economic Performance and Elite Defection from Hegemonic, Parties, British Journal of Political Science, Volume 41, Issue 1, 83-110

Ross, Michael (2001). Does oil hinder democracy? World Politics, 53, 325–361.

Week 6– Repress or not repress? Coercion politics Sessions in week 6 discuss the benefits and pitfalls of repression politics in hybrid regimes and the ways non-democratic incumbent rulers learned to manage civil society. Readings:

*Gel'man, Vladimir. 2015. "The politics of fear: how the Russian regime confronts its opponents." Russian Politics & Law 53(5-6): 6-26.

*Rogov, K (2018) The Art of Coercion: Repressions and Repressiveness in Putin’s Russia, Russian Politics 3, 151-174.

*Way, L. A. and S. Levitsky (2006). "The dynamics of autocratic coercion after the Cold War." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39(3): 387-410.

Davenport, Christian. 2007. "State repression and political order." Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 10: 1-23.

Davenport, C. and M. Inman (2012). "The State of State Repression Research Since the 1990s." Terrorism and Political Violence 24(4): 619-634.

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De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. 2019. "Preemptive repression: deterrence, backfiring, iron fists, and velvet gloves." Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(2): 502-527.

Earl, Jennifer. 2011. "Political repression: Iron fists, velvet gloves, and diffuse control." Annual review of sociology 37: 261-284.

Frantz, Erica, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor. 2014. "A dictator’s toolkit: Understanding how co-optation affects repression in autocracies." Journal of Peace Research 51(3): 332-346.

Gilbert, L. and P. Mohseni (2018). "Disabling dissent: the colour revolutions, autocratic linkages, and civil society regulations in hybrid regimes." Contemporary Politics 24(4): 454-480.

Olar, Roman-Gabriel. 2019. "Do they know something we don’t? Diffusion of repression in authoritarian regimes." Journal of Peace Research: 0022343318822718.

Ritter, Emily Hencken, and Courtenay R. Conrad. 2016. "Preventing and responding to dissent: The observational challenges of explaining strategic repression." American Political Science Review 110(1): 85-99.

Robertson, Graeme B. 2009. “Managing society: protest, civil society, and regime in Putin's Russia.” Slavic Review, 68(3): 528-547.

Schneider, Carsten Q., and Seraphine F. Maerz. 2017. "Legitimation, cooptation, and repression and the survival of electoral autocracies." Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 11(2): 213-235.

Bilek, J. (2017). "Authoritarian Repressive Strategies and Electoral Competitiveness." Sociologia 49(4): 343-368.

Week 7 – Center and Regions. Subnational Political Regimes In week 7, we will deal with the power dynamics in the relationships between the center and the regions, which result in the variety of political regimes at the subnational level. Also, we will trace the consequences of these power dynamics on regime in-/stability. Readings:

*Libman, A. and M. Rochlitz (2019). Federalism in China and Russia, Edward Elgar Publishing. Chapter 5.

*Turovskii, Rostislav F. 2010. “Regional Political Regimes in Russia.” Russian Politics & Law 48 (2): 27–49. https://doi.org/10.2753/RUP1061-1940480202

Sharafutdinova, Gulnaz. 2010. “Subnational Governance in Russia: How Putin Changed the Contract with His Agents and the Problems It Created for Medvedev.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 40: 4: 672–96. https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjp036.

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Gel'man, V. and S. Ryzhenkov (2011, May). Local Regimes, Sub-national Governance and the `Power Vertical' in Contemporary Russia. Europe-Asia Studies 63 (3), 449-465.

Gelman, V. (2010). "The Dynamics of Subnational Authoritarianism." Russian Politics & Law 48(2): 7-26.

Golosov, G. V. (2011). "The Regional Roots of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia." Europe-Asia Studies 63(4): 623-639.

Ross, C. (2011). "Regional Elections and Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia." Europe-Asia Studies 63(4): 641-661.

Week 8 – Powers of media, symbols and ideas? – Legitimation and legitimacy Sessions in week 8 explore how media propaganda and (nationalist, etc.) ideologies contribute to stability of hybrid regimes. Readings:

*Gerschewski, Johannes (2018). “Legitimacy in Autocracies. Oxymoron or Essential Feature?” Perspectives on Politics, 16, 3, 652-665.

*von Soest, C. and J. Grauvogel (2017). "Identity, procedures and performance: how authoritarian regimes legitimize their rule." Contemporary Politics 23(3): 287-305.

Dukalskis, Alexander, and Johannes Gerschewski. “Adapting or Freezing? Ideological Reactions of Communist Regimes in a Post-Communist World.” Government & Opposition.

Matveeva, A. (2009). "Legitimising Central Asian Authoritarianism: Political Manipulation and Symbolic Power." Europe-Asia Studies 61(7): 1095-1121.

Weßels, Bernhard. 2016. “Democratic Legitimacy. Concepts, Measures, Outcome.”In How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy, ed. Monica Ferrín and Hanspeter Kriesi. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yan, H. T. (2017). "Comparing democratic performance of semi-presidential regimes in the post-communist region: Omnipotent presidents and media control." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 50(4): 263-275.

Week 9 – External Environment and External Actors In week 9 we will overview the external factors that contribute to or undermine the legitimacy, patronage and coercion of incumbents in hybrid regimes.

Readings:

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*Krekó, P. (2021). How Authoritarians Inflate Their Image. Journal of Democracy 32(3), 109-123. doi:10.1353/jod.2021.0037.

* Escribà-Folch, A. and J. Wright (2015). Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival, OUP Oxford. Chapter 3.

*Yakouchyk, K. (2019). "Beyond Autocracy Promotion: A Review." Political Studies Review 17(2): 147-160.

Kneuer, M., et al. (2019). "Playing the regional card: why and how authoritarian gravity centres exploit regional organisations." Third World Quarterly 40(3): 451-470.

Busygina, Irina & Mikhail Filippov (2020) Russia, Post-Soviet Integration, and the EAEU: The Balance between Domination and Cooperation, Problems of Post-Communism, DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2020.1803755

Schmotz, A. and O. Tansey (2018). "Regional autocratic linkage and regime survival." European Journal of Political Research 57(3): 662-686.

Börzel, T. A. (2015). "The noble west and the dirty rest? Western democracy promoters and illiberal regional powers." Democratization 22(3): 519-535.

Hartmann, C. (2016). "Leverage and linkage: how regionalism shapes regime dynamics in Africa." Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 10: 79-98.

Jackson, N. J. (2010). "The role of external factors in advancing non-liberal democratic forms of political rule: a case study of Russia's influence on Central Asian regimes." Contemporary Politics 16(1): 101-118.

Stoddard, E. (2017). "Authoritarian regimes in democratic regional organisations? Exploring regional dimensions of authoritarianism in an increasingly democratic West Africa." Journal of Contemporary African Studies 35(4): 469-486.

Wong, M. Y. H. (2019). "Chinese influence, US linkages, or neither? Comparing regime changes in Myanmar and Thailand." Democratization 26(3): 359-381.

Week 10 – Authoritarian modernization mission impossible? Sources of bad governance and mechanism of policy-making In week 10, we will deal with policy-making, bad governance and modernization attempts in hybrid regimes. Video: Loren Graham, Russia’s failed modernization. Link to the video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HFSDVrnAXZI Readings:

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*Gel’man, Vladimir (2017): Political foundations of bad governance in post-Soviet Eurasia: towards a research agenda, East European Politics, DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2017.1348350

Sebők, Miklós, Boda, Zsolt (2021) Policy Agendas in Autocracy, and Hybrid Regimes. The Case of Hungary. Palgrave Macmillan. Chapters 1 and 2: https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030732226?fbclid=IwAR3Ka7x1C25EQ-bAfDXqX2LMad9ojjSGP0K0_-We_ablnuTUfwGkGLn8ivM

Petrov, N., et al. (2013). "Three dilemmas of hybrid regime governance: Russia from Putin to Putin." Post-Soviet Affairs 30(1): 1-26.

Boda, Z. and V. Patkós (2018). "Driven by politics: agenda setting and policy-making in Hungary 2010–2014." Policy Studies 39(4): 402-421.

Melville, A. and M. Mironyuk (2016). "“Bad enough governance”: state capacity and quality of institutions in post-Soviet autocracies." Post-Soviet Affairs 32(2): 132-151.

Sebok, M. (2019). The Comparative Agendas of Hybrid Regimes - A Research Agenda. Budapest: Hungarian Policy Agendas Project

Week 11 – Civil Society and Opposition: Strategies and Successes Stories In week 11, we will review factors and strategies of civil society and opposition in hybrid regimes which help them to survive and sometimes come to power. Readings:

*Gorokhovskaia, Y. (2019). "What it takes to win when the game is rigged: the evolution of opposition electoral strategies in Moscow, 2012-2017." Democratization 26(6): 975-992.

*Semenov, A. The rationale of organizational control: managing the political opposition in Putin’s Russia. Eur Polit Sci (2021). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-021-00324-y

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Sullivan, Christopher M. 2016. "Undermining resistance: Mobilization, repression, and the enforcement of political order." Journal of Conflict Resolution 60(7): 1163-1190.

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Aburamoto, M. (2019). "The Politics of Anti-Corruption Campaigns in Putin’s Russia: Power, Opposition, and the All-Russia People’s Front." Europe-Asia Studies 71(3): 408-425.

Frantz, E. (2018). "Voter turnout and opposition performance in competitive authoritarian elections." Electoral Studies 54: 218-225.

Sozen, Y. (2019). "Competition in a Populist Authoritarian Regime: The June 2018 Dual Elections in Turkey." South European Society and Politics 24(3): 287-315.

Gonzalez, F. and M. Prem (2018). "Can television bring down a dictator? Evidence from Chile's "No" campaign." Journal of Comparative Economics 46(1): 349-361.

Beardsworth, N. (2016). "Challenging dominance: the opposition, the coalition and the 2016 election in Uganda." Journal of Eastern African Studies 10(4): 749-768.

Ng, H. Y. (2016). "What Drives Young People Into Opposition Parties Under Hybrid Regimes? A Comparison of Hong Kong and Singapore." Asian Politics & Policy 8(3): 436-455.

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Week 12 – Conclusion, Reflection and Open Questions