HOW USEFUL IS THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF CRIME IN ASSISTING THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM?

© Institute of Economic Affairs 2002. Published by Blackwell Publishers, Oxford

The economics of crime

Blackwell Science Ltd

H O W U S E F U L I S T H E E C O N O M I C M O D E L O F C R I M E I N A S S I S T I N G T H E W A R A G A I N S T T E R R O R I S M ?

Dorothy Manning

This article considers whether the economic model of crime can be applied

to terrorist activity. It concludes that the model does explain both secular and

religiously motivated terrorism: policy-makers wishing to reduce terrorist

activity should aim at devising policies which increase costs and/or decrease

benefits to change terrorist incentives. The ‘war’ should continue as long as

the probable costs to society incurred by terrorist activity are greater than

the costs of abatement.

Introduction

Following the horrific events of 11 September and the subsequent ongoing ‘war on terrorism’ pursued by the West, the world has become very aware of the modern-day problem posed by terrorism. But how great is the threat of terrorism? Is the problem more acute in 2002 than in previous years? What can and should be done to alleviate the threat? Has the Western world overreacted? Terrorism, because of its very nature of ‘creating terror,’ is charged with negative connotations so is often treated emotively rather than in objective terms. Whilst addressing the above questions this article will focus on how valid the economic model of crime is in explaining terrorist activity and consider if it can aid policy-making institutions formulating policies to counter terrorist activities.

What is the economic model of crime?

Any economic model deliberately simplifies and generalises in order to gain a better understanding of the real world. Every model is based on a set of assumptions and, if the model is meaningful, it will generate predictions to which behaviour conforms more often than it does not. The economic model of crime is no exception to this. This model, originally developed by Becker,

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is based on a set of assumptions, the main one being that criminals

are rational actors who will only engage in crime if it is beneficial for them to do so. Criminals weigh up their expected private costs and benefits of participating in illegal and legal activities and when the expected net benefit of illegal activity is greater than that from legal activity they will choose the criminal option. The decision to participate in crime is then a calculated decision by a rational individual. The criminal is not, therefore, a hapless victim of socio-economic circumstances driven into a life of crime, totally beyond his own control absolved of all responsibility for his actions. He is not pre-programmed by his physiological makeup, being born ‘bad’ with genes which dictate a life of crime; nor is he suffering from any psychological illness (‘mad’). The criminal deliberately chooses to pursue the criminal route as it maximises his own self-interest. This view of an individual’s behaviour is common to all individuals, so is indifferent to a person’s wealth, education, religion, culture and society. According to the model we are all potential criminals; the people who become criminals do so not because their basic motivation differs from those of others but because their costs and benefits differ.

The economic model of crime is a predictive model of criminal behaviour. The fundamental hypothesis in the economic approach to crime is that offenders will alter their behaviour in response to a change in incentives. According to the deterrence hypothesis, an increase in costs and a decrease in benefits will lower the willingness of a person to


22 h o w u s e f u l i s t h e e c o n o m i c m o d e l o f c r i m e i n a s s i s t i n g t h e wa r a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m ?

engage in criminal activity. As costs include the chance of being caught and punished the model asserts crime rates will respond in a predicted manner to changes in the probability of apprehension, conviction and severity of punishment, thus giving clear guidance for criminal justice policies.

Does the economic model of crime explain terrorist activities? If it does, then it will be of use to governments and other institutions formulating counter-terrorist policies. Empirical studies show the model best explains property crimes; that is, those with a money motive. Terrorism, as it is an illegal activity, is a crime but it is not motivated by personal monetary gain. Does this invalidate the model in explaining terrorist behaviour? Theoretically the model does not require that pecuniary motives are the only, or even dominant, motive in the decision to participate in crime.

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Pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors are included in the definitions of costs and benefits. Does it matter that decisions made by terrorists involve the death of innocents? The economic approach does not distinguish between major decisions involving life and death and minor decisions such as choosing a brand of coffee, or between those decisions involving strong or weak emotions.

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So there is no need to discard the model on these counts.

All models are sensitive to assumptions, and changing any of the assumptions will generate different results. The cornerstone of the economic model of crime is that the criminal is rational and self-interested, aiming to maximise his own personal welfare and is the best judge of what this constitutes. Is the terrorist a rational person? Is terrorist activity rational? If the answer is no, does it then render the model invalid for explaining terrorism? In order to assess this, the characteristics, structure and objectives of terrorists and their organisations need to be considered.

Is the individual terrorist a rational being?

What makes a person become a terrorist? Why do some people become terrorists whilst others with the same religion or beliefs do not? There are tens of thousands of terrorists in the world coming from all walks of life – from the poor slums in Egypt to the fabulously wealthy from Saudi Arabia. So they are not all hapless victims of socio-economic circumstances.

Are they all psychologically disturbed or genetically disposed to terrorise? The literature abounds with studies that conclude terrorists are not suffering from psychological abnormalities. Long

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states terrorists do not share a personality type. No work has revealed a particular psychological type or uniform terrorist mind-set. Similarly, Sarraj,

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after examining many people identified as potential suicide bombers, found no psychological problems among them. Merari’s

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research found the only common characteristics of suicide terrorists were that they were young and unmarried. They had no common socio-economic background, coming from a cross-section of society. None of the terrorists in his study were found to be suffering from psychological abnormalities. Horgan

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too claims there are no personality traits that will allow you to predict that one person or another is more likely to become a terrorist. It is likely that the terrorist groups do not actually want psychopaths or mentally unstable members in their group as this poses far too great a risk to security and operations.

Most terrorists join an organisation while young and are predominantly male. Why do they join an organisation and take risks when they personally do not gain benefit by achieving their objective? O’Brien

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states the sentimentalist thinks of the terrorist as driven to violent acts as a result of being a victim of oppression or to ratify a grievance. But the pursuit of a cause is not the sole motive for becoming a terrorist. There are other more immediate rewards. Many terrorists come from poor backgrounds where unemployment is high and prospects are few. Terrorism offers them the opportunity for gratification of a grievance and also, from the moment they become terrorists, it offers them access to significant amounts of power, prestige and wealth. It is, therefore, more realistic to see the terrorist as bettering himself. O’Brien

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writes:

‘For an unemployed young man . . . the most promising channel of upward social mobility is . . . the national terrorist organisation . . . In this situation the terrorist option is a rational one . . . you don’t have to be a nut, a dupe or an idealist.’

Hence when terrorism receives a glare of publicity it improves recruitment because it enhances the prestige and glamour of terrorism. According to Johnson

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the media glorify terrorism and have elevated Osama bin Laden into an ‘invincible sort of person.’ And with more than half the population in


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the Middle East below the age of 20 years there is no shortage of potential recruits. The model would seem appropriate here as the opportunity costs of legitimate employment are lower for unemployed, poorly educated, young people.

On the other hand, some terrorists are extremely wealthy and/or well educated and, while they may seek other non-pecuniary rewards such as personal glorification, they primarily seek gratification of hatred or pursuit of a quest. This hatred/grievance may or may not be rational. A terrorist’s beliefs and way of thinking may be based on false information, flawed assumptions and/or irrational inferences but this does not invalidate him making rational decisions based on irrational beliefs. The trend now is a rise in the Islamic fundamentalist religious groups with a vehement hatred of the US; whether or not this hatred is justified is irrelevant to the workings of the economic model of crime.

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Are suicide bombers rational?

Although incidents of suicide terrorism have occurred for hundreds of years, the present era of suicide bombings began in the early 1980s most notably with those in Beirut in 1983 when hundreds of servicemen were killed. There have been many other incidents since then. The trend is on the increase but they still remain only the minority of acts. Most terrorist acts are not suicide missions. Most terrorists are willing to risk their life by taking part in terrorist acts but most want to get out alive. What about the minority of individuals willing to take their own life in pursuance of their cause? Is readiness to take your own life in an act of terrorism the behaviour of a rational individual or irrational fanatic?

Harrison

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has addressed this question and concludes that suicide terrorists are rational and self-interested. His explanation is that it is human nature to adopt an identity and some people will go to great lengths to defend it, some even being willing to die rather than relinquish it. Sprinzak

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too believes suicide terrorists are rational individuals. He states people who would never consider killing themselves for the more normal reasons for taking your own life, ‘opt for suicide terrorism as a result of cold reasoning.’

The terrorist does not see deliberately killing himself as an act of suicide but rather as an act of self-sacrifice; martyrdom for a cause he or she vehemently

believes is right and just. He or she may actually despise people who take their own life for other reasons and see them as weak, pathetic individuals. The religiously motivated suicide terrorists see their life on earth as only a small part of their entire existence – their life after death being more important. Islamic fundamentalist terrorists’ interpretation of Islamic religion is such that they see being a suicide terrorist as an opportunity to secure for themselves a place in Paradise. By perpetrating an act against the enemy entailing sacrificing their own life they will reap their rewards in heaven, while on earth, after their death, they will be revered as heroes bringing honour and glory on themselves and their family.

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This is why it is essential for Islamic religious terrorists to receive the sanction of the religious clerics before going on a suicide mission.

It may be argued that once in the terrorist organisation individuals are deliberately indoctrinated and brainwashed, manipulated by leaders, so they can no longer be thought of as rational decision-makers. However, suicide terrorists are always volunteers. They are never coerced into it. There is far too much planning at stake for the leaders to risk using people against their will. Suicide bombers have usually trained with the intention of sacrificing their life for a long time before they actually do so. Merari

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maintained that no organisation could create a person’s basic readiness to die. The task of recruiters is not to produce but rather to identify and reinforce a person’s predisposition to suicide. During the 1990s Merari changed this view and now believes that suicide terrorists have been deliberately indoctrinated by the terrorist organisation.

So is becoming a terrorist rational or irrational behaviour? Many experts argue that terrorists are not crazy but are rational people pursuing goals. ‘They are rational, they are not insane . . . they have goals and they are moving towards those goals,’ writes Pearlstein.

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Sprinzak

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states, ‘The perception that terrorists are undeterrable fanatics . . . belies the reality that they are cold rational killers who employ violence to achieve specific political objectives.’ And what about the reformed ex-terrorists who have relinquished terrorist tactics and are now integrated back into society? Are these people, some of whom are now well-known politicians, deemed to be irrational beings?

It is often argued that suicide terrorists are irrational fanatics but there are other acts of suicide



and these perpetrators are not condemned outright as irrational. As Harrison

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points out, in other cases of suicide perpetrators are often seen as heroic or tragic, not ‘mad’ or ‘bad.’ The

kamikaze

pilot laying down his life is a hero in his country; a person dying rather than bringing shame on his family is tragic. So there is no reason to assume a suicide bomber is not rational. However, even if they are irrational, a few participants whose behaviour does not comply with the assumptions of the model does not invalidate the model. A model is a generalisation only. The theory allows for irrational behaviour but argues that groups of individuals behave as if they are rational. The economic approach does not contend that all individuals are rational; rather, economic man is an average in which extremes of behaviour are evened out.

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Is terrorist activity rational?

When is terrorist activity resorted to rather than using legal methods? When it is cheaper, more effective and quicker than political ways. When, because of asymmetric military strengths, one party stands no chance of winning an outright war. Terrorists will utilise every possible method that will further their cause. Given they possess relatively few resources compared to governments terrorism is the easiest and most effective form of insurgency. Is it ever justified? Are any terrorists really honourable freedom fighters? This is another story and not relevant to the application of the economic model of crime in explaining terrorist behaviour.

Terrorist groups differ in their structure and characteristics but mainly they are well organised and members well disciplined. They operate in cells with terrorists having information on a need-to-know basis for security reasons. There can be thousands of terrorists operating in many cells, all pursuing the same mission. Members of an organisation receive training so they become skilled in terrorist activity (although there is an increase in the use of amateurs now). In larger organisations, the financial side is well organised with personnel dedicated to raising, managing, investing and distributing funds via front companies.

Acts themselves are well thought out and meticulously planned and are usually part of an overall strategy to achieve some desired end result. The growing trend in using suicide terrorism is

because this is a very effective and cost-efficient weapon of terrorism.

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It has an immense impact on spreading terror because it is seen as so hard to defend against and is usually successful. It can be used to inflict mass casualties and extensive damage and it can also be used for precise targeting. The Tamil Tigers killed two heads of state in the early 1990s this way.

Terrorist organisations do not keep repeating the same behaviour. They are evolving organisations as they consciously learn, develop, adapt and react to improve effectiveness. They research and develop better tactics and more effective weapons to keep ahead of the authorities. Bombs are now smaller, more lethal, easier to detonate and harder to detect. Small, inconspicuous bodysuits have been designed for suicide bombers. They learn from mistakes and change their behaviour accordingly. Transcripts of terrorist trials are meticulously combed through for information on how authorities operate and why a terrorist was caught. They learned this way that fingerprints can be taken from inside refrigerators and underneath toilet seats.

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The most famous lesson learned is possibly the Stockholm Syndrome when terrorists learned not to talk to hostages and to change guards frequently to prevent personal relationships being established. New information is recorded in training manuals and communicated between groups.

Although the economic model of crime can account for spontaneous crime to some extent it most certainly accounts for premeditated crimes better. Terrorist activity indisputably comes under the category of premeditated crime as sometimes years of training, planning and preparation take place before the execution of an act. The definition of terrorism used by the US Department of State is ‘premeditated, politically motivated violence.’

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Merari

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compares different forms of insurgency and determines that terrorism is not spontaneous but a strategy of protracted struggle over the long term. Grenshaw

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describes terrorism as ‘systematic, deliberate and sustained over time; it is not spontaneous . . . engaging in terrorism usually requires a sustained commitment.’ Using terrorism itself is a rational decision given the difference in resource endowment between the terrorists and the authorities. Using terrorist methods puts those few resources into good effect, targeting a few yet impacting on many.


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Is it rational to engage in an activity where the chance of success is very remote? A group aiming to overthrow a government or change a political/economic system cannot realistically expect to win. Or can they? Osama bin Laden has often stated that one of his goals is to destroy the US. This is not unobtainable in his view. He believes he is carrying out the will of God and with God on his side he will succeed. According to Johnson,

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bin Laden sees US society as evil, a hollow shell that, if hit in the right spot, will collapse. Bin Laden himself has often stated that the USSR was defeated in the war in Afghanistan and that victory can be repeated: ‘I am confident that Muslims will be able to end the legend of the so-called superpower that is America.’

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The majority of terrorists have additional reasons for their behaviour so their reward is not reliant on the achievement of their long-term objective.

The economic model of crime does not require decision-makers to be aware of consciously calculating the costs and benefits of their actions, only that their behaviour can be explained as if they do.

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Terrorist activity, by both secular and religious terrorists, does seem to comply with the requirements of the model.

Can terrorism be deterred?

The economic model of crime predicts changing terrorist incentives by increasing the costs and lowering the benefits of terrorism will deter activity, thus giving a clear goal for counter-terrorist policies. The benefits to terrorist organisations are achievement of end goals and any interim goals such as withdrawal of the military from an area, receipt of ransom money, release of prisoners, etc. To the individual terrorist it is the glamour, prestige and access to wealth being a terrorist brings. To the suicide bomber it is eternal life in Paradise. Any policies to lower these should reduce terrorist activity.

In accordance with the deterrence hypothesis increasing the probability of apprehension and conviction and the severity of punishment raises costs. The US government aimed to do this by showing terrorists they would be caught and brought to justice no matter how long it took. It took over ten years to bring the terrorists accused of the Pan Am 103 bombing to court. The more a terrorist is convinced that there is a high probability of response and it will be of great severity, the greater the deterrence effect.

Weinberger

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claims that the weak response of the US government in the past has encouraged more attacks.

Even suicide bombers can be deterred this way. Harrison

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points out the desire of terrorists to sacrifice their life would fall if religious clerics could be persuaded not to sanction suicide attacks as the benefits of eternal life would become more uncertain. Sprinzak

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believes terrorist organisations can be deterred from using suicide acts. He sees these organisations as rational, calculating decision-making units. If you make the costs to them of using suicide terrorism as a weapon so great by sanctions and military reprisals this will serve as a deterrent.

The most active groups at present are the religiously motivated groups and it is not easy to manipulate their costs and benefits sufficiently to change incentives. Their benefits, being spiritual and eternal, are very high. A traditional method of lowering benefits such as a policy of non-negotiation and not complying with terrorists’ demands is ineffective with these groups, as they do not try to negotiate demands. It is also hard to put pressure on these terrorists by raising their costs as the conventional tools used by the authorities are less effective. Sanctions have limited impact as these groups have access to private wealth and income from drugs trafficking so are less dependent on state sponsors. Covert intelligence operations are more difficult to operate as it is virtually impossible to infiltrate their groups. Key targets can be hardened and additional security measures put in place but as their objective is causing maximum lethality and destruction they are more indiscriminate about targets and so have a much wider scope for attack. Even military reprisals are made difficult as the terrorists are not often visible and located in an area that can be attacked as their networks are spread out in small cells around the world.

How many resources should be allocated to combating terrorism?

There is a risk of overreacting to terrorism due to overestimating the extent of the threat it poses. Economic theory can demonstrate how many resources to devote to countering terrorist activity and how these resources should be allocated to each policy choice. The stated objective of the Bush administration is to put an end to all terrorist networks. President George W. Bush, in his now



famous speech on 21 September to Congress, announced,

‘We will direct every resource at our command, every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence and every necessary weapon of war – to disruption and defeat of the global terrorist network.’

Is this a reasonable response or an over-reaction to albeit the worst terrorist attack in history? Should the aim be to extirpate terrorism? There are other demands on government resources, other risks to citizens, and resources are limited. How many resources should be devoted to combating terrorism?

Economic theory states that terrorism should only be abated as long as the marginal social benefits of abating the terrorist activity are greater than the marginal social costs of abatement. That is, if it is going to cost more to stop a terrorist act than the value of the damage done to society by the act taking place, then allow the terrorist act to go unabated. This concept of an optimal level of terrorism can cause outrage from non-economists, appalled at the thought of permitting some criminal activity to occur. But some criminal acts confer only low costs to society. This concept applies to all areas of policy. Only a certain level of pollution should be abated. Why go to the expense of fitting anti-pollution equipment if the damage done by pollution is less than the cost of the abatement? So too terrorism should only be abated to the point where marginal social cost of abatement equals marginal social benefits.

So how great is the threat of terrorism? Terrorism endangers human life and property but does not pose a significant threat to democracy, Christianity or the state. Until recently the actual damage caused by terrorism was relatively small, with the majority of acts being domestic incidents killing and injuring a small number of people. However, now with the increase in activity by religiously motivated groups with different motives and characteristics, the actual and potential costs have increased.

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Figure 1 shows the upward trend in deaths and injuries as a result of international terrorist attacks. The new terrorists engage in spectacular acts, often occurring in swarms, intent on causing greater lethality and destruction. The events on 11 September are a prime example.

What about the future potential costs of terrorist activity? To date, the bomb has been the most favoured weapon of the terrorist.

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Terrorists will continue using conventional weapons but many experts warn there is a real danger that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will be used in the near future. Most terrorist groups have so far vied away from WMD, not only because of the logistical difficulty in acquiring, transporting and distributing them but also because the old-style terrorists are concerned about the backlash of public opinion.

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The signs are that the willingness amongst terrorist groups to use WMD has increased and their access to them is easier than ever. The new religious terrorist groups now have a new type of motive. They see themselves as operating in a ‘war paradigm’ with a goal to kill as many of the enemy and to wreak as much havoc and destruction as possible. They are unconcerned with public reaction. And they justify it to themselves as carrying out the will of God so any crime is acceptable in their mind-sets. Osama bin Laden has made it clear in his numerous declarations that he considers it is his religious duty to seek to acquire WMD and if he manages to acquire them then it is God’s will that he has done so and God means him to use them against his enemies. It is the holy duty of all Muslims to use ‘any means available to kill all Americans.’

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At the present time it is relatively easy to acquire WMD. The dissolution of the old Soviet bloc and the ending of the Cold War means there are stockpiles of chemical, biological and nuclear materials in the ex-Soviet Union, ineffectively accounted for and poorly guarded. Unemployed scientists previously employed

Figure 1: Terrorism becoming more dangerousSource: Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, Report of the National Commission on Terrorism.


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on WMD R&D programmes were known to be looking for jobs in the global labour market, both legal and illegal. The spread of the global information economy and IT developments means that information on methods to produce WMD is available on the Internet.

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Terrorists may launch a nuclear attack in the future but a more realistic threat in this arena is that they will use a ‘dirty bomb,’

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which would be much simpler to produce and deploy, and the results would be devastating. It is rumoured that the bombs used in the first attack on the World Trade Centre in 1993 contained sodium cyanide.

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The use of chemical or biological weapons seems a likely option. Smallpox, anthrax, plague and mustard gas, for example, are quite easily manufactured and require only fairly unsophisticated equipment to do so. Another alternative that could cause immense damage to Western economies is cyber-terrorism. Laqueur

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sees this as a credible threat and questions why terrorists would use violent acts if they can produce chaos by ‘electronic switching,’ stating,

‘If the new terrorism directs its energies toward information warfare, its destructive power will be exponentially greater than any it wielded in the past – greater even than it would be with biological and chemical weapons.’

Is there a real danger of terrorists resorting to using WMD?

The US treats it as a real threat and sees itself as the prime target for an attack using WMD. It has established units/instigated training to deal with attacks by WMD on civilians. The US offers assistance to Russia to ensure all nuclear materials are accounted for or disposed of properly. Merari

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seems to suggest that they will be used if given the opportunity, as

‘Al Qaeda has made the jump to mass casualty terrorism and the only factors constraining their actions in terms of the scale of casualties they seek to create are practical and technical, not political and moral.’

Hoffman

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states that the different objectives, values, justifications and mind-set of the new type of terrorists suggest they will be more likely than their secular counterparts to use WMD. Terrorists used to want more people watching than dead; now it is the other way. Alibek

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too believes ‘there is no doubt that

we will see future uses of biological weapons by terrorist groups, as there have been several attempts already.’ Laqueur

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predicts it will be the unsuccessful groups that turn to WMD in despair.

In contrast, however, Sprinzak

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sees it as an over-rated threat stating, ‘Whereas the threat of WMD terrorism is little more than overheated rhetoric, suicide bombing remains a devastating form of terrorism.’ Johnson

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warns the threat of terrorism is ‘over-heated’ and blames media coverage for distorting the problem. He argues it is only Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda specifically targeting and killing Americans and they are not able to commit acts with greater frequency than once a year. And Al-Qaeda is not a particularly sophisticated organisation as ‘footsteps the size of elephants’ were left after 11 September.

So the growth in religiously motivated terrorism with the objective of causing greater lethality and destruction indicates future costs could be very much higher which suggests the optimal level of abatement has increased.

Summary and conclusion

This article asks if terrorism, being an illegal activity, can be encompassed by the economic model of crime and concludes it can. It is whether or not it explains the new religious terrorism that is contentious. This article suggests there is a body of evidence that demonstrates the model’s main assumption of rationality is met at both the individual and organisational level of both secular and religious terrorist groups. Having established that the model is valid in explaining terrorist behaviour, it then aids the authorities by giving a clear signal that the level of terrorist activity can be manipulated by changing costs and benefits. Faced with higher costs and/or lower benefits, terrorists, as rational, calculating decision-makers, will be deterred and choose to participate in a lower level of terrorist activity.

It is difficult to find evidence to support or refute the deterrence hypothesis as applied to terrorism as you cannot measure how many acts have been deterred. Even if evidence showed counter-terrorist policies have not been a deterrent it does not necessarily invalidate the model. It could be that costs have not been raised and benefits lowered sufficiently to alter behaviour.



In determining how many resources should be devoted to deterring terrorism the optimal level of abatement the government should aim at is where marginal social costs of terrorism equals the marginal social cost of abatement. With the growth in religious terrorism operating in a war paradigm and intent on destruction of their enemies the possibility of terrorists using WMD in the future is now much higher than before. And if even one act is not deterred it would have catastrophic consequences. It seems the ‘war on terrorism’ is justified from an economic perspective at the present time, as the potential costs to society if the most dangerous groups are not deterred are enormous. The costs incurred by the secular terrorists will probably remain relatively small so it may be inefficient to abate all terrorism. Any abatement of terrorist activity should only occur if the cost of doing so is less than the costs the act would confer on society.

1. G. S. Becker (1968) ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,’

Journal of Political Economy

, 76, 2, 169–217.

2. I. Ehrlich (1984) ‘The Economic Approach to Crime – A Preliminary Assessment,’ in A. I. Ogus and C. J. Veljanovski (eds.)

Readings in the Economics of Law and Regulation

, Oxford: Oxford University Press.3. G. S. Becker (1984) ‘The Economic Approach to Human

Behaviour,’ in Ogus and Veljanovski (eds.) op. cit.4. In ‘The Psychology of Terrorism Understanding Evil,’

University of Wisconsin, posted 20 September 2001 (http://whyfiles.org/140terror-psych).

5. E. Sarraj, cited in ‘Inside the Minds of Suicide Bombers’ (www.npr.org).

6. A. Merari, cited in ‘Inside the Minds of Suicide Bombers’ (www.npr.org).

7. In ‘Serving a New Audience Understanding Evil,’ University of Wisconsin (2001) (http://whyfiles.org/140terror-psych).

8. C. C. O’Brien (1986) ‘Thinking About Terrorism,’

The Atlantic Monthly

, June.9. Ibid.

10. Frontline: Hunting bin Laden. Interviews: Larry C. Johnson (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline).

11. See, for example, the article by B. Lewis (1990) ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage,’

The Atlantic Monthly

, September. For a different viewpoint see William Blum (2002)

The Rogue State

, London: Zed Books.12. M. Harrison (2001) ‘The Economic Logic of Suicide

Terrorism,’ University of Warwick (Draft).13. E. Sprinzak (2000) ‘Rational Fanatics,’

Foreign Policy

, September/October.

14. Families may also receive a financial reward.15. A. Merari, cited in ‘Fletcher Hosts Israeli Suicide Terrorism

Expert,’ by A. Moghdan (http://fletcherledger.com/

archive); and also ‘Who is the Suicide Terrorist?’ by R. Litwak (http://wwwics.si.edu). Also E. Sprinzak, op. cit.

16. In ‘The Psychology of Terrorism Understanding Evil,’ op. cit.

17. Sprinzak, op. cit.18. Harrison, op. cit.19. C. J. Veljanovski (1984) ‘The New Law-and-Economics:

A Research Review,’ in Ogus and Veljanovski (eds.) op. cit.

20. Although some terrorist groups never use suicide acts and others use them only on an ad hoc basis, there are some groups such as the Tamil Tigers that have permanent suicide squads.

21. B. Hoffman (2001) ‘Combating Terrorism: In Search of a National Strategy,’

Rand Testimony Series CT-175

.22.

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000

, released April 2001.23. A. Merari, ‘Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency.’24. M. Grenshaw (ed.) ‘Terrorism in Context’

(http://www.psupress.org/books).25. Frontline: Hunting bin Laden, op. cit.26. Ibid.27. Becker (1984) op. cit.28. Interview with C. Weinberger in Frontline:

Target America: ‘Lessons Learned in the 1980s’ (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline).

29. Harrison, op. cit.30. Sprinzak, op. cit.31. For databases see

Patterns of Global Terrorism

, The Rand–St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, DCI Counterterrorist Centre.

32. According to the Political Terrorism Database, 46% of total terrorist attacks between 1968 and 1993 were bombings.

33. So far the main incidents using WMD seem to be the attempts by the Japanese religious sect Aum Shinrikyo, who made several unsuccessful attempts to spread botulism, anthrax and sarin gas and who eventually succeeded in dispersing sarin gas in the Tokyo underground in 1995 killing several people and injuring thousands. The most famous will probably be the anthrax postal attacks in the US after 11 September.

34. Frontline: Hunting bin Laden, op. cit.35. For example, information on the production of sarin

gas is available on the Internet.36. A ‘dirty bomb’ being a conventional explosive containing

low-grade fissionable material.37. S. H. Leader, ‘The Rise of Terrorism’

(www.securitymanagement.com).38. W. Laqueur (1996) ‘Postmodern Terrorism: New Rules for

an Old Game,’

Foreign Affairs

, 75, 5.39. In R. Litwak, ‘Who is the Suicidal Terrorist?’ summary of

presentation by A. Merari (http://wwics.si.edu/NEWS).40. B. Hoffman, ‘Old Madness, New Methods’

(www.rand.org).41. K. Alibek (1998) ‘Terrorist and Intelligence Operations:

Potential Impact on the US Economy’ (http://www.house.gov).

42. Laqueur, op. cit.43. Sprinzak, op. cit.44. Frontline: Hunting bin Laden, op. cit.

Dorothy Manning

is Senior Lecturer in Economics at the University of Northumbria, UK.

Documents

HOW USEFUL IS THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF CRIME IN ASSISTING THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM?