Fortnight Publications Ltd.

Human Rights v. TerrorismAuthor(s): Tom HaddenSource: Fortnight, No. 399 (Oct., 2001), pp. 11-12Published by: Fortnight Publications Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25560401 .

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- 4

=C indifference of the Bush Administration to a re newed cycle ofviolence in the Middle East alienated sections of opinion which might have been in a position to have passed on warnings of the impend ing disaster.

These are all grounds for arguing that the combi nation of circumstances that produced 11 Septem ber may never be repeated. Of course, as a matter of simple prudence, it is sensible to take precautions against the possibility of the misuse of any product of modern technology. However, it is probably dangerous to conceive of the threat as peculiarly belonging to the realm of international terrorism. It may even be dangerous to do so, since once Bush declares that he has achieved victory over interna tional terrorism, there will be a temptation to ig nore the fact that a disgruntled scientist or a religious sect is just as likely to be responsible for the next

WTC-size atrocity as terrorists. The use of the term terrorists as a synonym for evil-doers whatever their

motivation reinforces a tendency to describe as

terrorism acts which are really the actions of indi viduals and not groups bound together by a political agenda. The obvious example in this context is Timothy McVeigh who carried out the Oklahoma City massacre, an action often wrongly ascribed to the militia movement of which he was a member. In short McVeigh was not a terrorist, though the risk of being misunderstood would deter me from saying so too loudly in public.

11 September perhaps fits best what Peter Merkl has described as the fire-sale theory of terrorism, that groups sometimes resort to the most extreme forms of violence when the political agenda they espouse is on the retreat. It is the final desperate bid to provoke reaction that might change the trend of political developments. There is a strongly nihilist dimension to such a calculation that accounts for its other features foreign to most conventional acts of terrorism, the absence of any claim of responsibility as well as the lack of associated political demands or

manifesto.

v.terrorism

Events have a nasty habit of thwarting the best laid plans. Just as the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission had launched their consultation docu ment on the proposed Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland with copious provisions to give better protec tion to all suspects, the international terrorists re sponsible for the plane-bombing of New York and

Washington have changed the agenda. Instead of a climate in which a move away from armed conflict into a new culture of human rights seemed possible,

we are faced with one in which human rights seem once again to be subordinated to the demands of 'the war against terrorism'.

So what can the human rights community say and do about the attacks in American and the threatened

American-or global-responses? Loose talk ofwag ing war against those responsible, however under standable at a popular level, is clearly dangerous.

What are the alternatives ?

How TO DESCRIBE THE ATTACKS

A few things are reasonably clear. One is that the hijacking of the planes, the deliberate sacrificing of their civilian passengers and the plane-bombing of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were violations of all the basic principles of human rights law and the law of conflict. It is also clear that terrorism is now an accepted term within interna tional law-meaning attacks designed to spread ter ror among the civilian population. The old slogan that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' is no longer tenable. Mary Robinson, the UN

High Commissioner for Human Rights, has gone so far as to call the attacks a crime against humanity,

presumably with a view to the eventual trial of those responsible before an international criminal court.

It is ironic it was the United States which blocked the specific inclusion of terrorist acts in the stat

ute for the newly established International Crimi nal Court.

Another is that the attacks were not 'mindless terrorism' but were based on a deep hatred of the

United States and the policies it has been pursuing in the Middle East. If we are to be tough on terror ism, we need also to be tough on the causes of terrorism. The British and Irish Governments and

most people here should be well aware of that aspect of the 'war against terrorism' here in Ireland.

A third, which so far seems to have been accepted by the United States and its major allies, is that for any response to be effective in the long run, it must be kept within the general principles of interna tional law and human rights standards. That is not

just because there is an obligation on all states to adhere to international law and human rights. It is also because acting in line with those principles is the only way to ensure effective international co-opera tion, which in its turn is the onlyway to ensure lasting protection from international terrorism.

POSSIBLE RESPONSES

What kind of response does all this point to? One possibility-which seems at the time of writing to be in the offing-is to declare war on states thought to be sponsoring or harbouring those responsible and to rely on rules for international warfare in the 1949

Geneva Conventions. That would mean restricting attacks to genuine military targets, avoiding any dis proportionate injury to civilians and their homes and treating those captured as prisoners of war. In human rights terms wars of that kind can only be waged with the support of the United Nations Security Council.

In the aftermath of the attacks upon America TOM HADDEN considers the response options open under international human rights law

OCTOBER 2001 FO R T N I G H T 11

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I TERROR 2001 I

But it has already passed a resolution declaring that the attacks in America constitute a threat to international peace and security, which is the formal basis for authoris ing international military action.

Another would be to claim that the response is a legitimate act of self-defence under article 51 of the UN

Charter. That would presumably apply to defence from attacks from non-state bodies as well as states. But the right of self-defence must be distinguished from retaliation or punishment. It permits states to take proportionate action against a current or immi

nent attack. It does not permit any form of retaliatory military action.

A third possibility would be to treat the attacks not as a kind of international war, but as a non-international armed conflict. Thatwould bring into play a different set of rules under the 1977 Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions-or Common Article 3 of the 1949 Con ventions. In conflicts of that kind those arrested are not entitled to be treated as combatants or prisoners of war but should be tried under the relevant national or

international law. In reality none of these rules quite fit the situation

which the international community is faced with. But the UN Human Rights Commission has made a start on a new approach. In a resolution in 1998 it called up on states

'to take all necessary and effective meas ures in strict conformity with international law, including international human rights standards, to prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, wherever and by

whomever committed.' What the international coalition now needs to do

is to build on that approach by setting out in much greater detail precisely what action is required from all states and what sanctions can be imposed on those who refuse to co-operate. In the meantime any response must be kept within the general principles of human rights and the Geneva Conventions and resolute action must be taken to address the under lying causes of the problem.

Losk 'em u

GARY KENT thinks it's time to reconsider the

internment option

Internmentwas a complete disaster thirtyyears ago. Britain's outdated intelligence was dangerously com bined with the desire for revenge by the Unionist State in its dying moments of supremacy. Few loyal ists were picked up and, in the main, the wrong republicans were locked up. It was only imposed on one side of the border.

A republican I know was blindfolded and pushed out of an Army helicopter. It was only six feet up but he thought he would finish six feet under. Britain was found guilty of torturing internees. Internment boosted the Provos who milked for all it was worth. The Irish seriously contemplated internment in 1983 but retreated under pressure from a "petrified" British Government.

2001 presents completely different circumstances: mainstream Irish republicanism is seeking to run the State. Discrimination against catholics is being eradicated and power-sharing is the basic norm of government.

I assume, after the Manhattan massacre, that the Provisional IRA and its mainstream loyalist equiva lents will decommission or be sidelined, although gangsterism is deeply embedded and will require other dedicated actions such as an Anti-Intimidation Unit.

There are conflicting signals about the Real IRA's intentions. They may again declare a fake ceasefire to escape public odium but, even in the face of a

Bush Administration determined to tackle terror ism, the Real IRA and dissident loyalists may con tinue. If so, internment would be aimed at the Real IRA and various loyalist groups.

There are sound civil liberties arguments against internment without trial and on the word of a hand ful of servants of the state-it ignores the principle that a person is innocent until found guilty by due process of law. There are also more practical politi

cal considerations. It could be plausibly argued that internmentwould be counter-productive andwould

make martyrs of them, thus increasing their wider and softer support base. It would be argued that it

would be far more efficient to prove that politics rather than violence works.

But the die-hard militarists of the Real IRA or last ditch loyalists seem immune to political blandish

ments and have no significant social base or international support to mobilise. Internment must remain a last resort. The legal action initiated by the relatives of the Omagh victims could do much to disrupt the Real IRA. Allowing wiretap evidence in courts would also help.

Some analysts deride the capacity of the Real IRA whilst others believe that they have recovered from their three main set-backs-public indignation over Omagh, private infiltration by various en emies and Provisional IRA threats and secretly grassing them up. In any case, they now seem keen to demonstrate that they haven't gone away. It may only be a matter of time before they pull off a lethal spectacular.

Internmentwould require awell-understood pub lic narrative in these islands and Irish-America that

ultimately there was no judicial or political alterna tive. That is undoubtedly made easier by the back lash against terrorism. But Sinn Fein couldn't and

wouldn't back it. Democratic societies have to defend themselves,

sometimes with illiberal measures. Unfortunately, one of Mo Mowlam's more foolish decisions was to

withdrawinternmentfrom the State's legal armoury. It would have to be reinstated some time before any possible use, for otherwise its reinstatement would telegraph the punch. Selective internment along

with other security measures should be debated seriously.

12 F o R T N I G H T OCTOBER 2001

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