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Contemporary Sociology: A
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DOI: 10.1177/0094306114531283
2014 43: 312Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of ReviewsStephan Fuchs
How Not To Do (Field) Theory
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SYMPOSIUM
How Not To Do (Field) Theory
STEPHAN FUCHS
University of [email protected]
When it comes to foundational and compre-hensive theories of society, theories withgeneral and broad range in the grand styleof the classics, the options today are veryfew. There is network theory and its cultural-ist derivative, relational sociology, Luh-mann’s theory of social systems, Latour’sactor-network theory, and Bourdieu’s fieldtheory. In their own attempt to work outsuch a general theory of society in the formof a unified field theory, Neil Fligstein andDoug McAdam in A Theory of Fields do notengage network theory in its most advancedversion, presented by Harrison White. Theycompletely disregard Luhmann and Latour.There is a rather brief acknowledgment ofBourdieu, but this is more of a nod, and fallsway short of a thorough discussion of Bour-dieu’s accomplishments and failures. Theydo not show how or why their own theorymight count as a superior alternative toBourdieu, or at least offers some kind ofimprovement. The authors’ own theorizingabout social fields nowhere comes close tothe level of sophistication and conceptualelaboration achieved by Bourdieu or Luh-mann. It is puzzling that an attempt at foun-dational social theory, a theory that claims tohave ‘‘discerned a set of foundational truthsabout social life’’ (p. xiii), can afford to com-pletely ignore or fail to assess thoroughly thefew other foundational attempts that doexist in the sociological field today.
In fact, it is not even clear what kind oftheory the authors’ field theory is supposedto be. While they acknowledge that there aredifferent kinds and types of theory, they donot say what kind their own theory mightbe, or why they chose one type rather thananother. It is certainly not explanatory theo-ry. For the most part, their theory of fieldsseems culled from work in the authors’
main areas, social movements (McAdam)and economic sociology (Fligstein). Thislack of care and attention to theoretical clar-ity and conceptual precision is presentthroughout the book and its many claims,extending even to editorial practices: thereare sections of text that appear twice, insome cases down to word-for-word repeti-tion (compare pp. 10–11 and pp. 88–89).Many of the claims are as grand as theyappear unwarranted. For example, theauthors assert that ‘‘there is a general, sharedunderstanding of what is going on in thefield. . . ’’ (p. 10), or expect that the actors insettled fields ‘‘share a consensus as to whatis going on’’ (p. 11). It is unclear whethersuch sweeping statements are to be takenas axioms, hypotheses, empirical generaliza-tions, or operational definitions. Many ofthem amount to little more than analyticaltruisms and commonplaces. Another exam-ple for this is the assertion that ‘‘the greatmajority of strategic action fields are inde-pendent of each other’’ (p. 19). How couldthis possibly be decided, given how manysuch fields there must be? The possible num-ber of fields is actually never considered,unlike in Bourdieu’s field theory or Luh-mann’s theory of social systems. Neitherare substantial differences among fields con-sidered, such as the difference between a sci-ence and an art, or the difference betweenthe field of sociology and, say, physics. Areall fields action fields, or are some fields ofcommunication? Does this difference make
A Theory of Fields, by Neil Fligstein andDoug McAdam. New York, NY: OxfordUniversity Press, 2012. 238pp. $29.95cloth. ISBN: 9780199859948.
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a difference to a theory of fields? Does it notmatter whether fields are action fields, inter-action fields, or communication fields?
The core idea of the book is that society iscomposed of sets of related and nested ‘‘stra-tegic action fields.’’ These are said to be‘‘constructed social orders that define anarena within which a set of consensuallydefined and mutually attuned actors vie foradvantage’’ (p. 64). These fields provide the‘‘basic structural building blocks’’ of society,which itself is composed of the economy,civil society, and the state (p. 3). Withinsuch fields, actors, either incumbents whobenefit from the status quo or challengerswho benefit from change, build alliancesand coalitions to compete for the materialand status rewards that are at stake in a field.Forces of order work against forces ofchange, though I think this very distinctionis dubious, as change is itself a mode oforder and ordering. Fields come in variousmajor states; emerging fields displaydynamics that differ from settled fields orfields that experience inner or outer shocksor episodes of contention. The main formsof social activity are competition, coopera-tion, and conflict; they are structured bythe rules of the field, which prescribe thelegitimate strategies available to actors injockeying for positions. Here, the theoryresembles rational choice and game theory,but the authors dislike the ‘‘naked instru-mentalism’’ (p. 18) of such theories. Theytry to mitigate instrumentalism by anemphasis on ‘‘meaning,’’ which is supposed-ly ‘‘subjective,’’ making it difficult to seehow collective actors, presumably entitieswithout minds and consciousness, couldengage in subjectively meaningful action. Ifaction is as much instrumental as interpre-tive, then the very label ‘‘strategic actionfields’’ seems misleading. If, as the authorsclaim, ‘‘the essence of human sociability iscollaborative meaning making’’ (p. 49),then the image that comes to mind is sociallife as campfire storytelling, not strategicpursuit of interests in power and resources.
Fields are related to other fields invarious ways, and these dependencies arecommonly managed through some internalgovernance institution. Some fields are hier-archies, such as states and bureaucraticorganizations; others distribute rewards
and positions more equally. But there is nothorough explanation of the variable condi-tions under which these different modes ofstructuration occur. Strategic action fieldsare socially constructed in that they restupon shared meanings and understandingsof the field. These shared meanings interpretthe ‘‘purpose’’ of the field, the positions ofactors within it, the rules of the game, andthe mutual understandings actors developthrough role-taking. It is not said to whatextent such meanings are shared, or howone meaning makes itself the dominantone. Neither is there any account of howthe construction of meanings and shared,or even consensual, interpretations mightvary from field to field, or between variouslevels of nesting of action fields.
A theory of fields should not just list someof their common elements, but shouldaccount for what makes a field the field itis. It may well be that both states and mar-kets are fields, but we also need to knowwhat makes one field a state, another a mar-ket, and yet another a science or art. It is alsovery doubtful that all fields at all times andon all levels are fields of strategic action,and whether this kind of action is the onlyor the dominant type. While it may be thecase that fields are socially constructed, thisis not much more than a truism unless onerecognizes that modes of construction willlikely vary from field to field. The construc-tion of a scientific fact in physics is probablyvery different from the construction of a sup-ply chain, the construction of an identity, orthe construction of a statue in an art field.Strategic action fields are said to be com-posed of actors, but these actors are strategicaction fields as well (p. 9), leading to theredundancy that action fields are composedof action fields. To say they are ‘‘nested’’ like‘‘Russian dolls’’ will not suffice, unless thetheory can accommodate different modesand levels of social organization, which thepresent theory does not and probably cannotdo. For example, the authors argue thatinternational arms control is a strategicaction field, within which governmentalfields are nested and embedded, which gov-ernmental systems can further be decom-posed into military fields that consist of yetmore basic levels, such as armies and, ulti-mately, platoons (p. 80). What is uncertain
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is not that this can be done, that levels ofsocial organization are nested and embed-ded in other levels, but which level andhow many levels in which relations are crit-ical for a given research question. Since theauthors also claim to address the micro-macro problem, one would expect a clearanalysis of how macrofields (e.g., arms con-trol) can be explained and accounted for interms of fields at microlevels (e.g., platoons).No such analysis is given, or even its possi-bility outlined.
This theory of fields is not much of a theo-ry, particularly when the ambition is to pro-vide foundations and ultimate buildingblocks of the social. Much more attention isneeded for the foundational concepts, suchas ‘‘actor’’ and ‘‘action.’’ We need a theorythat can distinguish between fields, net-works, social worlds, and systems. We alsolack a notion of how ‘‘social existence’’ dif-fers from ‘‘human existence,’’ and howsuch existing differs from other modes ofbeing in the world. As it stands, the theoryis not even at the level of Weber’s theory ofaction, which at least draws certain distinc-tions between various action types. It is notclear who counts as an actor, and whodecides this—another actor? A field? Onewould think sociologically that actors areconstituted by fields, but sometimes it seemsto be the other way around, so that actorscome already equipped with certain capaci-ties, skills, and resources. Sometimes, theauthors appear to talk about persons, at oth-er times about collective or corporate actors,and sometimes the two are treated as inter-changeable. When the authors assert, againwithout warrant or grounds, that ‘‘actorsknow who their friends, their enemies,and their competitors are’’ (p. 11), or thatpeople ‘‘possess a highly developed capac-ity for reading people and environments’’(p. 17)—but do they?—the implication isthat actors are persons, but this seems notto side well with yet another assertion,that ‘‘formal organizations are very often
the central players in strategic action fields’’(p. 64).
As a result, the foundation of the authors’theory of fields rests on very shaky grounds.At the very least, one would expect somekind of classification or typology of variouskinds of actors and actions, and a clear ratio-nale for distinguishing between individualsand corporate or collective actors. Next,one would need to know through whichstrategies an individual actor can inflateitself into a collective, or when the oppositehappens; that is, a collective actor decom-posing into its individual components. Incrafting such a basic theory, Latour and Luh-mann have very much to offer, much morethan the authors of this book. The difficultiesand deficits pile up when it comes to the‘‘microfoundations’’ of field theory. No men-tion is made of what is probably the mostadvanced microfoundational theory avail-able today, Randall Collins’ interaction ritualchains. Nothing is said about the ontologyand phenomenology of the social.
Fligstein’s and McAdam’s own micro-foundation involves no interaction systemsat all, but instead consists of ‘‘social skills’’and the ‘‘existential functions of the social.’’As far as I can tell, the latter means that mod-ern humans’ expanded capacities for self-consciousness and reflexivity make themwonder about the ‘‘meaning of life’’ (p. 41),and that the construction of strategic actionfields compensates for the existential fearand loathing that large brains routinely gen-erate. It is said that ‘‘we function as existen-tial ‘coconspirators,’ relentlessly—if general-ly unconsciously [sic]—exchanging affirma-tions that sustain our sense of our ownsignificance and the world’s inherent mean-ingfulness’’ (p. 42). No robust and solid the-ory can rest on such ‘‘foundations.’’
Summing up, this book presents no novelapproaches or foundational insights. I mustsay I have learned nothing from this book,and cannot recommend it to others.
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