How Grassroots Lobbying Disclosure Suppresses Political Participation

By Jeffrey Milyo, Ph.D.APril 2010

Executive Summary

Grassrootslobbyingisanyefforttoorganize,coordinateorimploreotherstocontactpublicofficialsinordertoaffectpublicpolicy.Throughgrassrootslobbying,like‐mindedcitizenscanalertelectedofficialstoconstituents’preferences,educatefellowcitizensandmaketheirvoicesheard,andevenpersuadethepublictoadoptnewviews.Inshort,grassrootslobbyingisquintessentialrepresentativedemocracyinaction.

However,asthisreportdocuments,sweepinglobbyinglawsin36states

threatentostranglegrassrootsmovementsinredtapeandbureaucraticregulation.Twenty‐twostatesexplicitlyincludegrassrootslobbyinginthedefinitionoflobbying,whileanother14consideranyattempttoinfluencepublicpolicytobelobbying,aslongasacertainamountisspent.Thus,suchcommonactivitiesaspublishinganopenletter,organizingademonstrationordistributingflyerscantriggerregulationandforceorganizerstoregisterwiththestateandfiledetailedreportsontheiractivities,aswellastheidentitiesofsupporters.

Theseregulationsraisethecostsofpoliticalactivityandsetlegaltrapsfor

unsuspectingcitizens,thusmakingitmoredifficultforordinarycitizenstoparticipateinpolitics—allwithlittleornobenefittothepublic.Asthisreportfinds:

• Lobbyingregulationsarenotintendedtobeunderstoodbyordinarypeople.

ThefirstparagraphofMassachusetts’newlobbyinglaw,forexample,scored0.9ona100‐pointscaleinareadabilitytest.Goingbysuchtests,itwouldtake34yearsofformaleducationtounderstandthatparagraph;notevenadoctoratefromMITorHarvardwouldbeenough.

• Theredtapewould‐begrassrootslobbyistsmustnavigatetoproperlydisclose

activitiesandfinancialsupportiscomplexandburdensome.Inpreviousresearch,ordinarycitizenswhotriedtofilloutsimilarformscorrectlycompletedonlyabout40percentoftasks.

• Runningafouloftheseregulationscouldbringstiffpenalties,including

thousandsincivilfinesandinsomestatescriminalpenalties.InNewYork,themaximumcriminalpenaltyis$5,000andfouryearsinjail,equivalenttoarsonorriot;inAlabama,itis$30,000and20years,equivalenttokidnapping.

• Thepubliclikelygainslittlefromtheseregulations.Previousresearchsuggests

fewwillseekoutthedisclosedinformation,butmanywillbedeterredfrompoliticalactivitybythepublicdisclosureoftheirpersonalinformation.

Thesefindingssuggestelectedofficialsshouldlistentoconstituentconcernsor

debateideasintheopen,ratherthanmowingdownthegrassrootswithregulation.

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Introduction

IsthereanythingmoredistinctlyAmericanthangrassrootspoliticalengagementandactivism?Fromtown‐hallmeetingsandstatehouseralliestotalkradio,blogsandmeet‐ups,Americansfollowpoliticswithapassion;moreimportantly,wegetinvolved—andnotjusteverytwoyearsatelectiontime.Whetheritisdebatingcurrentissueswithcoworkers,contactingelectedrepresentativesorjuste‐mailingnewsarticlesandpoliticalvideostofriendsandfamily,Americansmaketheirvoicesheard.Atleastthatistheidealthatweallrevere,butthesadtruthisthatnowadays,youneedmorethanthecourageofyourconvictionsandasoapboxifyoudaretospeakuponpublicissues.Thatisbecausetheactofpubliclydiscussingpendinglegislationorregulatorymatters—forexample,publishinganopenletter,organizingademonstration,speakingatarally,distributingflyers,displayingayardsign,etc.—fallsunderthelegaldefinitionoflobbyinginmanystates.Andlobbyists,eveninformalandamateurgrassrootsactivists,aresubjecttoamazeofregulationsandlegalrestrictionsiftheysimplyurgetheirfellowcitizenstotakepoliticalaction.

Inmoststates,groupsthatengageinthatkindofspeechandactivism,so‐

called“grassrootslobbyists,”mustregisterwiththestateandfilefrequentanddetailedreportsontheiractivities.Thismeansitemizingexpendituresorcontributions,includingdonateditems(e.g.,theuseofawebsite,acarorofficeequipment),anditmaymeanreportingthenamesandaddressesofsupporters.Suchregulationssetalegaltrapforunsuspectingcitizens:Otherthanprofessionalpoliticiansandlobbyists,whowouldthinktoconsultalawyerandregisterwiththestatebeforespeakingoutonapublicissue?Whowouldthinkthatspeakingoutconstitutes“grassrootslobbying”?Worseyet,lobbyingregulationsarecomplexandnotwritteninamanneraccessibletolaypersons.Sonotonlyisiteasyforpeopletorunafoulofsuchlaws,theymaybeintimidatedbythem.Likewise,mandatorypublicdisclosureofcontributorstograssrootslobbyingmaydetersomepeoplefromgettinginvolvedoutoffearofretributionforsupportingacontroversialposition.

Inthisreport,Idescribeindetailhowexistingstatelawsonlobbyingareso

overbroadastoconstituteanassaultonpopularparticipationinpublicpolicydebate.

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Grassroots Lobbying: What It Is and Why It Matters

Simplyput,grassrootslobbyingisanyefforttoorganize,coordinateor

imploreotherstocontactpublicofficialsforthepurposeofaffectingpublicpolicy.Grassrootslobbyingisthereforenotjusttheexerciseoffreespeechandassociation,buttheveryprocessbywhichlike‐mindedpeoplecoordinatetheireffortsandpetitiongovernmentfortheredressofgrievances.So,whetherittakestheformofapublicrallyonthestepsoftheCapitol,aletter‐writingcampaignoranimpassionedblogentry,grassrootslobbyingisquintessentialrepresentativedemocracyinaction.

ThetraditionofgrassrootslobbyinginAmericahasitsrootsincolonialtown

hallmeetingsandanonymouspamphleteers;itwasfamouslylaudedinTocqueville’sDemocracyinAmericaandhassinceoftenbeencelebratedinAmericanart(e.g.,“Mr.SmithGoestoWashington”).Butthisisonetraditionthathasgrownimmenselymoreimportantascommunicationtechnologyhasadvanced,sothatnowjustabouteveryoneisoneemailortweetawayfromacalltoactionbyamultitudeofformalandinformalvoluntarymembershiporganizations.Tocitejustoneexample,thewebsiteoftheAmericanCivilLibertiesUnionofVirginiaencouragesmemberstosignupasgrassrootslobbyists;membersthenreceive“regularlegislativesummarieslistingthestatusofbillsidentifiedbytheACLUofVirginiastaffaspotentiallyimpactingourcivilrightliberties…(and)…asneeded,‘actionalerts’onparticularbillsthatrequireimmediateattention.”1

Theeffectivenessofgrassrootslobbyingismanifestbytheeffortofevery

major(andnot‐so‐major)interestgrouptoinformandenergizeitsmembership.ElectedofficialspaysomuchattentiontogroupsliketheAARP,theNRA,MADDandtheSierraClubpreciselybecausethosearelargeassociationswithademonstratedabilitytomobilizetheirmembershiptoaction.2Thenumberandvarietyofgroupsthatutilizegrassrootslobbyingwouldbeimpossibletocataloguehere,butevenrelativelyminorgroupslikecatfanciersrecognizeitsimportanceandencouragetheirmemberstospeakoutonissuesofmutualconcern:

GrassrootslobbyingisthefoundationoftheAmericanpoliticalsystem.Throughthismedium,ourlawmakerslearnwhatthewilloftheirconstituentsis,andthemannerinwhichtheselawmakersrespondisthebasisonwhichtheyareheldaccountable.–CatFanciers’Association,Inc.3

Grassrootslobbyingisthereforeonewayconstituentscaninform

officeholdersofwhatpeopleintheirdistrictthinkandspurthemtoaction.Insuchcases,everyparticipantinagrassrootslobbyingcampaignisapotentialvoteforacompetitorinthenextelection,andpopularleadersofgrassrootscampaignsoftenmakeeffectiveoppositioncandidates.Forthesereasons,incumbentlegislatorsare

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YOU MIGHT BE A LOBBYIST IF….

You are paid to directly communicate to legislators for the purpose of influencing pending legislative proposals.

Every state regulates paid direct lobbying of this sort, but many states extend the list of covered public officials and actions well beyond what reasonable people would consider lobbying.

You send e-mails to all your personal and professional contacts, informing them about a proposed state tax hike; in the e-mail you suggest that recipients should contact their state legislator and make their voice heard.

Twenty-two states explicitly define lobbying to include soliciting others to contact public officials for the purpose of influencing public policy.

You and your friends post flyers calling for a rally in support of anti-hate-crimes legislation; at the rally, you distribute homemade signs and T-shirts with political slogans.

Another 14 states define lobbying as any attempt to influence public policy, as long as you meet a certain threshold of compensation or expenditures (including the value of homemade or donated items).

You invite a group of your neighbors to your home for light refreshments; you also circulate a petition to the town council seeking an ordinance to require pet owners to pick up after their pets.

In several states, such as Georgia, Minnesota and New York, even communicating with local officials about local matters may violate state laws.

You post an open letter to public officials on a social networking webpage, or even in the window of your private home or business.

There is no minimum compensation or expenditure threshold to be classified as a lobbyist in North Dakota, Rhode Island or Wyoming; this means that just about any public statement on legislative or regulatory matters is considered lobbying.

You prepare a report for your employer regarding the effects of a proposed change in state labor regulations; of your own volition, you later write to your state representative about the proposed regulations.

In several states, including Connecticut and Vermont, the value of any research or planning that is later employed in lobbying, or even being compensated for such research, counts toward the threshold expenditure requirements for lobbying.

You even think about doing any of the above.

Most states allow lobbyists a few days grace period to register and start filing reports about lobbying activities, but some states, like Idaho and Iowa, require that you register as a lobbyist before you engage in any lobbying activities. But given the overbroad definitions of lobbying in many states, this means you may not only be a lobbyist, you may already be subject to fines and criminal prosecution.

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oftenveryresponsivetograssrootsactivity,whichinturnmakesgrassrootslobbyingcampaignsanimportantcheckontheabilityofpartyleaderstopressurelegislatorstoworkcontrarytotheinterestsoftheirdistricts.

Butgrassrootslobbyingismorethanjustanalarmbell;italsoservesan

importanteducationalfunction.Grassrootsgroupsexplainthecontentandeffectsofproposedlegislationthatwouldotherwisebecompletelyhiddenorincomprehensibletomostcitizens.Further,grassrootsgroupseducatepeopleaboutthelegislativeprocessandenablethemtodirecttheirconcernstotherelevantcommitteeandsubcommitteemembersortolegislatorswhomaywieldadecisivevote.Inthisway,grassrootslobbyingcanserveasapowerfulcheckonlegislativegatekeepersandagendasetterswhomightotherwisebottleuppopularlegislation.Asjustoneexampleofthiseducationalroleofgrassrootslobbying,considertheNationalVolunteerFireCouncil,anonprofitassociationofvolunteerfire,EMSandrescueservices,whosewebsiteincludestutorialsongrassrootslobbyingtechniques,howabillbecomesalaw,congressionalorganizationandthefederalbudgetprocess.4

Intheseways,thegrassrootslobbyingactivitiesofindustryandtrade

associations,unions,ideologicalinterestgroupsandpoliticalpartiesservetokeeppeopleinformedandalertregardingpolicyproposalsthataffectthemandfacilitatetheabilityofcitizenstoparticipateinthelegislativeprocessinamannerthatgivestheirvoicesmaximalimpact.Forexample,whensomelegislatorsinConnecticuttriedtopushthroughabilltopunishtheCatholicChurchforitssuccessfulactivisminthatstate,theChurchwasabletoquicklymobilizeitsmembersandshinelightontheunsavoryactivitiesofthoselegislators(see“YoucanpetitionGod,butnottheConnecticutGeneralAssembly,”nextpage).

Finally,grassrootslobbyingalsoincludesattemptstopersuadefellowcitizenstoadoptanewviewaboutpendinglegislationorregulation.Inademocracy,newideasandpolicyproposalsareimplementedonlyaftertheygainmajoritysupport;however,bydefinition,anynewideamustoriginatewithaminorityofcitizens.Therefore,inanywell‐functioningdemocracy,therewillalwaysbepassionateminorities(i.e.,specialinterests)thatworktoconvincefellowcitizensofthewisdomoftheirviews.Thisiswhyfreespeechandassociationiscrucialforthehealthofdemocracies;itisthroughthevigorousandfreeexchangeofideasthatnewpoliciesareintroducedandexplained,andperhapsacceptedbythelargercommunity.5

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YOU CAN PETITION GOD, BUT NOT THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY

In March 2009, state legislators in Connecticut tried to rush through a bill that was

widely recognized as a blatant act of retribution against the Roman Catholic Church. The Bridgeport Diocese had previously been successful in fighting for a conscience-protection amendment to gay marriage legislation. Elected officials responded with Raised Bill 1089. This legislation would require lay people to govern corporations that own church property, which would effectively strip Catholic bishops and pastors of control over Church finances. The bill was introduced without notice and placed on the legislative fast-track. But state legislators underestimated the Most Reverend William Lori, the blogging bishop of Bridgeport.

Lori used his website to inform the faithful and send out a call to action. On just four days’ notice, the Bridgeport Diocese arranged for buses to take parishioners to a hastily scheduled hearing at the state Capitol in Hartford. The subsequent flood of phone calls and e-mails, along with the prospect of an overflowing and hostile crowd led legislators to cancel the hearing and abandon the bill (although the rally went on as planned with the crowd estimated at more than 3,500 people). Six weeks after the rally, the Office of State Ethics informed the Bridgeport Diocese that it may have violated state lobbying regulations. Connecticut law defines lobbying as communicating or soliciting others to communicate with any public official, or their staff, for the purpose of influencing any legislative or administrative action. The next week, the OSE threatened the church with a formal complaint and multiple fines of $10,000 each.

That’s when the Diocese brought a federal lawsuit, which in turn prompted the Connecticut Attorney General, Richard Blumenthal, to tell the Office of State Ethics to back off. Unfortunately, Blumenthal did not issue a formal advisory opinion, which might have offered some protection to future grassroots efforts, and his letter to the OSE made clear that he still supports strict regulation of grassroots lobbying, even for churches communicating to their members. For his part, the Reverend Lori was gracious and turned the other cheek. He promptly posted a note on his blog thanking the Attorney General, and even praised Blumenthal:

His opinion is a truly significant announcement that stands not just with our State's Catholics but with all citizens of the State whose fundamental civil liberties were placed in jeopardy by the application by the OSE of the State's lobbying registration requirements. It is essential that citizens have the right to organize and communicate their views to their government without being required to register as lobbyists.6

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Grassroots Lobbying and Political Entrepreneurship

Would‐begrassrootslobbyistsfaceaninherentdifficultyknowninpoliticalscienceliteratureastheproblemofcollectiveaction:Oftentimes,self‐interestedindividualsdonothaveasufficientincentivetotakeactionsthatwouldbeintheinterestofagroupofpeople.7Politicalparticipationisrifewithsuchproblems,fromvotingandcontributingtocandidatestocontactinglegislatorsaboutissuesofsharedconcern.Ineachofthesecases,isolatedindividualsmayrationallychoosetoslackoff;afterall,theincrementalvalueofjustonevoteoronevoiceissmall.Andthelargeragroup,thegreatertheincentivetofreeride—lettingothersdotheworkforyou—allelseconstant.

Onelessonthatemergesfromscholarlyresearchisthatpoliticalentrepreneurscansolvethecollective‐actionproblem.Moreeffectivegroupsarethosewheresomememberscareenoughaboutthegrouptotakeonthecostofcoordinating,communicatingandmobilizingotherindividuals.Thesegroupsbecomeorganizedandfunctionasinterestgroups.Electedpoliticiansoftenplaytheroleofpoliticalentrepreneur,butoutsideactors,betheyexistinginterestgroups,candidates‐in‐waitingorconcernedcitizens,mayalsoplaytheroleofpoliticalentrepreneur.8However,unlikeincumbentpoliticians,outsidepoliticalentrepreneursoftenlackapublicplatformfromwhichtocommunicateanddonothaveaprofessionalstafftohelporganizegroupmembers.Forthesereasons,grassrootslobbyistsrelyonpatronsandcontributorstoprovideresourcestoinform,coordinateandmobilizegroupmembers.

Seeninthislight,thefrequentassumptionthatauthenticgrassroots

lobbyingcanonlyoccurabsentpoliticalentrepreneursandprofessionalexpertiseissimplyridiculous.Unorganizedandordinarycitizenswithlegitimateandlatentpreferencesforpolicycannotbeexpectedtomonitorthelegislativecalendarconstantlyjustincaseanitemofconcernshouldpopup;norcanordinarycitizensbeexpectedtofullycomprehendthelegislativeprocesssothattheycancontacttheappropriatecommitteemembersattheappropriatetime.Advocacygroupsandotherentrepreneursprovideavaluablefunctionforunorganizedinterestsbymonitoringlegislationandsendingactionalertswhenappropriate,aswellashelpingtocoordinategrassrootsactionformaximumeffectbyinformingpeopleabouttheissuesathand,therelevantactorstocontactandthetimeframeforaction.

Farfrombeingasuspectenterprise,politicalentrepreneurshipisa

necessaryconditionforvigorousandrobustgrassrootslobbying.Ifanything,itistheabsenceofsuchactivitythatshouldcauseconcern,sinceitwouldmeanthatlatentgroupsareleftunorganizedandtheirpreferenceslikelyignoredbythe

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politicalprocess.Unfortunately,regulationsinnumerousstatesarecreatingjustsuchadynamic. How Overbroad Lobbying Regulations Hamper Grassroots Lobbying

TheSupremeCourthaslongrecognizedthatlobbyingisprotectedbythefundamentalFirstAmendmentrightsofspeech,associationandpetition;9nevertheless,thefederalgovernmentandall50statesregulatelobbyistsinsomefashion.Inmostcases,lobbyistsmustregister,payannualfeesanddisclosegiftsandexpendituresthroughouttheyear.Inaddition,severalstatesrequirelobbyiststoundergotrainingandprohibitlobbyistsfrommakingpoliticaldonations.Finally,lobbyistsfaceadministrativefinesandevencriminalpenaltiesforfailingtocomplywiththeseregulations.

Statementsofintentfromlobbyingstatutesinthestatesindicatethatthe

primaryrationaleespousedforregulatinggrassrootslobbyingisthatthepublichasa“righttoknowwhoisspeaking”andaninterestinpreserving“theintegrityofdemocracy.”10Forexample,RhodeIsland’sdeclarationofintentstates:“Publicconfidenceintheintegrityofthelegislativeprocessisstrengthenedbytheidentificationofpersonsandgroupswhoonbehalfofprivateinterestsseektoinfluencethecontent,introduction,passageordefeatoflegislationandbythedisclosureoffundsexpendedinthateffort.”11Similarly,thestateofWashingtondeclares:“Thepublic’srighttoknowthefinancingofpoliticalcampaignsandlobbyingandthefinancialaffairsofelectedofficialsandcandidatesfaroutweighsanyrightthatthesemattersremainsecretandprivate.”12

Theseclaimsaredisturbinginseveralrespects.First,thevaguereferenceto

the“integrityofdemocracy”isreminiscentofsimilarclaimsmadebyadvocatesofrestrictivecampaignfinancelaws.However,thereisnoscientificevidencethatrestrictivecampaignfinancelawshavemuchofanimpactoncitizens’trustingovernment;13andbyextension,lobbyingdisclosurelawsareunlikelytohaveanyimportanteffectseither.Second,giventheimportantroleofgrassrootslobbyinginfosteringcitizenparticipationandactingasacheckonlegislativegatekeepersandmalfeasantrepresentatives,lobbyingdisclosurelawsthatraisethecostsofsuchactivitymayactuallyunderminetheintegrityofdemocracy.Third,theseclaimsignoretheSupremeCourt’srepeatedrecognitionthatmandatorydisclosureimposesunacceptablyhighcostsoncertainunpopulargroupsandspeakers.14Finally,theverynotionthatdisclosureofgrassrootslobbyingactivitiesisnecessaryforthepublictoknow“whoisspeaking”isquiteinsulting.Inessence,itassumesthatcitizenswhocontactalegislatoraspartofagrassrootscampaignarejust

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mindlessautomatonsrelayingthevoiceofthepoliticalentrepreneur,ratherthanconcernedcitizensexpressingtheirownviews.

Despitethedubiousrationalesforgrassrootslobbyingdisclosurelaws,only

14statesthinkenoughoftheircitizenstopermitunregulatedgrassrootslobbyingoflegislators,asshowninTable1;thesestatesregulatetraditionallobbyingperformedbypaidagentsthatcommunicatedirectlywithlegislatorsbutnotcommunicationsmadetothepublicregardinglegislativeproposals.Oftheremainingstates,22explicitlydefinelobbyingasdirectandindirectcommunicationwithpublicofficials,and14broadlydefinelobbyingasanyattempttoinfluencepublicofficials.15Bothofthesedefinitionsaresobroadastocoverapersonorgroupreachingouttofellowcitizenstospurthemtopoliticalaction,althoughstateenforcementoftheselawsagainstgrassrootslobbyingeffortsmayvaryacrossstatesandovertime.Finally,whilefederallawdoesnotcurrentlymandatedisclosureofgrassrootslobbying,in2007theU.S.Congressdidconsideraproposaltoregulateactivitiesthatwould“stimulate”grassrootslobbyingoffederallegislators.Althoughthatmeasurewasdefeated,advocatescontinuetoargueforfederalregulation.16

Table 1: Definition of lobbying Directcommunicationwithpublicofficials

Arizona,Delaware,Illinois,Iowa(lobbyingtheexecutivebranch),Kentucky,Louisiana,Maine,Michigan,Nevada,Ohio,Oklahoma,SouthCarolina,Texas,Utah,Wisconsin

Directandindirectcommunicationwithpublicofficials

Alaska,Arkansas,California,Colorado,Connecticut,Georgia,Hawaii,Idaho,Massachusetts,Maryland,Minnesota,Mississippi,NorthCarolina,NorthDakota,NewJersey,Pennsylvania,RhodeIsland,Tennessee,Virginia,Vermont,WestVirginia,Wyoming

Anyattempttoinfluencepublicofficials

Alabama,Florida,Iowa(lobbyingthelegislature),Indiana,Kansas,Missouri,Montana,Nebraska,NewHampshire,NewMexico,NewYork,Oregon,SouthDakota,Washington

Includesanyattempttostimulategrassrootslobbying

FederalgrassrootslobbyingproposalremovedfromtheHonestLeadershipandOpenGovernmentActof2007

Note:InOklahomaandIowa,lobbyingisdefinedbroadly;howeverOklahomaalsoexempts“widelydistributed”communications,whileanadvisoryopinionbytheIowaEthicsCommission,whichhasjurisdictionoverexecutivebranchlobbyingbutnotlegislativelobbying,exemptssolicitingotherstocommunicatewithpublicofficials.

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Regulation of Grassroots Lobbying in the States

Amongthe36statesthatregulategrassrootslobbyinginsomefashion,mostexemptincidentalactivityfromreportingrequirements.AsTable2shows,thethresholdforreportinggrassrootslobbyingactivity—meaningthepointatwhichcommunicationsqualifyaslobbyingregulatedunderthelaw—variesconsiderablyacrossstates,butinmostinstancespart‐timeemploymentorexpendituresof$500oncommunicationseffortsissufficienttotriggerreportingrequirements.Consequently,anyonethatreceivesormakesapaymentforthepurposeofcommunicatingwithfellowcitizensaboutpendingorproposedlegislationispotentiallyinviolationofstatelaws,evenifsuchpaymentsarelimitedtoreimbursements.

Inthe22statesthatdefinelobbyingasdirectorindirectcommunicationto

publicofficials,thelowdollarandhourlythresholdsmeanthatanypersonorgroupthatissufficientlymotivatedtopurchaseadvertising,payforawebsiteorhirepeopletomakephonecalls,knockondoorsorprepareapolicyreportmayalsobeconsideredalobbyist,justaslongasthepurposeofthatactivityistotrytoconvinceotherpeopletomaketheirvoiceheardbycontactingapublicofficial.Infact,threestates,NorthDakota,RhodeIslandandWyoming,donotevendefineadollarthresholdforlobbying,sointhosestates,anyattempttoinducefellowcitizenstocontactlegislatorswouldbeconsideredlobbying.

Further,directcompensationisnottheonlytriggerforbeingdesignateda

lobbyist;statestypicallydefinecontributionsandexpendituresasanythingofvalue,sodonateditems(officemachinesorspace,photocopying,theuseofpersonalvehicles,etc.)andevenvolunteeringprofessionalservicesmaycountas“in‐kind”contributionstowardagrassrootslobbyingcampaign.Severalstatesalsoexplicitlyincluderesearchexpenses,suchasopinionpolling,consultingandthelikeaspartoftheexpensesassociatedwithgrassrootslobbying.Thus,itisnotdifficultforevenadhocandinformalgrassrootsgroupstoqualifyaslobbyistsinmoststates.Forexample,theConnecticutOfficeofStateEthicsinformedtheBridgeportCatholicDiocesethatitcrossedthe$2,000thresholdforlobbyingbyprovidingbustransportationforparishionerstoattendarallyinthestatecapital.

Furthermore,inthe14statesthatdefinelobbyingasessentiallyanyattempt

toinfluencepublicofficials,itiseveneasiertocrossthelineintolobbying.Inthesestates,whichincludeFlorida,Missouri,NewYorkandWashington,justaboutanyformofparticipationinpublicdebatewillbeconsideredlobbying,aslongastheminimumthresholdismet.Andinsuchlargestates,itisdifficulttoconceiveoforganizingandmountingasuccessfulgrassrootslobbyingeffortwithoutexpendingseveralthousanddollars.Anadvertisementfeaturingasingleopenletterinamajornewspapercanbeenoughtotransformapersonintoalobbyist.

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Table 2: Thresholds for reporting grassroots lobbying activity Alabama Anyemploymentor$100inexpensesAlaska 10hoursemploymentina30dayperiodArkansas $400incompensationorexpensesina90dayperiodCalifornia $5,000incompensationorexpensesColorado AnyemploymentConnecticut $2,000incompensationorexpensesFlorida AnyemploymentGeorgia $250incompensationorexpensesHawaii 5hoursemploymentpermonthor$750inexpensesina30dayperiodIowa Anyemploymentor$1,000inexpensesIdaho $250incompensationina90dayperiodIndiana $500incompensationKansas Anyemploymentor$100inexpensesMaryland $2,000incompensationorexpensesMassachusetts $250incompensationorexpensesMinnesota $3,000incompensation,or$250inexpensesMississippi $200incompensationorexpensesMissouri AnyemploymentMontana $2,500incompensationNebraska AnyemploymentNewHampshire

Anyemployment

NewJersey $100compensationorexpensesina90dayperiodNewMexico AnyemploymentNewYork $5,000incompensationNorthCarolina $3,000incompensationorexpensesina90dayperiodNorthDakota NothresholdOregon $200incompensationorexpensesina30dayperiod(or$500in90days)Pennsylvania $2,500incompensationor20hourslobbyinginanyquarterRhodeIsland NothresholdSouthDakota AnyemploymentTennessee Anyemploymentor10dayslobbyingVirginia $500incompensationorexpensesVermont $500incompensationorexpensesWashington $500incompensationorexpensesinany30dayperiod(or$1,000in90

days)WestVirginia $200incompensationorexpensesinany30dayperiod(or$500in90

days)Wyoming AnycompensationorexpensesFederal(proposedin2007)

Federalgrassrootslobbyingproposal–$25,000perquarterincompensationorexpensesbothintendedtostimulategrassrootslobbyinganddirectedat500ormorepeople.

Note:Annualthresholds,unlessotherwiseindicated.

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Onceclassifiedasalobbyist,anindividualorgroupmustnotonlyregisterandpayalicensingfee,butmustalsosubmitperiodicreports;however,thereportingrequirementsforgrassrootslobbyingdifferdramaticallyacrossstates.Insomestatesfinancialdisclosureisminimal(e.g.,SouthDakota,whichonlyrequiresannualregistration),butinothers,grassrootslobbyistsmustfilequarterlyorevenmonthlyexpensereports,detailingthingssuchasalllegislationthatisrelevanttothegroup’sactivities,theamountsofcontributions(includingdonateditems),thenamesandaddressesofcontributorsanditemizedexpenditures.Forsophisticatedprofessionaladvocacygroups,mostofthesereportingrequirementsarelikelyjustanuisance,butforordinarycitizenstheycanbequitedaunting.

Forexample,considerthatthestateofWashington,whichthe“Campaign

DisclosureProject”recentlyawardedthehighestgradeoutofall50statesforitscampaigndisclosurelawsandpractices,17definesnolessthan11differenttypesoflobbyists.Inparticular,“grassrootslobbying”isdefinedas“aprogramaddressedtothegeneralpublic,asubstantialportionofwhichisintended,designedorcalculatedprimarilytoinfluencestatelegislation.”18Anypersonororganizationthatsponsorsgrassrootsactivitiesthatarenototherwisereportableunderoneoftheotherdefinitionsoflobbyingmustthenfileaninitialgrassrootslobbyingreportwithin30daysofinitiatinganygrassrootsactivity.Grassrootssponsorsarethenrequiredtofilemonthlyactivityreports,aswellasafinalreportoncethatparticulargrassrootscampaigniscompleted.Thesemonthlyreportsrequirethatgroupsidentifynotonlythetopiconwhichtheyarefocused,buttheactualbill,ruleorratenumber,aswellasthenamesandaddressesofallprincipalsormanagersoftheorganization.Grassrootsgroupsmustalsodisclosethenamesandaddressesofallemployeesorfirmshiredbythegroup,includingthetermsoftheircompensation.Thesemonthlyreportsalsorequirethedisclosureofcontributornamesandaddresses,aswellascontributionamounts.Finally,grassrootslobbyingorganizationsmustreportexpendituresdisaggregatedby10differentcategories,withseparateentriesforradio,televisionandprintadvertising,aswellasforsignsandmailings.

Red Tape, Compliance Costs and Legal Traps

Oneobviousproblemwithlobbyingregulationsliketheseisthattheyclearlyarenotintendedtobeunderstoodbyordinarypeople.Regulationsarewritteninlegaleseimpenetrabletomostcitizens,andinstructionsforcompletingdisclosureformscanbeintimidating,asillustratedbyMassachusetts’newlobbyinglaw(see“AmIalobbyist?Massachusettsanswers—sortof,”nextpage).ItestedthereadabilityofMassachusettsregulationspertainingtograssrootslobbyingbyrunningthetextofthefirstparagraphofthegrassrootsregulationsthroughseveraldifferentautomatedreadabilitycalculators.19Forexample,theFleschReadingEase

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AM I A LOBBYIST? MASSACHUSETTS ANSWERS—SORT OF

The Secretary of State for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is required by statute to provide training for lobbyists. Below is an excerpt from the online “educational seminar on lobbying.” This seminar is a downloadable handbook that consists of two things: (i) the verbatim text of the relevant statutes and (ii) a disclaimer that warns readers not to rely on the accuracy of the educational handbook, but to instead consult a lawyer.20

This is the first sentence of the Massachusetts lobbying handbook that relates to grassroots lobbying:

On or before the fifteenth day of July, complete from January first through June thirtieth; and the fifteenth day of January, complete from July first to December thirty-first of the preceding year, any group or organization, however constituted, not employing an executive or legislative agent which as part of an organized effort, expends in excess of two hundred and fifty dollars during any calendar year to promote, oppose, or influence legislation, or the governor’s veto or approval thereof, or to influence the decision of any officer or employee of the executive branch or an authority, including, but not limited to, statewide constitutional officers and employees thereof, where such decision concerns legislation or the adoption, defeat or postponement of a standard, rate, rule or regulation pursuant thereto, or to do any act to communicate directly with a covered executive official to influence a decision concerning policy or procurement shall register with the state secretary by rendering a statement, under oath, containing the names and addresses of the principals of such group or organization, the purposes of the organization, such aforesaid decisions of such employees of the executive branch or an authority or legislation which affects those purposes, the total amount of expenditures, incurred or paid during the reporting period in furtherance of the foregoing objectives and an itemized statement containing all expenditures made for or on behalf of statewide constitutional officers, officers and employees of such offices, members of the general court, officers and employees of the general court, officers and employees of the executive branch and officers and employees of an authority.

The penalty for running afoul of the law described by this dense text

supposedly intended to provide clarity is $10,000—per violation.

The Massachusetts Secretary of State website also provides a flowchart (next page) to help people understand whether they must register as a lobbyist. The chart, however, merely indicates the conditions under which you “may” or “may not” be required to register as a lobbyist.21

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Scoreisoneoftheoldestsuchmethodsforjudgingwhetheratextcanbecomprehendedbyadults;thesescoresrangefromzero(leastreadable)to100(mostreadable),withscoresbelow30considered“VeryConfusing.”TheGettysburgAddresshasareadabilityscoreof70;thefirstparagraphoftheMassachusettsgrassrootslobbyingtextscores0.9onthe100‐pointscale.Infact,accordingtotheAutomatedReadabilityIndexemployedbytheU.S.militaryforimprovingtechnicalmanuals,apersonwouldneed34yearsofformaleducationtounderstandthatoneparagraphongrassrootslobbying.Incontrast,theparagraphyouarereadingnowrequireslessthanacollegedegreebythesamemeasure.ThesescoresimplythatevenadoctoratefromHarvardorMIT(i.e.,20yearsofformaleducation)isnotsufficienttocomprehendgrassrootslobbyingregulationsinMassachusetts.What’sworse,consultingstateregulatorsdirectlyforclarificationsaboutwhetheryouarealobbyistmayevendomoreharmthangood.

Irecentlyconductedahighlyinformalexperimentbycontactingtherelevantregulatorybodiesintwodifferentstatestoinquirewhethertheactofsolicitingotherpersonstocontactstatelegislatorstopromoteoropposeapieceoflegislationissubjecttolobbyingregulationsinthatstate;inbothcases,thecorrectanswershouldhavebeen“yes,”atleastaccordingtotheplainlanguageoftheexistingstatelaws.Inonestate,theregulatoryofficialprovidedthecorrectanswer.ButthestaffpersonthatIwasreferredtointheotherstatesoundedlikeagameshowcontestant:“Iwouldhavetosaaaaayyyyy……No!”Anyonerelyingonsuchadvicesubsequentlycouldbefineduptoseveralthousanddollarsforviolatingthatstate’slobbyingregulations.Ifstateofficialswithresponsibilityforenforcementcanbeunclearaboutthelaw,thenwhathopedoordinarycitizenshaveinunderstandingandcomplyingwiththeseregulations?

Inearlierresearch,Iconductedaformalexperimentontheabilityof

ordinarycitizenstocomplywithstatedisclosureformsforgrassrootsgroupsthatadvocatefororagainstballotmeasures;theresultsofthatworkaredescribedinCampaignFinanceRedTape:StranglingFreeSpeechandPoliticalDebate,whichwaspublishedbytheInstituteforJusticein2007.22Becausethedisclosurelawsforgrassrootslobbyistsaresimilarinmanyrespectstothoseforpoliticalcommitteesexaminedinmyearlierresearch,severallessonsfromthatworkapplyhereaswell.

Inthe“redtape”study,Ipresented255peoplewithasimplescenarioof

grassrootspoliticalactivitiesrelatedtosupportingaballotmeasure(organizingneighbors,makingplacards,holdingarally,etc.),andthenaskedthemtocompleteactualstatedisclosureformsforballotcommitteesinCalifornia,ColoradoorMissouri.Whiletheseformsarenotidenticaltolobbyingdisclosureforms,theyareequallyunfamiliartomostpeople.Inbothcases,ordinarycitizensareunlikelytobeawareoftheexistenceofsuchlaws,letalonehaveanyexperiencewithcompliance.Further,thelegaljargonrelatingtopoliticalexpenditures,contributionsandin‐kind

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contributionsiscommontobothcases,asistheintimidatingstatutorylanguageandterseinstructionsforindividualswhomustcomplywiththeselaws.

Subjectswererecruitedfrommychurchandlocalneighborhood,from

universityadministrativestaff,graduatestudentsinpoliticalscienceandpublicaffairs,aswellasafewgraduatingseniorsattheUniversityofMissouri.Inordertoencouragesubjectstomakeagoodeffortatcomplyingwiththedisclosureregulations,theywerepaidnotonlyforparticipation,butcouldlosesomeofthatmoneyforeacherrorthattheymade.Thesubjectsweregiven90minutestocompletetheexercise,althoughsomequitinfrustrationwellbeforetimewasup.

Thefirstlessonfromthered‐tapeexperimentwasthatmorethan90

percentoftheparticipantshadnoideathattheyhadtoregisterwiththestateinordertoengageinpoliticalspeech;thereislittledoubtthatmostpeoplearesimilarlyignorantaboutgrassrootslobbyingrestrictions.Consequently,inmoststates,assoonasordinarycitizensdecidetoengageingrassrootsactivity,theyarelikelytoviolatestatelawsoutofsheerignorance.

Oncesubjectswereinformedabouttheexistenceofregistrationand

disclosurelaws,theywerepresentedwithasimplehypotheticalscenarioofagroupofneighborsorganizinganinformalrallyagainstalocalballotmeasure.Thesubjectswerethenaskedtofillouttherequiredpaperworkforthisgroup;thescenarioincludedonepurchaseofaprintadvertisement,thepurchaseanddistributionofT‐shirtswithpoliticalslogans,thedistributionofhome‐madesignsandatotaloftencontributionsofvaryingsizes.Theresultswerenotpretty.

InTable3,Ilistdisclosuretasksrequiredforgrassrootslobbyinginthestate

ofWashingtonalongsidesimilartasksrequiredbyCalifornialawthatwereexaminedinthedisclosureexperiment.InthelastcolumnofTable3,IreportthepercentagesofexperimentalsubjectsthatcouldactuallyperformthosetasksusingtheCaliforniaforms.Nearlyallthesubjectsincorrectlyhandledalarge(illegal)anonymouscontribution,whilemostneverrecognizedthatnon‐monetarydonationswerealsosupposedtobetreatedascontributionstotheirgroup.However,manysubjectscouldnotevencorrectlyaccountfordirectcashcontributionsandexpendituresbecausetheysimplycouldnotunderstandorfollowthecomplicatedformsandinstructions.SubjectsfaredslightlybetteratthesetaskswhengivendisclosureformsforColoradoandMissouri,butoverall,subjectswereonlyabletocompleteabout40percentoftheassignedtasks.Noonereceivedaperfectscore.

Theresultsofthisexperimentunambiguouslyrevealthatsubjects,regardlessofageoreducationalattainment,weresimplyflummoxedwhenconfrontedwithreal‐lifedisclosureformsandinstructions.Ialsooffered

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participantsintheexperimenttheopportunitytowriteabriefcommentabouttheirexperience.Notsurprisingly,manysubjectsexpressedfrustration,callingtheprocess“confusing,”“ridiculous”and“worsethantheIRS!”Severalsaidtheywouldneedalawyertocompletetheforms,includingthelawyerwhoparticipatedintheexperiment.Finally,nearly90percentoftheparticipantsagreedthatthespecterofcomplicatedredtapeandlegalpenaltieswoulddeterordinarycitizensfrompoliticalactivity.

Table 3: Disclosure tasks for grassroots lobbying and the compliance experiment

Tasksrequiredbystatedisclosureregulations

Grassrootslobbying(Washingtonstate)

Ballotcommittees(California)

Complianceexperiment(%correct)

Requiredtoregister Ifspending$500inonemonthor$1,000inthreemonths

Ifreceiving$1,000inanycalendaryear

7%

Reportexpenditures Ineachoftencategories

Itemizeifover$100 49%

Reportmonetarycontributions Itemizeifover$25 Itemizeifover$100 56%

Reportnon‐monetarycontributions Itemizeifover$25 Itemizeifover$100 18%

Anonymouscontributions Prohibitedover$25 Prohibitedover$100 2%

Notes:PercentofsubjectscorrectlyreportingcontributionsandexpendituresistheaveragescoreforeachtypeoftaskforsubjectsusingCaliforniaforms(scoresareadjustedforsubjectcharacteristicstoreflecttheperformanceofanon‐studentregisteredvoterwithacollegeeducation).

Asidefromthesecompliancecosts,grassrootslobbyingregulationsset

numeroustrapsforhaplesscitizensthatseektoexercisetheirconstitutionalrights.Itstrainscredulitytothinkthatordinarycitizenswouldhavethefaintestideathattheyshouldregisterwiththestateandconsultalawyerbeforespeakingtofellowcitizensaboutpublicissues.Second,myreadingoftherulesforeverystatethatregulatesgrassrootslobbyingconfirmsthattheselawsareascomplexasthoseforballotmeasuredisclosure;itissimplyinconceivablethattheseregulationswerewritteninamannerintendedtobeaccessibletoanordinarycitizen.Itseemsclearthattheimplicitassumptionbehindtheselawsisthatpoliticsisfor“professionalsonly.”23Third,severalstatesrequirethatlobbyistsregisterpriortoengaginginanygrassrootsactivities(whichcanincluderesearchorotherpreparationcosts).Combinethiswiththeoverbroaddefinitionsoflobbyinginmoststatesanditiseasy

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Table 4: Examples of penalties related to grassroots lobbying MaximumadministrativeandcivilfinesState

Latereports OtherviolationsMaximumcriminal

penalties

Alabama $10,000 $30,000and20yearsAlaska $10/day $1,000and1yearArkansas $25‐$200/day $1,000 $1,000and1yearColorado $10/day $5,000and1yearConnecticut $10,000 Hawaii $2,000perviolation Idaho $2,500and6monthsIndiana $100 $100forlate

reports$500and3years

Kansas $5,000 $1,000and6monthsMassachusetts $100/day $10,000and5yearsMinnesota $100perviolation $3,000and1yearMissouri $5,000and4yearsMississippi $5,000and3yearsMontana $2,500perviolation NorthCarolina $5,000perviolation 6monthsNorthDakota $1,000and30daysNebraska $750perreport NewJersey $1,000perviolation NewMexico $50/day $5,000 NewYork $50,000 $5,000and4yearsPennsylvania $50/day $2,000perviolation $25,000RhodeIsland $2,000 $10,000Tennessee $2,000 $10,000 $2,500and1yearVirginia $2,500and10yearsVermont $4,175 $10,000per

violation

WestVirginia $5,000perviolation Washington $10,000 Federalproposal(2007)

$100,000

Notes:Thislistisnotexhaustive,butrepresentsonlythosepenaltiesthatarereadilyidentifiablefromstatestatutesandregulations.

toseehowordinarycitizensmightrunafouloflobbyinglawsthattheydidnotknowexistedandcannotunderstandanyway.

Notonlyisiteasyforordinarycitizenstoviolatelobbyingdisclosurelawsbyengagingingrassrootslobbying,thepenaltiesfordoingsocanbequitesevere,asshowninTable4.Whilesomestatessetamaximumforlatefeesandfines,severaldonot.Butwhatshouldbemostdisconcertingisthatmanystatesallowfinestobeleviedonaperviolationbasis;givenmultipleandcomplicatedreports,itiseasyfor

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suchfinestomountquickly.Inaddition,severalstatesimposecriminalpenaltiesfordisclosureviolations,rangingashighas20yearsinprisoninAlabamaforintentionalmisreporting.Finally,severalstatesalsobanlobbyistsfrommakingcampaigncontributions,sosomeoneengagingingrassrootslobbyingcannotonlyviolatelobbyingrules,butcampaignfinancelawsaswell.

Unintended Consequences of Lobbying Disclosure

Thecostsofdisclosurelawsarenotlimitedtothehassle,frustrationandpenaltiesassociatedwithredtaperequirements.Theexistenceofoverbroadandvagueregulationsonpoliticalactivities,coupledwithsteepcivilandcriminalpenalties,isaninvitationforabuseatthehandsofunethicalandpartisanregulators,astheplightofReverendLoriinConnecticutillustrates(seepage5).Furthermore,lobbyingdisclosurerequirementsignoretheimportantandlong‐acceptedroleofanonymityinpublicdebate.

Itseemsunlikelythatknowledgeaboutwhocontributed$20toagrassroots

campaignisofmuchbenefittothepublic,especiallycomparedtothecostsimposedonthosewhowishtospeakout.Infact,thereisgoodreasontobeskepticalabouttheefficacyofdisclosurelaws;inarecentexaminationofmandatorydisclosurelawsinballot‐initiativecampaigns,DickCarpenterfindslittleevidencethatvotersmakeuseofmandatorydisclosure.24Forexample,arepresentativesurveyofcitizensinsixstateswithballotinitiativesrevealsthatonlyabout27percentofrespondentsclaimthattheysoughtoutinformationondonorstopoliticalcampaigns,andfewerthanhalfexpressedmuchawarenessoftheleadingdonorstoballotmeasurecampaigns.Theseself‐reportsbysurveyrespondentsarealsoconsistentwithcontentanalysesofcampaignmaterialsandnewscoverageofcampaignsthatfindfewinformationsourcesavailabletovoters—namelynewspapersandothermedia—makeuseofmandatorydisclosureofcontributoridentitieseither.25

Carpenteralsofindsthatupwardsof80percentofrespondentsbelievethat

mandatorydisclosureisacceptablewhenappliedtoothers,butonly40percentsupportsuchlawswhenframedasapplyingtothemselves.Infact,whensuchdisclosurelawsaredescribedasalsorequiringrespondentstodivulgetheiremployer’sname,supportformandatorydisclosurefallstojust25percent.Giventhisdiscomfortfordisclosingpersonalinformation,itisnotsurprisingthatabout60percentofthesurveyrespondentsalsoagreethatthepresenceofmandatorydisclosurelawswouldbeadeterrenttotheirownpoliticalactivity.Thereasonsgivenbyrespondentsincludeadesiretoremainanonymous,fearofharassmentandprivacyconcerns.

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THINKING ABOUT GETTING INVOLVED? DON’T DO THE CRIME IF YOU CAN’T DO THE TIME

Failure to properly disclose grassroots lobbying activity is punishable by administrative fines, suspension of lobbying privileges and in some states even criminal penalties. For example, in the following states, disclosure violations for grassroots lobbying carry the same maximum criminal penalty as:

North Dakota Driving under the influence $1,000 and 30 days in jail

Tennessee Negligently discharging raw sewage into public

waterways $500 and 6 months in jail

Indiana Receiving stolen property

$500 and 3 years in jail

Minnesota Repeated assault against the same person $3,000 and 1 year in jail

Missouri Sexual misconduct with a minor

$5,000 and 4 years in jail New York Arson or riot

$5,000 and 4 years n jail Massachusetts Maintaining a house of prostitution

$10,000 and 5 years in jail Virginia Hit and run resulting in serious injury or death

$2,500 and 10 years in jail Alabama Kidnapping

$30,000 and 20 years in jail

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Thesefindingsunderscoretheshallownessofpopularsupportfordisclosureregulationsintheabstract,andtheveryrealdiscomfortthatmanypeoplehavewithhavingtheirownpoliticalactivitiesannouncedinpublic.Consequently,concernsthatmandatorydisclosuremayhaveachillingeffectongrassrootspoliticalactivityarewell‐founded.So,whilemandatorydisclosureappliedtograssrootslobbyingcampaignsatbestsatisfiesthecuriosityofafewpoliticaljunkies,italsoatworstempowerstheenemiesoffreeandopendebatetomakecrediblethreatsofretaliationagainstunpopularvoices.

Grassroots Lobbying Versus “Astroturf Lobbying”

Criticsofgrassrootslobbyingoftenusethedisparagingterm“Astroturflobbying”toimplythatsomegrassrootseffortsare“inauthentic,”butwhenitcomestosuchcharges,authenticityisintheeyeofthebeholder.WhetheritisgrassrootsactivismdirectedattheIraqwar,healthinsurancereform,campaignfinancereformorjustaboutanyotherissue,antagonistsonbothsidesoftheissuetrytounderminethecredibilityoftheiropponentsbyexaggeratingtheextenttowhichpublicconcernontheothersideis“artificially”stimulated.26Forthisreason,attemptstocurbso‐calledAstroturflobbyingthroughincreasedstateandfederalregulationsandevenpublic“outing”andshamingofaccusedringleadersmustbetreatedwithhealthyskepticism.

Itiseasytounderstandwhyincumbentpoliticiansandpartisansattemptto

dismissdemonstrationsofcontraryviewsasinsincereandillegitimate:pureself‐preservation.Hardertofathomiswhysomanyprogressive‐mindedandself‐described“goodgovernment”reformersareoftenfoundonthefrontlinesseekingtocurbgrassrootslobbying.Suchactionsbetrayafundamentalmisunderstanding,sincetheveryideathatcoordinationandleadershipmakesapopularmovementsuspectfliesinthefaceofdecadesofpoliticalscienceresearchonpoliticalentrepreneurshipandcollectiveaction.

Inthecaseofactualfraud,thedistinctionbetween“authentic”and

“inauthentic”politicalpressuremakessense,butbeyondthatthedistinctionbecomesmeaningless.Forexample,iflegislatorsreceivefraudulentmessagesfromasinglesourceposingasmultipleconstituents,suchanactivitydoesnotrepresentpublicsentiment,regardlessofhowitwasstimulated.Ofcourse,itisnotnecessarytoregulategrassrootslobbyinginordertodetersuchfraud.Lawsforbiddingidentitytheft,fraudorfalsestatementstogovernmentofficials,aswellasthepossibilityofdiscoveryandtheattendantharmtothesource’scause,shouldkeepthispractice,evenwhenitisnotobvious,toaminimum.

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Evenso,actualinstancesoffraudulentlobbyingappeartobeextremelyrareandeasilydiscovered,whileaccusationsofAstroturflobbyingareubiquitous.Thisisbecause“Astroturf”lobbyingisnearlyalwaysusedtorefertoinstancesofcitizenlobbyingthathavesomehowbeeninducedbytheparticipationofanadvocacygroup,lobbyist,publicrelationsfirmorsomeother“artificialmeans.”Thisjaundicedviewdeniestheimportantrolethatpoliticalentrepreneursplayinfosteringgrassrootsactivism,whileatthesametimedisparagingthecompetenceandautonomyofpeoplewhochoosetojoinsuchgrassrootscampaigns.Butmorethanthis,thenotionthatgrassrootscampaignsarelegitimateonlyiftheyareunsophisticatedandamateurishisakintosaying,“Youhavetherighttopetition,justaslongasyou’renottooeffectiveatit.”

Conclusion

Thetwopillarsofrepresentativedemocracyarefreeandopenelectionsandfreeandopendebate.PopularpoliticalparticipationissofundamentaltoAmericandemocracythattheBillofRightsenshrinescitizens’rightstospeech,associationandpetitionintheFirstAmendmenttotheConstitution.EveryschoolchildistaughtthatAmericaisgreatbecausecitizensspeakoutonissuesofpublicconcernandbringtheirargumentsdirectlytopoliticians.Infact,manyprobablystillrecalltheclassic1975“SchoolhouseRock!”segmentonhowabillbecomesalaw(“I’mJustaBill”),inwhichlegislationrequiringschoolbusestostopatrailroadcrossingsstartswith“justanidea”untilsome“folksbackhome”decidetheywantalawpassedandcontacttheircongressman.Buttoday,shouldyoudecidetoexerciseyourrightsasanAmericanwithonlycivicslessonsandtheBillofRightsasyourguide,beware.

Therightsofcitizenstoparticipateintheirgovernmenthavebeenerodedto

thepointthatevenprofessionalpoliticiansandlobbyistsoftenmustrelyonastaffofdedicatedlegalexpertstonavigatethemazeoffederalandstateregulationsthatnowgovernpublicdiscourse.RegulationofgrassrootsactivisminthestatesstandsinstarkcontrasttothebasicprincipleaffirmedintherecentlydecidedCitizensUnitedv.FederalElectionCommission:

TheFirstAmendmentdoesnotpermitlawsthatforcespeakerstoretainacampaignfinanceattorney…orseekdeclaratoryrulingsbeforediscussingthemostsalientpoliticalissuesofourday.Prolixlawschillspeechforthesamereasonthatvaguelawschillspeech:People“ofcommonintelligencemustnecessarilyguessat[thelaw’s]meaninganddifferastoitsapplication.”27Nevertheless,undertheguiseofpreservingtheintegrityofdemocracy,

misguidedpopulistsandcynicallyself‐interestedpoliticianshavesuccessfully

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pushedforcampaignfinanceandlobbyingdisclosureregulationsthatactuallyhinderpoliticalcompetitionamongbothcandidatesandideas.

Perhapsthemostdisturbingaspectofrecentreformsistheardorwith

whichso‐calledreformersseektocontrolandlimitgrassrootslobbying.Therecentpushtoexpandthereachoflobbyingregulationsintothepublicsquarehasledtothepassageofoverlybroadandvaguestatelawsthatmakeapotentialcriminaloffenseoutofjustaboutanythingacitizenmightdotoparticipatemeaningfullyinpolitics.Andjustasthestatesareconsideringreformstofurther“reinin”grassrootslobbying,thefederalgovernmentmaywellfollowsuit.Althoughthe2007proposaltoregulateanyonespending$25,000inaquarterforthepurposeof“stimulating”grassrootslobbyingfailedtopassCongress,so‐calledreformerscontinuetopressforregulation.Giventhetenorofcurrentdebatesoverhealthreformandcap‐and‐trade,andthedisturbinglyblithemannerwithwhichmanypoliticiansdismisspopularconcernas“manufactured”opinion,itseemsasafebetthatfederalgrassrootslobbyingwillagainbeonthecongressionalagenda.

Butregulationofgrassrootspoliticalactivityputsordinarycitizensatriskof

legalentrapment,leavesdisfavoredgroupsopentoabusefrompartisanregulatorsandrobsunpopularspeakersoftheprotectivebenefitsofanonymousspeech.Worstofall,theseveryrealcostscomewithoutanyrealpublicbenefit.Electedofficialswoulddobettertolistentoconstituentconcernsordebateideasintheopen,astheframersoftheFirstAmendmentintended,ratherthanmowingdownthegrassrootswithregulation.

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Endnotes 1www.acluva.org/pages/grassrootslobbyform.html.2Thepoliticalscienceliteraturealsosupportsthenotionthatgrassrootslobbyingcaninfluencepolicy,althoughtheconcernisthatthepresenceof“reversecausality”mayexaggeratetheperceivedeffectofgrassrootslobbying.Inotherwords,becausepeoplearemorelikelytojoinandactivelyparticipateinpowerfulgroups,thetrueimpactofgrassrootslobbyingislessthanwouldbecommonlyperceived.However,recentfieldexperimentsconfirmthepotentiallylargeimpactofgrassrootslobbyingonstatelegislators(Bergen,DanielE.,2009.“DoesGrassrootsLobbyingWork?”AFieldExperimentMeasuringtheEffectsofane‐MailLobbyingCampaignonLegislativeBehavior,”AmericanPoliticsResearch,37(2):327‐352).3http://www.cfainc.org/articles/legislative/grass‐roots‐lobbying.html.4http://www.nvfc.org/page/684/Volunteer_Fire_Service_Advocacy_Center.htm.5E.g.,Hayek,FriedrichA.1960.TheConstitutionofLiberty.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.6Carney,Timothy.“Connecticutuseslobbyinglawstomuzzlepriests,”WashingtonExaminer,July9,2009,viewedat:http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/politics/Connecticut‐uses‐lobbying‐laws‐to‐muzzle‐priests‐‐47458612.html.Dixon,Ken.“ThousandsinHartfordtoProtestBill,”ConnecticutPostOnline,March11,2009,viewedat:http://www.ctpost.com/default/article/Thousands‐in‐Hartford‐to‐protest‐bill‐114166.php.“GrassrootsLobbyingtoProtecttheSeparationofChurchandState,”HoltzmanVogelLawandPolicyUpdate,Summer2009,viewedat:http://www.holtzmanlaw.net/upload_files/Law%20&%20Policy%20Update%20‐%20Summer%202009.pdf.“ThankYou!CatholicsacrosstheStateofConnecticutmobilizeanddefeattheirrational,unlawful,andbigotedProposedBill#1098,”RomanCatholicDioceseofBridgeport,viewedat:http://www.bridgeportdiocese.com/Fight_1098.shtml.

7E.g.,Olson,Mancur,1965.TheLogicofCollectiveAction:PublicGoodsandtheTheoryofGroups.HarvardUniversityPress.8Denzau,ArthurandMichaelMunger,1986.“LegislatorsandInterestGroups;HowUnorganizedInterestsGetRepresented,”AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,80(1):89‐106.9UnitedStatesv.Hariss,347U.S.612(1954)andEasternRailroadsPresidentConferencev.NoerrMotorFreight,Inc.365U.S.127.10Alsosee,Maskell,Jack,2008.“GrassrootsLobbying:ConstitutionalityofDisclosureRequirements,”CongressionalResearchService(updated),RL33794.

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11RhodeIslandGen.Laws1956,§22‐10.12RCW42.17.010(10).13Primo,DavidandJeffreyMilyo,2006.“CampaignFinanceLawsandPoliticalEfficacy:EvidencefromtheStates,”ElectionLawJournal,5(1):23‐39.14Thomasv.Collins,323U.S.516(1945);NAACPv.Alabama,357U.S.449(1958);Talleyv.California,362U.S.60(1960);andMcIntyrev.OhioElectionsCommission,514U.S.334(1995).15Iclassifystatesthatregulategrassrootslobbyingbasedontheplaintextofexistingstatestatutes.Forexample,bystatute,Alaskadefineslobbyingascommunicatingwithpublicofficialseitherdirectlyorthroughanagent(AS24.45.171(11)(A));further,thedefinitionofpaymentsorexpendituresforlobbyingincludes“thecostofsolicitingorurgingotherpersonstoenterintodirectcommunicationwithalegislatororotherpublicofficial…”(AS24.45.171(13)(E)).Therefore,IclassifyAlaskaamongthosestatesthatregulategrassrootslobbying.However,enforcementofsuchprovisionsisalwayssubjecttothediscretionofstateregulators,socurrentpracticemaynotbeconsistentwiththetextofstatelawsinanygivenstateandatanygiventime.16http://www.creators.com/opinion/jacob‐sullum/astroturf‐and‐sunlight.html.17http://www.campaigndisclosure.org/gradingstate/wa.html.18“LobbyistReporting:January2009InstructionManual,”WashingtonStatePublicDisclosureCommission.19Onlinereadabilitycalculatorsareavailablefromseveralsources;fortheexamplesinthetext,Iusedtheautomatedcalculatorfoundat:www.editcentral.com.20RegisteredlobbyistsinMassachusettsarerequiredtocompletean“onlineLobbyistEducationalSeminar”asindicatedhere:http://www.sec.state.ma.us/LobbyistWeb/Common/Signin.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2fLobbyistWeb%2fdefault.aspx.However,theso‐callededucationalseminarconsistsofsimplythetextofthelobbyingstatuteitself(M.G.L.Chapter3:sections39‐50),albeitprecededbythisdisclaimer:“ThisEducationalSeminarisapresentationoftheMassachusettslobbyinglawanditsrequirements.ItisnotmeanttoserveasanadvisoryopinionorasasubstituteforanofficialeditionoftheMassachusettsGeneralLawsortheadviceofcounsel.”http://www.sec.state.ma.us/pre/prepdf/OnlineSeminar_V1.pdf.Inotherwords,theSecretaryofStatewillnotevencommittocutting‐and‐pastingthetextofthelawcorrectly.21Flowchartavailableathttp://www.sec.state.ma.us/pre/prepdf/areyoulobbying.pdf.22Milyo,Jeffrey,2007.“Campaign‐FinanceRedTape:StranglingFreeSpeechandPoliticalDebate,”InstituteforJustice(Washington,D.C.).

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23Carpenter,Dick,JeffreyMilyo,andJohnK.Ross,2009.“PoliticsforProfessionals,”Engage:TheJournaloftheFederalistSocietyPracticeGroups,10(3):80‐85.24Carpenter,DickM.,2009.“MandatoryDisclosureforBallot‐InitiativeCampaigns,”TheIndependentReview,13(4):567‐583.25InadditiontoCarpenter(2009),see:LaRaja,RaymondJ.,2007.“SunshineLawsandthePress:TheEffectofCampaignDisclosureonNewsReportingintheAmericanStates,”ElectionLawJournal,6(3):236‐250.26E.g.,Pulizzi,Henry,2009.“WhiteHouseNotConcernedHealth‐careProtestsWillDerailReform,”DowJonesNewswire,August4,2009,viewedat:http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/stock‐market‐news‐story.aspx?storyid=200908041043dowjonesdjonline000465&title=white‐house‐not‐concerned‐health‐care‐protests‐will‐derail‐reform.27(558U.S.___2010;slipopinionp.7).

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR JEFFREY MILYO, PH.D. JeffreyMilyoistheHannaFamilyScholarintheCenterforAppliedEconomicsattheUniversityofKansasSchoolofBusiness;aprofessorinthedepartmentofeconomicsandtheTrumanSchoolofPublicAffairsattheUniversityofMissouri;aseniorfellowattheCatoInstituteandanacademicadvisortotheCenterforCompetitivePolitics.MilyopreviouslywasonthefacultyattheUniversityofChicagoandatTuftsUniversity;hehasalsobeenavisitingscholarattheMassachusettsInstituteforTechnology,StanfordUniversity,WashingtonUniversityinSt.LouisandYaleUniversity.

Dr.Milyo’sresearchexpertiseisinAmericanpoliticaleconomicsandpublicpolicy;hehasbeenstudyingthefieldofpoliticalcampaignfinancefor18years.Milyo’sworkhasbeenpublishedinseveralleadingscholarlyjournals,suchatheAmericanEconomicReview,theQuarterlyJournalofEconomics,theJournalofLawandEconomics,theJournalofPolicyAnalysisandManagement,ElectionLawJournal,PublicChoice,andStatePoliticsandPolicyQuarterly.Inaddition,hisscholarlyresearchhasbeenrecognizedandsupportedbytheNationalScienceFoundationandtheRobertWoodJohnsonFoundation.Dr.Milyo’sresearchisalsofrequentlycitedinthenationalmedia,includingTheNewYorkTimes,TheWashingtonPost,LosAngelesTimes,ChicagoTribune,USAToday,BusinessWeek,NationalReview,TheWeeklyStandard,CNN,FOXNewsandNationalPublicRadio.

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE TheInstituteforJusticeisanonprofit,publicinterestlawfirmthatlitigatestosecureeconomicliberty,schoolchoice,privatepropertyrights,freedomofspeechandothervitalindividuallibertiesandtorestoreconstitutionallimitsonthepowerofgovernment.Foundedin1991,IJisthenation’sonlylibertarianpublicinterestlawfirm,pursuingcutting‐edgelitigationinthecourtsoflawandinthecourtofpublicopiniononbehalfofindividualswhosemostbasicrightsaredeniedbythegovernment.TheInstitute’sstrategicresearchprogramproduceshigh‐qualityresearchtoinformpublicpolicydebatesonissuescentraltoIJ’smission.